- The document discusses Russia's foreign policy under Vladimir Putin and his pursuit of national security through territory acquisition, economic resources, and military buildup. It analyzes Russia's invasions of Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine/Crimea in 2014 as acts of territory acquisition. It also discusses Russia's use of oil/gas exports and partnerships with other resource-rich countries to bolster its economy. Finally, it notes Russia's large military buildup since the 1990s to protect its resources and assert sovereignty. Overall, the document argues that Putin's aggressive foreign policy has strained US-Russia relations.
Newsbud Exclusive – “From the Atlantic to the Pacific”: Vladimir Putin & the ...Chris Helweg
During the Beijing summit, Putin intentionally contrasted the positive prospects of Eurasian integrations “to promote steady development, increase citizens’ incomes and improve education and health care” with the instability, uncertainty, and unpredictability in other regions of the world, including the EU and the U.S. He stated that in the U.S. “an intense internal political struggle continues, creating a nervous atmosphere in both politics and the economy,” while in Europe,
This document provides an overview of Russia's hybrid war against Ukraine and the West. Some key points:
- Russia sees Ukraine's experience with hybrid warfare as a lesson for other countries to learn from, as Russia aims to weaken states from within before military aggression.
- Russian political experts and officials see this as a time of opportunity, as they view the West as weak under Obama/Trump and burdened by other conflicts. Russia aims to reassert itself as a great power over a Eurasian sphere of influence.
- Ukraine has faced aggression, occupation, cyberattacks, and political/economic pressure from Russia. Other tactics include fueling internal/external conflicts, supporting radical groups, and controlling the narrative through
The document analyzes reasons for perceived "blunders" in EU policy towards Ukraine. It argues that EU policy was based on an overestimation of the EU's ability to influence Ukraine and an underestimation of Russia's potential reaction. As a result, when Russia annexed Crimea and supported separatists in eastern Ukraine, the EU was unprepared. This conflict has significantly changed dynamics in world politics and left Ukraine unstable, with ongoing fighting, Russian occupation of Crimea, and economic sanctions between Russia and the EU. The document examines power competition between Russia and the EU over influence in Ukraine as a contributing factor.
This document summarizes the political and military situation in Ukraine. It describes how Russia's 2014 military intervention in Ukraine continues to define Ukrainian politics, with a stalemated conflict and peace process. The document discusses Russia's strategy of destabilizing Ukraine and influencing its policies through the conflict. It also notes growing political disillusionment in Ukraine due to corruption and lack of reforms, which could benefit Russian-backed political forces. The document analyzes the Minsk peace agreements and how Russia uses this process to maintain influence in eastern Ukraine.
Lillith Solomon Undergraduate Research PresentationLillithSolomon
This is a summary of my paper Russia’s Manipulative Influence in the Politics of Serbia and the United States:
Breaking the Grip of United States Unipolarity
Vladimir Putin has been President of Russia for 15 years, during which time he has pursued two objectives: stabilizing Russia and making it a global power. To achieve these, Putin has implemented aggressive domestic and foreign policies. Domestically, he cracked down on oligarchs and consolidated power around himself and the central government in Moscow. In foreign policy, he seeks to restore Russia's influence and undermine the U.S.-led global order. Putin has proven remarkably successful in these goals, strengthening his popularity at home and power abroad, though economic troubles and corruption remain issues.
The document provides a summary of the strategic communication, military, cyber, and economic aspects of the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine. It notes that Ukraine has gained the upper hand in strategic communication by portraying Zelensky as a heroic leader defending against Russian aggression. Militarily, Russian forces have encircled some Ukrainian cities but are facing stronger-than-expected resistance in urban areas. There has been a global uprising of cyber partisans attacking Russian targets, while Russian cyber operations have targeted Ukrainian infrastructure. Western sanctions are severely impacting the Russian economy. The outlook is that Russia will escalate violence in Ukrainian cities as its economy begins to collapse under sanctions.
- The document discusses Russia's foreign policy under Vladimir Putin and his pursuit of national security through territory acquisition, economic resources, and military buildup. It analyzes Russia's invasions of Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine/Crimea in 2014 as acts of territory acquisition. It also discusses Russia's use of oil/gas exports and partnerships with other resource-rich countries to bolster its economy. Finally, it notes Russia's large military buildup since the 1990s to protect its resources and assert sovereignty. Overall, the document argues that Putin's aggressive foreign policy has strained US-Russia relations.
Newsbud Exclusive – “From the Atlantic to the Pacific”: Vladimir Putin & the ...Chris Helweg
During the Beijing summit, Putin intentionally contrasted the positive prospects of Eurasian integrations “to promote steady development, increase citizens’ incomes and improve education and health care” with the instability, uncertainty, and unpredictability in other regions of the world, including the EU and the U.S. He stated that in the U.S. “an intense internal political struggle continues, creating a nervous atmosphere in both politics and the economy,” while in Europe,
This document provides an overview of Russia's hybrid war against Ukraine and the West. Some key points:
- Russia sees Ukraine's experience with hybrid warfare as a lesson for other countries to learn from, as Russia aims to weaken states from within before military aggression.
- Russian political experts and officials see this as a time of opportunity, as they view the West as weak under Obama/Trump and burdened by other conflicts. Russia aims to reassert itself as a great power over a Eurasian sphere of influence.
- Ukraine has faced aggression, occupation, cyberattacks, and political/economic pressure from Russia. Other tactics include fueling internal/external conflicts, supporting radical groups, and controlling the narrative through
The document analyzes reasons for perceived "blunders" in EU policy towards Ukraine. It argues that EU policy was based on an overestimation of the EU's ability to influence Ukraine and an underestimation of Russia's potential reaction. As a result, when Russia annexed Crimea and supported separatists in eastern Ukraine, the EU was unprepared. This conflict has significantly changed dynamics in world politics and left Ukraine unstable, with ongoing fighting, Russian occupation of Crimea, and economic sanctions between Russia and the EU. The document examines power competition between Russia and the EU over influence in Ukraine as a contributing factor.
This document summarizes the political and military situation in Ukraine. It describes how Russia's 2014 military intervention in Ukraine continues to define Ukrainian politics, with a stalemated conflict and peace process. The document discusses Russia's strategy of destabilizing Ukraine and influencing its policies through the conflict. It also notes growing political disillusionment in Ukraine due to corruption and lack of reforms, which could benefit Russian-backed political forces. The document analyzes the Minsk peace agreements and how Russia uses this process to maintain influence in eastern Ukraine.
Lillith Solomon Undergraduate Research PresentationLillithSolomon
This is a summary of my paper Russia’s Manipulative Influence in the Politics of Serbia and the United States:
Breaking the Grip of United States Unipolarity
Vladimir Putin has been President of Russia for 15 years, during which time he has pursued two objectives: stabilizing Russia and making it a global power. To achieve these, Putin has implemented aggressive domestic and foreign policies. Domestically, he cracked down on oligarchs and consolidated power around himself and the central government in Moscow. In foreign policy, he seeks to restore Russia's influence and undermine the U.S.-led global order. Putin has proven remarkably successful in these goals, strengthening his popularity at home and power abroad, though economic troubles and corruption remain issues.
The document provides a summary of the strategic communication, military, cyber, and economic aspects of the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine. It notes that Ukraine has gained the upper hand in strategic communication by portraying Zelensky as a heroic leader defending against Russian aggression. Militarily, Russian forces have encircled some Ukrainian cities but are facing stronger-than-expected resistance in urban areas. There has been a global uprising of cyber partisans attacking Russian targets, while Russian cyber operations have targeted Ukrainian infrastructure. Western sanctions are severely impacting the Russian economy. The outlook is that Russia will escalate violence in Ukrainian cities as its economy begins to collapse under sanctions.
This dissertation examines the influence of Cold War considerations on the political relationship between the United States and Iran from 1949 to 1989. The author analyzes key events like the 1953 CIA-backed coup against Mohammad Mossadeq and the failure to predict the 1979 Iranian Revolution. The Cold War impacted U.S.-Iran relations as the U.S. sought Iranian cooperation against communism and supported the Shah, though this alliance broke down after the revolution established an Islamic republic opposed to Western influence. The dissertation aims to evaluate how Cold War dynamics shaped this relationship over time through a historical analysis of primary and secondary sources.
The Russia-China partnership has developed over the past 20 years based on several factors:
1) They have a long historical relationship with few conflicts compared to Russia's relationships with other countries.
2) They have parallel experiences with imperial decline in the 19th century and revolutions in the early 20th century.
3) Currently, they share geopolitical interests in opposing US unilateralism and hegemony.
4) Economic cooperation has increased but remains asymmetrical, with Russia exporting energy and arms and China exporting manufactured goods.
5) Ideologically, they both favor state-capitalist models and defense of sovereignty over Western democracy promotion.
This document provides an overview and analysis of the conflict in Ukraine from 2014-2015. It begins by discussing the concept of "New Wars" and how they differ from traditional wars, featuring non-state actors, privatized violence, and the blurring of internal/external forces. It then applies this framework to analyze Russia's involvement in Ukraine. Specifically, it distinguishes between the annexation of Crimea, which featured limited non-state actor involvement, and the conflict in Donbass, which aligned more closely with the "New Wars" model through its emphasis on identity and the central role of non-state rebel groups backed by Russia. In both cases, the document argues Russia used identity politics and the defense of Russian minorities to intervene
1) Georgia has faced a difficult geopolitical position since independence from the Soviet Union, wanting to align with the West but facing complications from Russia and internal conflicts.
