The document provides a threat assessment for Iraq from August 3-16, 2016. It summarizes security incidents including IED attacks in Baghdad (36) and Babil (5), a suicide bombing in southern Iraq, ongoing clashes between ISF and ISIS in Al Anbar, arrests of suspected militants in Diyala, Kirkuk and Salah al Din, and protests in southern Iraqi cities. Analysis indicates IEDs remain the primary threat in Baghdad while ISIS maintains the ability to conduct attacks despite ongoing security operations against the group.

1. THREAT ASSESSMENT
IRAQ
3-16 August 2016

2. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TERRITORIAL CONTROL IN IRAQ: 16 AUGUST, 2016

3. DISTRIBUTION OF SECURITY INCIDENTS IN IRAQ 3-16
AUGUST 2016
This report assesses issues that have arisen from 3-16
August, 2016. For a detailed record of security incidents
occurring in Iraq, subscribers should refer to SicuroIMS
Incident Mapping Platform.
BAGHDAD AND BABIL
 36 IED attacks occurred in Baghdad from 3-15 August
 2 suicide bombings targeted checkpoints in Arab Jabour, south of Baghdad
 Anti-corruption protests continued on Fridays in Tahrir Square
 A tribal clash killed and injured 14 in Jisr Diyala, southeast Baghdad
 5 IED attacks occurred in northern Babil
SOUTHERN IRAQ
• A suicide VBIED hit a checkpoint in al-Mamalaha, southeast of Samawah
• This point lies along an ISIS smuggling route
• 2 IEDs targeted cafes in Basrah city; no one was injured
• Protesters demanding jobs blocked roads in the al-Burjasiyah oil zone
• Protests supporting Sadrist anti-corruption reforms continued across the region
AL-ANBAR
 ISF continued operations to clear ISIS from Khalidiya and Albu Baili, east of Ramadi
 ISF continued operations to clear IEDs from Fallujah and neighbouring areas
 Air strikes continued to target ISIS north of Ramadi
 ISF seized control of the al-Waleed border crossing to Syria
 Fighting and air strikes targeting ISIS continued from Hit to Haditha
SALAH AL-DIN, DIYALA, AND KIRKUK
 8 IED attacks occurred across ISF controlled parts of Diyala
 ISF seized and cleared 33 IEDs in Miqdadiyah and the Hamrin Basin
 10 ISIS militants were arrested in the Kikruk city
 An IED damaged an oil well in Sulayman Bashqan, northwest of Kirkuk
 PMU militias and Peshmerga repelled ISIS attack on the Highway 55 corridor west of
Tuz Khurmatu
 Militants continued to target ISF north of Baiji
 4 men were arrested in Samarra on charges of planning an attack in the city
KURDISTAN REGION AND NINAWA
 Asayish intercepted 2 ISIS suicide bombers in Sangaw, southwest of Sulaymaniyah
 A journalist for RojNews was murdered west of Dahuk; protest followed his death
 Peshmerga seized 11 villages from ISIS near Khidhir
 Heavy fighting continued between ISF and ISIS near Qayyarah
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

4. SITUATION OVERVIEW AND MAJOR EVENTS
 Baghdad experienced 36 IED attacks during 3-16 August, 2016
 28 IEDs targeted civilians; 6 targeted security forces and government
personnel; 2 had unknown targets
 Two suicide bombings targeted security forces in Arab Jabour
 A tribal clash between the Ashiyat and al-Ashirati clans killed and injured 14 in
the Jisr Diyala area
 2 mortar shells hit Radwaniyah, south of Baghdad
 Protests regarding government corruption continued in Tahrir Sq. on Fridays
 5 IED attacks occurred in Yusufiya, Mahmudiyah, Latifiyah, and Alexandria
TRENDS AND ANALYSIS
IEDs remain the most significant security threat in Baghdad. During this
reporting period, no incidents resulted in more than 3 fatalities or 11 total
casualties. These incidents were typical of attacks in the city, with the majority of
bombings consisting of roadside IEDs targeting soft civilian areas, most
commonly, markets, shops, and cafes.
Adhesive under-vehicle IEDs are second most common variety of IED attacks in
Baghdad. Seven of these attacks occurred during this reporting period,
accounting for 19.4% of all IED attacks. This marks an increase in the relative
prevalence of adhesive IEDs, which have averaged 11.3% of IED attacks since the
beginning of the year. This is the result of a decline in IED attacks overall,
primarily due to a drop in medium impact bombings in civilian locations.
In addition to these incidents, two suicide bombings targeted security forces in
Arab Jabour, a rural area south of Baghdad. Both of these incidents hit ISF
patrols, resulting in minimal casualties. It is notable that since 3 July, 2016 (the
date of the Karada bombing which killed and injured 352), Baghdad has seen five
suicide bombings. All of these incidents have hit patrols or checkpoints
surrounding the city. This marks a change from past suicide attacks, which
primarily targeted crowded civilian areas inside Baghdad. It may be that the
recent attacks have been the result of security forces intercepting bombers who
intended to targeted other areas in Baghdad. If this is the case, it suggests that
security measures surrounding the city have improved. However, these
bombings also indicate that ISIS is engaged in ongoing operations to launch
suicide attacks inside Baghdad.
BAGHDAD AND BABIL
DISTRIBUTION OF SUICIDE BOMBINGS IN BAGHDAD 1 JANUARY – 3 JULY 2016
DISTRIBUTION OF SUICIDE BOMBINGS IN BAGHDAD 4 JULY – 16 AUGUST 2016

