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Scaling Web Security - Tools,
Processes and Techniques to Enable
Security At Scale
About Me
michael.coates@owasp.org
“The global cost of cybercrime is greater than
the combined effect on the global economy of
trafficking in marijuana, heroin and cocaine”
theregister.co.uk
Sept 7, 2011
Reality
Data Loss & Breaches
Verizon Data Breach Report 2013datalossdb.org/statistics
Data Loss & Breaches
Verizon Data Breach Report 2013datalossdb.org/statistics
The Supposed Security Program
• “Security is everyone’s job…”
• “Security training is the answer…”
• “It’s easy, just use encoding…”
• “Companies that care about security wouldn’t
have those vulnerabilities…”
Two Facts about Security Programs
1) Fixing a single security bug:
1) Fixing a single security bug:
Easy
1) Fixing a single security bug:
Easy (generally)
2) Ensuring no critical bugs are introduced to
software
2) Ensuring no critical bugs are introduced to
software
• While moving fast
2) Ensuring no critical bugs are introduced to
software
• While moving fast
• With minimal impact to developers
2) Ensuring no critical bugs are introduced to
software
• While moving fast
• With minimal impact to developers
• Within an agile or constant deployment model
2) Ensuring no critical bugs are introduced to
software
• While moving fast
• With minimal impact to developers
• Within an agile or constant deployment model
• Across thousands of developers, multiple sites
and services, and numerous new lines of code
2) Ensuring no critical bugs are introduced to
software
• While moving fast
• With minimal impact to developers
• Within an agile or constant deployment model
• Across thousands of developers, multiple sites
and services, and numerous new lines of code
The Goal
• Eliminate all possible security bugs?
• Keep company out of the headlines?
• Protect data?
• Ensure uptime?
• The real goal – manage risk
RETHINKING SECURITY PROGRAMS
Eliminate the Security Professional
You can’t solve security by throwing
bodies at the problem
Security Professionals
– Expensive
– Hard to find
– Competition for employment
Humans Don’t Scale Well
Security Throughout SDLC
Development
• Developer Training
• Coding Guidelines
– Cheat Sheets
– Concise, Usable
owasp.org/index.php/Cheat_Sheets
Development
• Security Libraries & Services
– Abstract away internals of security code
– Standardized security libraries
• OWASP ESAPI – an example of what you should build
within your organization
– Web services for security
Automation
• Dynamic security
analysis built for
developers
– Report what can be
found >95% accuracy
– Skip issues where
accuracy is low
– Accurate Tool > Tool
which requires security
team
wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Projects/Minion
Automation
• Static / Dynamic Analysis
– Careful – security resource may be required
– Can scale if homogenous environment
• Security X as a Service
– Yes! The Future!
QA
• Security validation within QA
• Functional testing of forms + basic sec tests
• Follow patterns of current QA
– Pass / Fail
– Self contained testing – no need for security evaluation
“><script>alert(‘problem’)</script>
Organizational Strategy
• Embedding security
inside dev team
– team effort to ship
– real time collaboration
– eliminates “us” vs
“them”
– build alliance
Dev
Team
Dev
Team
Dev
Team
Organizational Strategy
• Scaling via Security Champions
• Primary Role: Developer
Secondary: Security
• Scales Effectively
• Liaison to security team
Dev Team
Dev Team
Post Release - Bounty Programs!
• Engage Security Community
https://bugcrowd.com/list-of-bug-bounty-programs/
Post Release – Defend That App
• Detect and repel common
attacks
– Web Application Firewall
• Detect and repel custom
attacks at business layer
– Integrated application defense
– OWASP AppSensor
owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_AppSensor_Project
crosstalkonline.org/storage/issue-archives/2011/201109/201109-Watson.pdf
Post Release – Defend That App
• Scale!
– Attack blocking?
Automated only
– No human analysis in
critical path.
