In this study security of internet access over the Third Generation (3G) telecommunication systems is considered and Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) is selected as the most popular system among 3G systems. The study then focuses on network access security mechanism of UMTS, called Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA). In addition, twenty types of important attacks and threats in UMTS system are presented and classified based on three major security factors; authentication, confidentiality, and data integrity. The evaluations finally show that the authentication factor is more interesting than other factors for hackers. Then, we describe four attacks named; man-inthe-middle, denial of service, identity catching, and redirection as the most significant attacks against authentication mechanism. Furthermore, we provide some solutions and methods to improve AKA
mechanism and prevent these attacks in UMTS system.
The VLR is a database that contains temporary information about subscribers that are visiting its
serving area. The VLR is associated with one or more MSCs. When a subscriber enters a new MSC area, the
VLR associated with that MSC requests data about the subscriber from the HLR. This data is stored in the VLR
as long as the subscriber remains in the MSC area.
4.1.8 Equipment Identity Register (EIR): The EIR is a database that contains a list of all valid mobile
equipment on the network in the form of their International Mobile Equipment Identities (IMEI). The EIR is
consulted by the VLR to check if a particular mobile is allowed to be used
The document discusses security issues with 4G networks. It first provides an overview of 4G network architecture, including the IP Multimedia Subsystem security architecture and next generation network security architecture. It then discusses eight security dimensions for 4G networks: access control, authentication, non-repudiation, data confidentiality, communication security, data integrity, availability, and privacy. Finally, it outlines some specific security issues with 4G, including physical layer issues, WiMAX MAC layer issues, denial of service attacks, and Wi-Fi security issues.
This paper presents a brief study of recent advances in wireless network security issues. The paper makes a number of contributions to the wireless networking field. First, it studies the 4G mail threats and risk and their design decisions. Second, the security of 4G architecture with next generation network security and 8-security dimensions of 4G network. Third, security issues and possible threats on 4G are discussed. Finally, we proposed four layer security model which manages to ensure more secure packets transmission by taking all the necessary security measures.
This workshop aims to give an intermediate-level understanding of the potential risk associated with cellular mobile communication networks and the security issues in the radio access network. In particular, we begin with a brief history of Telecom, fundamentals of mobile network, radio signals, the security architecture of GSM/UMTS/LTE, cellular network attack detection methods, and security vulnerabilities with possible practical examples with case studies.
Design of Transparent Distributed IMS Network: Security Challenges Risk and S...ijngnjournal
The IP Multimedia subsystem (IMS) based on SIP as mechanism signalling and interfaces with other servers using OSA (Open Service Access) and CAMEL (Customized Applications for Mobile network Enhanced Logic).Is responsible for the interconnection of IP packets with other network, IMS support data communication services, voice, video, messaging and web-based technologies. In this work we present a distributed design of architecture that turns up some challenges of transparent mobility on the secured IMS architecture. We introduced the architecture with clustering database HSS and automatic storage of data files that give a secure access to database. This paper gives an overview of classification of security in IMS network and we show delay analysis comparison in signalling interworking with and without securing Gateway (SEG) in the registration of any UE in access network based IMS. We show that there is a tradeoff between the level of increasing system security and the potential delay incurred by mobility in Access Network .we conclude that this architecture is suitable for operators and services providers for the new
business models delivering ,the services based IMS Everywhere, anytime and with any terminals.
Security model evaluation of 3 g wireless network1 paper presentationRotract CLUB of BSAU
This document provides an overview of security in 3G wireless networks. It discusses the security features of 2G networks like GSM and how they have known vulnerabilities. It then examines the two main 3G standards - UMTS and CDMA2000, pointing out their security improvements over 2G as well as some remaining issues. The document evaluates the 3G security model based on availability, confidentiality and integrity.
LTE Security Training – LTE and LTE-Advanced SecurityBryan Len
Length: 2 Days
LTE Security Training course focuses in detail the security mechanisms employed to meet current and future LTE requirements.
LTE Security Training explains how LTE/E-UTRAN and EPC security substantially extends GSM, 3G/UMTS, and IMS security. LTE security training also highlights the E-UTRAN, EPC and IMS security architectural.
Some of the basics learning highlights:
Shows how GSM and 3G/UMTS security was enhanced and extended to meet the requirements of LTE and LTE/Advanced fourth generation systems
Shows concepts behind LTE/E-UTRAN, LTE-Advanced, EPC, IMS and Voice over LTE (VoLTE) Security
Explains why LTE security solutions are designed
Topics Included:
Evolution of Cellular Systems from GSM to LTE-Advanced
Introduction to LTE and LTE-Advanced
Basic Security Concepts
Basic Cryptographic Concepts
Principles of GSM Security
GSM Cryptographic Algorithms
Principles of Third-Generation (3G) Security
UMTS Cryptographic Algorithms
3G–WLAN Interworking
Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA /GAA)
Security Mechanisms of 3G–WLAN Interworking
Cryptographic Algorithms for 3G–WLAN Interworking
EPS Security Architecture
Requirements and Features of EPS Security
EPS Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA)
EPS Authentication and Key Agreement Procedure
Key Hierarchy
EPS Protection for Signaling and User Data
NAS Signaling Protection
AS Signaling and User Data Protection
The AS (RRC and UP) and NAS Security
NAS and AS protection keys
The eNB cryptographically keys
NAS (EPC/UE) level AKA procedure (KASME)
key identifier (KSIASME)
Certificate Enrolment for Base Stations
Security in Intra-LTE State Transitions and Mobility
Transitions to and from Registered State
Periodic Local Authentication Procedure
More...
Request more information regarding LTE and LTE advanced security training. Visit tonex.com for course and workshop detail.
LTE Security Training – LTE and LTE-Advanced Security
https://www.tonex.com/training-courses/lte-security-training/
This document summarizes a research paper that classifies different types of networks and discusses their associated security issues. It categorizes networks based on size (LAN, MAN, WAN), design (peer-to-peer, client-server, standalone), layering (layered, non-layered), and provides examples such as Ethernet, Wi-Fi, VPNs. It also discusses common security threats for different network types like viruses, denial of service attacks, and evaluates security measures including encryption, firewalls, access control. The paper aims to provide a comprehensive classification of networks and analyze how security needs vary depending on the network and software development stages.
The VLR is a database that contains temporary information about subscribers that are visiting its
serving area. The VLR is associated with one or more MSCs. When a subscriber enters a new MSC area, the
VLR associated with that MSC requests data about the subscriber from the HLR. This data is stored in the VLR
as long as the subscriber remains in the MSC area.
4.1.8 Equipment Identity Register (EIR): The EIR is a database that contains a list of all valid mobile
equipment on the network in the form of their International Mobile Equipment Identities (IMEI). The EIR is
consulted by the VLR to check if a particular mobile is allowed to be used
The document discusses security issues with 4G networks. It first provides an overview of 4G network architecture, including the IP Multimedia Subsystem security architecture and next generation network security architecture. It then discusses eight security dimensions for 4G networks: access control, authentication, non-repudiation, data confidentiality, communication security, data integrity, availability, and privacy. Finally, it outlines some specific security issues with 4G, including physical layer issues, WiMAX MAC layer issues, denial of service attacks, and Wi-Fi security issues.
This paper presents a brief study of recent advances in wireless network security issues. The paper makes a number of contributions to the wireless networking field. First, it studies the 4G mail threats and risk and their design decisions. Second, the security of 4G architecture with next generation network security and 8-security dimensions of 4G network. Third, security issues and possible threats on 4G are discussed. Finally, we proposed four layer security model which manages to ensure more secure packets transmission by taking all the necessary security measures.
This workshop aims to give an intermediate-level understanding of the potential risk associated with cellular mobile communication networks and the security issues in the radio access network. In particular, we begin with a brief history of Telecom, fundamentals of mobile network, radio signals, the security architecture of GSM/UMTS/LTE, cellular network attack detection methods, and security vulnerabilities with possible practical examples with case studies.
Design of Transparent Distributed IMS Network: Security Challenges Risk and S...ijngnjournal
The IP Multimedia subsystem (IMS) based on SIP as mechanism signalling and interfaces with other servers using OSA (Open Service Access) and CAMEL (Customized Applications for Mobile network Enhanced Logic).Is responsible for the interconnection of IP packets with other network, IMS support data communication services, voice, video, messaging and web-based technologies. In this work we present a distributed design of architecture that turns up some challenges of transparent mobility on the secured IMS architecture. We introduced the architecture with clustering database HSS and automatic storage of data files that give a secure access to database. This paper gives an overview of classification of security in IMS network and we show delay analysis comparison in signalling interworking with and without securing Gateway (SEG) in the registration of any UE in access network based IMS. We show that there is a tradeoff between the level of increasing system security and the potential delay incurred by mobility in Access Network .we conclude that this architecture is suitable for operators and services providers for the new
business models delivering ,the services based IMS Everywhere, anytime and with any terminals.
Security model evaluation of 3 g wireless network1 paper presentationRotract CLUB of BSAU
This document provides an overview of security in 3G wireless networks. It discusses the security features of 2G networks like GSM and how they have known vulnerabilities. It then examines the two main 3G standards - UMTS and CDMA2000, pointing out their security improvements over 2G as well as some remaining issues. The document evaluates the 3G security model based on availability, confidentiality and integrity.
LTE Security Training – LTE and LTE-Advanced SecurityBryan Len
Length: 2 Days
LTE Security Training course focuses in detail the security mechanisms employed to meet current and future LTE requirements.