2) Early nationalist policies under Zviad Gamsakhurdia exacerbated ethnic tensions that led to conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Eduard Shevardnadze then took power amid civil unrest.
3) Current relations with Russia remain icy due to the 2008 conflict and Russia's support of breakaway regions. Georgia also seeks closer ties with the EU and NATO but these aspirations are threatened by territorial disputes.
Former US ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul will discuss the diplomatic challenges facing the US and Russia, examining these issues from both the Western and the Russian perspective.
This is presented during a session "Strategic cultures" at the symposium “Lessons of 1914 for the future of Asia” on 14-15 July 2014 held at Temple University Japan Campus. This symposium is organized by Andreas Herberg-Rothe, Faculty of social and cultural studies, University of Applied Sciences Fulda, Germany and supported by the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in Japan.
#38 who is the true threat to the west-5pgDaniel Wambua
Very good essay about threats to the west. America and other western have had threats coming from the middle west and economic threats from Asia particularly China.
U.S – RUSSIAN RELATIONS UNDER THE OBAMA-MEDVEDEV PRESIDENCIES: THE RESULTS OF...Susana Gallardo
U.S. – Russian relations have always been at the forefront of academic
debates, particularly since the advent of World War II. For better or
worse, the people who have not experienced the worst phase of the
Cold War were obliged to bring about rapprochement to this often
complicated relationship. ‘Hope’, ‘Yes We Can’ and ‘reset’ slogans made
their way into our lives and greatly enriched our diplomatic vocabulary.
A new promising era seemed to be underway with the Presidents
Barack H. Obama and Dmitri A. Medvedev since they were both encouraging
prospects of rapprochement and engagement.
Brzezinski The Geostrategic Triad Living With China, Europe And Russia (2...guestaab442
This document provides an introduction and overview of a monograph on the United States' strategic priorities and engagement with major powers in Eurasia. It discusses how the success of US international engagement in the 21st century will depend on its relationships with China, Japan, Russia, and Europe. Specifically, it outlines two "Eurasian power triangles" that are important for the US - one between the US, EU, and Russia, and another between the US, Japan, and China. The document introduces Zbigniew Brzezinski's analysis of these relationships and the strategic considerations that should guide the US approach in each case.
This document provides a national security strategy for Ukraine with the aim of achieving sovereignty, independence, strength, freedom and prosperity within NATO and the EU. It identifies the main objectives of Russia, which is to dominate Ukraine and reduce costs and risks of invasion through political means. It also outlines Ukraine's main objectives in the war, which is to fight using all means to defend its independence and sovereignty against Russian encroachment. The top challenges for Ukraine are addressed across legal/political, socio-economic, military, foreign relations, and hybrid dimensions. Key issues discussed include the role of the President, containing Russia strategically, economic and social revival, restructuring organizations, reforming defense, and international relations.
This document provides a 3,318 word analysis of the conflict resolution in Eastern Ukraine between partition or a frozen conflict. It summarizes the causes of the civil war in the Donbass region, including structural factors like a weak Ukrainian state after regime change in Kiev and emotional factors like resentment from the Russian-speaking population. It analyzes how external support from Russia and international intervention can both prolong and shorten the duration of the conflict. The document also examines barriers to conflict resolution, such as security dilemmas from the ethnic nature of the fighting and goals of conflicting parties preventing a decisive victory.
Gustavo De Arístegui: "Putin Has Lost Touch with Reality, He Considers That W...Lina Maya
Gustavo de Arístegui, an international affairs expert, was interviewed about the situation in Ukraine. He criticized Putin's aggressive actions, saying Putin has lost touch with reality and believes invading Ukraine is an act of self-defense. De Arístegui discussed how most Russians currently support the invasion due to nationalism and state-controlled media. He argued the geopolitical balance has changed with the invasion, and countries like Finland may reconsider their neutrality and join NATO for protection. The economic and strategic consequences will also be complex as other countries replace Russian exports.
The Separatist War in Donbas: A Violent Break-up of Ukraine?DonbassFullAccess
This document analyzes the conflict in Donbas, Ukraine between pro-Russian separatists and the Ukrainian government. It notes that there are conflicting narratives about what caused the conflict and how it has unfolded. The study aims to determine why Ukraine experienced this violent conflict in Donbas by examining the roles and perspectives of different actors, including separatists, the Yanukovych government, Maidan opposition, Russia, the US, and the EU. It also analyzes a survey on public support for separatism in Donbas compared to other regions that was commissioned by the author. The conflict involved both a civil war and direct Russian military intervention and has international significance.
The document summarizes 10 of the most important events of 2012, which have the potential to lead to significant transformations in the future. These events include the Muslim Brotherhood coming to power in Egypt, the continuing European economic crisis, protests sparked by an anti-Islam video, increasing tensions between China and its neighbors over territorial disputes, ongoing violence in Syria with no resolution in sight, Facebook's IPO and implications for the virtual world, Russia's resurgence on the global stage, the US beginning to exit Afghanistan, democratic reforms in Myanmar, and Malala Yousafzai becoming a symbol of courage in Pakistan. While 2012 seemed somewhat calm, these events sow the seeds for large changes in global politics, economics,
This document is a dissertation analyzing Russia's new foreign policy under President Vladimir Putin and the reasons behind it. It provides theoretical frameworks of realism, geopolitics, and Eurasianism to analyze Putin's doctrine. The document gives a brief historical background of Russia from the Soviet Union to today. It then applies the theoretical lenses to understand Putin's justification for Russia reasserting itself on the global stage and restoring its sphere of influence in places like Ukraine and Crimea.
Slides from a talk given at the National Genealogical Society Family History Conference, Raleigh, NC, May 13th, 2017 - Session S455. Shared for personal use only. No use approved for non-profit or for-profit organizations.
The sharp fall in Russian markets was an overreaction to protests in Moscow following parliamentary elections. While events in other countries sparked regime changes, Russia's political consequences will likely unfold gradually. The protests were also not unprecedented and should not have justified the large sell-off. More important short-term issues for Russian investors include the EU debt crisis, China's economic growth, and oil prices. While not dismissing the protests, Russia's stable macroeconomic conditions differ significantly from those in countries experiencing Arab Spring uprisings. Changes in Russia are expected slowly rather than dramatically as public frustration has grown with a new middle class and expectations of reform.
Russia's geopolitics are defined by its lack of natural defenses for its heartland and its use of distance as a primary defense. Both Napoleon and Hitler were defeated in Russia after overextending their supply lines. Currently, Russia enforces crucial geopolitical frontlines in the Arctic, Crimea, and Kaliningrad by heavy militarization in these regions. The Ukraine crisis has accelerated a power shift with Russia losing influence, Europe emerging stronger, and China seeing new opportunities. However, Russia's economic crisis poses broader threats if it causes political instability and leadership change in Russia.
This document summarizes the state of U.S.-Russian relations during the Obama administration's early days in 2009. Relations had deteriorated in the prior year due to Russia's invasion of Georgia, but Obama signaled a desire for improved cooperation in his inaugural address. However, the Kremlin's behavior both before and after the U.S. election showed little sign of rapprochement. Experts debated whether declining relations were due to a resurgent Russian nationalism or U.S. policies that antagonized Russia, though the document argues that faults lay with both countries. Meanwhile, Russia under Putin and later Medvedev continued moving away from democracy toward a more authoritarian system and rigid state control.
2015 03-11 - russia one year after crimea - event summary jmIlya Ponomarev
- Ponomarev emphasized that Russia's foreign policy poses a dangerous threat and prioritizes undermining Western influence over combating threats like ISIS.
- Nationalism in Russia includes xenophobia, ethnic nationalism seeking a purely "Russian Russia", imperialist views, and a possible "healthy nationalism".
- Russian state propaganda portrays the West as weak and misguided, while Putin presents himself as defending traditional values, but many Russians can access alternative views if desired.
- The West must maintain a consistent long-term policy not based on the old view of competing spheres of influence, and should counter Russian information campaigns rather than offer military aid.
The document discusses the Ukraine crisis between Russia and Western countries in 2014. It summarizes that former Ukrainian president Yanukovych abandoned a trade deal with the EU in favor of an investment agreement with Russia, sparking mass protests. Russia then annexed Crimea after a referendum, threatening Ukraine's territorial integrity. The crisis highlighted a power struggle between Russia seeking to maintain influence and the West supporting Ukrainian sovereignty. International relations theories of realism and defensive/offensive approaches help explain Russia's aggressive actions under Putin to regain regional power lost after the Soviet Union's collapse.
This dissertation examines the influence of Cold War considerations on the political relationship between the United States and Iran from 1949 to 1989. The author analyzes key events like the 1953 CIA-backed coup against Mohammad Mossadeq and the failure to predict the 1979 Iranian Revolution. The Cold War impacted U.S.-Iran relations as the U.S. sought Iranian cooperation against communism and supported the Shah, though this alliance broke down after the revolution established an Islamic republic opposed to Western influence. The dissertation aims to evaluate how Cold War dynamics shaped this relationship over time through a historical analysis of primary and secondary sources.
