6. Previous TAP report findings
• Potential events not identified and mapped to capabilities (controls)
• Linkages across to-from other PHMPs / PCPs
• Risk assessments (or process) of determining adequacy requirements
• Rescue, Fire, Medical & Hazmat (equipment, capability and personnel)
• Self Rescuer / escape equipment
• Clearly identifying the controls needed, and those considered and not adopted & why
• Consultation is generally inadequate
• RA score validity – particularly exposure to irrespirable atmosphere
• Transition from prescriptive requirements
7. Previous TAP report findings
• Installation standards not adhered to:
• Life lines & signage, fire fighting installations
• Unrealistic maintenance of competency
• Medical, rescue equipment, fire fighting and Incident Managers
• Spread of capabilities (maintaining effective coverage)
• Maintaining effective coverage across shifts
• Familiarisations – random
• Testing – random (workforce & management teams)
8. Previous TAP report findings
• Self escape expectations for general workforce (distances & hydration)
• Firefighting strategies & abilities – not mapped to threat
• Firefighting PPE – consideration & options
• Safety management system inhibitors for external notifications
9. Previous TAP report
findings
• Good worker awareness of
escape routes & self-rescue
equipment
• Established emergency response
equipment was generally well
maintained
9
10. Key focus areas
Self escape system
Emergency response capabilities
Incident management capabilities
12. Self Rescuers
• “provided with an appropriate self-rescuer”
• “ must conduct a risk assessment to
determine whether self-contained self-
rescuers should be provided”
• “procedures, so far as is reasonably
practicable, for rehydration and
communication in an irrespirable
atmosphere”
13. Hydration
13
• Expectations of workers – worst case
scenarios: how far, how long
• Heat and humidity (rest and….)
• Panic and disorientation
14. Daniel Rockhouse
2 seconds from bang to zero
visibility
• Burning eyes
• Cant see hand in front of face
• Confusion
• Breathing from airline
• Couldn’t get self rescuer working
• Helping another on way out
• No one waiting at portal
www.stuff.co.nz
15. Egress & Lifelines
• Do they do what they are meant to
• Are they installed to standard
• Maintenance
• Trafficability in poor conditions
18. Site medical capabilities
• Golden hour – c1975
• based on traumatic injury
outcomes research
• State rescue policy breaks down
response times, with 60 mins being
the remote/very remote objective.
quora.com
21. Incident management capabilities
• Training in roles and testing whole
system
• Notifications are critical
• Ready for reality? –
Family/Media/Agencies
• Learning under pressure is a big ask
22. External agencies – consultation & response
• All coal mines - Cl89 WHS(MPS)
Regulation
• NSW Rescue and Emergency
Management arrangements
• Underground coal environment makes it
even more critical
25. AIIMS training & structures
Loy Yang Mine now has
• 17 Level 2 Incident Controllers
• 9 Liaison Officers trained
Emergency Management Lessons
25
CIMS training & structures
Emergency Services integrated
throughout planning and training
26. • NSW Emergency Management principles:
• Prevention, Preparedness, Response and Recovery.
• The all agencies, all hazards approach.
HOWEVER:
26
NSW Emergency and Rescue arrangements
and themes within the inquiries
27. [The emergency plan] did not adequately contemplate a catastrophic event
underground…….
…minimal emergency exercises and no practices that simulated emergency
conditions.
27Pike River Royal Commission
28. “The lack of formal arrangements and training with other agencies for
dealing with a large-scale emergency at an underground coal mine impacted
badly on the emergency operation”
28Pike River Royal Commission
29. “The plan should be capable of seamless integration with emergency
services.”
29Pike River Royal Commission
30. • Engineering disciplines all have forums
and collaboration opportunities.
• EMP is the end point in planning –
consequence management across all
hazards
• Significant focus in WHS
• Complex linkages across EM framework
Emergency Engineering?
30
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