LTE Security Training explains how LTE/E-UTRAN and EPC security substantially extends GSM, 3G/UMTS, and IMS security. LTE security training also highlights the E-UTRAN, EPC and IMS security architectural.
Some of the basics learning highlights:
Shows how GSM and 3G/UMTS security was enhanced and extended to meet the requirements of LTE and LTE/Advanced fourth generation systems
Shows concepts behind LTE/E-UTRAN, LTE-Advanced, EPC, IMS and Voice over LTE (VoLTE) Security
Explains why LTE security solutions are designed
Topics Included:
Evolution of Cellular Systems from GSM to LTE-Advanced
Introduction to LTE and LTE-Advanced
Basic Security Concepts
Basic Cryptographic Concepts
Principles of GSM Security
GSM Cryptographic Algorithms
Principles of Third-Generation (3G) Security
UMTS Cryptographic Algorithms
3G–WLAN Interworking
Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA /GAA)
Security Mechanisms of 3G–WLAN Interworking
Cryptographic Algorithms for 3G–WLAN Interworking
EPS Security Architecture
Requirements and Features of EPS Security
EPS Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA)
EPS Authentication and Key Agreement Procedure
Key Hierarchy
EPS Protection for Signaling and User Data
NAS Signaling Protection
AS Signaling and User Data Protection
The AS (RRC and UP) and NAS Security
NAS and AS protection keys
The eNB cryptographically keys
NAS (EPC/UE) level AKA procedure (KASME)
key identifier (KSIASME)
Certificate Enrolment for Base Stations
Security in Intra-LTE State Transitions and Mobility
Transitions to and from Registered State
Periodic Local Authentication Procedure
More...
Request more information regarding LTE and LTE advanced security training. Visit tonex.com for course and workshop detail.
LTE Security Training – LTE and LTE-Advanced Security
https://www.tonex.com/training-courses/lte-security-training/
This document summarizes a research paper that classifies different types of networks and discusses their associated security issues. It categorizes networks based on size (LAN, MAN, WAN), design (peer-to-peer, client-server, standalone), layering (layered, non-layered), and provides examples such as Ethernet, Wi-Fi, VPNs. It also discusses common security threats for different network types like viruses, denial of service attacks, and evaluates security measures including encryption, firewalls, access control. The paper aims to provide a comprehensive classification of networks and analyze how security needs vary depending on the network and software development stages.
This document discusses security issues and mechanisms in cellular wireless networks. It begins by explaining how cellular communication has become important for daily tasks like accessing the internet, banking, messaging, etc. It then outlines several key security issues for cellular networks including authentication, integrity, confidentiality, access control, location detection, viruses/malware, downloaded content security, device security, and operating system vulnerabilities. Next, it describes various types of attacks such as denial of service, distributed denial of service, channel jamming, and man-in-the-middle attacks. The document concludes by explaining 3G and 4G security architectures and features like network access security, challenge response authentication, and encryption between devices and base stations.
Congestion and overload control techniques in massive M2M systems: a surveyapnegrao
Lilatul Ferdouse1, Alagan Anpalagan1* and Sudip Misra2
1 WINCORE Lab, Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Ryerson University, Toronto, Canada
2 School of Information Technology, Indian Institute of Technology, Kharagpur, India
International Journal of Engineering Research and Applications (IJERA) is an open access online peer reviewed international journal that publishes research and review articles in the fields of Computer Science, Neural Networks, Electrical Engineering, Software Engineering, Information Technology, Mechanical Engineering, Chemical Engineering, Plastic Engineering, Food Technology, Textile Engineering, Nano Technology & science, Power Electronics, Electronics & Communication Engineering, Computational mathematics, Image processing, Civil Engineering, Structural Engineering, Environmental Engineering, VLSI Testing & Low Power VLSI Design etc.
Survey of Security and Privacy Issues of Internet of ThingsEswar Publications
This paper is a general survey of all the security issues existing in the Internet of Things (IoT) along with an analysis of the privacy issues that an end-user may face as a consequence of the spread of IoT. The majority of the survey is focused on the security loopholes arising out of the information exchange technologies used in Internet of Things. No countermeasure to the security drawbacks has been analyzed in the paper.
GSM is a standard for 2G digital cellular networks that was designed to be secure with strong authentication and encryption of over-the-air transmissions. However, due to the ubiquitous wireless medium, GSM networks are more susceptible to security attacks than wired networks. The document discusses GSM security features including encryption algorithms like A5 and key lengths. While GSM provided improvements over analog networks, the encryption used has been broken and more secure algorithms are needed given the hundreds of millions of users.
This paper clarifies the standards defined around LTE network security by standard development organizations including 3GPP, ITU, ETSI, and industry group NGMN. It also examines the different security borders of the mobile network, and delves deeper into the requirements of the Mobile Access Border - the border between the RAN and the core (S1).
A Survey of Key Management Framework for Wireless Mobile EnvironmentAM Publications,India
This document provides a summary of key challenges and approaches for key management in mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs). It discusses how MANETs have dynamic topologies and limited resources, posing security challenges. It reviews how cryptography is used to provide security but requires effective key management. It surveys research on asymmetric, symmetric, and group key management schemes proposed for MANETs. It also discusses trust models for key distribution, including centralized models using a trusted third party and decentralized models without a central authority.
This document discusses security issues in wireless cellular networks. It covers 4 generations of cellular networks and outlines limitations of wireless networks compared to wired networks. Some key security issues addressed include authentication, integrity, confidentiality, and various types of attacks such as unauthorized access, eavesdropping, and man-in-the-middle attacks. The document also notes that 3G networks provide features to enhance security but that continued research is needed to address new issues and further improve security as cellular technologies advance.
This document summarizes an article that investigates security algorithms for WiMAX networks. It begins by describing the architecture of WiMAX networks, including the user terminals, access service network, and connectivity service network. It then discusses vulnerabilities in the WiMAX standard, including issues at the physical layer and weaknesses in authentication and key management protocols. The document reviews some common denial of service attacks on WiMAX, such as attacks using ranging request/response messages. It also summarizes some existing encryption protocols like DES, TDES, RC2, and RC4. Finally, it suggests the need to address denial of service attacks prior to authentication as a way to improve WiMAX security.
The broadcast nature of radio medium in GSM networks makes them more vulnerable to various attacks.
Any attacker can have complete control over the communication channel, listen to phone calls, read email,
and spy on whatever data has been sent via GSM mobile communication system. This paper introduces a
middleware security system that aims to protect the GSM communication channel and minimize the
computational overheads of the provided authentication and cryptographic schemes of the network The
proposed scheme supports an end-to-end secured communication between the GSM mobile devices and the
GSM base stations; insure compatibility between wireless GSM devices (telephones, PDAs, etc.), and easy
to install without any modification of the current systems
This document provides background information on the history and importance of network security. It discusses how the advent of the internet led to security becoming a major concern, as the internet's architecture allowed for many security threats. The document outlines the internet and network security timeline, from the creation of the ARPANET in 1969 to the crimes of Kevin Mitnick in the 1990s that heightened awareness of information security. It also examines the differences between data security and network security, and how a layered security model corresponds to the OSI model layers.
Authentication and Key Agreement in 3GPP Networks csandit
The document summarizes authentication and key agreement in 3GPP networks. It discusses the LTE/SAE 4th generation network security architecture, including the key hierarchy and derivation. The authentication and key agreement protocol in EPS (EPS AKA) is also summarized, which involves mutual authentication between the network and UE to establish a shared key for secure communication.
This document contains requirements for the OneM2M standard specification. It includes over 100 functional requirements across various categories such as semantics, security, charging, and operations. It also describes functional roles in OneM2M including end users, application service providers, machine-to-machine service providers, and underlying network providers. The requirements cover supporting communication between devices and applications, reusing services from underlying networks, and managing devices and gateways.
Salsa20 based lightweight security scheme for smart meter communication in sm...TELKOMNIKA JOURNAL
The traditional power gird is altering dramatically to a smart power grid with the escalating development of information and communication technology (ICT). Among thousands of electronic devices connected to the grid through communication network, smart meter (SM) is the core networking device. The consolidation of ICT to the electronic devices centered on SM open loophole for the adversaries to launch cyber-attack. Therefore, for protecting the network from the adversaries it is required to design lightweight security mechanism for SM, as conventional cryptography schemes poses extensive computational cost, processing delay and overhead which is not suitable to be used in SM. In this paper, we have proposed a security mechanism consolidating elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) and Salsa20 stream cipher algorithm to ensure security of the network as well as addressing the problem of energy efficiency and lightweight security solution. We have numerically analyzed the performance of our proposed scheme in case of energy efficiency and processing time which reveals that the suggested mechanism is suitable to be used in SM as it consumes less power and requires less processing time to encrypt or decrypt.
Demilitarized network to secure the data stored in industrial networks IJECEIAES
Currently, the data and variables of a control system are the most important elements to be safeguarded in an industrial network, so it is vitally important to ensure their safety. This paper presents the design and simulation of a demilitarized network (DMZ) using firewalls to control access to all the information that is stored in the servers of the industrial network of the Hermanos Díaz Refinery in Santiago de Cuba, Cuba. In addition, the characteristics, configurations, methods, and rules of DMZs and firewalls are shown, select the configuration with three multi-legged firewalls as the most appropriate for our application, since it allows efficient exchange of data guaranteeing security and avoiding the violation of the control system. Finally, the simulation of the proposed network is carried out.