The Russia-China partnership has developed over the past 20 years based on several factors:
1) They have a long historical relationship with few conflicts compared to Russia's relationships with other countries.
2) They have parallel experiences with imperial decline in the 19th century and revolutions in the early 20th century.
3) Currently, they share geopolitical interests in opposing US unilateralism and hegemony.
4) Economic cooperation has increased but remains asymmetrical, with Russia exporting energy and arms and China exporting manufactured goods.
5) Ideologically, they both favor state-capitalist models and defense of sovereignty over Western democracy promotion.
This document provides an overview and analysis of the conflict in Ukraine from 2014-2015. It begins by discussing the concept of "New Wars" and how they differ from traditional wars, featuring non-state actors, privatized violence, and the blurring of internal/external forces. It then applies this framework to analyze Russia's involvement in Ukraine. Specifically, it distinguishes between the annexation of Crimea, which featured limited non-state actor involvement, and the conflict in Donbass, which aligned more closely with the "New Wars" model through its emphasis on identity and the central role of non-state rebel groups backed by Russia. In both cases, the document argues Russia used identity politics and the defense of Russian minorities to intervene
1) Georgia has faced a difficult geopolitical position since independence from the Soviet Union, wanting to align with the West but facing complications from Russia and internal conflicts.
2) Early nationalist policies under Zviad Gamsakhurdia exacerbated ethnic tensions that led to conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Eduard Shevardnadze then took power amid civil unrest.
3) Current relations with Russia remain icy due to the 2008 conflict and Russia's support of breakaway regions. Georgia also seeks closer ties with the EU and NATO but these aspirations are threatened by territorial disputes.
Former US ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul will discuss the diplomatic challenges facing the US and Russia, examining these issues from both the Western and the Russian perspective.
This is presented during a session "Strategic cultures" at the symposium “Lessons of 1914 for the future of Asia” on 14-15 July 2014 held at Temple University Japan Campus. This symposium is organized by Andreas Herberg-Rothe, Faculty of social and cultural studies, University of Applied Sciences Fulda, Germany and supported by the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in Japan.
#38 who is the true threat to the west-5pgDaniel Wambua
Very good essay about threats to the west. America and other western have had threats coming from the middle west and economic threats from Asia particularly China.
U.S – RUSSIAN RELATIONS UNDER THE OBAMA-MEDVEDEV PRESIDENCIES: THE RESULTS OF...Susana Gallardo
U.S. – Russian relations have always been at the forefront of academic
debates, particularly since the advent of World War II. For better or
worse, the people who have not experienced the worst phase of the
Cold War were obliged to bring about rapprochement to this often
complicated relationship. ‘Hope’, ‘Yes We Can’ and ‘reset’ slogans made
their way into our lives and greatly enriched our diplomatic vocabulary.
A new promising era seemed to be underway with the Presidents
Barack H. Obama and Dmitri A. Medvedev since they were both encouraging
prospects of rapprochement and engagement.
Brzezinski The Geostrategic Triad Living With China, Europe And Russia (2...guestaab442
This document provides an introduction and overview of a monograph on the United States' strategic priorities and engagement with major powers in Eurasia. It discusses how the success of US international engagement in the 21st century will depend on its relationships with China, Japan, Russia, and Europe. Specifically, it outlines two "Eurasian power triangles" that are important for the US - one between the US, EU, and Russia, and another between the US, Japan, and China. The document introduces Zbigniew Brzezinski's analysis of these relationships and the strategic considerations that should guide the US approach in each case.
This document provides a national security strategy for Ukraine with the aim of achieving sovereignty, independence, strength, freedom and prosperity within NATO and the EU. It identifies the main objectives of Russia, which is to dominate Ukraine and reduce costs and risks of invasion through political means. It also outlines Ukraine's main objectives in the war, which is to fight using all means to defend its independence and sovereignty against Russian encroachment. The top challenges for Ukraine are addressed across legal/political, socio-economic, military, foreign relations, and hybrid dimensions. Key issues discussed include the role of the President, containing Russia strategically, economic and social revival, restructuring organizations, reforming defense, and international relations.
This document provides a 3,318 word analysis of the conflict resolution in Eastern Ukraine between partition or a frozen conflict. It summarizes the causes of the civil war in the Donbass region, including structural factors like a weak Ukrainian state after regime change in Kiev and emotional factors like resentment from the Russian-speaking population. It analyzes how external support from Russia and international intervention can both prolong and shorten the duration of the conflict. The document also examines barriers to conflict resolution, such as security dilemmas from the ethnic nature of the fighting and goals of conflicting parties preventing a decisive victory.
Gustavo De Arístegui: "Putin Has Lost Touch with Reality, He Considers That W...Lina Maya
Gustavo de Arístegui, an international affairs expert, was interviewed about the situation in Ukraine. He criticized Putin's aggressive actions, saying Putin has lost touch with reality and believes invading Ukraine is an act of self-defense. De Arístegui discussed how most Russians currently support the invasion due to nationalism and state-controlled media. He argued the geopolitical balance has changed with the invasion, and countries like Finland may reconsider their neutrality and join NATO for protection. The economic and strategic consequences will also be complex as other countries replace Russian exports.
The Separatist War in Donbas: A Violent Break-up of Ukraine?DonbassFullAccess
This document analyzes the conflict in Donbas, Ukraine between pro-Russian separatists and the Ukrainian government. It notes that there are conflicting narratives about what caused the conflict and how it has unfolded. The study aims to determine why Ukraine experienced this violent conflict in Donbas by examining the roles and perspectives of different actors, including separatists, the Yanukovych government, Maidan opposition, Russia, the US, and the EU. It also analyzes a survey on public support for separatism in Donbas compared to other regions that was commissioned by the author. The conflict involved both a civil war and direct Russian military intervention and has international significance.
The document summarizes 10 of the most important events of 2012, which have the potential to lead to significant transformations in the future. These events include the Muslim Brotherhood coming to power in Egypt, the continuing European economic crisis, protests sparked by an anti-Islam video, increasing tensions between China and its neighbors over territorial disputes, ongoing violence in Syria with no resolution in sight, Facebook's IPO and implications for the virtual world, Russia's resurgence on the global stage, the US beginning to exit Afghanistan, democratic reforms in Myanmar, and Malala Yousafzai becoming a symbol of courage in Pakistan. While 2012 seemed somewhat calm, these events sow the seeds for large changes in global politics, economics,
This document is a dissertation analyzing Russia's new foreign policy under President Vladimir Putin and the reasons behind it. It provides theoretical frameworks of realism, geopolitics, and Eurasianism to analyze Putin's doctrine. The document gives a brief historical background of Russia from the Soviet Union to today. It then applies the theoretical lenses to understand Putin's justification for Russia reasserting itself on the global stage and restoring its sphere of influence in places like Ukraine and Crimea.
Slides from a talk given at the National Genealogical Society Family History Conference, Raleigh, NC, May 13th, 2017 - Session S455. Shared for personal use only. No use approved for non-profit or for-profit organizations.
The sharp fall in Russian markets was an overreaction to protests in Moscow following parliamentary elections. While events in other countries sparked regime changes, Russia's political consequences will likely unfold gradually. The protests were also not unprecedented and should not have justified the large sell-off. More important short-term issues for Russian investors include the EU debt crisis, China's economic growth, and oil prices. While not dismissing the protests, Russia's stable macroeconomic conditions differ significantly from those in countries experiencing Arab Spring uprisings. Changes in Russia are expected slowly rather than dramatically as public frustration has grown with a new middle class and expectations of reform.
Russia's geopolitics are defined by its lack of natural defenses for its heartland and its use of distance as a primary defense. Both Napoleon and Hitler were defeated in Russia after overextending their supply lines. Currently, Russia enforces crucial geopolitical frontlines in the Arctic, Crimea, and Kaliningrad by heavy militarization in these regions. The Ukraine crisis has accelerated a power shift with Russia losing influence, Europe emerging stronger, and China seeing new opportunities. However, Russia's economic crisis poses broader threats if it causes political instability and leadership change in Russia.
This document summarizes the state of U.S.-Russian relations during the Obama administration's early days in 2009. Relations had deteriorated in the prior year due to Russia's invasion of Georgia, but Obama signaled a desire for improved cooperation in his inaugural address. However, the Kremlin's behavior both before and after the U.S. election showed little sign of rapprochement. Experts debated whether declining relations were due to a resurgent Russian nationalism or U.S. policies that antagonized Russia, though the document argues that faults lay with both countries. Meanwhile, Russia under Putin and later Medvedev continued moving away from democracy toward a more authoritarian system and rigid state control.
2015 03-11 - russia one year after crimea - event summary jmIlya Ponomarev
- Ponomarev emphasized that Russia's foreign policy poses a dangerous threat and prioritizes undermining Western influence over combating threats like ISIS.
- Nationalism in Russia includes xenophobia, ethnic nationalism seeking a purely "Russian Russia", imperialist views, and a possible "healthy nationalism".
- Russian state propaganda portrays the West as weak and misguided, while Putin presents himself as defending traditional values, but many Russians can access alternative views if desired.
- The West must maintain a consistent long-term policy not based on the old view of competing spheres of influence, and should counter Russian information campaigns rather than offer military aid.
