This document analyzes fire incident data on mobile plant from July 2014 to March 2019. It shows trends in fires by month, quarter, sector, and potential heat and fuel sources. Investigation findings identify failures to identify risks, implement safe work systems, properly supervise work, provide adequate training, and use fit-for-purpose equipment. Recommendations focus on risk assessment, supervision, training, equipment design, and procedures to prevent fires during refueling. Specific case studies on refueling truck and grader fires provide additional investigation findings and recommendations.
The death of a truck operator in the USA in 2018 at a Peabody mine as a result of a fire highlights the importance of installing fire suppression systems. Firestorm has been involved in the world's largest retrofit of fire supression systems on buses. While buses may be considered simple for fire protection versus a mining machine, buses can carry up to 100 passengers and typically there is a lack of mechanical protection with the majority of the body made of fibreglass, wood and plastics that burn very quickly and are highly toxic. The risk for multiple deaths is therefore a much higher factor compared with a mining machine with one operator. The risk assessment required in AS5062-2016 needs to consider the egress paths available for an operator/passenger to safely evacuate the machine and consideration for actuators and fire extinguishers along this path.
Changes to laws in 2016 required the removal of PFAS and PFOS in both Queensland and South Australia with penalties noe effective for non-compliance. Several NSW mines have been put on notice by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to prevent further contamination of waterways. Firestorm is now moving away from exposing our own people to PFAS/PFOS systems to ensure we are providing best practice even though laws are not yet in place for NSW. This presentation looks at what it means if you choose to move away from PFAS/PFOS systems.
Clint has experienced the evolution of workers' personal risk management from being self-managed to a prescribed personal risk assessment process and company risk management. This has gone from a process not involving or understood by the worker to a prescribed process with the worker having direct involvement and influence in managing hazards at a mine.
The NSW Resources Regulator is committed to supporting the health and safety of those working in the mining industry through the development and distribution of relevant and flexible learning and development programs.
As part of our commitment, we have collaborated to develop three flexible learning programs that specifically incorporate the findings from investigations and independent reviews of mining incidents that have involved multiple fatalities or where the circumstances that occurred presented a significant risk of death to workers or the wider community.
The case studies selected have been deliberately designed to represent all mining contexts. This is to reinforce to the industry that the risk of fatalities occurs in all parts of the mining industry, which requires everyone to remain vigilant and proactive. For this reason, learning from disasters has been directly integrated into the requirements to maintain competence, where relevant, as part of the maintenance of competence scheme for practising certificates.
Learning from experience, preventing devastating reoccurrences and improving the health and safety of all working in this industry is a profound way of acknowledging and recognising all those who have been affected by mining safety incidents throughout history.
The death of a truck operator in the USA in 2018 at a Peabody mine as a result of a fire highlights the importance of installing fire suppression systems. Firestorm has been involved in the world's largest retrofit of fire supression systems on buses. While buses may be considered simple for fire protection versus a mining machine, buses can carry up to 100 passengers and typically there is a lack of mechanical protection with the majority of the body made of fibreglass, wood and plastics that burn very quickly and are highly toxic. The risk for multiple deaths is therefore a much higher factor compared with a mining machine with one operator. The risk assessment required in AS5062-2016 needs to consider the egress paths available for an operator/passenger to safely evacuate the machine and consideration for actuators and fire extinguishers along this path.
Changes to laws in 2016 required the removal of PFAS and PFOS in both Queensland and South Australia with penalties noe effective for non-compliance. Several NSW mines have been put on notice by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to prevent further contamination of waterways. Firestorm is now moving away from exposing our own people to PFAS/PFOS systems to ensure we are providing best practice even though laws are not yet in place for NSW. This presentation looks at what it means if you choose to move away from PFAS/PFOS systems.
Clint has experienced the evolution of workers' personal risk management from being self-managed to a prescribed personal risk assessment process and company risk management. This has gone from a process not involving or understood by the worker to a prescribed process with the worker having direct involvement and influence in managing hazards at a mine.
The NSW Resources Regulator is committed to supporting the health and safety of those working in the mining industry through the development and distribution of relevant and flexible learning and development programs.
As part of our commitment, we have collaborated to develop three flexible learning programs that specifically incorporate the findings from investigations and independent reviews of mining incidents that have involved multiple fatalities or where the circumstances that occurred presented a significant risk of death to workers or the wider community.