Netmanias.2013.08.05 lte security i-concept and authentication.engson6971
The document summarizes LTE network security, including LTE authentication, NAS security, and AS security. It provides an overview of the LTE security concept and scope, explaining that LTE authentication performs mutual authentication between the UE and network using EPS AKA, while NAS security provides integrity and ciphering of signaling between the UE and MME, and AS security provides integrity and ciphering of RRC signaling and ciphering of user plane traffic between the UE and eNB. The document then focuses on detailing the LTE authentication procedure.
A New Scheme of Group-based AKA for Machine Type Communication over LTE Netwo...IJECEIAES
Machine Type Communication (MTC) is considered as one of the most important approaches to the future of mobile communication has attracted more and more attention. To reach the safety of MTC, applications in networks must meet the low power consumption requirements of devices and mass transmission device. When a large number of MTC devices get connected to the network, each MTC device must implement an independent access authentication process according to the 3GPP standard, which will cause serious traffic congestion in the Long Term Evolution (LTE) network. In this article, we propose a new group access authentication scheme, by which a huge number of MTC devices can be simultaneously authenticated by the network and establish an independent session key with the network respectively. Experimental results show that the proposed scheme can achieve robust security and avoid signaling overload on LTE networks.
The document provides an overview of wireless network and mobile device security. It discusses some key factors that contribute to higher security risks for wireless networks compared to wired networks, including the wireless channel, mobility, limited device resources, and accessibility. It also describes common wireless network threats like accidental association, man-in-the-middle attacks, denial of service attacks, and network injection. The document then discusses measures to secure wireless transmissions and access points. It outlines security threats specific to mobile devices like lack of physical security controls and use of untrusted networks and applications. Finally, it provides an overview of IEEE 802.11 wireless LAN security standards including WEP, WPA, RSN, and the phases of 802.
Security issues and solutions in vehicular adhoc network a review approachcsandit
Vehicular networks are the promising approach to provide safety to the drivers. It becomes a
key component of intelligent transport system. A lot of research work has been done towards it
but security issue got less attention. In this article we discuss about the VANET, it's technical
and security challenges. We also discuss some major attacks and solutions that can be
implemented against these attacks. We compare the solution on different parameters and lastly
discuss the mechanisms that are used in the solutions.
COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY OF POSSIBLE SECURITY ISSUES ON 4G NETWORKSIJNSA Journal
This paper presents a brief study of recent advances in wireless network security issues. The paper makes a number of contributions to the wireless networking field. First, it studies the 4G mail threats and risk and their design decisions. Second, the security of 4G architecture with next generation network security and 8-security dimensions of 4G network. Third, security issues and possible threats on 4G are discussed. Finally, we proposed four layer security model which manages to ensure more secure packets transmission by taking all the necessary security measures.
Performance Analysis of Mobile Security Protocols: Encryption and Authenticat...CSCJournals
Due to extremely high demand of mobile phones among people, over the years there has been a great demand for the support of various applications and security services. 2G and 3G provide two levels of security through: encryption and authentication. This paper presents performance analysis and comparison between the algorithms in terms of time complexity. The parameters considered for comparison are processing power and input size. Security features may have adverse effect on quality of services offered to the end users and the system capacity. The computational cost overhead that the security protocols and algorithms impose on lightweight end users devices is analyzed. The results of analysis reveal the effect of authentication and encryption algorithms of 2G and 3G on system performance defined in terms of throughput which will further help in quantifying the overhead caused due to security.
International Journal of Engineering Research and DevelopmentIJERD Editor
Electrical, Electronics and Computer Engineering,
Information Engineering and Technology,
Mechanical, Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering,
Automation and Mechatronics Engineering,
Material and Chemical Engineering,
Civil and Architecture Engineering,
Biotechnology and Bio Engineering,
Environmental Engineering,
Petroleum and Mining Engineering,
Marine and Agriculture engineering,
Aerospace Engineering.
This document discusses security issues and mechanisms in cellular wireless networks. It begins by explaining how cellular communication has become important for daily tasks like accessing the internet, banking, messaging, etc. It then outlines several key security issues for cellular networks including authentication, integrity, confidentiality, access control, location detection, viruses/malware, downloaded content security, device security, and operating system vulnerabilities. Next, it describes various types of attacks such as denial of service, distributed denial of service, channel jamming, and man-in-the-middle attacks. The document concludes by explaining 3G and 4G security architectures and features like network access security, challenge response authentication, and encryption between devices and base stations.
Congestion and overload control techniques in massive M2M systems: a surveyapnegrao
Lilatul Ferdouse1, Alagan Anpalagan1* and Sudip Misra2
1 WINCORE Lab, Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Ryerson University, Toronto, Canada
2 School of Information Technology, Indian Institute of Technology, Kharagpur, India
International Journal of Engineering Research and Applications (IJERA) is an open access online peer reviewed international journal that publishes research and review articles in the fields of Computer Science, Neural Networks, Electrical Engineering, Software Engineering, Information Technology, Mechanical Engineering, Chemical Engineering, Plastic Engineering, Food Technology, Textile Engineering, Nano Technology & science, Power Electronics, Electronics & Communication Engineering, Computational mathematics, Image processing, Civil Engineering, Structural Engineering, Environmental Engineering, VLSI Testing & Low Power VLSI Design etc.
Survey of Security and Privacy Issues of Internet of ThingsEswar Publications
This paper is a general survey of all the security issues existing in the Internet of Things (IoT) along with an analysis of the privacy issues that an end-user may face as a consequence of the spread of IoT. The majority of the survey is focused on the security loopholes arising out of the information exchange technologies used in Internet of Things. No countermeasure to the security drawbacks has been analyzed in the paper.
GSM is a standard for 2G digital cellular networks that was designed to be secure with strong authentication and encryption of over-the-air transmissions. However, due to the ubiquitous wireless medium, GSM networks are more susceptible to security attacks than wired networks. The document discusses GSM security features including encryption algorithms like A5 and key lengths. While GSM provided improvements over analog networks, the encryption used has been broken and more secure algorithms are needed given the hundreds of millions of users.
This paper clarifies the standards defined around LTE network security by standard development organizations including 3GPP, ITU, ETSI, and industry group NGMN. It also examines the different security borders of the mobile network, and delves deeper into the requirements of the Mobile Access Border - the border between the RAN and the core (S1).
A Survey of Key Management Framework for Wireless Mobile EnvironmentAM Publications,India
This document provides a summary of key challenges and approaches for key management in mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs). It discusses how MANETs have dynamic topologies and limited resources, posing security challenges. It reviews how cryptography is used to provide security but requires effective key management. It surveys research on asymmetric, symmetric, and group key management schemes proposed for MANETs. It also discusses trust models for key distribution, including centralized models using a trusted third party and decentralized models without a central authority.
This document discusses security issues in wireless cellular networks. It covers 4 generations of cellular networks and outlines limitations of wireless networks compared to wired networks. Some key security issues addressed include authentication, integrity, confidentiality, and various types of attacks such as unauthorized access, eavesdropping, and man-in-the-middle attacks. The document also notes that 3G networks provide features to enhance security but that continued research is needed to address new issues and further improve security as cellular technologies advance.
This document summarizes an article that investigates security algorithms for WiMAX networks. It begins by describing the architecture of WiMAX networks, including the user terminals, access service network, and connectivity service network. It then discusses vulnerabilities in the WiMAX standard, including issues at the physical layer and weaknesses in authentication and key management protocols. The document reviews some common denial of service attacks on WiMAX, such as attacks using ranging request/response messages. It also summarizes some existing encryption protocols like DES, TDES, RC2, and RC4. Finally, it suggests the need to address denial of service attacks prior to authentication as a way to improve WiMAX security.
The broadcast nature of radio medium in GSM networks makes them more vulnerable to various attacks.
Any attacker can have complete control over the communication channel, listen to phone calls, read email,
and spy on whatever data has been sent via GSM mobile communication system. This paper introduces a
middleware security system that aims to protect the GSM communication channel and minimize the
computational overheads of the provided authentication and cryptographic schemes of the network The
proposed scheme supports an end-to-end secured communication between the GSM mobile devices and the
GSM base stations; insure compatibility between wireless GSM devices (telephones, PDAs, etc.), and easy
to install without any modification of the current systems
This document provides background information on the history and importance of network security. It discusses how the advent of the internet led to security becoming a major concern, as the internet's architecture allowed for many security threats. The document outlines the internet and network security timeline, from the creation of the ARPANET in 1969 to the crimes of Kevin Mitnick in the 1990s that heightened awareness of information security. It also examines the differences between data security and network security, and how a layered security model corresponds to the OSI model layers.
Authentication and Key Agreement in 3GPP Networks csandit
The document summarizes authentication and key agreement in 3GPP networks. It discusses the LTE/SAE 4th generation network security architecture, including the key hierarchy and derivation. The authentication and key agreement protocol in EPS (EPS AKA) is also summarized, which involves mutual authentication between the network and UE to establish a shared key for secure communication.
This document contains requirements for the OneM2M standard specification. It includes over 100 functional requirements across various categories such as semantics, security, charging, and operations. It also describes functional roles in OneM2M including end users, application service providers, machine-to-machine service providers, and underlying network providers. The requirements cover supporting communication between devices and applications, reusing services from underlying networks, and managing devices and gateways.