The document discusses the Ukraine crisis between Russia and Western countries in 2014. It summarizes that former Ukrainian president Yanukovych abandoned a trade deal with the EU in favor of an investment agreement with Russia, sparking mass protests. Russia then annexed Crimea after a referendum, threatening Ukraine's territorial integrity. The crisis highlighted a power struggle between Russia seeking to maintain influence and the West supporting Ukrainian sovereignty. International relations theories of realism and defensive/offensive approaches help explain Russia's aggressive actions under Putin to regain regional power lost after the Soviet Union's collapse.
Lecture 3 - Technology, Innovation and Great Power CompetitionStanford University
Mike McFaul, Russia, Technology, Innovation and Great Power Competition,TIGPC, Gordian knot Center, DIME-FIL, department of defense, dod, hacking for defense, intlpol 340, joe felter, ms&e296, raj shah, stanford, Steve blank,
FOREIGN POLICY INSIGHT: Russian Aggression, International Support and Action ...Mmedeiros_1986
1. The document summarizes the Russian aggression in Crimea and the international response. It discusses the positions of major global players, Russia's geopolitical and economic interests in Crimea, and various conspiracy theories about Russia's motivations. It also outlines restraints on Russia's actions and the information war between Russia and Maidan.
2. The document analyzes Russia's violations of international treaties and its goal of attaching Crimea to a "small security belt" of regions under its control. It explores theories that Russia aims to raise stakes in negotiations, counter US influence in Ukraine, or distract from its own economic problems.
3. The international response and NATO military superiority in the Black Sea have restrained further
The Ukrainian Challenge for Russia: Working paper 24/2015Russian Council
The events in Ukraine in 2013-2014 did not reveal any new, deep-rooted contradictions between Kiev and Moscow; they had existed long before, albeit not so acutely. They have, however, triggered the fiercest confrontation between the two biggest countries in the post-Soviet space, which has raised numerous questions regarding the future of Russian-Ukrainian relations, along with exposing a whole range of serious problems within the entire international security system.
Authors: A.V. Guschin, Ph.D. in History; S.M. Markedonov, Ph.D. in History; A.N. Tsibulina, Ph.D. in Economics
This document summarizes and critiques five common myths about the situation in Ukraine:
1. That the Crimea referendum was illegal, arguing that the West only objects because they disliked the outcome.
2. That the uprisings in Ukraine were solely due to a desire for democracy, rather than also being influenced by Western interference.
3. That Western sanctions support the Ukrainian people, when in reality the sanctions have little impact and the West prioritizes its own economic interests over Ukraine's.
4. That the world is on the verge of World War III, which overstates tensions to justify Western interference despite all sides having economic reasons to avoid war.
5. That the West suddenly cares about the Tat
The document discusses the history of Ukraine and its relationship with Russia and the West over centuries. It notes that Ukraine was originally part of Kievan Rus along with Russia, but later split between Western Catholic powers like Poland and the growing Russian Orthodox state. This created an East-West divide in Ukraine that continues today. In the 17th century, the Cossack people led an uprising for Ukrainian independence but ultimately allied with Russia, bringing Eastern Ukraine under Russian control while Western Ukraine remained with Poland.
RAND_PEA2510-1 - AVOIDING A LONG WAR.pdfEdouardHusson
Rapport de la Rand Corporation plaidant pour une fin négociée rapide de la guerre entre l'Ukraine et la Russie. Le débat est lancé à Washington sur la meilleure manière de terminer la guerre sans avoir à concéder une défaite américaine.
Reshetnikov M.M. The modern world - psycho-political analysis: what attracts young people to terrorist
organizations and groups? // Oxford University Press: J. Social Problems, Issue 4(2), Vol. 64 - 2017. - P. 1132 - 1153
US Foreign Policy in Middle East Problems and Perspectivesijtsrd
In this article, the author examines what role the Middle East region plays in the foreign strategy of the United States of America and the main approaches of the US administrations to the region. It also provides recommendations on the future behavioral role of the United States in the Middle East. Fuzail Makhmudov "US Foreign Policy in Middle East: Problems and Perspectives" Published in International Journal of Trend in Scientific Research and Development (ijtsrd), ISSN: 2456-6470, Volume-6 | Issue-1 , December 2021, URL: https://www.ijtsrd.com/papers/ijtsrd47943.pdf Paper URL: https://www.ijtsrd.com/humanities-and-the-arts/political-science/47943/us-foreign-policy-in-middle-east-problems-and-perspectives/fuzail-makhmudov
Six Scenarios How Russia May Use Nukes: Discussion of the unthinkable — The scenarios for Russia to use nuclear weapons.
Russia's war against Ukraine is raising the risks to everyone. It is not a pleasant topic, but one which we must understand for no other reason than we need to be purposeful in watching for indicators that may lead down one of these paths, so we might have the best opportunity in avoiding nuclear tyranny.
Final Analysis of Competing Hypotheses_gradedEric Tallant
Russia's goals in Eastern Ukraine are to limit Western influence near its borders and project strength. By annexing Crimea and fueling conflict in Eastern Ukraine, Russia has created a buffer zone between itself and expanding NATO. This prevents NATO from advancing further into Ukraine and deters it from directly intervening in the conflict for fear of provoking Russia. Maintaining instability in Eastern Ukraine also allows Russia to control the strategic Crimean region and its ports on the Black Sea.
The document summarizes the crisis between Russia and Ukraine that began in 2013. Protests erupted in Ukraine after the Ukrainian government rejected a trade agreement with the EU under pressure from Russia. Russia then offered Ukraine an economic deal. The protests grew and spread nationwide, leading Russian troops to enter Ukraine in 2014 and annex Crimea. The crisis highlighted historical and political divisions between Ukraine and Russia and their struggle for influence and power in the region.
Frozen Conflicts in the Post-Soviet Space and Problems on RussiaJeanmarieColbert3
Frozen Conflicts in the Post-Soviet Space and Problems on Russia’s Periphery
Hard Targets and Intelligence
Week 3
Duggleby
The Florida State University
1
Sovereignty?
2
Let’s address that sovereignty thing again
Only states deal with sovereignty and exercise authority over territory
States have “national interests,” which drive decision-making and policy
History, Culture and Religion play a major role within a state…
So does Nationalism, Patriotism and Pride!
The United States is the only remaining true super-power following the collapse of the Soviet Union
3
What is a ‘Frozen Conflict’?
Armed conflict has ended, but no peace treaty or political resolution has resolved the tensions to the satisfaction of the different sides(1)
Russia is responsible for ALL internationally recognized ‘frozen conflicts’ that began since the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991
Sovereign nations affected represent 1/3 of countries previously part of the USSR: (Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia)
Russia’s response has been to send ‘peacekeepers’, but then remain in the region and ‘stoke the fire’
Moscow’s pretext and justification is the need to ‘protect’ its compatriots—ethnic Russians and Russian speakers (1)
It all begins innocently, with attempts to appeal to the geographically conflicted locals by citing common values, the Orthodox Church, culture
—leads to handing out Russian citizenship/passports(2)
Internal sovereignty is achieved, but external sovereignty is not—no international recognition.
The United States and NATO respects the sovereignty of all states affected
Agnia Grigas: Frozen Conflicts; A Took Kit for US Policymakers
Beyond Crimea, the new Russian empire
4
5
Frozen Conflicts
Ukraine and Moldova are restricting Russian military access to the breakaway territory of Transnistria, where Russia maintains about 1500 “peacekeepers”
6
Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP)
U.S. sponsored, 18-month, $64 million program aimed at increasing the capabilities of the Georgian Armed Forces and enhancing Georgia’s CT capabilities
Began in May, 2002, ultimately trained and equipped four 600-man Special Forces battalions (2 Brigades) with light weapons, vehicles and communications
Was US SOF lead in the beginning, shifting to the USMC and the British Army
GTEP ended in April 2004, but actually continued under the Georgia Sustainment and Stability Operations Program, preparing Georgian troops for operations in Iraq
3d largest troop contributor in Afghanistan in 2008. Georgia had its two U.S. trained brigades deployed at the time Russia invaded in August of that year. This was certainly a calculated strategic move by Putin
7
Georgia Frozen Conflicts
Ukraine and Moldova are restricting Russian military access to the breakaway territory of Transnistria, where Russia maintains about 1500 “peacekeepers”
8
9
10
11
Hybrid Warfare
Hybrid warfare is a military st ...
The document discusses the relationship between Russia and Ukraine since Ukraine gained independence from the Soviet Union. It notes that Ukraine has faced its most serious crisis in recent years as it has tried to strengthen economic ties with the EU, while also dealing with tensions between Russia and Western powers over Crimea. The roots of the crisis stem from decades of corruption and an economy dominated by oligarchs in Ukraine, as well as religious and cultural differences between eastern and western Ukraine. Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 further heightened tensions and showed Russia's desire to expand its sphere of influence.
This document discusses the crisis in Ukraine and Crimea's annexation by Russia, as well as broader issues related to the expansion of NATO and use of democracy and freedom as strategic tools. It argues that expanding NATO and using democratic ideals to advance strategic interests has undermined stability in Eastern Europe and democracy globally. The document advocates for an approach grounded in equilibrium and restraint between major powers.
