Security in an Interconnected and
Complex World of Software
Michael Coates
@_mwc
michael.coates@owasp.org
About
• Chairman OWASP Board
• Shape Security
– Director of Product Security
• Mozilla
– Director of Security Assurance
• 2012 SC Magazine Influential
Security Mind
Billion Dollar Cybercrime
~US $350 Billion – Global Drug Trafficking Estimates
US $170 Billion – Apple Annual Revenue 2013
US $263 Billion – Hong Kong 2012 Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
US $469 Billion – Walmart Annual Revenue 2013
US $95 Billion – Morocco 2012 Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
US $112 Billion – Hewlett-Packard Annual Revenue 2013
US $104 Billion – Honda Annual Revenue 2012
Billion Dollar Cybercrime
~US $350 Billion – Global Drug Trafficking Estimates
US $113 Billion – Global price tag of consumer cybercrime
US $170 Billion – Apple Annual Revenue 2013
US $263 Billion – Hong Kong 2012 Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
US $469 Billion – Walmart Annual Revenue 2013
US $95 Billion – Morocco 2012 Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
US $112 Billion – Hewlett-Packard Annual Revenue 2013
US $104 Billion – Honda Annual Revenue 2012
2013 Norton Report by Symantec
Cost of Security
• Cybercrime cost to companies
– 26% increase 2012 to 2013
• Cybercrime cost to individual
– 50% increase 2012 to 2013
• Cost per breached record to company
– Average US $136 / JPY ¥13,923
Hacking Becomes Leading Cause of
Data Breaches
Another Day, Another Retailer in a Massive Credit Card
Breach
Secret Service investigating possible data breach at
Sears
Report: Verizon Uncovers Two More Retail Breaches …
Adobe Breach Impacted At Least 38 Million Users
Largest Single Culprit : Hacking
Verizon Data Breach Report 20132013 Incidents by Breach Type
datalossdb.org
48% from Hacking 52% involved Hacking
THE ENEMY
Enemy
• Script Kiddies
– Scanners & generic tools
• Organized Crime
– Exploit kits
• Targeted & Specialized
– Precise, 0-day, determined
Opportunistic Scanners
• Scan web for common vulnerabilities
• Highly leverage automation
• Often untargeted
75% Attacks Opportunistic
Verizon Data Breach Report 2013
Organized Cybercrime
• Financial motivation
• Business groups of attackers
• Evolved systems for exploitation
Blackhole
CrimePack
Phoenix
Account Takeover – Web Brute Force
Underground Market Prices
2013 Dell SecureWorks
USD JPY
Visa, American Express, Discover $4-$8 ¥409 - ¥818
Credit Card with track 1 and 2 data $12 ¥1227
Full user information $25 ¥2557
1,000 Infected Computers $20 ¥2046
DDOS Attacks (per hour) $3-$5 ¥306 - ¥511
.onion TLD via Tor
Underground Financial Services
Underground Financial Services
Underground Marketplace
Stolen Account Balance
US $700-$4100
JP ¥760,00 – ¥420,000
Underground Price
US $90-$322
JP ¥9,200 - ¥33,000
Marketplace For Credit Card Fraud
List of vulnerable sites
for “carding”
COMPLEXITY
The future is more complex
180 Million Active Sites
Cloud
Internet of Things
techcrunch.com/2013/05/25/making-sense-of-the-internet-of-things/
REALITY CHECK
Security & Elements of Consideration
Secure Code vs. Secure Software
Fixing a single security bug Ensuring no critical bugs are
introduced to software
Secure Code vs. Secure Software
Fixing a single security bug
• While moving fast
• With minimal impact to
developers
• Within an agile or constant
deployment model
• Across thousands of
developers, multiple sites
and services, and numerous
new lines of code
Ensuring no critical bugs are
introduced to software
Secure Code vs. Secure Software
Fixing a single security bug
• While moving fast
• With minimal impact to
developers
• Within an agile or constant
deployment model
• Across thousands of
developers, multiple sites
and services, and numerous
new lines of code
Ensuring no critical bugs are
introduced to software
HardEasy
(generally)
Question the Models
• Industry Drivers
– PCI, Sarbanes Oxley, Hipaa, Self Regulation
• Business Drivers
– Innovation, fail fast, time to market, competitive
disadvantage
• Development Practices
– Code Reuse, Libraries, Patching
Standards Based Security is Failing
• Motivates for compliance over security
• Complex & unrealistic in many scenarios