The case studies selected have been deliberately designed to represent all mining contexts. This is to reinforce to the industry that the risk of fatalities occurs in all parts of the mining industry, which requires everyone to remain vigilant and proactive. For this reason, learning from disasters has been directly integrated into the requirements to maintain competence, where relevant, as part of the maintenance of competence scheme for practising certificates.
Learning from experience, preventing devastating reoccurrences and improving the health and safety of all working in this industry is a profound way of acknowledging and recognising all those who have been affected by mining safety incidents throughout history.
Glencore Coal Assets Australia has grown to be the largest coal producer in Australia with open cut and underground mines spread throughout NSW and Queensland. Glencore has very high regard for engineering and has sponsored the development of statutory mechanical engineers in NSW for more than a decade. This presentation looks at where Glencore stands in relation to safety and engineering, how this is managed within Glencore Coal, and some of the key challenges, direction and lessons.
This presentation outlines the approach taken by EnviroMist, in partnership with the University of Wollongong, to develop effective dust suppression systems for the mining industry.
A thorough approach using real-time dust monitoring, airspeed monitoring and material testing will be presented as the first step to define a dust problem. Following that, the use of modeling techniques such as CFD and DEM in combination with laboratory test data allows for the variables defining a problem to be investigated.
Finally, a solution can be proposed that is specific to the conditions of the application, based on the data collected and the results predicted from the simulation modelling. The presentation includes various case studies which demonstrate the effectiveness of this approach.
Code of Practice
C.O.P # 01
Fire Prevention Requirements
(Management of Combustible Materials & Electrical Inspections)
Table of Content
1. Fire Prevention and Combustible Material Management 3
2. Standards & Requirements for Combustible Stores and Temporary Structures 7
3. Fire Prevent Inspection Schedule 10
4. Fire Prevent Inspection Report 11
5. Fire Prevention Checklist 12
6. Office Porta cabin Inspection 18
7. Store Inspection 19
8. Electrical Inspections and Fire Safety 20
1. Fire Prevention and Combustible Material Management
Introduction
Fire is chemical reaction of three elements (fuel, heat and oxygen) if we remove 1 element, fire will end. Fire is a major risk both to persons and to property. You can either help prevent fires, or you can help start/allow them. In order to minimize the risk of fire in the workplace, it is vital that everyone is aware of the common causes of fire and the appropriate actions to take in the event of a fire.
Fire is one of our man risks in the construction Industry and due to many management, subcontractor and employee “cultural” issues, is even higher in the G.C.C. and the region. The cause of fire is generally combustible construction material and packing rather than incorporated items. However, even knowing this the planning, control and management of combustible materials are generally inadequate and this inadequate combustible material management is causing our project to be at higher risk levels than we should be. This document sets out to correct all the issues and short-comings in one consolidate “Company Name” Code of Practice. Combustible materials can be deemed to be at four levels of controls:
1. Stored safety in combustible materials stores.
2. Temporary stored in combustible materials managed area.
3. Stored uncontrolled.
4. In designated waste disposal area.
A HSE professional having with 12 years experienced Oil & Gas, drilling, Petrochemicals, Oil & Gas Constructions as well as With Administrative Support and Technical support experienced in Health Safety and Environment, working in a fast- paced environments demanding strong organizational, technical, and interpersonal skills, Trustworthy, ethical and discreet committed to superiors. Confident in interactions with individuals at all levels. Detail- oriented and resourceful in completing on-site or plant projects, to do multi-task effectively. Wide working experienced in providing HSE advocacy Sound Knowledge of entire functionality as a HSE Officer/Supervisor/Advisor. Extensive knowledge of working in multicultural environment proven ability to deliver high quality service, also with an international certifications as NEBOSH IGC, NEBOSH PSM, IOSH, Osha, IADC rig pass….
ILSM is one of the most important Joint Commission processes to understand. Test your ILSM knowledge and fill in the gaps regarding when and how to conduct an assessment.
