The document summarizes David Alexander's research on enhancing resilience after disasters in the Philippines, Japan, and Mexico. It discusses the impacts of Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines in 2013, the 2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami in Japan, and landslides in Mexico. Key findings include that simple existing knowledge was not utilized to protect survivors, transitional shelter was poorly constructed, and opportunities to reduce poverty were missed. The document also analyzes approaches to disaster risk reduction, reconstruction, and the role of organizational, social, and political systems in influencing vulnerability to natural hazards.

1. Enhancing Resilience
David Alexander
University College London

2. The Philippines, Japan and Mexico:
the Odyssey of a disasterologist...

3. Philippines

4. Taclóban, E. Visayas Province, Leyte
Island, Philippines, four months after
cyclone Yolanda (Haiyan) 8/11/2013

5. The storm surge exceeded 5 metres
in places, and 7,360 people died.

6. House occupied
by a family
Dangling piece
of concrete
Vulnerability
Collapsed
sports arena

7. We conducted 160 interviews with
survivors (a 97% response rate).

8. "Good morning - may we
ask you some questions?"

9. "Was your house damaged by the
cyclone? ... It was destroyed."

10. "Did you build this shelter yourself? ...
You did. Did you receive any help? ...No."

11. "Did anyone tell you how to
build a safe shelter? ... No."

12. "Did you buy the materials?
... You found them."

13. "How many people in your family? ...
11 before the cyclone, 6 afterwards."

14. "Did you receive a warning? ... Yes.
Did you evacuate? ... Women and
children, not men. They drowned."

15. "Your employment situation? ...
Husband was rickshaw driver before
the cyclone, you are unemployed now."

16. "Did you receive help from
the Government? ... 15 kilos
of rice. Is that all? ... Yes."

17. "From NGOs? ... 12,000 pesos
from Tzu-Chi Foundation."

19. "What did you use it for?
... Building materials."

20. "Were they more expensive
than usual? ... Yes, 30%"

21. Beached ships
Sea
Village

22. "What do you know about the
reconstruction? ... Nothing."

23. • men were more likely to die, women
bore greatest burden in recovery
• cash distribution saved the day for
survivors but contributed to inflation
• transitional shelter was poorly
constructed and not hazard-proof
• links between emergency, transitional
phase and reconstruction were very poor
• opportunities to lift people out of
poverty and destitution not taken.
Some conclusions on Tacloban

24. Simple, existing knowledge was not widely
utilised to make life safer for survivors.

25. The transitional phase between emergency
and reconstruction remains controversial.

27. Tacloban,
Philippines

28. Kesennuma,
Japan

29. Tōhoku earthquake
and tsunami
11 March 2011
18,500 dead,
6,150 injured
max. wave height
40.5 metres
500 sq. km
devastated in
three prefectures.
Shizugawa,
Miyagi Prefecture

30. Cascading
effects
Collateral
vulnerability
Secondary
disasters
Interaction
between risks
Climate
change
Probability
Indeterminacy
"Fat-tailed" (skewed)
distributions
of impacts

31. For what magnitude and frequency of
event should structural defences be built?

32. Organisation Resources
Self-organisation
Imposed
organisation
Voluntarism
Community disaster planning
Laws, protocols, directives
Standards, norms, guidelines
Community
resources
Governmental
resources
Donations
International resources

33. "...we had long been alarmed by the
lack of gender sensitivity in plans for
disaster risk reduction and reconstruction."
Domoto, A. et al. 2013. Disaster Risk Reduction: A
Japanese Women's Perspective on 3/11. Japan Women's
Network for Disaster Risk Reduction, Tokyo, 31 pp.

34. "Organized solely by men and operated on the basis
of bureaucratic expediency, the tightly regimented
shelters completely disregarded ... women’s needs."
Domoto, A. et al. 2013. Disaster Risk Reduction: A
Japanese Women's Perspective on 3/11. Japan Women's
Network for Disaster Risk Reduction, Tokyo, 31 pp.

35. "...local community leaders, most of whom were
elderly men with outdated values, took charge."
Domoto, A. et al. 2013. Disaster Risk Reduction: A
Japanese Women's Perspective on 3/11. Japan Women's
Network for Disaster Risk Reduction, Tokyo, 31 pp.

36. "Like most older Japanese, the women were
unaccustomed to challenging authority."
Domoto, A. et al. 2013. Disaster Risk Reduction: A
Japanese Women's Perspective on 3/11. Japan Women's
Network for Disaster Risk Reduction, Tokyo, 31 pp.

