Dissertation April 22nd

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Dissertation for Wednesday 22/04/2015 Department of Government
Project Supervisor: Professor Han Dorussen
Russia’s new foreign policy: reasons and goals behind the
Putin doctrine
Name: Axel Xavier Patrice Rigault de Puteani Jorgensen
Registration number: 1202108
Module code: GV831-6-FY-CO

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
I) INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................3
II) THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK........................................................4
III) BRIEF HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ............................................6
FROM THE SOVIET UNION TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ...............................6
IV) APPLICATION OF THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ...........8
REALISM: BACK TO THE USSR ...........................................................8
EURASIANISM: BACKFIRE....................................................................9
THE BALTIC DILEMMA: A HISTORIC, LINGUISTIC AND ETHNIC
ATTACHMENT.................................................................................................................11
The Commonwealth of Independent States............................................13
GEOPOLITICS: THE PUTIN DOCTRINE........................................... 15
SOFT POWER VERSUS HARD POWER............................................ 17
FINLANDISATION ..........................................................................................................17
Reunification ...........................................................................................................19
V) UNDERSTANDING THE RUSSIAN POINT OF VIEW: A
LINKAGE BETWEEN REALISM, EURASIANISM, AND
GEOPOLITICS. ....................................................................................... 23
CONTESTING THE RUSSIAN JUSTIFICATION .........................................................29
VI) CONCLUSION .................................................................................. 32

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I) Introduction
On March 18th 2014, Russian president Vladimir Putin and the Crimean leadership signed an
agreement formally making the Ukrainian peninsula part of the Russian Federation. This
operation was an evident response to the Ukrainian revolution, in which pro-Russian
president Viktor Yanukovych renegaded from his promise to sign a long awaited association
agreement with the European Union after years of negotiations. Under evident Russian
pressure, he abandoned his promise to the Ukrainian people1. While Kiev was in turmoil,
Putin did his utmost to take advantage of the situation. The annexation of Crimea was well
planned and skilfully executed. This move pointed to the impression that Putin for long had
intended to occupy the region in order to extend Moscow’s sphere of influence, and to
succumb their smaller, uneasy neighbour. In the following weeks, the Eastern Ukrainian
regions of Donetsk and Luhansk declared independence from the government in Kiev,
marking the beginning of what has since been called the Ukrainian civil war2. The unrest in
Ukraine and the Russian occupation of Crimea has plunged Eastern Europe into a nail-biting
conflict, not seen since the Yugoslav wars in the 1990s.
Russia might still be an enormous country, although it declined considerably in size since the
end of the Cold War. The Baltic countries, Ukraine, Moldova, the Caucasus countries,
Belarus, and the Central Asian ex-Soviet republics all gained independence after the Soviet
Union collapsed, something of a calamity for Moscow.
In the years prior to the Crimean annexation, Russia had unfolded her strategies according to
the familiar playbook of the regional bigger brother. Moscow intentionally stirred up ethnic
tensions and applied soft power in neighbouring regions to gain a strengthened foothold over
the political landscape, making these countries targets for Russian influence3. The Russian
annexation of Crimea, however, was from a Western perspective, a hostile act of aggression,
directly opposed to the old ways of applying diplomatic and economic pressure. Putin has
demonstrated his ambition, and indeed willingness towards his neighbours and to the world.
1 BBC 2013, ”Ukrainian protests after Yanukovych EU deal rejection” available at
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-25162563 30/11/2013, retrieved on
7/01/2015.
2 Time 2014, Feeney, Nolan ” Pro-Russia insurgents declare independence in Eastern
Ukraine” available at http://time.com/96102/ukraine-donetsk-independence-russia/
12/05/2014, retrieved on 7/01/2015.
3 Mankoff, Jeffrey (May/June 2014) “ Foreign affairs: Russia’s latest land grab, how Putin
won Crimea and lost Ukraine” Council of foreign relations, New York, p. 60.

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Putin is looking to slowly rebuild Russia’s super-power reputation and impact on the world
stage by reasserting Russia’s right to interfere and control former parts of its empire. The
Russian bear has showed its claws, and no one knows where it will strike next.
This research paper will focus on the doctrine of one man, Vladimir Putin, who as head of
Russian politics for the last 15 years, has transformed and developed a broken and fragile
state into a powerful and aggressive player in international affairs. Russian hegemony within
the country’s sphere of influence is the pinnacle of this doctrine, which was thoroughly
demonstrated to the world in March of last year.
Thus, my research question is the following:
Why is President Putin focusing on his foreign policy agenda to reaffirm and restore Russia’s
greatness? And how is the president planning to do so?
II) Theoretical framework
This essay will encompass several theories. These will be developed and defined to help the
reader comprehend the nature of the concepts involved, and what functions they serve to the
research question at hand. The theories will be shortly defined, while the main part of the
essay will describe how the Putin doctrine can be linked to each individual theory.
- Geopolitics
- Realism
- Eurasianism
Geopolitics
Geopolitics is a common term to define global conflict and change; it characterises the
struggle over power and geography that are dominant in the world today. Geopolitics provides
us with an understanding of “historical struggles over the organisation of global political
space”4. This theory deals with the complete vision of the world’s political landscape5.
4 Tuathail, Gearoid, Dalby, Simon & Routledge, Paul (1998)” The Geopolitics reader,
Routledge, New York, foreword.

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Territorial struggles, globalisation, conflict, sovereignty, and national interests are all
variables of modern day geopolitics. Although the end of the Cold War brought the great
geopolitical struggle of the 20th century to a close (the Cold War between East and West),
variables such as national boundaries, national self-determination, and spheres of influence
have continued to play a part of today’s geopolitical agenda6. The Russian annexation of
Crimea confirms this point to be true.
The reason geopolitics plays an important part of the essay is because it is an integral part of
any foreign policy doctrine, and especially that of Russia.
Realism
Realism in the realms of international relations is a framework well worth using when trying
to understand, or describe the Putin doctrine. Realism sees the state as an independent actor in
international politics, where no superior power exists, and actors operate out of basic self-
interest without consideration for others7. It is a presumption that, all states, democratic or
not, tend to operate in accordance with decisions based on maximising their national interest.
Foreign policy, for realists, should be performed in conformity with realpolitik8. The struggle
for national security, power and wealth are pivotal in a realist state of mind. Furthermore,
according to Brian Schmidt, “ the real essence of the state is found to be sovereignty (…)
absolute authority internally and externally”9. Realism advocates that there is no power above
the sovereign state, because there is no other sovereign authority which enforces the rule of
law10, hence, every state has the right to make its own decisions.
5 Tuathail, Gearoid, Dalby, Simon & Routledge, Paul (1998)” The Geopolitics reader,
Routledge, New York, p . 1.
6 Foreign Affairs 2014, Mead, Walter R. ”The return of geopolitics: the revenge of the
revisionist powers” available at
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141211/walter-russell-mead/the-return-of-
geopolitics May/June issue, retrieved on 6/04/2015.
7 Steans, Pettiford, Diez & El-Anis (2010) “An introduction to international relations theory,
perspectives and themes” Pearson Education limited, Harlow, Essex, p.71.
8 Rochester, Martin J. (2010) “Fundamental principles of international relations“
Westview Press, Boulder, p.83.
9 Schmidt, Brian C. (1998) “The political discourse of anarchy: a disciplinary history of
international relations”. State university of New York press, New York, p. 83.
10 Steans, Pettiford, Diez & El-Anis (2010) “An introduction to international relations theory,
perspectives and themes” Pearson Education limited, Harlow, Essex, p. 54.

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Lastly, the autonomy of a country’s political sphere, the drive for the state’s survival, and the
promotion of national interests are basic assumptions for realist thinking11. Realist theory is
fitting to the essay at hand, for it will help to interpret the Putinist doctrine.
Eurasianism
Eurasianism is a geopolitical theory that focuses on Russia having a particular and exclusive
position in the world; Russia is unique and posses its own path and mission12. The theory
rejects the notion that Russia is part of Europe, or entirely part of Asia, but something in
between. The goal for Eurasianism is to create a different centre of power and culture that
would be neither European, nor Asian, but would have traits of both13. The new Eurasian
movement, advocated by Russian political theorist Alexander Dugin, is anti-American, anti-
European, and clearly expansionistic in nature. The theory states that it should be an ultimate
goal for the Russian state to incorporate all of the former Soviet republics, and all former
Soviet satellites into Russia14. It is an ultra-nationalistic, neo-imperial ideology, which, as the
Putin doctrine, promotes Russia’s rebirth as a great power. Thus, it is a suiting theory to use to
analyse Moscow’s foreign policy agenda.
III) Brief historical background
From the Soviet Union to the Russian Federation
11 Donnelly, Jack (2000) “Realism and international relations” Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, p.7.
12 Foreign Affairs 2014, Barbashin, Anton & Thoburn, Hannah ”Putin’s brain: Alexander
Dugin and the philospohy behind Putin’s invasion of Criema” available at
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141080/anton-barbashin-and-hannah-
thoburn/putins-brain 31/03/2014, retrieved on 06/04/2015.