I. SCOPE
II. DEFINITION
III. FIRE EMERGENCIES - GENERAL
1. On discovering a fire:
2. On hearing the alarm:
3. If trapped in an office/ room:
4. If caught in smoke:
5. If forced to advance through flames:
IV. GENERAL SPILL RESPONSE PROCEDURES
1. ASSESS THE RISK
2. PROTECT PERSONAL
3. CONFINE THE SPILL
4. CONTAIN THE LEAK/ RELEASE AT THE SOURCE
5. CLEAN UP/ REINSTATEMENT OF THE SITE.
6. SPILL FROM FUEL TANKS:
7. SPILL OR RELEASE FROM SMALL SIZE CONTAINERS
8. Chemical and Solvent Spills:
9. Toxic Fumes
V. MEDICAL EMERGENCY
ANY PERSON WITNESSING A MEDICAL EMERGENCY
Response to Medical Emergency
First Aid Tips:
1. Bleeding
2. Burns, Chemical and Thermal.
3. Chocking
4. Fainting and Shock
5. Fractures and Sprains
6. Poisoning and Overdose
7. Seizure
8. Shock
9. Unconscious/ Unresponsive
VI. ORGANIZATION CHART OF RESPONSE TEAM
VII. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
VIII. EMERGENCY ESCAPE ROUTE AND ASSEMBLY POINT
Learn how SiteFM's CMMS (Work Order application) provides the organizational capabilities to report by EC Discipline. Reports are accessed directly by the Safety Committee members to significantly reduce the workload required to prepare for these regular meetings, while also assisting in a Continuous Compliance model.
Glencore Coal Assets Australia has grown to be the largest coal producer in Australia with open cut and underground mines spread throughout NSW and Queensland. Glencore has very high regard for engineering and has sponsored the development of statutory mechanical engineers in NSW for more than a decade. This presentation looks at where Glencore stands in relation to safety and engineering, how this is managed within Glencore Coal, and some of the key challenges, direction and lessons.
This presentation outlines the approach taken by EnviroMist, in partnership with the University of Wollongong, to develop effective dust suppression systems for the mining industry.
A thorough approach using real-time dust monitoring, airspeed monitoring and material testing will be presented as the first step to define a dust problem. Following that, the use of modeling techniques such as CFD and DEM in combination with laboratory test data allows for the variables defining a problem to be investigated.
Finally, a solution can be proposed that is specific to the conditions of the application, based on the data collected and the results predicted from the simulation modelling. The presentation includes various case studies which demonstrate the effectiveness of this approach.
Code of Practice
C.O.P # 01
Fire Prevention Requirements
(Management of Combustible Materials & Electrical Inspections)
Table of Content
1. Fire Prevention and Combustible Material Management 3
2. Standards & Requirements for Combustible Stores and Temporary Structures 7
3. Fire Prevent Inspection Schedule 10
4. Fire Prevent Inspection Report 11
5. Fire Prevention Checklist 12
6. Office Porta cabin Inspection 18
7. Store Inspection 19
8. Electrical Inspections and Fire Safety 20
1. Fire Prevention and Combustible Material Management
Introduction
Fire is chemical reaction of three elements (fuel, heat and oxygen) if we remove 1 element, fire will end. Fire is a major risk both to persons and to property. You can either help prevent fires, or you can help start/allow them. In order to minimize the risk of fire in the workplace, it is vital that everyone is aware of the common causes of fire and the appropriate actions to take in the event of a fire.
Fire is one of our man risks in the construction Industry and due to many management, subcontractor and employee “cultural” issues, is even higher in the G.C.C. and the region. The cause of fire is generally combustible construction material and packing rather than incorporated items. However, even knowing this the planning, control and management of combustible materials are generally inadequate and this inadequate combustible material management is causing our project to be at higher risk levels than we should be. This document sets out to correct all the issues and short-comings in one consolidate “Company Name” Code of Practice. Combustible materials can be deemed to be at four levels of controls:
1. Stored safety in combustible materials stores.
2. Temporary stored in combustible materials managed area.
3. Stored uncontrolled.
4. In designated waste disposal area.
A HSE professional having with 12 years experienced Oil & Gas, drilling, Petrochemicals, Oil & Gas Constructions as well as With Administrative Support and Technical support experienced in Health Safety and Environment, working in a fast- paced environments demanding strong organizational, technical, and interpersonal skills, Trustworthy, ethical and discreet committed to superiors. Confident in interactions with individuals at all levels. Detail- oriented and resourceful in completing on-site or plant projects, to do multi-task effectively. Wide working experienced in providing HSE advocacy Sound Knowledge of entire functionality as a HSE Officer/Supervisor/Advisor. Extensive knowledge of working in multicultural environment proven ability to deliver high quality service, also with an international certifications as NEBOSH IGC, NEBOSH PSM, IOSH, Osha, IADC rig pass….
