IoT Seminar (Jan. 2016) - (1) dr omar elloumi - onem2m interworking and seman...Open Mobile Alliance
Slides from the OMA and oneM2M IoT Seminar on January 21, 2016
Speaker 1:
Dr. Omar Elloumi, Alcatel-Lucent Bell Labs (ATIS), Technical Plenary Chair
Presentation Title: “oneM2M interworking and semantics framework”
Dr. Omar Elloumi is a Head of M2M and Smart Grid standards within Alcatel-Lucent CTO. He is the recently elected chair of oneM2M Technical Plenary after having led the oneM2M Architecture group delivering the first release of specifications.
Omar joined Alcatel-Lucent in 1999 and held several positions including research, strategy and system architecture. He holds a Ph. D. degree in computer science and served on the ATM Forum and IPSphere Forum Board of Directors. Omar Elloumi is coeditor of books on M2M communications and Internet of Things published in 2012. He is also involved in program committees of several international conferences on M2M and IoT.
EVALUATION OF SECURITY ATTACKS ON UMTS AUTHENTICATION MECHANISMIJNSA Journal
In this study security of internet access over the Third Generation (3G) telecommunication systems is considered and Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) is selected as the most popular system among 3G systems. The study then focuses on network access security mechanism of UMTS, called Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA). In addition, twenty types of important attacks and threats in UMTS system are presented and classified based on three major security factors; authentication, confidentiality, and data integrity. The evaluations finally show that the authentication factor is more interesting than other factors for hackers. Then, we describe four attacks named; man-inthe-middle, denial of service, identity catching, and redirection as the most significant attacks against authentication mechanism. Furthermore, we provide some solutions and methods to improve AKA
mechanism and prevent these attacks in UMTS system.
LTE Security Training – LTE and LTE-Advanced SecurityBryan Len
Length: 2 Days
LTE Security Training course focuses in detail the security mechanisms employed to meet current and future LTE requirements.
LTE Security Training explains how LTE/E-UTRAN and EPC security substantially extends GSM, 3G/UMTS, and IMS security. LTE security training also highlights the E-UTRAN, EPC and IMS security architectural.
Some of the basics learning highlights:
Shows how GSM and 3G/UMTS security was enhanced and extended to meet the requirements of LTE and LTE/Advanced fourth generation systems
Shows concepts behind LTE/E-UTRAN, LTE-Advanced, EPC, IMS and Voice over LTE (VoLTE) Security
Explains why LTE security solutions are designed
Topics Included:
Evolution of Cellular Systems from GSM to LTE-Advanced
Introduction to LTE and LTE-Advanced
Basic Security Concepts
Basic Cryptographic Concepts
Principles of GSM Security
GSM Cryptographic Algorithms
Principles of Third-Generation (3G) Security
UMTS Cryptographic Algorithms
3G–WLAN Interworking
Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA /GAA)
Security Mechanisms of 3G–WLAN Interworking
Cryptographic Algorithms for 3G–WLAN Interworking
EPS Security Architecture
Requirements and Features of EPS Security
EPS Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA)
EPS Authentication and Key Agreement Procedure
Key Hierarchy
EPS Protection for Signaling and User Data
NAS Signaling Protection
AS Signaling and User Data Protection
The AS (RRC and UP) and NAS Security
NAS and AS protection keys
The eNB cryptographically keys
NAS (EPC/UE) level AKA procedure (KASME)
key identifier (KSIASME)
Certificate Enrolment for Base Stations
Security in Intra-LTE State Transitions and Mobility
Transitions to and from Registered State
Periodic Local Authentication Procedure
More...
Request more information regarding LTE and LTE advanced security training. Visit tonex.com for course and workshop detail.
LTE Security Training – LTE and LTE-Advanced Security
https://www.tonex.com/training-courses/lte-security-training/
IoT Seminar (Jan. 2016) - (1) dr omar elloumi - onem2m interworking and seman...Open Mobile Alliance
Slides from the OMA and oneM2M IoT Seminar on January 21, 2016
Speaker 1:
Dr. Omar Elloumi, Alcatel-Lucent Bell Labs (ATIS), Technical Plenary Chair
Presentation Title: “oneM2M interworking and semantics framework”
Dr. Omar Elloumi is a Head of M2M and Smart Grid standards within Alcatel-Lucent CTO. He is the recently elected chair of oneM2M Technical Plenary after having led the oneM2M Architecture group delivering the first release of specifications.
Omar joined Alcatel-Lucent in 1999 and held several positions including research, strategy and system architecture. He holds a Ph. D. degree in computer science and served on the ATM Forum and IPSphere Forum Board of Directors. Omar Elloumi is coeditor of books on M2M communications and Internet of Things published in 2012. He is also involved in program committees of several international conferences on M2M and IoT.