Understanding Russia and Its Relationship with the Westtnwac
In 1994 at the dawn of the post-Cold War era Marieta Velikova left Surgut, Western Siberia in the Russian Federation bound for Weippe, Idaho as a high school exchange student. She returned to Russia with her first glimpses of life in America that would be followed by graduate and doctoral studies at Mississippi State University starting in 2002. She has lived in the United States ever since and is a proud Nashvillian who travels to Siberia twice a year to visit family.
Professor Velikova has a special perspective on US-Russian relations that she will share at this Global Dialogue session including discussion of President Vladimir Putin — how is he viewed among Russians and why does that differ from the view of the West; the situations in Chechnya, Georgia, Crimea and Ukraine; and the issue of US elections.
The return of Mackinder’s Heartland Theory with new strategic development in Eurasia, Defense Partnership and Alliances in the Heartland, Major Asian Power- Groping their way Amid Extremism including Test Case for India and China in Strategic Asia .
Here is Gabe Whitley's response to my defamation lawsuit for him calling me a rapist and perjurer in court documents.
You have to read it to believe it, but after you read it, you won't believe it. And I included eight examples of defamatory statements/
El Puerto de Algeciras continúa un año más como el más eficiente del continente europeo y vuelve a situarse en el “top ten” mundial, según el informe The Container Port Performance Index 2023 (CPPI), elaborado por el Banco Mundial y la consultora S&P Global.
El informe CPPI utiliza dos enfoques metodológicos diferentes para calcular la clasificación del índice: uno administrativo o técnico y otro estadístico, basado en análisis factorial (FA). Según los autores, esta dualidad pretende asegurar una clasificación que refleje con precisión el rendimiento real del puerto, a la vez que sea estadísticamente sólida. En esta edición del informe CPPI 2023, se han empleado los mismos enfoques metodológicos y se ha aplicado un método de agregación de clasificaciones para combinar los resultados de ambos enfoques y obtener una clasificación agregada.
04062024_First India Newspaper Jaipur.pdfFIRST INDIA
Find Latest India News and Breaking News these days from India on Politics, Business, Entertainment, Technology, Sports, Lifestyle and Coronavirus News in India and the world over that you can't miss. For real time update Visit our social media handle. Read First India NewsPaper in your morning replace. Visit First India.
CLICK:- https://firstindia.co.in/
#First_India_NewsPaper
Essential Tools for Modern PR Business .pptxPragencyuk
Discover the essential tools and strategies for modern PR business success. Learn how to craft compelling news releases, leverage press release sites and news wires, stay updated with PR news, and integrate effective PR practices to enhance your brand's visibility and credibility. Elevate your PR efforts with our comprehensive guide.
Acolyte Episodes review (TV series) The Acolyte. Learn about the influence of the program on the Star Wars world, as well as new characters and story twists.
An astonishing, first-of-its-kind, report by the NYT assessing damage in Ukraine. Even if the war ends tomorrow, in many places there will be nothing to go back to.
1. THE UKRAINE CRISIS RMP 2017
The New Cold War: The United States’ Political, Economic, and Strategic Options for
Containing Russian Military Aggression in Eastern Europe
Leo Rassieur,1
Gokh Alshaif,2
1
Cupertino High School, 10100 Finch Avenue, Cupertino, CA 95014, USA
e-mail address: leorassieur@gmail.com
2
Department of Global and International Studies, UC Santa Barbara, CA 93106, USA
In 2014, Russia illegally annexed the Ukrainian territory of Crimea, causing Ukraine to seek greater military
aid from North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members. This event, along with others preceding it,
has led regional experts to believe that tensions between the two Cold War-era adversaries—NATO and
Russia—may reach a breaking point within the next decade. Additionally, experts have argued that Russia’s
instigation of conflict in eastern Ukraine further demonstrates a desire to fragment the liberal democratic
world order. Multiple issues factor into the roles of NATO and Russia in the conflict—hegemonic
competition, national security, and domestic political support. Through reviewing academic literature,
policymakers’ statements, and news media, I attempt to understand the behavior of the actors involved in the
ongoing geopolitical confrontation between Russia and NATO. To resolve the conflict, this paper outlines
several options the United States has to contain Russian aggression and prevent global warfare.
Keywords: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Russia, United States, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, Cold War
I. INTRODUCTION
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, many
Western nations hoped that the influence of its successor
state, Russia, would fade, allowing for a new world order
dominated by a single superpower—the United States.
Although most scholars would agree that we live in a
unipolar world, several critical assumptions in post-Cold
War triumphalism have now been disproven. Rather than
aligning with the European Union (EU) and NATO, many
Soviet-era satellite states and republics, such as Belarus,
Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, continue to look to Russia
as an economic and military partner.1
Ukraine, the epicenter
of the ongoing geopolitical competition between NATO and
Russia, best demonstrates the profound divide between the
two powers’ interests in the region.
Post-communist politics in Ukraine primarily center
around its conflicting reliance on Russian investment and
desire for Western economic and political assistance. This
schism has led to tremendous political instability in the
country, culminating in a pro-Europe coup d’état February
2014 in Kiev, the nation’s capital.2
Russia responded by
launching operations to annex the southern territory of
Crimea from Ukraine in March 2014 and instigate violent
pro-Russia protests in the southeast in April,3
the beginning
of the current civil war.
Moreover, conventional strategies used by the West—
military encroachment and economic isolation—have
produced unforeseen ramifications. Due in part to EU and
U.S. sanctions beginning in March of 2014,4
Russia turned
to China for economic partnership, inadvertently bolstering
another of the U.S.’s strategic adversaries.5
NATO’s troop
movements into the Baltic states have been met by
reciprocation from Russia, heightening the need for peace
negotiations before conflict inevitably erupts.
Through my research, I aim to uncover the historical
foundations of the conflict between NATO and Russia. I
begin by examining relevant literature to see what factors
motivate Russian foreign policy. I then track the
development of the conflict over time. In the following
section, I analyze the perspectives of each actor involved and
use their motivations to understand how to create a peaceful
resolution to the conflict. Thereafter, I outline the previously
proposed peace agreements, particularly the Minsk Protocol
and Minsk II. Then, I focus on the United States’s role as
Europe’s strongest ally in limiting Russian influence and
preventing conflict. Finally, I identify several strategies the
United States can implement to achieve its goals in the
region—conflict resolution, deterrence of Russian
aggression, and geopolitical dominance.
By examining the conflict through multiple lenses and
perspectives, I hope to challenge the unsuccessful
components of Russia-United States relations and adopt a
worldview that is consistent with the rapidly shifting global
political landscape. By adopting Russia’s viewpoint as a
rational actor, I will limit the potential for adverse
consequences from the policy options I outline. This will
ensure that my solutions are more effective than those
previously attempted in establishing peace and
accomplishing American foreign policy objectives.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Most authors on the subject of West-Russia relations
agree that the dominant motivating factor for Russia’s
military intervention in eastern Ukraine in 2014 and beyond
is the desire to rebuild the historic Russian empire of the
Romanov (pre-1917) and Soviet eras. Ukrainian and Russian
historian Serhy Yekelchyk argues that a negative view of the
dissolution of the Soviet Union and thus of the loss of ‘great
2. THE UKRAINE CRISIS RMP 2017
power’ status is at the core of post-Cold War Russian foreign
policy.6
Historian Richard Sakwa agrees with this
assessment, although he adds that the ‘anti-Russianism’ of
NATO and EU after 1991 also contributed to Russian
leadership’s antagonism toward the West.7
Sten Rynning, a
Research Fellow with the Copenhagen Peace Research
Institute, alleges that Russia’s moves against the West were
never improvised—rather, they were deeply rooted in the
nation’s imperial legacy as the dominant Eurasian power.8
Examining this idea, Dr. Nadia Alexandrova-Arbatova
concludes that, in ignoring Russia’s tendency toward empire,
NATO and the EU inadvertently instigated Russian
aggression by ‘squeezing’ Russia out of its ties with key
Soviet-era allies. She additionally asserts that any U.S.
military action in Ukraine would escalate the conflict, as
Ukraine’s status as a buffer against NATO is a linchpin in
the Russian national security mission.9
Other sources highlight Russian security needs as a
driving rather than secondary factor in its reaction to the
Euromaidan Revolution in Ukraine. Political scientist Dr.
Agnia Grigas identifies the importance of reclaiming the
Russian diaspora to Russian President Putin, as the territory
and population of Crimea and east Ukraine are crucial to
countering NATO’s absorption of the Baltics, which are now
no longer ‘buffer zones’ for Moscow. Another important
facet Dr. Grigas analyzes is President Putin’s domestic
support, his military ambitions a successful attempt to revive
Russian nationalism and bolster his declining public
approval out of fear that the trend of movements demanding
regime change in the post-Soviet space could reach
Moscow.10
Contributing to this perspective, Professor
Elizabeth A. Wood suggests that the narrative of defending
‘Russian compatriots’ on Russia’s doorstep serves as Putin’s
backdrop for political crackdowns and shifts attention away
from domestic concerns. 11
However, Wood believes that,
despite the numerous political and strategic incentives for
Putin, the conflict was largely precipitated by economic
rivalry.
From a practical standpoint, duty-free EU trade with
Ukraine would circumvent Russian tariffs on European
goods meant to strengthen its Eurasian economic hub.