ILSM is one of the most important Joint Commission processes to understand. Test your ILSM knowledge and fill in the gaps regarding when and how to conduct an assessment.
I. SCOPE
II. DEFINITION
III. FIRE EMERGENCIES - GENERAL
1. On discovering a fire:
2. On hearing the alarm:
3. If trapped in an office/ room:
4. If caught in smoke:
5. If forced to advance through flames:
IV. GENERAL SPILL RESPONSE PROCEDURES
1. ASSESS THE RISK
2. PROTECT PERSONAL
3. CONFINE THE SPILL
4. CONTAIN THE LEAK/ RELEASE AT THE SOURCE
5. CLEAN UP/ REINSTATEMENT OF THE SITE.
6. SPILL FROM FUEL TANKS:
7. SPILL OR RELEASE FROM SMALL SIZE CONTAINERS
8. Chemical and Solvent Spills:
9. Toxic Fumes
V. MEDICAL EMERGENCY
ANY PERSON WITNESSING A MEDICAL EMERGENCY
Response to Medical Emergency
First Aid Tips:
1. Bleeding
2. Burns, Chemical and Thermal.
3. Chocking
4. Fainting and Shock
5. Fractures and Sprains
6. Poisoning and Overdose
7. Seizure
8. Shock
9. Unconscious/ Unresponsive
VI. ORGANIZATION CHART OF RESPONSE TEAM
VII. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
VIII. EMERGENCY ESCAPE ROUTE AND ASSEMBLY POINT
Learn how SiteFM's CMMS (Work Order application) provides the organizational capabilities to report by EC Discipline. Reports are accessed directly by the Safety Committee members to significantly reduce the workload required to prepare for these regular meetings, while also assisting in a Continuous Compliance model.
This presentation is an overview of the work Mangoola Coal has done with Maintenance Technology Institute (MTI) within the Department of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering at Monash University to understand the causes of failure relating to an incident in October 2016, and developing strategies to prevent similar failures in the future.
Techshore Inspection Services, (An ISO 9001-2008 certified Organisation) since its inception in the year 2006, has been a leading engineering service provider, offers a wide range of innovative services, engineering solutions, and professional training in the field of Oil and Gas, Power and other major industries in the disciplines of Mechanical, Civil, Instrumentation and NDT(Concrete NDT/Mechanical). Our service is being rendered by a group of professionals who are having enormous experience in the field of engineering in the aforesaid disciplines. As a leading engineering solution provider for the engineering industry for more than a decade, our robust technology, innovative approach, Technical support,Quality consciousness, and Safety can bring you tangible benefits in all the sectors of your business.
Every organisation has a culture, and every culture is different. Every organisation has a culture around safety, which can often conflict with the culture around hydraulic systems.
Since the inception of the NSW Resources Regulator's MDG 41 - Guidleine for fluid power safety at mines there has been an explosion of interest in the safety of hydraulic systems. From the early days of MDG41 there was a significant drop in hydraulic incidents reported to the Regulator.
Recently there has been a spike in fluid power-related incidents around the industry, which suggests there is a disconnect between the perceived and real dangers of fluid power systems. As we now see the industry growing and less experienced workers joining the industry we must ensure that we demonstrate the correct culture when dealing with hydraulic systems.
Liberty Industrial was engaged by Glencore to complete the demolition of a former coal preparation plant on a redundant mine site in Teralba NSW. While the mine was non-operational and formerly underground, many of the mine systems, plant pass-in and permitting requirements were based on on the site being an operational underground mine. Both Liberty Industrial and Glencore worked together during the planning phase to ensure that both parties understood the work, the design-related aspects and aspects of the Glencore systems that were not appropriate for this type of work. The teams worked together to develop a risk-based approach that satisfied the Glencore internal systems while maintaining efficient execution processes.
This presentation runs through case studies illustrating why machine failures are an invaluable source of knowledge. Yes, it comes at an expense, downtime, repairs and can have a significant impact on safety. However, it is the key lessons from a failure investigation that drive continuous improvement and, with it, commercial success and an environment where safety is paramount.
The studies draw on the concept of the price of non-conformance and why solely focusing on commercial short term gain can ultimately lead to long term pain. This is particularly true for critical assets that can affect production and safety if something goes wrong.