EVALUATION OF SECURITY ATTACKS ON UMTS AUTHENTICATION MECHANISMIJNSA Journal
In this study security of internet access over the Third Generation (3G) telecommunication systems is considered and Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) is selected as the most popular system among 3G systems. The study then focuses on network access security mechanism of UMTS, called Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA). In addition, twenty types of important attacks and threats in UMTS system are presented and classified based on three major security factors; authentication, confidentiality, and data integrity. The evaluations finally show that the authentication factor is more interesting than other factors for hackers. Then, we describe four attacks named; man-inthe-middle, denial of service, identity catching, and redirection as the most significant attacks against authentication mechanism. Furthermore, we provide some solutions and methods to improve AKA
mechanism and prevent these attacks in UMTS system.
LTE Security Training – LTE and LTE-Advanced SecurityBryan Len
Length: 2 Days
LTE Security Training course focuses in detail the security mechanisms employed to meet current and future LTE requirements.
LTE Security Training explains how LTE/E-UTRAN and EPC security substantially extends GSM, 3G/UMTS, and IMS security. LTE security training also highlights the E-UTRAN, EPC and IMS security architectural.
Some of the basics learning highlights:
Shows how GSM and 3G/UMTS security was enhanced and extended to meet the requirements of LTE and LTE/Advanced fourth generation systems
Shows concepts behind LTE/E-UTRAN, LTE-Advanced, EPC, IMS and Voice over LTE (VoLTE) Security
Explains why LTE security solutions are designed
Topics Included:
Evolution of Cellular Systems from GSM to LTE-Advanced
Introduction to LTE and LTE-Advanced
Basic Security Concepts
Basic Cryptographic Concepts
Principles of GSM Security
GSM Cryptographic Algorithms
Principles of Third-Generation (3G) Security
UMTS Cryptographic Algorithms
3G–WLAN Interworking
Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA /GAA)
Security Mechanisms of 3G–WLAN Interworking
Cryptographic Algorithms for 3G–WLAN Interworking
EPS Security Architecture
Requirements and Features of EPS Security
EPS Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA)
EPS Authentication and Key Agreement Procedure
Key Hierarchy
EPS Protection for Signaling and User Data
NAS Signaling Protection
AS Signaling and User Data Protection
The AS (RRC and UP) and NAS Security
NAS and AS protection keys
The eNB cryptographically keys
NAS (EPC/UE) level AKA procedure (KASME)
key identifier (KSIASME)
Certificate Enrolment for Base Stations
Security in Intra-LTE State Transitions and Mobility
Transitions to and from Registered State
Periodic Local Authentication Procedure
More...
Request more information regarding LTE and LTE advanced security training. Visit tonex.com for course and workshop detail.
LTE Security Training – LTE and LTE-Advanced Security
https://www.tonex.com/training-courses/lte-security-training/
OMA Seminar/Webinar, October 27, 2016, "How Developers Can Get the Most Out of IoT Standards and Tools" - Presentation #3 from Nicolas Damour, Senior Manager, Business and Innovation, Sierra Wireless
"Combining LightweightM2M and oneM2M for Developers"
"How Standardization Enables The Next Internet Evolution," 1st in a series of 4 webcasts introducing oneM2M, the global standards initiative for Machine-to-Machine communications and the Internet of Things, delivered via BrightTALK on October 16th, 2014.
SDL BASED VALIDATION OF A NODE MONITORING PROTOCOLcscpconf
Mobile ad hoc network is a wireless, self-configured, infrastructure less network of mobile nodes. The nodes are highly mobile, which makes the application running on them face network related problems like node failure, link failure, network level disconnection, scarcity of resources, buffer degradation, and intermittent disconnection etc. Node failure and Network fault are need to be monitored continuously by supervising the network status. Node monitoring protocol is crucial, so it is required to test the protocol exhaustively to verify and validate the functionality and accuracy of the designed protocol. This paper presents a validation model for Node Monitoring Protocol using Specification and Description L language (SDL) using both Static Agent (SA) and Mobile Agent (MA). We have verified properties of the Node Monitoring Protocol (NMP) based on the global states with no exits, deadlock states or proper termination states using reach ability graph. Message Sequence Chart (MSC) gives an intuitive understanding of the described system behaviour with varying node density and complex behaviour etc.
SDL Based Validation of a Node Monitoring Protocol csandit
Mobile ad hoc network is a wireless, self-configured, infrastructure less network of mobile
nodes. The nodes are highly mobile, which makes the application running on them face network
related problems like node failure, link failure, network level disconnection, scarcity of
resources, buffer degradation, and intermittent disconnection etc. Node failure and Network
fault are need to be monitored continuously by supervising the network status. Node monitoring
protocol is crucial, so it is required to test the protocol exhaustively to verify and validate the
functionality and accuracy of the designed protocol. This paper presents a validation model for
Node Monitoring Protocol using Specification and Description L language (SDL) using both
Static Agent (SA) and Mobile Agent (MA). We have verified properties of the Node Monitoring
Protocol (NMP) based on the global states with no exits, deadlock states or proper termination
states using reach ability graph. Message Sequence Chart (MSC) gives an intuitive
understanding of the described system behaviour with varying node density and complex
behaviour etc.