• Retroactive removal of certification
Business Motivation
• Security sometimes viewed as tax
• Tradeoff of time to market
• Put off by aggressive security requirements
– An overly secure system used by no one provides
no security
ORGANIZING FOR SECURITY
Company Structure is Critical
Humans Don’t Scale Well
Humans Don’t Scale Well
Hiring More Security Isn’t Realistic
Security Professionals
– Expensive
– Hard to find
– Competition for employment
Centralized Security Organization
• Accountability & leadership
• Increases communication
• Enables security vision &
forward planning
• Cohesive vision across
security disciplines Application
Security
Network Ops
Security
Corporate
Security
Information
Security
Centralized Security Organization
• Build bridges throughout company
• Become partners with groups
• Increase communication & support
Dev
QA
Product
PR
IT
Legal
Security
Influence instead of Dictate
• Teach security
approaches
throughout org
• Build tools & guidance
• Avoid processes that
require security staff
involvement
Avoid security choke point
Influence without blocking
Embedding Approach
• Embedding security
inside dev team
– team effort to deliver
product
– real time
collaboration
– eliminates “us” vs
“them”
– build alliance
Developer
Team
Developer
Team
Developer
Team
Security Team
Organizational Strategy
• Scaling via Security Champions
• Primary Role: Developer, Secondary: Security
• Scales Effectively
• Liaison to security team
Developer Team
Security Champion
Developer Team
Security Throughout SDLC
Development
• Developer Training
• Coding Guidelines
– Cheat Sheets
– Concise, Usable
owasp.org/index.php/Cheat_Sheets
Development
• Security Libraries & Services
– Abstract away internals of security code
– Standardized security libraries
• OWASP ESAPI – an example of what you should build
within your organization
• Engineered web services for security
Safety Proof & Shift Burden
Current
• Developer must remember
to enable security
• Ability to build anything –
for better or worse Necessary
• Security fully enabled, opt-
out of security with caution
• Pre-packaged code widgets
– Appeal to masses
– Limited customization
– Safe for beginners
Smart Automation
• Dynamic security
analysis built for
developers
– Report what can be
found >95% accuracy
– Skip issues where
accuracy is low
– Accurate Tool > Tool
which requires
security team
wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Projects/Minion
Automation
Static / Dynamic Analysis
Can scale if homogenous environment
Careful of human involvement
Security X as a Service
Yes! The Future!
Quality Assurance
• Security validation within QA
• Functional testing of forms + basic sec tests
• Follow patterns of current QA
– Pass / Fail
– Self contained testing – no need for security
evaluation
“><script>alert(‘problem’)</script>
Post Release - Bounty Programs!
Engage Security Community
Post Release – Defend The App
• Detect and repel common
attacks
– Web Application Firewall
• Detect and repel custom
attacks at business layer
– Integrated application defense
– OWASP AppSensor
• Disable ability for automated
attacks
owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_AppSensor_Project
Post Release – Defend at Scale
• Design for Scale
– Automated attack
blocking & deflection
– No human analysis in
critical path.
• Human interaction
– Slow
– Ineffective against
distributed attacks
Key Points
Adversary is motivated and talented
– Organized criminal attackers
– Resourced and focused
Key Points
Satisfying security standards is a false sense of
security
– Focus on activities brining value
– Meet required standards & understand lack of
value
Key Points
Complex systems require comprehensive
security
– Integrate security in every step of software
development
– Build to scale with business needs & development
speed
Thanks!
@_mwc
michael.coates@owasp.org

Security in an Interconnected and Complex World of Software

  • 1.
    Security in anInterconnected and Complex World of Software Michael Coates @_mwc michael.coates@owasp.org
  • 2.
    About • Chairman OWASPBoard • Shape Security – Director of Product Security • Mozilla – Director of Security Assurance • 2012 SC Magazine Influential Security Mind
  • 3.