Salsa20 based lightweight security scheme for smart meter communication in sm...TELKOMNIKA JOURNAL
The traditional power gird is altering dramatically to a smart power grid with the escalating development of information and communication technology (ICT). Among thousands of electronic devices connected to the grid through communication network, smart meter (SM) is the core networking device. The consolidation of ICT to the electronic devices centered on SM open loophole for the adversaries to launch cyber-attack. Therefore, for protecting the network from the adversaries it is required to design lightweight security mechanism for SM, as conventional cryptography schemes poses extensive computational cost, processing delay and overhead which is not suitable to be used in SM. In this paper, we have proposed a security mechanism consolidating elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) and Salsa20 stream cipher algorithm to ensure security of the network as well as addressing the problem of energy efficiency and lightweight security solution. We have numerically analyzed the performance of our proposed scheme in case of energy efficiency and processing time which reveals that the suggested mechanism is suitable to be used in SM as it consumes less power and requires less processing time to encrypt or decrypt.
Demilitarized network to secure the data stored in industrial networks IJECEIAES
Currently, the data and variables of a control system are the most important elements to be safeguarded in an industrial network, so it is vitally important to ensure their safety. This paper presents the design and simulation of a demilitarized network (DMZ) using firewalls to control access to all the information that is stored in the servers of the industrial network of the Hermanos Díaz Refinery in Santiago de Cuba, Cuba. In addition, the characteristics, configurations, methods, and rules of DMZs and firewalls are shown, select the configuration with three multi-legged firewalls as the most appropriate for our application, since it allows efficient exchange of data guaranteeing security and avoiding the violation of the control system. Finally, the simulation of the proposed network is carried out.
Netmanias.2013.08.05 lte security i-concept and authentication.engson6971
The document summarizes LTE network security, including LTE authentication, NAS security, and AS security. It provides an overview of the LTE security concept and scope, explaining that LTE authentication performs mutual authentication between the UE and network using EPS AKA, while NAS security provides integrity and ciphering of signaling between the UE and MME, and AS security provides integrity and ciphering of RRC signaling and ciphering of user plane traffic between the UE and eNB. The document then focuses on detailing the LTE authentication procedure.
A New Scheme of Group-based AKA for Machine Type Communication over LTE Netwo...IJECEIAES
Machine Type Communication (MTC) is considered as one of the most important approaches to the future of mobile communication has attracted more and more attention. To reach the safety of MTC, applications in networks must meet the low power consumption requirements of devices and mass transmission device. When a large number of MTC devices get connected to the network, each MTC device must implement an independent access authentication process according to the 3GPP standard, which will cause serious traffic congestion in the Long Term Evolution (LTE) network. In this article, we propose a new group access authentication scheme, by which a huge number of MTC devices can be simultaneously authenticated by the network and establish an independent session key with the network respectively. Experimental results show that the proposed scheme can achieve robust security and avoid signaling overload on LTE networks.
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Security issues and solutions in vehicular adhoc network a review approachcsandit
Vehicular networks are the promising approach to provide safety to the drivers. It becomes a
key component of intelligent transport system. A lot of research work has been done towards it
but security issue got less attention. In this article we discuss about the VANET, it's technical
and security challenges. We also discuss some major attacks and solutions that can be
implemented against these attacks. We compare the solution on different parameters and lastly
discuss the mechanisms that are used in the solutions.
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Performance Analysis of Mobile Security Protocols: Encryption and Authenticat...CSCJournals
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International Journal of Engineering Research and DevelopmentIJERD Editor
Electrical, Electronics and Computer Engineering,
Information Engineering and Technology,
Mechanical, Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering,
Automation and Mechatronics Engineering,
Material and Chemical Engineering,
Civil and Architecture Engineering,
Biotechnology and Bio Engineering,
Environmental Engineering,
Petroleum and Mining Engineering,
Marine and Agriculture engineering,
Aerospace Engineering.
This document discusses the security measures of cellular communication systems like GSM. It outlines four main security measures in GSM: PIN codes, SIM card authentication, user authentication by the network including encrypting information over the radio interface, and using a temporary mobile subscriber identity instead of the international mobile subscriber identity over the radio interface. It also describes the four main security services provided: anonymity, authentication, signaling protection, and user data protection. Finally, it discusses some limitations of security in GSM systems and the need for periodic review and improvement of technical security features.
Security Models in Cellular Wireless NetworksWilliam Chipman
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4G and 5G network security techniques and algorithms.pdfssuser989b18
4G and 5G networks security techniques and algorithms document discusses:
1. 4G LTE security features including access security using authentication vectors, ciphering for confidentiality, and integrity mechanisms.
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SECURITY V/S QOS FOR LTE AUTHENTICATION AND KEY AGREEMENT PROTOCOLIJNSA Journal
Protocol and technology convergence, the core of near future communication, will soon be forming the interoperating heterogeneous networks. Attaining a strict secure authentication without risking the QoS performance and call success rates is a major concern when it comes to wireless heterogeneous
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(Ensure Confidentiality Authentication and Key Agreement) based on security, cost effectiveness, signaling overhead, delay and performance. It is proven that EC-AKA is the exclusive protocol satisfying the New Generation Network’s KPIs and it will be promoted as the target generic AKA protocol in
heterogeneous networks.
A survey study of title security and privacy in mobile systemsKavita Rastogi
This document summarizes security and privacy issues related to mobile systems. It discusses how mobile systems originally focused on securing phone calls but now must address additional challenges due to lost/stolen devices and user expectations of flexibility. The document then examines authentication techniques, security across different network domains, and technologies like encryption, digital rights management, and trusted computing platforms that aim to enhance mobile security. It concludes that secure information transmission will become increasingly important as mobile technologies continue advancing.
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This document summarizes a research paper about denial of service (DoS) attacks against signaling in UMTS (Universal Mobile Telecommunications System) and IMS (IP Multimedia Subsystem). The paper describes several novel DoS attacks that exploit vulnerabilities in the security architecture of UMTS and integrated UMTS/WLAN systems. It analyzes how the attacks can be triggered against the core UMTS architecture and IMS components. Additionally, it surveys similar attacks against UMTS and related protocols. The paper also provides suggestions for making the system more resistant to DoS attacks.
The Long Term Evolution (LTE) is the latest step in an advancing series of mobile telecommunications systems. In this paper, authors show interest on the security features and the cryptographic algorithms used to ensure confidentiality and integrity of the transmitted data. A closer look is taken upon EPS confidentiality and integrity algorithms. The authors also defined AKA, AS and NAS security and key derivations during normal Attach process and Handover also.
The broadcast nature of radio medium in GSM networks makes them more vulnerable to various attacks. Any attacker can have complete control over the communication channel, listen to phone calls, read email, and spy on whatever data has been sent via GSM mobile communication system. This paper introduces a middleware security system that aims to protect the GSM communication channel and minimize the computational overheads of the provided authentication and cryptographic schemes of the network The proposed scheme supports an end-to-end secured communication between the GSM mobile devices and the GSM base stations; insure compatibility between wireless GSM devices (telephones, PDAs, etc.), and easy to install without any modification of the current systems.
This document summarizes a conference paper about an M2M communication framework called sMeter for smart metering applications. sMeter manages data aggregation and encryption mechanisms for wireless multi-hop communication between smart meters. It addresses challenges of simultaneously executing data aggregation and encryption while meeting requirements of multiple concurrent applications. The paper describes sMeter's architecture, an implementation using low-cost hardware in an indoor test, and evaluation of communication performance in terms of delay, reception ratio and signal strength.
This document summarizes LTE security concepts and procedures, including authentication, NAS security, and AS security. It provides an overview of LTE authentication using EPS AKA, where the HSS generates authentication vectors that are used by the MME and UE to mutually authenticate. It also describes how NAS security keys are derived from the shared KASME key to secure NAS signaling, and how AS security keys are derived from KeNB to secure RRC signaling and user data.
This document summarizes LTE security concepts and procedures, including authentication, NAS security, and AS security. It provides an overview of LTE authentication using EPS AKA, where the HSS generates authentication vectors that are used by the MME and UE to mutually authenticate. It also describes how NAS security keys are derived from the shared KASME key to secure NAS signaling, and how AS security keys are derived from KeNB to secure RRC signaling and user data.
Seps aka a secure evolved packet system authentication and key agreement sch...csandit
In this paper, we propose a secure authentication of the Evolved Packet System Authentication
and Key Agreement (EPS-AKA) for the LTE-A network. Our scheme is proposed to solve the
problem of sending the IMSI as a clear text, and hence prevents the mobility management entity
attack. We will use public key (PK) cryptography to protect the transmitted messages, the RSA
scheme computation to compute a temporary value to the IMSI, and nonce to generate
challenge messages toward the opposite side. Our scheme does not need to change the original
framework and the infrastructure of the LTE-A network, although a ciphered IMSI is
transmitted. The authentication procedure is performed by the HSS to authenticate the UEs and
the MME; therefore, the impersonating of the MME and UEs is not possible. Our evaluation
demonstrates that the proposed scheme is secure and achieves the security requirements of the
LTE-A subscribers such as privacy, authentication, confidentiality and integrity. In our scheme,
we try to maintain the problems defined in the previous related works.