How to Use Security Expertise
• Security strategy, risk programs, architecture &
design
• Tackle new problems, determine how to
automate them
• Build scalable security resources & services
Key Points
• Security is not just an activity conducted by a
single team
• A strategic security program gains incremental
wins at every step
• Build everything for scaling
• Automate first, human SMEs only when required
Thanks
@_mwc
michael.coates@owasp.org
security101@lists.owasp.org
https://lists.owasp.org/mailman/listinfo/security101

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2013 michael coates-javaone

  • 1. Scaling Web Security - Tools, Processes and Techniques to Enable Security At Scale
  • 3. “The global cost of cybercrime is greater than the combined effect on the global economy of trafficking in marijuana, heroin and cocaine” theregister.co.uk Sept 7, 2011
  • 5. Data Loss & Breaches Verizon Data Breach Report 2013datalossdb.org/statistics
  • 6. Data Loss & Breaches Verizon Data Breach Report 2013datalossdb.org/statistics
  • 7. The Supposed Security Program • “Security is everyone’s job…” • “Security training is the answer…” • “It’s easy, just use encoding…” • “Companies that care about security wouldn’t have those vulnerabilities…”
  • 8. Two Facts about Security Programs
  • 9. 1) Fixing a single security bug:
  • 10. 1) Fixing a single security bug: Easy
  • 11. 1) Fixing a single security bug: Easy (generally)
  • 12. 2) Ensuring no critical bugs are introduced to software
  • 13. 2) Ensuring no critical bugs are introduced to software • While moving fast
  • 14. 2) Ensuring no critical bugs are introduced to software • While moving fast • With minimal impact to developers
  • 15. 2) Ensuring no critical bugs are introduced to software • While moving fast • With minimal impact to developers • Within an agile or constant deployment model
  • 16. 2) Ensuring no critical bugs are introduced to software • While moving fast • With minimal impact to developers • Within an agile or constant deployment model • Across thousands of developers, multiple sites and services, and numerous new lines of code
  • 17. 2) Ensuring no critical bugs are introduced to software • While moving fast • With minimal impact to developers • Within an agile or constant deployment model • Across thousands of developers, multiple sites and services, and numerous new lines of code
  • 18. The Goal • Eliminate all possible security bugs? • Keep company out of the headlines? • Protect data? • Ensure uptime? • The real goal – manage risk
  • 19. RETHINKING SECURITY PROGRAMS Eliminate the Security Professional
  • 20. You can’t solve security by throwing bodies at the problem Security Professionals – Expensive – Hard to find – Competition for employment
  • 23. Development • Developer Training • Coding Guidelines – Cheat Sheets – Concise, Usable owasp.org/index.php/Cheat_Sheets
  • 24. Development • Security Libraries & Services – Abstract away internals of security code – Standardized security libraries • OWASP ESAPI – an example of what you should build within your organization – Web services for security
  • 25. Automation • Dynamic security analysis built for developers – Report what can be found >95% accuracy – Skip issues where accuracy is low – Accurate Tool > Tool which requires security team wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Projects/Minion
  • 26. Automation • Static / Dynamic Analysis – Careful – security resource may be required – Can scale if homogenous environment • Security X as a Service – Yes! The Future!
  • 27. QA • Security validation within QA • Functional testing of forms + basic sec tests • Follow patterns of current QA – Pass / Fail – Self contained testing – no need for security evaluation “><script>alert(‘problem’)</script>
  • 28. Organizational Strategy • Embedding security inside dev team – team effort to ship – real time collaboration – eliminates “us” vs “them” – build alliance Dev Team Dev Team Dev Team
  • 29. Organizational Strategy • Scaling via Security Champions • Primary Role: Developer Secondary: Security • Scales Effectively • Liaison to security team Dev Team Dev Team
  • 30. Post Release - Bounty Programs! • Engage Security Community https://bugcrowd.com/list-of-bug-bounty-programs/
  • 31. Post Release – Defend That App • Detect and repel common attacks – Web Application Firewall • Detect and repel custom attacks at business layer – Integrated application defense – OWASP AppSensor owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_AppSensor_Project crosstalkonline.org/storage/issue-archives/2011/201109/201109-Watson.pdf
  • 32. Post Release – Defend That App • Scale! – Attack blocking? Automated only – No human analysis in critical path.
  • 33. How to Use Security Expertise • Security strategy, risk programs, architecture & design • Tackle new problems, determine how to automate them • Build scalable security resources & services
  • 34. Key Points • Security is not just an activity conducted by a single team • A strategic security program gains incremental wins at every step • Build everything for scaling • Automate first, human SMEs only when required