5. Unlike past suicide bombings in the region, this most recent attack did not
targeted a crowded area, resulting in limited casualties when compared to similar
past attacks. This information suggests that the driver of the VBIED detonated his
bomb prematurely due to possible discovery by security forces.
If this is the case, it suggests that ISIS has not significantly changed the route it
uses to move IEDs from al-Anbar into southern Iraq. It also suggests that the
group remains unable to manufacture high yield IEDs within the region but also
demonstrates that the groups remains capable of launching attacks within
southern cities.
In early August, the Iraqi government began constructing a 70km trench west of
Karbala in order to prevent ISIS infiltration into the governorate and southern
Iraq. This will aid in controlling movement into Karbala and northern Babil. It will
also cut the known ISIS smuggling route into southern Iraq. Completion of this
project thus has the potential to curtail militant operations in the region.
SITUATION OVERVIEW AND MAJOR EVENTS
 A suicide VBIED targeted a checkpoint in al-Mamalaha, 45 km southeast of
Samawah, killing and injuring 6
 2 IEDs targeted cafes in Basrah city without causing casualties
 Construction began on a 70 km trench west of Karbala to prevent ISIS
infiltration into southern Iraq
 Tribal clashes occurred in al-Shuaiba (north of Zubayr) and al-Majer al-Kaber
 Protesters demanding employment blocked roads in the al-Burjasiyah oil
zone, east of Zubayr
 Protests supporting Sadrist reforms occurred in Basrah, Samawah, Diwaniyah,
Kut and Amarah
 Robberies and other criminal actions remain the most common security
threat in southern Iraq
 3 carjacking 2 motorcycle thefts were reported in Basrah city
TRENDS AND ANALYSIS
On 11 August, the driver of a VBIED detonated his device at an ISF checkpoint in
al-Mamalah, 45 km southwest of Samawah. Two people were killed and four
injured in the blast.
Suicide bombings are rare in southern Iraq. Since the beginning of 2016, the
region has seen five suicide attacks. These occurred in Karabla, Samawah, Um
Anij, and Basrah city. Additionally, VBIEDs have been cleared and ISIS militants
linked to IED attacks have been arrested in Najaf, Diwaniyah, Shatrah and Zubayr
in addition to the aforementioned cities. Successful IED attacks have hit a range
of targets including cafes, police and PMU militias, and a foreign security
companies compound in Basrah.
Information gained through interrogation of ISIS militants linked to the 1 May
bombing in Samawah (which killed and injured 103) indicated that ISIS
transported IEDs from al-Anbar to Samawah with the help of guides who enabled
the militants to avoid security checkpoints (see the following slide for an image
map of this route). The route uncovered by this interrogation would have led
militants traveling from al-Anbar through the al-Mamalaha area, where the 11
August attack occurred.
SOUTHERN IRAQ
DISTRIBUTION OF SUICIDE BOMBINGS, VBIEDS, AND RELATED ARRESTS IN
SOUTHERN IRAQ 1 JANUARY – 16 AUGUST 2016