SEPS-AKA: A SECURE EVOLVED PACKET SYSTEM AUTHENTICATION AND KEY AGREEMENT SCH...cscpconf
In this paper, we propose a secure authentication of the Evolved Packet System Authentication and Key Agreement (EPS-AKA) for the LTE-A network. Our scheme is proposed to solve the
problem of sending the IMSI as a clear text, and hence prevents the mobility management entity attack. We will use public key (PK) cryptography to protect the transmitted messages, the RSA scheme computation to compute a temporary value to the IMSI, and nonce to generate challenge messages toward the opposite side. Our scheme does not need to change the original
framework and the infrastructure of the LTE-A network, although a ciphered IMSI is transmitted. The authentication procedure is performed by the HSS to authenticate the UEs and
the MME; therefore, the impersonating of the MME and UEs is not possible. Our evaluation demonstrates that the proposed scheme is secure and achieves the security requirements of the
LTE-A subscribers such as privacy, authentication, confidentiality and integrity. In our scheme, we try to maintain the problems defined in the previous related works.
MOBILE ADHOC NETWORKS SECURITY CHALLENGES: A SURVEYIAEME Publication
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MOBILE ADHOC NETWORKS SECURITY CHALLENGES: A SURVEYIAEME Publication
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EVALUATION OF SECURITY ATTACKS ON UMTS AUTHENTICATION MECHANISM
1. International Journal of Network Security & Its Applications (IJNSA), Vol.4, No.4, July 2012
DOI : 10.5121/ijnsa.2012.4403 37
EVALUATION OF SECURITY ATTACKS ON UMTS
AUTHENTICATION MECHANISM
Mojtaba Ayoubi Mobarhan, Mostafa Ayoubi Mobarhan
and Asadollah Shahbahrami
Department of Computer Engineering, Faculty of Engineering,
University of Guilan, Rasht, Iran
E-mail: Mojtaba.ayoubi@gmail.com, Mostafa.ayoubi7@yahoo.com,
shahbahrami@guilan.ac.ir
ABSTRACT
In this study security of internet access over the Third Generation (3G) telecommunication systems is
considered and Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) is selected as the most popular
system among 3G systems. The study then focuses on network access security mechanism of UMTS,
called Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA). In addition, twenty types of important attacks and
threats in UMTS system are presented and classified based on three major security factors;
authentication, confidentiality, and data integrity. The evaluations finally show that the authentication
factor is more interesting than other factors for hackers. Then, we describe four attacks named; man-in-
the-middle, denial of service, identity catching, and redirection as the most significant attacks against
authentication mechanism. Furthermore, we provide some solutions and methods to improve AKA
mechanism and prevent these attacks in UMTS system.
KEYWORDS
GSM System, Telecommunications System, UMTS Security, Denial of Service Attack, Authentication and
Key Agreement.
1. INTRODUCTION
The Third Generation (3G) plan for cellular communications enables to provide global roaming,
high transfer rates and modern value added services such as internet access, e/m-commerce,
Global Positioning System (GPS), mobile payment and Multimedia Messaging Services (MMS)
using audio and video. The Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) is one of
the famous 3G mobile cellular communication systems being developed within the structure
designed and introduced by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and known as
IMT-2000. It builds on the ability of today’s mobile technologies by providing increased
capacity, data ability and a greater domain of services using a radio interface standard called
UMTS Terrestrial Radio Access (UTRA). The structure and characteristics of UMTS like basic
radio, network and essential service parameters, were organized and defined by the European
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) in early 1998. The UMTS system is built on top
of the well-known and existing Global System for Mobile communications (GSM)
infrastructure and combines both packet and circuit data broadcast. Hence, the design
concurrently allows UMTS to be used in parallel with GSM [1, 2].
Recently, the mobile users are much interested in finance services by their mobile equipment.
These services include mobile payment, mobile banking and mobile shopping. When such type
of sensitive data is transferred in the air, it attracts hackers and attacker to get fraudulent
2. International Journal of Network Security & Its Applications (IJNSA), Vol.4, No.4, July 2012
38
transactions, stolen user accounts, and so on. Hence, the security of the network connections is
necessary for user trust. Unfortunately, First Generation (1G) mobile systems provided mainly
no security quality. After that, the Second Generation (2G) mobile system (for instance GSM)
was designed and presented such that it provides security similar to that of eavesdropping in
fixed phones, and to protect against cloning of mobile identities. The GSM allows its network
operator to verify the identity of a user such that it is fundamentally impossible for attacker to
masquerade as a valid user [3].
UMTS security is built on the success of GSM by retaining its strong security features and
advantages. Although GSM security has been very successful compared to 1G, one of the
purposes of the UMTS security design was to address its original and noticed GSM weaknesses.
The following are some of these weaknesses and threats [4, 5, 6].
• Active attacks utilizing a “false base station”.
• Unidirectional Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) protocol.
• Possibility of replay attacks.
• Cipher keys and authentication data are transmitted in clear between and within networks.
• Encryption does not extend far adequate towards the core network and data is transmitted in
clear on the microwave links.
• Weak cryptographic (at present lots of successful attacks have been published on A5/1 and
especially A5/2) and short cipher key size (64 bit).
• Data integrity as one of the most significant security factors in radio interface is not
provided.
• User authentication on a previously generated cipher key and channel hijack depends on the
use of encryption.
• 2G systems do not have the flexibility to upgrade and enhance security functionality over
time.
Therefore, 3G defined the UMTS system to improve security of communication systems. It
provides a high level of security in comparison with GSM. It also prepares significant
improvements to overcome the vulnerabilities in the 1G and 2G systems. These improvements
include mutual authentication, freshness and liveliness assurance of AKA, sufficient and
suitable Integrity Key (IK) and Cipher Key (CK) sizes (128 bits) and data integrity of signalling
messages in radio interface. The following are the major aims of carrying out this work.
1. The most important security mechanisms of the UMTS system are presented.
2. Most efficient attacks on UMTS system are studied and analyzed.
3. UMTS attacks are classified based on three major factors and demonstrate authentication is
more attractive than others for attacker.
4. Some solutions and methods are presented to improve AKA mechanism in UMTS system.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing UMTS security
architecture. In section 3, we focus on network access security mechanism in UMTS. Section 4
identifies two types of confidentiality services. In section 5, we explain data integrity in UMTS
system. Then, KASUM algorithm is mentioned in section 6. In section 7, we evaluate security
of keys in UMTS system. Section 8 studies some threats and attacks on UMTS and describes
four important of them. Some solutions to improve UMTS AKA are depicted in section 9, and
conclusions are presented in section 10.
3. International Journal of Network Security & Its Applications (IJNSA), Vol.4, No.4, July 2012
39
2. THE UMTS SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
The UMTS security architecture defines five separate security domains, intended to meet
specific threats and to establish definite security mechanisms:
1) Network access security: In this domain some issues like; mutual authentication,
confidentiality of user identity and transferred data, integrity protection of important
data, are discussed.
2) Network domain security: enables different nodes in the network domain to securely
exchange data, and protects against attackers on the wire line network.
3) User domain security: ensures only authorized access to Universal Subscriber Identity
Module (USIM).
4) Application domain security: enables applications in the user and provider domains to
sensitive exchange messages.
5) Visibility and configurability of security: notifies the user whether a security feature
is in action and if the use and provision of services should depend on the security
important.
As we said before, the UMTS security has five domains. But we focus our efforts on network
access security because this is the most vulnerable and important part in UMTS architecture.
The other domains use well established security protocols such as IPsec [5].
3. AUTHENTICATION AND KEY AGREEMENT
The network access security mechanism, called AKA, is based on a secret key, K, distributed
between the Home Network (HN) and the USIM. The design of AKA protocol for UMTS
reflects the results of an analysis of the threats and risks in GSM system as we mentioned in
section 1. The main alterations with respect to the GSM authentication and key agreement
protocol are [1]:
• The first challenge is protected against replay attacks by a Sequence Number (SQN) and it is
also ‘signed’. This means that authentication data intercepted by a hacker cannot be reused.
• The AKA generates an IK in addition to a CK. This key is used to protect the integrity of the
signalling data between the Mobile Station (MS) and the Radio Network Controller (RNC).
The UMTS AKA is selected in such a way as to achieve maximum compatibility with the
current GSM security architecture [6]. UMTS AKA is a one-pass challenge response protocol.
The UMTS authentication mechanism has been studied [7, 8, 9, 10, 11], resulting in suggestions
for some improvements. The AKA mechanism executes mutual authentication of the user and
the network using a symmetric key, K and derives the new cipher and integrity keys. There are
three important parts included in this process:
1) The home environment of the user (Home Location Register/Authentication Centre
(HLR/AuC)), that uses the secret key, K, to create the Authentication Vectors (AV).
4. International Journal of Network Security & Its Applications (IJNSA), Vol.4, No.4, July 2012
40
2) The service network (Serving GPRS Support Node/Visitors Location Register
(SGSN/VLR)), where the users are stationed, that receives and employs these AV to
authenticate.
3) The User Equipment (UE) that uses its secret key, for authentication and security
establishment with the network.
3.1. International Mobile Subscriber Identity
A fundamental entity authentication is that the entities have well defined unique identities. The
primary user identity is the International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) number. It is not the
well-known subscriber number (called MSISDN number). The MSISDN number (or numbers)
is a telephone number with full international prefix and is associated with the IMSI number in
the valid databases. The MSISDN numbers are (generally) public information, while the IMSI
number is designed for system internal identification and routing intentions [10, 12].
3.2. Temporary Mobile Station Identity
Identity presentation must precede identity verification (authentication), since it is the
authentication procedure that generates the session keys used for encryption. We have a
situation where the permanent identity (IMSI) will be visible on the air interface. This is
unsecured since it allows for subscriber location tracking. To solve the problem the Serving
Network (SN) may issue a local temporary identity called the Temporary Mobile Station
Identity (TMSI) to be used for subsequent identification [12]. The normal procedure is therefore
that the UE presents itself with its IMSI the first time. It enters a new service area (SGSN or
VLR). Thereafter encryption has commenced, the SN sends a TMSI number to the UE. This
identity is called the International Mobile station Equipment Identity (IMEI) and is a unique
identity. The IMEI number will regularly be checked against a database called the Equipment
Identity Register (EIR).
