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INTERNET KEY
  EXCHANGE
  PROTOCOL
              PRESENTED BY
       PRATEEK SINGH BAPNA
Internet Key Exchange (IKE)

Described in RFC 2409
Used for Key Management in IPSec Networks
Allows automatic negotiation and creation of IPSec
SAs between IPSec Peers
IKE History

IKE is a hybrid protocol based on:
  ISAKMP (RFC 2408), the protocol for negotiated
  establishment of security associations
  Oakley (RFC 2412), the key agreement/exchange
  protocol
  SKEME, another key exchange protocol
ISAKMP

Expands as Internet Security Association and Key
Management Protocol
Establishes a secure management session between
IPSec peers
Negotiates SAs between IPSec peers
Oakley Protocol

Defines the mechanisms for key exchange over the
IKE session
Determines AH/ESP keying material for each IPSec SA
automatically
By default, it uses an authenticated Diffie-Hellman
Algorithm for key exchange
Diffie-Hellman Algorithm

Algorithm for secure key exchange over unsecured
channels
Based on the difficulty of finding discreet algorithms
Used to establish a shared secret between parties
(usually the secret keys for symmetric encryption or
HMACs)
Diffie-Hellman Algorithm
         (Contd.)
Diffie-Hellman in Action

A   Private Value, X
    Public Value, Y

                                         Private Value, X
                                         Public Value, Y    B

                       (Shared Secret)
IPSec and IKE Relationship

IPSec needs SAs to protect traffic
If no SAs are in place, IPSec will ask IKE to provide
IPSec SAs
IKE opens a management session with relevant peer,
and negotiates all SAs and keying material for IPSec
IPSec protects traffic
IPSec and IKE Relationship
             (Contd.)
1. Outbound packet from A to B, no SA
                       4. Packet is sent from A to B protected by IPSec SA

             IPSec
                                                          IPSec
               A
                                                            B
A’s Laptop                                                         B’s Laptop



              IKE                                          IKE
               A                IKE Session                 B

2. A’s IKE begins negotiations with B’s
             3. Negotiations complete, A and B now have complete SAs in place
IKE Protocol

An IKE session runs over UDP (source and destination
port 500)
IKE session establishment results in the creation of IKE
SAs
IKE then establishes all requested IPSec SAs on
demand
IKE Session Protocol

IKE sessions are protected by cryptographic
algorithms/protocols
The peers need to agree on a bundle of algorithms and
protocols, known as IKE protection suites, to protect
the IKE session
Protection suites can be Encryption Algorithm,
Hashing MAC Algorithm, Peer Authentication
Procedure, DH group for Initial Key Exchange, SA
Lifetime
IKE Phases and Modes

IKE has 2 phases:
• IKE Phase 1
  o Uses main or aggressive mode exchange
  o Negotiates IKE SA
• IKE Phase 2
  o Uses quick mode exchange
  o Negotiates IPSec SAs
Phase 1 Attributes
Phase 2 Attributes

Group Description (for PFS)
Encryption Algorithm (if any)
• Key Length
• Key Rounds
Group Description (for PFS)
Life duration (seconds and/or kilobytes)
Encapsulation mode (transport or tunnel)
Why Two-Phase Design?

Expensive 1st phase creates main SA
Cheaper 2nd phase allows to create multiple child SA
(based on main SA) between same hosts
IKE Peer Authentication

To establish the IKE SA, peers have to authenticate
each other (two way)
3 defined mechanisms:
• Pre-shared keys
• RSA encrypted nonce
• RSA signatures
IKE Session Encryption

IKE session is encrypted either by DES or 3DES
Keying material is generally derived from the initial DH
change
In main mode, peer identity is also encrypted
IKE Session Integrity

IKE uses HMAC functions to guarantee session
integrity
Choice between keyed SHA-1 and MD5
Keying material is generally derived from the initial DH
exchange
Other Aspects of IKE

Interaction with other network protocols
Error handling
Protocol management
Legacy authentication
THANK YOU !!!