6. SOUTHERN IRAQ
ROUTE TAKEN BY THE VBIED USED IN THE 1 MAY 2016 SUICIDE BOMBING IN
SAMAWAH

7. SITUATION OVERVIEW AND MAJOR EVENTS
 ISF continued to clash with ISIS in the Khalidiya and Albu Baili area, east of
Ramadi, contradicting claims that PMU militias had secured the area
 Air strikes frequently targeted ISIS positions north of Ramadi
 An ISIS attack was repelled near Tharthar Lake
 ISF seized 38 IEDs and cleared 35 in Hasai and al-Halabsah south of Fallujah
 Air strikes continued to target ISIS positions near the Highway 12 corridor
from Hit to Haditha; ISF claim a new offensive will begin shortly in the area
 ISF seized control of the al-Waleed crossing to Syria
 Air strikes continued to target ISIS-controlled al-Qaim and Rawa
TRENDS AND ANALYSIS
Khalidiya and the countryside north of Ramadi were the most heavily contested
areas of al-Anbar during this reporting period. Kalidiya, which lies south of the
Euphrates between Ramadi and Habbaniya, saw multiple IED attacks targeting
ISF and PMU militias. These incidents occurred in the context of security
operations intended to search out and destroy an extensive network of ISIS
tunnels and bunkers. Although ISF appear to be gaining ground, the recent
violence demonstrates that ISF reports claiming to have secured the area
(announced in late July) were premature.
North of the Euphrates, Albu Aath, Albu Bali, and Albu Ali Jassim saw frequent air
strikes and conflict between ISF and ISIS militants. ISF maintain positions in Albu
Diab and along Highway 23; however, they have been unable to secure the
surrounding countryside. The weak ISF presence along the north bank of the
Euphrates enables ISIS militants to move from Syria and western al-Anbar to the
Taiji area in southern Salah al-Din. Securing the area from the Euphrates to
Tharthar Lake is thus essential to breaking ISIS infiltration into Salah al-Din and
Baghdad. Heavy fighting in the area is thus likely to continue.
Fallujah did not see any reports of militant attacks during this reporting period.
This suggests that ISF operations in the city, along with neighbouring Karma and
Amiriyat al-Fallujah districts, were successful in disrupting ISIS’ network and that
current policing has prevented the group from quickly re-infiltrating the area.
AL ANBAR
ISF in the region are currently engaged in clearing the hundreds of remaining
IEDs planted by ISIS in Fallujah and the surrounding countryside.
In western al-Anbar, on 3 August, ISF seized control of the al-Waleed border
crossing, Iraq’s southern official crossing point into Syria. The area abuts a Syrian
Free Army (FSA) controlled military camp to the east. The FSA seized control of
this area on 14 May and has held it since. Social media sources have shown
British special forces embedded in the area with FSA fighters. This demonstrates
that coalition forces have made controlling the crossing a priority and suggests
that there will likely be coordination between Syrian and Iraqi forces in
preventing ISIS from retaking the area. Nonetheless, ISIS continues to control
territory immediately to the north. Future attacks on al-Waleed are likely.
DISRIBUTION OF MILITARY OPERATIONS, AIR STRIKES AND MILITANT
ATTACKS IN AL-ANBAR 3-16 AUGUST 2016

