The Battle to retake the Iraqi city of Mosul The political and economic implications - September 2016 The final battle to retake Mosul from the Islamic State could begin as soon as October, according to authorities in Iraq’s armed forces. In this note, Whispering Bell looks at the current status of the tightening noose around Mosul, the military outlook, the political maneuvering that accompanies the planning for the assault, and some of the near term implications for Iraq’s political and economic future. This 11-page report has been prepared by Whispering Bell and made available as free to download.

1. The Battle to Retake Mosul:
Political and Economic Implications
— September 2016
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— September 2016
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Table of Contents
INTRODUCTION:
STATUS
OF
MOSUL
LIBERATION
...........................................................................................................
3
MILITARY
OUTLOOK
...................................................................................................................................................................
4
POLITICAL
MANEUVERING
........................................................................................................................................................
6
IMPLICATIONS
FOR
BAGHDAD-­‐ERBIL
RELATIONS
...........................................................................................................
8
ABOUT
WHISPERING
BELL
.......................................................................................................................................................
11

3. The Battle to Retake Mosul: Political and Economic Implications
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Introduction: status of Mosul liberation
The battle to retake Mosul is likely to be the next major engagement in Iraq’s war against
the Islamic State (IS). Iraqi authorities have generally stated that they expect the assault to
begin by the end of 2016. Some Iraqi commanders say the battle could even begin by
late October. Recent events clearly show a tightening noose around the city, as Iraqi
Security Forces (ISF) seek to cut off any potential IS escape routes. As is apparent in the
below map, Mosul is almost completely encircled by coalition forces, with all populated
areas cut off. Only open desert routes to the west of Mosul connect the city with other IS-
occupied territory.
Figure 1. Map of control of territory in Iraq as of August 25, 2016.
Source: Institute for the Study of War.
The latest major events were the retaking of Qayarra air base, 40 miles south of Mosul, in
July, and the capture of the city of Qayarra itself in August. The city’s condition upon its

4. The Battle to Retake Mosul: Political and Economic Implications
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capture hint at what Mosul will likely look like when it is finally captured. Shops in Qayarra
city were closed, food supplies low, and people were surviving on wheat from the recent
harvest. The local oil wells, at Qayarra and Najma, which had produced 30,000 barrels per
day (bpd) before IS took over, were set on fire, and are not expected to be back in
production until well after Mosul is captured. Three of the wells are still burning as of our
latest information.
Military outlook
All evidence points to the expectation that the battle for Mosul will be hard and costly.
Mosul was Iraq’s second-largest city prior to IS’ capture of it, and urban warfare is
notoriously more difficult for the coalition forces than open field battles, where the ISF can
benefit from easily identifiable enemy, coalition air support and superior firepower. And
the IS presence in Mosul is apparently still rather heavy; coalition commander Lieutenant
General Stephen Townsend estimates that there are some 3,000-4,500 fighters in the city. In
Mosul, the ISF will constantly have to balance the safety of civilians, and their desire to
keep the city intact, against the amount of force needed to conduct effective attacks.
Nonetheless, Iraqi and western officials seem to be more
optimistic about Mosul than they have been in months. Today,
ISF and coalition forces have become stronger and better
coordinated, while the coalition’s persistent attacks have
weakened IS significantly. Recent victories against IS in major
cities in Anbar – some of them surprisingly quick – have also
boosted morale among Iraqi forces, and given them important
experience in urban warfare. One unnamed western diplomat
in the Financial Times, was recently quoted saying that the
situation has gotten much better and that, “It’s still a long way
to go, and the error range is massive … but about four months ago, we sat here and
thought Mosul was going to be an unmitigated disaster.”
Further, there does seem to be something of a change in attitude among the ISF
themselves, which in the past often seemed to see residents of recaptured parts of the
country – especially Sunni Arabs – as almost as guilty as IS. The Iraqi army generally, but
especially the Shi’ite-dominated militia, the Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) or Hashd al-
Shaabi, have been accused of atrocities in the past against Sunni Arab populations in
conquered cities, like Tikrit. Kurdish peshmerga militia also have been accused of similar
abuses.
Sensitive to this, the attack on Mosul will be led by the more ethnically balanced and
disciplined regular army, with Hashd al-Shaabi and peshmerga in less central, supporting
roles. Notably, the same western diplomat quoted above said, “I’ve had it described to
me by senior Iraqis as, ‘We need to ensure the people of Mosul look at how were doing
this campaign and feel liberated.’” It is also notable on the map in Figure 1 above that the
Iraqi Shi’a militias have been mostly present in the center of Iraq (yellow in the map),
whereas the latest thrust, from Baiji, north to Qayarra air base and Qayarra city, has been
led by the ISF (shown in green on the map) without a large presence of the PMUs.
Iraqi and western
officials seem to
be more optimistic
about the attack on
Mosul than they
have been in
months.