    Billion Dollar Cybercrime ~US$350 Billion – Global Drug Trafficking Estimates US $170 Billion – Apple Annual Revenue 2013 US $263 Billion – Hong Kong 2012 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) US $469 Billion – Walmart Annual Revenue 2013 US $95 Billion – Morocco 2012 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) US $112 Billion – Hewlett-Packard Annual Revenue 2013 US $104 Billion – Honda Annual Revenue 2012
  • 4.
    Billion Dollar Cybercrime ~US$350 Billion – Global Drug Trafficking Estimates US $113 Billion – Global price tag of consumer cybercrime US $170 Billion – Apple Annual Revenue 2013 US $263 Billion – Hong Kong 2012 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) US $469 Billion – Walmart Annual Revenue 2013 US $95 Billion – Morocco 2012 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) US $112 Billion – Hewlett-Packard Annual Revenue 2013 US $104 Billion – Honda Annual Revenue 2012 2013 Norton Report by Symantec
  • 5.
    Cost of Security •Cybercrime cost to companies – 26% increase 2012 to 2013 • Cybercrime cost to individual – 50% increase 2012 to 2013 • Cost per breached record to company – Average US $136 / JPY ¥13,923
  • 6.
    Hacking Becomes LeadingCause of Data Breaches Another Day, Another Retailer in a Massive Credit Card Breach Secret Service investigating possible data breach at Sears Report: Verizon Uncovers Two More Retail Breaches … Adobe Breach Impacted At Least 38 Million Users
  • 7.
    Largest Single Culprit: Hacking Verizon Data Breach Report 20132013 Incidents by Breach Type datalossdb.org 48% from Hacking 52% involved Hacking
  • 8.
  • 9.
    Enemy • Script Kiddies –Scanners & generic tools • Organized Crime – Exploit kits • Targeted & Specialized – Precise, 0-day, determined
  • 10.
    Opportunistic Scanners • Scanweb for common vulnerabilities • Highly leverage automation • Often untargeted 75% Attacks Opportunistic Verizon Data Breach Report 2013
  • 11.
    Organized Cybercrime • Financialmotivation • Business groups of attackers • Evolved systems for exploitation
  • 12.
  • 13.
  • 14.
  • 15.
    Account Takeover –Web Brute Force
  • 16.
    Underground Market Prices 2013Dell SecureWorks USD JPY Visa, American Express, Discover $4-$8 ¥409 - ¥818 Credit Card with track 1 and 2 data $12 ¥1227 Full user information $25 ¥2557 1,000 Infected Computers $20 ¥2046 DDOS Attacks (per hour) $3-$5 ¥306 - ¥511
  • 17.
  • 18.
  • 19.
  • 20.
    Underground Marketplace Stolen AccountBalance US $700-$4100 JP ¥760,00 – ¥420,000 Underground Price US $90-$322 JP ¥9,200 - ¥33,000
  • 21.
    Marketplace For CreditCard Fraud List of vulnerable sites for “carding”
  • 22.
  • 23.
  • 24.
  • 25.
  • 26.
    REALITY CHECK Security &Elements of Consideration
  • 27.
    Secure Code vs.Secure Software Fixing a single security bug Ensuring no critical bugs are introduced to software
  • 28.
    Secure Code vs.Secure Software Fixing a single security bug • While moving fast • With minimal impact to developers • Within an agile or constant deployment model • Across thousands of developers, multiple sites and services, and numerous new lines of code Ensuring no critical bugs are introduced to software
  • 29.
    Secure Code vs.Secure Software Fixing a single security bug • While moving fast • With minimal impact to developers • Within an agile or constant deployment model • Across thousands of developers, multiple sites and services, and numerous new lines of code Ensuring no critical bugs are introduced to software HardEasy (generally)
  • 30.
    Question the Models •Industry Drivers – PCI, Sarbanes Oxley, Hipaa, Self Regulation • Business Drivers – Innovation, fail fast, time to market, competitive disadvantage • Development Practices – Code Reuse, Libraries, Patching
  • 31.
    Standards Based Securityis Failing • Motivates for compliance over security • Complex & unrealistic in many scenarios • Retroactive removal of certification
  • 32.
    Business Motivation • Securitysometimes viewed as tax • Tradeoff of time to market • Put off by aggressive security requirements – An overly secure system used by no one provides no security
  • 33.