Current issues - International Journal of Network Security & Its Applications...IJNSA Journal
nternational Journal of Network Security & Its Applications (IJNSA) is a bi monthly open access peer-reviewed journal that publishes articles which contribute new results in all areas of the computer Network Security & its applications. The journal focuses on all technical and practical aspects of security and its applications for wired and wireless networks. The goal of this journal is to bring together researchers and practitioners from academia and industry to focus on understanding Modern security threats and countermeasures, and establishing new collaborations in these areas.
Introduction to M2M
What is M2M?
The Business of M2M
Accelerating M2M Maturity
M2M Standards
The Business of M2M
The M2M Market
The M2M Market Adoption: Drivers and Barriers
The M2M Value Chain
Market Size Projections
Business Models
M2M Business Metrics
Market Evolution
Early M2M Deployments
M2M Requirements and High-Level Architectural Principles
Use-Case-Driven Approach to M2M Requirements
Smart Metering Approach in ETSI M2M
eHealth Approach in ETSI M2M
High-Level Architecture Principles for M2M Communication
ETSI M2M Services Architecture
High-Level System Architecture
ETSI TC M2M Service Capabilities Framework
ETSI TC M2M Release 1 Scenarios
ETSI M2M Service Capabilities
Introducing REST Architectural Style for M2M
ETSI TC M2M Resource-Based M2M Communication and Procedures
Sensor nodes are highly mobile, which makes the application running on them face network related problems like node failure, link failure, network level disconnection, scarcity of resources etc. Node failure and Network fault are need to be monitored continuously by supervising the network status especially for critical applications like Health Monitoring System. We propose Node Monitoring protocol (NMP) to monitor the node good conditions using agents and ensure that node gets promised quality of service. These Nodes senses environment and communicates important data to the sink or base station. To establish the correct event time, these nodes need to be synchronized with global clock. Therefore, time synchronization is very important parameter. We have built a simulating environment for Validating Node Monitoring Protocol (NMP) to assess the reliability of Health Monitoring systems. Formal Specification and Description Language tool (SDL) has been used to validate the NMP at design time in order to increase the confidence and efficiency of the system.
Network Management System and Protocol usibilityHamdamboy (함담보이)
The SNMP Version 1 RFC is:
RFC 1157. Simple Network Management Protocol
SMIv1 RFCs also apply to all SNMPv1 entities. MIB-II RFCs also apply to all SNMPv1 agent entities.
A network management system (NMS) refers to a collection of applications that enable network
components to be monitored and controlled.
network management systems have the same basic architecture, a
Safalta Digital marketing institute in Noida, provide complete applications that encompass a huge range of virtual advertising and marketing additives, which includes search engine optimization, virtual communication advertising, pay-per-click on marketing, content material advertising, internet analytics, and greater. These university courses are designed for students who possess a comprehensive understanding of virtual marketing strategies and attributes.Safalta Digital Marketing Institute in Noida is a first choice for young individuals or students who are looking to start their careers in the field of digital advertising. The institute gives specialized courses designed and certification.
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June 3, 2024 Anti-Semitism Letter Sent to MIT President Kornbluth and MIT Cor...Levi Shapiro
Letter from the Congress of the United States regarding Anti-Semitism sent June 3rd to MIT President Sally Kornbluth, MIT Corp Chair, Mark Gorenberg
Dear Dr. Kornbluth and Mr. Gorenberg,
The US House of Representatives is deeply concerned by ongoing and pervasive acts of antisemitic
harassment and intimidation at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). Failing to act decisively to ensure a safe learning environment for all students would be a grave dereliction of your responsibilities as President of MIT and Chair of the MIT Corporation.
This Congress will not stand idly by and allow an environment hostile to Jewish students to persist. The House believes that your institution is in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, and the inability or
unwillingness to rectify this violation through action requires accountability.
Postsecondary education is a unique opportunity for students to learn and have their ideas and beliefs challenged. However, universities receiving hundreds of millions of federal funds annually have denied
students that opportunity and have been hijacked to become venues for the promotion of terrorism, antisemitic harassment and intimidation, unlawful encampments, and in some cases, assaults and riots.
The House of Representatives will not countenance the use of federal funds to indoctrinate students into hateful, antisemitic, anti-American supporters of terrorism. Investigations into campus antisemitism by the Committee on Education and the Workforce and the Committee on Ways and Means have been expanded into a Congress-wide probe across all relevant jurisdictions to address this national crisis. The undersigned Committees will conduct oversight into the use of federal funds at MIT and its learning environment under authorities granted to each Committee.
• The Committee on Education and the Workforce has been investigating your institution since December 7, 2023. The Committee has broad jurisdiction over postsecondary education, including its compliance with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, campus safety concerns over disruptions to the learning environment, and the awarding of federal student aid under the Higher Education Act.
