Every day during the 2014 ISIS crisis in Iraq, the Institute for the Study of War publishes a Situation Map that indicates significant activity for that day with an analysis of what it means for the current situation as well as what to watch for in the near future. Subscribe to all updates at www.understandingwar.org
The document discusses the complex relationships between various Islamist groups operating in Syria and Iraq, including ISIS, Al-Qaeda affiliated Al-Nusra, and other factions. It notes that Al-Nusra wanted to create its own Islamic state in Syria, competing with ISIS which wanted a unified Islamic state across Syria and Iraq. Meanwhile, countries like Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia supported different factions and plans for the future of Syria and Iraq, sometimes coming into conflict with each other and with Iran and Russia's backing of Assad. Over time the situation continued shifting as the goals and alliances of these groups changed.
- The opposition in Syria is uniting various armed groups through new military alliances and negotiations to restructure their forces and launch joint operations.
- A Saudi sheikh has called on all fighters and merchants to support jihad in Syria, providing phone numbers to join battles and donate funds.
- The leader of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) was killed in clashes with Kurdish forces in Hasakah countryside. Fierce clashes also erupted between ISIL and the Islamic Front in Raqqa.
- Syrian government officials said presidential elections will be held on schedule and that the army expects to advance on Raqqa within two months.
The document discusses the origins and characteristics of the Islamic State group. It traces IS back to al-Qaeda in Iraq and its leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Over time it evolved into various iterations, eventually declaring a caliphate in 2014 led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. The document outlines IS's territorial control, revenues, and military capabilities. It also examines the international coalition against IS and the challenges of eliminating the group through both military operations and counter-messaging.
The document provides updates on various events in Syria from the perspective of opposition sources. It reports on clashes between the Syrian army and opposition fighters in different areas, the killing of opposition leaders, violations of settlements, and defections from ISIL. It also summarizes opposition rejection of a government draft statement on combating terrorism during Geneva talks and notes the coalition will reject any results involving Iranian participation.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham’s (ISIS) Wilayat Sana’a may have begun a Ramadan vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) campaign targeting the al Houthis in Yemen’s capital, Sana’a. The group claimed credit for four simultaneous bombings on the first day of Ramadan and has continued VBIED attacks in the capital that ISIS has framed as part of a campaign in its messaging. ISIS is probably seeking to inflame sectarian tensions in Yemen and elicit an overreaction from the al Houthis.
2. The Iranian regime continued to stress that it has not compromised on Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s nuclear redlines ahead of the June 30 deadline to reach a final deal with the P5+1. Khamenei highlighted four key red lines for a final nuclear agreement in a June 23 speech: Iran will not accept a “long-term limitation [on enrichment] of 10-12 years;” there will be no limitations “on [nuclear] research, development, and construction” during the period limiting enrichment; the UN Security Council, Congress, and U.S. government economic sanctions must be removed “immediately after the signing of the agreement;” and there will be no inspections of military sites, interviews with Iranian scientists, or other “unconventional” inspections.
3. Al Qaeda-linked groups in West Africa may be attempting to coordinate against the threat of ISIS. There are reports of a recent rapprochement of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and al Murabitoun leadership. Al Murabitoun leader Mokhtar Belmokhtar, who is reported to have survived the U.S. airstrike targeting him, initially broke from AQIM in 2012 over disagreements as to the direction of AQIM. Additionally, AQIM’s religious scholars have issued statements chastising ISIS.
The summary provides the key takeaways from the document in 3 sentences:
The warring factions in Yemen continued fighting despite a ceasefire announcement ahead of UN negotiations. Al Shabaab announced a new fighting unit focused on Kenyan operations, indicating continued prioritization of attacks in Kenya. An AQIM attack on a gas plant in Algeria was likely part of its efforts to compete with growing ISIS influence in the Maghreb region.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Prominent Iranian Reformists’ mobilization of votes for more centrist candidates in the Assembly of Experts and parliamentary elections on February 26 could help centrist politicians win the additional seats they need in both bodies to sideline their hardliner opponents. Many reformist candidates had sought to run in both elections until the Guardian Council, or the body charged with vetting electoral candidates, disproportionally disqualified them.
2. U.S. airstrikes targeted an Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) training camp near Sabratha in northwestern Libya. The strikes killed over 40 militants, including a Tunisian ISIS operative linked to the March 2015 Bardo Museum attack in Tunis. Targeted strikes may temporarily disrupt ISIS’s ability to plan and launch spectacular attacks in the region, but the group maintains an experienced leadership cell in Libya and will be able to regenerate capabilities.
3. Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi appointed General Ali Mohsen al Ahmar as deputy commander of Yemen’s Armed Forces. Ali Mohsen, the former commander of Yemen’s powerful First Armored Division, is a powerbroker whose support of Hadi requires contesting the al Houthi-Saleh alliance in northern Yemen. Ali Mohsen’s appointment probably indicates the coalition will prioritize actions to further isolate the al Houthi-Saleh alliance in northern Yemen and to apply pressure directly on the capital, Sana’a.
The document discusses the complex relationships between various Islamist groups operating in Syria and Iraq, including ISIS, Al-Qaeda affiliated Al-Nusra, and other factions. It notes that Al-Nusra wanted to create its own Islamic state in Syria, competing with ISIS which wanted a unified Islamic state across Syria and Iraq. Meanwhile, countries like Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia supported different factions and plans for the future of Syria and Iraq, sometimes coming into conflict with each other and with Iran and Russia's backing of Assad. Over time the situation continued shifting as the goals and alliances of these groups changed.
- The opposition in Syria is uniting various armed groups through new military alliances and negotiations to restructure their forces and launch joint operations.
- A Saudi sheikh has called on all fighters and merchants to support jihad in Syria, providing phone numbers to join battles and donate funds.
- The leader of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) was killed in clashes with Kurdish forces in Hasakah countryside. Fierce clashes also erupted between ISIL and the Islamic Front in Raqqa.
- Syrian government officials said presidential elections will be held on schedule and that the army expects to advance on Raqqa within two months.
The document discusses the origins and characteristics of the Islamic State group. It traces IS back to al-Qaeda in Iraq and its leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Over time it evolved into various iterations, eventually declaring a caliphate in 2014 led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. The document outlines IS's territorial control, revenues, and military capabilities. It also examines the international coalition against IS and the challenges of eliminating the group through both military operations and counter-messaging.
The document provides updates on various events in Syria from the perspective of opposition sources. It reports on clashes between the Syrian army and opposition fighters in different areas, the killing of opposition leaders, violations of settlements, and defections from ISIL. It also summarizes opposition rejection of a government draft statement on combating terrorism during Geneva talks and notes the coalition will reject any results involving Iranian participation.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham’s (ISIS) Wilayat Sana’a may have begun a Ramadan vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) campaign targeting the al Houthis in Yemen’s capital, Sana’a. The group claimed credit for four simultaneous bombings on the first day of Ramadan and has continued VBIED attacks in the capital that ISIS has framed as part of a campaign in its messaging. ISIS is probably seeking to inflame sectarian tensions in Yemen and elicit an overreaction from the al Houthis.
2. The Iranian regime continued to stress that it has not compromised on Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s nuclear redlines ahead of the June 30 deadline to reach a final deal with the P5+1. Khamenei highlighted four key red lines for a final nuclear agreement in a June 23 speech: Iran will not accept a “long-term limitation [on enrichment] of 10-12 years;” there will be no limitations “on [nuclear] research, development, and construction” during the period limiting enrichment; the UN Security Council, Congress, and U.S. government economic sanctions must be removed “immediately after the signing of the agreement;” and there will be no inspections of military sites, interviews with Iranian scientists, or other “unconventional” inspections.
3. Al Qaeda-linked groups in West Africa may be attempting to coordinate against the threat of ISIS. There are reports of a recent rapprochement of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and al Murabitoun leadership. Al Murabitoun leader Mokhtar Belmokhtar, who is reported to have survived the U.S. airstrike targeting him, initially broke from AQIM in 2012 over disagreements as to the direction of AQIM. Additionally, AQIM’s religious scholars have issued statements chastising ISIS.
The summary provides the key takeaways from the document in 3 sentences:
The warring factions in Yemen continued fighting despite a ceasefire announcement ahead of UN negotiations. Al Shabaab announced a new fighting unit focused on Kenyan operations, indicating continued prioritization of attacks in Kenya. An AQIM attack on a gas plant in Algeria was likely part of its efforts to compete with growing ISIS influence in the Maghreb region.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Prominent Iranian Reformists’ mobilization of votes for more centrist candidates in the Assembly of Experts and parliamentary elections on February 26 could help centrist politicians win the additional seats they need in both bodies to sideline their hardliner opponents. Many reformist candidates had sought to run in both elections until the Guardian Council, or the body charged with vetting electoral candidates, disproportionally disqualified them.
2. U.S. airstrikes targeted an Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) training camp near Sabratha in northwestern Libya. The strikes killed over 40 militants, including a Tunisian ISIS operative linked to the March 2015 Bardo Museum attack in Tunis. Targeted strikes may temporarily disrupt ISIS’s ability to plan and launch spectacular attacks in the region, but the group maintains an experienced leadership cell in Libya and will be able to regenerate capabilities.
3. Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi appointed General Ali Mohsen al Ahmar as deputy commander of Yemen’s Armed Forces. Ali Mohsen, the former commander of Yemen’s powerful First Armored Division, is a powerbroker whose support of Hadi requires contesting the al Houthi-Saleh alliance in northern Yemen. Ali Mohsen’s appointment probably indicates the coalition will prioritize actions to further isolate the al Houthi-Saleh alliance in northern Yemen and to apply pressure directly on the capital, Sana’a.
The document summarizes the fracturing of opposition groups in Syria and the merging of conflicts in Iraq and Syria. It discusses the origins and rivalry between ISIS and Al-Qaeda affiliated groups. Key points include:
- ISIS originated as an Al-Qaeda affiliate in Iraq but has expanded operations into Syria, battling both governments and other opposition groups.
- Al-Nusra Front was formed by ISIS in Syria but tensions grew as it rose in prominence, leading to an open rivalry between the two largest Islamist opposition factions.
- The Syrian civil war drew in fighters from Iraq and exacerbated existing tensions between Sunni and Shia factions in both countries, blurring the border between the two conflicts
The document summarizes security developments in Yemen, Somalia, Libya, the Maghreb, and the Sahel region over the past month based on intelligence reports. It notes increased Iranian support for Houthi rebels in Yemen and clashes between militant groups in Libya, Somalia, and Mali. Contact information is also provided for analysts from AEI's Critical Threats Project who study security issues in these regions.
The document provides assessments and updates on significant security events involving al Qaeda affiliates, the conflicts in Yemen and Libya, and activities of militant groups in the Sahel region and Horn of Africa. Key events include US airstrikes against al Shabaab in Somalia, an AQIM attack in Ivory Coast, and the breaking of an al Houthi siege in Yemen. Analysts assess that al Qaeda linked groups will strengthen local control while international pressure mounts on implementing unity governments in Libya and Yemen.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The U.S. confirmed that a coalition airstrike killed senior al Qaeda operative Sanafi al Nasr outside of Aleppo, Syria. Sanafi al Nasr was the highest ranking leader of al Qaeda’s Khorasan group, a cell advising Syrian al Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al Nusra. His death will deal a blow to al Qaeda operations in Syria, but will not generate lasting effects.
2. National Security and Foreign Policy Parliamentary Commission Chairman Alaeddin Boroujerdi and Deputy Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian stated that Iran could expand its military presence in Syria if asked by Damascus or Moscow.
3. The leader of an al Qaeda-linked Malian group Ansar al Din condemned recent steps taken by a Tuareg coalition to reconcile with the Malian government and promised future attacks against the French troops in Mali.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. A UN-brokered ceasefire is holding in Yemen in advance of scheduled talks to resolve the political crisis. There are reports of ongoing fighting along contested frontlines in central Yemen despite the start of the ceasefire on April 10. All major players in the conflict have expressed formal support for the ceasefire agreement, while reserving the right to take defensive action should violations occur. Ongoing high-level meetings indicate that each faction is preparing seriously for UN-led peace talks, which are set to begin in Kuwait on April 18. The formal ceasefire will likely continue to hold, despite clashes on the ground, as Yemen’s powerbrokers pursue their objectives in the political arena.
2. A new Salafi-jihadi organization, “Jabha East Africa” (East Africa Front), released its “bayat” or oath of loyalty to the emir of the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), Abu Bakr al Baghdadi. The group reported that its members are former al Shabaab members who have returned to their home countries throughout East Africa, paralleling the al Shabaab-affiliated al Muhajiroun. ISIS has not replied to the pledge. Jabha East Africa’s operational strength, as well as any official connections to ISIS, remains unknown.
3. Key Libyan factions backed the newly installed and UN-recognized Libyan national unity government, the Government of National Accord (GNA). The GNA will probably become a critical counter-terrorism partner as Western powers begin to develop strategies to combat ISIS in Libya. The GNA must still develop local legitimacy, however. It will need to ameliorate Libya’s economic woes. It will also need to gain the official endorsement of the country’s internationally recognized House of Representatives, which is currently split on the issue of ceding power to the GNA.
This document provides a summary of recent events in Syria from the perspective of the Syrian government. It reports on military operations against armed groups in multiple locations across Syria that resulted in deaths of militants from various countries. It also mentions the reopening of the Aleppo-Hama road by the Syrian army, attacks by armed groups that killed civilians, and the split of a militant group in Aleppo to join another extremist organization. Additionally, it reports on international opposition calls and upcoming peace talks.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1) The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) continued its Ramadan surge in Yemen. ISIS Wilayat Hadramawt detonated four explosive devices in a coordinated attack on multiple Yemeni military locations in al Mukalla, Hadramawt governorate on June 27. The suicide attacks targeted Yemeni security personnel gathering to break their fasts. A June 9 CTP assessment forecast that ISIS would carry out attacks on these targets before the end of Ramadan, an Islamic holy month. Ramadan runs from June 5 to July 5 in 2016. ISIS may attempt another large-scale explosive attack on a government or military target in Aden or al Mukalla before July 5.
2) Al Shabaab continued its Ramadan offensive with a complex attack on the Naso Hablod Hotel in Mogadishu. Militants detonated a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) to breach the compound before detonating a suicide vest and opening fire on guests. The attack killed 16 people, including a Somali government minister, and wounded at least 24 others. Al Shabaab may attempt an attack on a Somali National Army (SNA) or African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) base before July 5.
3) Libyan factions are using counterterrorism operations as cover to compete for control of terrain in eastern Libya. The Libyan National Army (LNA) and the Petroleum Facilities Guard (PFG), which are allied with two competing political bodies, are converging on Ajdabiya city with the stated intent of fighting an Islamist militia coalition there, but are preparing to fight each other. The PFG’s engagement with the LNA may pull forces away from territory east of Sirte, providing an opportunity for ISIS militants currently besieged in the city.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei conditionally approved the implementation of the nuclear deal in an open letter to President Hassan Rouhani on October 21. His approval will likely end domestic debate over whether Iran should reject the deal before a violation by other parties.
2. Yemeni stakeholders agreed to resume talks under UN auspices, but the conflict on the ground continues unabated. There will be an initial round of talks held in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia with Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government and in Muscat, Oman with the al Houthis, before both sides come together.
3. An al Shabaab religious leader based in Puntland publicly pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), sparking a round of internal al Shabaab arrests as the group attempts to limit ISIS’s influence in Somalia. Al Shabaab has actively sought to maintain a cohesive front against ISIS outreach.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Senior Foreign Policy Advisor to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Akbar Velayati indicated that an upcoming trilateral meeting between Iran, Iraq, and Syria will strengthen the "resistance front" against the U.S. and its regional allies.
2. The Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) may have growing influence and strength in North Africa, despite recent setbacks in Derna, Libya. ISIS claimed the terrorist attack on a tourist beach resort in Sousse, Tunisia, that killed 38 people. The attack was the deadliest in Tunisia’s history.
3. ISIS is conducting a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) campaign against the al Houthis in Sana’a, Yemen’s capital. ISIS Wilayat Sana’a has claimed credit for three separate VBIED attacks, including four bombings on the first day of Ramadan, June 17, another on June 20, and the third on June 29. The press releases frame these attacks specifically as targeting the “dens” of the al Houthis, which is distinct from how Wilayat Sana’a has laid claim to improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Sana’a.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The takeover of four eastern Libyan oil ports by a militia coalition may ignite armed conflict between Libya’s rival governments. The Libyan National Army (LNA), a militia coalition led by General Khalifa Haftar, seized four oil ports in eastern Libya from militias allied with the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) on September 11. The seizure scuttled the GNA’s efforts to resume oil exports from eastern Libya, undermining a major effort to secure legitimacy for the fragile unity government. The LNA’s advance threatens the interests of western Libyan militias aligned with the GNA. These militias fought against the LNA in central Libya in the past and may resume hostilities in response to LNA aggression in the oil crescent. Libyan actors will prioritize the unresolved civil war over the fight against the Islamist State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and other Salafi-jihadi groups operating in Libya.
2. Escalating economic protests in Tunisia may incite a government crackdown and draw limited security resources away from counter-terrorism operations. Protests broke out in Fernana, northwestern Tunisia on September 7 after a café worker named Wisam Nisrah set himself on fire. Nisrah’s self-immolation and the subsequent protests mirror the event s that sparked Tunisia’s Arab Spring uprising in December 2010. Similar protests began in Ben Guerdane, eastern Tunisia on September 5. Growing protests could destabilize Tunisia’s new unity government. Civil unrest strains limited security resources and provides opportunities for Salafi-jihadi groups, including al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s Tunisian affiliate and the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), to conduct attacks.
3. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri called for Muslims to continue the fight against the U.S. and to reject ISIS’s ideology in a video commemorating the fifteenth anniversary of the September 11 attacks. Zawahiri emphasized al Qaeda’s role as a defender of the oppressed. He urged black Americans to turn to shari’a and al Qaeda for justice. Zawahiri also emphasized al Qaeda’s power as a unifying “message” rather than a physical group, like ISIS, that imposes its will on Muslim populations. Zawahiri’s address continues a series of statements intended to reinforce al Qaeda’s position as the leader of the global Salafi-jihadi movement.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda issued a call for Muslims to mobilize to fight in
al Sham. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri urged Muslims to fight in Syria and for the factions in Syria to unify. Zawahiri described the Syrian uprising as the only one from the Arab Spring to have continued along the right path. He sought for Muslims to defend the gains made in Syria against other actors like Russia, Iran, and the West, and stated the objective of a governing entity establishing itself in the territory. Hamza bin Laden, Osama bin Laden’s son, echoed the call for mobilization. He also called on Muslims to unify in Iraq and Syria and for those who cannot travel to conduct lone-wolf attacks.
2. A pro-Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) cell attempted to weaponize anthrax and plan a mass-casualty attack similar to the 2013 Westgate Mall attack, according to Kenyan and Ugandan authorities. The cell’s ringleader may have communicated with ISIS militants in Libya and Syria, indicating an expansion of ISIS’s influence in East Africa. Governments seeking counterterrorism funding may also exaggerate ISIS’s presence, however.
3. ISIS resumed a territorial growth strategy in Libya after planned offensives on its stronghold in Sirte stalled. ISIS militants seized strategically located towns from Misratan militias to the west of Sirte as part of efforts to expand its contiguous zone of control in central Libya. ISIS is also bolstered by the support of tribal leaders and elders, representing factions of a large tribal federation that has suffered since the fall of Qaddafi. These tribal leaders are aligning with ISIS against opponents in both the Libyan National Army bloc in the east and the Misratan bloc in the west in order to protect their political and economic interests.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The operational tempo of U.S.-backed Somali special operations forces (SOF) raids against al Shabaab spiked as the Somali SOF conducted a series of raids in central Somalia. The American military’s role in the recent raids has been limited to an advise-and-assist capacity, as well as possibly providing air assault capabilities. The raids have targeted al Shabaab military positions and a high-level leadership meeting. The U.S. has been training Somali SOF forces to build a counterterrorism capability within the Somali security forces. These elite units have countered al Shabaab attacks in Mogadishu and are increasingly deploying into central Somalia for raids targeting al Shabaab leadership and key ground positions.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) are attempting to degrade the Yemeni security forces and government in southeastern Yemen. ISIS Wilayat Hadramawt launched an explosive attack campaign in al Mukalla, Hadramawt that resembles the ongoing ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan campaign in Aden city. ISIS Wilayat Hadramawt conducted at least two suicide attacks on military and security targets in al Mukalla between May 12 and May 15, with reports that security forces found and cleared additional explosives-laden vehicles. AQAP preserved its military strength by withdrawing from populated centers, but is resuming its campaign of assassinations, targeting high-ranking military commanders and government officials.
3. The U.S. and international partners agreed to consider arming and training forces for Libya’s Government of National Accord (GNA) to fight ISIS. Libyan armed factions, including the GNA, will continue to prioritize securing their own objectives over the counter-ISIS fight. The GNA is also far from uniting Libya’s divided armed factions, and competition for international support will likely exacerbate tensions between armed groups. The rush to secure counterterrorism partners in Libya also gives anti-Western actors, including Russia, the opportunity to back factions that could ultimately undermine the GNA and subvert American and European interests in Libya.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. A pro-Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) group may be growing stronger in Somalia, but its ability to compete with al Shabaab remains limited. The U.S. Department of State designated Abdul Qadir Mumin, a pro-ISIS cleric, as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist on August 31. Al Shabaab militants reportedly attacked Mumin’s forces in Bay region, Somalia on September 4. Mumin is an al Shabaab defector, and al Shabaab has eliminated pro-ISIS members from within its ranks. It is also possible that the attack indicates that Mumin’s group has grown stronger and that al Shabaab considers it a threat. ISIS may seek to develop networks in Somalia now that its African hub in Sirte, Libya is under pressure by U.S.-backed militias. ISIS is unlikely to dedicate significant resources to the Horn of Africa at this time, however.
2. The UN-brokered political process in Libya may be breaking down. The collapse of the UN-backed Libyan government, the Government of National Accord (GNA), could have an impact on U.S. counter-terrorism operations against ISIS in Libya. The UN convened an emergency meeting in Tunis on September 5 to address rising tensions between eastern and western factions. The U.S. extended its airstrike mission in Libya for an additional month at the request of the GNA. Rising challenges to the GNA’s legitimacy threatened to undermine future operations against ISIS or other Salafi-jihadi groups in Libya.
3. The al Houthi-Saleh alliance’s September 2 announcement of a new missile in Yemen may be in response to increasing military threats from Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s coalition. The missile, the Borkan-1, is a modified Scud missile. The capability may have been transferred through the Iranian network. A political resolution to Yemen’s civil war remains unlikely despite both sides’ willingness to participate in a U.S.-backed peace plan. Yemeni factions expressed conditional support for U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry’s plan, but unresolved disagreements over representation in the transitional government will likely continue to hinder talks. Saudi Arabia may pursue talks to de-escalate conflict in the Saudi-Yemeni border region but will continue to support efforts by President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government to oust the al Houthi-Saleh alliance from Yemen’s capital, Sana’a.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) may be preparing to attack Tunisian targets in conjunction with Ramadan, an Islamic holy month, and the centennial anniversary of the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Tunisian security forces interdicted a suspected pro-ISIS attack in La Marsa, the site at which Tunisian officials established a French protectorate in 1882. ISIS traditionally surges before or during Ramadan, and the holiday’s juxtaposition with the Sykes-Picot anniversary will probably inspire attacks on symbols of Western colonialism in the near term.
2. An offensive against ISIS’s stronghold in Sirte remains likely, though deep divisions within Libya’s armed forces may limit its effectiveness. Clashes continue between Libyan National Army (LNA) and Misratan forces, forces on opposite sides of Libya’s civil war. ISIS continues to harden Sirte’s defenses and lay the groundwork for a controlled withdrawal from the city, should holding Sirte become untenable. Sirte is not the sole key to defeating ISIS in Libya, however, and ISIS will likely continue to destabilize the region from a base in southwestern Libya.
3. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) may be preparing to withdraw from Zinjibar, Abyan, following reports of local mediation. AQAP just withdrew its forces from al Mukalla, Hadramawt before a Yemeni offensive with Emirati support. The loss of these cities is a temporary setback for AQAP, however. The group derives its strength from popular support, not territorial control, and it has resurged from similar losses in 2012.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Iranian officials such as Deputy Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian and the Supreme Leader’s Senior Military Advisor and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi voiced their support for Syrian President Bashar al Assad and for Russian involvement in the conflict in Syria.
2. Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi returned to the country after six months in exile in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Hadi’s cabinet returned in advance of him and began re-establishing the Hadi-led central government in Aden, in southern Yemen.
3. Malian factions met for the first time in Mali’s capital, Bamako, to improve implementation of a June ceasefire agreement and continued talks. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb-linked Islamist groups have taken advantage of the conflict in Mali and are pushing their area of operations southward.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Representatives from the al Houthis and former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh’s General People’s Congress party (GPC) are refusing to attend UN-led peace talks in Kuwait until the ceasefire is implemented and Saudi-led coalition airstrikes against al Houthi-Saleh positions stop. Key Yemeni factions would not have had representation at the Kuwait talks and would have been unlikely to accept a negotiated solution. These factions, which include southern secessionists, would probably continue to fight to secure their interests.
2. The Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) is reconstituting its explosives capabilities in eastern Libya and will use them to deter action against its stronghold in Sirte. ISIS will likely use these capabilities against the Libyan National Army (LNA), which may be assembling a force to attack Sirte, as well as against civilian populations to undermine the LNA in Benghazi. ISIS is conducting similar attacks on Misratan militia positions in western Libya, likely to deter Misratan operations. ISIS will likely attack Libya’s new unity government, too, especially as it becomes the West’s preferred counterterrorism partner in Libya.
3. ISIS is building a support network in Tunisia to support the establishment of a formal ISIS wilayat in Tunisia. ISIS is attempting to co-opt al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s networks in western Tunisia, where it is developing safe havens from which to conduct attacks in both Tunisia and Algeria. The group is also recruiting heavily in eastern Tunisia’s population centers, where Tunisian security forces recently arrested a deputy mayor for belonging to a pro-ISIS cell, indicating the extent to which ISIS is attempting to infiltrate Tunisian society.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Libyan counter-ISIS campaign will likely become a prolonged siege of city. Armed factions that support the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) are advancing on Sirte from the east and west. Some of these forces are shaping their offensive to cut off ISIS’s access to southwest Libya, the most likely route by which ISIS would attempt a tactical withdrawal should holding Sirte become untenable. ISIS is calling for reinforcements and dedicating significant resources to hardening the city’s defenses and delaying its enemies’ advance. The current Libyan forces lack the capability to take Sirte without support, and continued competition between rival Libyan militias and political powerbrokers will likely impede efforts to oust ISIS from its urban stronghold.
2. Al Shabaab attacks against Somali government and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) targets will likely surge during Ramadan month. Al Shabaab conducted a complex attack on Mogadishu’s Ambassador Hotel on June 1 that killed at least 16 people, including two members of the Somali Parliament, following warnings that the group plans to increase its attacks during the Ramadan season. Al Shabaab continues to demonstrate resiliency and attack capabilities despite a U.S.-backed campaign targeting its leadership. A U.S. airstrike killed senior al Shabaab military commander and intelligence chief Abdullahi Haji Da’ud on May 27, and U.S. advisers supported a raid that killed senior commander Mohamed Mohamud Kuno, who masterminded the April 2015 attack on Kenya’s Garissa University, on May 31.
3. Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) echoed guidance that had been issued by senior al Qaeda leadership. The group’s leader and its spokesman both issued statements that warned against killing Muslim civilians in attacks. AQIS emir Asim Umar encouraged fighters instead to attack “the head of the serpent,” and engage in the far war. AQIS spokesman Usama Mahmoud condemned the January 2016 Bacha Khan University and December 2015 Pakistan National Database and Registration Authority attacks.
An Iraqi bill proposes granting immunity to Shia militias who fought against ISIS, but critics say this could encourage rights violations and affect Sunni Arabs. ISIS is preparing for the battle over Mosul by digging trenches, booby-trapping areas, and removing residents to use as human shields. Sources say the number of foreign ISIS fighters in Mosul has diminished recently. Experts say the political issues that allowed ISIS to take hold in Mosul must be addressed for long-term stability.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The failure of Libya’s UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) to achieve legitimacy may impede U.S. efforts to partner with it for future operations against the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and other enemy groups in Libya. A democratically elected body, whose mandate expired in October 2015, based in eastern Libya voted no-confidence in the GNA and its prime minister on August 22. The vote is contested, but might invalidate prior GNA decisions if upheld. These decisions could include the GNA’s July 2016 request for U.S. airstrikes against ISIS in Sirte. Political turmoil will continue to undermine local and international efforts to defeat ISIS and other Salafi-jihadi groups in Libya.
2. Russia is attempting to use Yemen’s political crisis opportunistically to expand its sphere of influence in the Arabian Peninsula. Former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh offered Russia access to Yemen’s bases, airports, and ports in an interview with a Russian state news outlet on August 21. Saleh’s statement follows the Russian Charge d’Affaires for Yemen’s vocal support for an al Houthi-Saleh power-sharing body established on August 15. Russia has opposed measures that favor President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government over the al Houthi-Saleh alliance, though it has also taken steps to placate Saudi Arabia and other international supporters of the Hadi government. Russia will continue to maneuver on both sides of the political crisis in order to advance its own interests in the event of a negotiated settlement in Yemen.
3. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri called for fighters to unify in their support for the Afghan Taliban and to reject and ignore ISIS. Zawahiri’s call was probably a reaction to ISIS’s resurgence in parts of Afghanistan, as well as continuing reports of Taliban militants switching allegiance to ISIS. Zawahiri’s statement was likely timed to rally support for an ongoing Taliban offensive to control Kunduz city in northern Afghanistan. Zawahiri accused ISIS and its leader, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, of sowing discord among the mujahideen.
Since ISIS stormed onto the world's stage on June 10, 2014 with its seizure of Mosul, the Institute for the Study of War has been the institution of record for tracking ISIS. The ISW "ISIS Sanctuary Map" quickly became an iconic image of the conflict raging across Syria and Iraq. It has been used hundreds of times, in several languages, and adapted for such uses as electronic backdrops on CNN, Fox, and other news broadcasts. When developing a 1,200 year history of Iraq in maps, The National Geographic used only one source for its map of the recent conflict: ISW.
The ISIS Sanctuary Maps from the last 14 months (and longer) show how ISW has tracked the conflict and become the recognized expert on ISIS's expansion. As we approach the one-year anniversary of U.S. and coalition airstrikes against ISIS, we have collected all our Sanctuary Maps, along with examples of where they have appeared, to help show the role ISW is proud to have played in tracking ISIS.
This product reviews the current situation of the Syrian Opposition in terms of its military and political components.
In the context of the military stand-off between the opposition and regime security forces, the product depicts the Urban-Rural stalemate that has emerged in terms of terrain secured by both sides. It also describes the emergence of Provincial Military Councils that provide operational command and control for disparate rebel groups.
In terms of the political opposition, the product also establishes the grassroots political opposition that has organized around Revolutionary Councils that cooperate and correspond with the military Provincial Military Councils. These Revolutionary Councils have consolidated into three National Political Coalitions that achieve effective pan-provincial representation.
Enduring challenges exist with regard the limits of the Expatriate Opposition, vulnerabilities to rebel radicalization, and factionalization as exacerbated by external support. Opportunities also exist to support the professionalization of the militant opposition in order to treat these challenges.
The document summarizes the fracturing of opposition groups in Syria and the merging of conflicts in Iraq and Syria. It discusses the origins and rivalry between ISIS and Al-Qaeda affiliated groups. Key points include:
- ISIS originated as an Al-Qaeda affiliate in Iraq but has expanded operations into Syria, battling both governments and other opposition groups.
- Al-Nusra Front was formed by ISIS in Syria but tensions grew as it rose in prominence, leading to an open rivalry between the two largest Islamist opposition factions.
- The Syrian civil war drew in fighters from Iraq and exacerbated existing tensions between Sunni and Shia factions in both countries, blurring the border between the two conflicts
The document summarizes security developments in Yemen, Somalia, Libya, the Maghreb, and the Sahel region over the past month based on intelligence reports. It notes increased Iranian support for Houthi rebels in Yemen and clashes between militant groups in Libya, Somalia, and Mali. Contact information is also provided for analysts from AEI's Critical Threats Project who study security issues in these regions.
The document provides assessments and updates on significant security events involving al Qaeda affiliates, the conflicts in Yemen and Libya, and activities of militant groups in the Sahel region and Horn of Africa. Key events include US airstrikes against al Shabaab in Somalia, an AQIM attack in Ivory Coast, and the breaking of an al Houthi siege in Yemen. Analysts assess that al Qaeda linked groups will strengthen local control while international pressure mounts on implementing unity governments in Libya and Yemen.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The U.S. confirmed that a coalition airstrike killed senior al Qaeda operative Sanafi al Nasr outside of Aleppo, Syria. Sanafi al Nasr was the highest ranking leader of al Qaeda’s Khorasan group, a cell advising Syrian al Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al Nusra. His death will deal a blow to al Qaeda operations in Syria, but will not generate lasting effects.
2. National Security and Foreign Policy Parliamentary Commission Chairman Alaeddin Boroujerdi and Deputy Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian stated that Iran could expand its military presence in Syria if asked by Damascus or Moscow.
3. The leader of an al Qaeda-linked Malian group Ansar al Din condemned recent steps taken by a Tuareg coalition to reconcile with the Malian government and promised future attacks against the French troops in Mali.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. A UN-brokered ceasefire is holding in Yemen in advance of scheduled talks to resolve the political crisis. There are reports of ongoing fighting along contested frontlines in central Yemen despite the start of the ceasefire on April 10. All major players in the conflict have expressed formal support for the ceasefire agreement, while reserving the right to take defensive action should violations occur. Ongoing high-level meetings indicate that each faction is preparing seriously for UN-led peace talks, which are set to begin in Kuwait on April 18. The formal ceasefire will likely continue to hold, despite clashes on the ground, as Yemen’s powerbrokers pursue their objectives in the political arena.
2. A new Salafi-jihadi organization, “Jabha East Africa” (East Africa Front), released its “bayat” or oath of loyalty to the emir of the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), Abu Bakr al Baghdadi. The group reported that its members are former al Shabaab members who have returned to their home countries throughout East Africa, paralleling the al Shabaab-affiliated al Muhajiroun. ISIS has not replied to the pledge. Jabha East Africa’s operational strength, as well as any official connections to ISIS, remains unknown.
3. Key Libyan factions backed the newly installed and UN-recognized Libyan national unity government, the Government of National Accord (GNA). The GNA will probably become a critical counter-terrorism partner as Western powers begin to develop strategies to combat ISIS in Libya. The GNA must still develop local legitimacy, however. It will need to ameliorate Libya’s economic woes. It will also need to gain the official endorsement of the country’s internationally recognized House of Representatives, which is currently split on the issue of ceding power to the GNA.
This document provides a summary of recent events in Syria from the perspective of the Syrian government. It reports on military operations against armed groups in multiple locations across Syria that resulted in deaths of militants from various countries. It also mentions the reopening of the Aleppo-Hama road by the Syrian army, attacks by armed groups that killed civilians, and the split of a militant group in Aleppo to join another extremist organization. Additionally, it reports on international opposition calls and upcoming peace talks.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1) The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) continued its Ramadan surge in Yemen. ISIS Wilayat Hadramawt detonated four explosive devices in a coordinated attack on multiple Yemeni military locations in al Mukalla, Hadramawt governorate on June 27. The suicide attacks targeted Yemeni security personnel gathering to break their fasts. A June 9 CTP assessment forecast that ISIS would carry out attacks on these targets before the end of Ramadan, an Islamic holy month. Ramadan runs from June 5 to July 5 in 2016. ISIS may attempt another large-scale explosive attack on a government or military target in Aden or al Mukalla before July 5.