Perhaps more importantly, however, is Putin’s unwillingness
to relinquish Ukraine as a Russian economic satellite despite
the 2014 Ukrainian Revolution replaced a non-aligned
president with one who was overtly pro-West.12
Another
economic influence emphasized by authors J.L. Black and
Michael Johns is the West’s 2014 decision to sanction
Russia, which ‘hardened’ Moscow’s position by eliminating
economic ties.13
Dr. Grigas agrees that the Russia-EU
economic battle rewarded Putin’s military actions, but
ultimately disagrees with Black, Johns, and Wood,
contending that the failure of the sanctions to halt Russian
aggression disproves the idea that economic pressures
affected Putin’s decision-making in 2014.14
In recognizing the four central aspects of Russia’s
motivations in Eastern Europe—its imperial legacy, strategic
considerations, Putin’s popular support, and economic
relations—this paper seeks to clarify Russia’s foreign policy
objectives and thus propose options for resolution that ensure
the conflict’s key actor is compliant.
III. TIMELINE OF CONFLICT
DEVELOPMENT
2013
After decades of transition out of the Soviet system into
neoliberalism, Ukraine experiences its first violent anti-
government protests this year. Rather than immediate
transformation into a wealthy Western nation, the
introduction of capitalism to Ukraine led to massive state
corruption and lower quality of life—between 1991 and
2013, the national population decreases from 52 to 44
million,15
a decline greater than 15%. During the same time
period, the globe as a whole sees a population increase of
over 33%.16
Russophones and ethnic Russians looked to
Ukraine’s Westernization as the source of its economic woes
while pro-Europeans saw them as a sign of Russia
constraining Ukraine’s EU economic opportunities.
On November 21, President Viktor Yanukovych
suspends seven-year talks on the landmark EU Association
Agreement over backlash from Russia,17
whose 30%
discount on natural gas and investment are crucial for
Ukraine’s struggling economy.18
Yanukovych’s government
had tried courting both the EU and Russia, but the EU forces
a decision between the Association Agreement and the
Russian Commonwealth Free Trade Area. As a result, mass
pro-Europe protests take place in the historic Maidan
Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square), an event dubbed the
Euromaidan, which triggers the current Ukraine crisis. Amid
calls for the government to resign, both the West and Russia
mobilize to secure the future of Ukrainian politics. In
December, representatives from Germany, the EU, and the
U.S. travel to Kiev, communicating an overall pro-
Euromaidan message. President Yanukovych speaks with
opposition leaders, while on December 17 President Putin
announces another 30% natural gas discount and the
purchasing of Ukrainian government bonds, signaling
solidarity with Yanukovych.19
2014
In January, the Parliament of Ukraine, or Rada, begins
cracking down on freedom of speech and assembly while
hundreds of thousands of protestors engage in street violence
against the government, leading to the first few fatalities.20
After tens of deaths in February, France, Germany, Poland,
and Russia oversee a truce agreement between the
government and the opposition; this is quickly rejected by
Maidan protesters despite being signed by opposition
leaders.21
One day later on February 22, President
Yanukovych flees Kiev to the pro-Russia southeast for his
personal safety.22
This coup triggers an immediate response
from Russia, which sees the possibility of a West-aligned
3. THE UKRAINE CRISIS RMP 2017
Ukraine on its border as unthinkable for its national security.
On February 27, Russia begins covertly moving soldiers to
seize government and transit buildings in Crimea. Russian
operatives prompt the Crimean legislature to implement a
referendum to declare independence from Ukraine and join
Russia, which on March 16 allegedly passes with 97% in
favor with 83% turnout23
—although European observers are
skeptical of these values, the success of the referendum was
all but guaranteed by the locals largely being ethnic Russians
and Russophones.
The United Nations (UN) General Assembly votes in
March to condemn the Russian annexation of Crimea, and
the West begins implementing economic and diplomatic
sanctions on Russia, which are met by counter-sanctions.
Despite this, President Putin’s approval jumps to a record
83% due to national pride after the victory in Crimea and
China’s $400 billion energy deal with Russia helping ease
the effects of low oil prices on its economy.24
In the same
month, pro-Russian rebels organize independence referenda
in Luhansk and Donetsk, two Russia-aligned oblasts
(provinces) in eastern Ukraine collectively called the
Donbass. May sees the referenda pass and the election of
pro-West President Petro Poroshenko in Kiev, concluding
the 2014 Ukrainian Revolution.25
Ceasefires are attempted in
June and September, the latter of which being the Minsk
Protocol (see below), but both fail before one month’s time.
Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 crashes in the Donetsk Oblast
in July, killing the 298 on board. Both sides of the conflict
blame each other for the crash.26
The fighting in the Donbass
between Kiev and the self-proclaimed Luhansk People’s
Republic (LPR) and Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) is
ongoing at the end of the year.
2015
The West and Russia continue to deliver humanitarian
aid to their allies in Ukraine. On February 12, France,
Germany, Russia, and Kiev sign Minsk II (see below),
aiming to withdraw troops and plan local elections in the
Donbass.27
By March, Putin openly admits to plotting the
annexation of Crimea as Kiev begins to waver in its
withdrawal agreement, citing continued separatist activity.28
The EU and Russia extend their prior sanctions in June,
justifying this move as conditioning for the success of Minsk
II and reciprocity respectively.29
By August, over 6,500
casualties have been reported30
in the now-sporadic conflict
and President Poroshenko’s constitutional amendments to
give the Donbass special status pass the first round of
approval in the Rada, leading to three deaths in the ensuing
violent protests.
In September, NATO establishes military command
posts in Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria,
and Russia develops a base near its border.31
At this point
Minsk II looks to be effective at mitigating the scale of the
conflict, although withdrawal of military presence has not
fully occurred. Kiev continues to request weaponry from
NATO, but only technical assistance with military
organization and countering Russian propaganda is
provided. In October, the Dutch Safety Board publishes a
report attributing the crash of Malaysian Airlines Flight 17
to a Buk missile fired from the pro-Russian east.32
Kiev
withdraws the first small weapons, but by December the
conflict sees minor escalation and economic ties between
Russia and Kiev deteriorate.33
2016
In February President Poroshenko announces a troop
buildup on the border with Crimea, signaling his intent to
retake the territory from Russia. Talks in Paris during March
fail to see either side commit to Minsk II, with a key area of
contention being local elections in the separatist regions; a
NATO-Russia Council meeting in April again fails to reach
any agreement.34
However, a meeting on April 29 between
Russia, Ukraine, and representatives from the Organization
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) succeeds in
having both parties agree to a ceasefire starting on Easter.35
Despite this, the fighting in the Donbass continues almost
immediately following the announcement of the peace
agreement.36
An announcement from the speaker of the Rada in June
states that Ukraine is fully committed to joining NATO.37
The EU unanimously agrees extends its sanctions on Russia
in June until January 2017, although Italy, Greece, and
Hungary question their effectiveness in changing Russian
policy in Ukraine.38
An August UN report concludes that
both sides continue to use heavy artillery, in violation of the
ceasefire agreements.39
Peace seems more attainable in
September, as President Poroshenko takes steps to pass
constitutional amendments through the Rada to grant
autonomy to eastern Ukraine and the head of state of the
DPR, announces a unilateral ceasefire in support of the
Minsk agreements. France, Germany, Russia, and Ukraine
meet again in October, making minimal progress.40
The
election of President Donald Trump in the U.S. on
November 8 produces concern in Kiev, which had
previously relied on the Obama administration’s hardline
stance on Russia; Trump, meanwhile, had made several pro-
Russia statements during his presidential campaign. The EU
again extends sanctions on Russia for six months in
December.41
2017
President Poroshenko in February plans a referendum
for Ukraine joining NATO, which looks to succeed as
violence in the east sees an uptick.42
Later in the month,
President Putin issues a decree recognizing passports from
the LPR and DPR.43
In March, Poroshenko halts all freight
transit between the government-controlled Ukraine and the
separatists, aiming to punish their seizure of Ukrainian
businesses in the region.44
As the conflict currently stands in
mid-2017, the West and Russia are still at an impasse.
Economic ties between the two continue to fragment,
4. THE UKRAINE CRISIS RMP 2017
harming each nation involved, while covert military buildup
continues.
IV. ACTORS’ PERSPECTIVES
1. NATO—Central and Western Europe
NATO member states in Central and Western Europe,
most notably France and Germany, are most interested in
supporting Ukraine’s transition into a Western economic
power, establishing peace in Ukraine, and upholding
international law on state sovereignty.
For NATO’s most powerful leaders, Germany’s
Chancellor Angela Merkel and France’s President
Emmanuel Macron, reconciliation with Russia is unlikely to
be possible in the near future. Putin’s violation of Ukraine’s
sovereignty in Crimea and the Donbass, as outlined in the
1975 Helsinki Final Act signed by the U.S., most of Europe,
and the Soviet Union,45
indicates a blatant disrespect for
Western liberal norms. Moreover, Putin’s repeated
deceptions regarding the extent of Russian interference in
Western elections and in Ukraine makes it unlikely Merkel
will have the goodwill to concede any Ukrainian territory.46
Strategically, Russia does not pose a credible threat to
nations in Central and Western Europe due to its moderately
weak military and the buffer zone of Eastern Europe between
the two.47
Indeed, a purpose of NATO expansion westward was
making the threat of a Russian attack both less likely and less
effective. By limiting Russian influence in Eastern Europe,
European leadership hopes to expand international trade and
strengthen the global economy, and ultimately spread the
Western democratic system of government. This grand
vision begins with Ukraine integrating with the EU and
cutting off economic ties with Russia, a goal made more
likely to succeed by the European funding of Kiev.