8. and the interception of four boats transporting weapons on Hamrin Lake. These
operations built off of the surge in counterterrorism activity from Baqubah to
Miqdadiyah during July.
The last four weeks have seen the lowest levels of IED attacks in Diyala since the
beginning of the year. This suggests that these operations have been successful
in curtailing militant activity. However, due to the rural natures of this area, ISF
have historically had difficulty in preventing ISIS from establishing cells following
clearing operations. Recent arrests were informed by documents seized in
Fallujah which identified militant supporters in Diyala. As a result, the recent
operations have been more thorough than those in the past. Nonetheless, it is
not clear whether ISF will be able to maintain the gains made during the past
month.
SITUATION OVERVIEW AND MAJOR EVENTS
DIYALA
 8 IED attacks occurred in Madain, Nahrawan, Miqdadiyah, and the
Adhaim area
 20 IED trapped homes were cleared in the Hamrin Basin
 11 people were killed and injured in a tribal clash in Shafta, Baqubah
 ISF raided a house in Miqdadiyah, seizing 13 IEDs
 9 men were arrested on terrorism charges in Baqubah, al-Abbarah, al-
Waqf, Miqdadiyah and the Hamrin Basin
 Police freed a kidnapped girl in Khanaqin and arrested a kidnapper
KIRKUK
 9 suspected ISIS militants were arrested in Bajwan, Kikruk city
 ISIS attacks were repelled in Humeria and near Daquq southeast of Kikruk
 An IED damaged oil well 34 in Sulayman Bashqan, near Bai Hasan
 Gunmen fired on the home of the Inspector General in Kirkuk city,
injuring 3 guards
 ISIS executed 85 civilians in Hawija on 8 August
SALAH AL-DIN
 PMU forces and Peshmerga repelled ISIS attacks in Bir Ahmed and
Zerkah, west of Tuz Khurmatu
 Unknown gunmen clashed with militants in ISIS controlled Shirqat
 ISF repelled 3 ISIS attacks in the Mkahoul area north of Baiji
 20 mortar shells were fired on a convoy of displaced persons near Tikrit
 4 men were arrested on charges of planning a terrorist attack in Samarra
 IED attacks declined in Taiji and Tarmiyah
 A suicide bomber with 4 other militants attacked ISF in al-
Moshahda, north of Taij
TRENDS AND ANALYSIS
DIYALA
ISF expanded counter terrorism operations in the Hamrin Basrin during this
reporting period. This consisted of searches of homes and the countryside
and resulted in the clearing of 20 IED trapped buildings, clearing a BBIED,
SALAH AL-DIN KIRKUK, AND DIYALA
IED ATTACKS IN DIYALA FROM BAQUBAH TO THE HAMRIN BASIN 1 APRIL –
16 AUGUST 2016

9. TRENDS AND ANALYSIS CONTINUED
KIRKUK
On 3 August, 9 ISIS militants were reported arrested in the Bajwan
neighbourhood of Kikruk city, while a tenth militant was intercepted on 16
August. These arrests followed closely on the heals of an attack by four
suicide bombers in the Bani Hassan oilfield. This attack sparked fears that
ISIS continues to have sleeper cells in Kurdish controlled areas of the Kirkuk
governorate, which has been confirmed by the recent arrests.
The militant captured on 15 August was discovered traveling amongst
displaced persons (IDPs). There have been numerus incidents of militants
attempting to infiltrate Kurdish and government territory in other
governorates by hiding among IDPs. Kirkuk and Makhmur have received
hundreds of civilians fleeing from Hawija and Qayyarah during the past two
months. This has resulted in an increased threat of militant infiltration.
SALAH AL-DIN
The security situation in Salah al-Din did not see any significant changes
during this reporting period. ISF remain in control of Highway 1 and all
major towns and cities in the governorate, with the exception of Shirqat.
However, insurgents continue to operate in rural areas east of Tikrit. These
groups remain a threat to the highway government towns in the area.
Areas north of Baiji saw the highest amount of ISIS activity. This included
clashes and IED attacks in the Makhoul area and near the Shirqat
Intersection. This section of road is critical for the supplies supporting the
ongoing ISF offensive in Qayyarah and directly borders with villages under
ISIS control. Due to this context frequent attacks are expected to continue
in the area.
Central and southern Salah al-Din remains under threat of infiltration by ISIS
militants in eastern Kirkuk and al-Anbar. This frequently results in fighting in
the oilfields east of Tikrit and occasional IED and suicide attacks in
government controlled towns, such as the 8 July bombing in Balad, which
killed 40. The arrest of four ISIS members in Samarra on 13 August and the
SALAH AL-DIN KIRKUK, AND DIYALA
shelling of a convoy of displaced persons near Tikrit on 6 August demonstrate the
continued threat of militant activity in the region.
The Tuz Khurmatu district also remains under threat of ISIS attacks. During this
reporting period Peshmerga and PMU forces repelled two ISIS assaults on
positions along Highway 55. Security forces along the Highway have reported 12
militant attacks since the beginning of the year, ten of which have occurred since
June. Additionally, during the past three months, Sulayman Beg and Tuz
Khurmatu have seen five suicide bombings and attempted suicide bombings.
These incidents indicate expansion of ISIS activity in the district.
Tuz Khurmatu and surrounding villages are policed by a combination of
Peshmerga, PMU militias, and local Turkmen militias. On multiple occasions,
tensions between these groups have escalated to violence. As a result, there is
little cooperation between security forces in the area. This has resulted in an
increased risk of militant infiltration.
CLASHES, IEDS, AND COMPLEX ATTACKS IN THE TUZ KHURMATU DISTRICT
AND ALONG HIGHWAY 55 1 January – 16 August 2016