• The Committee on Oversight and Accountability is investigating the sources of funding and other support flowing to groups espousing pro-Hamas propaganda and engaged in antisemitic harassment and intimidation of students. The Committee on Oversight and Accountability is the principal oversight committee of the US House of Representatives and has broad authority to investigate “any matter” at “any time” under House Rule X.
• The Committee on Ways and Means has been investigating several universities since November 15, 2023, when the Committee held a hearing entitled From Ivory Towers to Dark Corners: Investigating the Nexus Between Antisemitism, Tax-Exempt Universities, and Terror Financing. The Committee followed the hearing with letters to those institutions on January 10, 202
2024.06.01 Introducing a competency framework for languag learning materials ...Sandy Millin
http://sandymillin.wordpress.com/iateflwebinar2024
Published classroom materials form the basis of syllabuses, drive teacher professional development, and have a potentially huge influence on learners, teachers and education systems. All teachers also create their own materials, whether a few sentences on a blackboard, a highly-structured fully-realised online course, or anything in between. Despite this, the knowledge and skills needed to create effective language learning materials are rarely part of teacher training, and are mostly learnt by trial and error.
Knowledge and skills frameworks, generally called competency frameworks, for ELT teachers, trainers and managers have existed for a few years now. However, until I created one for my MA dissertation, there wasn’t one drawing together what we need to know and do to be able to effectively produce language learning materials.
This webinar will introduce you to my framework, highlighting the key competencies I identified from my research. It will also show how anybody involved in language teaching (any language, not just English!), teacher training, managing schools or developing language learning materials can benefit from using the framework.
Synthetic Fiber Construction in lab .pptxPavel ( NSTU)
Synthetic fiber production is a fascinating and complex field that blends chemistry, engineering, and environmental science. By understanding these aspects, students can gain a comprehensive view of synthetic fiber production, its impact on society and the environment, and the potential for future innovations. Synthetic fibers play a crucial role in modern society, impacting various aspects of daily life, industry, and the environment. ynthetic fibers are integral to modern life, offering a range of benefits from cost-effectiveness and versatility to innovative applications and performance characteristics. While they pose environmental challenges, ongoing research and development aim to create more sustainable and eco-friendly alternatives. Understanding the importance of synthetic fibers helps in appreciating their role in the economy, industry, and daily life, while also emphasizing the need for sustainable practices and innovation.
The French Revolution, which began in 1789, was a period of radical social and political upheaval in France. It marked the decline of absolute monarchies, the rise of secular and democratic republics, and the eventual rise of Napoleon Bonaparte. This revolutionary period is crucial in understanding the transition from feudalism to modernity in Europe.
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Read| The latest issue of The Challenger is here! We are thrilled to announce that our school paper has qualified for the NATIONAL SCHOOLS PRESS CONFERENCE (NSPC) 2024. Thank you for your unwavering support and trust. Dive into the stories that made us stand out!
Francesca Gottschalk - How can education support child empowerment.pptxEduSkills OECD
Francesca Gottschalk from the OECD’s Centre for Educational Research and Innovation presents at the Ask an Expert Webinar: How can education support child empowerment?
1. OneM2M
Standard Specification
Khamdamboy Urunov, a Ph.D. student.
Special Communication Research Center.,
Financial Information Security.,
Kookmin University
Seoul, South Korea
Requirements
(TS-0002-V2.7.1)
2. The schedule of OneM2M Specification
• TS-0002-V2.7.1 Requirements
• TS-0001- Functional_Architecture-V2_10_0
• TS-0004_Service_Layer_Core_Protocol_V2_7_1
2
4. Functional roles description
4
Individual or
Company- end user
- Provides an M2M Application
Service
- Operates M2M Application
- Provides an M2M Services to
Application Service Provider
- Operates M2M Common
Service
• Provides Connectivity and related services for M2M
Service Providers
• Operates an Underlying Network. Such an Underlying
Network could be a telecom network.
5. 5
Requirement ID Description Release
OSR-001 The oneM2M System shall allow communication between M2M
Applications by using multiple communication means based on IP
access.
Implemented in Rel-
1
OSR-002a The oneM2M System shall support communication means that can
accommodate devices with constrained computing (e.g. small CPU,
memory, battery) or communication capabilities (e.g. 2G wireless
modem, certain WLAN node).
Implemented in Rel-
1
OSR-002b The oneM2M System shall support communication means that can
accommodate devices with rich computing capabilities (e.g. large CPU,
memory) or communication (e.g. 3/4G wireless modem, wireline).
Implemented in Rel-
1
OSR-006 The oneM2M System shall be able to reuse the services offered by Underlying
Networks to M2M Applications and/or M2M Services by means of open access
models (e.g. OMA, GSMA OneAPI framework).
Examples of available services are:
• IP Multimedia communications.
• Messaging.
• Location.
• Charging and billing services.
• Device information and profiles.
• Configuration and management of devices.
• Triggering, monitoring of devices.
• Small data transmission.
