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Uploaded byProf. David E. Alexander (UCL)
New Directions in Disaster Risk Reduction
This document discusses new directions for disaster risk reduction. It notes increasing global risks like climate change, pandemics, and conflicts that exacerbate vulnerability. Disasters are seen not just as physical events but as outcomes of social, economic, and political factors that shape vulnerability. Cascading and interconnected disasters are a growing threat as infrastructure and systems become more interdependent. Strategies for managing risk emphasize addressing root causes of vulnerability rather than just preparing for hazards. International frameworks for disaster risk reduction are critiqued as weak on accountability and potentially reinforcing top-down approaches. Overall, new approaches are needed that tackle growing social and economic inequalities driving greater precarity and susceptibility to harm.
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More from Prof. David E. Alexander (UCL)
New Directions in Disaster Risk Reduction
- 1. The Game Changes: NewImperatives and New Directions in Disaster Risk Reduction David Alexander University College London
- 2. Human misery ●poverty ●disease ●malnutrition ●conflict ●displacement ● ... climate change,ecological collapse...? disasters
- 3. Disaster Risk Reduction ordisaster risk creation?
- 4. The cure to damage ratiois 1:43
- 5. Risk amplification factors Risk mitigation factors Total vulnerability Risk perception factors- +positivenegative DIALECTIC
- 6. Climate change Terrorism Displacement andmigration Pandemics and epidemics Population increase Environmentalchange Conflict Technological disasters and major incidents 'Natural' disasters
- 7.
- 8. The "egg hypothesis"Disaster • prima facie causes • root causes • vulnerabilities • dynamic pressures Context • general vulnerability • poverty • deprivation • marginalisation
- 9. HAZARD/THREAT DISASTER VULNERABILITY WEAKENING OF SOCIAL FABRIC GENERAL VULNERABILITY HUMAN CONSEQUENCES The'hazardscape' or 'risk landscape' The 'wreckage economy'
- 10.
- 11.
- 12. HUMAN CONSEQUENCES OF DISASTER “ORTHODOX” MODEL PHYSICAL EVENT HUMAN VULNERABILITY “RADICALCRITIQUE” (K. HEWITT et al.) HUMAN CONSEQUENCES OF DISASTER HUMAN VULNERABILITY PHYSICAL EVENT CURRENT NEEDS HUMAN CONSEQUENCES OF DISASTER HUMAN VULNERABILITY CULTURE HISTORY PHYSICAL EVENTS CONTEXT & CONSEQUENCES
- 13. physical environmental social economic health-related cultural educational infrastructural institutional RESILIENCE COPING VULNERABILITY FRAGILITY SUSCEPTIBILITY Organisation: • public admin. •private sector • civil society Community Individual ...and relationships
- 14. Vulnerability Total: life is generallyprecarious Economic: people lack adequate occupation Technological/technocratic: due to the riskiness of technology Delinquent: caused by corruption, negligence, etc. Residual: caused by lack of modernisation Newly generated: caused by changes in circumstances
- 15. • an objective,a process or a strategy? • a paradigm, diverse paradigms? • 'bounce-back' or 'bounce-forward'? • should it focus on the community scale? • can it reconcile dynamic and static elements?. Resilience
- 16. RESILIENCE: as a materialhas brittle strength and ductility: society must have an optimum combination of resistance to hazard impacts and ability to adapt to them.
- 17.
- 18. ` • current knowledgeabout the concepts of vulnerability, threat and risk • current knowledge about the concept of resilience • human organisation in crisis situations • gap analysis and resilience matrix • interactions between vulnerability and resilience: theoretical model. Balancing vulnerability and resilience
- 19.
- 20. • topping dominoes,knock-on effects • linking physical & social vulnerabilities • compound and interconnected risks • non-linear progress and amplification of risks • multiple-scale & secondary risks. Cascading disasters
- 21.
- 22.
- 23. Electricity failure Water andsewerage failure Refrigeration failure (food toxicity) Banking failure Food and fuel supply failure Transportation failure Social success or failure? Communications failure
- 24.
- 25. In Japan, FukushimaDai'ichi destroyed the relationship of trust between the people, government and science.
