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![Cascading disasters
[crises, emergencies]
are negative events that involve:-
• a primary impact (the trigger)
• chains & networks of consequences
• secondary impacts
• complex interacting vulnerabilities
• escalation points
• (usually) complex impacts
upon critical infrastructure.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/cascadingdisasters03-09-2019-190903061803/85/Cascading-Disasters-16-320.jpg)
Uploaded byProf. David E. Alexander (UCL)
Cascading Disasters
This document discusses cascading disasters and critical infrastructure. It begins with an overview of cascading disasters as events with primary impacts that lead to secondary impacts through interconnected vulnerabilities and escalation points. The document then discusses critical infrastructure and how the failure of critical systems like power, water, and communications can cascade and impact other sectors. It emphasizes that cascading disasters involve long chains of consequences and that risk analysis should consider escalation points and worst-case scenarios. The goal is to understand these complex events in order to enhance resilience and protection of critical infrastructure.
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Cascading Disasters
- 1. David Alexander University CollegeLondon Cascading Disasters: Lessons from the Past, Recent Developments, Future Prospects
- 2. Institute for Riskand Disaster Reduction Prof. David Alexander Professor of Risk and Disaster Reduction Dr Gianluca Pescaroli Lecturer in Business Continuity and Organisational Resilience Dr Robert Wicks Associate Prof. of Space Weather Risk IRDR / Dept of Space and Climate Physics UCL-IRDR Cascading Disasters Research Group
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- 5. The wider agenda:- •what is the role of root causes in disasters? • what is the balance between root causes and immediate causes? • how do cascades function? • what and where are the escalation points? • how do we deal with all of this in order to make life safer?
- 6. 'PRESSURE-AND-RELEASE' MODEL PROGRESSION OFVULNERABILITY ROOT CAUSES DYNAMIC PRESSURES UNSAFE CONDITIONS HAZARDSDISASTER Theoretical and conceptual framework for analysis Wisner, Cannon, Blaikie and Davis 2004, At Risk.
- 7. 'PRESSURE-AND-RELEASE' MODEL PROGRESSION OFVULNERABILITY ROOT CAUSES DYNAMIC PRESSURES UNSAFE CONDITIONS HAZARDSDISASTER Theoretical and conceptual framework for analysis Wisner, Cannon, Blaikie and Davis 2004, At Risk.
- 8. The "egg hypothesis"Disaster • prima facie causes • root causes • vulnerabilities • dynamic pressures Context • general vulnerability • poverty • deprivation • marginalisation
- 9. The "egg hypothesis"Disaster • prima facie causes • root causes • vulnerabilities • dynamic pressures Context • general vulnerability • poverty • deprivation • marginalisation Disaster Marginalisation, impoverishment
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- 11. Risk amplification factors Risk mitigation factors Total vulnerability Risk perception factors- +positivenegative DIALECTIC
- 12. HAZARD or THREAT SPECIFIC VULNERABILITY HUMAN CONSEQUENCES The 'hazardscape'or the 'risk landscape' WEAKENING of the SOCIAL FABRIC GENERAL VULNERABILITY HUMAN CONSEQUENCES The 'wreckage economy' Health Employment Services • reduced • rationed • overpriced
- 13. ` • current knowledgeabout the concepts of vulnerability, threat and risk • current knowledge about the concept of resilience • human organisation in crisis situations • gap analysis and resilience matrix • interactions between resilience and vulnerability: theoretical model. Balancing vulnerability and resilience
- 14. Direct causes: practical problems contributingto disaster Long-term causes (dynamic pressures): predisposition for disaster Root causes: motivating and underlying factors Local cascading effects National cascading effects International cascading effects Escalation factors Context
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- 16. Cascading disasters [crises, emergencies] arenegative events that involve:- • a primary impact (the trigger) • chains & networks of consequences • secondary impacts • complex interacting vulnerabilities • escalation points • (usually) complex impacts upon critical infrastructure.