• Group management. (see note 1).
Partially
implemented (see
note 10
Table 1: Overall System Requirements
Functional Requirements~100 requirements
Note1: The set of features or APIs to be supported depends on the M2M Common Services and access to available APIs
6. 6
Requirement ID Description Release
OSR-012 The oneM2M System shall support communications
between M2M Applications and M2M Devices supporting
M2M Services by means of continuous or non continuous
connectivity.
Implemented in
Rel-1
OSR-014 The oneM2M System shall be able to communicate with
M2M Devices, behind an M2M Gateway that supports
heterogeneous M2M Area Networks.
Implemented in
Rel-1
OSR-020 The oneM2M System shall be able to support policies and
their management regarding the aspects of storage and
retrieval of data/information.
Implemented in
Rel-1
OSR-021 The oneM2M System shall be able to provide mechanisms
to enable sharing of data among multiple M2M
Applications.
Implemented in
Rel-1
OSR-046 The oneM2M System shall be able to support a capability
for the M2M Application to request/disallow
acknowledgement for its communication.
Not
implemented
Table 1: Overall System Requirement
Functional Requirements (1)
7. 7
Requirement ID Description Release
OSR-061 M2M Devices and M2M Gateways may support time
synchronization within the oneM2M System.
Not implemented
OSR-75 See
REQ-
20150546R01
The oneM2M System shall be able to collect, store Time
Series Data.
Implemented in
Rel-2
OSR-76 See
REQ-
20150546R01
The oneM2M System shall be able to detect and report the
missing data in time series.
Implemented in
Rel-2
OSR-086 See
REQ-
20150611R02
The oneM2M System shall enable M2M Gateways to
discover M2M Infrastructure Nodes and M2M Devices
available for data exchange.
Not implemented
OSR-090 See
REQ-
20150622R02
The oneM2M System shall be able to forward the M2M
Application Data to M2M Application without storing the Data.
Partially
implemented (see
note 22)
OSR-098 See
REQ-
20160055R02
The oneM2M system shall be able to support machine
socialization functionalities (such as existence discovery,
correlated task discovery, message interface discovery
and process optimization for multiple machines with same
tasks).
Not implemented
Table 1: Overall System Requirem
Functional Requirements (2)
NOTE 22: In Rel-2 data are stored in the CSE but never get retrieved by other entities except by subscribe/notify
mechanism.
8. Management Requirements
8
Table 2: Management Requirements
~19 requirements
Requirement
ID
Description Release
MGR-001 The oneM2M System shall be able to support management and configuration
of M2M Gateways/ Devices including resource constrained M2M Devices.
Implemented in
Rel-1
MGR-002 The oneM2M System shall provide the capability to discover the M2M Area
Networks including information about devices on those networks and the
parameters (e.g. topology, protocol) of those networks.
Implemented in
Rel-1
MGR-008 The oneM2M System shall provide the capability for software management of
devices in M2M Area Networks.
Implemented in
Rel-1
MGR-009 The oneM2M System shall provide the capability for rebooting and/or
resetting of M2M Gateways/Devices and other devices in M2M Area
Networks.
Implemented in
Rel-1
MGR-010 The oneM2M System shall provide the capability for authorizing devices to
access M2M Area Networks.
Implemented in
Rel-1
MGR-016 The oneM2M System shall be able to retrieve information related to the Static
and Dynamic Device/Gateway Context for M2M Gateways/Devices as well as
Device Context for other devices in M2M Area Networks.
Implemented in
Rel-1
9. Semantics Requirements
9
Ontology Related Requirements
Table 3: Ontology Requirements
Requirement ID Description Release
ONT-001 See REQ-
20150521R01
The M2M System shall support a standardized format for the
rules/policies used to define service logic.
Not
implemented
ONT-002 See REQ-
20150521R01
The M2M System shall support modelling semantic descriptions
of Things (including relationships among them) by using
ontologies.
Implemented in
Rel-2
ONT-004 See REQ-
20150521R01
The M2M System should be able to provide translation
capabilities from different modeling languages for ontologies to
the language adopted by oneM2M if the expressiveness of the
imported ontology allows.
Not
implemented
ONT-005 See REQ-
20150521R01
The M2M System shall provide the capability to retrieve semantic
descriptions and ontologies stored outside of the M2M System.
Not
implemented
ONT-007 See REQ-
20150521R01
The M2M System shall be able to support extending ontologies in
the M2M System.
Not
implemented
ONT-008 See REQ-
20150521R01
The M2M System shall be able to use ontologies that contain
concepts representing aspects (e.g. a room) that are not
represented by resources of the M2M System.
Implemented in
Rel-2
17 requirements
10. Semantics Requirements (1)
10
Ontology Related Requirements
Table 3: Ontology Requirements
Requirement ID Description Release
ONT-013 See
REQ-20150521R01
The M2M System shall be able to support update of ontologies. Not
implemented
ONT-014 See
REQ-20150521R01
The M2M System shall enable functions for data conversion
based on ontologies.