   QUERIES???

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Internet Key Exchange Protocol

  • 1. INTERNET KEY EXCHANGE PROTOCOL PRESENTED BY PRATEEK SINGH BAPNA
  • 2. Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Described in RFC 2409 Used for Key Management in IPSec Networks Allows automatic negotiation and creation of IPSec SAs between IPSec Peers
  • 3. IKE History IKE is a hybrid protocol based on: ISAKMP (RFC 2408), the protocol for negotiated establishment of security associations Oakley (RFC 2412), the key agreement/exchange protocol SKEME, another key exchange protocol
  • 4. ISAKMP Expands as Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol Establishes a secure management session between IPSec peers Negotiates SAs between IPSec peers
  • 5. Oakley Protocol Defines the mechanisms for key exchange over the IKE session Determines AH/ESP keying material for each IPSec SA automatically By default, it uses an authenticated Diffie-Hellman Algorithm for key exchange
  • 6. Diffie-Hellman Algorithm Algorithm for secure key exchange over unsecured channels Based on the difficulty of finding discreet algorithms Used to establish a shared secret between parties (usually the secret keys for symmetric encryption or HMACs)
  • 8. Diffie-Hellman in Action A Private Value, X Public Value, Y Private Value, X Public Value, Y B (Shared Secret)
  • 9. IPSec and IKE Relationship IPSec needs SAs to protect traffic If no SAs are in place, IPSec will ask IKE to provide IPSec SAs IKE opens a management session with relevant peer, and negotiates all SAs and keying material for IPSec IPSec protects traffic
  • 10. IPSec and IKE Relationship (Contd.) 1. Outbound packet from A to B, no SA 4. Packet is sent from A to B protected by IPSec SA IPSec IPSec A B A’s Laptop B’s Laptop IKE IKE A IKE Session B 2. A’s IKE begins negotiations with B’s 3. Negotiations complete, A and B now have complete SAs in place
  • 11. IKE Protocol An IKE session runs over UDP (source and destination port 500) IKE session establishment results in the creation of IKE SAs IKE then establishes all requested IPSec SAs on demand
  • 12. IKE Session Protocol IKE sessions are protected by cryptographic algorithms/protocols The peers need to agree on a bundle of algorithms and protocols, known as IKE protection suites, to protect the IKE session Protection suites can be Encryption Algorithm, Hashing MAC Algorithm, Peer Authentication Procedure, DH group for Initial Key Exchange, SA Lifetime
  • 13. IKE Phases and Modes IKE has 2 phases: • IKE Phase 1 o Uses main or aggressive mode exchange o Negotiates IKE SA • IKE Phase 2 o Uses quick mode exchange o Negotiates IPSec SAs
  • 15. Phase 2 Attributes Group Description (for PFS) Encryption Algorithm (if any) • Key Length • Key Rounds Group Description (for PFS) Life duration (seconds and/or kilobytes) Encapsulation mode (transport or tunnel)
  • 16. Why Two-Phase Design? Expensive 1st phase creates main SA Cheaper 2nd phase allows to create multiple child SA (based on main SA) between same hosts
  • 17. IKE Peer Authentication To establish the IKE SA, peers have to authenticate each other (two way) 3 defined mechanisms: • Pre-shared keys • RSA encrypted nonce • RSA signatures
  • 18. IKE Session Encryption IKE session is encrypted either by DES or 3DES Keying material is generally derived from the initial DH change In main mode, peer identity is also encrypted
  • 19. IKE Session Integrity IKE uses HMAC functions to guarantee session integrity Choice between keyed SHA-1 and MD5 Keying material is generally derived from the initial DH exchange
  • 20. Other Aspects of IKE Interaction with other network protocols Error handling Protocol management Legacy authentication
  • 21. THANK YOU !!! QUERIES???