37. The disaster has
many important
cultural connotations
Rikuzentakata, Iwate Prefecture

38. Memory and commemoration

41. Long term
Short term
Emic components
Etic components
METAMORPHOSIS
OF CULTURE
Experiences of culture
[mass-media and consumer culture]
Accumulated cultural traits and beliefs
Inherited cultural background
Ideological
(non-scientific)
interpretations
of disaster
Learned
(scientific)
interpretations
of disaster

42. COASTAL
NATURAL
HAZARDS
The national culture of
'top-down' recovery
and mitigation
JAPAN
The local
spontaneous
risk aversion
culture
The local
inherited
marine culture
(bonds with
the sea)
The national culture of
acceptance of authority
DYNAMIC STATIC
OR LESS
DYNAMIC
STATIC
EXPEDIENT

43. Etic
elements
of culture
Emic
elements
of
culture
Area
of cultural
interpenetration

44. Post-Earthquake Report card
Institutional learning: professional/bureaucratic
model (partially successful)
Governance: still very top-down
Volunteer organisation: progress, but starting
from a low level
Community organisation: weak
Gender issues: progress, but starting
from a low level
Environmentalism: poor
DRR: narrow, dominated by structural solutions
Developments beyond Kobe 1995:
strong in certain sectors
Developments beyond Tōhoku 2011: limited

45. The rapidity of reconstruction in Tōhoku
Region (7-year programme) means that many
problems will be faced after it is over,
which will make them harder to resolve.
Time is socially necessary in disaster recovery.

46. Vending machines: the most
resilient things in Japan?

47. Mexico

48. Teziutlán
Puebla
Mexico City

49. 5 October 1999: Aurora
109 dead in landslide here

50. Ayotzingo: a community
reconstructed

51. Urban landsliding
in Teziutlán

52. Aire Libre: house occupied by a
family threatened with landslide

55. Teziutlán: an emerging
civil protection system

56. Functional
divisions:
government,
healthcare,
commerce, etc.
Hierarchical
divisions:
national,
regional,
local, etc.
Geographical
divisions:
catchments,
jurisdictions,
areas, etc.
Organisational
divisions:
police, fire,
ambulance,
etc.
Division
and
integration

57. P
E
S
T
O
R
Policies/Ethics
Strategies
Tactics
Operations
Results
General
public
Public administrators
and politicians
Emergency and
technical services
Command
function
organisation

59. Some of the indicators used to evaluate
the civil protection system in Teziutlán

60. System state Capabilities
Integration with
other levels and
services
Birth of the civil protection system
Nascent Very few None
Threshold of an incipient functional entity
Restricted
operation
Some Limited
Threshold of widened and improved functionality
Functional Improved Significant
Threshold of excellence and efficiency
Fully efficient Comprehensive Fully integrated
Stage of
development*
0
1
2
3
4
5
EMERGENCE

61. • reveal the weakest parts of the system
• indicate where investment is needed
• help decide priorities for growth
• assess emergency response capacity
• draw an objective picture of the system.
How does evaluation of a CP system help?

62. Conclusions

63. There is no doubt
that "we live in
interesting times".

64. "The City of Venice joined the
[UNISDR Safe Cities] Campaign
as a Role Model for cultural heritage
protection and climate change adaptation."

69. • corruption
• political decision-making
• shoddy building (often wilful)
• ignorance (sometimes wilful)
• seismicity.
What causes earthquake disasters?
- in probable order of importance -

70. Organisational
systems:
management
Social
systems:
behaviour
Natural
systems:
function
Technical
systems:
malfunction
VulnerabilityHazard
Resilience
Political
systems:
decisions

71. HUMAN
CONSEQUENCES
OF DISASTER
“ORTHODOX” MODEL
PHYSICAL
EVENT
HUMAN
VULNERABILITY
“RADICAL CRITIQUE” (K. HEWITT et al.)
HUMAN
CONSEQUENCES
OF DISASTER
HUMAN
VULNERABILITY
PHYSICAL
EVENT
PROPOSAL FOR A NEW MODEL
HUMAN
CONSEQUENCES
OF DISASTER
HUMAN
VULNERABILITY
CULTURE HISTORY
PHYSICAL
EVENTS
CONTEXT & CONSEQUENCES

72. THE PILLARS OF MODERN LIFE
idealism
principle
belief
faith
fanaticism
ultranationalism
authoritarianism
backlash
virtue
charity
service
defence of principles
unscrupulousness
corruption
opportunism
censure
capital availability
wealth diffusion
financial security
financial repression
debt burden
consumerism
ingegnuity
pragmatism
technological progress
crass materialism
galloping consumption
pollution and waste
technological hegemony
Ideocentrism
Morality
Luchrocentrism
Technocentrism
SPIRITFLESH
PHILOSOPHICALMECHANISTIC
Positive Negative

73. ...culturally conditioned.
Ideocentrism
+ ideal: effective disaster mitigation
- fanaticism: politicization of humanitarian relief
Morality
+ virtue: untiring application of mitigation measures
- corruption: failure to observe building codes
Luchrocentrism
+ financial security: monetary reserves vs. disaster
- financial repression: poverty --> vulnerability
Technocentrism
+ ingenuity: new hazard monitoring systems
- technological hegemony: unfair distribution of
mitigation benefits

74. The vulnerability
is the hazard!

75. david.alexander@ucl.ac.uk
www.slideshare.net/dealexander
emergency-planning.blogspot.com
Ishinomaki