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Finally, there are also reports of grass roots resistance in Mosul. For instance, there were
reports in August that a major IS recruiter of child soldiers was apparently assassinated last
month, and “Down with ISIS” graffiti is apparently appearing on walls within the city.
Consequently, it appears that the stage is set for support from local Mosul inhabitants, and
that the local population seems ready for the IS militants to go.
Of course, Mosul will be on an entirely different scale than the
ISF’s recent experiences in Ramadi or Fallujah, so it is not totally
clear that the experience from Anbar can be fully replicated in
Mosul. For one thing, IS has had almost two years to prepare for
the fight, with fortifications, tunnels and improvised explosive
devices (IEDs) in place waiting for the attack. IS has reportedly
dug moats around the city and filled them with oil and tires to
light on fire to create smoke and make air attacks more difficult
and dangerous. Depending on whether IS chooses to stand and
fight or try to melt away into the population, it could require
massive destruction to take them out. One estimate presented to Prime Minister Haider al-
Abadi, of the cost of reconstruction in Mosul if maximum force is required, said that it could
cost $1.5 billion a year just for the humanitarian requirements of the displaced people,
who will then have to live in camps outside the city.
And the displaced personnel themselves will clearly be a significant concern. Over 213,000
people have fled their homes in recent months across Iraq, with 48,000 of those coming
from the Mosul area and 78,000 from surrounding areas such as Sharqat and Qayarra. The
battle for Mosul itself could affect up to 1.2 million people. The UN is still planning for a
worst case scenario where nearly 1 million people must flee Mosul, with a direct
international appeal for $284 million in aid. Only half of that amount has been funded so
far.
However, tactics have evolved with the ISF’s experience in Anbar. The ISF estimate that
retaking Ramadi required the destruction of more than 50% of the city, whereas Fallujah
required 20% of the city to be destroyed. Qayarra, the most recent battle, apparently only
required 10% of the city to be destroyed. The lower level of destruction is apparently a
result of the ISF shifting to an encirclement and siege approach rather than direct attacks
on IS positions. This approach not only reduces direct destruction, but also allows the ISF to
avoid the IEDs that IS usually leaves behind as they retreat. The only problem is that the
approach also exposes the local population to the risk of starvation. However, in the long
run it reduces the chance that they will have to be shifted to camps afterward, because
more local housing is left intact.
Mosul will be an
entirely different
scale than Ramadi
or Fallujah; it is
not totally clear the
experience in
Anbar can be fully
replicated

6. The Battle to Retake Mosul: Political and Economic Implications
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Political maneuvering
The capture of Mosul, of course, as difficult as it will be, is only the first step. Dealing with
the aftermath of the battle could prove much more difficult. As noted above, for now, it
does seem that the ISF, and the coalition overall, are in the dominant leadership position,
with more ethnically-focused militia like the PMUs and peshmerga less central to the
operation. This is incredibly important given the sensitivities of the Mosul population, which
is wary of new ethnic strife. However, the current situation is highly dependent on a
delicate balancing act.
While the ISF currently plans to lead the attack on Mosul, it is in a tenuous position. Kurdish
peshmerga forces occupy the north and east of Mosul, and the PMUs are influential to the
south. It is not clear that the militias will decide to remain outside the main action in central
Mosul, although for the moment, they claim to want to remain in secondary roles for fear
of inflaming tensions in the Sunni Arab-dominated population. Sunni Arab militia, as well as
other minority populations may also start to participate – a chance for these forces to
reassert their local authority after having lost it to IS. As a consequence, this will be a very
complicated situation on the ground.
And these forces will definitely have reason to be involved with
the governance of the city after the reconquest, especially
because Ninewa is a much more ethnically and religiously
mixed area than southern Iraq. In particular, the KRG and local
Sunni and minority militia will want to influence future
governance of the area. The Kurds have a substantial minority
population in Mosul and the surrounding Ninewa province, and
has a strong affinity for the Yazidi population of western
Ninewa, who are ethnic Kurds. Christians, Turkmen, and Shi’ite
minorities will want their say in Mosul as well. And it is not clear
how much the PMU will want to extend Shi’ite Arab – and
indirectly Iranian – influence into the area as well. At a minimum, they will want to protect
the rights of the Shi’ite minority in Mosul.
As a result, although the current status quo has the Iraqi government in firm control, the
situation could rapidly become fluid, as rival interests start jockeying for influence after
recapture. In fact, some of those moves may have begun; there have been recent reports
of Kurdish peshmerga forces moving to capture villages around Mosul in an attempt to
build bargaining leverage for the period after Mosul is captured.
Further, lingering distrust among all parties, especially among Sunni Arabs, is fairly likely to
emerge following a successful recapture of Mosul. In fact, part of the reason for the
growth of IS in Iraq in the first place was the vicious sectarianism of former Shi'ite Iraqi Prime
Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Some Sunnis, who felt persecuted under Maliki’s rule, welcomed IS
as liberators when they routed the Iraqi army in 2014. These bitter memories are not gone,
and could reemerge once the euphoria of Mosul’s liberation fades. Local Sunni Arabs, as
well as other populations, are likely to be on the look out for signs that the bad old days of
Shi’ite domination from Baghdad are back.
Ninewa is a much
more ethnically and
religiously mixed
area than southern
Iraq – all of these
groups will have to
be involved in
governance