- 26.
- 27. Grenfell Tower, June2017:- • welfare and equity issues • 314 dangerous residential towers emergency management procedures • decimated building regulations • highly dangerous urban pollution.
- 28. Triggering event Response capacity overwhelmed Disruption of critical infrastructure Cascading escalation of secondary events Intangible effects Shut-down ofservices and facilities Equipment failures Social reaction • therapeutic community • law and order Back-up generator failures Mortality and morbidity Shortages • water • fuel • sewerage After Pescaroli & Kelman 2016, JCCM
- 30. Time Short/fastLong/slow SpaceRestricted Extensive CAS &critical infrastructure Macro-level socio- technical systems, e.g. globalisation Local & regional socio- technical systems, e.g. policies Environmental triggers (if any) Impact and feedback Vulnerability loops
- 32. RISK • Compound risk:multiple extreme events • Interacting risk: environmental drivers • Interconnected risk: interdependent natural, human & technological systems • Cascading risk: tightly-coupled systems and critical infrastructure • Composite risk: any and all?.
- 33. Coronal mass ejections "spaceweather" • damage to electricity transformers • damage to communications satellites • damage to global navigation systems • increased radiation dose • communications interruptions
- 34. 1859 - the"Carrington Event" 660 BC - a CME ten times larger...
- 35. Magnitude classification ofcascading incidents, crises and disasters Source: Alexander, 2018
- 36. • do notfocus only on the trigger of the event • consider the strategic and tactical levels • encourage dialogue between professional fields • policies and plans to take account of possible cascades. Strategies for managing cascades
- 37. Strategies for managingcascades • broaden impact analysis • use impact trees • identify escalation points • subject them to 'stress tests'.
- 38. Ishinomaki, 2014 The SendaiFramework for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2015-2030 a critique
- 39. • signing upto a non-binding agreement does not necessarily mean DRR action • unscrupulous politicians can be legitimised at home and abroad • good DRR is not exactly a top-down process • collects evidence but uses it at best selectively • accountability remains weak. Deficiencies of the UN process
- 40. • ten-point actionplan • conferences of mayors • field assessment and implementation • signing up to the initiative • safe schools and health facilities. UNISDR Safe Cities Initiative: Making Cities Resilient
- 41. "The City ofVenice joined the [UNISDR Safe Cities] Campaign as a Role Model for cultural heritage protection and climate change adaptation."
- 42. Venice on anordinary day…
- 43. Twelve awkward questionsabout the SFDRR 1. Do we need this document, and why? 2. Whether it is a good or bad instrument, will it have an impact on losses caused by disasters? 3. What are the alternatives to having a Sendai Declaration? Is there a better way? 4. Who will hold governments to account, and how?.
- 44. Twelve awkward questionsabout the SFDRR 5. Would changing the wording of the SFDRR affect disaster losses? 6. Can a document like the SFDRR ever be anything but "top-down", and does this matter? 7. The word 'should' appears 21 times in the SFDRR: does it have real meaning? 8. In the face of 'disaster risk creation', do targets have any meaning?.
- 45. Twelve awkward questionsabout the SFDRR 9. For whom is science, and who will decide that? 10. What framework will produce results when a government is corrupt and unethical? 11. Does globalisation render principles of DRR incapable of being implemented? 12. Is the top-down culture of DRR promoted by UN agencies unhealthy?.
- 46. The sceptic's viewpoint: Thelogic of needing a Sendai Declaration for Disaster Risk Reduction: "Houston, we have a problem. We cannot fix it: nobody has told us to".
- 47.
- 48. Some issues fordisaster risk reduction:- • Widening wealth gap and polarisation between rich and poor • The wrong kind of globalisation; tax havens, exploitation • Gender: plight of women and girls • Power structures: human rights, corruption • Military aid versus humanitarian aid • Disintegrating consensuses.
- 49. ...merely rearranging the deckchairson the Titanic It is time for a new approach to DRR to avoid...
- 50. Thank you forlistening! david.alexander@ucl.ac.uk emergency-planning.blogspot.com slideshare.net/dealexander