While critical control frameworks are becoming increasingly common in mines and quarries in NSW, effective implementation of these frameworks can be hampered by an inadequate grasp of the necessary data inputs, indicators and human psychology that govern whether the framework will create the intended outcome. As statutory mechanical officials in mines and quarries in NSW, assuring the effectiveness of critical risk controls can significantly reduce blidspots and improve your ability to know where you stand in relation to critical control effectiveness. This presentation will elevate your ability to:
• Identify and address complexity risk in developing critical control frameworks
• Recognise and respond to cognitive bias to maximise the performance of critical control frameworks
• Evaluate and apply key risk indicators and risk tolerances in order to effectively and honestly measure the performance of critical control frameworks.
The need to protect workers from diesel particulate matter (DPM) has led the underground coal mining industry to install disposable filter systems on their vehicles. While the disposable filters are efficient at removing significant DPM some major issues have arisen. ACARP, the Australian Coal Association Research Program funded two projects to research and develop solutions to these issues. This presentation provides the key findings from ACARP project C26070.
The emergence of new technologies for collision management has prompted many mining operators to reassess their approach to addressing mobile equipment interaction risk. Drawing on his experience in South Africa, where the regulatory environment is driving the introduction of new technologies to reduce the risk of collisions, there are lessons that can be applied to Australian mining operations. Based on a recent analysis of interaction risk for Australian mines and quarries, this presentation provides a practical approach to addressing collision risk with examples of measures to reduce exposure.
Access systems for operator cabins and routine maintenance areas of earthmoving machinery have been a significant area of discussion and interest in the NSW mining industry for many years. This presentation continues that discussion and brings new perspectives into the design of earthmoving machinery and the inherent considerations and trade-offs.
Understanding what airborne dust is, its potential health effects and how to manage dust in all areas of the workplace is fundamental to ensure that the respiratory health of your workforce is protected.
Generating potentially harmful levels of respirable airborne dust is not confined to production-based tasks within an operation. Engineering and maintenance tasks also have the potential to expose tradesmen and operators to respirable dust that can cause lung disease. Many of these tasks are also often conducted without the need for respiratory protection being taken into consideration.
Occupational dust disease is 100% preventable, and the key to workers making smart choices about their health is education.
This presentation is a generic version of the Airborne Dust Awareness sessions that have been rolled out to thousands of mineworkers in the NSW coal industry recently and has resulted in positive behavioural change in and around the workplace.
As industry leaders, we all need to understand the risks before we can identify them, then eliminate or control them.
What is your level of airborne dust awareness?
Presentation by Jared Jageler, David Adler, Noelia Duchovny, and Evan Herrnstadt, analysts in CBO’s Microeconomic Studies and Health Analysis Divisions, at the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists Summer Conference.
A process server is a authorized person for delivering legal documents, such as summons, complaints, subpoenas, and other court papers, to peoples involved in legal proceedings.
What is the point of small housing associations.pptxPaul Smith
Given the small scale of housing associations and their relative high cost per home what is the point of them and how do we justify their continued existance
Understanding the Challenges of Street ChildrenSERUDS INDIA
By raising awareness, providing support, advocating for change, and offering assistance to children in need, individuals can play a crucial role in improving the lives of street children and helping them realize their full potential
Donate Us
https://serudsindia.org/how-individuals-can-support-street-children-in-india/
#donatefororphan, #donateforhomelesschildren, #childeducation, #ngochildeducation, #donateforeducation, #donationforchildeducation, #sponsorforpoorchild, #sponsororphanage #sponsororphanchild, #donation, #education, #charity, #educationforchild, #seruds, #kurnool, #joyhome
This session provides a comprehensive overview of the latest updates to the Uniform Administrative Requirements, Cost Principles, and Audit Requirements for Federal Awards (commonly known as the Uniform Guidance) outlined in the 2 CFR 200.
With a focus on the 2024 revisions issued by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), participants will gain insight into the key changes affecting federal grant recipients. The session will delve into critical regulatory updates, providing attendees with the knowledge and tools necessary to navigate and comply with the evolving landscape of federal grant management.
Learning Objectives:
- Understand the rationale behind the 2024 updates to the Uniform Guidance outlined in 2 CFR 200, and their implications for federal grant recipients.
- Identify the key changes and revisions introduced by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in the 2024 edition of 2 CFR 200.