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The other major issue is the overall political context within Iraq. The government in
Baghdad is anything but united, with Prime Minister Abadi barely able to make progress
on appointing a new technocratic parliament since the beginning of the year. He was
finally able to appoint five out of the six new Ministers he put forward in August – before
ending up losing his Minister of Defense, Khalid al-Obeidi, the following week to a vote no
confidence. Obviously, this could have a direct effect on the war against IS at this critical
juncture before the assault on Mosul, and comes after another setback when his Minister
of Interior resigned at the beginning of July following a huge bombing in Baghdad.
Former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki seems to be a villain in all of
this as well, having exploited a split among the Sunni blocs in the
Council of Representatives (CoR) to oust Obeidi. Obeidi’s
Mutahidun Party is a Sunni rival to the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP), to
which the Speaker of the House, Salim al-Jubouri, belongs. Obeidi
accused Jubouri, among others, of corruption when he was
questioned about corruption in the military. This exposed a rift
among Sunnis, which Maliki was able to exploit to get enough
Sunnis to vote against Obeidi. Notably, Osama al-Nujaifi, former
Speaker of the House, and Atheel al-Nujaifi, the former governor of
Ninewa Province, of which Mosul is the capital, are prominent
leaders in Mutahidun – and presumably hope to have a leading role in Ninewa after its
liberation.
Further, the vote set a dangerous precedent, with Obeidi ousted by a simple majority of
142 to 102, with 263 abstaining. This simple majority, of only those who voted, is a much
lower bar, which would have required 165 votes to dismiss Obeidi. The issue now is that
other Ministers become vulnerable, including Finance Minister Hoshyar Zebari, who seems
to be next in Maliki’s sites. The issue here is that there is also an internal split among Kurds in
parliament, with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and Gorran parties having just come
together to counter the dominant Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). This gives Maliki an
opportunity to do the same against the Kurds that he did to the Sunnis, getting half of
them to vote against Zebari, who is a member of the KDP. Further, the KDP is leading the
peshmerga effort against Mosul, with PUK peshmerga more prominent in Sulaimaniya and
Kirkuk, further west (see map in Figure 1 above).
The issue with Mosul is that not all of this maneuvering comes at a time that the two major
minorities in Iraq – the Kurds and the Sunnis – could end up jockeying for influence in Mosul,
and potentially portends Maliki making a play to regain influence in Baghdad at Abadi’s
expense. Thus, the future of Mosul, with all of its ethnic diversity, could end up being
complicated not only by military jockeying on the ground, but also by conspiracies among
different ethnic groups in Baghdad. The maneuvering could not only paralyze the
attempts to re-integrate Mosul, with both the Ministry of Defense and Interior without their
official leaders, but also could end up changing the balance of power among and within
the various ethnic and religious groups that will compete in Mosul.
Maliki exploited a
split among the
Sunni blocs in the
Council of
Representatives
(CoR) to oust
Obeidi