Not
implemented
ONT-015 See
REQ-20150521R01
The M2M System shall be able to model devices based on
ontologies which may be available outside the M2M System (e.g.
HGI device template).
Implemented in
Rel-2
ONT-016 See
REQ-20150521R01
The M2M System shall support storage, management and
discovery of ontologies.
Not
implemented
ONT-017 See
REQ-20150609
The oneM2M System shall support a semantic relation ("Is
Paired To") between two M2M Devices.
Not
implemented
11. HGI device template
• HGI has completed its mission to set key specifications for Home Gateways, Home Networks, and the
Smart Home. HGI worked from 2005 until 2016.
11
Fig.2. Home Gateway project template
http://www.homegatewayinitiative.org/
12. Semantics Annotation Requirements
12
Table 4: Semantics Annotation Requirements
7 requirements
Requirement ID Description Release
ANN-001 See REQ-
20150521R01
The oneM2M System shall provide capabilities to manage
manage semantic information about the oneM2M resources,
Implemented in Rel-2
2
ANN-002 See REQ-
20150521R01
The oneM2M System shall support a common language for
language for semantic description, e.g. RDF.
Implemented in Rel-2
ANN-004 See REQ-
20150521R01
The oneM2M System shall support semantic annotation
annotation based on related ontologies.
Implemented in Rel-2
ANN-006 See REQ-
20150521R01
The oneM2M System shall enable applications to retrieve an
retrieve an ontology representation related to semantic
semantic information used in the M2M System.
Not implemented
ANN-007 See REQ-
20150521R01
The oneM2M system shall provide capabilities to manage
manage data quality descriptions of resource.
Not implemented
13. Semantics Query Requirements
13
Table 5: Semantics Query Requirements
1 requirement
Requirement ID Description Release
QRY-001 See REQ-
20150521R01
The oneM2M System shall provide capabilities to discover
discover M2M Resources based on semantic descriptions.
descriptions.
Implemented in Rel-2
2
14. Semantics Mashup Requirements
14
Table 6: Semantics Annotation Requirements
5 requirements
Requirement ID Description Release
MSH-001 See REQ-
REQ-20150521R01
The oneM2M System shall provide the capability to host
host processing functions for mash-up.
Not implemented
MSH-002 See REQ-
REQ-20150521R01
The oneM2M System shall enable M2M Applications to
Applications to provide processing functions for mash-
mash-up.
Not implemented
MSH-003 See REQ-
REQ-20150521R01
The oneM2M System itself may provide pre-provisioned
provisioned or dynamically created processing functions
functions for mash-up.
Not implemented
MSH-004 See REQ-
REQ-20150521R01
The oneM2M System shall be able to create and execute
execute mash-ups based on processing functions.
Not implemented
MSH-005 See REQ-
REQ-20150521R01
The oneM2M System shall be able to expose mash-ups
ups as resources e.g. virtual devices.
Not implemented
15. Semantics Reasoning Requirements
15
Table 7: Semantics Reasoning Requirements
3 requirements
Requirement ID Description Release
RES-001 See REQ-
20150521R01
The oneM2M System shall be able to update ontologies as a
result of the ontology reasoning.
Not implemented
RES-002 See REQ-
20150521R01
The oneM2M System shall be able to support semantic
reasoning e.g. ontology reasoning or semantic rule-based
reasoning.
Not implemented
RES-003 See REQ-
20150521R01
The oneM2M System shall be able to support adding and
updating semantic information based on semantic reasoning.
Not implemented
16. Data Analytics Requirements
16
Table 8: Data Analytics Requirements
Requirement
ID
Description Release
ANA-001 See REQ-
20150521R01
The oneM2M System shall be able to support capabilities (e.g.
processing function) for performing M2M data analytics based on
semantic descriptions from M2M Applications and /or from the M2M
System.
Not implemented
ANA-002 See REQ-
20150521R01
The oneM2M System shall provide the capability of interpreting and
applying service logic (e.g. rules/policies of triggering operations upon
other resources or attributes according to the change of the monitored
resource) described with semantic annotation and ontology.
Not implemented
ANA-003 See REQ-
20150521R01
The oneM2M System shall support a standardized format for the
rules/policies used to define service logic.
Not implemented
3 requirements
17. Security Requirements
17
Table 9: Security Requirements63 requirements
Requirement
ID
Description Release
SER-001 The oneM2M System shall incorporate protection against threats to its
its availability such as Denial of Service attacks.
Partially Implemented in
in Rel-1
SER-002 The oneM2M System shall be able to ensure the Confidentiality of data.
data.
Implemented in Rel-1
SER-003 The oneM2M System shall be able to ensure the Integrity of data. Implemented in Rel-1
SER-008 The oneM2M System shall support countermeasures against
unauthorized access to M2M Services and M2M Application Services.
Services.