- Gain proficiency in applying the updated regulations to ensure compliance with federal grant requirements and avoid potential audit findings.
- Develop strategies for effectively implementing the new guidelines within the grant management processes of their respective organizations, fostering efficiency and accountability in federal grant administration.
Many ways to support street children.pptxSERUDS INDIA
By raising awareness, providing support, advocating for change, and offering assistance to children in need, individuals can play a crucial role in improving the lives of street children and helping them realize their full potential
Donate Us
https://serudsindia.org/how-individuals-can-support-street-children-in-india/
#donatefororphan, #donateforhomelesschildren, #childeducation, #ngochildeducation, #donateforeducation, #donationforchildeducation, #sponsorforpoorchild, #sponsororphanage #sponsororphanchild, #donation, #education, #charity, #educationforchild, #seruds, #kurnool, #joyhome
Jennifer Schaus and Associates hosts a complimentary webinar series on The FAR in 2024. Join the webinars on Wednesdays and Fridays at noon, eastern.
Recordings are on YouTube and the company website.
https://www.youtube.com/@jenniferschaus/videos
Russian anarchist and anti-war movement in the third year of full-scale warAntti Rautiainen
Anarchist group ANA Regensburg hosted my online-presentation on 16th of May 2024, in which I discussed tactics of anti-war activism in Russia, and reasons why the anti-war movement has not been able to make an impact to change the course of events yet. Cases of anarchists repressed for anti-war activities are presented, as well as strategies of support for political prisoners, and modest successes in supporting their struggles.
Thumbnail picture is by MediaZona, you may read their report on anti-war arson attacks in Russia here: https://en.zona.media/article/2022/10/13/burn-map
Links:
Autonomous Action
http://Avtonom.org
Anarchist Black Cross Moscow
http://Avtonom.org/abc
Solidarity Zone
https://t.me/solidarity_zone
Memorial
https://memopzk.org/, https://t.me/pzk_memorial
OVD-Info
https://en.ovdinfo.org/antiwar-ovd-info-guide
RosUznik
https://rosuznik.org/
Uznik Online
http://uznikonline.tilda.ws/
Russian Reader
https://therussianreader.com/
ABC Irkutsk
https://abc38.noblogs.org/
Send mail to prisoners from abroad:
http://Prisonmail.online
YouTube: https://youtu.be/c5nSOdU48O8
Spotify: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/libertarianlifecoach/episodes/Russian-anarchist-and-anti-war-movement-in-the-third-year-of-full-scale-war-e2k8ai4
Canadian Immigration Tracker March 2024 - Key SlidesAndrew Griffith
Highlights
Permanent Residents decrease along with percentage of TR2PR decline to 52 percent of all Permanent Residents.
March asylum claim data not issued as of May 27 (unusually late). Irregular arrivals remain very small.
Study permit applications experiencing sharp decrease as a result of announced caps over 50 percent compared to February.
Citizenship numbers remain stable.
Slide 3 has the overall numbers and change.
ZGB - The Role of Generative AI in Government transformation.pdfSaeed Al Dhaheri
This keynote was presented during the the 7th edition of the UAE Hackathon 2024. It highlights the role of AI and Generative AI in addressing government transformation to achieve zero government bureaucracy
6. Heat Sources
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Exhaust system
Electrical component
Not recorded
Turbo
Friction e.g. breaks
Engine
Hot work (welding or grinding)
10
6
5
5
3
2
1
Fires on mobile plant heat sources - January 2019 to March 2019
7. Fuel Sources
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Hydraulic oil
Null
Other
Diesel or petrol
Electrical wiring
Engine oil
Grease
Lubricating gear oil
Rags, cartons or other debris
9
5
5
4
3
3
1
1
1
Fires on mobile plant fuel sources - January 2019 to March 2019
8. Failed Component
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Hose
Not recorded
Any electrical cable or wiring
Fitting
Seal
Any other part of the engine
Any part of the braking system
Any part of the starter motor
N/A
Other
Transmission or drive chain
13
5
4
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
Fires on mobile plant failed component - January 2019 to March 2019
9. Actions that can reduce the likelihood of fire
incidents
SURFACE TEMPERATURE
• Reduce surface temperature
• Double skin
• Water jacket
• If lagged, cover completely and
securely
• Survey for electrical hot joints
FUEL SOURCE
• Prevent escape of fluids
• Careful supervised maintenance
• Security of fittings and joints
• Hose clamping and routing
• Eliminate rubbing and chafing
• Segregation from hot surfaces
• Fire walls
• Guards
• Minimise non-metallic materials
• Consider fire resistant fluids
10. FOCUS RE-FUELLING
• https://youtu.be/fiSr4r8uqhM
The injured worker ran in an easterly direction.