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On New Year’s Eve 1999, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin took the reins of the Russian
presidency after the resignation of Boris Yeltsin15. Putin, an ex-KGB officer fluent In
German, had been head of the Federal security service, and then Prime Minister of Russia16.
He had been Yeltsin’s protégé, and had quickly risen in the ranks of Russian politics, and was
now holding the highest office in Russia.
For the ordinary Russian, he represented a return to a stable and idealised foreign policy
order, after the turbulent presidency of Boris Yeltsin17.
The mysterious and complex allure of the new president astonished Western and Russian
commentators alike, prompting them to ask, “Who is Mr Putin?”18 If there was ever any
doubt, the Russian annexation of Crimea 15 years later removed all doubts of who Putin was
or of what his intentions were. With such a bold and unanticipated move, he intended to prove
to the world that Russia was back in the top flight of world politics, and that he would defend
Russian interests abroad whatever the cost. The question, from a Western perspective, is what
exactly prompted this hostile act against a sovereign and independent country? And what
agenda and ideology is at the starting point of this blunt and unexpected move?
When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Russia became a shadow of her former self, the
economy was in crisis, and society was in turmoil19. Furthermore, 14 of the other Soviet
republics had declared independence from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).
Although Russia was by far the largest and the most important state in the union, the
independence of the other republics led Moscow to lose 49% of the former Soviet Union’s
population, 24% of its territory, and 39% of its gross national product20. The nascent Russian
15 BBC 1999 ”Putin takes over as Yeltsin resigns” available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/december/31/newsid_4102000/41
02107.stm 31/12/1999, retrieved on 8/01/2015.
16 The Telegraph 2012, Brown, Mick ”Vladimir Putin: the godfather of a mafia clan”
available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/vladimir-
putin/9100388/Vladimir-Putin-the-godfather-of-a-mafia-clan.html 25/02/2012,
retrieved on 8/01/2015.
17 Lo, Bobo (2003) ”Vladimir Putin and the evolution of Russian foreign policy”
Blackwell Publishing Ltd, Oxford, p.1.
18 Lo, Bobo (2003) ”Vladimir Putin and the evolution of Russian foreign policy”
Blackwell Publishing Ltd, Oxford, p.2.
19 BBC 2011, Brinkworth, Malcolm ” The Soviet Union’s last stand” available at
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/coldwar/soviet_stand_01.shtml
17/02/2011, retrieved on 9/01/2015.
20 Thompson, John M. (2013) ”Russia and the Soviet Union: A historical introduction
from the Kievan state to the present” Westview Press, Boulder, p.321.

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Federation was fragile, and the sad reality of post-communist society, which was far from as
ideal as expected, made Russians lose faith in Yeltsin and in the newly established democratic
free market system21. As the new millennium dawned, however, a new man was in charge,
and he was ready, eager and most willing to bring Russian pride and glory back from the
ashes. The age of Putin would bring drastic changes not only to Russia and its people, but also
to Russia’s closest neighbours.
IV) Application of the theoretical framework
Realism: Back to the USSR
Throughout Vladimir Putin´s time in power, Russia has steadily reorganised, restructured and
reformulated its foreign policy, differentiating it from that of Boris Yeltsin. Under Boris
Yeltsin, the first post-Soviet president, Russia sought a rapprochement with the Western
powers22. This approach saw an abrupt end when Russia occupied Crimea. The relations
between the East and the West are, once again, at a freezing point. Russia has once and for all
rejected the Western rules of the game. They see themselves as the master of their own house,
and nobody has the right to interfere in their internal affairs. From a Russian perspective, the
seeds of conflict were sown even before Putin became president. As the newly born
Federation was struggling to find its place in the post-Cold War era, the West, and especially
the United States, the only remaining super power, was presented with two choices of
partnership towards Russia. The first option was to include Russia as an equal partner in
world affairs, and assimilate her to the West. The second was to wrest away Russia’s former
sphere of influence23. President Bill Clinton and George W. Bush chose the latter option24. In
the late days of the Soviet Union, although not formally, the United States had promised not
from the Kievan state to the present” Westview Press, Boulder, p. 322.
22 Foreign affairs 2014, Lukin, Alexander ”What the Kremlin is thinking: Putin’s vision
for Eurasia” available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141538/alexander-
lukin/what-the-kremlin-is-thinking July/August 2014, retrieved on 9/01/2015.

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to meddle in what was then the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence. However, as the USSR
collapsed, the West went back on their word. Although the mentioned promise was never
concretely formalised, Russians believed that their plea had been heard, and that the West
would stay out of the affairs of the former Soviet Union. Within a few years and three rounds
of enlargements later, NATO added 12 new Eastern European and former Soviet satellite
states as members to its alliance system25. Russia was outraged. For them, naive cooperation
with the West was off the table, and a more realism-based foreign policy would have to be
applied26. Russia had proven their willingness to make sacrifices in order to improve relations
and reach compromise, but perceived that they had ultimately been betrayed. From that time
on, the defence of Russian national interests has come before all else, and Vladimir Putin has
become the tool to reinforce the will.
Eurasianism: Backfire
For Russia, the United States and the European Union are no longer perceived as credible
partners, neither economically, nor politically. Eurasia has become the new playing field for
Russian economic and political interests. The former Soviet republics are not only closer to
home, but they are rightfully seen as the pillar of Russian influence and activity. Under
Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Empire, these regions were highly significant for Russian
geostrategic interests. To counter his Western rivals, Putin hopes to transform the Eurasian
countries into a geopolitical and cultural alternative to the West27. Europeanization of Russia
is out of the question, as Russia posses its own unique cultural values and norms which will
only be respected and implemented within an entity that Moscow is able to de facto control.
Hence, the regions and countries close to home, which fear Russia enough to succumb to its
will. This Eurasian integration process and its crown jewel, the Eurasian Economic Union
(EEU), which is the pinnacle of this cooperative compromise, seems to have collapsed even
before it could blossom. The reason for this catastrophic start is, ironically, because of
Russian meddling in Ukraine. The union was supposed to be composed of Belarus,
25 Foreign affairs 2014, Sarotte, Mary E. ”A broken promise? What the West really told
Moscow about NATO expansion” available at
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141845/mary-elise-sarotte/a-broken-promise
September/October 2014, retrieved on 9/01/2015.
26 Mankoff, Jeffrey (2009) ” Russian foreign policy: the return of great power politics”
Rowman & Littlefield, Maryland, p. 28.
27 Mankoff, Jeffrey (May/June 2014) “ Foreign affairs: Russia’s latest land grab, how
Putin won Crimea and lost Ukraine” Council of foreign relations, New York, p. 66.

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Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine (while Armenia and Kirgizstan would join later), and Putin
has himself stated that the Union would amount to little without Ukraine28. Simply explained,
it is because Ukraine would not be able to offer its substantial economic potential to the union
(the country has the second biggest economy after Russia of the member countries). The
reason for the Ukrainian revolution was directly related to President Yanukovych’s rejection
of the association agreement with the EU, a decision that was forced upon him by Moscow.
The Kremlin knew that, if the Ukrainians were allowed to sign the accords with the European
Union, they would directly exclude themselves from the Eurasian Economic Union and it
would lead to the demise of the EEU. Unfortunately for Putin, his manoeuvres backfired
utterly. Not only did the Ukrainian people oust Yanukovych for his broken promise, thus
removing Russia’s hand in Ukrainian politics, but the new Ukrainian president Petro
Poroshenko ultimately signed the association agreement with the European union a few
months later. This killed the last Russian hope of a Ukrainian puppet state, and the dreams of
a well functioning Eurasian Economic Union. Eurasian political and economic cooperation
without Ukraine has undermined the union’s integrity, and the shared effort by Kazakhstan,
Belarus and Russia has ultimately not given the Kremlin anything more than bragging rights
about the symbolism of a Russian made union29.
For Putin, it became clear that Ukraine had ultimately chosen Europe over Russia. In response
to the Euromaidan revolution, Crimea was occupied and annexed, not only to get exclusive
access to their black sea fleet, or to accommodate the will of the Russian majority on the
peninsula, but as a symbolic act, meant to prove that Russia was still in charge. Further
repercussions against the Ukrainians were steadfastly reassured throughout the spring and
summer of 2014 when Russia was directly involved in arming pro-Russian separatists in
Donetsk and Luhansk, albeit they deny ever having gone through with such measures30. The
message from Moscow, however, is clearer than ever: Ukraine is Eurasian, and Eurasia is
ours.
Putin won Crimea and lost Ukraine” Council of foreign relations, New York, p. 66.
29 Foreign affairs 2014, Schenkkan, Nate “Eurasian Disunion: Why the union might not
survive 2015” available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/142745/nate-
schenkkan/eurasian-disunion 26/12/2014, retrieved on 11/01/2015.
30 Reuters 2014, Grove, Thomas & Strobel, Warren ”Special report: where Ukraine’s
separatists get their weapons” available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/29/us-ukraine-crisis-arms-specialreport-
idUSKBN0FY0UA20140729 29/07/2014, retrieved on 11/01/2015.