3.3. Authentication and Key Agreement Procedure
When UMTS Mobile Equipment (ME) is switched on, it scans for available node (BS) and tries
to connect with the one having best signal strength. Initially a location update procedure is
carried out which may be IMSI attach, Normal Location Update (NLU) or Periodic Location
Update (PLU). Location update starts with Radio Resource Control (RRC) connection request
sent by the ME to BS. No dedicated channel is available yet; therefore, this first message is
transported through common control channel that is mapped on random access channel for
uplink direction. After this step, the AKA procedure is performed. As we said previously, the
AKA provides two way authentication. It authenticates the ME and the SN simultaneously. This
procedure starts with authentication data request by VLR/SGSN. It forwards IMSI of USIM to
HLR/AuC. This request is shown as message 1 in Figure 1. The IMSI and key, K are shared
between USIM and HLR. On the basis of IMSI, K and Random Number (RAND), five AV are
produced by HLR and forwarded to VLR/SGSN, shown as message 2 in Figure 1. The
VLR/SGSN selects RAND and Authentication Token (AUTN) corresponding to one AV and
forwards it to ME as shown in message 3. Now the ME computes expected Message
Authentication Code (X-MAC) and compares it with MAC obtained from AUTN. If both are
same and SQN is in the valid range then the network is authenticated. A consequence of having
mutual authentication is that the USIM is now an active entity. In UMTS, the USIM attempts to
authenticate the network and it is now possible that the USIM will reject the network. But in
GSM, the user could not authenticate the network. Hence, the UE could not reject the network.
Now ME calculate response (called RES) and transmit it to VLR/SGSN as shown in message 4
(Figure 1). VLR/SGSN compares RES with expected response (X-RES). If both are same then
the user is authenticated.
5. International Journal of Network Security & Its Applications (IJNSA), Vol.4, No.4, July 2012
41
Figure 1. UMTS authentication and key agreement
The VLR/SGSN now transfers CK and IK to RNC. After this step, both RNC and the ME
have their respective keys for encryption and integrity protection. The message numbers 1 to 4
(shown in Figure 1) are neither encrypted nor integrity protected because they are transported
before key agreement. These messages are transmitted through air on interface between ME and
BS and hence are susceptible to interception and modification. Their modification by intruder
may cause specific attack such as Denial of Service (DoS) and Man-In-the-Middle (MiM) [2].
3.4. Authentication Vectors
The AVs contain sensitive and important data like challenge-response authentication data and
cryptographic keys. It is therefore clear that the transfer of AVs between the HLR/AuC and the
SGSN/VLR requires to be secured against eavesdropping and modification attacks. The actual
transfer mechanism for the AVs is the SS7-based Mobile Application Part (MAP) protocol. The
MAP protocol principally includes no security functionality, but a security extension to MAP
called MAPSec [12] has been developed by the 3G Partnership Project (3GPP). The MAPSec
protocol belongs to the Network Domain Security (NDS) work area in UMTS security
architecture as we mentioned in section 2. It includes both the MAPSec specification and
specifications for how to protect internet protocol connections on the control plane of the
UMTS core network. The AV has five components generated using five security functions (f1,
f2, f3, f4 and f5), as shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2. AV functions
6. International Journal of Network Security & Its Applications (IJNSA), Vol.4, No.4, July 2012
42
Table 1. Components of AV
Description
RAND Random value.
SQN Sequence number, masked with the key AK.
AMF
Authentication Management Field is a 16 bit field used for
management purposes.
MAC Message Authentication Code that is verified by the user.
XRES The response that the service network expects to receive from the user.
CK Confidentiality Key.
IK Integrity Key.
AUTN Authentication token, verified by the user to authenticate the network.
3.5. Secret Key in AKA Mechanism
The authentication sequence performed between the SGSN/VLR and the USIM is based on a
mutual authentication scheme using a long-term pre-shared secret key, K (128-bit). This master
key, K is only stored on the Universal Integrated Circuit Card (UICC) or USIM and in the AuC.
The UICC is a tamper-resistant smartcard subscriber identity module, and the USIM is an
application running on the UICC. For security to be maintained, it is an essential requirement
that K is never disclosed or otherwise compromised for the given UICC/USIM during its
lifetime. The AKA sequence is normally initiated by the VLR/SGSN when the network needs to
verify the identity of the subscriber. If the SGSN/ VLR do not already possess a valid AV
(Figure 1) for the claimed subscriber identity, it must request at least one AV from the
HLR/AuC. The AV is computed by and stored at the AuC. The AV is generated by means of
the operator-specific authentication functions.
4. CONFIDENTIALITY
The confidentiality mechanism is realized by means of encryption in many systems and
services. The cryptographic keys such as CK and IK to be used are generated by the AKA
procedure. The CK is always 128 bits long, but one can control the number of significant bits by
configuring the key derivation f3 function (showed in Figure 2). The default produced by
MILENAGE f3 is for a confidentiality key of 128 significant bits. We can classify
confidentiality in two different types; user identity confidentiality and data confidentiality.
4.1. User Identity Confidentiality
The main objectives of user identity confidentiality feature are to prevent intruders from some
attacks like eavesdropping the IMSI. To achieve this purpose the user is identified by means of
a TMSI on the radio interface which has local importance and is combined with Location Area
Identifier (LAI) or Routing Area Identifier (RAI), for the circuit switched and packet switched
domain respectively. Whenever a UE tries to access 3G services, it identifies itself by means of
the TMSI/LAI or TMSI/RAI [3].
4.2. Data Confidentiality
In the UMTS Security, user data and some information elements are considered sensitive and
may be confidentiality protected. The need for a protected mode of transmission is fulfilled by a
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confidentiality f8 function. This encryption function is applied on dedicated channels between
the ME and the RNC. In current specifications the f8 function is based on KASUMI algorithm.
4.3. Confidentiality Function
The UMTS encryption f8 function is a link layer symmetric synchronous stream cipher. This
function is designated to generate a pseudo-random key stream block that is combined with a
plaintext block by means of bitwise modulo 2 operations (XOR function). The function takes a
128 bit key CK, but operates mentally on 64 bit blocks. This confidentiality function (Figure 3)
takes as input the confidentiality key (CK, 128 bit), a sequence number (COUNT-C, 32 bit), the
radio channel indication (BEARER, 5 bit) and a direction indication (DIRECTION, 1 bit).
Additionally, the length (LENGTH, 16 bit) of the key stream block is provided.
Figure 3. f8 Function
5. DATA INTEGRITY
As discussed in section 3.3 the integrity protection of signalling messages, between ME and
RNC starts as soon as the integrity key and integrity protection algorithm is known. The IK is
always 128 bits long, but similar to CK, one can also configure IK to have fewer significant bits
if required. The default MILENAGE f4 function produces an IK with 128 significant bits
(Figure 2). A MAC function is applied to each special message at the RRC layer of UMTS
Terrestrial Radio Access Network (UTRAN) protocol stack. Integrity protection of critical
messages provides protection against many active threats and attacks such as an MiM. Partial
integrity protection of user data UMTS also has a mechanism which prevents the insertion or
deletion, but not the modification, of user data. This characterize is meant to prevent certain
bandwidth hijacking attacks while avoiding the cost of full-blown integrity protection
mechanisms for user data [1, 3]. The integrity security service is comprehended by means of a
MAC mechanism that provides both message authentication and integrity protection against
intentional modifications.
5.1. Data Integrity Function
UMTS data Integrity is restrict to insuring messages between the MS and the RNC. The
integrity function, f9 (Figure 4) takes as input the integrity key (IK, 128 bit), the message
(MESSAGE) to be protected, a sequence number (COUNT-I, 32 bit), a random value (FRESH,
32 bit), and a direction indication (DIRECTION, 1 bit) value. The computed MAC-1 is
comprised in the signalling message by the sending side. The receiving side calculates the
corresponding XMAC-1 over the message, and data integrity is considered to be confirmed if
the calculated XMAC-1 and the received MAC-1 are identical.
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Figure 4. f9 Function
In UMTS system, signalling messages are generally short; hence, the lengths of the MESSAGE
main components are correspondingly short. The actual length of the MESSAGE element
presented to the f9 function is longer than the message sent over the air since the five bits
utilized to indicate the bearer channel are extracted from the radio bearer context. The
specifications arbitrarily limit the size of an f9 input message to 5000 bits. The standard f9
function is based on the KASUMI block cipher (like f8). This function is a variant of the
familiar Cipher-Block-Chaining Message Authentication Code construction (CBC-MAC)
technique. Had an ordinary CBC-MAC mode been used for KASUMI, it would have been
restricted by the block size of 64 bits, but a strange chaining technique has allowed the f9
function to support a 128 bit internal situation. The final output from the KASUMI used in f9 is
a 64-bit cipher block, which is truncated to become the 32-bit MAC value [12]. Figure 4
illustrates the use of integrity algorithm f9 to authenticate the data integrity of an RRC
signalling message [3, 4].