    ORGANIZING FOR SECURITY CompanyStructure is Critical
  • 34.
  • 35.
  • 36.
    Hiring More SecurityIsn’t Realistic Security Professionals – Expensive – Hard to find – Competition for employment
  • 37.
    Centralized Security Organization •Accountability & leadership • Increases communication • Enables security vision & forward planning • Cohesive vision across security disciplines Application Security Network Ops Security Corporate Security Information Security
  • 38.
    Centralized Security Organization •Build bridges throughout company • Become partners with groups • Increase communication & support Dev QA Product PR IT Legal Security
  • 39.
    Influence instead ofDictate • Teach security approaches throughout org • Build tools & guidance • Avoid processes that require security staff involvement Avoid security choke point Influence without blocking
  • 40.
    Embedding Approach • Embeddingsecurity inside dev team – team effort to deliver product – real time collaboration – eliminates “us” vs “them” – build alliance Developer Team Developer Team Developer Team Security Team
  • 41.
    Organizational Strategy • Scalingvia Security Champions • Primary Role: Developer, Secondary: Security • Scales Effectively • Liaison to security team Developer Team Security Champion Developer Team
  • 42.
  • 43.
    Development • Developer Training •Coding Guidelines – Cheat Sheets – Concise, Usable owasp.org/index.php/Cheat_Sheets
  • 44.
    Development • Security Libraries& Services – Abstract away internals of security code – Standardized security libraries • OWASP ESAPI – an example of what you should build within your organization • Engineered web services for security
  • 45.
    Safety Proof &Shift Burden Current • Developer must remember to enable security • Ability to build anything – for better or worse Necessary • Security fully enabled, opt- out of security with caution • Pre-packaged code widgets – Appeal to masses – Limited customization – Safe for beginners
  • 46.
    Smart Automation • Dynamicsecurity analysis built for developers – Report what can be found >95% accuracy – Skip issues where accuracy is low – Accurate Tool > Tool which requires security team wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Projects/Minion
  • 47.
    Automation Static / DynamicAnalysis Can scale if homogenous environment Careful of human involvement Security X as a Service Yes! The Future!
  • 48.
    Quality Assurance • Securityvalidation within QA • Functional testing of forms + basic sec tests • Follow patterns of current QA – Pass / Fail – Self contained testing – no need for security evaluation “><script>alert(‘problem’)</script>
  • 49.
    Post Release -Bounty Programs! Engage Security Community
  • 50.
    Post Release –Defend The App • Detect and repel common attacks – Web Application Firewall • Detect and repel custom attacks at business layer – Integrated application defense – OWASP AppSensor • Disable ability for automated attacks owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_AppSensor_Project
  • 51.
    Post Release –Defend at Scale • Design for Scale – Automated attack blocking & deflection – No human analysis in critical path. • Human interaction – Slow – Ineffective against distributed attacks
  • 52.
    Key Points Adversary ismotivated and talented – Organized criminal attackers – Resourced and focused
  • 53.
    Key Points Satisfying securitystandards is a false sense of security – Focus on activities brining value – Meet required standards & understand lack of value
  • 54.
    Key Points Complex systemsrequire comprehensive security – Integrate security in every step of software development – Build to scale with business needs & development speed
  • 55.

Editor's Notes

  • #6 http://www.hpenterprisesecurity.com/ponemon-2013-cost-of-cyber-crime-study-reportshttps://www4.symantec.com/mktginfo/whitepaper/053013_GL_NA_WP_Ponemon-2013-Cost-of-a-Data-Breach-Report_daiNA_cta72382.pdfhttp://www.symantec.com/about/news/release/article.jsp?prid=20131001_01
  • #8 Datalossdb.org – 48% from hacking, 8% fraud, 7% stolen laptopVerizon DBR – 52% involved hacking
  • #13 28% of all web threats detected by Sophos and 91% by AVG are due to this exploit kit
  • #15 $2,200 – base pricebooby-trap hacked and malicious Web sites so that they foist drive-by downloadshttp://krebsonsecurity.com/2013/04/phoenix-exploit-kit-author-arrested-in-russia/