2) Al Shabaab continued its Ramadan offensive with a complex attack on the Naso Hablod Hotel in Mogadishu. Militants detonated a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) to breach the compound before detonating a suicide vest and opening fire on guests. The attack killed 16 people, including a Somali government minister, and wounded at least 24 others. Al Shabaab may attempt an attack on a Somali National Army (SNA) or African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) base before July 5.
3) Libyan factions are using counterterrorism operations as cover to compete for control of terrain in eastern Libya. The Libyan National Army (LNA) and the Petroleum Facilities Guard (PFG), which are allied with two competing political bodies, are converging on Ajdabiya city with the stated intent of fighting an Islamist militia coalition there, but are preparing to fight each other. The PFG’s engagement with the LNA may pull forces away from territory east of Sirte, providing an opportunity for ISIS militants currently besieged in the city.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei conditionally approved the implementation of the nuclear deal in an open letter to President Hassan Rouhani on October 21. His approval will likely end domestic debate over whether Iran should reject the deal before a violation by other parties.
2. Yemeni stakeholders agreed to resume talks under UN auspices, but the conflict on the ground continues unabated. There will be an initial round of talks held in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia with Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government and in Muscat, Oman with the al Houthis, before both sides come together.
3. An al Shabaab religious leader based in Puntland publicly pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), sparking a round of internal al Shabaab arrests as the group attempts to limit ISIS’s influence in Somalia. Al Shabaab has actively sought to maintain a cohesive front against ISIS outreach.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Senior Foreign Policy Advisor to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Akbar Velayati indicated that an upcoming trilateral meeting between Iran, Iraq, and Syria will strengthen the "resistance front" against the U.S. and its regional allies.
2. The Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) may have growing influence and strength in North Africa, despite recent setbacks in Derna, Libya. ISIS claimed the terrorist attack on a tourist beach resort in Sousse, Tunisia, that killed 38 people. The attack was the deadliest in Tunisia’s history.
3. ISIS is conducting a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) campaign against the al Houthis in Sana’a, Yemen’s capital. ISIS Wilayat Sana’a has claimed credit for three separate VBIED attacks, including four bombings on the first day of Ramadan, June 17, another on June 20, and the third on June 29. The press releases frame these attacks specifically as targeting the “dens” of the al Houthis, which is distinct from how Wilayat Sana’a has laid claim to improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Sana’a.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The takeover of four eastern Libyan oil ports by a militia coalition may ignite armed conflict between Libya’s rival governments. The Libyan National Army (LNA), a militia coalition led by General Khalifa Haftar, seized four oil ports in eastern Libya from militias allied with the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) on September 11. The seizure scuttled the GNA’s efforts to resume oil exports from eastern Libya, undermining a major effort to secure legitimacy for the fragile unity government. The LNA’s advance threatens the interests of western Libyan militias aligned with the GNA. These militias fought against the LNA in central Libya in the past and may resume hostilities in response to LNA aggression in the oil crescent. Libyan actors will prioritize the unresolved civil war over the fight against the Islamist State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and other Salafi-jihadi groups operating in Libya.
2. Escalating economic protests in Tunisia may incite a government crackdown and draw limited security resources away from counter-terrorism operations. Protests broke out in Fernana, northwestern Tunisia on September 7 after a café worker named Wisam Nisrah set himself on fire. Nisrah’s self-immolation and the subsequent protests mirror the event s that sparked Tunisia’s Arab Spring uprising in December 2010. Similar protests began in Ben Guerdane, eastern Tunisia on September 5. Growing protests could destabilize Tunisia’s new unity government. Civil unrest strains limited security resources and provides opportunities for Salafi-jihadi groups, including al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s Tunisian affiliate and the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), to conduct attacks.
3. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri called for Muslims to continue the fight against the U.S. and to reject ISIS’s ideology in a video commemorating the fifteenth anniversary of the September 11 attacks. Zawahiri emphasized al Qaeda’s role as a defender of the oppressed. He urged black Americans to turn to shari’a and al Qaeda for justice. Zawahiri also emphasized al Qaeda’s power as a unifying “message” rather than a physical group, like ISIS, that imposes its will on Muslim populations. Zawahiri’s address continues a series of statements intended to reinforce al Qaeda’s position as the leader of the global Salafi-jihadi movement.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda issued a call for Muslims to mobilize to fight in
al Sham. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri urged Muslims to fight in Syria and for the factions in Syria to unify. Zawahiri described the Syrian uprising as the only one from the Arab Spring to have continued along the right path. He sought for Muslims to defend the gains made in Syria against other actors like Russia, Iran, and the West, and stated the objective of a governing entity establishing itself in the territory. Hamza bin Laden, Osama bin Laden’s son, echoed the call for mobilization. He also called on Muslims to unify in Iraq and Syria and for those who cannot travel to conduct lone-wolf attacks.
2. A pro-Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) cell attempted to weaponize anthrax and plan a mass-casualty attack similar to the 2013 Westgate Mall attack, according to Kenyan and Ugandan authorities. The cell’s ringleader may have communicated with ISIS militants in Libya and Syria, indicating an expansion of ISIS’s influence in East Africa. Governments seeking counterterrorism funding may also exaggerate ISIS’s presence, however.
3. ISIS resumed a territorial growth strategy in Libya after planned offensives on its stronghold in Sirte stalled. ISIS militants seized strategically located towns from Misratan militias to the west of Sirte as part of efforts to expand its contiguous zone of control in central Libya. ISIS is also bolstered by the support of tribal leaders and elders, representing factions of a large tribal federation that has suffered since the fall of Qaddafi. These tribal leaders are aligning with ISIS against opponents in both the Libyan National Army bloc in the east and the Misratan bloc in the west in order to protect their political and economic interests.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The operational tempo of U.S.-backed Somali special operations forces (SOF) raids against al Shabaab spiked as the Somali SOF conducted a series of raids in central Somalia. The American military’s role in the recent raids has been limited to an advise-and-assist capacity, as well as possibly providing air assault capabilities. The raids have targeted al Shabaab military positions and a high-level leadership meeting. The U.S. has been training Somali SOF forces to build a counterterrorism capability within the Somali security forces. These elite units have countered al Shabaab attacks in Mogadishu and are increasingly deploying into central Somalia for raids targeting al Shabaab leadership and key ground positions.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) are attempting to degrade the Yemeni security forces and government in southeastern Yemen. ISIS Wilayat Hadramawt launched an explosive attack campaign in al Mukalla, Hadramawt that resembles the ongoing ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan campaign in Aden city. ISIS Wilayat Hadramawt conducted at least two suicide attacks on military and security targets in al Mukalla between May 12 and May 15, with reports that security forces found and cleared additional explosives-laden vehicles. AQAP preserved its military strength by withdrawing from populated centers, but is resuming its campaign of assassinations, targeting high-ranking military commanders and government officials.
3. The U.S. and international partners agreed to consider arming and training forces for Libya’s Government of National Accord (GNA) to fight ISIS. Libyan armed factions, including the GNA, will continue to prioritize securing their own objectives over the counter-ISIS fight. The GNA is also far from uniting Libya’s divided armed factions, and competition for international support will likely exacerbate tensions between armed groups. The rush to secure counterterrorism partners in Libya also gives anti-Western actors, including Russia, the opportunity to back factions that could ultimately undermine the GNA and subvert American and European interests in Libya.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. A pro-Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) group may be growing stronger in Somalia, but its ability to compete with al Shabaab remains limited. The U.S. Department of State designated Abdul Qadir Mumin, a pro-ISIS cleric, as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist on August 31. Al Shabaab militants reportedly attacked Mumin’s forces in Bay region, Somalia on September 4. Mumin is an al Shabaab defector, and al Shabaab has eliminated pro-ISIS members from within its ranks. It is also possible that the attack indicates that Mumin’s group has grown stronger and that al Shabaab considers it a threat. ISIS may seek to develop networks in Somalia now that its African hub in Sirte, Libya is under pressure by U.S.-backed militias. ISIS is unlikely to dedicate significant resources to the Horn of Africa at this time, however.
2. The UN-brokered political process in Libya may be breaking down. The collapse of the UN-backed Libyan government, the Government of National Accord (GNA), could have an impact on U.S. counter-terrorism operations against ISIS in Libya. The UN convened an emergency meeting in Tunis on September 5 to address rising tensions between eastern and western factions. The U.S. extended its airstrike mission in Libya for an additional month at the request of the GNA. Rising challenges to the GNA’s legitimacy threatened to undermine future operations against ISIS or other Salafi-jihadi groups in Libya.
3. The al Houthi-Saleh alliance’s September 2 announcement of a new missile in Yemen may be in response to increasing military threats from Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s coalition. The missile, the Borkan-1, is a modified Scud missile. The capability may have been transferred through the Iranian network. A political resolution to Yemen’s civil war remains unlikely despite both sides’ willingness to participate in a U.S.-backed peace plan. Yemeni factions expressed conditional support for U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry’s plan, but unresolved disagreements over representation in the transitional government will likely continue to hinder talks. Saudi Arabia may pursue talks to de-escalate conflict in the Saudi-Yemeni border region but will continue to support efforts by President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government to oust the al Houthi-Saleh alliance from Yemen’s capital, Sana’a.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) may be preparing to attack Tunisian targets in conjunction with Ramadan, an Islamic holy month, and the centennial anniversary of the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Tunisian security forces interdicted a suspected pro-ISIS attack in La Marsa, the site at which Tunisian officials established a French protectorate in 1882. ISIS traditionally surges before or during Ramadan, and the holiday’s juxtaposition with the Sykes-Picot anniversary will probably inspire attacks on symbols of Western colonialism in the near term.
2. An offensive against ISIS’s stronghold in Sirte remains likely, though deep divisions within Libya’s armed forces may limit its effectiveness. Clashes continue between Libyan National Army (LNA) and Misratan forces, forces on opposite sides of Libya’s civil war. ISIS continues to harden Sirte’s defenses and lay the groundwork for a controlled withdrawal from the city, should holding Sirte become untenable. Sirte is not the sole key to defeating ISIS in Libya, however, and ISIS will likely continue to destabilize the region from a base in southwestern Libya.
3. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) may be preparing to withdraw from Zinjibar, Abyan, following reports of local mediation. AQAP just withdrew its forces from al Mukalla, Hadramawt before a Yemeni offensive with Emirati support. The loss of these cities is a temporary setback for AQAP, however. The group derives its strength from popular support, not territorial control, and it has resurged from similar losses in 2012.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Iranian officials such as Deputy Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian and the Supreme Leader’s Senior Military Advisor and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi voiced their support for Syrian President Bashar al Assad and for Russian involvement in the conflict in Syria.
2. Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi returned to the country after six months in exile in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Hadi’s cabinet returned in advance of him and began re-establishing the Hadi-led central government in Aden, in southern Yemen.
3. Malian factions met for the first time in Mali’s capital, Bamako, to improve implementation of a June ceasefire agreement and continued talks. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb-linked Islamist groups have taken advantage of the conflict in Mali and are pushing their area of operations southward.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Representatives from the al Houthis and former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh’s General People’s Congress party (GPC) are refusing to attend UN-led peace talks in Kuwait until the ceasefire is implemented and Saudi-led coalition airstrikes against al Houthi-Saleh positions stop. Key Yemeni factions would not have had representation at the Kuwait talks and would have been unlikely to accept a negotiated solution. These factions, which include southern secessionists, would probably continue to fight to secure their interests.
2. The Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) is reconstituting its explosives capabilities in eastern Libya and will use them to deter action against its stronghold in Sirte. ISIS will likely use these capabilities against the Libyan National Army (LNA), which may be assembling a force to attack Sirte, as well as against civilian populations to undermine the LNA in Benghazi. ISIS is conducting similar attacks on Misratan militia positions in western Libya, likely to deter Misratan operations. ISIS will likely attack Libya’s new unity government, too, especially as it becomes the West’s preferred counterterrorism partner in Libya.
3. ISIS is building a support network in Tunisia to support the establishment of a formal ISIS wilayat in Tunisia. ISIS is attempting to co-opt al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s networks in western Tunisia, where it is developing safe havens from which to conduct attacks in both Tunisia and Algeria. The group is also recruiting heavily in eastern Tunisia’s population centers, where Tunisian security forces recently arrested a deputy mayor for belonging to a pro-ISIS cell, indicating the extent to which ISIS is attempting to infiltrate Tunisian society.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Libyan counter-ISIS campaign will likely become a prolonged siege of city. Armed factions that support the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) are advancing on Sirte from the east and west. Some of these forces are shaping their offensive to cut off ISIS’s access to southwest Libya, the most likely route by which ISIS would attempt a tactical withdrawal should holding Sirte become untenable. ISIS is calling for reinforcements and dedicating significant resources to hardening the city’s defenses and delaying its enemies’ advance. The current Libyan forces lack the capability to take Sirte without support, and continued competition between rival Libyan militias and political powerbrokers will likely impede efforts to oust ISIS from its urban stronghold.
2. Al Shabaab attacks against Somali government and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) targets will likely surge during Ramadan month. Al Shabaab conducted a complex attack on Mogadishu’s Ambassador Hotel on June 1 that killed at least 16 people, including two members of the Somali Parliament, following warnings that the group plans to increase its attacks during the Ramadan season. Al Shabaab continues to demonstrate resiliency and attack capabilities despite a U.S.-backed campaign targeting its leadership. A U.S. airstrike killed senior al Shabaab military commander and intelligence chief Abdullahi Haji Da’ud on May 27, and U.S. advisers supported a raid that killed senior commander Mohamed Mohamud Kuno, who masterminded the April 2015 attack on Kenya’s Garissa University, on May 31.
3. Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) echoed guidance that had been issued by senior al Qaeda leadership. The group’s leader and its spokesman both issued statements that warned against killing Muslim civilians in attacks. AQIS emir Asim Umar encouraged fighters instead to attack “the head of the serpent,” and engage in the far war. AQIS spokesman Usama Mahmoud condemned the January 2016 Bacha Khan University and December 2015 Pakistan National Database and Registration Authority attacks.
An Iraqi bill proposes granting immunity to Shia militias who fought against ISIS, but critics say this could encourage rights violations and affect Sunni Arabs. ISIS is preparing for the battle over Mosul by digging trenches, booby-trapping areas, and removing residents to use as human shields. Sources say the number of foreign ISIS fighters in Mosul has diminished recently. Experts say the political issues that allowed ISIS to take hold in Mosul must be addressed for long-term stability.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The failure of Libya’s UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) to achieve legitimacy may impede U.S. efforts to partner with it for future operations against the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and other enemy groups in Libya. A democratically elected body, whose mandate expired in October 2015, based in eastern Libya voted no-confidence in the GNA and its prime minister on August 22. The vote is contested, but might invalidate prior GNA decisions if upheld. These decisions could include the GNA’s July 2016 request for U.S. airstrikes against ISIS in Sirte. Political turmoil will continue to undermine local and international efforts to defeat ISIS and other Salafi-jihadi groups in Libya.
2. Russia is attempting to use Yemen’s political crisis opportunistically to expand its sphere of influence in the Arabian Peninsula. Former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh offered Russia access to Yemen’s bases, airports, and ports in an interview with a Russian state news outlet on August 21. Saleh’s statement follows the Russian Charge d’Affaires for Yemen’s vocal support for an al Houthi-Saleh power-sharing body established on August 15. Russia has opposed measures that favor President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government over the al Houthi-Saleh alliance, though it has also taken steps to placate Saudi Arabia and other international supporters of the Hadi government. Russia will continue to maneuver on both sides of the political crisis in order to advance its own interests in the event of a negotiated settlement in Yemen.
3. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri called for fighters to unify in their support for the Afghan Taliban and to reject and ignore ISIS. Zawahiri’s call was probably a reaction to ISIS’s resurgence in parts of Afghanistan, as well as continuing reports of Taliban militants switching allegiance to ISIS. Zawahiri’s statement was likely timed to rally support for an ongoing Taliban offensive to control Kunduz city in northern Afghanistan. Zawahiri accused ISIS and its leader, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, of sowing discord among the mujahideen.
Since ISIS stormed onto the world's stage on June 10, 2014 with its seizure of Mosul, the Institute for the Study of War has been the institution of record for tracking ISIS. The ISW "ISIS Sanctuary Map" quickly became an iconic image of the conflict raging across Syria and Iraq. It has been used hundreds of times, in several languages, and adapted for such uses as electronic backdrops on CNN, Fox, and other news broadcasts. When developing a 1,200 year history of Iraq in maps, The National Geographic used only one source for its map of the recent conflict: ISW.
The ISIS Sanctuary Maps from the last 14 months (and longer) show how ISW has tracked the conflict and become the recognized expert on ISIS's expansion. As we approach the one-year anniversary of U.S. and coalition airstrikes against ISIS, we have collected all our Sanctuary Maps, along with examples of where they have appeared, to help show the role ISW is proud to have played in tracking ISIS.
This product reviews the current situation of the Syrian Opposition in terms of its military and political components.
In the context of the military stand-off between the opposition and regime security forces, the product depicts the Urban-Rural stalemate that has emerged in terms of terrain secured by both sides. It also describes the emergence of Provincial Military Councils that provide operational command and control for disparate rebel groups.
In terms of the political opposition, the product also establishes the grassroots political opposition that has organized around Revolutionary Councils that cooperate and correspond with the military Provincial Military Councils. These Revolutionary Councils have consolidated into three National Political Coalitions that achieve effective pan-provincial representation.
Enduring challenges exist with regard the limits of the Expatriate Opposition, vulnerabilities to rebel radicalization, and factionalization as exacerbated by external support. Opportunities also exist to support the professionalization of the militant opposition in order to treat these challenges.
Recent rebel victories in the Syrian capital region, such as the closure of the Damascus International airport, have led to speculation that the Assad regime may be close to collapse. While this is possible, it is also important to recognize that the regime still maintains control of downtown Damascus despite these significant victories for the opposition. This elevates the question of where specifically the regime still maintains control in Damascus.