6. KASUMI ALGORITHM
As we said in section 4 and 5, the confidentiality function, f8 is used for provision of data
encryption while f9 function is used for integrity protection of signalling data. These functions
are used in USIM and RNC. Presently KASUMI algorithm is standardized for use in these
algorithms. The f8 function (confidentiality), function f9 (integrity), and the algorithm used in
these functions have been analyzed by different researchers and have been found having
sufficient and suitable security [2]. The block cipher KASUMI is a modification of MISTY1.
KASUMI is a Feistel cipher with eight rounds. It operates on a 64 bit data block under control
by a 128 bit key. The security architecture of UMTS allows for 16 different encryption
algorithms and 16 different integrity algorithms specified through the UMTS Encryption
Algorithm (UEA) and UMTS Integrity Algorithm (UIA) identifier [3, 12].
7. SECURITY OF KEYS IN UMTS
As indicated previously, the UMTS security uses three keys, K (the secret key shared between
the HN and the USIM and used during the AKA procedure), CK (confidentiality key), and IK
(data integrity key). These three keys are exposed on the radio link in a similar manner against
cryptographic attacks. If the hacker wants to retrieve CK or IK, he must use the data sent
between the UE and the SN in order to attack the functions (f8 or f9). In this occasion, the
attacker has access only to the protected data; hence hacker can only mount cipher-text only
attacks [24]. In another scenario, if the attacker wants to break K, he will intercept the messages
that are exchanged during the AKA procedure and will use them to mount attacks against the
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security functions f1, f2, f3, f4 and f5. The significant values that the attacker can intercept are
AMF, MAC, RES and RAND (Table 1). Hence, when the attacker tries to retrieve K, the
attacker can mount both cipher-texts only and known plaintext attacks. In previous case,
attacker tries to retrieve CK or IK, he has more text that he can use, but can mount only cipher-
text only attacks. Therefore, we can conclude the similarity of the exposure to attacks is in
contrast to the enormous difference of the importance of a successful attack if CK or IK are
broken only a limited amount of data is compromised, whereas if K is broken the entire security
of past and future communications is compromised. So K is more interesting and attractive than
CK and IK for attackers and hackers. Hence, protection of this key is so important for both UE
and SN. Some mechanisms and procedures are proposed to enhance the security of the secret
key. Three methods were previously presented an enhanced identification procedure that allows
the establishment of a Temporary Key (TK), the encryption of the authentication messages that
will protect them from attacks and the increase of the size of the secret key, K.
In first measure, we can use a protocol that has already been proposed and we can enhance it
order to assure adequate protection for the master key. This protocol is the Enhancement Mobile
Security and User Confidentiality for UMTS (EMSUCU) that was proposed for the protection
of IMSI [26, 27]. As we said before, the UMTS system limits the usage of the IMSI identity as
much as possible. Whenever possible a temporary identity, the TMSI, is used. Furthermore, the
TMSI is sent encrypted over the radio link. Correspondingly, we propose that the AV be
generated using a TK, instead of the K. For the establishment of the secret key TK we propose
adapting the EMSUCU protocol. A new TK will be generated each time the Enhanced
EMSUCU protocol is performed [5]. As we discussed in section 3, in the UMTS security
standard when the cryptoperiod of the keys pair CK, IK has expired the ME will delete their
value. Subsequently, a new AKA procedure will be initiated in order to produce a new pair of
keys CK and IK. Other proposition is very easy and suitable: when the cryptoperiod of CK and
IK expires, the ME initiates the AKA procedure before deleting the keys pair CK and IK. In this
case, these keys will be used to protect the messages that are exchanged during the AKA
procedure. It will be very simple to implement this method, because it involves only a minor
change in the order of events of the UMTS security protocols. As with all other messages, the
encryption will be performed by the ME at the user side and by the RNC at the network side
using the same security algorithms. Although the encryption of the AKA messages are efficient
and easy to implement, it has a drawback it needs a set of valid secret keys CK and IK. So, there
will be cases when it will not be possible to use it to protect the AKA messages, e.g. when the
user turns his UE on. Besides the above mentioned measures we also propose to increase the
size of the secret key K from 128 bits to at least 256. Due to the importance of the secret key K,
we advise a minimal length of 256 bits.
8. THREATS AND ATTACKS ON UMTS
On one hand, it is easy to intercept into the UMTS system because its interface is air. On the
other hand, the UMTS system protection is difficult. The 3GPP has identified different threats
into the UMTS system. Some of them are as follows, DoS, impersonation of a user, and
impersonation of the network, MiM attack, and identity catching. In a multi service providing
system, where the mobile is used for e-commerce, banking transactions and wireless mobile
payments, the authentication, confidentiality and data identity of a user is a necessity. Hence,
the above attacks are sufficient to attract an attacker to identify the user and even trace him.
Table 1 depicts these attacks. They are studied and categorized based on three security factors
namely, authentication, confidentiality, and data integrity.
A: Authentication C: Confidentiality D I: Data Integrity
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Table 2: UMTS Security Attacks
As this Table shows, some attacks threaten on one factor and some of them carry out on two or
three factors. Hence, the attacks are classified into three risk level, Low, Medium, and High. In
this section, we have selected four attacks with high level of risk in Table 2. These attacks can
exploit a weakness of the system and focus on AKA mechanism. We will try to give a brief
explanation of each one. They can be noted in their referenced articles with their details.
8.1. Man-In-the-Middle Attack
An ability of the intruder to put himself between two communicating parties, a user (MS) and
the network, enabling him for various actions including eavesdropping, modifying, deleting, re-
UMTS Attacks A C D I Risk
1. Replay Attack [2, 13, 16, 23 ] Yes No No Low
2. Man-In-the-Middle (MiM) Attack [2,
3, 8, 13, 14, 15, 16] Yes Yes Yes High
3. Brute Force Attack [8] Yes No Yes Medium
4. Eavesdropping Attack [2, 3, 4, 13, 15] No Yes No Low
5. Impersonation of The User Attack [2,
3, 4, 22] Yes No No Low
6. Dictionary Attack [8] Yes No No Low
7. Impersonation of The Network Attack
[2, 3, 22] Yes No No Low
8. Compromising AV In The Network
Attack [2, 3, 10] Yes No No Low
9. Denial of Service (DoS) Attack [2, 3, 8,
18, 22] Yes Yes Yes High
10. Identity Catching Attack [3, 20, 21] Yes Yes Yes High
11. Redirection Attack [13, 14 ] Yes Yes Yes High
12. Sequence Number Depletion Attack
[13] Yes No No Low
13. Roaming Attack[13] Yes Yes Yes High
14. Bidding Down Attack [19] No Yes Yes Medium
15. Guessing Attack [23] Yes Yes No Medium
16. Substitution Attack [23] Yes Yes Yes High
17. Disclosure Of User Identity(IMSI)
Attack [16] Yes No No Low
18. Packets Injection Attack [8] No No Yes Low
19. Content Modification Attack [8] No No Yes Low
20. Secret Key Exposure Attack [21] Yes Yes Yes High
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ordering, replaying, and spoof signalling or user data. A MiM attacks are one of the most
popular and challenging threats in communication systems (such as GSM, GPRS and especially
UMTS) and there is a large body of research dedicated to the detection and analysis of different
forms of these attacks [13, 14, 15, 16, 17]. A MiM attack is defined as an attack in which the
intruder is able to read and write messages communicated between two parties of network
without either party being conscious of this fact.
8.2. Denial of Service Attack
The DoS attacks on UMTS systems are difficult to launch as integrity protection of critical
signalling messages avoids the DoS attacks using User de-registration request spoofing, location
update request spoofing and Camping on false BS/MS. We show that unprotected messages
before security mode command may be used for launching DoS attacks [8, 18, 22].The
following will result in complete or partial DoS to the target user.
1) User de-registration request spoofing: If the network side cannot authenticate
messages, then an attacker (with a modified MS) can send a de-registration request to
the network, which is compiled by the network and simultaneously sends instructions
data to the HLR to do the same. Thus Integrity protection of critical signalling messages
is mandatory. The SN verifies the de-registration request for integrity and replay.
2) Location updates request spoofing: Instead of sending requests for de-registration, the
attacker sends a location update request from a different area of SN (or another
networks) in which the user is presently located. As a result the user is paged in the new
area. The location update request is always protected against replay and modification.
3) Camping on a false BS/MS: The attacker with a modified BS/MS place in himself
between the SN and the target user. The integrity protection of critical signalling
messages protects against the DoS to some degree, as the intruder can’t modify
signalling messages. However, the system does not prevent the attacker and hacker
from relaying of messages between the network and the target user or ignoring some of
them (not all of them) [3, 18].
8.3. Redirection Attack
Redirection attack is one of the possible attacks on multi homed mobile networks. In this attack,
an attacker owns a device that can simultaneously impersonate both the Base Station Subsystem
(BSS) and the MS. To cheat the victim MS, the attacker masquerades as a legitimate BSS by
broadcasting a bogus BSS ID. It also disguises as the victim MS to trick the BSS. The attacker
connects to another legal foreign network on behalf of the legitimate MS and builds up a clear
tunnel to relay messages between the authorized foreign network and the victim MS. Since
AUTN, RAND, and secret keys are successfully negotiated, the victim MS will then be
authenticated by the foreign network. The redirection attack annoys a victim MS with billing
Problems, forcing the victim MS on his HN to be charged for roaming into a foreign domain
operated by another service provider. In this case, neither the HN nor the victim MS can detect
the redirection attack. It is also possible that the attacker can redirect the victim MS to an
insecure network with weak or none encryption. Hence, the adversary can eavesdrop the
communication sessions [14].