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The Baltic dilemma: a historic, linguistic and ethnic attachment.
The Russian annexation of Crimea, which was part of sovereign Ukrainian territory, left many
of Russia’s neighbours feeling especially hesitant and vulnerable about their own security.
Three states in particular are genuinely concerned about what Moscow’s meddling in the
region could suggest for their own safety. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are the countries in
question. In the immediate aftermath of Russia’s seizure of the Crimean peninsula, the Baltic
States were not only the first, but also the fiercest condemners of Russian aggression against
Ukraine.
The three states have the right to dread Putinist foreign policy, which according to Chatam
House, a London based institute of international affairs, clearly implicates the Baltics as being
part of Russia’s sphere of influence31. According to Eurasianist theory, the Baltics form the
Western frontier of a larger Russian state, and are not part of Europe.
There are thus several compelling arguments that would serve as a reminder to Europe and
NATO, that Russia might make the Baltics their next target of neo-imperial subjugation.
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania all share common features with Ukraine, which points to the
main reason these countries showed solidarity with the Ukrainians after Russia’s annexation
of Crimea. Firstly, there are several historic connections at play. The Baltic States have all, at
one time or another, been part of either the Soviet Union or Tsarist Russia32. In 1917, the
nascent Soviet Union lost her former Tsarist territories, and the three new countries gained
independence. It did not take long, however, before Russia once again would incorporate
them into the Soviet Union under Stalin. After a few years under German occupation during
World War II, they once again became part of the USSR as Germany retreated westwards. It
would take until 1991, and the collapse of the Soviet Union before the countries would regain
freedom33. Like the Baltic States, Ukraine gained independence in 1991 as well34. The four
31 Chatam House 2012, Grigas, Agnia “Legacies, Coercion and soft power: Russian
influence in the Baltic States” available at
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Russia%20
and%20Eurasia/0812bp_grigas.pdf April 2012, retrieved on 20/01/2015.
32 The Economist 2014 ”Echoes of the Sudetenland: the Baltics look to NATO for
protection” available at http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21599828-baltics-
look-nato-protection-echoes-sudetenland 29/03/2014, retrieved on 20/01/2015.
33 O’Connor, Kevin (2003) “ The history of the Baltic States” Greenwood Press, Westport,
p. 3.
34 The Washington Post 2014, Taylor, Adam “To understand Crimea, take a look back at
its complicated history” available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/02/27/to-understand-

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countries are former Russian territories, and former Soviet republics. If the scale of Russian
aggression were to be considered strictly in respect to historical attachments, the Baltics
would essentially be Putin’s next geostrategic objective.
Secondly, an even more compelling argument, which supports the comparison between the
two regions, is the Russian minority population spread across all the four countries.
According to World Politics Review, a Washington based think tank covering international
relations, the percentage of Russian-speaking minorities in the Baltics amounts to almost one
third of the countries’ linguistic makeup; In Estonia Russian speakers make up circa 30% of
the population, in Latvia roughly 34%, while Lithuania has around 15% of Russian
speakers35. It most be pointed out that having a considerable Russian ethnic minority has
never been an obstacle in itself, however, after having seen the Putin doctrine at work in
Ukraine, it could become a hypersensitive and problematic affair. Ukraine on its part has,
according to a 2001 census, only 17% of ethnic Russians living within its borders, although
30% of Ukrainians considered Russian to be their mother tongue36. Looking at the history that
unfolded in Crimea, where Russia used the pretext of protecting “compatriots and fellow
citizens”37, it gives Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania the right to tremble. Moscow has already
demonstrated to its neighbours that Russia is more than willing to establish puppet states in
countries with a strong Russian minority population. South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia,
Moldova’s Transnistria, Ukraine’s Eastern half and Crimea have all faced Russian foreign
policy at swords’ points38. Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius might be next.
crimea-take-a-look-back-at-its-complicated-history/ 27/02/2014, retrieved on
20/01/2015.
35 World Politics Review 2014, Grigas, Agnia ”Compatriot Games: Russian-speaking
minorities in the Baltic States” available at
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/14240/compatriot-games-russian-
speaking-minorities-in-the-baltic-states 21/10/2014, retrieved on 20/01/2015.
36 Forbes Magazine 2014, Krasnozhon, Leo “The ethnicities of Ukraine are united”
available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2014/03/13/the-ethnicities-of-
ukraine-are-united/ 13/03/2014, retrieved on 20/01/2015.
37 Crowley, Michael & Shuster, Simon (May 2014) “ Time magazine: This is war: Vladimir
Putin has seized Crimea and destabilised Ukraine, what drives him?” Time inc, New
York, p. 20.
Putin won Crimea and lost Ukraine” Council of foreign relations, New York, p. 62-63.

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The Commonwealth of Independent States
What replaced the Soviet Union were 15 independent states, who all struggled to find their
place in the new world order. In the aftermath of the collapse, the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) was declared, encompassing all former Soviet states except Georgia
and the Baltic countries39. Through this organisation, the former Soviet countries have kept
close cultural, economic and political linkages. However, during the 1990s, the CIS turned
into a contested zone between the major powers; Russia, Europe, the U.S. and even China
tried to seek influence in these former Soviet republics40. The pursuit of influence within
these states came as a surprise to Russia, who regarded the entire region as hers exclusively,
but in the 1990s, Russia was too weak to enforce its claim41. Times have changed. Under
Vladimir Putin, Russia has become reborn, and is ready to reassert its claim on the Russian
sphere of influence. Moscow is looking to become a pivotal player inside the CIS, by
reversing the drift of member countries away from its orbit42. The reasoning behind Russia’s
neo-imperial and Eurasian agenda is simple. The reconstruction of a strong Russian state,
with the mandate to interfere and control former parts of the Soviet Union is the main goal.
The Question is why? As mentioned earlier, when the Soviet Union broke up, Russia lost
49% of the Soviet Union’s population, 24% of the territory and close to 40% of its GNP43.
Although the Soviet Union was never rich, the loss of these factors plunged Russia into deep
poverty in the 1990s. The Russian economy is thus a fundamental aspect of Russian foreign
policy, and is an important cause for wanting to retain control over the Commonwealth of
Independent States. The energy sector is pivotal in understanding Russia’s need to reassert her
power. The Russian struggle does not entirely evolve around power politics and nostalgia
over past greatness. The economy plays an important role in all aspects of Putin’s agenda.
The Caucasus and the Central Asian republics are all major energy producers, while the
39 Global Security 2014, ”Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)” available at
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/int/cis.htm 13/12/2014, retrieved on
23/03/2015.
40 Mankoff, Jeffrey (2009) ”Russian foreign policy: the return of great power politics”
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc, Maryland, p.241.
from the Kievan state to the present” Westview Press, Boulder, p.321.

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Caucasian countries, including Belarus and Ukraine are important elements in Russia‘s
“pipeline diplomacy” with the major powers44.
The newly established Eurasian Economic Union is meant to be a steppingstone for an
economic integration process between Russia and former Soviet republics with the intention
of retaining the latter states under the Russian orbit. Russia cannot allow other major powers
to meddle in the Caucasus, the central Asian republics or in Ukraine, as it means losing not
only political control, but also economic benefits, which are pivotal in the pursuit of a strong
Russia.
Looking at the growth of the Russian economy since Putin’s time in power from 1999 to
2008, and comparing the numbers with the Russian economy in the 1990s, the improvement
is outstanding. From 1992 to 1998, the Russian economy suffered a staggering annual decline
in GDP of 6,8% per year. The country was in turmoil, and was struggling to adapt to the new
free market system and the globalised world economy. From 1999 to 2008 however, the
Russian GDP increased with 6,9% per year45. In his quest to rebuild Russia, the economy has
been pivotal for Putin. The strong growth during his first two terms in office proved that
Russia adapted to the market forces. The President is determined to preserve the component
which gave the Russian economy such a boost. This component has been Russia’s close
economic partnership with the CIS. Russia will thus try to hinder any other major player
access to the CIS markets, so she alone can benefit form the economic profits. The CIS
countries are all well within the Russian sphere of influence, and to loose them to economic
rivals is out of the question. Through Putin Russia posses the powers to enforce its economic
claims on these countries, unlike during the 1990s, when these regions were out of the
Russian reach. The Eurasian Economic Union is meant to favour Russia at the expense of the
other member states, which are to have secondary roles46. The newly established organisation
already resembles the CIS, meant at consolidating Russia’s control over these member states’
markets, to cement Russia’s dominion and to prevent Europe or the U.S. to gain a foothold in
the region. The Eurasian campaign is partially ideological, but also has a major economic
context. Eurasianist theory is thus crucial in understanding Putin’s foreign policy.
45 Nichol, Jim (2014) “Russian political, economic and security issues and U.S. interests”
Congressional research service, Washington, p. 34.
46 Foreign affairs 2015, Barbashin, Anton “The Eurasian illusion: the myth of Russia’s
economic union” available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/142781/anton-
barbashin/the-eurasian-illusion 15/01/2015, retrieved on 24/03/2015.

