Mike McFaul, Russia, Technology, Innovation and Great Power Competition,TIGPC, Gordian knot Center, DIME-FIL, department of defense, dod, hacking for defense, intlpol 340, joe felter, ms&e296, raj shah, stanford, Steve blank,

1. Technology, Innovation, and Great
Power Competition
INTLPOL 340; MS&E 296
Steve Blank, Joe Felter, Raj Shah
Lecture #3: Russia and Other Rivals
5 October 2021

2. The Russia Challenge

3. ● Former U.S. Ambassador to Russia
● Former NSC Senior Director for Russian and
Eurasian Affairs
● Author: From Cold War to Hot Peace: An
American Ambassador in Putin’s Russia.
Ambassador Michael McFaul
Director, Freeman
Spogli Institute for
International Studies

4. Agenda
• Logistics
• Russia and Great Power Competition
• Other Rivals
• Group Project
• Next Week

5. Logistics
• Group Project Office Hours
• Sign ups will be live after class today
• Meetings are required on a weekly basis by 2+ team members
• Please arrive with slides to show the following:
• Current problem statement [“what did you think”]
• 3 key takeaways from your research and interviews [“what did you learn”]
• Your next steps [“what will you do”]
• Slides are not being graded for style—we just care about content
• Interviews - must be synchronous conversation
• Great work with on the reflections!

6. Individual Assignment
• Change to the individual assignment ‘mid-term’
• Now due Monday before Week 7 class (November 1)
• It is a short policy memo on how one U.S. competitor is
using one technology to counter U.S. interests
• More details posted online this week

7. The Russia Challenge

8. Ideological motivations do not animate every Russian
foreign policy action in the world today. Russia pursues
security and economic interests in parallel to ideological
aims. Sometimes these multiple objectives complement
each other. At other times, they clash. Risky and costly
actions—the annexation of Crimea, military intervention in
Syria, and interference in the U.S. 2016 presidential
election—can only be fully explained by accounting for
the causal influence of one leader, his ideas, and his
political institutions.
Michael McFaul, “Putin, Putinism, and the Domestic Determinants of Russian Foreign Policy

9. According to the prevailing wisdom in the West, the Ukraine crisis can be
blamed almost entirely on Russian aggression. Russian President Vladimir
Putin, the argument goes, annexed Crimea out of a long-standing desire to
resuscitate the Soviet empire, and he may eventually go after the rest of
Ukraine, as well as other countries in eastern Europe. In this view, the ouster of
Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych in February 2014 merely provided a
pretext for Putin’s decision to order Russian forces to seize part of Ukraine. But
this account is wrong: the United States and its European allies share most
of the responsibility for the crisis. The taproot of the trouble is NATO
enlargement, the central element of a larger strategy to move Ukraine out of
Russia’s orbit and integrate it into the West.
John Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West’s Fault

10. “Reviewing the history of international relations in the modern era, which
might be considered to extend from the middle of the seventeenth century
to the present, I find it hard to think of any event more strange and
startling, and at first glance more inexplicable, than the sudden and total
disintegration and disappearance from the international scene...of the
great power known successively as the Russian Empire and then the Soviet
Union.”
- George F. Kennan, 1995
Fall of the USSR

11. Fall of the USSR
As the world's first real Marxist experiment, the Soviet Union, by virtue of lasting
seventy odd years, proved Western intelligentsia wrong. The latter had long
thought it was doomed to fail. When the Berlin Wall fell in 1989 and the Soviet
Union disintegrated two years later, Western conservatives and liberals alike felt
vindicated. United States conservatives would point to Reagan's military arms
buildup which the Soviet Union could not keep pace with, while liberal capitalists
believed in the inherent unfeasibility of a nonmarket system. Contrary to these
suppositions, Stephen Kotkin's Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse 1970-2000,
paints a picture of a behemoth, bureaucratic state resting atop a superannuated
industrial infrastructure. Yet he maintains that if the Soviet elite had so
chosen, they could have sustained it decades longer.
Peter Crowley in review of Stephen Kotkin’s book

12. "Above all, we should acknowledge that the
collapse of the Soviet Union was a major
geopolitical disaster of the century. As for the
Russian nation, it became a genuine drama. Tens
of millions of our co-citizens and co-patriots
found themselves outside Russian territory.
Moreover, the epidemic of disintegration infected
Russia itself.”
Vladimir Putin, 2005
Fall of the USSR - the Russian Perspective
“After the collapse of one pillar of the former
bipolar world order, it became fashionable in
the West to think that the world order could
become unipolar, with the U.S. at the helm,” he
says. “In the 1990s, Russia descended into its
worst crisis since 1917. It not only ceased to be a
superpower, it suffered political, economic, and
social collapse as well. It was not even clear that
Russia would survive physically. So, perhaps
believing that Russian interests and views
didn’t matter anymore, Clinton made the
decision to enlarge NATO to the east.”
Alexei Gromyko, Russian Foreign Policy Analyst, 2020