The document discusses force requirements for Afghanistan and proposes increasing US and international forces. It argues that additional forces are needed to accelerate training of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and reduce the insurgent threat. This would allow the ANSF to take on more responsibility more rapidly and enable a faster drawdown of international forces. The document analyzes the current status and planned expansion of the ANSF and coalition forces. It prioritizes counterinsurgency efforts in Regional Command South and parts of Regional Command East, where the insurgency is most dangerous.
The Afghan National Army (ANA) is divided into five combat Corps. The Corps function as regional commands and are deployed throughout the country. In addition to the 201st Corps in Kabul, the 203rd Corps is based in Gardez; the 205th Corps is based in Kandahar; the 207th Corps is based in Herat; the 209th Corps is based in Mazar-e-Sharif. The kandak, or battalion, of 600 troops is the basic unit of the ANA. Most kandaks are infantry units. As of April 2009, there were roughly 80,000 soldiers in the ANA. Read more at http://www.understandingwar.org/afghanistan-national-army-ana
Jebel al-Zawiyah is a rebel stronghold that lies 11 kilometers to the west of the highway linking Damascus to Aleppo. It lies 30 km southeast of the Turkish border. The city of Ariha sits along the main road linking Aleppo to Latakia. Rebel groups there are well positioned to deny the regime access to key lines of communication across Syria.
The ANSF's quality and performance depends on the legitimacy and capability of the Afghan government it is defending. Undermining the government's legitimacy risks damaging ANSF morale and effectiveness. Additional US forces are needed to shore up governance, counter corruption and violence, and ensure the ANSF has time to develop independently.
Damascus is the Syrian regime’s center of gravity -- the struggle for Damascus is existential for the regime as well as the opposition.
Damascus has always been heavily militarized and has hosted a high proportion of the Syrian armed forces throughout the war.
In response to rebel incursions to the capital, the regime escalated operations in late 2012 and consolidated forces from other parts of the country.
Rebels in Damascus worked to improve their organizational structure, and implemented a shift towards targeted attacks on infrastructure and strategic assets.
The regime has augmented its fighting forces with foreign fighters, namely Hezbollah and Iraqi Shi‘a militias, and with pro-regime militias.
This reliance on foreign and irregular forces leaves its military capacity vulnerable to events beyond its control.
The regime has used indiscriminate targeting of civilian areas, including “barrel bombs,” to mimic the effects of chemical weapons.
Renewed rebel campaigns in Damascus suggest that they will survive the winter months, and continue to challenge Assad’s grip on the fortress of Damascus.
The regime is running out of options for a decisive victory, but does not seem at risk of losing their capital seat at the present.
Air Vice Marshal John Blackburn on 21st Century Force DesignICSA, LLC
In the last formal presentation of the Williams Seminar on air-sea integration, John Blackburn, the former Deputy Chair of the Williams Foundation and a past Deputy Chief of the RAAF, addressed the challenge of building from the ground up a truly integrated force. To do so, requires more than the significant efforts the services are each doing working to shape cross modernization; it required a new approach to force structure design.
He then announced that on 6 March 2017, the Foundation will run a one-day Seminar on the topic of Integrated Force Design, stepping beyond the focus on airpower, sea power and Land power to one of integrated power. He also announced the Foundations plan to run a case study Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) in order to explore how we could achieve an Integrated Force Design.
"We will explore a new way of working together at the integrated level and we intend to some analysis with force characteristics of this future integrated force. We aim to help the project officers think beyond their own projects to design in greater capability to leverage one another from the outset, from the design level. In fact, the challenge is ensure that the aperture is wide within individual projects to have the kind of interactive dynamic developments which a joint force design process can unleash. Unfortunately many projects often narrow the aperture to a replacement mindset in order to save time.
We want the project officers of individual projects to be able to say: "Okay, in my project as well as replacing what I had today, I've got to make sure that the capability I'm designing be a part of the future kill web rather than a force component networked or connected in an after-market after thought.
We see that as the main challenge and the opportunity to design the future force, integrated at birth."
This is a handbook for identifying the most common and significant weapons in Syria.
Syria’s light infantry rebel force use the small arms and crew-served weapons, while the Assad regime uses the infantry fighting vehicles and main battle tanks shed light on the primary armored vehicles. Aircraft, artillery and air defense artillery highlight some additional capabilities the Assad regime has relied on in the conflict.
Opposition media has a tendency to report all armored vehicles as “tanks.” Analysts examining videos the Syrian opposition has posted can use this guide to correctly identify the various armored vehicles used in the Assad regime’s operations.
Similarly, many observers have been eager to understand the capabilities of the Syrian rebels, and this guide may offer a better appreciation of the strengths and weaknesses of the armed opposition.
The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) has taken Mosul, the 2nd largest city in Iraq, as part of a multi-front, concerted military campaign. Read this SlideShare presentation for the current state of play in a dangerous and developing situation.
ISW provides analysis and expertise to US policymakers and media on national security issues. Their analysts and board members regularly testify before Congress and are cited by major media. ISW also educates the next generation of security leaders through internship and fellowship programs. They have trained nearly 100 young professionals. Additionally, ISW revolutionizes intelligence gathering by analyzing unclassified sources to provide early warnings on crises.
Some have suggested that a better alternative would be to establish a 'no fly zone" over Northern Syria to go after ISIS and pursue other objectives, including undercutting the regime of Assad.
Secretary of State Kerry has asked his staff to look into doing so, and presidential candidates including Hillary Clinton and various Republican candidates, which include Jeb Bush, Ben Carson, Chris Christie, Carly Fiorina, Lindsay Graham, John Katich, and Marco Rubio.
But does doing so make any sense and what would be the realistic strategic purpose of a no fly zone in contested Syria?
In a briefing by Lt. General (Retired) Dave Deptula, the question of a Syrian no fly zone was examined carefully when it first bubbled up as a popular antidote to the disintegration of Syria.
The presentation to the U.S. Institute of Peace, dated May 29, 2014 but updated recently for this article, Deptula highlighted a number of key considerations, but really boil down to a direct question: what are the strategic objectives for such an action?
The document summarizes Russian airstrike locations in Syria between September 2015 and June 2016 based on reports from local Syrian groups, statements by Russian and Western officials, and social media documentation. It describes the Institute for the Study of War's methodology for assessing airstrikes as high or low confidence based on corroborating evidence. Maps show targeted locations but not numbers of strikes. The methodology changed in May 2016 to rely more on indicators of Russian airstrikes than statements by officials.
The pattern of violent incidents attributed to Salafist groups in Libya from March 2012 to September 2012 indicate that security across the country, and particularly in Benghazi, had deteriorated prior to the attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi.
The Battle to retake the Iraqi city of Mosul
The political and economic implications - September 2016
The final battle to retake Mosul from the Islamic State could begin as soon as October, according to authorities in Iraq’s armed forces. In this note, Whispering Bell looks at the current status of the tightening noose around Mosul, the military outlook, the political maneuvering that accompanies the planning for the assault, and some of the near term implications for Iraq’s political and economic future.
This 11-page report has been prepared by Whispering Bell and made available as free to download.
SicuroIMS Iraq Threat Assessment 3 - 16 August 2016Polina Shulyatova
The document provides a threat assessment for Iraq from August 3-16, 2016. It summarizes security incidents including IED attacks in Baghdad (36) and Babil (5), a suicide bombing in southern Iraq, ongoing clashes between ISF and ISIS in Al Anbar, arrests of suspected militants in Diyala, Kirkuk and Salah al Din, and protests in southern Iraqi cities. Analysis indicates IEDs remain the primary threat in Baghdad while ISIS maintains the ability to conduct attacks despite ongoing security operations against the group.
- The Syrian army took over Rima farms near Damascus after clashes with al-Nusra Front and Islamic Front gunmen, killing around 40 al-Nusra fighters. The army also targeted militant hideouts in rural Damascus and Aleppo.
- UN announced the release of 181 detainees from Homs old city prison. Meanwhile, the "Sunaa Brigade" targeted power facilities in Daraa, causing outages. Several factions formed a new "Southern Front to Liberate Syria".
- An Israeli study found that 23 of 30 suicide bombers in Syria were foreigners, mainly from Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Iraq. The Syrian army killed foreign militants in Homs and Latakia countryside.
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1) Turkey bombed an ISIL convoy inside Turkish borders after ISIL militants attacked a Turkish military base near the Syrian border.
2) Opposition forces recaptured the village of Alnairab and surrounding areas in Aleppo from government forces after battles. Over 7,000 foreign fighters are involved in the Syrian conflict.
3) The Syrian government delegation accused opposition delegates of exerting external pressure during peace talks in Geneva and communicating with the U.S. ambassador, while the opposition said some progress was made in discussions around a transitional governing body.
This document provides a summary of news from various areas in Syria on February 3, 2014. Key points include:
- ISIL controls the large Koneko gas field in Deir Ezzor province and most headquarters of al-Nusra Front in the area.
- Al-Qaeda denies having any links with or responsibility for the activities of ISIL, saying it did not establish the group.
- FSA kills an ISIL commander in Raqqa countryside while clashes between Turkmen factions and ISIL fighters in Aleppo kill 20.
- The citizens of al-Ashrafeyya village hand the area over to the Syrian army without battles.
- A US
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Iran continues to provide sanctuary to senior al Qaeda operatives. The U.S. Department of the Treasury imposed sanctions on three senior al Qaeda members operating from Iran, describing one of the operatives, al Qaeda military committee chief Faisal Jassim Mohammed al Amri al Khalidi, as “part of a new generation of al Qaeda operatives,” in the press release. Yisra Muhammad Ibrahim Bayumi served as a mediator between al Qaeda and Iranian authorities, and Abu Bakr Muhammad Muhammad Ghumayn held financial, communications, and logistical roles in the group. Iran has facilitated al Qaeda activities in the Middle East since 2005 and al Qaeda is able to move money, facilitators, and operatives through Iran.
2. Mokhtar Belmokhtar, the emir of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) affiliate al Murabitoun, denounced French intervention in Libya and called for Libyan Muslims to fight against the West. The release of the written statement by al Murabitoun’s media arm strengthens CTP’s assessment that Belmokhtar survived the June 2015 U.S. airstrike targeting a meeting of Islamist leaders in Ajdabiya, Libya. France confirmed its military presence in Libya on July 20 after three French soldiers died during a counterterrorism operation in Benghazi. [See CTP’s “Backgrounder: Fighting Forces in Libya” and “GNA-Allied Forces Seize Momentum against ISIS in Sirte” for more.]
3. Al Qaeda’s affiliate in Somalia, al Shabaab, targeted the primary African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) peacekeeping base in Mogadishu on July 26. A militant detonated a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) near the entrance of Halane Base Camp, killing at least 13 security contractors and civilians, before a second suicide bomber attempted to storm the compound. The assessed target was UN and African Union personnel. Al Shabaab attempted an SVBIED attack targeting a gathering of Somali politicians at a Mogadishu hotel on July 14, and Somali security forces disrupted an SVBIED attack on July 24.
Warplanes targeted an industrial city in Aleppo while clashes occurred between government forces and rebels trying to control the strategic region. Activists reported cases of asphyxiation from gases released by the Syrian army in Deir al-Zour. A revised plan was submitted to remove all chemicals from Syria by the end of April. Clashes also resumed between Palestinian groups and Al-Nusra Front militants in the Yarmouk refugee camp in Damascus.
The document reports on recent fighting and developments in the Syrian civil war. It describes battles between Syrian government forces and opposition fighters in various cities that resulted in casualties on both sides. It also discusses the formation of a new political group by dissident Syrian officers aimed at overthrowing the regime and notes controversies over the credentials and nominations of certain opposition figures.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. A U.S.-backed campaign against the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in Libya may culminate prematurely. Libyan militias allied with the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) may declare victory over ISIS in Sirte within the coming days, and U.S. air support for GNA-allied militias could end as early as this week. The loss of Sirte has not reduced ISIS’s ability to conduct high-casualty explosive attacks, and the group may be increasingly active in southwestern Libya, according to local security sources. CTP assessed in April 2016 that ISIS would likely withdraw from Sirte and attempt to establish a safe haven in southern Libya. The conditions are set for ISIS to survive and likely resurge in Libya after the U.S. air campaign ends.
2. A political resolution to the civil war in Yemen remains unlikely. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry announced a revised peace plan on August 25 based on the formation of a national unity government—an al Houthi-Saleh demand excluded from the preliminary stages of prior UN-led negotiations. Secretary Kerry also emphasized the need for al Houthi-Saleh forces to withdraw from Sana’a, Yemen’s capital, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 2216. The al Houthi-Saleh alliance is unlikely to withdraw from Sana’a, where its recently formed Supreme Political Council has popular support. Al Houthi-Saleh leadership is seeking to legitimize the new governing body as a challenge to the internationally recognized government led by President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi, which operates from Aden.
3. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri called on the Sunni community to unite against American and Iranian intervention. He accused the U.S. and Iran of forming an alliance that aims to exterminate Sunni populations and appealed to Iraqi Sunni, in particular, to fight “occupation” in their country. Zawahiri also called on members of ISIS to renounce their current allegiance and follow in the footsteps of Abu Musab al Zarqawi, the late leader of the former al Qaeda in Iraq. Zawahiri’s statements were likely timed to capitalize on ISIS’s recent territorial losses in Iraq and Syria. Zawahiri called for the formation of a “shari’a judiciary” in Syria, possibly indicating that al Qaeda will take additional measures to unify Salafi-jihadi groups there.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. A coordinated release of strategic guidance across al Qaeda’s affiliates indicates continued centralized direction from al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri to the al Qaeda network. Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent issued a detailed statement outlining how its followers should interact with other Salafi-jihadi groups and treat Muslim civilians in order to cultivate the support of the masses. The document also listed and prioritized legitimate targets for attacks. Al Shabaab emir Ahmed Umar (Abu Ubaidah) issued guidance for Muslims in East Africa, couching the local objectives in terms of the global fight.
2. Ongoing negotiations between members of the Saudi-led coalition and former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh’s block are occurring outside of the UN-led process. An elite-brokered deal is unlikely to address the core underlying grievances that feed conflict in Yemen’s civil war and therefore may not stabilize the country. Current reports indicate that former Yemeni prime minister Khaled Bahah could replace Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi as president and Saleh’s son, Ahmed Saleh, would take the office of the vice president.
3. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) is attacking oil infrastructure in Libya. ISIS in Libya has reconstituted sufficiently to launch a counter-counter-offensive to destabilize Libya further and create space for its forces to regroup. The Misratan counter-ISIS offensive in Libya degraded ISIS significantly, but did not defeat the group.
This document summarizes tensions between various militant groups in Syria, including between al-Nusra Front and ISIL. Al-Nusra gives ISIL a 5-day ultimatum to prove its leader's innocence, threatening to drive them out if not. ISIL responds calling the ultimatum foolish. Meanwhile, the Islamic Front says fighting ISIL is a priority over the regime. There are also reports of clashes and attacks between opposition groups and the Syrian army in various locations.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Ayman al Zawahiri issued a critique of the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and ISIS leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi. Zawahiri, who has remained largely silent on ISIS, dismissed the Caliphate as illegitimate and called for all Muslims to defend themselves against the West. Zawahiri still seeks to unify the global jihad and sees ISIS as a dividing force.
2. Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei defended the Guardian Council’s supervisory role in elections as its “legal” and “rational right,” pushing back on President Hassan Rouhani’s August 19 critique of the Guardian Council. Khamenei’s public correction of Rouhani may be aimed at ensuring the latter’s influence and politico-economic reforms do not become unmanageable.
3. ISIS consolidated control in Sirte, Libya, and the surrounding areas. ISIS is using methods similar to those seen in Syria and Iraq.
The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) originated as an al-Qaeda linked Sunni insurgent group in Iraq after the 2003 US invasion. It expanded into Syria during the civil war, declared a caliphate in 2014, and controls territory in Iraq and Syria while carrying out operations in other countries. ISIL generates revenue through oil production and smuggling, taxes, ransoms from kidnappings, selling plundered artifacts, and other criminal activities to fund its violent extremist activities and attracts foreign fighters through effective propaganda.
1) The document discusses the arming of Iraqi security forces by countries like the US, Iran, and Russia in an effort to stem the advance of ISIS in Iraq.
2) It outlines US efforts to modernize and train the Iraqi security forces since 2003, but notes the forces have struggled with sectarianism and faced challenges in countering ISIS.
3) Iran has also played a significant role in arming and advising Iraqi security forces and Shiite militias in their fight against ISIS, expanding Iranian influence in Iraq.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and al Murabitoun confirmed their rumored re-unification, citing their combined November 20 attack on the Radisson Blu hotel in Bamako, Mali as proof. Mokhtar Belmokhtar, the leader of al Murabitoun, split from AQIM in December 2012. This reconciliation of al Qaeda affiliates, which likely stems from their desire to counter ISIS’s influence in the region, increases the security threat to northern Mali as the groups integrate their resources, personal networks, and lines of communication.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) assassinated its first high-profile target in Yemen. ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan claimed responsibility for a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device attack that killed the Governor of Aden and threatened to launch additional attacks on Yemeni government officials. ISIS will likely attempt to leverage this spectacular attack to drive recruitment in the region, possibly in competition with AQAP elements regenerating in neighboring Abyan governorate. ISIS's growing strength in Aden will threaten the Saudi-led coalition's efforts to secure the city and restore President Hadi's government there.
3. The International Atomic Energy Agency is likely to close its investigation into the possible military dimensions (PMD) of Iran's nuclear program following the release of its report on December 2. The report assesses that while Iran made a “coordinated effort” to develop a “nuclear explosive device” before the end of 2003, there are no “credible indications of activities in Iran relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device after 2009.” Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi claimed that the report proves “the peaceful nature” of Iran’s nuclear program and called upon the P5+1 to close Iran’s PMD file at the IAEA Board of Governors in December.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
1. Libyan Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) cells demonstrated a high level of coordination by conducting a large-scale spectacular attack on security forces in support of an ongoing campaign to seize Libyan oil infrastructure. ISIS Wilayat Tarablus detonated a large suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device at a police training camp in Zliten, Libya on January 7 and described the attack as part of the “Invasion of Abu al Mughira al Qahtani,” which is an operation focused on taking over Libya’s oil infrastructure. ISIS Wilayat Tarablus likely executed the Zliten attack to prevent or deter security forces from responding to ongoing offensive operations at the al Sidra and Ras Lanuf oil terminals, conducted by ISIS Wilayat Barqa. These concurrent actions demonstrate not only significant coordination between ISIS cells in Libya, but also the exportation of military knowledge, explosives expertise, and leadership capabilities from ISIS core to Libya.
2. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is conducting media campaigns meant to both enhance the group’s local legitimacy in Yemen and reaffirm its status in the global jihadist community. The group released a video of operations in Taiz city, where AQAP militants are leveraging the al Houthi fight to build relationships with local militias, including tribal fighters and local Salafi groups. AQAP also released an audio statement from its chief bombmaker, Ibrahim al Asiri, likely in an effort to capitalize on al Asiri’s notoriety and highlight AQAP’s credentials as a leader of jihad against the West.
3. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and its associates may be resurging in Mali. An intercepted letter from AQIM-linked Ansar al Din to an associated militant group, the Macina Liberation Front, called for increased attacks against isolated Malian army posts.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Yemeni government launched an offensive to seize Sana’a from the al Houthis and forces loyal to former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh on August 6. CTP assessed in July 2016 that forces allied with President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government were preparing to pursue a military victory in the absence of a negotiated settlement. The Saudi-led coalition resumed airstrikes on Sana’a in support of the offensive, which followed the suspension of UN-led peace talks. This offensive will prolong the war and distract from the fight against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), allowing AQAP to recoup recent losses and grow stronger in Yemen.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) replaced Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau as the governor of ISIS’s affiliate in West Africa. ISIS replaced Shekau, whose leadership deterred both ISIS and al Qaeda from close coordination with his group, with a more responsive leader. This reshuffle gives ISIS the opportunity to fully integrate its Nigerian affiliate into its global network and establish a new foothold in Africa.
3. Jamatul Ahrar (JuA), a splinter group of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, conducted a suicide bombing that killed more than 70 people at a hospital in Quetta, Pakistan on August 8. The attack targeted lawyers mourning the regional bar association president, whom JuA assassinated earlier that day. JuA has expressed pro-ISIS leanings, but has not formally affiliated with the group. It has targeted the judiciary before and will likely continue to attack courts, lawyers, and related targets throughout Pakistan. JuA is responsible for the Easter Sunday bombing that targeted Pakistani Christians in Lahore on March 27, 2016.
The document provides a summary and assessment of critical threats from terrorist and militant groups around the world in 3 pages divided into regional sections. Some key events summarized include:
1. A suicide bombing in Lahore, Pakistan claimed by Jamatul Ahrar that killed over 70 people.
2. Pro-GNC militias in Libya preventing the UN-backed unity government from establishing itself in Tripoli.
3. Continued fighting in Yemen between Houthi-Saleh forces and coalition-backed forces with additional fractures appearing as peace talks continue.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Senior Iranian officials censured President Hassan Rouhani for criticizing the IRGC’s arrests of individuals suspected of promoting foreign influence, indicating that disagreements over how to block foreign influence will continue alongside greater crackdowns.
2. Tensions between Somalia and Kenya are high due to border disputes and allegations that Kenyan military figures participated in al Shabaab’s illegal smuggling operations. The Somali parliament passed a motion to expel both regular Kenyan Defense Force (KDF) units and the KDF’s African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) contingent from Somalia. A breakdown in cooperation among security forces will provide opportunities for al Shabaab to expand.
3. Malian forces under Operation Seno conducted successful clearing operations in central Mali, with particular success against the Macina Liberation Front (MLF), associated with the AQIM-affiliated Ansar al Din. The MLF will continue to retaliate against Malian and UN security forces.
1) The document reports on recent developments in Syria, including a ceasefire agreement in Damascus countryside, threats by rebels to shell presidential election centers, and the US preparing to train moderate Syrian opposition forces.
2) Fighting continued in different areas of Syria, with opposition launching attacks in Idlib and preparing to storm northern Aleppo. Meanwhile, clashes occurred around a prison in central Aleppo.
3) Efforts were underway to form a unified council of rebel factions in Deir ez-Zor, while ISIL threatened locals in the city and a ceasefire was announced in another area.
The document discusses the rise of ISIS in Iraq and Syria and argues that defeating ISIS requires more than just military force. It will require the Iraqi government, led by Nouri al-Maliki, to build consensus with Kurds and Sunnis to undermine the social support ISIS currently has. While military efforts are important, the key to rolling back ISIS's gains will be addressing the political issues that have disaffected Sunni communities and strengthened ISIS.
The document summarizes photos and captions from an event held by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) where they presented their 5th annual National Security Leadership Award to General Raymond T. Odierno. The event included an introduction by General David Petraeus, a discussion between General Odierno and ISW President Kimberly Kagan, and a cocktail reception with ISW supporters, donors, and sponsors. ISW President Kimberly Kagan presented the award to General Odierno at the conclusion of the evening.
The capture of Ramadi by ISIS stunned the world. ISW has tracked the ISIS assault on Ramadi since January 2014 when they attacked both Ramadi and Fallujah. This presentation shows how ISIS has positioned itself in Anbar Province since that time to the capture of Ramadi this past weekend. See more reports at www.understandingwar.org
The document provides a summary of situation reports from the Iraq Situation Report team at the Institute for the Study of War covering events in Iraq from June 21 to July 2, 2014. The reports can be subscribed to on the Institute's Iraq blog. The Institute for the Study of War is a non-profit policy research organization based in Washington, D.C. that studies modern wars and political violence.
The Assad regime’s military position is stronger in January 2014 than it was a year ago and remains committed to fighting for Damascus, Homs, and Aleppo. Nonetheless, the conflict remains at a military and political deadlock.
In the spring of 2013 the regime lacked the necessary manpower to conduct simultaneous operations on multiple fronts against rebel groups that were quickly making gains throughout the north, south, and Damascus countryside.
The Syrian regime has since been resuscitated by infusions of men and materiel from Iran, Hezbollah, and Russia and from the formalization of pro-regime militias under the National Defense Forces.
Beginning with the al-Qusayr offensive in 2013, the regime demonstrated the capacity to overcome its manpower deficit and inability to fight simultaneously on multiple fronts. It also illustrated the regime’s strategy to defeat the opposition by isolating rebel systems from their supply lines, attacking by fire, then clearing and holding terrain.
Despite a lack of national-level command and control on the part of the rebels, the resilience of rebel systems, guerilla tactics, and effective attacks by groups such as ISIS have prevented the regime from uprooting the armed opposition from the country or even from major cities, including Damascus and Aleppo.
The regime’s growing strength and the growing extremism of the al-Qaeda affiliates has pushed the Syrian opposition to evolve, leading to a drive for unification among the internal fighting forces, independent of the political leadership-in-exile, which has failed to provide the amount of support that the fighting groups have needed.
Despite the regime’s apparent resurgence and the opposition’s enduring challenges, the Assad Regime is not winning the Syrian civil war, and it does not have the strength to win decisively in 2014.
This product is a technical study of the requirements to conduct a limited strike. It is not a recommendation for or against such a strike, nor does it evaluate the possible effects of such a strike on the regime, the rebels, or the various states and non-state actors supporting both sides.
Three thousand troops are not sufficient to keep even a single U.S. military base in Afghanistan after 2014. This report, released jointly with the Institute for the Study of War, describes how to calculate the force requirements for keeping one single base in Afghanistan after 2014, concluding that it is not possible to do so with fewer than about 6,000 troops. The report identifies many (but not all) of the specific tasks and specialties required to keep an airbase capable of handling large cargo aircraft running and to protect it against known, current enemy capabilities. It also finds that a base manned at such a level would have virtually no ability to advise and assist the Afghan National Security Forces or even to conduct meaningful counter-terrorism operations. The notion of keeping only 3,000 troops in Afghanistan is militarily infeasible.
As the proficiency of Syria’s armed opposition has increased, the Assad regime has been forced to rely on more of its arsenal to combat the opposition.
This document profiles numerous armed opposition groups operating in Syria's Aleppo, Idlib, Homs, and Dera'a provinces. It provides details on each group such as their area of operations, commander, estimated strength, and in some cases a brief assessment of their activities and credibility. The largest and most effective rebel force mentioned is the Khalid bin Walid Brigade operating in Homs Province with over 3,000 fighters. Overall the document aims to catalog and provide basic information on armed opposition units active in Syria's ongoing conflict.
The document profiles leadership of armed opposition groups in Syria, including the Free Syrian Army. It lists leaders' names, ranks, affiliations, and areas of operation. Many leaders are identified as having defected from the Syrian military and now lead FSA battalions from headquarters in Turkey or within Syria. The document focuses on leadership of the FSA as well as the Khalid bin Walid Brigade and Osama bin Zaid Battalion, active in Homs, Idlib, Hama and surrounding areas.
AHMR is an interdisciplinary peer-reviewed online journal created to encourage and facilitate the study of all aspects (socio-economic, political, legislative and developmental) of Human Mobility in Africa. Through the publication of original research, policy discussions and evidence research papers AHMR provides a comprehensive forum devoted exclusively to the analysis of contemporaneous trends, migration patterns and some of the most important migration-related issues.
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1. Iraq Situation Reports
July 3-21, 2014
ISW Iraq Team
Institute for the Study of War
Subscribe to Iraq SITREPs here:
http://www.understandingwar.org/iraq-blog
2. Iraq Situation Report: July 3, 2014
Repercussions from the clashes between the ISF and the followers of Mahmoud al-Sarkhi continue to unfold. Sarkhi is a Shi’a cleric who
positions himself as a marja‘a, or Shi’a religious authority, of Iraqi and Arab origin. This is seen as a direct challenge to Grand Ayatollah Ali
al-Sistani. On June 26, Sarkhi criticized Sistani’s June 13 anti-ISIS fatwa. Sarkhi followers have clashed with U.S. forces in the past, in
addition to engaging in skirmishes with the Iraqi Security Forces in the spring of 2012. Further clashes in the south are likely to stretch the
ISF’s already limited resources, creating instability in areas that the ISF need to remain under control as they seek to focus on ISIS.
100km
Qaim
9
by Ahmed Ali, ISW Iraq Team, and Nichole Dicharry
100km
Fallujah
Baqubah
As Sulaymaniyah
ArbilMosul
Basra
An Nasriyah
An Najaf
Karbala
Al Kut
Ar Ramadi
Samarra
Tikrit
Kirkuk
Baghdad
Dahuk
Al Amarah
Al Hillah
Ad Diwaniyah
Muqdadiyah
Samawa
Rutba
Qaim
Haditha
ISIS
ISF
Followers of al-Sarkhi
Major Cities
Major Clash
Kidnapping
Armed Drones
SVEST
4
1
7
3
2
6
1 According to an unnamed activist in Mosul, criminal
activity, including kidnapping for ransom, is on the rise
primarily in western Mosul.The perception is that ISIS is
not tackling this issue because it is prioritizing other
missions. In general, reports indicate difficult living
conditions in the city due to lack of payment for
government officials since the fall of Mosul on June 10.
ISF ordnance teams are reportedly
dismantling large numbers of IEDs
emplaced by ISIS in the Salah ad-Din
provincial government building in the
southern outskirts of Tikrit.
2
On July 2, a suicide bomber wearing
an SVEST attacked a Husseiniyya — a
Shi’a religious center — in the Jihad
neighborhood in southwestern Baghdad
killing at least 5 individuals and
injuring at least 13 others.
3
5
The Iraqi Police in Babil arrested 28
armed Sarkhi supporters in Hilla who
were reportedly inciting violence and
calling on supporters to head to Karbala.
7
The Iraqi Security Forces have
besieged the neighborhoods of Saif Saad
and Molhaq in southern Karbala city where
Shi’a cleric Mahmoud al-Sarkhi and his followers
have a strong presence.The security forces are
searching for Sarkhi who is believed to have taken
shelter in one of these neighborhoods after the ISF
burned his office and residence.
Forces from the 31st Brigade, 8th IA Division, FP,
and popular committees launched an operation against
ISIS in the areas of Buhairat, al-Ruaia, and Fadhliya,
northern Babil.The ISF used air assets and artillery in
the operation.
5
The IA and IP in Diyala, supported
by IA Aviation and artillery, launched
an operation in villages around the
sub-district of Mansouriyah, located
north of Muqdadiyah.
6
Raid
4
3. Iraq Situation Report: July 4, 2014
ISIS targeted the Baiji refinery and IA positions south of Tikrit, likely to divert attention and resources from the ISF counter-offensive in
Tikrit. Clashes and indirect fire continued in Samarra, indicating that ISIS has forces that can operate in the vicinity of Baiji, Tikrit, and
Samarra simultaneously. There is also increased Iraqi Shi’a militia activity south of Baghdad. The protection of Mahmudiyah and Madaeen
is a priority for the Iraqi Shi’a militias in order to prevent ISIS advance into Baghdad from the south, in addition to securing the shrines in
Samarra and Karbala.
100km
Qaim
9
by Ahmed Ali, ISW Iraq Team, and Aaron Reese
100km
Fallujah
Baqubah
As Sulaymaniyah
ArbilMosul
Basra
An Nasriyah
An Najaf
Karbala
Al Kut
Ar Ramadi
Samarra
Tikrit
Kirkuk
Baghdad
Dahuk
Al Amarah
Al Hillah
Ad Diwaniyah
Muqdadiyah
Samawa
Rutba
Qaim
Haditha
ISIS
ISF
Unknown gunmen
Major Cities
Major Clash
Airstrikes
Kidnapping
SVBIED
Armed Drones
ISF and Militias
4
1
3
Forces from the Counter-Terrorism Services (CTS), 9th
IA Division, and IA Aviation repelled an ISIS attack against
the Baiji refinery.
2
1
A Suicide Vehicle-Borne Improvised
Explosive Device (SVBIED) targeted a
gathering of the Iraqi Army (IA) in the
Dijla district, south of Tikrit.The attack
resulted in the death of 12 soldiers and
injury of 27 soldiers.
2
Clashes took place in Samarra that
resulted in the death of 10 ISIS members
and the injury of two members of the
Sadrist Peace Brigades (PB).The source
added that ISIS shelled PB Headquarters
with mortars.
3
5
SU-25 jets bombed three locations in Hawijah
southwest of Kirkuk, where ISIS members are
believed to concentrate in order to “maintain weapons
and prepare explosives.”
The head of the Baghdad provincial
council, Riyadh al-Adhadh, stated that there
are cases of kidnappings and killings in
Baghdad province, specifically in the areas of
Mahmudiyah and Madaeen.
5
4
4. Iraq Situation Report: July 5, 2014
ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi delivered a public sermon in his proclaimed role as Caliph Ibrahim, the leader of the Islamic State,
presenting a major challenge to al-Qaeda senior leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. The public appearance of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in Mosul and
the destruction of shrines and mosques in Mosul and Tal Afar indicate that ISIS control in northern Iraq is uncontested. Meanwhile, ISIS
went on the offensive against the ISF in Tikrit and Baiji, indicating that their northern campaign has not culminated. Additionally, ISIS
projected explosive attacks in other provinces. The bridge attack in Ramadi likely aimed to isolate the ISF in Anbar in order to facilitate the
capture of Ramadi, Haditha, and Hit. The VBIEDs in Basra demonstrate the far reach of ISIS and their capability to attack the Shi’a heartland
while the ISF and Shi’a militias concentrate forces elsewhere.
100km
Qaim
9
by ISW Iraq Team and Aaron Reese
100km
Fallujah
Baqubah
As Sulaymaniyah
ArbilMosul
Basra
An Nasriyah
An Najaf
Karbala
Al Kut
Ar Ramadi
Samarra
Tikrit
Kirkuk
Baghdad
Dahuk
Al Amarah
Al Hillah
Ad Diwaniyah
Muqdadiyah
Samawa
Rutba
Qaim
Haditha
ISIS
ISFMajor Cities
Major Clash
Armed Drones
Anti-ISIS Tribes
VBIED
Execution
Shia militias
Basra
4
1
3
ISIS released a video of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi leading
Friday prayers in a mosque described as the Grand Mosque,
located in central Mosul.This is his first known video
appearance.
2
1
ISIS released images that illustrated
the destruction of shrines and Shia
mosques in the city of Mosul and in Tal
Afar. Salafi Islamists believe that such
shrines are representations of polytheism
and should therefore be destroyed.
2
Security forces in Tikrit University,
located north of Tikrit proper, reportedly
repelled an attack by ISIS on the university.
4
5
Anti-ISIS tribal elements targeted an ISIS leader
near the area of Rashad, south of Kirkuk.The attack
was successful in killing the ISIS figure.
Two VBIEDs detonated sequentially in
central Basra, resulting in the death of at least
two individuals and the injury of at least six
others.
8
6
ISIS launched an attack on the Baiji
refinery from two axes, initiating heavy
clashes that lasted throughout the night.
The ISF is still in control of the facility.
3
ISIS targeted a strategic bridge in the area of Saqlawiah,
northwest of Fallujah, using IEDs.The bridge was on the
highway that connected Baghdad to Ramadi.
5
The IP found two unidentified dead bodies in
the area of Shula, northwestern Baghdad.This was
most likely the work of Iraqi Shia militias.
7
6
7
8
5. Iraq Situation Report: July 6-7, 2014
ISIS attacked the northwest Baghdad neighborhood of Kadhmiya for the second time in a week, this time employing an SVBIED. This
indicates that ISIS can still attack heavily protected areas in Baghdad with vehicles. The attack upon the 6th IA Division commander west
of Baghdad, indicates that anti-government forces in the area are conducting visual observation of ISF movements. Meanwhile, ISIS went
on the offensive in Tikrit and also attacked ISF and Shi’a militia elements at Camp Speicher. It is unclear if ISIS attacked from within
downtown Tikrit or from outside the city, but ISIS is still able to go on the offensive in the north. Nevertheless, ISIS is meeting with
resistance from some tribes in northern Salah ad-Din as they attempt to enter new villages. The ISF response to ISIS now includes airstrikes
against bridges deep within ISIS control zones, such as the Zab Triangle connecting northern Salah ad-Din to Hawija. The precision of the
airstrike against a bridge in this zone indicates that the pilot of the SU-25 was likely Russian or Iranian. The overt activities of Shi’a militias
in northern Babil indicate that Jurf al-Sakhar may become a principal attack zone as ISIS and Shi’a militias face off directly. The task
organization of multiple Shi’a militia groups and Federal Police to protect Samarra demonstrates orchestrated role management.
