Some have suggested that a better alternative would be to establish a 'no fly zone" over Northern Syria to go after ISIS and pursue other objectives, including undercutting the regime of Assad. Secretary of State Kerry has asked his staff to look into doing so, and presidential candidates including Hillary Clinton and various Republican candidates, which include Jeb Bush, Ben Carson, Chris Christie, Carly Fiorina, Lindsay Graham, John Katich, and Marco Rubio. But does doing so make any sense and what would be the realistic strategic purpose of a no fly zone in contested Syria? In a briefing by Lt. General (Retired) Dave Deptula, the question of a Syrian no fly zone was examined carefully when it first bubbled up as a popular antidote to the disintegration of Syria. The presentation to the U.S. Institute of Peace, dated May 29, 2014 but updated recently for this article, Deptula highlighted a number of key considerations, but really boil down to a direct question: what are the strategic objectives for such an action?

1. A Syrian No Fly Zone:
Elements, Prerequisites, Key Considerations
Lt Gen David Deptula, USAF (ret)
Dean, Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies
Presented to U.S. Institute of Peace, 29 May 2013
Updated October, 2015

2. Overview
n Elements of a No-Fly Zone
n Operation Northern Watch (ONW)
Example
n Differences From ONW
n Prerequisites
n Key Considerations
n Points to Ponder
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3. What is a No-Fly Zone
n A set of operations restricting freedom of action in
airspace over an area of interest
n A NFZ is not a strategy or a “silver bullet”
n To be effective it must be an element of a strategy with well defined objectives
n Uses:
n Restrict, control, or eliminate use of capabilities from, through, or to airspace
(more appropriately labeled an “Air Exclusion Zone”)
n Reduces the risk associated with other military action (ISR, interdiction, etc.)
n Block air, sea, and land routes to reduce logistics, resupply, or commerce
n Dynamics:
n An air occupation that usurps the sovereignty over the area of operation
n Creates significant effects without the risk associated with boots on the ground
n It’s not cheap
n It’s not risk free
n Requires significant preparation and smart execution
3

4. Elements of a No-Fly Zone
n Clear objectives at strategic, operational, and tactical levels
n Clearly defined command relationships
n Clear and concise rules of engagement
n Basing locations, rights, and host-nation agreements
n Logistics adequate to support the NFZ operation’s endurance
n Air and missile defense in-place for asset protection
n Joint/Combined Task Force components:
n Command and control elements (air, sea, land) (E-2C, E-3, etc.)
n Intelligence, surveillance & reconnaissance (RQ-4, EP-3, RC-135, MQ-1/9, U-2, etc.)
n Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) aircraft (EF-18G, F-16, F-22, etc.)
n Counter-air aircraft (F-22, F-15C, Rafale, Typhoon, etc.)
n Strike assets (B-2, F-22, F-15E, F-16, F/A-18, B-1, MQ-9, cruise missiles, etc.)
n Air refueling aircraft (KC-135, KC-10, A330, etc.)
n Combat search and rescue capability (CV-22, AV-8, MC-130, HH-60, etc.)
4

5. Insert From ONW Brief
5

6. A “No-Fly Zone” Over Syria Would Be Considerably
More Challenging than ONW…or Any Other NFZ to Date:
It’s Doable, but It Would be Different
§ Hostilities on-going in Syria with limited U.S. intervention;
In ONW U.S. was continuing actions following Desert Storm
§ NFZ over Syria commits U.S. to war
§ Significantly more robust and capable integrated air
defense system in Syria vs Iraq
§ Iraqi Air Force was destroyed in 1991/Syrian Air Force intact
§ Syria possesses longer range/more capable SAMs than Iraq circa ‘91
§ Russia actively supporting Assad—Saddam was isolated
§ No UN resolution(s) authorizing a no-fly zone over Syria
Differences: Syrian NFZ with ONW

7. Need to Clearly Define the “No-Fly Zone” Prerequisites
§ What’s the desired end-state?
§ Who is the authorizing authority?
§ What are the command relationships among coalition forces (who is in charge)?
§ What are the rules of engagement (how to manage actions in the no-fly zone)?
§ Where is the area of coverage?
§ How structure NFZ to allow safe continuation of commercial air traffic in the region?
§ What is the duration of the coverage?
§ Operational times: 24/7; daytime only; variation?
§ Entire operation: Days; Months; Years?
§ What are the elements subject to engagement?
§ Aircraft—all; military only; cargo carriers from other countries; etc.?
§ Airborne; ground?
§ Airfields—military; civil; both; regional?
§ Air defenses—SAMs; AAA; Command & Control; Communications?
§ Hostile act or hostile intent requirement, or not?
§ Helicopters—in-flight; stationary; in transition?
§ Theater Ballistic Missiles—preparing to launch; post-launch; in garrison?
Syrian No-Fly Zone Prerequisites

8. Need to Define the “WHY” Before Moving to the “HOW”
§ What are the critical U.S. national security interests
at stake worth the expenditure of U.S. blood and treasure?
§ What’s the desired end-state?
§ “Protection” of the population; Which one? Exit strategy?
§ Assad departs; Syria under new leadership; Who?
§ A “broken” Syria (Smaller “Syria” with Assad/rebel/Kurd sub-states?)
§ Break in the “bridge” between Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, Russia?
§ Is the U.S. willing to initiate a state of war with Syria?
§ A “no-fly zone” will involve the use of lethal force against a sovereign state
§ NFZ mission success is tied to clarity in these areas:
§ Purpose (Currently unclear)
§ Method (This we can do)
§ End State (Currently undefined)
Key Considerations

9. § Why a NFZ? Are there alternatives to achieve the desired outcomes?
-- No drive zone?
- Interdict ground resupply routes to Islamic State/undesirable rebels?
-- Selective strikes to inhibit Syrian regime/Islamic State/“bad” rebels resupply
- Nullify airfields/ports
§ Selective air strikes can “level the playing field” inhibiting
Syrian atrocities without the level of effort of a NFZ
§ A NFZ is an air occupation with attendant consequences
§ Chemical Weapons
-- Air ops alone cannot stop all delivery methods
§ U.S. readiness crisis as a result of “sequestration” will be a factor
in any NFZ operation requiring sustained operations
Points to Ponder

10. A Syrian No Fly Zone:
Elements, Prerequisites, Key Considerations
Lt Gen David Deptula, USAF (ret)
Dean, Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies
Presented to U.S. Institute of Peace, 29 May 2013
Updated October, 2015