- 17. Intangible effects heritage e.g. museum-> artefacts -> restorers Cascading escalation of secondary events Triggering event National response capacity overwhelmed Disruption of critical infrastructure Direct effects: functional nodes e.g. power plant failure - > lack of energy supply - > lack of water Indirect effects: autonomous hazards e.g. nuclear plant- >contamination->CBRN training and dosimetersRequest/offer international relief Source: Pescaroli & Kelman 2016, JCCM
- 18. C E E E E C E/C E E E E E E E E E/C (a) (b) C -cause E - effect E/C- escalation points Source: Pescaroli & Alexander (2015)
- 19. Water treatment works Railwaystation Fire station Electricity sub-station Broadband antenna Hospital Supermarket Power station Waste water treatment works FLOOD SITUATION
- 20. Cascading disasters • toppingdominoes, knock-on effects • linking physical and social vulnerabilities • compound and interconnected risks • non-linear progress and amplification of risks • multiple-scale and secondary risks.
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- 23. Rigopiano, 18 Jan.2017 Central Italy, January 2017: Connected Events Campo Felice, 24 Jan. 2017
- 24. TimeLongShort/Fast Scenario trigger N1(e.g. Cyber attack) Scenario trigger N2 (e.g. Extreme space weather). Scenario trigger N3 (e.g.Pandemics). Scenario trigger N4 (e.g. Flooding). Scenario trigger Nx (Other scenarios) Possible path Realised path Secondary emergency Escalating crisis Primary impact
- 25. Primary cause of disaster Impact on critical infrastructure Impacton housing Impact on productive capacity Direct impacts Indirect impacts Impact on activities Secondary impacts Impact on livelihoods Impact on revenue Secondary cause of disaster Impact on well-being Impact on safety Impact on recovery
- 26. Source: Pescaroli andAlexander, 2016 Time Short/fastLong/slow SpaceRestricted Extensive CAS & critical infrastructure Macro-level socio- technical systems, e.g. globalisation Local & regional socio- technical systems, e.g. policies Environmental triggers (if any) Impact and feedback Vulnerability loops
- 27. Cascading disasters magnitudescale (Alexander 2018) Cascading disasters involve escalation points which result from the interaction of different vulnerabilities.
- 28. Level 0 -Simple incident or major incident. No significant cascades or escalation points. Level 1 - Major incident of limited complexity. Simple, short cascades as secondary effects of the starting impact. Level 2 - Major incident or small disaster, some complex consequences. Limited cascade chains propagate to tertiary levels. Level 3 - Disaster, with complex consequences. Significant cascade chains with at least one escalation point. Level 4 - Disaster, with substantially complex consequences. Easily identifiable cascades with escalation points. Level 5 - Catastrophe, with overwhelmingly complex consequences. Major initial impact sets off long causal chains of cascading consequences, some of which through escalation points generate secondary causal chains. Magnitude classification of cascading incidents, crises and disasters
- 29. Interacting Risk Interconnected Risk Compound Risk Cascading Risk Environmental drivers Simultaneous or successive extreme events Global interdependencyof human, natural and technological systems Disruption of critical infra- structure and tightly coupled organisational systems Multiple risk assessment Globalisation, Systems theory Causality chains Background conditions amplify events (underling risk drivers) Climate change, Physical and statistical components Environmental drivers Tightly coupled organisational systems Disruption of critical infrastructure Source:Pescaroli and Alexander, 2019
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- 31. Critical infrastructure: "thoseinfrastructure assets (physical or electronic) that are vital to the continued delivery and integrity of the essential services upon which society relies, the loss or compromission of which would lead to severe economic or social consequences or to loss of life."
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- 33. Criticality scale Impact on life Economic impact Impacton essential services Impactcategories 5 4 3 2 1 Critical threshold Critical national infrastructure Other national infrastructure
- 34. Cost of riskreduction Risk Inefficient measures Disproportionate measures Insufficient measures Optimal measures Critical infrastructure
- 35. Coronal mass ejections "spaceweather" • damage to electricity transformers • damage to communications satellites • damage to global navigation systems • increased radiation dose • communications interruptions
- 36. 1859 - the"Carrington Event" 660 BC - a CME ten times larger...