100km
Qaim
9
by ISW Iraq Team, and Heather L. Pickerell
100km
Fallujah
Baqubah
As Sulaymaniyah
ArbilMosul
Basra
An Nasriyah
An Najaf
Karbala
Al Kut
Ar Ramadi
Samarra
Tikrit
Kirkuk
Baghdad
Dahuk
Al Amarah
Al Hillah
Ad Diwaniyah
Muqdadiyah
Samawa
Rutba
Qaim
Haditha
ISIS
ISF
Unknown gunmen
Major Cities
Major Clash
Airstrikes
SVBIED Shi’a militias
SVEST
7
1
On July 7, an airstrike targeted the
Rashedeya area, north of Mosul, killing and
injuring 40 individuals and damaging 20
houses, prompting 75 Turkmen families to
flee the area.
1
8
6
2
3
5
4
On July 6, ISIS launched an attack on
Camp Speicher, west of Tikrit, where IA,
CTS, and Iraqi Shi’a militias are positioned.
2
On July 7, heavy clashes took place
between ISIS and tribal elements from the
villages of Zowiya and Mishak in northern
Salah ad-Din after ISIS attempted to enter
the villages.
3
6 On July 6, an SU-25 aircraft targeted a bridge
connecting Zab, south of Kirkuk, to an area north of
Salah ad-Din.
On July 6, the Babil local
government announced that it will
create a 50 km sand berm extending
from the Owissat area in northern
Babil to the Razaza Lake.The berm is
intended to disrupt ISIS supply lines.
Also, a local government official stated
that Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH),
Katai’b Hizb Allah, and Abu Fadhil
al-Abbas Battalions are operating in
northern Babil.
8
On July 7, an SVBIED targeted
a security checkpoint in Kadhmiya,
northwestern Baghdad, killing at
least five individuals and injuring 15
others. On July 6, an SVEST attack
on a local café in the area of
Washash, western Baghdad, killed 5
individuals and injured 12 others.
On July 7, the commander of the 6th IA Division was killed in an
area west of Baghdad.There were conflicting reports whether he was
killed by mortars or sniper fire.
5
On July 7, Badr and AAH
forces were reportedly tasked with
protecting the Askari Shrine in Samarra
while forces from the Federal Police were
deployed to the area of Jalam, northeast of
Samarra. Meanwhile, forces from the Sadrist
Peace Companies are protecting the area
around the city.
4
7
Anti-ISIS Tribes
6. Iraq Situation Report: July 8, 2014
ISIS continues to threaten tribes as it attempts to enforce the pledge of allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of ISIS and the
self-proclaimed Caliph of the Islamic State. The fall of Zowiya indicates the challenges the tribes in rural villages will face in countering ISIS,
which may be focusing on rural areas in order to gain control of lines of communication and, eventually, other urban areas. ISIS continues
to attack the Samarra area where the Sadrist“Peace Brigades”are currently consolidated as a holding force. ISIS’s effort in Samarra is
intended to divert resources from Tikrit, although the Iraqi Security Force likely deems the Peace Brigades sufficient to secure Samarra
without reinforcement. ISIS is establishing a system by which it can financially benefit from controlling oil fields, such as Ajil, in northern
Iraq. Further gains of oil resources by ISIS hinge on the fate of the Baiji refinery, which the Iraqi government continues to try to secure.
100km
Qaim
9
by Ahmed Ali, ISW Iraq Team, and Heather L. Pickerell
100km
Fallujah
Baqubah
As Sulaymaniyah
ArbilMosul
Basra
An Nasriyah
An Najaf
Karbala
Al Kut
Ar Ramadi
Samarra
Tikrit
Kirkuk
Baghdad
Dahuk
Al Amarah
Al Hillah
Ad Diwaniyah
Muqdadiyah
Samawa
Rutba
Qaim
Haditha
ISIS
ISF
Unknown gunmen
Major Cities
Major Clash
Airstrikes
SVBIED
Shi’a militias
Anti-ISIS Tribes
Anti-Government Armed Groups
On July 7, two SU-25s reportedly targeted buildings
located in central Tuz Khurmatu, which is Peshmerga-
controlled. One of the damaged buildings belonged to the
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK).These attacks resulted
in the death of one child and the injury of eight other
individuals.This has generated discontent among the local
government, the Peshmerga, and the PUK.
5ISIS elements established control of Zowiya village,
northern Salah ad-Din after heavily clashes with local tribes
that had resisted. ISIS fired approximately 60 mortar rounds,
killing 13 individuals over the course of the fighting. ISIS
gunmen also blew up 10 homes in the village and searched
homes for weapons. Other reports indicated that 50
tribal members were executed by ISIS.
1
5
2
1
7
3
4
6
According to an anonymous source
in Jalula, Peshmerga forces are using
tribal elders as mediators to negotiate
with gunmen in order to peacefully
take control of the predominantly Iraqi
Arab neighborhoods of al-Tajnid and
al-Wihda.
6
An SVBIED detonated at an IP
checkpoint in southern Samarra.The attack
resulted in the death of two IP members,
two civilians, and the injury of six others,
half of whom were civilians. Also, multiple
IEDs detonated on an IP patrol in southern
Samarra, killing three IP members and
burning four IP vehicles.
2
The deputy chairman of the
Anbar Provincial Council, Falih
al-Issawi, stated that ISIS militants killed
several leaders of anti-government armed
groups at a July 6 meeting in Fallujah after the
leaders refused to pledge allegiance to the leader of
ISIS, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Issawi added that the
incident heightened tension in the city and called for the
Iraqi Government to take advantage of this opportunity
to reach out to these groups.
3
4 An anonymous medical source at the Fallujah General Hospital stated that
four Katyusha rockets fell on the hospital and on the Fallujah College of Medicine.
Sources from the hospital also added that mortars landed on civilian homes in the
Fallujah neighborhoods of al-Askari, al-Jughayfi, al-Nazal, al-Shuhada, and Jubail,
wounding seven civilians.
The Mayor of Tuz Khurmatu, Shalal
Abdul, stated that ISIS has been
extracting oil a Hamrin Ridge area and
the Ajil Oil Field north of Salah ad-Din
and selling that oil to generate revenue.
According to Abdul, ISIS is selling
tankers of oil to smugglers for $ 10,000-$
14,000 each.
7
Peshmerga
Execution
7. Iraq Situation Report: July 9, 2014
ISIS has expanded its posture in Diyala, an area in which it has clashed for territory. Iraqi Shi’a militias have, however, held a line against
ISIS advances at Khalis. The seizure of the nearby Sudur mini-dam is significant in particular if ISIS continues to control it. ISIS has experi-
ence with utilizing dams as assets to demobilize the ISF, as evident in the April flooding of areas around the Fallujah dam. The discovery of
bodies in Babil is a significant event as well. The identities of the victims and perpetrators are unclear. However, on June 23, 70 prisoners
were killed in an attack targeting a convoy transporting prisoners from Hillah to Nasriyah. ISW assessed that they were likely killed by the
ISF to prevent their escape and no bodies were found. If the bodies discovered are those of the victims of the June 23 attack, the Iraqi
Sunni community will likely view this as a retaliatory sectarian attack.
100km
Qaim
9
Unknown Gunmen
by Ahmed Ali, ISW Iraq Team, and Aaron Reese
100km
Fallujah
Baqubah
As Sulaymaniyah
ArbilMosul
Basra
An Nasriyah
An Najaf
Karbala
Al Kut
Ar Ramadi
Samarra
Tikrit
Kirkuk
Baghdad
Dahuk
Al Amarah
Al Hillah
Ad Diwaniyah
Muqdadiyah
Samawa
Rutba
Qaim
Haditha
ISIS
ISF
Major Cities
Major Clash
Armed Drones
VBIED
Execution Shi’a militias
Airstrikes
Raid
Military Parade
A VBIED detonated in Jaza’ir neighbor-
hood, northern Hillah city near the federal
court building, and 2 VBIEDs detonated in
the Imam sub-district in Mahawil, northern
Babil. At least 11 individuals were killed and
wounded.The IP in Babil found 50
unidentified bodies in the al-Nil area, north
of Hillah.The bodies were reportedly
decomposed and had gunshots to the head
and some were handcuffed.
4
1
3
An airstrike targeted oil tankers in the area of Hamam al-Alil,
south of Mosul causing serious damage with no reported casualities.
The reserves included tanks of fuel.The incident was reported as a
drone strike, although the ISF is not known to possess this capability.
2
1
Three Syrian aircraft carried out
airstrikes in Qaim.The strikes targeted the
meteorological observatory center and the
city council, and caused damage to four
homes and three shops which resulted in the
death of seven civilians and injured six
others.
2
An anonymous police source in Anbar stated that ISIS
gunmen with light and medium weapons attacked the
Hurriyah IP station in the area known as “5 km,” western
Ramadi.The gunmen also attacked security checkpoints in
the “5 km” area leaving five IP members dead and three
wounded in addition to seizing a military transport vehicle
and IP weapons.
4
5
ISIS seized the Sudur mini-dam located approximately 3 miles east
of Khalis after clashing heavily with the ISF in the area. The ISF started
an effort to retake it. Earlier, ISIS targeted the Sudur IP station, in the
outskirts of Mansouriya, which resulted in the death of one captain and
the injury of five IP members. The IA and the IP, supported by IA
Aviation, carried out an operation in the orchards of Sudur.
8
6
IA aviation targeted four homes
in Dhuluiyah, south of Samarra, killing two
individuals and injuring 15 others from the
same family.The local government in the area
demanded an investigation by the MoD since the
“sub-district has no armed activities.”
3
According to a security source in Kirkuk, ISIS members
conducted an armed parade using 300 vehicles in the areas
of Hawija, Manzala, Multaqa, and Riyadh, located
southwest of Kirkuk. ISIS members paraded using
equipment recently seized from the Iraqi Army.
5
A member of Abu al-Fadhil al-Abbas Brigade was
killed and another one was injured in the area of
Snidij, northern Babil by a sniper attack.The
commander of the Federal Police (FP) brigade in Jurf
al-Sakhar was injured during an operation in the area.
7
6
7 8
Syrian Government Forces
On July 8, members from the Scorpion
Force carried out raids in the areas of
Iskandariyah and Mussayeb which
resulted in the arrest of “34 gunmen.”
8. Iraq Situation Report: July 10, 2014
ISIS may now possess 88 pounds of unenriched uranium that had been stored at Mosul University, elevating the terrorist threat that ISIS
poses. Meanwhile, the former IA officers kidnapped in Mosul were most likely targeted by ISIS in in order to minimize their influence over
a potential resistance to ISIS control of the city. It is not clear at this time who was responsible for the separate kidnapping of farmers near
Balad Airbase, but the presence of armed groups near the base continues to pose a threat to the facility. To the east, ISIS continued to
challenge the ISF in central Diyala for a second day while gunmen also clashed with the ISF near Tikrit University. The ISF conducted
airstrikes in Mosul and Tikrit, apparently selecting targets assessed to hold strategic value for ISIS.
100km
Qaim
9
by Ahmed Ali, ISW Iraq Team, and Heather L. Pickerell
100km
Fallujah
Baqubah
As Sulaymaniyah
ArbilMosul
Basra
An Nasriyah
An Najaf
Karbala
Al Kut
Ar Ramadi
Samarra
Tikrit
Kirkuk
Baghdad
Dahuk
Al Amarah
Al Hillah
Ad Diwaniyah
Muqdadiyah
Samawa
Rutba
Qaim
Haditha
ISIS
ISF
Unknown gunmen
Major Cities
Major Clash
Airstrikes
VBIED
Kidnapping
Armed Drones
6
2
5
7
4
1
3
ISIS kidnapped 30 senior officers of the former IA in
Mosul and took them to an unknown location.
1
On July 10, airstrikes targeted the
Ninewa Operations Command headquarters
building, which is reportedly now used by
ISIS as a headquarters. On July 9, airstrikes
also targeted a residential area in western
Mosul and a lumber yard in the eastern part
of the city, which resulted in the death of
three individuals and injury of nine others.
2
Heavy clashes took place between the
IA and unidentified gunmen near Tikrit
University, north of downtown Tikrit.
Also, an airstrike targeted the
real estate bank in the city.
3
A motorcycle-borne IED detonated near a gas station
in southwestern Kirkuk City, which resulted in the injury
of seven individuals including three members of the IP.
5
ISIS took control of the Sudur IP
station, northeast of Muqdadiyah after
the clashes with the ISF reported
yesterday continued today. Meanwhile
IA forces were reportedly able to
recapture parts of the 22nd IA brigade
base in the vicinity that were taken by
ISIS on July 9.
6
7 Unidentified gunmen stormed a
local vegetable market in the area of
Yathrib, three miles north of Balad
Airbase.The gunmen kidnapped 35
farmers at gunpoint and took them to
an unknown location.
The IA forces stationed outside
of Fallujah continued shelling the city,
which resulted in the death of eight
individuals and the injury of 35 others, including
women and children.
4
9. Iraq Situation Report: July 11, 2014
Armed groups south, west, and north of Baghdad are becoming increasingly active. ISIS may be on the offensive in Ramadi, Jurf al-Sakhar,
Samarra, and northern Diyala. ISIS’s attempt to move from strongholds near Fallujah toward southern Baghdad, in operational
coordination with elements in Babil, illustrates ISIS’s continued intention to penetrate the capital’s southern belt with maneuver forces as
well as terrorist cells. Ramadi is likely to be the next urban objective that ISIS seeks to control. Volunteers from Shi’a provinces deployed to
Anbar in order to shore up security, prevent or delay ISIS’s advance into Ramadi, and force the culmination of the ISIS middle Euphrates
offensive. The reinforcements may also increase sectarian clashes in the predominantly Sunni province. ISIS has a presence north of
Baghdad that should be considered a separate and available fighting force. Meanwhile, the displacement of populations in Diyala, Anbar,
and northern Iraq is exacerbating the humanitarian crisis. The depopulation of these urban and rural areas may further preclude the
development of tribal forces resisting ISIS.
by Ahmed Ali, ISW Iraq Team, and Heather L. Pickerell
100km
Fallujah
Baqubah
As Sulaymaniyah
ArbilMosul
Basra
An Nasriyah
An Najaf
Karbala
Al Kut
Ar Ramadi
Samarra
Tikrit
Kirkuk
Baghdad
Dahuk
Al Amarah
Al Hillah
Ad Diwaniyah
Muqdadiyah
Samawa
Rutba
Qaim
Haditha
4
2
1
5
7
2
Anbar Governor Ahmed al-
Dulaimi stated that 4,000 volunteers
arrived in Anbar from Baghdad, Karbala,
Najaf, and Basra.The governor added that the
volunteers will be deployed in Ramadi and the Upper
Euphrates areas to counter ISIS. On July 10, the ISF
engaged in heavy clashes with militants in the Albu
Hayes area in Ramadi. Militants were reportedly
targeting the 8th Brigade headquarters.
4
6
Peshmerga forces took control of the Bai Hassan oil field in
northwestern Kirkuk.The field produces 195,000 barrels per day.
The oil ministry called on the Peshmerga to withdraw from the
field. An SVBIED detonated at a Peshmerga checkpoint in
southern Kirkuk city resulting in the death of 2 people and injury of
at least 21 people.
1
3
3 Between July 10-11, ISIS destroyed 300
homes in the al-Zowiya village, north of
Baiji. ISIS reportedly ransacked the houses
before using explosives to destroy them.
ISF and Militias
2 An anonymous security source stated that
the Sadrist Peace Brigades (PB) prevented ISIS
elements from entering north Samarra.The PB
fired 20 mortar shells at ISIS elements at which
point ISIS elements were forced to withdraw to
neighboring houses, using civilian homes as
shields.
5 ISF and ISIS clashed near a military base
known as the 2nd Corps in Muqdadiyah,
northeastern Diyala, killing three ISIS fighters.
The source stated that ISIS fighters launched an
attack on the base from nearby orchards, but
were forced back with the help of IA Aviation.
7 On July 10, IA and volunteer forces
repelled an offensive by ISIS in Jurf
al-Sakhar as ISIS elements attempted to
cross the Fadiliyah Bridge linking
Amiriyat al-Fallujah and Baghdad.
Military forces were reportedly deployed
in Fadiliyah to prevent any possible ISIS
advancement towards Baghdad.
According to an official in Diyala’s
government, 14,000 families had been
displaced in the province as a result of
the ongoing security operations.
ISIS
ISF
Major Cities
Major Clash
Armed Drones
SVBIED
Shi’a militias
Airstrikes
Peshmerga
Volunteers Movement
Projected Movement
6
VolunteersV
V
10. Iraq Situation Report: July 12, 2014
The ISIS attack in Haditha demonstrates the continuation of its urban offensive to control cities in the middle Euphrates. The attack is also
likely intended to either control the city before the deployment of recently-arrived reinforcement to Anbar, or to divert those resources to
Haditha in order to weaken defenses around Ramadi and eventually control it. Either way, ISF defenses in Anbar and northern Diyala will
demonstrate how effectively the ISF can hold terrain against ISIS and other armed groups. The interdiction of an ISIS fuel tanker convoy by
the Iraqi Air Force demonstrates the intent of the ISF to disrupt ISIS logistics and finance. Meanwhile, ISIS low-level activity near Baghdad
continues. The presence of a weapons cache in Arab Jabour indicates that ISIS has established a presence in southeast Baghdad in
addition to the north and west. The visible activity of Iraqi Shi’a militia extra-judicial killings is indicative of their freedom of movement
and that their role in the defense of Baghdad affects security for citizens. The report of an ISIS police force in Mosul is consistent with their
measures of social control in ar-Raqqa, Syria.
by Ahmed Ali, Jessica D. Lewis, and Nichole Dicharry
100km
Fallujah
Baqubah
As Sulaymaniyah
ArbilMosul
Basra
An Nasriyah
An Najaf
Karbala
Al Kut
Ar Ramadi
Samarra
Tikrit
Kirkuk
Baghdad
Dahuk
Al Amarah
Al Hillah
Ad Diwaniyah
Muqdadiyah
Samawa
Rutba
Qaim
Haditha
4
1
5 7
2
ISIS attacked at 3:00am local
time in the city of Haditha in western
Anbar province.The Iraqi Security Forces
(ISF) repelled the attack and reportedly killed
13 ISIS elements and detained 31 others.
Four Iraqi Police (IP) members were killed
while 11 were injured.