Continued missions to train the Ukrainian military makes it
clear that Merkel and Macron are unwilling to surrender
eastern Ukraine to Putin.48
A contributing factor in this is the considerable time
spent by Germany and France in fostering the Minsk
agreements; their failure would reflect poorly in the eyes of
the European public. For these nations, a diplomatic victory
with Russia to resume EU expansion and uphold
international law on sovereignty would be the ideal
resolution to the conflict, codifying the role of Europe as the
center of the international community.
2. NATO—Eastern Europe
NATO member states in Eastern Europe, most notably
the Baltics (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) and Poland, are most
interested in avoiding conflict with Russia and maintaining
NATO’s defense credibility.
Unlike the other NATO member states, Eastern Europe
perceives Russia as a credible and dangerous security threat.
In the case of conflict escalation, the Baltics, where the U.S.
and Germany have positioned a substantial number of
troops, would see the most conflict. Another scenario, in
which Ukraine were to become a pawn of Russia over the
course of years of EU withdrawal, would allow Russia to
place troops on Poland’s border. Both circumstances
represent an unacceptable existential threat to Eastern
Europe. As such, these nations are reliant on assistance from
the U.S., Germany, France, and others in maintaining
NATO’s defense spending and resisting Russia.
Worse yet is the possibility that Putin will circumvent
Western authorities by using covert tools against Eastern
Europe, as it did in Ukraine. Cyberattacks, targeting of the
sizeable Russian ethnic minorities49
in these post-Soviet
states through the media and sending paramilitary operatives
to seize government buildings or initiate referenda are all
grave concerns for the leaders of the Baltics—Estonia’s and
Latvia’s populations are 30% and 34% Russian-speaking,
respectively.50
The likelihood of these dangers was amplified
by the Russian abduction of an Estonian counterintelligence
officer in September 2014, who Moscow claimed was
planning espionage. Through strengthening NATO’s troop
presence in these countries and punishing Russia for illegal
intervention in Ukraine, Eastern Europe hopes that the
Ukraine crisis will not become the first in a series of Russian
destabilization operations in NATO member states.51
3. NATO—United States
The U.S., as a member of NATO, is most interested in
keeping open opportunities for future collaboration with
Russia in Syria and beyond and establishing peace in
Ukraine.
The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 made
Russo-American relations significantly more complex.
During the détente between the West and post-Soviet states
in the 1990s, the U.S. perceived Russia as no longer being a
strategic threat to its status as a global superpower, and
nuclear warfare remained unlikely due to mutually assured
destruction. However, Russia’s apparent unwillingness to
cede its imperial past has again made the country a focal
point in American politics. Under the Obama Administration
between 2009 and 2017, a policy of containment was
implemented which saw little potential for cooperation with
President Putin; by moving troops into NATO’s eastern
border in the Baltics and levying sanctions, Obama’s Russia
policy demonstrated agreement with Europe. Critics point to
the failed negotiations with Russia over the Syrian Civil War
as evidence that the Obama Administration was nonetheless
distracted by the potential for cooperation, precluding a
credible hardline stance in Ukraine.52
The Trump Administration has opened new dialogues
for collaboration with President Putin in both Syria and
Ukraine. Although Trump’s campaign promise of
‘friendliness’ with Russia was largely shattered by the
reinstatement of Obama-era sanctions and missile launches
against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, a longtime ally of
Putin, current Secretary of State Rex Tillerson has stated that
the Minsk agreements should not be a burden to Ukraine
5. THE UKRAINE CRISIS RMP 2017
negotiations. This sudden departure from NATO’s insistence
on the implementation of Minsk reveals Trump’s greater
foreign policy vision—to reset relations with Russia and
become independent from the current European unity against
Russia.53
Unfortunately for Trump, this vision has been
weakened by legislation passed by Congress on July 25,
2017 containing new sanctions on Russia and preventing
Trump from lifting them.54
The U.S.’ European allies are doubly concerned by
Trump’s threat to disengage from NATO, another keystone
promise in his 2016 presidential campaign. This split from
decades of American coalition-building is based on the
failure of weaker NATO states to contribute to defense
spending, and Trump’s desire to disengage from
international organizations and efforts. In May 2017,
however, American foreign policy representatives have
asserted their commitment to the common defense principle
of NATO.55
Undoubtedly, European leaders such as
Germany’s Merkel are troubled by the U.S.’ simultaneous
courting of Russia and of NATO.
This seeming contradiction exposes Trump’s belief that
trilateral cooperation between the U.S., Europe, and Russia
is both possible and crucial for accomplishing America’s
mission in Ukraine. In line with international withdrawal,
ceding the Donbass and Crimea to Russia is a possibility for
the Trump Administration, particularly if it would allow a
victorious collaborative effort in Syria. These two
accomplishments would bolster Trump’s ideal image as a
political outsider who will erase years of failed, archaic
foreign policy by bureaucrats in Washington and forge a new
international order with the U.S. and Russia as allies. The
two critical assumptions underpinning this worldview are
that eastern Ukraine is unimportant strategically for the
U.S.56
and that NATO is not critical to the future of Russo-
American relations.57
4. Ukraine—Government (Kiev)
The Kiev-based government of Ukraine is most
interested in retaining political influence in Crimea and the
Donbass, avoiding military escalation with Russia, and
integrating with the EU and NATO.
President Poroshenko faces substantial pressure from
constituents to accelerate integration with the EU and assist
the nation’s troubled economy. The faults in the Ukrainian
economy go beyond endemic corruption; the severance of
freight transit and financial cooperation between the west
and the separatist east has severely disrupted domestic
production. The economic damage is expected to cost tens of
thousands of jobs and billions of dollars in 2017.58
This
would hamper the country’s chances of acceding to the EU,
which is still in the stage of assisting with economic reforms
in Ukraine. Meanwhile, the civil war still prevents outright
joining the EU, as the organization will not admit a nation
with a territorial dispute.
In order to achieve long-term economic growth, Kiev
needs to make peace with the separatists and Russia, and
move towards the reforms that the EU and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) have proposed. Resumed economic
interaction between the east and west will help to ease
economic stability as well. To accomplish this, Kiev seeks to
grant the Donbass and Crimea greater autonomy,
recognizing that a return to 2013 is unrealistic. Kiev
perceives Russian control of these territories as violations
that should not go unpunished; otherwise, this would set an
unfortunate precedent for the sovereignty of the country and
its Eastern European neighbors in the future. By courting the
U.S.’ President Trump, Poroshenko hopes that he does not
consider a direct deal with Putin to exchange east Ukraine
for cooperation on Syria, for instance.59
5. Ukraine—Separatists (Donbass)
The Donbass separatists in Ukraine are most interested
in integrating with Russia, political independence from Kiev,
and avoiding military escalation with NATO.
The motives for the insurgents in the Donbass and the
voters in Crimea to seek reunion with Russia are both
cultural and historical. In 1954, the Presidium of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union approved a motion to
transfer control of Crimea from the Russian Soviet
Federative Socialist Republic to the Ukrainian Soviet
Socialist Republic. At the time, Soviet leaders assumed that
the Soviet Union would never fall, making the transfer of
Crimea, with a 75% ethnic Russian majority, simply a matter
of proximity and goodwill to the Ukrainian leadership. This
territory transfer, however, laid the ground for the pro-
Russian separatists’ feelings of cultural divide.60
The Donbass is home to Ukraine’s most influential
oligarchs—artifacts of the post-Soviet republic’s graceless
fall into capitalism—and sorely lacks a modernized
economy.61
The conflict has led to the displacement of over
one million citizens, with many others lacking access to
food, water, and educational and vocational opportunities.62
The hope for the leaders of the DPR and LPR is to end the
conflict as soon as possible to allow humanitarian aid access
while also retaining autonomy from Kiev. Reunion with
Ukraine would, moreover, allow Donbass citizens to have a
meaningful voice in the Rada and help restore Ukrainian
economic ties with Russia to their 2013 state. However, the
ideal resolution is to join Russia, as the separatists most
identify with Russian culture and their history as a part of the
greater Russian empire, both Romanov and Soviet.
6. Russia
Russia is most interested in retaining jurisdiction over
Crimea, establishing the Donbass as a buffer zone with
NATO, preventing Ukrainian integration with the EU and
NATO, and avoiding military escalation with NATO.