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Implications for Baghdad-Erbil relations
What results from these various movements is a very complex situation, to say the least. The
situation on the ground in Mosul and the political situations in Baghdad and Erbil could
create substantial feedback loops among them. As a result, all of the three situations will
need to be monitored to understand how the Baghdad-Erbil relationship will play out. We
would look to the following indicators among the three areas and how they might
influence Baghdad-Erbil:
o Military and political power on the ground in Mosul and outlying areas.
• The Kurds seem to generally agree to a support role
in the assault on Mosul, but there is still evidence
that they intend to press for leverage. So we would
watch how they move to see if they gain strength or
leverage out of their troops’ positioning around
Mosul. Importantly, as a sub-group, we would watch
Yazidi, Christian, and other minorities in Ninewa,
especially in the plains between Erbil and Mosul and
between Duhok and Sinjar, as these minorities play
a delicate balancing act between the more
dominant Sunni Arabs in Ninewa and the Kurds. They
may end up trying to use the Kurds to help secure themselves against the
Sunni majority – and the Kurds will likely try to use them to secure more
influence and legitimacy in Ninewa province.
• The ISF are leading the way into Mosul, and the stronger they are, the better
and more comfortable it will be for the Sunni Arabs in Mosul. The ISF are also
more likely to be a predictable ally for the coalition and to impose a more
consistent rule of law in Mosul. If the ISF start to lose influence, that may not be
good for the stability of Mosul after it is recaptured.
• The PMUs are generally far in the background and the least influential, at least
on the surface, in the plans to take Mosul. It is in Abadi’s interest, and in the
interest of Sunnis in Mosul, that they stay that way. If they start to try to push
into Mosul and gain influence, it could create problems in the city.
• Expect the two Nujaifi brothers to push for power and influence in Mosul and
Ninewa once Mosul is reclaimed. They will try to claim legitimacy as one of the
previous leading families within Ninewa (as well as Anbar). However, it remains
to be seen how well the Sunni population will support them, as some may see
them as not having done much to help them when Anbar and Ninewa were
occupied by IS. There will also be a synergistic relationship between the local
support they are able to gain and their power and support they are able to
gain in Baghdad. If they are able to gain support in Baghdad, it will help them
bring aid to Ninewa, and gain support there, and vice versa.
The Kurds seem to
generally agree to
a support role in
Mosul, but there is
still evidence that
they intend to
press for leverage

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o Baghdad politics.
• The first influence of Mosul on Baghdad is that it could help spur the splits in
political blocs in Baghdad. As Mutahidun and the IIP, and to a lesser extent,
the PUK and KDP, fight over influence in Mosul, this
will influence politics in Baghdad. This fight will
determine who is driving the relationship that
Ninewa and the Kurdistan Region have with the
federal government, and how much money and
other support flows between the federal budget
and those regions. In the case of Ninewa, it is aid
money for reconstruction; in the case of Erbil it is
the Kurdistan Region’s budgetary allocation and
the all-important division of oil revenues. The fate of
Mosul could influence both questions.
• The other piece is how Mosul politics could affect the balance of power
between the current Prime Minister, Abadi, and his rival, Maliki, who appears
to be attempting a comeback at Abadi’s expense. If Maliki can exploit the
divisions among the Kurds to get Finance Minister Zebari dismissed, the same
way he used the Sunni divisions to get Defense Minister Obeidi dismissed, he
will start to gain traction as a power broker in Parliament, at Abadi’s expense.
However, the Kurds may see Maliki’s plan and try to block it by remaining
united at the national level, even as they continue to compete within
Kurdistan.
• Lastly, the appearance of a success or failure in the battle of Mosul could
weaken or strengthen Prime Minister Abadi. Maliki would likely benefit if Abadi
is weakened, as he tries to make his comeback. The loss of the Defense
Minister helps Maliki’s cause; however, it does appear that the ISF have gained
valuable experience and has other strong leadership that can step into
Obeidi’s shoes.
o Erbil politics.
• The politics in Erbil are likely to influence and be influenced by the battle for
Mosul. Mainly, the Mosul battle would seem to increase the influence of the
KDP, as their peshmerga are at the forefront of that battle, and presumably
any influence over local minority Yazidi, Christian, and other populations would
be a benefit to the KDP. To the extent that the PUK peshmerga can
participate, they may gain some influence, but geographically, the KDP has a
greater advantage. If this helps the KDP influence these minority parties in
Baghdad, it could help the KDP maintain its influence there – and counteract
the PUK and Gorran there. And of course, the continued strength of the KDP
with these minority groups, and to the extent that the KDP can position
themselves as a strong advocate for them, the more leverage the KDP can
have in both Kurdistan and national politics.
Mosul could help
drive splits in the
political blocs in
parliament in
Baghdad

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• And extremely important for Erbil is the strength of Maliki in Baghdad. Maliki has
historically been a fierce opponent of Kurdish moves towards autonomy,
especially over oil. As a result, the Kurds should be fiercely opposed to any
return of Maliki’s influence. This works both ways. The Kurds have every interest
in presenting a united front against Maliki in Baghdad (for instance, in keeping
Zebari as Finance Minister). And conversely, if Maliki gains more influence in
Baghdad, it could be bad for Erbil-Baghdad relations, as one would expect a
return to the historically contentious and argumentative relationship between
the two.

11. The Battle to Retake Mosul: Political and Economic Implications
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