10. The suicide bombers killed near Sangaw were most likely travelling from ISIS
territory in Kirkuk via the Tuz Khurmatu district in Salah al-Din. Given the remote
area where they were encountered, the militants likely made use of minor roads
through rural areas to avoid detection. Although eastern Kikruk and Tuz
Khurmatu are under Kurdish and ISF control, these areas have seen a higher rate
of militant attacks than areas officially under KRG governance.
In 2016 this has resulted in 19 suicide bombings and clashes between security
forces and ISIS militants in the Tuz Khurmatu district and three IED attacks in
eastern Kirkuk with suspected ISIS links. These incidents show Kirkuk-Tuz
Khurmatu areas as potential weak points through which small groups of militants
may infiltrate the Kurdistan region.
NINAWA AND MAKHMUR
On 14 August, Peshmerga launched major offensive against ISIS along the Khidir
front in southeast Ninawa. Between 2,500 and 5,000 Kurdish fighters were
reported to have participated in the fighting, which resulted in the deaths of at
least 130 militants. Kurdish forces were able to seize control of 11 villages and
key hill tops (see the following page for a territorial control map of southern
Ninawa). This has pushed ISIS positions back from the Great Zab River, reducing
the threat of ISIS shelling along the western border of the Arbil governorate. It
will also enable Peshmerga to observe and shell Highway 80 between al-Khidhr
and al-Kuwayr, impeding ISIS movement in the area.
This corresponded with ongoing fighting between ISIS and ISF along the
Makhmur front. ISF continued to advance slowly on Qayyarah, resulting in
fighting at the Qayyarah power plant. This was matched by ISIS attacks on ISF
positions near the city, all of which were repelled.
Following these gains, ISIS launched a significant attack on the Sinjar Cement
Factory, east of Sinjar city. The attack was repelled and 25 militants reported
killed without resulting in any significant change in military positions. Fighting in
other areas of Ninawa was concentrated on the frontier of Kurdish zones ISIS
controlled zones near Sinjar and northeast of Mosul.
SITUATION OVERVIEW AND MAJOR EVENTS
 2 ISIS suicide bombers were intercepted near Sangaw; 1 detonated a BBIED,
injuring 4 Asayish, second was shot and killed
 A journalist for PKK-affiliated RojNews was shot and killed on 13 August on
Highway 2 between Dahuk and Sumel
 Protesters in Arbil demanded the KRG disclose information regarding
the killing
 PKK fighters exchanged mortar fire with Iranian forces near the border in
northeast Arbil governorate
 ISF gained ground near Qayyarah; heavy fighting is ongoing in the area
 Peshemerga launched a new offensive southeast of Khidhir; seizing control of
11 villages
 Peshmerga repelled an ISIS attack on the Sinjar Cement Factory, killing 25
militants
 Coalition air strikes targeted ISIS near Tal Afar, Kisik, Mosul, Sinjar, near
Khidhir, Badush and Qayyarah
TRENDS AND ANALYSIS
KURDISTAN
On 14 August, Asayish forces intercepted two ISIS militants in the hills outside
Dilizah village, near Sangaw. One of the militants detonated a BBIED, injuring
four Asayish, while the second was shot and killed. The militants, including a
foreign ISIS fighter and a local teenager from Kalar, were intercepted due to
reports by local villagers. Kurdish security forces have speculated that the
militants were traveling to Sulaymaniyah.
Despite sharing borders with ISIS controlled territory in Ninawa and Kirkuk, the
KRG’s security apparatus has been effective in limiting militant infiltration into
Kurdish territory. Excluding the conflict zone west of Makhmur, since January
2015, ISIS has only successfully conducted a single attack inside the three
governorates of the Kurdistan Region. However, arrests indicate that ISIS is
engaged in an ongoing attempt to attack Arbil and Sulaymaniyah. These have
included a foiled VBIED attack in Arbil city on 11 November 2015 and the
arrested of an Iranian ISIS militant transporting an IED in Sulaymaniyah on 19
March 2016. Arrests of suspected ISIS militants peaked in April and May 2015,
with only two arrests reported in 2016 in February and April.
KURDISTAN REGION AND NINAWA

11. KURDISTAN REGION AND NINAWA
TERRITORIAL CONTROL IN SOUTHERN NINAWA AND MAKHMUR: 16 AUGUST, 2016

12. ABOUT US
ABOUT SICUROIMS
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