8.4. Identity Catching
Unfortunately, UMTS system offers little protection against identity catching. Although IMSI is
replaced by TMSIs after the first connection request, IMSI is sent clear during the initial
rrcConnectionRequest and also on the occasions like VLR database crash, VLR’s inability to
identify the TMSI. The attacker impersonates as a UMTS VLR/SGSN. During
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rrcConnectionRequest the victim may use TMSI. If TMSI cannot be resolved, then the network
can make an identity request. In this case, ME has to send its IMSI in clear. After obtaining the
IMSI, the attacker disconnects himself. We classify this attack as follow [2].
1) Passive identity catching: The attacker with a modified MS waits inactively for a new
registration or a database crash as in this state the user is requested to send its identity in
clear text. The use of temporary identities inhibits passive identity catching since the
intruder has to wait for a new registration or a mismatch in the SN database in order to
capture the user’s permanent identity in clear text.
2) Active identity catching: In this case, the attacker with a modified BS entices the user to
camp on his BS and then asks him to send his IMSI. Unfortunately 3G does not provide
perfect protection against this type of attack.
9. IMPROVING AKA SECURITY MECHANISM
In this section, we present some protocol and method such as Cocktail-AKA, S-AKA, and
PANA/UMTS to improve UMTS authentication mechanism. Most of these techniques focus on
AKA as an important authentication mechanism in UMTS system. Some of them are designed
to protect specific attacks such as MiM and DoS. The study tries to describe briefly different
scenarios and procedures to enhance UMTS authentication mechanism (AKA). They are as
follows [8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 16, 19, 21, 22, 23, 25].
The first Scenario proposes an authentication method combining the USIM mechanism and the
concepts of AAA (Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting) for the fast authentication. In
a wireless environment, authentication is required every time the mobile user moves from one
cell to another. Therefore, authentication time should be taken into account as a significant and
major factor in mobility. This method presents the procedure to achieve the secure and rapid
authentication by applying the USIM mechanism well-suited over 3GPP to AAA.
In the second scenario, we propose special protocol to provide an IP compatible, lightweight,
and flexible technique to authenticate a user to an access network. This protocol is based on
Protocol for carrying Authentication for Network Access (PANA), a network-layer access
authentication protocol carrier, which communicates, via Extensible Authentication Protocol
(EAP), with an AAA infrastructure interacting with a UMTS AuC. PANA/UMTS is also based
on EAP/AKA, which allows to using the AKA mechanism in new mobile generations
comprising devices equipped with a USIM technology. PANA/UMTS prevents some significant
attacks such as MiM, reply, hijacking, packets injection and content modification. It imposes
data-origin authentication, replay protection based on SQN and integrity protection. In addition,
it uses a 128 bit key length and is not vulnerable to brute-force or dictionary attacks.
As it is known Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol has proved its efficiency in the wired
internet and it will probably be the most promising candidate for wireless environments. In this
scenario, this famous and previous protocol is purposed to improve some existing problems
related to AKA procedures, such as compromised authentication vectors attacks, as they appear
in current mobile communication systems such as GSM and UMTS. This method proposes how
SSL, combined with Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) elements, can be used to resolve these
vulnerabilities. measurements display that SSL-based authentication can be possible in terms of
service time in wireless systems, while it can concurrently provide the suitable flexibility and
scalability to network operators and a high level of confidence and assurance to mobile users.
In this part, new authentication protocol based on previous scenario is introduced (but with
some modification) for 3G UMTS networks. This proposed protocol uses digital certificates
PKI and SSL symmetric key generation schemes to generate CK and IK. In this scenario IMSI
is sent encrypted while it is sent in plaintext in AKA procedure. The proposed protocol is more
secure than 3GPP AKA and provides IMSI privacy against eavesdropping attack. In addition, it
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does not use AVs and find a new solution to vector attack vulnerability in UMTS AKA. This
method reduces the total signalling traffic between entities and decreases the bandwidth
consumed between database entities, while increasing the bandwidth consumed between MS
and VLR.
As discussed in section 8, two important attacks of UMTS AKA are redirection and MiM. In
these attacks, an adversary can launch these attacks to eavesdrop, or cause billing problems. To
cope with these problems, a new Secure Authentication Key Agreement Protocol (S-AKA) is
proposed in this scenario to improve the security to resist these threats. The analysis shows that
proposed S-AKA not only defeats those attacks mentioned above, but also reduces up to 45% of
bandwidth consumption. The formal proof of S-AKA is also given to ensure the security
strength of S-AKA. In this method, S-AKA can resolve these attacks with the MS assistance
itself and the SGSN. In S-AKA, the MS can reject illegal BS connection, and on the other hand
the SGSN can verify the LAI sent from the MS. If the LAI is illegal, the SGSN will drop the
connection. The LAI in UMTS AKA is not encrypted by any means, and thus can be altered by
the adversary for significant attacks. In S-AKA, we use MAC to protect the integrity of LAI. If
an attacker attempts to modify LAI, the illegal modification will be detected immediately.
This scenario introduces a new way to overcome the congenital defects and weaknesses of the
AKA mechanism in UMTS. In this method, Ou et al. propose an improved protocol called the
cocktail-AKA protocol to prevent some significant and powerful attacks such as DoS and
impersonation. Cocktail-AKA protocol follows the essence of eminent cocktail therapy that is,
using two kinds of AVs in the protocol. All SNs produce their own AVs in advance, which are
called Medicated Authentication Vectors (MAV). These MAVs can be reused; hence, they need
to be produced only once. When the authentication phase is initiated, the HE calculates a private
AV for the MS and transfers it to the SN. This is called the Prescription Authentication Vector
(PAV). The SN dispenses the PAV with the MAV, which can produce many effective AVs that
can be used later for mutual authentication with the MS.
This method proposes a new and secure authentication mechanism by integrating the public key
with the hash-chaining technique. The proposed protocol satisfies the security requirements of
3G mobile networks. It also provides the protection of IMSI to ensure subscriber un-traceability,
key refreshment periodically, strong key management and a new non-repudiation service in a
simple and elegant way. To avoid the complicated synchronization as in UMTS this protocol
does not use SQN, the management of a hash chain is simple and elegant compared to that of
SQN. This proposed protocol is secure against network attacks, such as replay attacks, guessing
attacks, and other attacks.
In this scenario enhancements for the initial identification and for the AKA protocols are
proposed that solve two known vulnerabilities and attacks of UMTS system like identity
catching and secret key exposure. This solution, inspired from Al Saraireh identification
protocol, realizes the encryption of the permanent identity of the subscriber and protects the
messages exchanged during the AKA protocol. The proposed improvements that we proposed
are in line with the UMTS security development philosophy: it is preferred to propose
modifications to the current security protocols or to already proposed ones rather than proposing
radical new protocols.
10. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper the security framework and mechanisms in the UMTS system are reviewed. The
focus was on authentication mechanism, called Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) as
important security mechanism in this system. In addition, the most important security attacks
such as Denial of Service (DoS), Man-In-the-Middle (MiM), Redirection, and Replay attacks,
which threaten the mobile and network users, are presented. The results of these attacks mainly
concern the availability of resources and services, the authentication and authorization of users
and actions, and the integrity and confidentiality of the data transferred. We evaluated these
attacks and classified them based on three security factors, authentication, confidentiality, and
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data integrity. The evaluations showed that the authentication factor is more interesting for
attackers and hackers. In addition, we described the DoS, MiM, Identity catching, and
Redirection attacks as the most prevalent and significant attacks which are target authentication
factors in UMTS system and finally some resolves and purposes to improve authentication
mechanism against these attacks and threats were found and presented.
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Authors
M. Ayoubi Mobarhan received the BSc degrees in electrical engineering
(electronic) from Islamic Azad University of Lahijan (Iran) in 2008. He has been
working at his own private company (IT and Electronic engineering) since August
2007. In October 2009, he joined the Department of Computer Engineering,
University of Guilan, Iran, as a full-time MSc. student under advisor Dr.
Asadollah Shahbahrami. His research interests include wireless Application
Protocol (WAP), image and video processing, wireless networks, and security of
mobile communications.
M. Ayoubi Mobarhan received the BSc degrees in electrical engineering
(electronic) from Islamic Azad University of Lahijan (Iran) in 2008. He has been
working at his own private company (IT and Electronic engineering) and
scientific institute since August 2005. In October 2009, he joined the Department
of Computer Engineering, University of Guilan, Iran, as a full-time MSc. student
under advisor Dr. Asadollah Shahbahrami. His research interests include image
and video processing, wireless networks, security of communication networks,
mobile communications, and multimedia instructions set design.
16. International Journal of Network Security & Its Applications (IJNSA), Vol.4, No.4, July 2012
52
A. Shahbahrami received the BSc and MSc degrees in computer engineering
(hardware and machine intelligence) from Iran University of Science and
Technology and Shiraz University in 1993 and 1996, respectively. He was offered
a faculty position in the Department of Electrical Engineering at University of
Guilan. He has been working at University of Guilan since August 1996. In
January 2004, he joined the Faculty of Electrical Engineering, Mathematics, and
Computer Science, Delft University of Technology, Delft, The Netherlands, as a
full-time Ph.D. student under advisors Prof. Stamatis Vassiliadis and Dr. Ben
Juurlink. He received his PhD degree in September 2008 from Delft University of Technology. He has an
assistant professor position in Department of Computer Engineering at the University of Guilan. His
research interests include advanced computer architecture, image and video processing, multimedia
instructions set design, reconfigurable computing, parallel processing, and SIMD programming.