He knew that the sleeve of his shirt was on fire
and took the shirt off as he ran. He knew that
there was an emergency shower at the
refuelling facility but considered it to be too
close to the fire to stop and safely use it. After
he took his shirt off, he realised that his hair
was on fire. He continued to run to a drain at
the eastern end of the refuelling facility. He
put his head into mud that was in the drain
and extinguished the fire in his hair.
11. Investigation Findings - Failing to identify and
assess the risks
• Failure by Operator and
Contractor to identify all risks
associated with the operation
of the refuelling facility and
the contractor’s tyre handlers.
workers accessing the refuelling facility without authorisation
and/or training
the introduction and use of non-fit for purpose equipment at the
refuelling facility.
12. Investigation Findings - Failure to implement
safe systems of work
• The mine operator and
contractor each failed to
establish safe systems of work
for refuelling the contractor’s
tyre handlers at the mine.
Failure to communicate expectations
Delays in the supply of diesel to the contractor’s tyre handlers
Lack of awareness of obligation of service cart operators to provide
fuel
Low priority given to contractor’s requests for fuel
13. Investigation Findings - Failing to properly
supervise
• The mine operator stated that it
used three controls to prevent
unauthorised access to the
refuelling facility. None of the
controls were effective.
The refuelling facility was not supervised to ensure compliance with
site induction processes
The contractor worked within the external boundary fences
The masts of the contractor’s tyre handlers were too tall to fit under
the roof of the mine’s light vehicle refuelling facility.
14. Investigation Findings - Failing to provide
information and training
• contributed to the belief by a
number of service cart
operators that the contractor’s
workers were authorised to use
the refuelling facility
the ad hoc instruction that was provided to the contractor’s workers
by a number of the operator’s service cart operators was incomplete
Confusion about the order of actions when fuelling
The contractor did not provide any training to its workers at the mine
in relation to the use of the refuelling facility
15. Investigation Findings - Provision of
equipment that was not fit for purpose
• the adapter was not fit for purpose for
refuelling the contractor’s tyre
handlers
It has not been precisely determined who introduced the adapter to the mine site.
Given the adapter was kept at the mine for such a long time demonstrates that
there was a deficiency in the operator’s inspection regime for the refuelling facility
the contractor did not know that the adapter was being used. This was a result of
its failure to undertake risk assessments and supervise its workers
16. Investigation Findings - Human and
organisational factors
• Performance shaping factors
Contractor management - The mine operator’s contractor management system failed to identify
that the contractor’s workers were undertaking risky refuelling practices.
Supervision leader expectations - The mine operator and contractor failed to communicate with
each other about the difficulties that the contractor was experiencing with respect to refuelling
Training sufficiency - The mine operator and contractor each failed to provide workers with enough
training to competently identify the risks associated with refuelling.
Risk management practices - Effective risk management practices were not applied by the
contractor, nor enforced by the mine operator, in relation to the fuelling of the contractor’s mobile
plant.
Checking, inspection and monitoring - The mine operator did not supervise activity at its
refuelling facility to a sufficient standard to enable it to identify that unauthorised use was occurring.
17. Investigation Findings - Recommendations
• Operators and Contractors:
review their fuel delivery systems to ensure that only competent and authorised workers
have access to refuelling facilities
conduct an audit of refuelling facilities and service equipment to ensure that all refuelling
equipment is fit for purpose
review safety management systems (including contractor management systems) to ensure
that adequate risk assessments are conducted for the full range of work activities
ensure that adequate supervision is provided to workers undertaking refuelling activities
train workers about the correct use of refuelling equipment
prohibit the use of free flow fuel adapters that defeat inbuilt safety functions of refuelling
systems
18. FOCUS RE-FUELLING
A fuel service truck caught fire at an open cut
coal mine. Diesel fuel from a breather
assembly on top of the fuel tank flowed
directly onto hot engine surfaces. The onboard
fire suppression systems on the truck were
unable to extinguish the fire.