Implemented in Rel-1
SER-009 The oneM2M System shall be able to support Mutual Authentication for
for interaction with Underlying Networks, M2M Services and M2M
Application Services.
Implemented in Rel-1
SER-010 The oneM2M System shall be able to support mechanisms for protection
protection against misuse, cloning, substitution or theft of security
security credentials.
Implemented in Rel-1
SER-011 The oneM2M System shall protect the use of the identity of an M2M
M2M Stakeholder within the oneM2M System against discovery and
misuse by other stakeholders.
Implemented in Rel-1
SER-012 The oneM2M System shall be able to support countermeasures against
against Impersonation attacks and replay attacks.
Partially implemented in
in Rel-1 (see note 3)
SER-013 The oneM2M System shall be able to provide the mechanism for
integrity checking on boot, periodically on run-time, and on software
software upgrades for software/hardware/firmware component(s) on
Not implemented
18. Security Requirements (1)
18
Table 9: Security Requirements
Requirement ID Description Release
SER-014 The oneM2M System shall be able to provide configuration data
to an authenticated and authorized M2M Application in the M2M
Gateway/Device.
Implemented in Rel-1
SER-019 The oneM2M System shall be able to use service-level
Credentials present inside the M2M Device for establishing the
M2M Services and M2M Applications level security.
Implemented in Rel-1
SER-024 The oneM2M System shall enable M2M Applications to use
different and segregated security environments.
Partially implemented
SER-026 The oneM2M System shall be able to provide mechanism for the
protection of Confidentiality of the geographical location information
(see note 2).
Implemented in Rel-1
SER-030 The oneM2M System shall enable security protocol end-points to
protect portions of individual oneM2M messages so that
intermediate entities (whether trusted or untrusted) forwarding the
messages are unable to access the protected portions of the
messages in clear text.
Implemented in Rel-2
SER-033 See
REQ-
20150569R03
The oneM2M System shall enable security protocol end-points to
establish security sessions which are used for protecting
portions of one or more oneM2M messages so that security
protocol end-points can detect modification, including modification
by intermediate service layer entities (whether trusted or untrusted)
forwarding the messages.
Implemented in Rel-2
SER-036 See
REQ-
20150575R01
The oneM2M System shall enable security protocol end-points
to authenticate each other without relying on intermediate
service layer entities (whether trusted or untrusted).
Implemented in Rel-2
19. Security Requirements (2)
19
Table 9: Security Requirements
Requirement ID Description Release
SER-050 See
REQ-20150620
The oneM2M System shall enable pre-defined conditions to be
protected from unauthorized modification.
Implemented in Rel-2
SER-051 See
REQ-20150620
The oneM2M System shall enable the deletion of M2M data
produced/stored by the M2M Devices/Gateways based on request
from an authorized entity.
Implemented in Rel-2
SER-052 See
REQ-
20150621R01
The oneM2M System shall store and process privacy
preferences in an interoperable manner.
Implemented in Rel-2
SER-055 See
REQ-
20150623R01
The oneM2M System shall be able to support configuration of
security related settings of its infrastructure side components
by a privileged user through standardized API.
Not implemented
SER-056 See
REQ-
20150623R01
The oneM2M System shall allow overriding of security settings
by a privileged User through standardized API.
Not implemented
SER-061 See
0585R01- App-ID
Requirements
The oneM2M System shall be able to verify the App-ID to
support the detection of impersonation or to support revocation.
Not implemented
SER-062 See
REQ-
20160056R01
The oneM2M system shall be able to reuse the privacy policy of
the underlying network.
Not implemented
20. Charging Requirements
20
Table 10: Charging Requirements
Requirement ID Description Release
CHG-001 The oneM2M System shall support collection of charging specific
information related to the individual services facilitated by the
oneM2M System (e.g. Data Management, Device Management
and/or Connectivity Management). Collection of charging specific
information shall be possible concurrent with the resource
usage. The format of the recorded information shall be fully
specified including mandatory and optional elements.
Implemented in Rel-1
(see note 4)
CHG-002 The oneM2M System shall support mechanisms to facilitate
correlation of charging information (e.g. of a User) collected for
M2M Services, M2M Application Services and services
provided by Underlying Network Operators.
Partially implemented
(see note 2)
CHG-003 The oneM2M System shall provide means to coordinate charging
data records for data usages with differentiated QoS from the
Underlying Network.
Not implemented
CHG-006 The oneM2M System should support generation of charging
events for the purpose of requesting resource usage
Authorization from the real time credit control system where the
subscriber account is located. The information contained in the
charging events and the relevant chargeable events shall be fully
specified including mandatory and optional elements (see note 1).
Not implemented
6 requirements
21. Operational Requirements
21
Table 11: Charging Requirements
Requirement ID Description Release
OPR-001 The oneM2M System shall provide the capability for monitoring
and diagnostics of M2M Applications.
Implemented in Rel-1
OPR-002 The oneM2M System shall provide the capability for software
management of M2M Applications.