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Geopolitics: The Putin doctrine
The reasons for Russian aggression must be seen in the light of the foreign policy agenda,
which is currently in place in the Kremlin. This doctrine might not be as ideologically guided
as the one of the Soviet Union, but there is no doubt that Putin has a well-composed and
fastidious idea behind what he is doing. According to Western journalists and policy makers,
there is a coherent interest-driven philosophy behind the Russian foreign policy of the
moment. That philosophy is based on regional hegemony in the Russian sphere of influence47.
There are several notable advantages that may come of this, most particularly the economic,
military, cultural, and political reintegration of what used to be the former Soviet republics
under Russian leadership48. Putin knows exactly what he wants, and there is no reason to
share his thoughts through totalitarian propaganda. After all, the age of totalitarian Russia is
over.
What is not over, however, is the reminiscence of past days of glory, in other words, the era of
Soviet foreign policy. For many Russians, including the policy makers, Russia has the right to
interfere in her former territories. It is a notion of “Russia’s historical heritage” in the cadre of
security in the country’s sphere of influence49. The justification given by the president in the
aftermath of the annexation of Crimea was simple, and it was taken out of the upper drawer of
Putinist foreign policy. He claimed the broad right to protect “ compatriots and fellow
citizens”50. The right to protect Russian minorities in different countries is a major item on the
foreign policy agenda, which makes up the Putin doctrine. If the Kremlin decides to go
through with this concrete policy, many countries other than Ukraine have the right to feel
47 The Moscow Times 2014, Ryzhkov, Vladimir “The new Putin doctrine” available at
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/the-new-putin-
doctrine/497316.html 3/04/2014, retrieved on 14/01/2015.
48 Foreign affairs 2013, Aron, Leon, “ The Putin doctrine: Russia’s quest to rebuild the
Soviet state” available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139049/leon-
aron/the-putin-doctrine 8/03/2013, retrieved on 14/01/2015.
49 The Moscow Times 2014, Ryzhkov, Vladimir “The new Putin doctrine” available at
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/the-new-putin-
doctrine/497316.html 3/04/2014, retrieved on 14/01/2015.
50 Crowley, Michael & Shuster, Simon (May 2014) “ Time magazine: This is war: Vladimir
Putin has seized Crimea and destabilised Ukraine, what drives him?” Time inc, New
York, p. 20.

16
threatened, for Ukraine is far from the only country in Eastern Europe with a sizeable Russian
minority, as discussed earlier.
At the annual State of Nation address in the Duma in 2005, Vladimir Putin proclaimed that
the breakup of the Soviet Union was “the biggest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th
century”51. This statement utterly surprised Russians and Westerners alike. Was the President
simply reminiscing on the old days in the KGB, or was there a grander meaning behind this
proclamation? Looking at the speech today, many believe they have understood the true
meaning behind it. It can in some respects be interpreted as Putin’s doctrine for the years to
come. In this speech, Putin declared “Our objectives on the international stage are very clear –
to ensure the security of our borders and create favourable external conditions for the
resolution of our domestic problems”, and “ We consider international support for the respect
of the rights of Russians abroad an issue of major importance one that cannot be the subject of
political and diplomatic bargaining”52. Of course, journalists, political analysts and politicians
alike are free to make assumptions as they see fit, but by thoroughly analysing some of the
quotes from the speech, one can draw a striking parallel between the annexation of Crimea,
and Russia’s ruthless foreign policy from the Georgian invasion onwards. The creation of
´favourable external conditions´ can be associated with pro-Russian neighbouring
governments, or the establishment of such governments, if deemed necessary. In other words,
the defence of geopolitical interests at the expense of governments, seen as unfavourable to
Moscow, within the Russian sphere of influence is Putin’s unequivocal goal. The most
forceful example is Russian interference in Ukraine, as well as the mentioned swift military
campaign against Georgia in 2008, to protect pro-Russian separatists. The conclusion that can
be drawn from the second quote ´the respect of the rights of Russians abroad´ can be coupled
with Putin’s pretext for the Russian invasion of Crimea, to “protect compatriots and fellow
citizens”. After all, Putin declared that the annexation was a reunification with Russia53.
51 BBC 2005 ”Putin deplores collapse of the Soviet Union” available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/4480745.stm 25/04/2005, retrieved on 15/01/2015.
52 Vladimir Putin (2005), ”Addresses to the Federal Assembly” available at
http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2005/04/25/2031_type70029type82912_870
86.shtml 25/04/2005, retrieved on 15/01/2015.
53 Washington Post 2014, Englund, Will ” Kremlin says Crimea is now officially part of
Russia after treaty signing, Putin speech” available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/russias-putin-prepares-to-annex-
crimea/2014/03/18/933183b2-654e-45ce-920e-4d18c0ffec73_story.html
18/03/2014, retrieved on 15/01/2015.

17
The question is whether the reunification policy of “what was once ours will once again be
ours” is to be steadfastly enforced in other regions. If that were to be the case, a long list of
countries could be under the scope. Especially the former Soviet republics members of the
European Union, or NATO, for they have according to Russia, drifted away from the true
path. Legitimately they are seen as assets of Russia, and not the Euro-Atlantic alliance
system54. The doctrine only demonstrates to what length Putin is willing to go to fulfil his
ambitions as leader of a powerful, re-born Russia. Economics, politics and indeed security are
three components, which Russia will not hesitate to use as weapons in her quest for greatness.
Soft power versus hard power
Finlandisation
Finlandisation was a term coined during the Cold War, to describe Russia’s control of
Finland’s foreign policy55. Although the Finish state was neutral during the Cold War, that is
neither a NATO member nor a communist state; Russia exercised substantial influence, and
indirectly controlled Helsinki’s foreign policy. This Northern European country, which shares
an immense 1300km border with Russia, was strongly affected by the Cold War, and her
policies were thoroughly scrutinized by the Eastern superpower until 199156.
Although the process of Finlandisation was a notion of the past, the present Russian foreign
policy agenda has made the term applicable once again. This approach is precisely one of the
measures that the Kremlin wishes to implement as a standardised policy towards her
neighbours57.
Russia does not necessarily need to be in complete control of all the regions inside her sphere
of influence (e.g. the incorporation of Crimea into the Russian Federation), as long as she can
54 Financial Times 2014, Milne, Richard & Buckley, Neil ”Baltic security: tensions on the
frontier” available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/13469356-5829-11e4-b331-
00144feab7de.html#axzz3Ou61zdlO 20/10/2014, retrieved on 15/01/2015.
55 The Oxford dictionary 2015 “The definition of Finlandisation” available at
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/Finlandization, retrieved on
16/01/2015.
56 BBC 2014. Bosworth, Mark ”Finns on Russian border wary of NATO ties” available at
16/01/2015.
57 Foreign affairs 2013, Aron, Leon “ The Putin doctrine: Russia’s quest to rebuild the
Soviet state”, available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139049/leon-