19. Investigation Findings - Recommendations
• Operators and Contractors to review:
fuel service trucks to ensure control measures are effective to contain and redirect
flammable liquids spilled from the top of the tank away from hot surfaces
the design arrangements of the ball float and breather vent settings on fuel service trucks
to ensure that they meet OEM specifications
controls to manage the hazard of fuel venting through breathers during fuelling and roll-
over event are effective
the operating gradients of fuel service trucks are within OEM design specifications
maintenance practices of ball float and breather vent settings on fuel service trucks to
ensure life cycle inspections and maintenance programs are effectively performed
change management systems to ensure modifications of fuel storage and delivery
systems on fuel service trucks are appropriately assessed and include consultation with
OEM.
20. FOCUS RE-FUELLING
Fire occurred in the engine bay of a grader
whilst being refuelled.
The root cause of the incident was identified
as a blocked fuel cap breather element
allowing the designed pressurised fuel system
to release flammables onto adjacent hot
components.
21. Investigation Findings - Factors
• Contributing Factors:
The refuelling systems were all quick-fill – dry break type.
The refuelling system relied on a pressure build-up in the tank to trigger the refuelling
system to stop.
The fuel filling system, tank, or associated fittings or alternate fill points failed to contain
the pressurised fuel.
The close proximity of the fill points to exposed hot engine components facilitated the
ignition of the fuel when it escaped the pressurised system.
People were in the vicinity during refuelling.
Most installations were user-specified, site specific alterations to the plant.
The source of diesel fuel was from the fuel tank manual fill cap dislodged o-ring seal
22. Investigation Findings - Recommendations
• When altering plant to fit quick fill refuelling
systems consideration should be given to:
identify all risk scenarios that may give rise to fuel spillage and/or fire during the refuelling process
and implement control measures in accordance with the hierarchy of risk controls
carrying out a failure modes effects analysis (FMEA), or similar analysis, on the final design to
identify lifecycle inspection and maintenance requirements
using refuelling systems that do not rely on fuel tank pressurisation to stop fuel flow when the tanks
are full
locating fuel fill points and air vents away from hot engine components as far as possible
ensuring fuel dispensing flow rate and air vent capacity of fuel tanks is correctly matched
ensuring refuelling nozzles and fuel tank receivers are a matched set
checking the designs of fuel tanks to ensure they are capable of accepting the high delivery flows
and pressure of the refuelling system on a cyclic basis without deformation of the fuel tank
23. Investigation Findings - Recommendations
• When altering plant to fit quick fill
refuelling systems consideration
should be given to:
installing decals on or near the fill points with max designed flow rates nominated
for the mobile plant
verifying the quick fill system design is compatible with the refuelling farm or
tanker delivery capacities
an engineering means or alternative cap to prevent regular “splash” fill points from
being left open and preventing pressurisation of the fuel tank during refuelling
using hose(s) compatible with diesel fuel and capable of withstanding the
maximum refuelling pressure, even if used as a drain line.
24. Investigation Findings - Recommendations
• Mines that use quick fuel systems should:
review refuelling procedures with consideration to:
the potential for the regular fuel cap to be inadvertently left open during quick refuelling
the need to leave the refuelling vehicle running, the position and the distance between the vehicle being refuelled
and the refuelling vehicle so it can be moved away quickly in the event of an emergency
ensuring an attendant remains at the fuel quick fill point during refuelling and does not leave the mobile plant
unattended
no people being on the refuelled plant during the refuelling process.
ensure inspection and maintenance activities consider lifecycle degradation of the refuelling system,
the mine environment and the manufacturer’s recommendations.
provide refresher training to workers who refuel mobile plant.
check an engineered “break link” is fitted to the fuel filling line at the fuel supply end to stop flow of
fuel in an emergency and for a quick exit away from a potential fire.
25. Fires on Mobile Plant – Focus
• Fire risk assessments must be rigorous and identified controls must be
effectively implemented and regularly monitored
• It is considered reasonably practicable for mine engineers and equipment
manufacturers to work towards engineering solutions to control surface
temperature
• Stringent monitoring and quality control of maintenance and repair
activities must be undertaken on mine sites to prevent fires on mobile
plant
• OEMs, designers and suppliers need to develop solutions to address the
persistence of fires on mobile plant, to ensure they are meeting their
obligations under the Work Health and Safety legislation.