13. Russian Geopolitics & Foreign Policy
In 2014, amid the Ukraine crisis, Russia broke out of the post–Cold War system and
openly challenged U.S. dominance....[ending] a quarter century of cooperative
relations among great powers and ushered in an era of intense competition between
them. Two years on...the conflict with the West has deepened, and confrontation with the
United States and estrangement from EU countries are now the salient features of Russia’s
international environment. Virtually simultaneously, Russia has entered a severe
economic crisis, brought about by the demise of its oil-dependent economic model, which
was exacerbated by Western sanctions in response to Moscow’s actions in Ukraine and
especially by the plunge in the oil price. This complicated situation will last a number of
years, and its outcome will largely determine the future of Russia. This outcome will
also have a significant impact on the international system.
Dmitri Trenin, Russia expert, Carnegie Center Moscow

14. Why did Russia's relations with the West shift from cooperation a few decades ago to a
new era of confrontation today? Some explanations focus narrowly on changes in the
balance of power in the international system, or trace historic parallels and cultural
continuities in Russian international behavior. For a complete understanding of
Russian foreign policy today, individuals, ideas, and institutions—President
Vladimir Putin, Putinism, and autocracy—must be added to the analysis. An
examination of three cases of recent Russian intervention (in Ukraine in 2014, Syria in
2015, and the United States in 2016) illuminates the causal influence of these domestic
determinants in the making of Russian foreign policy.
Putin & Putinism
Michael McFaul, “Putin, Putinism, and the Domestic Determinants of Russian Foreign Policy

15. Sino-Russian relations are now at their highest point since the mid-1950s, when
Moscow and Beijing were communist allies. The Russia–China entente is likely to get
even stronger in the wake of the coronavirus pandemic. Facing an intensifying hostility
from Washington, Beijing will need Russia—its only major-power friend—even more.
Meanwhile, Moscow looks to China, and its continued demand for Russian energy and
commodities, as Russia’s best chance to recover economically after the pandemic.
Russia and China are being drawn to each other by the most elementary law of
international politics: that of the balance of power.
- Artyom Lukin
Russia’s Pivot to Asia

16. Russia has long struggled to overcome the constraints imposed by the country’s
chronic inability to retain talent in support of homegrown innovation and R&D.
That reality may consign it to a follower role in the technological realm. Russia’s global
activism continues to lean heavily on tried-and-true tactics and capabilities that are
popping up more frequently in a variety of far-flung venues. The blatant and often
sloppy nature of such efforts suggests the Russian leadership believes that even
adverse publicity helps strengthen Moscow’s claim to the status of a global power.
- Andrew Weiss
Russian Technology Strategy

17. Discussion Questions

18. 1) What are Russia’s geopolitical interests, goals, and/or objectives?
From Moscow’s perspective, what are the main obstacles standing
in the way of achieving its national goals?
1) To what degree is Vladimir Putin a unitary actor? How much is he
the system of government versus the product of a system?
1) How does Moscow view the existing, American-led rules-based
international order?
1) What role, if any, does ideology play in Moscow’s strategy?

19. 5) In what ways are Moscow’s goals compatible and/or incompatible
with U.S. national interests?
5) In what domains does the competition between the United States
and the Russian Federation play out? How do these domains
interact with one another? Is cooperation between the two possible
and beneficial?
5) How would you characterize the Sino-Russian relationship? In what
dimensions is the relationship the strongest? Where are its fault
lines? Is the relationship enduring or transient?

20. Other Rivals - North Korea

21. DPRK Problem Sets
• Nuclear weapons program
• Estimated 10-40 nuclear weapons
• ICBM program
• Maximum ~8,100 mile range
• All of the continental United States in range

22. DPRK Problem Sets (cont’d)
• Cyber attacks
• February 2021 federal indictment against 3
DPRK hackers
• Hostilities with South Korea

23. Other Rivals - Iran

24. IRI Problem Sets
• Aspiring nuclear weapons program
• 60% enrichment (90% weapons grade, 3.67% JCPOA
limit)
• Ballistic missile program
• Regional destabilization, hostage-taking, and
sponsorship of terrorism
• Ansar Allah (Houthis) in Yemen, Hezbollah in Lebanon,
Hamas/PIJ in Palestine, numerous Shia militias in Iraq
(Kataib Hezbollah, Asaib Ahl al Haq, Badr Organization)

25. IRI Problem Sets (cont’d)
• Conflict with Israel leading to broader conflict in the
region
• Cyber attacks
• Attacks on commercial shipping and harassment of
FONOPs in the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz

26. Other Rivals - Non-State
Actors

27. Non-State Actor Problem Sets
• International terror attacks
• Persistent, survivable threat unconstrained by traditional geopolitical checks (irrational
actor)
• WMD proliferation
• Addressing the problem (COIN, CT ops) runs the risk of long-term, drawn out engagements
deleterious to other national objectives (GPC) and, sometimes, the national interest
• Yet, if left unaddressed, has potential to fester and spread globally and create second- and third-
order challenges (al-Shabab, Boko Haram, Abu Sayyaf)