4
An IED exploded in the Bayaa neighborhood in southwestern
Baghdad city resulting in the death of two people and injury of four
people. Unidentified gunmen stormed an apartment complex in
eastern Baghdad’s Zayuna neighborhood resulting in the death of
28 women and 2 males.The gunmen reportedly targeted specific
apartments in what ISW assesses to be morality executions by Iraqi
Shi’a militias.
1
3
3
An IED attack in a Mahmudiyah market resulted in the
death of one person and injury of seven. Mahmudiyah is
located in southern Baghdad province.
2 According to Shafaq News, ISIS has opened
a police department in the city of Mosul and is
now accepting volunteers to the department
which is known as the “Islamic Police.”
According to reports, ISIS is offering a salary to
its new police force estimated at over 400 USD,
but what time period that covers is unclear.
5
The Iraqi Ministry of Defense announced that it seized shells,
explosive material, and bomb-making material in the Arab Jubur area
in southern Baghdad.The operation was carried out by the 23rd
brigade of the 17th Iraqi Army Division
The ISF launched a clearing operation
in the northern parts of Muqdadiyah in
northeastern Diyala.The ISF is operating
alongside the tribes and with support from
the Iraqi Army Aviation to clear the areas
of the Sudur orchards and the villages of
Khamis, Sansal, and al-Jazeera.The ISF
reportedly cleared a neighborhood in Sudur.
Unidentified gunmen kidnapped
the head of the Independent High
Electoral Commission in Diyala,
Amer Latif, in Buhriz which is
located 8 km south of Baquba
ISIS
ISF
Major Cities
Major Clash
Armed Drones Shi’a militias
6
Kidnapping
Unknown gunmen
An IED targeted a police patrol in
the Corniche Street in southern
Kirkuk city.The attack resulted in the
injury of three police members.
7
9
9
A medical source in Fallujah stated that in Fallujah 3
people were killed while 18 were injured in mortar attacks
that targeted the neighborhoods of al-Jughaifi, Askari,
Nazal, Dhubat, Jolan, Shuhada, Nazal, and al-Jbeil. Women
and children were among the victims.
6 Iraqi Air Force jets targeted an ISIS “court building” in the Riyadh sub-district in
western Kirkuk resulting in damage to the building. ISIS members were wounded in the
attack in addition to three civilians who were in the vicinity.The Iraqi Air Force also
attacked an ISIS fuel-tanker convoy as it was passing the village of Safra in Riyadh.The
convoy was reportedly destroyed.
10
Airstrikes
10
8
8
Anti-ISIS Tribes
11. Iraq Situation Report: July 13, 2014
ISIS is trying to continue its maneuver campaign along the Tigris and the Euphrates. ISIS launched an attack on Haditha for the second
time in two days, which indicates that its previously reported negotiations with the tribes did not succeed. The reported presence of
volunteers who are likely Iraqi Shia creates an interesting dynamic and illustrates both the importance of Haditha to the government and
the strong desire of tribes in Haditha to prevent ISIS from entering the district. Dhuluiya is the route by which historically AQI and ISIS
transited from Diyala to Samarra. The attack upon Dhuluiya indicates the presence of an ISIS force in the vicinity of Samarra that is able to
go on the offensive despite the heavy presence of Iraqi Shia militias to the north and the ISF in Balad airbase to the south. Meanwhile,
Saddam Hussein's former vice president and Ba'athist leader, Izzat al-Duri, gave his first statement after the fall of Mosul. He highlighted
the role of JRTN and other armed groups participating in the offensive and gave a special highlight to ISIS describing its members as
“heroes and knights.”Duri also called for unity among the anti-government forces and urged them to postpone their disagreements in
order to achieve victory. Duri also called for the Jihadi and Islamic forces to transcend sectarian, ethnic, and regional differences. His
statement is significant because it highlights the strategic role that JRTN and other Ba'athist groups are playing in the ongoing offensive,
even though they likely support an end-state that collapses the Iraqi government more than establishing an Islamic Caliphate.
by ISW Iraq Team and Aaron Reese
100km
Fallujah
Baqubah
As Sulaymaniyah
ArbilMosul
Basra
An Nasriyah
An Najaf
Karbala
Al Kut
Ar Ramadi
Samarra
Tikrit
Kirkuk
Baghdad
Dahuk
Al Amarah
Al Hillah
Ad Diwaniyah
Muqdadiyah
Samawa
Rutba
Qaim
Haditha
4
12
The local government in Zubair District in
Basra created an operations room in order to
tighten security in Zubair and the sub-districts of
Um Qasr and Safwan.The mayor of Zubair stated
that 2,200 night guards were tasked with security
in order to fill the security gap due to the
deployment of some Basra-based ISF units to
other provinces.
4
Around 80 gunmen from ISIS launched an attack on Dhuluiya,
southeast of Samarra.The gunmen initiated the attack from the
north and clashed heavily with the IP and tribal elements from the
Jubouri tribe, resulting in the death of three ISIS members and the
injury of seven others while four IP members were killed. Clashes
are reportedly ongoing.The attack was preceded by a VBIED attack
on a bridge that connected the district to Balad in order to
prevent reinforcements from arriving.
1
3
3
2 Gunmen from ISIS riding in military and
4x4 civilian vehicles attacked Haditha District
from three axes and clashed with the IA, IP,
SWAT, volunteers, and tribal element from the
Jighaifa tribe for more than four hours.Thirteen
ISIS gunmen were reportedly killed and five
vehicles were destroyed while casualties from the
other sides were not reported.
The IA forces stationed outside
Fallujah shelled several neighborhoods in
the city, resulting in the death of seven
individuals including women and a child in
addition to the injury of 14 others.
ISIS
ISF
Major Cities
Major Clash
Armed Drones
Anti-ISIS Tribes
V Volunteers
V
V
12. Iraq Situation Report: July 10, 2014
ISIS is launching attacks into Baghdad with a series of VBIEDs in and near the capital in order to set the terms of battle by probing the
defenses of pro-government forces and demoralizing them. The efforts center on the northern belt. The VBIED in Taji's industrial area is
particularly significant as ISW continues to assess ISIS's northern approaches to Baghdad and intent regarding ISF bases. ISIS continues to
consolidate its gains in Dhuluyia. ISIS continues to destroy houses in ways consistent with the Soldiers' Harvest campaign it has conduct-
ed for the past year. ISIS need not be present to cause destruction in a place such as Udhaim, where ISW previously assessed it had a
headquarters that it reportedly left several weeks ago. Even though the ISF along with Iraqi Shi’a militias were able to remove ISIS from
the area, those forces do not fully control the terrain. The clashes within the ranks of anti-government forces illustrate that ISIS will
continue to impose its will on other groups, including the Islamic Army, an Iraqi Sunni insurgency group that fought US forces after 2003,
through the use of force despite a conciliatory tone from JRTN leader Izzat al-Duri towards ISIS in his weekend speech.
100km
Qaim
9
Iraq Situation Report: July 14, 2014
by Ahmed Ali, ISW Iraq Team, and Heather L. Pickerell
100km
Fallujah
Baqubah
As Sulaymaniyah
ArbilMosul
Basra
An Nasriyah
An Najaf
Karbala
Al Kut
Ar Ramadi
Samarra
Tikrit
Kirkuk
Baghdad
Dahuk
Al Amarah
Al Hillah
Ad Diwaniyah
Muqdadiyah
Samawa
Rutba
Qaim
Haditha
5
4
7
3
2
6
1
A Vehicle-Borne Improvised
Explosive Device (VBIED) exploded
near a car dealership in the al-Bayaa area,
southwestern Baghdad. A second VBIED
exploded on 6th Street in the al-Alawi area of
central Baghdad. Meanwhile, a third VBIED exploded
near an industrial district in Taji, northern Baghdad.
The attacks resulted in the death of four people and
injury of 21 people.
4
An anonymous security source stated that
the Sharia Court in Sharqat was targeted by
IA Aviation in the village of al-Sderah, in the
vicinity of Sharqat, in northern Salah ad-Din
province, resulting in the death of ISIS’s judge
in the area, Abu Hajir al-Iraqi.
2
ISF and Militias
ISIS
JRTN
Peshmerga
ISF
Anti-ISIS Tribes
Islamic Army
ISIS clashed with elements of the Islamic Army in
the eastern suburbs of Sadia in northern Diyala province.
A security source added that eight ISIS members were
killed in addition to 11 Islamic Army elements. An
additional source stated that ISIS executed 10 members
from JRTN and the Islamic Army in Sadia as well.
5
ISIS reportedly controls 40 percent
of Dhuluiya after two days of ongoing
clashes.The remaining 60 percent is
reportedly under the control of members
of the Juburi tribes and local police.
Residents report that there is no Iraqi
Army in Dhuluiya and that population
displacement from the area has taken
place due to clashes. On July 13, ISIS
published photos of its members raising
ISIS flags on top of government
buildings in Dhuluiya.
73 ISIS attempted to take control of
Amerli sub-district in eastern Tikrit.The
ISIS attack was repelled by a force likely
comprised of local and tribal elements in
Amerli.The attack has so far resulted in the
death of five ISIS members and injury of
15 anti-ISIS tribal figures. Amerli is
predominantly Iraqi Turkmen.
An SVEST attack targeted a Peshmerga checkpoint in the Qara Tapa area
in northern Diyala.The attack resulted in the death or injury of about 11
Peshmerga elements.
1
In the last two weeks, ISIS
destroyed 41 houses of local officials,
ISF, and Sahwa (awakening) members
in the Udhaim area in northern Diyala.
6
Major Cities
Major Clash
Airstrikes
VBIED
SVEST
13. Iraq Situation Report: July 15, 2014
ISIS is likely seeking to establish a presence in Kirkuk city. The pattern of attacks in the city indicates an early replication of previous ISIS
efforts in other parts of Iraq where ISIS was seeking to soften defenses and establish control. In Mosul, photos of the distribution of food aid
represent an attempt by ISIS to project a sense of normalcy and a functioning state while avoiding blame in light of reported difficult living
conditions in the city. Furthermore, ISIS is exhibiting signs of confidence by not protecting the identities of its members in published
photos. The Mujahidin Army, an Iraqi Sunni insurgent group founded after 2003, rejected ISIS’s attempt to establish a state. It will be
important to watch how ISIS reacts to smaller groups that reject its authority in areas it seeks to control.
by Ahmed Ali, ISW Iraq Team, and Aaron Reese
100km
Fallujah
Baqubah
As Sulaymaniyah
ArbilMosul
Basra
An Nasriyah
An Najaf
Karbala
Al Kut
Ar Ramadi
Samarra
Tikrit
Kirkuk
Baghdad
Dahuk
Al Amarah
Al Hillah
Ad Diwaniyah
Muqdadiyah
Samawa
Rutba
Qaim
Haditha
ISF and Militias
V Volunteers
Peshmerga
Mujahidin Army
4
1
5
7
2
Unidentified gunmen destroyed the Albu Ghaib Bridge in
the Saqlawiyah area in Anbar province.The bridge connects the
Saqlawiyah with Ramadi.
4
The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) published photos
of its members distributing food supplies to families, presumably in
Mosul.The supplies are provided in bags stamped with “Relief
Department-Islamic State”labels. Notably, ISIS members do not
have their faces covered or pixilated in the photos as is normally
ISIS procedure.The photos emerged as ISIS has reportedly
instructed food ration agents not to distribute food to Iraqi
Christians, Yazidis, or Shabak.
1
3
3
An IED attack targeted an IA patrol in the village of Arab Jassim in Yusufiyah,
resulting in the death of one IA member and the injury of four. A mortar attack targeted
Yusufiyah as well resulting in the death of a civilian and the injury of two children.
2 ISF launched a clearing operation in Tikrit,
reportedly involving counter-terrorism, IA, and
IP forces.The operation was named “al-Saif
al-Batar”[“The Severing Sword”] and was
launched from the southern and northern parts
of the city.There are reports that the ISF were
able to secure important locations in the city
including the Tikrit hospital and police academy.
However, other security sources indicate that
ISF push into the city was hampered by ISIS
snipers.
5
The Mujahidin Army, an Iraqi Sunni
insurgent group founded after 2003,
reportedly distributed leaflets in the
northern neighborhoods of Diyala in
which it rejected pledging allegiance to
ISIS head Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.
Reportedly, the leaflets also criticized the
establishment of the ISIS “Caliphate.”
Two VBIEDs targeted an Iraqi Army
and a volunteers’ convoy near a restaurant in
southern Samarra.The attack resulted in the death
of five people and injury of 23 others.
ISIS
ISF
Major Cities
Major Clash
Armed Drones
6
7
Two VBIEDs detonated near
the Hay market in Sadr city that
resulted in the death of 7 people
and injury of 34 people.
6 Three attacks took place in the southern parts of
Kirkuk city. An explosion targeted a police patrol in the
Wasiti neighborhood in Kirkuk resulting in the injury of
one person. In the Aruba neighborhood, a “primitive”
bomb targeted the house of a member of the anti-crime
department in the city and also resulted in the injury of
his son who is a member of the Peshmerga. In the Sikak
neighborhood, an IED attack targeted the house of the
head of the Iraqi Turkmen Front’s office in Diyala.
8
8
V
VBIED
14. by ISW Iraq Team and Nichole Dicharry
100km
Fallujah
Baqubah
As Sulaymaniyah
ArbilMosul
Basra
An Nasriyah
An Najaf
Karbala
Al Kut
Ar Ramadi
Samarra
Tikrit
Kirkuk
Baghdad
Dahuk
Al Amarah
Al Hillah
Ad Diwaniyah
Muqdadiyah
Samawa
Rutba
Qaim
Haditha
Peshmerga
Airstrikes
4
1
5
7
2
Heavy clashes took place between ISIS and
the Peshmerga near the Tal al-Ward area, 20 km
southwest of Kirkuk city.The clashes are
reportedly ongoing and ISIS mortar attacks
resulted in the injury of 21 Peshmerga members.
4
A local leader of Ansar al-Sunna, an Iraqi Sunni armed group,
was found decapitated in the outskirts of Sadia after he disappeared
from the area last week.
1
3
3
Security forces found 12 unidentified
dead bodies in different areas of
Baghdad.
2 Two hundred families fled the area of Tajnid,
southern Julula, after ISIS gunmen took control
of large areas of the neighborhood. Also, the
Peshmerga clashed with gunmen in the area of
Wihda, southern Julula.
5
ISIS reportedly destroyed 20 houses that
belonged to ISF personnel in Hawija.
The members of the Iraqi Security Forces
that launched the assault on Tikrit yesterday
retreated from their positions.They faced heavy
clashes with ISIS and their progress was
hampered by booby-trapped buildings.
ISIS
ISF
Major Cities
Major Clash
Armed Drones
6
7
A VBIED detonated in central Hit
which resulted in the death of five
individuals and injured nine others.
6 ISIS cut the water supply from reaching the area of
Makhmur, located south of Mosul and controlled by the
KRG. ISIS reportedly cut the water after the local
government of Makhmur cut the electricity from Arab
villages in the vicinity. Residents in Makhmur
demonstrated for the restoration of services.
8
8
VBIED
Iraq Situation Report: July 16, 2014
ISIS continues its offensive into Kurdish areas along Kirkuk City and along the Arab-Kurd contested Green Line along the Hamrin Ridge.
ISIS’s attacks in Kirkuk escalated after July 9 when, according to security sources, ISIS conducted an armed parade of vehicles in the areas
southwest of Kirkuk, demonstrating its military capabilities around the city. ISIS’s contest for Jalula, along the Hamrin Ridge, has been
underway since the fall of Mosul. ISIS had engaged tribal elders in Jalula on July 8 in order to gain control of some Arab neighborhoods
there through negotiation after a series of clashes with Peshmerga in previous weeks. ISW assesses that ISIS is conducting a deliberate
campaign for Kurdish areas in Iraq, possibly to divert pressure by Peshmerga forces elsewhere and possibly to set conditions for further
operations. ISIS continues to prioritize the Middle Euphrates. ISIS has likely designed the attack in Hit to set conditions for further attacks
on Haditha or Ramadi by targeting local tribes and civilians. ISIS has so far failed to gain control of Haditha despite three attempts on the
city by force as well as by negotiation. ISIS continues to leverage its ability to control water resources to put pressure on inhabited areas,
cutting water to villages in Makhmur. ISIS has previously used its control of the Fallujah dam to deny water to Shi’a population centers and
to flood parts of Baghdad. The ISF counteroffensive in Tikrit continued, though the fighting forces retreated tactically after encountering
ISIS’s signature booby-trapped buildings. Iraqi Shi’a militias continue to be active in Baghdad as execution-style killings are again taking
place in the city.
Ansar al-Sunna
9
Airstrikes targeted a power station in Mosul University which rendered the
station inoperable and injured 10 individuals. Also, an airstrike targeted the
area of Rashediya, northwestern Mosul, which resulted in the death of two
individuals and injured four others from one family.