18
find a way of controlling policies, which coincide with Russian interests. There is a strategy
understanding between Russia and the former Soviet republics by which the latter surrender a
measure of independence in exchange for economic, political and even military assistance by
Moscow58.
For several years, Russia has tried to “Finlandise” countries that have in Russian eyes, been
flirting with the West, and behaved independently towards the Kremlin’s policies. Ukraine is
this far, the most obvious example. Using energy supplies as a weapon, the Kremlin has time
and again undermined the free will of Ukrainian policy makers, forcing the country to stay
inside Russia’s orbit59. The policy of Finlandisation is intimidating, but it might still be better
than the fate that awaits those who do not befall the might of Putninist politics.
Looking at history for evidence, Russian policies are a new form of neo-imperialism; Russian
expansionism today is similar to the legacy of former Soviet ideology60. Countries under
former Russian control are to be vassals of Putin’s new Russia. It is very much a combination
of Tsarist and Soviet foreign policy doctrines, a fusion of subjugation and repression, to alter
the will of anyone who is opposed to Russian hegemony.
Presently, Russian expansionist policy has the same aim as that of Finlandisation during the
Cold War. It is a new code of conduct, with similar goals. The result is the same; puppet
states controlled by Moscow. It is a pragmatic and blunt order of business. There is no middle
ground between Moscow and the West. You either chose one or the other, and depending on
your choice, you can either be a beneficiary of Russian goodwill, or be a victim of outright
hostility. If a country is unwilling to adjust to Russia’s will by the means of quiet subjugation,
it will alternatively have to be reunified with Russia, by more coercive measures.
This leads to the second option in Putin’s foreign policy agenda, which is the reunification of
former Soviet republics into a greater Russian state.
58 Mandelbaum, Michael (1998) ”The new Russian foreign policy” Council on foreign
relations books, New York, p. 38.
59 BBC 2014, Kirby, Paul “Russia’s gas fight with Ukraine” available at
16/01/2015.
60 Foreign affairs 2014, Gessen, Keith ” What’s the matter with Russia? Putin and Soviet
legacy” available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141487/keith-
gessen/whats-the-matter-with-russia July/August 2014, retrieved on 16/01/2015.

19
Reunification
For Western journalists, political scientists, and politicians alike, a reincorporation of former
Soviet states into Russia seems more probable than ever before. Both fomer U.S. Defence
Secretary Chuck Hagel, and Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk have stated that a
reunification of the former USSR is Putin’s ultimate goal61. Russian expansionism is one of
two sets of mechanisms to fulfil Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy doctrine (the other being neo-
Finlandisation). There are numerous examples of this form of realpolitik conducted by the
Kremlin. Firstly, there was the annexation of Crimea, which was reunified with Russia, and is
now believed to be an inseparable and integral part of the Russian homeland. Secondly, there
is the Kremlin’s attempt to justify the right of Russian minorities to defend themselves in the
Eastern half of Ukraine. In April of last year, Putin first used the term “Novorossiya”, literally
meaning New Russia, about the part of Ukraine engulfed by civil war. This phrase, coined
during the zenith of Tsarist Russia, was used to define the areas controlled by the Tsar in the
19th century, which included large parts of Southern and Eastern Ukraine62. By uttering this
one word, Putin once again raised a lot of eyebrows, and sent shockwaves from Washington
to Kiev. Was it meant as a threat, or was it simply melancholic rhetoric? Either way, it is clear
that Putin has the will, and the means, to restore Soviet and Tsarist possessions to their
perceived rightful sphere. These are two of several examples, which do support the theory that
Russia will in fact try to reunify former Soviet or Tsarist territories, if he is not actively
halted. As Ukraine is trying to wrestle away from Russia’s orbit, and create a stable
democracy, Moscow is doing everything in its power to prevent this goal being achieved,
which, once again certainly proves Russia’s appetite for expansionism and hunger for
conquest63.
As mentioned above, the Putin doctrine is twofold on the issues of soft power and hard power
in its approach regarding the former Soviet territories. In this context, soft power corresponds
61 Town Hall 2014. Barkoukis, Leah “Hagel: It’s no secret Vladimir Putin wants to reunify
the USSR” available at
http://townhall.com/tipsheet/leahbarkoukis/2014/05/26/chuck-hagel-vladimir-
putin-wants-to-restore-soviet-union-n1842602 26/05/2014, retrieved on 19/01/2015.
62 Holmås, Ragnhild (2014), ”Perspektiv: The Ukraine crisis: the fight for Russia’s border
states” Flyktningshjelpen, Oslo, p. 17.
63 New Eastern Europe 2014, Valkov, Volodymyr “Expansionism: the core of Russia’s
foreign policy” available at http://www.neweasterneurope.eu/interviews/1292-
expansionism-the-core-of-russia-s-foreign-policy 12/08/2014, retrieved on
19/01/2015.

20
to Finlandisation, while hard power corresponds to reunification. If a country inside Russia’s
sphere of influence bluntly denies any affiliation to Moscow, force is the only tool deemed
adequate to compel that state to remain loyal. This is exactly what happened to Ukraine,
where Crimea was incorporated into the Russian Federation, and the on-going attempt to do
the same with Novorossiya (Luhansk and Donetsk). In fact, Russia had “Finlandised” Ukraine
from its independence leading up to the Euromaidain revolution. One Ukrainian leader after
another were seen as puppets of Russia, or at least as taking a severe pro-Russian stance in
foreign as well as domestic policy (Leonid Kuchma, and Viktor Yanukovych being the two
most potent examples). When Ukrainian Presidents, and Prime Ministers alike, attempted to
gain political independence from the Eastern bigger brother, Russia used multiple coercive
measures to make sure that they would be toppled, lose elections, or suffer severe popularity
drops, thereby turning the people against them. Viktor Yushchenko, the highly popular pro-
European presidential candidate was poisoned during his election campaign in 200464, while
Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko was arrested for violating court procedure during her trial
for abuse of power in 201165.
While the perpetrators of these injustices towards pro-Western politicians have mostly been
Ukrainian, they have done so either with Russian help, or in accordance with Russian
wishes66. Ukraine has for years been the main battlefield for Russian interests, and the country
is the most evident example of Putin’s neo-imperialist agenda.
As the saga of Russian foreign policy unfolds, it only gives credence to the theories of a new
Soviet Union. Putin follows in the steps of the former Soviet leaders by decisively reasserting
Russia’s right to interfere in its sphere of influence. On the one hand, like his predecessors, he
targets countries where he is not wanted (Ukraine in 2014 and Georgia in 2008 compared to
64 The Washington post, Rupar, Terri “Remember when a Ukrainian presidential
candidate fell mysteriously ill?” available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/03/12/remember-
when-an-ukrainian-presidential-candidate-fell-mysteriously-ill/ 12/03/2014, retrieved
on 19/01/2015.
65 Huffington Post 2011, Melnichuck, Anna “Yulia Tymoshenko arrested: Ukraine’s Ex
Prime Minister picked up during trial” available at
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/08/05/yulia-tymoshenko-
arrested_n_919405.html 8/05/2011, retrieved on 19/01/2015.
66 The Age 2005 ”The man who survived Russia’s poison chalice”available at
http://www.theage.com.au/news/World/The-man-who-survived-Russias-poison-
chalice/2005/01/22/1106334263427.html 23/01/2005, retreived on 19/01/2015.

21
Czechoslovakia in 1968 or Budapest in1956)67. On the other hand, he is decisively ignoring
the economic challenges to his country caused by his actions. Western sanctions have
drastically damaged the Russian economy since they were introduced in reprisals for Russia
annexing Crimea68. Lastly, the Russian president is using a swaggering display of courage to
cover up the weaknesses of his country, proving himself worthy of Stalin. The latter did the
exact same thing, using charisma and might to project a false sense of power69.
The resemblance between the Soviet leaders and Putin can indeed make Russia’s neighbours
shiver with fear. Stalin showed no reluctance when it came to restoring Russia’s pre-1914
borders after he came to power70. The question now is whether Putin will do the same to
restore the Soviet Union’s pre-1991 borders. If that is the case, the Baltic countries, as
mentioned earlier, could become the new front line in Putin’s imperious quest, for that is
exactly where Stalin started in 193971.
The difference between Ukraine and the Baltics
After Russia shook the West in February and March of last year, the leaders of the Baltic
countries have urged the West to react with the harshest of measures. Tallinn, Riga and
Vilnius have sought to draw parallels between themselves and Kiev. They are attempting to
use the civil war and the Crimean occupation as basis for their own security. The higher the
degree of similarities they share with Ukraine (historic, ethnic, linguistic and geostrategic
ties), a country where Russia is wreaking havoc, the bigger the perceived threat towards their
own countries. This perspective serves to draw Western attention towards their dilemma, and
in case of a Russian attack, the bigger are the chances of allied interference. In August 2014,
67 The Fiscal Times 2014, Francis, David ”Putin divulged his plot to reunify the USSR
years ago” available http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2014/04/28/Putin-
Divulged-His-Plot-Reunify-USSR-Years-Ago 28/04/2014, retrieved on 19/01/2015.
68 New York Times 2014, Kramer, Andrew E. ”Russia’s steep rate increase fails to stem
ruble’s decline “available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/17/business/russia-
ruble-interest-rates.html 16/12/2014, retrieved on 19/01/2015.
69 The Fiscal Times 2014, Francis, David ”Putin divulged his plot to reunify the USSR
years ago” available http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2014/04/28/Putin-
Divulged-His-Plot-Reunify-USSR-Years-Ago 28/04/2014, retrieved on 19/01/2015.
70 Khaleej Times 2014, Margolis, Eric S. “Return of the Soviet Union” available at
http://www.khaleejtimes.com/kt-article-display-
1.asp?xfile=data/opinion/2014/March/opinion_March26.xml&section=opinion
16/03/2014, retrieved on 19/01/2015.
71 Misiunas, Romuald J. & Taagepera, Rein (1993) ”The Baltic states, years of
Dependence, 1940-1990” University of California Press, Berkeley, p. 15.