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- 39. Knock-on effects ofelectricity failure • water: no pumping, no wastewater discharge or treatment • energy: heat and air conditioning down, gas unusable • food: no refrigeration; quick contamination • health: reliance on hospital generators • transport: no traffic control, no fuel pumping • communications: no mass-communications at all • finance: no money supply • government: cannot communicate with the people • emergency services: hampered and over-stretched.
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- 41. Basic problem: howto communicate when there is no electricity?
- 42. Hogan, M. 2013. AnytownReport. London Resilience Telecoms Electricity Water Acute healthcare Primary & community healthcare Wider community impact Local authorities & businesses environment sector Climate & Transport sector Emergency services sector
- 43. Generators in criticalfacilities (e.g. hospitals) • low or uncertain fuel autonomy & resupply • not designed to function for long periods • seldom tested • high rate of failure.
- 44. Wide-area prolonged powersupply interruption • technical failure with 'domino effect' • excess of demand over supply • successful cyber attack • direct terrorist attack (sabotage) • space weather damages transformers • ice storm, wind storm, etc. • other causes
- 45. Management, mitigation and resiliencestrategies
- 46. There is nowa demand for knowledge about cascading impacts and their effects • decision support systems • theoretical models • exploration of scenarios • training sessions • information dissemination • brainstorming sessions.
- 47. How to dealwith cascading disasters and crises • do not focus only on the trigger event • consider the strategic and tactical levels • use a broader impact analysis with 'impact trees' • create reasonable worst-case scenarios • identify escalation points and subject them to 'stress tests'.
- 48. Cyber Human Physical Set goals andobjectives Identify assets, systems and networks Assess risks: vulnerabilities, threats, consequences Prioritise Implement programmes Measure effectiveness Continuous improvement to enhance protection of critical infrastructure and key resources Feedback loop
- 49. Safeguarding critical infrastructure •redundant systems • adequate levels of operating supplies • fault-tolerant design • "fail-safe" design • adequate and reserve manpower • scenarios for failures and disasters • contingency and emergency plans kept current • involvement of top management.
- 50. evolution development of the scenarioevolution time zero formal evaluationof the outcome of the scenario consequences at time n Scenario methodology in emergency planning consequences at time 2 consequences at time 1 reference event initial conditions evaluation of the progress of the scenario historical analysis hypothetical ingredients
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- 52. DISASTER POLITICS ECONOMICS SOCIAL CONDITIONS PHYSICAL IMPACT Politicsin the service of economics VULNERABILITY knowledge is ideology Complexity Ideology • extremism • separatism • isolationism • exclusion Conflict Climate change Demographic change • human mobility Culture Underlying risk drivers
- 53. LOSS OF HUMAN RIGHTS PROXYWAR, CONFLICT & POLARISATION POVERTY & MARGINALISATION 'WRECKAGE ECONOMY' & RISE OF THE PRECARIAT LACK OF DISASTER GOVERNANCE NIHILISM CORRUPTION & LOSS OF TRUSTANOMIE constraints upon life and safety Anomie (Durkheim) is a condition of instability resulting from a breakdown of standards and values or from a lack of purpose or ideals.
- 54. Anomie means lossof basic morality. There is a disaster because fairness gives way to self-promotion and blatant exploitation. “Qu’ils mangent de la brioche!” Disaster is about the use and abuse of power: we have to factor that into the equation.
- 55. Conclusions • society iscomplex: all disasters of a certain size will involve cascades • more investigation of operational components is needed • we need operational guidelines on cascading effects of power failures • we need to understand how people behave in cascading crises • inter-institutional dialogue needs to be increased • we need to investigate more case studies.
- 56. International Journal of DisasterRisk Reduction Special Issue (2018): Understanding and mitigating cascading crises in the global interconnected system
- 58. Thank you forlistening! emergency-planning.blogspot.com www.slideshare.net/dealexander www.ucl.ac.uk/rdr/cascading David.Alexander@ucl.ac.uk