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57. • Abdulkadiroğlu, A. and Sönmez, T. [2013] “Matching Markets: Theory
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【日本語文献】
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グの経済学』ミネルヴァ書房
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ちくま新書
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『一橋ビジネスレビュー』第61巻5号, 6-21.
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ローチ』NTT出版.
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