22
Latvia’s President Toomas Ilves declared, “Ukraine is under attack by the armed forces of the
Russian Federation. This military aggression should finally dispel any doubts that Russia’s
words fail to match its actions”72. A month later, Lithuania’s President Daila Dybrauskaite
went even further in her rhetoric towards the Kremlin, saying “He (Putin) is capable to reach
Warsaw, the Baltics and Bucharest in two days (…) if we allow him to go, he will go
anywhere”73. The Baltic leadership have indeed been the most strident condemners of Russian
aggression, as they fear that an intrusive Russian foreign policy could spill over into their
homelands.
The Baltic States, however, have an advantage over Ukraine, as they are full-fledged
members of NATO. This is a deterrence mechanism aimed at Moscow that is absent in the
case of Ukraine.
The military alliance, which comprises of 28 countries, has the capability, and the
responsibility to safeguard the freedom and security of its members through military means,
and have a common goal of self-defence74. If Putin were willing to invade, conquer, or in any
other way dominate these countries militarily, article five of the NATO charter would be
enforced. The focal points from this article of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation goes as
follows: “The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or
North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently agree that, if
such an armed attack occurs, each of them (…) will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by
taking forthwith, individually and in concert with other Parties, such action as it deems
necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North
Atlantic area”75. In a more straightforward wording, an attack against one is an attack against
all. On the one hand, It is one thing for Russia to occupy the Crimea, which belongs to
72 Office of the President, Public relations department 2014 “Comments by President
Toomsa Hendrik Ilves on the invasion of Russian troops in Eastern Ukraine” available at
http://president.ee/en/media/press-releases/10486-comment-by-president-toomas-
hendrik-ilves-on-the-invasion-of-russian-troops-in-eastern-ukraine/index.html
28/08/2014, retrieved on 21/01/2015.
73 Slate Magazine, Weymouth, Lally “An interview with the Lithuanian President Daila
Grybauskaite” available at
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/foreigners/2014/09/russia_and_ukr
aine_lithuanian_president_dalia_grybauskaite_says_vladimir.html 24/09/2014,
retrieved on 21/01/2015.
74 NATO 2015 ”What is NATO” available at http://www.nato.int/nato-
welcome/index.html January 2015, retrieved on 21/01/2015.
75 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 1949, “The North Atlantic Treaty” available at
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm 04/04/1949, retrieved
on 20/01/2015.

23
Ukraine, a country that enjoys no backing from a strong Westernised military alliance. On the
other hand, it is an entire different matter to go to war with the Baltic states, thereby engaging
the power of countries such as Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and of course, the
United States.
V) Understanding the Russian point of view: A linkage between realism, Eurasianism,
and geopolitics.
Ever since Russia annexed Crimea, Western media and politicians have been criticising and
condemning this aggression fiercely. Anti-Russian rhetoric has become the prevailing
orientation towards the conflict, and finding non-biased perspective in Western media has
been tricky. To thoroughly understand the causes and motivations of Russian policies it is
necessary to study the Russian standpoint. Looking at their agenda, their approach may
become more justifiable.
The West currently gives the impression that ruthless Russian foreign policy is something
new and unheard of in the realms of international relations. Russia, however, only follows the
norm. Russian aggression against Ukraine is a classic example of how great powers use their
strength to secure their national interests by interfering in the internal affairs smaller states.
This is a realist approach to foreign affairs, which defends the right of the strongest party to
affirm their power. It is a notion of ‘the survival of the fittest’ in the realms of international
politics. The Western powers in their view, have the right to denounce and point fingers.
However, they are the originators of such great power politics, and to claim that Russia does
not have the right to do as she pleases in her sphere of influence is nothing but hypocritical
and two faced.
Russian behaviour in the aftermath of the Ukrainian revolution is a typical case of great
power politics, something the West, including the United States, has been doing for years76.
From Afghanistan to Iraq, the United States has gone to war to defend their national interests.
When Russia tries to do the same in a region a lot closer to home, it immediately gets branded
as an aggressor and a conqueror. It is an unfair and arbitrary denouncement of Russia, when
they in fact had more reason to invade Ukraine than the Americans had when they invaded
two far away Middle Eastern countries. Why should the world be utterly condemning when a
76 The National interest 2014, Kramer, Mark ”Russia’s great-power Ukraine strategy”
available at http://nationalinterest.org/feature/russias-great-power-ukraine-strategy-
11145 25/08/2014, retrieved on 24/03/2015.

24
strong nation other than the U.S. decides to resolve their foreign policy agenda through the
use of power?
From an objective point of view, Russia’s near abroad, through historical, linguistic, and
ethnic bonds, belongs to Russia’s sphere of influence. Still, the U.S. and the European Union
have time and again tried to undermine the will of Russian policy makers, by either
Europeanising ex-Soviet republics, or to bring them under NATO’s orbit. From the Kremlin’s
perspective, these two organisations are clearly trying to wrest away Russian influence from
what used to be the Soviet Union. The EU has been flirting with Ukraine for the better part of
a decade, while NATO has handed out memberships to countries once loyal to Moscow.
During the 1990s, Russia did not have the power to halt such enlargements. Under Putin,
however, Russia has regained enough strength to enforce her will to show the West that the
country is, once again, master of its own house. The question is whether the Kremlin in fact
have a point in asserting such an aggressive foreign policy?
If we once again look at history for examples, there are plenty of cases in which super powers
and strong nations have affirmed their right to defend their national interests through the use
of power. Russian meddling in Ukraine is far from the worst example. The United States and
Cuba during the 1960s is a clear example of a stronger nation trying to reassert its rule in their
own backyard. The United States did their utmost to destabilise, and undermine the Castro
government, after they took power in the aftermath of the Cuban revolution77. The U.S. used
all possible tricks in the book to try to oust, and even assassinate Fidel Castro. They could
simply not accept a communist, anti-American government a little less than 150 km from the
American homeland. The point of the matter is that the U.S. has seen Cuba as an impediment
to its vital national interest in the Caribbean ever since the revolution, and Cuba is thus seen
as a threat to American interest.
Furthermore, during the Cold War, when communists or even democratically elected socialist
leaders came to power in the Caribbean, Latin or South America, the Unites States would do
77 Council on Foreign Relations 2013, Hanson, Stephanie & Lee, Brianna ”U.S. Cuba
relations” available at http://www.laleadership.org/userfiles/30/Classes/806/U.S.-
Cuba%20Relations%20Backgrounder.pdf 31/01/2013, retrieved on 26/03/2015.

25
everything in its power to make sure these regimes would tumble, because of the ideological
threat posed by communism and leftism in the ramifications of the Cold War 78.
For the United States, as for any other major power, national interests are at the top of a
country’s foreign policy agenda. If these interests are threatened, Washington will not hesitate
to retaliate in the most severe of manners. Numerous examples were demonstrated during the
Cold War (Cuba, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Chile, El Salvador, Grenada and so on), and
continually in the post-Cold War period (Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Yugoslavia).
The conclusion drawn from these examples is that the U.S. has time and again proved willing
to interfere in another country’s domestic policies when those policies have been perceived as
a threat to American interests.
From a Russian perspective, it is thus utterly hypocritical that the United States criticizes
Russia and imposes strict economic sanctions on the country, when the United States itself
has engaged in the same type of policy towards perceived hostile regimes for decades.
Although the U.S. condemns Russia for its actions in Ukraine, they have themselves used
realpolitik and geopolitics as an excuse for decades, to interfere in foreign countries, topple
governments, and start wars. In this perspective, Russia is simply following in the American
footsteps.
The point is, that a geopolitical cataclysm like the Crimean annexation has not taken place
since the end of the Cold War, and since the U.S. became the sole most powerful player in
world politics. The U.S. does not want to allow any other country to rival their status as the
only super power, especially not Russia.
In a long interview with Rossiyskaya Gazeta, a Russian government daily newspaper, the
former FSB (Russian security services) chief Nikolai Patrushev gives a clear view on how the
Kremlin sees the situation in Ukraine. The entire interview was translated and printed in
English for the Guardian newspaper. In the interview, Mr Patrushev criticises the United
States for the sanctions and repercussions the country has initiated towards Russia. He states
the following: “The actions of the American administration during the Ukraine crisis are part
of a new current in White House foreign policy designed to preserve America’s position of
78 Bulmer-Thomas, Victor & Dunkerley, James (1999) ”The United States and Latin
America: the new agenda” Institute of Latin American studies, London, p. 34.