Implemented in Rel-1
OPR-003 The oneM2M System shall be able to configure the execution
state an M2M Application (start, stop, restart).
Implemented in Rel-1
OPR-006 Depending on availability of suitable interfaces provided by the
Underlying Network the oneM2M System shall be able to
provide information related to usage and traffic characteristics
of M2M Devices or M2M Gateways to the Underlying Network.
Implemented in Rel-2
OPR-008 See
REQ-
20150550R03
The oneM2M System shall be able to provide the M2M
Applications with status information received from the Underlying
Network.
Not implemented
OPR-010 See
0585R01- App-ID
Requirements
The oneM2M System Registration Authorities shall be able to
collect and maintain supporting required information when
assigning an App-ID.
Implemented in Rel-2
NOTE: "Time controlled" is equivalent to the MTC Features specified in clause 7.2 of 3GPP TS 22.368 [1].
22. Communication Management Requirements
22
Table 12: Communication Management Requirements
Requirement
ID
Description Release
CMR-001 The oneM2M System shall provide to M2M Applications a communication
service which provides buffering of messages to/from M2M
Gateway/Device/ Infrastructure Domain.
Implemented in
Rel-1
CMR-002 The oneM2M System shall be able to support forwarding buffered messages
depending on communication policies and based on service preference
associated with the buffered messages.
Implemented in
Rel-1
CMR-005 The oneM2M System shall be able to maintain context associated with
M2M sessions (e.g. security context or network connectivity context during
the interruption of the session).
Partially
implemented (see
note 1)
CMR-006
See REQ-
20150564R0
2
The oneM2M System shall support the ability for applications to categorize
requested communications (priority, importance, etc.), so that the oneM2M
System can adapt its actual communications (scheduling, aggregation,
compression, etc.) by taking this categorization into account.
Implemented in
Rel-1
CMR-009
See REQ-
20150564R0
2
The oneM2M System should support data compression based on
communication policies when exchanging data between the M2M
Gateway/Device/Infrastructure Domain.
Not Implemented
15 requirements
23. Communication Management Requirements(1)
23
Table 12: Communication Management Requirements
Requirement
ID
Description Release
CMR-010 See
REQ-
20150564R02
The oneM2M System shall support an additional randomized delay of
communications, based on communication policies, when exchanging data
between the M2M Gateway/Device/Infrastructure Domain.
Implemented in
Rel-2
CMR-015 See
REQ-
20150601R01
The oneM2M System shall be able to identify a series of data (e.g. Time
Series Data) and indicate individual data belonging to this series.
Implemented in
Rel-2
NOTE 1: Long lived security context and registration is covered, M2M Sessions are not
covered.
NOTE 2: CMDH policies (application side) is implemented, information from the Underlying
Network can be utilized but the method for provisioning via Mcn is not covered.
24. LWM2M Interworking Requirements
24
Table 13: LWM2M Interworking Requirements
Requirement
ID
Description Release
LWM2M-001
See REQ-
20150517R04
The oneM2M System shall provide the capability to transparently transport
LWM2M Objects between LWM2M Clients and M2M Applications.
Implemented in Rel-
2
LWM2M-002
See REQ-
20150517R04
The oneM2M System shall provide the capability to translate LWM2M Objects
into a semantic representation of the LWM2M Object as oneM2M resources.
Implemented in Rel-
2
LWM2M-003
See REQ-
20150517R04
The oneM2M System shall provide the capabilities of the LWM2M Server in order
to interwork between LWM2M Clients and M2M Applications.
Implemented in Rel-
2
LWM2M-005
See REQ-
20150517R04
When transparently transporting LWM2M Objects, the oneM2M System shall
provide the capability for M2M Applications to discover the defining of LWM2M
Objects transported by the oneM2M System.
Not implemented
LWM2M-007
See REQ-
20150517R04
The oneM2M System shall provide capability to onboard devices that
incorporate a LWM2M Client.
Implemented in Rel-
2
LWM2M-008
See REQ-
20150517R04
The oneM2M System shall provide the capability to interoperate the
underlying security mechanisms of the LWM2M Client with the security
capabilities provided by the oneM2M System.
Implemented in Rel-
2
8 requirements
25. Non-Functional Requirements (informative)
25
Table 14: Non-Functional Requirements
Requirement
ID
Description Release
NFR-001 Continua Health Alliance is incorporating a RESTful approach to its design.
To support CHA, oneM2M should consider RESTful styles and approaches
while designing the M2M architecture.
Implemented in Rel-
1
NFR-002 The oneM2M System should communicate using protocols that are efficient
in terms of amount of exchanged information over amount of exchanged
data measured in bytes.
Implemented in Rel-
1
2 requirements
This clause is intended to gather high-level principles and guidelines that shall govern the design of the
oneM2M System.
Such principles and guidelines are fundamental to the design of the oneM2M System.
But as they cannot necessarily be expressed as requirements per se, they shall be introduced and
expressed in this clause.