9
Shi’a militias
15. by Ahmed Ali, ISW Iraq Team and Heather L. Pickerell
100km
Fallujah
Baqubah
As Sulaymaniyah
ArbilMosul
Basra
An Nasriyah
An Najaf
Karbala
Al Kut
Ar Ramadi
Samarra
Tikrit
Kirkuk
Baghdad
Dahuk
Al Amarah
Al Hillah
Ad Diwaniyah
Muqdadiyah
Samawa
Rutba
Qaim
Haditha
7
5
1
6
9
3
4
8
2
Airstrikes
Major Cities
Major Clash
Kidnapping
Peshmerga
ISIS
ISF
Shi’a militias
Iraq Situation Report: July 17, 2014
The ISIS assault in Bashir, 30km south of Kirkuk city, continued with attacks upon Shi’a religious centers, shrines, and political party
headquarters. These indicate the level of control ISIS has in the area. Furthermore, ISIS may be attempting to split Peshmerga forces along
the extensive exposed border region between Sinjar and Jalula; it is, however, possible that ISIS will escalate attacks upon Kirkuk city if it
achieves sustained control of Bashir. ISIS has also launched an attack upon COB Speicher west of Tikrit, seizing an airfield that was likely key
to ISF aerial resupply and reinforcement in northern Iraq. The persistent effort by ISIS to establish control of Amerli, east of Tikrit suggests
that ISIS means to weed out this pocket of resistance. The Sadrist Peace Brigades charged with the perimeter security of Samarra have
reportedly launched operations in areas east of the city. Nevertheless, ISIS has wide operational presence to the east and west of Samarra;
these ISIS elements are likely to continue their activities south of Samarra in the vicinity of Balad and Taji. ISIS may also be encroaching
upon Ramadi from the west, indicating that they can flex among offensive efforts in Haditha, Hit, and Ramadi in order to maximize
resources to take all three cities. Meanwhile, ISIS mortar fire in northern Baghdad and an IED factory south of Baghdad indicate the
emergence of support zones in both areas. Continued reports of murdered civilians in Baghdad indicate the further pursuit of localized
control by Shi’a militias within the capital.
6 Airstrikes targeted the water treatment plan in eastern
Mosul which cut water supplies from reaching the eastern part
of Mosul. ISIS published images yesterday of the workers fixing
the pipes after they were damaged due to strikes.
7 Clashes continued for the second day near Tal
al-Ward, southwestern Kirkuk, between ISIS militants
and Peshmerga forces. So far, the clashes have resulted in
the death of two Peshmerga members and injury of 53
others.
8 Security sources and eyewitnesses in
Kirkuk reported that ISIS militants blew up
several Shi’a religious centers, shrines, and
political party headquarters in the village of
Bashir, 30km south of the city of Kirkuk.
2IA Aviation targeted the Abu-Ajil Hospital, located east of
Tikrit.The hospital reportedly houses wounded ISIS fighters.
3On July 16, ISIS fired mortar rounds for
the third day on the Amerli sub-district east
of Tikrit which resulted in the injury of
“dozens” of the residents.This area has been
surrounded by ISIS for 33 days and its local
leader stated that the IA aviation drops 10%
of the needed water and food supplies.
The Sadrist Peace Brigades fighters
reportedly launched operations in the
Al-Rusafi, Al-Shwarib, and Al-Jalam
areas in Samarra district. Sources
indicate that the areas have been cleared
of ISIS but that remains unconfirmed.
9
An attack targeted a Shi’a
religious center in the Shorja
neighborhood.There are conflicting
reports that it was either an IED or an
SVEST attack. Four unidentified bodies were
found in Zaarafia, Ur, and Shula areas.Two mortar
shells landed in the Sabaa al-Bur District in northern
Baghdad. Unidentified gunmen kidnapped the imam of a
mosque in the al-Baladiyat neighborhood in eastern
Baghdad. An IED exploded near a Sahwa force checkpoint in
the village of Albu Aitha, in Dora southern Baghdad. A force
from the 1st Federal Police (FP) division discovered an
IED-manufacturing plant in Kwerish District, southern
Baghdad.The attacks resulted in the death of 8 people and
injury of 29.
5
An anonymous tribal source stated that
dozens of civilians fled their homes in the
al-Tamim neighborhood, in western Ramadi,
after militants took control of the area.
Families reportedly fled to Hit and
al-Baghdadi, west of Ramadi.
4
Heavy clashes took place at the southern entrance of Tikrit last night between IA
and volunteers and ISIS. ISIS gunmen fired mortar rounds on Camp Speicher which
damaged two helicopters. ISIS now reportedly controls a runway at the base after
launching a wide attack on July 17.
1
16. by Ahmed Ali, ISW Iraq Team and Heather L. Pickerell
100km
Fallujah
Baqubah
As Sulaymaniyah
ArbilMosul
Basra
An Nasriyah
An Najaf
Karbala
Al Kut
Ar Ramadi
Samarra
Tikrit
Kirkuk
Baghdad
Dahuk
Al Amarah
Al Hillah
Ad Diwaniyah
Muqdadiyah
Samawa
Rutba
Qaim
Haditha
8
3
6
5
9
1
2
10
Major Cities
Major Clash
ISIS
ISF
Shi’a militias
Armed Drones
Iraq Situation Report: July 18, 2014
ISIS is gaining momentum in the fight for Tikrit, with multiple reports of ISIS infiltration of COB Speicher and clashes in areas of the city
where the ISF had previously established fixed positions. It is not yet clear whether the ISF will establish complete control over COB
Speicher, but its loss would disrupt the ability of the ISF to reinforce and resupply northern positions. ISIS also continued to strike positions
north of Balad airbase on the east and west of the river, south of the Samarra line. The bodies in the river near Samarra were most likely
victims of Shi’a militias that are participating in the layered defense of Samarra; however ISIS controls areas such as Dour to the north of
Samarra, and therefore attribution is uncertain. ISIS also clashed with the ISF, Shi’a militias, and popular forces in Amerli, Muqdadiyah, and
northern Babil. Clashes in Amerli will indicate whether the ISF can withstand an ISIS siege. Clashes in Muqdadiyah will indicate whether the
ISF can clear ISIS from an urban area and hold it. The departure of Christian families from Mosul indicates that ISIS is consolidating social
control in part by encouraging population displacement of religious minorities. ISW notes that no major cities have changed hands
between ISIS and the ISF since July 13, 2014, but attacks by ISIS and the ISF are ongoing on multiple fronts.
1 ISIS in Mosul gave Christian residents a deadline to depart
the city by tomorrow or they would be killed. Dozens of
Christian families already departed to areas southeast and north
of Mosul.
2 Heavy clashes took place between ISIS and the ISF
in Tikrit University.The university was previously
recaptured by the ISF.
3A security force found 20 unidentified
dead bodies floating in the Tigris near
Samarra.
10 ISIS launched an attack on Dhuluiya
from northwest of the city.The attack
initiated clashes between tribal forces
from the Jubur tribe, IP, and ISIS.
An SVBIED targeted a Federal
police (FP) checkpoint near the area
of Mahatat Balad, located on the
Baghdad-Mosul highway, northwest
of Balad Airbase.The attacks resulted
in the death of six FP members and
the injury of three others.
9
The ISF, with the likely participation of Iraqi
Shi’a militias, clashed with ISIS in the areas of
Haruniya,Tawakul, and Nawfal, in the district of
Muqdadiyah. Unconfirmed reports indicated that
the areas were cleared by the ISF. Meanwhile, ISIS
gunmen detonated IEDs on a bridge in Haruniya
that connected Muqdadiyah to Khanaqin.
8
6 Heavy clashes took place between ISIS and security
forces and volunteers in the areas of Seidat and Fariseya,
northern Babil.The clashes resulted in the death of five
volunteers and the injury of 10 others in addition to the death of 15
ISIS elements and the injury of an unspecified number of others who
were evacuated by other ISIS members to an unknown location.
The IA forces outside
Fallujah continued shelling the
city, which resulted in the death of 9
individuals and the injury of 19
others.
5
4
Dismounted gunmen from ISIS
infiltrated COB Speicher in the early hours
of the morning.The gunmen clashed with
security forces inside the base and carried out
at least one SVEST attack on IA helicopters,
which damaged at least three of them.
4
SVEST
Unknown Gunmen
7
7 ISIS launched an attack on the area of Amerli, south of Tuz Khurmatu,
using automatic weapons, mortars, and hand grenades.The area is predominantly
Iraqi Turkmen and is defended by the ISF, tribal forces, and forces from the
Popular Mobilization that most likely include Iraqi Shi’a militias.
Anti-Government Tribes
V
V VolunteersSVBIED
Anti-ISIS Tribes
17. by Ahmed Ali, Kimberly Kagan, Jessica D. Lewis, and Nichole Dicharry
100km
Fallujah
Baqubah
As Sulaymaniyah
ArbilMosul
Basra
An Nasriyah
An Najaf
Karbala
Al Kut
Ar Ramadi
Samarra
Tikrit
Kirkuk
Baghdad
Dahuk
Al Amarah
Al Hillah
Ad Diwaniyah
Muqdadiyah
Samawa
Rutba
Qaim
Haditha
VBIED
Peshmerga
ISF
ISIS
Asayesh
Armed Drones
Major Clash
Major Cities
3
5
2
1
4
Iraq Situation Report: July 19, 2014
ISIS’s VBIED command is active again, launching its first signature wave of Vehicle-Born Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs) since the
beginning of the Mosul offensive. The last VBIED wave occurred on May 13, 2014. VBIED waves, defined as six or more attacks on a single
day, are the signature pattern of attacks that ISIS pursued as it gained strength in 2012 and 2013. The successful VBIEDs detonated in
Baghdad’s Shi’a neighborhoods. This renewed capability is particularly significant because the ISF and Shi’a militia groups have deployed
thickly through Baghdad, particularly in these Shi’a neighborhoods. The Shi’a militia group Asai’b Ahl al-Haq, for example, has been
prominent in Abu Dashir since late 2012, for example. ISW assesses that ISIS intends to continue VBIED waves in Baghdad and elsewhere
through the end of Ramadan. Meanwhile, ISIS has extended its campaign against primarily Kurdish-protected areas by attempting a
complex attack in Sinjar using both a VBIED and a Suicide Vest. Sinjar, which has been quiet since Tal Afar fell, may become a more signifi-
cant focus for ISIS as it attempts to complete its line of communication from Mosul, Iraq to ar-Raqqa, Syria. Events in Syria may also be
driving the timing of this attack, as ISIS completed its military operation to connect its line of communication between its strongholds in
ar-Raqqa and Deir ez-Zour. ISIS continued its campaign for social and religious control in Mosul. After driving out Christians yesterday, ISIS
imposed further measures on rents, marriages, and female dress. ISIS and the ISF continued their fight for areas outside of Muqdadiya,
which an anonymous source prematurely reported yesterday as having been cleared by Iraqi forces.
1 Peshmerga forces stationed in Sinjar stopped a VBIED
driven by a person wearing an SVEST before he was able to
detonate either one.The event occurred near the Tal Banat
residential complex south of Sinjar.This follows reported clashes
between the Peshmerga and ISIS in Sinjar on July 17 and recent
targeting of Tal Banat with mortars.The Tal Banat complex is
reportedly home to Yazidis and IDPs from Tal Afar.
2 A member of the Iraqi Kurdish security force
known as Asayesh was injured when an IED
targeted his house in the Askari neighborhood in
southern Kirkuk. His brother was also injured in
the attack.
3Clashes continued between ISF and ISIS
in the Tawakul, Nawfal, and Sudur areas near
Muqdadiyah.
Six Vehicle-Born Improvised Explosive
Devices (VBIEDs) exploded in five
neighborhoods in Baghdad city.The VBIEDs
exploded in Jihad in southwestern Baghdad;
Kadhmiyah in northern Baghdad near a Shi’a
religious center; in al-Bayaa in southwestern
Baghdad, in the Ilam neighborhood; the Abu
Dashir area in the Dora neighborhood, in
southern Baghdad, targeting an ISF checkpoint;
and in the Saydiyah neighborhood. Casualty
figures from the attacks range between 70 to over
90 killed or injured.
5
ISIS religious and judicial bodies in Ninewa
issued decrees specifying the amount of rent to be
charged for property, forbade marriages outside its
courts, and forbade clothing stores from selling
women’s gowns that are “tight, transparent, or
embroidered.”
4
18. by Ahmed Ali, Kimberly Kagan, and Aaron Reese
100km
Fallujah
Baqubah
As Sulaymaniyah
ArbilMosul
Basra
An Nasriyah
An Najaf
Karbala
Al Kut
Ar Ramadi
Samarra
Tikrit
Kirkuk
Baghdad
Dahuk
Al Amarah
Al Hillah
Ad Diwaniyah
Muqdadiyah
Samawa
Rutba
Qaim
Haditha
Airstrikes
8
3
6
5
1
2
Major Cities
ISIS
ISF
Shi’a militias
Armed Drones
Iraq Situation Report: July 20, 2014
The situation in the vicinity of Baghdad continues to intensify. ISIS has emplaced IEDs in places such as Mada’in, Yusifiyah, and Mahmudiyah
in the southern belts of Baghdad. ISIS has previously conducted IED or suicide attacks in these three locations. ISIS may use these locations
as possible avenues of approach if it decides to attack Baghdad from the southern belt of the city. ISIS may also be attempting to restrict
the ISF’s mobility corridors in those areas. Iraqi Shi’a militia executions inside Baghdad may increase in response to the VBIED wave in Shi’a
neighborhoods on 19 July. Kidnapping and reprisal killings will cause major concern for Iraqi Sunni civilians in the city. The deployment of
volunteers from southern Iraq to Kirkuk province signifies the spread of their role to protect shrines in areas where ISIS is making advances.
The reallocation of Iraqi Security Forces from Baghdad to Dhuluiya signals the real challenge that ISIS poses there. ISW has assessed that
ISIS may try to draw the ISF out of Baghdad in advance of more robust attacks there.
1 Four airstrikes reportedly targeted the Wihda neighborhood
in eastern Mosul and the Jawsaq neighborhood in southwestern
Mosul.The strikes resulted in the injury of 9 people and
destruction of 12 houses.
3 Sources from the Fallujah hospital reported that
15 people were killed, including women and
children, when shelling targeted various
neighborhoods in Fallujah. 20-27 were injured in
the attacks. According to the sources, the shelling
included mortars, barrel bombs, and rockets.
2 Iraqi Security Forces reportedly sent reinforcements from
Baghdad to the Dhuluiya area, north of Baghdad, to shore up
the defenses of the anti-ISIS tribes and forces in the area.
According to reports, ISIS is now based in the areas of
Kbeba in the east and Khazraj and Bajwari in the
north of the area. ISIS is reportedly targeting
Dhuluiya from these areas.
An IED detonated in the Mada’in area
resulting in the death of 3 civilians and
injury of five civilians.
8
6 An IED targeted a police patrol in the Yusifiyah area,
south of Baghdad.Two policemen were killed while five were injured.
Three people were killed
and three people were injured
when “multiple mortar rounds”
landed in the Mahmudiyah area,
south of Baghdad.
5
4
Security forces discovered four
unidentified bodies in the
neighborhoods of Amal,
Shaab, and Bayaa.
4
7
7 A Katyusha rocket landed in the Taza area, 20 km south of Kirkuk resulting
in the injury of nine people from the same family. Meanwhile, 200 volunteers
from southern Iraq arrived in Kirkuk.The volunteers flew from the Najaf airport
in southern Iraq to Sulaimaniyah’s airport and will be assigned to protect the
Imam Zain al-Abdin Bin Ali shrine in Daquq which is located approximately 40
km south of Kirkuk.
V
V Volunteers
Anti-ISIS Tribes
19. by Ahmed Ali, ISW Iraq Team and Heather L. Pickerell
100km
Fallujah
Baqubah
As Sulaymaniyah
ArbilMosul
Basra
An Nasriyah
An Najaf
Karbala
Al Kut
Ar Ramadi
Samarra
Tikrit
Kirkuk
Baghdad
Dahuk
Al Amarah
Al Hillah
Ad Diwaniyah
Muqdadiyah
Samawa
Rutba
Qaim
Haditha
Armed Drones
Major Clash
Iraq Situation Report: July 21, 2014
5 A security source in Diyala stated that clashes
occurred between Ansar al-Sunna elements and ISIS
elements in al-Asaker area, north of Sadia in
northeastern Diyala Province.The clashes resulted in
the death of six Ansar al-Sunna members and five
ISIS fighters.
5
6
4
2
1
3
Major Cities
ISIS
ISF
Shi’a militias
V Volunteers
Ansar al-Sunna
Airstrikes
6 Security sources in Salah ad-Din
Province stated that at least three
mortar rounds landed on the volunteer
headquarters located in Bank Street of
central Samarra City. Other sources,
however, claimed that the rounds fell
approximately 60-70 meters from the
Al-Askari Shrine.Twenty volunteers
were injured as a result of the attacks.
V
4 According to Lieutenant
General Rashid Fleih, commander
of the Anbar Operations Command
(AOC), the ISF launched operations in
al-Garma (east of Fallujah), al-Nuaimiya (south of
Fallujah), and ISIS bases in Saqlawiyah (north of Fallujah).
A source in Hawijah stated that 10 people
were killed and 20 were wounded after IA
Aviation targeted a residential area in central
Hawijah. A source added that these areas
contain the ISIS Shari’a courts.
2
ISIS published images of military training it is
carrying out in Ninewa for “volunteers.”The photos show
training that includes religious lessons and introduction
to light weaponry. Some trainees are dressed in Afghan-
style garments and children and youth are shown
receiving training as well.
1
3 ISIS published images of its forces
distributing flour to families in al-Qaim.
Those receiving the flour are
described as “poor families.”
The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) continues to consolidate its governance presence in Mosul and western Iraq. This state of
affairs contradicts reports that ISIS is ceding power in Mosul to other armed groups including the Ba’athist JRTN. On the other hand,
Diyala continues to be the front line where ISIS continues to vie for power with other groups. These dynamics and competition will
continue to be manifested as events unfold. It is difficult to confirm the veracity that ISIS is distributing aid to“poor families”in Qaim. It
is clear, however, that ISIS propaganda seeks to portray it as an organization that is responsive to local needs. It will be important to
watch the effect of this strategy on the population’s response. The Iraqi Security Forces’(ISF) multiple and repeated attempts in the last
seven months to regain parts of Anbar are indicative of the difficulties the ISF will face in retaking bigger urban centers such as Mosul
and Tikrit. Nonetheless, the ISF are likely launching these operations to prevent ISIS from taking control of Ramadi and Haditha in
Anbar province.
20. Institute for the Study of War
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