26
leadership in the world by containing the growing power of Russia and other centres of
power”79.
Moscow thus views America as an impediment to their national interest, not because the
Russians themselves chose to, but because the Americans forced them to.
This view clearly echoes throughout the higher echelons of the Kremlin. The Crimean land
grab was not a Russian initiative, but it was a response to U.S. conduct in the region80. Crimea
was invaded to protect Russian interest as the country felt geopolitically threatened by the
United States. This action was instigated due to the American pursuit of a potential Ukrainian
NATO membership, which Russia believes, started the hostilities between the two ex-arch
enemies in the first place81. The approach taken by the Obama administration in the aftermath
of President Yanukovych’s removal from power has been a quest of quelling the Russian
geopolitical recovery. The purpose of which is to compromise Russia’s revival as a strong
regional power, because of their opposition and rejections of U.S. policies inside the Russian
sphere of influence82.
On the contrary to Western perceptions, the Kremlin considers that Russia is under siege, and
not the other way around, that Russia is an aggressive conqueror. Anti-Russian sentiments,
severe rhetoric, sanctions, and heightened tensions are to be blamed on the West, not on
Russia, nor on Putin himself.
From the Russian point of view, the Unites States, NATO and the European Union have
penetrated dangerously deep into Russia’s recognised sphere of influence, therefore Russia
felt it as a necessity to respond in similar kind83.
79 The Guardian 2014, Egorov, Ivan & Patrushev, Nikolai, translated by Johnston,
Cameron ”Ukraine crisis-the view from Russia” available at
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/24/sp-ukraine-russia-cold-war
23/10/2014, retrieved on 26/03/2015.
80 The National Interest 2014, Saudners, Paul J. ”How Russia sees the Ukraine crisis”
available at http://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-russia-sees-the-ukraine-crisis-
11461 13/10/2014, retrieved on 26/03/2015.
81 The National Interest 2014, Saudners, Paul J. ”How Russia sees the Ukraine crisis”
available at http://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-russia-sees-the-ukraine-crisis-
11461 13/10/2014, retrieved on 26/03/2015.
82 Global research 2014, Smith, Jack A. ”Ukraine and the Geopolitical chessboard”
available at http://www.globalresearch.ca/ukraine-and-the-geopolitical-
chessboard/5375343 26/03/2014, retrieved on 26/03/2015.
83 Global research 2014, Smith, Jack A. ”Ukraine and the geopolitcal chessboard”

27
Moscow has a point in believing that Washington has for many years tried to interfere in the
Russian sphere. The United States has for several decades tried to transform Ukraine into a
pro-Western entity situated within Washington’s sphere of influence, for security measures to
fend off Russian ambition84.
Putin will have nothing of it. America’s sphere of influence is not thousands of kilometres
away in Eastern Europe, but closer to home (Cuba). The U.S. should, geographically,
historically, and politically have no claim on Ukraine, for it belongs in another major power’s
backyard. Imagine if Putin tried to exert Russia’s power to gain influence in a country
belonging to America’s backyard. The United States would never accept it, yet they try to do
the same in Russia’s orbit.
The one time Russia in fact forged an alliance with a country opposed to American hegemony
in the U.S.’s backyard (Cuba, 1962), it led the world to the verge of nuclear war85. The
Russian response to Western entanglement in Ukraine is in this perspective a great deal less
intense. Russia did indeed invade Crimea and made the peninsula part of the Russian
Federation, but only after a referendum, which according to Russia was in conformity with
the wishes of the Crimean people86. According to John Mearsheimer, an American political
scientist and expert in the filed on international relations theory, “U.S. and European leaders
blundered in attempting to turn Ukraine into a Western stronghold on Russia’s border. Now
that the consequences have been laid bare, it would be an even greater mistake to continue
this misbegotten policy”87. Hence, Mearsheimer blames the West’s excessive interference in
Ukraine as the main factor that pushed Putin to annex Crimea.
This theory is very much in line with the normative view of Moscow’s ruling elite and the
Russian people.
84 Global research 2014, Smith, Jack A. ”Ukraine and the geopolitcal chessboard”
85 BBC 2012, Fidgen, Joe ”Cuban missile crisis: When nuclear war seemed inevitable”
available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-20068265 25/10/2012, retrieved
on 26/03/2015.
86 BBC 2014 “Crimea referendum: voters ‘back Russia union’” available at
26/03/2015.
87 Foreign Affairs 2014, Mearsheimer, John J. ” Why the Ukraine crisis is the West’s fault:
the liberal delusions that provoked Putin” available at
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141769/john-j-mearsheimer/why-the-
ukraine-crisis-is-the-wests-fault September/October 2014, retrieved on 26/03/2015.

28
From a Russian perspective, the Crimean annexation was justifiable, for more than one
reason. Russians view the Ukrainian conflict as a family dispute. They are the guarantors of
the rights of Russian-speakers in Ukraine, and fail to understand why the West would react so
decisively to a task they believe to be fair and legitimate88. The problem is that the United
States struggle to escape the bounds of their conservative Cold War rhetoric; it is impossible
for America to view the conflict which is unfolding from a Russian perspective. According to
Andranik Migranyan, an analyst and writer for the Kremlin connected Institute for
Democracy and Cooperation in New York, there is only one main objective behind American
sanctions and hostility towards Russia: “a desire to limit Russia’s geopolitical role”89.
The Kremlin believes that Western leaders were totally unprepared for the Crimean
occupation, hence they rejected the Crimean referendum, declaring that the annexation was
illegal and the vote null and void90.
The West clearly fails to recognise the crucial importance the Crimean peninsula has played
in Russian history, and how it only became part of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet republic in
1954 when Nikita Khrusjtsjov handed the peninsula over as a sign of good will91. From 1783
until that year, Crimea had belonged to Russia92 (with the exception of a few years during the
first and second World Wars), and Russians or Russian speakers have inhabited the peninsula
ever since. Indeed, the rationalization that Crimea belongs to Russia gains credence through
historic, ethnic and geographic linkages. For Russians, Crimea is now in its rightful
possession, which it had been for centuries. In geopolitical terms the reunification was
88 The National Interest, Saunders, Paul J. ”How Russia sees the Ukraine crisis: can a
compromise be found?” available at http://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-russia-
sees-the-ukraine-crisis-11461 13/10/2014, retrieved on 27/03/2015.
89 The National Interest, Saunders, Paul J. ”How Russia sees the Ukraine crisis: can a
compromise be found?” available at http://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-russia-
sees-the-ukraine-crisis-11461 13/10/2014, retrieved on 27/03/2015.
90 Global Research 2014, Smith, Jack A. ”Ukraine and the Geopolitical chessboard”
91 The Telegraph 2014, Korolkov, Alexandr ”Crimea: Nikita Khrushchev’s ’gift on a
golden dish’” available at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sponsored/rbth/politics/10745698/khrushchev-crimea-
ukraine.html 18/04/2014, retrieved on 27/03/2015.
92 Dickinson, Sara (2002) ”Explorations in Russian and Eurasian history” Slavica
Publishers, Indiana, p. 2.

29
justified simply to halt NATO’s continual advance toward Russia, something of an existential
matter for Moscow93.
The West faces two choices in Ukraine. They can either continue their anti-Russian policy,
which will only magnify hostilities with the Kremlin, while it will tear Ukraine apart, or they
have the option of halting their relentless campaign of westernising Ukraine, to help create a
neutral and potentially affluent country, which does not threaten Russian interests94.
Contesting the Russian justification
From a Western perspective Russian foreign policy under Putin is utterly ruthless and
dangerous, while Russia justifies its actions in the context of American, NATO and European
interference in the Russian orbit. This, however, does not overcome the fact that Russia
unexpectedly invaded a foreign country without any grounds or plausible claims, and in
discordance with international law.
The reasoning behind the annexation was to fulfil Putin’s foreign policy agenda, as any great
power claims to have the right to do, in conformity with realist theory. In the 21st century,
however, no such claims should be justified. A land grab of a sovereign country’s territory is
indefensible except in the case of war. Ukraine and Russia were not in a state of war when the
annexation was executed.
Not history, ethnicity, or even geopolitics can defend Putin’s choice to annex Crimea. The
Russian population on the peninsula might have had a desire to become Russian, but they
were neither threatened, nor ill-treated by the Ukrainian authorities. Crimea even had its
own autonomous status, with its own parliament and Prime Minister95. Hence, there was no
imperative cause for the annexation. According to leading legal experts on international
93 Global research 2014, Smith, Jack A. ”Ukraine and the Geopolitical chessboard”
94 Foreign Affairs 2014, Mearsheimer, John J. ” Why the Ukraine crisis is the West’s fault:
the liberal delusions that provoked Putin” available at
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141769/john-j-mearsheimer/why-the-
ukraine-crisis-is-the-wests-fault September/October 2014, retrieved on 27/03/2015.
95 BBC 2014 ”Why Crimea is so dangerous” available at
30/03/2015.