Russia’s foreign policy is dictated by President Vladimir
Putin, who faces an election in 2018.63
The upcoming
election has seemingly pushed Putin to revive Russian
nationalism with a state media-run narrative of defending
Russian compatriots in Ukraine, who are allegedly under
6. THE UKRAINE CRISIS RMP 2017
attack by Ukrainian nationalists at the state level. This
campaign bolsters Putin’s approval among Russians,
encouraging him to either prolong the conflict or seek a
resolution where Russia retains control of some or all of the
separatist Ukrainian territories.64
Past 2018, Putin has a much larger objective for his
Ukrainian policy. Taking back the territories of the previous
Russian sphere of influence and intimidating Russia’s
western neighbors into economic cooperation accomplish
several goals in Putin’s eyes. The Russian nation-state has
historically desired regional hegemon status, which is being
denied by NATO and the EU’s anti-Russia expansion
mission. Secondly, strengthening Russia’s now-weak
economy through trade and investment and Putin’s Eurasian
Customs Union will dramatically improve the lives of
Russians and fund its government. This is critical for the
sustainable growth of Russian defense spending, a tool Putin
needs to maintain a credible strategic threat against NATO
member states. In addition, stronger domestic support for
Putin’s foreign policy would further guarantee his reelection
bid passing without protest.
Currently, however, an invasion and occupation of
western Ukraine would expend too much of Moscow’s
economic and human capital to be tenable.65
With a new
opportunity in President Trump, Putin will likely attempt to
negotiate surrender of part of Ukraine back to Kiev in return
for lifting of sanctions and U.S. collaboration elsewhere,
such as in Syria. Alternatively, Putin can reduce support for
Syria’s President Assad in order to procure Trump’s
recognition of Russia’s jurisdiction over Crimea and the
Donbass. Such a scenario is tantalizing for Putin, as a splinter
between Europe and the U.S. would destroy the Western
monopoly on control of international conflicts. An emerging
multipolar world, Putin hopes, involves Russia just as much
as it does Germany or China. The autonomy of Crimea and
the Donbass also serves key strategic interests. Positioning
the Russian Navy in the waters near Crimea and having a
porous border between the Donbass and Russia will serve to
coerce Ukraine into preferring Russia and the EU equally
economically, if not Russia first.66
V. PREVIOUSLY ATTEMPTED
.PEACE FRAMEWORKS
1. Minsk Protocol
The first robust ceasefire agreement, the Minsk
Protocol, is signed by Kiev, the DPR, the LPR, Russia, and
a Swiss observer from the OSCE on September 5, 2014. The
critical points of the agreement are as follows:67
1. A full and immediate ceasefire to be reviewed by the
OSCE;
2. Implement legislation for decentralization of power
3. OSCE monitoring and securing of the Ukraine-Russia
border;
4. Progress toward normalizing relations between Kiev
and the separatists (exchange of detainees, amnesty for
combatants, humanitarian aid, and recovery of
economic activity in the Donbass);
5. Early local elections in particular districts of the
Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts;
6. Facilitation of an ‘inclusive national dialogue;’
7. Dismantling of illegal military groups.
The implementation of Minsk I failed within a matter of
days as violence simply continued after September 5.
Combat resumed full-scale by early October. Moscow’s
delivery of humanitarian aid was believed by Kiev to
actually be a shipment of heavy weaponry, a violation of the
agreement, highlighting the lack of accountability and severe
distrust between the negotiating parties.68
2. Minsk II
Following the almost immediate collapse of Minsk I in
September 2014, Minsk II is signed on February 12, 2015 by
Kiev, the DPR, the LPR, Russia, France, and Germany. The
critical points of the agreement are as follows:69
1. A full and immediate ceasefire in particular districts of
the Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts;
2. Withdrawal of heavy weaponry (i.e. artillery) from the
line of conflict;
3. A dialogue on local elections in particular districts in
the Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts based on Ukrainian
law;
4. Demarcation by the Ukrainian Rada of which territories
in the Donbass attain special self-governance status;
5. Progress toward normalizing relations between Kiev
and the separatists (exchange of detainees, access to
humanitarian aid, amnesty for combatants, and
cooperation on financial systems);
6. Granting full control of the national border to Kiev
following the local elections and by the end of 2015;
7. Pullout of all foreign troops and arms;
8. Dismantling of illegal military groups;
9. Constitutional and legislative reform to grant special
status to particular districts of the Luhansk and Donetsk
Oblasts.
Minsk II was substantially more effective than its
predecessor, leading to a moderate reduction in fighting for
several months. This was largely due to it being brokered by
Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel and France’s
President François Hollande. However, tensions have been
exacerbated by the question of local elections, which Kiev
perceive as a threat to its territorial integrity. However, the
greater concern for peace prospects is that the end of the
conflict remains opposed to Russian political and security
interests. Territorial disputes in Ukraine prevent accession to
the EU and NATO’s desire to partner with it, both victories
for Moscow.70
Russia’s responsibilities in upholding Minsk II have
been made conditions by the West for lifting sanctions.
However, the unilateral nature of the sanctions all but
guaranteed their failure. Intended to isolate Russia from
international business, they only encouraged non-Western
7. THE UKRAINE CRISIS RMP 2017
nations and organizations, such as China, the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization, and BRICS, to take advantage of
new trade and investment opportunities with Russia.71
Furthermore, the effect of the sanctions was minimal enough
to be ignored in the face of Putin’s broader geopolitical goals
in Ukraine, as low oil prices likely played a bigger role in the
Russian economic crisis than a reduction in trade swiftly
offset by Putin’s allies in Asia.72
VI. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR THE UNITED STATES
Potential objectives for U.S. foreign policy regarding
the conflict in Ukraine are as follows:
1. A permanent end to the violence in the Donbass;
2. The strengthening of economic and political alliances
with European nations;
3. Russian cooperation on international conflicts;
4. Intervention on behalf of international law;
5. Prevention of future security crises in Eastern Europe.
Policy options for U.S. intervention in the conflict in
Ukraine are as follows:
1. Negotiate with President Putin, President Poroshenko,
and European leaders to fully implement Minsk II.
President Trump’s involvement in negotiations will
increase accountability on both sides, just as Merkel and
Hollande’s involvement in the original February 2015
process improved on Minsk I. Poroshenko will be
pressured by the U.S. to uphold the agreement or face a
decrease in Western support. Likewise, Putin will likely
see Trump’s commitment as a display of goodwill, and
take the opportunity to deescalate the conflict once
additional concessions are made to the separatist
territories, such as greater autonomy or surrender of
Crimea. This is the lowest-risk course to maintain strong
diplomatic ties to both Europe and Russia. The
probability for future conflict would be low as the
reintegration of the pro-Russians into Ukraine would
give Putin the political and strategic buffer he needs in
Ukraine. This is the recommended course of action, as
it is the only one which lacks the potential for immediate
negative consequences if it fails. The other two courses
of action described below should be attempted if this
strategy consistently fails.
2. Negotiate with President Putin to cede the Donbass in
return for his cooperation in Syria and/or elsewhere.
Once Poroshenko stops receiving aid from the U.S., he
and his Western backers would inevitably be forced to
retreat from the separatist-held regions. Putin would
likely accept this bargain, as the cost of funding the
separatists is taking a toll on the Russia government.
The ideal exchange would involve Russia no longer
supporting the Assad regime in Syria; sharing military
intelligence in the fight against the Islamic State is still
unlikely to occur. EU leaders will no longer view the
U.S. as a reliable ally against Putin, although American
contributions to NATO are likely too significant to
ignore when Trump next asks for assistance. This
negotiation has the potential to backfire if Putin
backtracks on his promise to align with American
interests in Syria. This course of action is currently
unlikely to be taken by Trump due to his involvement in
the ongoing Russian election meddling scandal.
3. Deploy U.S. Marines to reclaim the Donbass from the
pro-Russia separatists. The humanitarian crisis in the
Donbass will likely motivate the rebels to surrender
once troops arrive. Regardless of whether the separatists
surrender, this will result in a decisive victory for the
U.S., reassuring its allies in Europe. President Putin will
reject cooperation in Syria and continue to turn to China
as an economic ally. Furthermore, Kiev will exhaust its
economic resources rebuilding the Donbass following
its reclamation, particularly if the war is prolonged.
Granting the Donbass autonomy will be necessary to
prevent a resurgence of protests, but their new
representation in the Rada will limit Ukraine’s
integration with the West. Russia will perceive the U.S.
troops presence on its border as a grave security threat;
Putin will not retaliate due to U.S. possession of nuclear
warheads, but may instead move troops to the border,
committing to a new Cold War, potentially recreating
the conditions for another proxy conflict to occur. For
these reasons, this conflict resolution option is not
highly recommended except as a last resort.
VII. CONCLUSION
The U.S. is now at a crossroads; President Trump must
choose between upholding the status quo of Western
solidarity against Russian aggression, or a multipolar world
in which the U.S. may withdraw from its role as a
superpower, allowing Russia and China to fortify their
spheres of influences in Eurasia. It is clear that the current
situation will result in thousands of more lives lost and
continuing damage to the economies of Ukraine and Russia.
Moving beyond Ukraine to prioritize defeating the Islamic
State is yet another reason to swiftly take action to end the
civil war. The burden on the Trump Administration is
unenviable: the way in which the U.S. answers the questions
at the heart of the Ukraine crisis will define the international
order for decades to come.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank my mentor, Gokh Alshaif, for
giving me direction in my research and encouraging my
progress. I additionally thank Dr. Lina Kim for giving me the
opportunity to conduct this research and pursue my academic
goals. I thank Zach Rentz for his helpful feedback on my
work. Finally, I would like to thank my family and friends
for supporting my interest in international relations and
political science and being positive influences in my life.
8. THE UKRAINE CRISIS RMP 2017
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