28. Group Projects

29. Group Project
• Problem Statement Review and Feedback
• 5 minutes per group
• Blunt and direct feedback
• “Socratic method with a stick” - Steve Blank
• We give feedback this way because it will help you move faster.
Indirect feedback takes too long for the course

30. Timeframe: Now to Week 8
• Who has this problem?
• List all the beneficiaries, stakeholders,
etc.
• How do you know?
• Why does the problem exist?
• How do you know?
• Consequence of the problem?
• List all the beneficiaries, stakeholders,
etc.
• Who wants a solution?
• How badly?
• When do they need a solution?
• For all beneficiaries, stakeholders, etc
Group Project Step 1: General Problem Definition
• How does this get deployed/delivered?
• At what scale / how many are needed
• How are they solving it today?
• Don't recognize it's a problem?
• Ignoring it?
• Piece part/silo'd solutions
• Incumbent provider, outmatched
• Existing organizations, regulations,
Acquisition processes, insufficient to
match threat?
• How do we know we solved the problem?
• What does mission achievement look
like?
• For each of the beneficiaries,
stakeholders, etc

31. Timeframe: Week 8 to Week 10
• What would a minimum viable product
look like?
• Physical, Software, white paper, policy,
change in regulation/law?
• Who would build and deliver the final
product/service?
• Existing contractor?
• New startup?
• ….?
• How to you create an "Innovation
Insurgency" around the idea?
• Who is the senior champion?
• Who is the innovation program
manager?
Group Project Step 2: General Solution Definition
• Who would have to get excited about the
MVP to fund it?
• List all the beneficiaries, stakeholders,
etc.
• Who are the saboteurs?
• Existing contractors?
• Internal PEO's?
• …

32. The gap between U.S. and Chinese military innovation is
rapidly closing and poses a threat to U.S. military
dominance specifically in the Indo-Pacific Region. In order
to maintain our capability gap, the U.S. needs to
reevaluate and improve its public venture capital
economic relationship with companies that have potential
for dual-use technologies which can play a vital role in
leading U.S. military innovation.
Team 1: Team Army Venture Capital Initiative

33. Team 2: Team Conflicted Capital
Chinese investment in US start-ups poses a threat to US
military capabilities across critical technologies. The open
nature and lack of transparency in venture capital
threatens the US government’s ability to track these
threats. Additionally, companies may desire to function as
national security capability providers but find themselves
unable to partner with government agencies due to a
compromised investment history.

34. Team 3: Project Aurora
How can the United States employ its cyber capabilities to
provide the populace of Hong Kong with unrestricted
Internet access? How can it use this access to bolster the
resiliency of Hong Kong’s civil society in the face of CCP
crackdowns, in order to pressure the PRC regime, spread
American liberal values, and uphold United States
freedom of action in the information domain?

35. Team 4: Team ShortCircuit
How should the United States scale the semiconductor
manufacturing capacity within the U.S. territory and other
directly securable regions to protect the viability of
American industries and military in case of disruptions in
the global supply chain of semiconductors?

36. Team 5: Team Honey Badgers
In order to strengthen credible deterrence by denial and
protect against asymmetric People’s Republic of China
(PRC) AI and swarm technologies in a potential Taiwan
Strait crisis, Group 5 analyzes the PRC’s joint service (联合
作战样式) operational concept for the future of
amphibious warfare (两栖登陆作战), as described in
open source official Chinese publications, and develops
low-cost, survivable, and lethal solutions in accordance
with guidance from subject matter experts and group
mentors.

37. Team 6: Apollo
The US Space Force needs innovative mechanisms to
incorporate emerging technologies to successfully lead in
space and defend American interests. In order to deter
adversaries in space, the USSF must leverage commercial
innovation and establish a trained, experienced
acquisition workforce that can effectively balance
commercial and government-only capabilities that will
deliver the acquisition and innovation impact that the
Space Force requires. Further aligning commercial and
military interests and operations in space will best protect
American interests in space.

38. Team 7: Catena
In this increasingly apparent great power competition,
China’s recent cryptocurrency ban has presented the
United States with an unparalleled opportunity to
leverage blockchain and digital asset technology toward
achieving a long-term strategic advantage. We plan to
identify strategic and economic innovation opportunities
and craft efficient mechanisms for our government to
promote and capitalize on technological opportunities in
this space.

39. Questions?
We are here to support!

40. Next Week
• Class 4 Topic: Semiconductors
• Updated readings will be
on Canvas shortly
• TA Team will post Week 4
Reading Reflection prompt
once readings are updated
• Updated problem statements
and interview trackers due
Mondays @ 11:59 PM PST

41. Technology, Innovation, and Great
Power Competition
INTLPOL 340; MS&E 296
Steve Blank, Joe Felter, Raj Shah
Lecture #3: Russia and Other Rivals
5 October 2021