30
law, the Crimean referendum provided no justification for the annexation96. The second
article of the United Nations charter clearly states “ all members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state”97. In other words, the forceful acquisition of sovereign
territory is illegal under international law. Putin acquired Crimea through the use of force,
without the acknowledgment of his Ukrainian counterpart, or the international community.
From a Western perspective, the Russian foreign policy doctrine is alarming, and to blame
the rationalisation behind such a political agenda on the West’s interference in the former
Soviet bloc is therefore groundless and unwarranted.
The West must see Russian foreign policy for what it really is, a ruthless and intrusive
agenda aimed at the total and complete recovery of the political, economic and geostrategic
benefits that evaporated after the collapse of the Soviet Union98. Although Putin’s regime
has remained secretive about the Kremlin’s long-term foreign policy goals, it is evident that
Russia is playing a dangerous game in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, designed to
destabilize the region and to re-establish Russia as the dominant power99. The collapse of
the Soviet Union was an immense disaster for those who believed in the system, including
Putin who perceived the collapse as an extreme humiliation. The Russian elite never
accepted the fact that the Soviet empire gave way, and that Russia became a second rate
power on the world stage. The break-up of the Soviet Union only resulted in nostalgia for
lost greatness and a feeling of revanchism and hatred towards those who made it happen100.
Furthermore, the disintegration of the Soviet Union made Russia lose its superpower status,
96 International Bar association 2014, Lowe, Rebecca ”Ukraine: clear breaches of
international law in Crimea” available at
http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=0b6a41e4-bca2-4234-8b3e-
9cb027b98607 2014, retrieved on 29/03/2015.
97 The United Nations ”Chapter I, article 2” available at
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml 26/06/1945, retrieved on
30/03/2015.
98 Foreign affairs 2013, Aron, Leon, “ The Putin doctrine: Russia’s quest to rebuild the
Soviet state” available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139049/leon-
99 Van Herpen, Marcel H. (2014) ”Putin’s wars: the rise of Russia’s new imperialism”
Rowman & Littlefield, Maryland, p.55.
100 Van Herpen, Marcel H. (2014) ”Putin’s wars: the rise of Russia’s new imperialism”
Rowman & Littlefield, Maryland, p.50.

31
and its influence in Eastern Europe, which has reinforced the need to redefine the Russian
identity ever since101. Putin’s realist-based Eurasian design has become the pinnacle of that
identity. A strong, reborn Russia with the capabilities to interfere and control former
dominions is the objective of this new Russian identity. It is a belief that the past greatness
will be restored through exerting power and influence in Russia’s near abroad. Only then
will Russia regain her rightful place as one of the world’s dominant powers.
The Russian foreign policy doctrine will exert military-political pressures and armed force
to achieve greater influence towards neighbouring states102, meanwhile the Kremlin is also
willing to play the ethnicity card; the fact that 25 million ethnic Russians and over 30
millions Russian speakers live outside the Federation gives the Kremlin the opportunity to
use this hand as a tool for the reassertion of Moscow’s control in a new sphere of
influence103. It happened in Ukraine, in Georgia/South Ossetia, in Transnistria (Moldova),
in Abkhazia (Georgia)104. Since 1991, Russia has deliberately taken advantage of ethnic
tensions as one of many methods to reinforce its influence in what used to be the Soviet
Union’s former territories.
The Russian explanation for exercising these powers is that the West, predominantly
NATO and the European Union, have attempted to expand their respective organisations’
into Russia’s backyard, thus transforming it into a Russian security issue more than
anything. NATO was after all established to contain the Soviet threat, and the spread of
communism105. As of today, however, the further enlargement of NATO will not
negatively affect the security of Russia. The organisation’s goal is to protect the
sovereignty of individual states106, not to provoke Russia. From the 1990s onwards, NATO
has successfully expanded without reviving Cold War divisions in Europe, and the
101 Allison, Roy & Bluth, Christoph (1998) ”Security dilemmas in Russia and Eurasia”
Royal institute of International Affairs, London, p. 33.
104 Foreign affairs 2014, Mankoff, Jeffrey ”Russia’s latest land grab: how Putin won
Crimea and lost Ukraine” available at
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141210/jeffrey-mankoff/russias-latest-land-
grab May/June 2014, retrieved on 31/03/2015.
105 Goldberg, Ronald A. (2012) ” America in the forties” Syracuse University Press, New
York, p. 153.
106 Herd, Graeme P. & Moroney, Jennifer D.P. (2003) ”Security Dynamics in the former
Soviet bloc” RoutledgeCurzon, London, p. 80.

32
organisation’s aim is to promote peace and stability, as opposed to only defending member
states against neo-imperialist Russia107. There is no NATO threat towards Russia, unless
the Kremlin instigates one. Unfortunately, that is what is happening. The aggressive
Russian foreign policy, which Vladimir Putin advocates, only heightens tensions between
East and West, threatens the very foundations of post Cold War Europe, and the peaceful
coexistence between Russia and the West.
VI) Conclusion
In this paper, I have endeavoured to study Russia’s foreign policy agenda, more precisely
the Putin doctrine, focusing on the annexation of the Crimean peninsula and its aftermath.
Taking as a point of departure a theoretical framework, respectively geopolitics, realism
and Eurasianism, I have studied and discussed, using newer Russian history as a frame of
reference, Putin’s Russia on the international scene. Taking into account both a Western
and an Eastern perspective, and referring to the three theories along the way, I have
attempted to justify both approaches. By applying this dual perspective I have, on the one
side discussed NATO’s and EU’s eastward movement, and on the other side I have
attempted to understand Moscow’s reactions, rationalization and indeed justification in
reference to the annexation of Crimea.
Since Vladimir Putin came to power, he has made it his quest to rebuild a strong Russia,
with the capabilities to control and dominate former Soviet or Tsarist possessions in the
near abroad. Russian national interests are today defined by the absolute recovery of
geostrategic, political, and economic assets that Russia lost after 1991. Countries in
Russia’s backyard have the choice of either quietly succumbing to Russian desires, or they
can face the wrath of the Kremlin’s power politics. The Ukrainian people chose the latter
option, and suffered for it as a consequence. Meanwhile, countries decisively opposed to
Russian hegemony, the Baltic States not least, are alarmed by Putin’s power play, and fear
what may come if Moscow is allowed to resume its neo-imperialist plans.
The Kremlin have a firm belief that what they are doing is strictly in line with the country’s
vital national interests. From the Russian point of view, it is the West’s constant meddling
inside the Russian sphere, which has caused the Russian reaction.
107 Herd, Graeme P. & Moroney, Jennifer D.P. (2003) ”Security Dynamics in the former
Soviet bloc” RoutledgeCurzon, London, p. 80.

33
Although Putin sees Russia as a victim, and not a conqueror, Russia is in fact the latter. The
foreign policy agenda advocated by Putin is indeed aggressive and neo-imperialistic. The
unprovoked and wanton aggression against a sovereign country’s territory is inexcusable.
The Crimean land grab and the instigation of ethnic tensions in Eastern Ukraine has only
served the Russian cause, but it has aggravated the relationship between Russia, its
neighbours, and the West. Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy doctrine is not only threatening,
but is also an authentic confirmation of the president’s plans of restoring Russia as a major
powerhouse, at the expense of the independence of Russia’s nearest neighbours.
The Russian President is using his foreign policy doctrine in order to create a powerful
Russia, which could take centre stage in world affairs, and secure Russian hegemony in
Russia’s historic sphere of influence. Vladimir Putin is using variables such as ethnicity,
language, geopolitics, history, and realpolitik in a bid to implement and justify his agenda
towards neighbouring states and the West. The Eurasianist doctrine is to be rationalised
through realist power politics for the benefit of Russian geopolitical goals.

34
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My dilemma when writing this essay is that the topic is relatively young and is a developing
political process. Hence, literature on the subject is limited apart from newspaper- and
magazine articles in addition to reports from various think –tanks. The theory has of course
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