The document discusses a research seminar aimed at galvanizing contributions to ongoing evidence-policy controversies. It examines questions around replication, incentives for open science, and issues with p-values and significance testing. It provides historical context on Fisher, Neyman, and Pearson in 1919 and discusses their later development of Neyman-Pearson tests, which put Fisherian tests on a logical footing. It also discusses criticisms of p-values like their inability to measure effect sizes and issues around large sample sizes. The document emphasizes evaluating evidence for discrepancies from the null based on the severity of tests.
Mayo Slides: Part I Meeting #2 (Phil 6334/Econ 6614)jemille6
Slides Meeting #2 (Phil 6334/Econ 6614: Current Debates on Statistical Inference and Modeling (D. Mayo and A. Spanos)
Part I: Bernoulli trials: Plane Jane Version
The following presentation is an introduction to the Algebraic Methods – part one for level 4 Mathematics. This resources is a part of the 2009/2010 Engineering (foundation degree, BEng and HN) courses from University of Wales Newport (course codes H101, H691, H620, HH37 and 001H). This resource is a part of the core modules for the full time 1st year undergraduate programme.
The BEng & Foundation Degrees and HNC/D in Engineering are designed to meet the needs of employers by placing the emphasis on the theoretical, practical and vocational aspects of engineering within the workplace and beyond. Engineering is becoming more high profile, and therefore more in demand as a skill set, in today’s high-tech world. This course has been designed to provide you with knowledge, skills and practical experience encountered in everyday engineering environments.
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Chapter 8: Hypothesis Testing
8.3: Testing a Claim About a Mean
Statistical inference: Probability and DistributionEugene Yan Ziyou
This deck was used in the IDA facilitation of the John Hopkins' Data Science Specialization course for Statistical Inference. It covers the topics in week 1 (probability) and week 2 (distribution).
Please Subscribe to this Channel for more solutions and lectures
http://www.youtube.com/onlineteaching
Chapter 5: Discrete Probability Distribution
5.2 - Binomial Probability Distributions
Solution to the practice test ch 8 hypothesis testing ch 9 two populationsLong Beach City College
Please Subscribe to this Channel for more solutions and lectures
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Elementary Statistics Practice Test 4
Module 4:
Chapter 8, Hypothesis Testing
Chapter 9: Two Populations
Mayo Slides: Part I Meeting #2 (Phil 6334/Econ 6614)jemille6
Slides Meeting #2 (Phil 6334/Econ 6614: Current Debates on Statistical Inference and Modeling (D. Mayo and A. Spanos)
Part I: Bernoulli trials: Plane Jane Version
The following presentation is an introduction to the Algebraic Methods – part one for level 4 Mathematics. This resources is a part of the 2009/2010 Engineering (foundation degree, BEng and HN) courses from University of Wales Newport (course codes H101, H691, H620, HH37 and 001H). This resource is a part of the core modules for the full time 1st year undergraduate programme.
The BEng & Foundation Degrees and HNC/D in Engineering are designed to meet the needs of employers by placing the emphasis on the theoretical, practical and vocational aspects of engineering within the workplace and beyond. Engineering is becoming more high profile, and therefore more in demand as a skill set, in today’s high-tech world. This course has been designed to provide you with knowledge, skills and practical experience encountered in everyday engineering environments.
Please Subscribe to this Channel for more solutions and lectures
http://www.youtube.com/onlineteaching
Chapter 8: Hypothesis Testing
8.3: Testing a Claim About a Mean
Statistical inference: Probability and DistributionEugene Yan Ziyou
This deck was used in the IDA facilitation of the John Hopkins' Data Science Specialization course for Statistical Inference. It covers the topics in week 1 (probability) and week 2 (distribution).
Please Subscribe to this Channel for more solutions and lectures
http://www.youtube.com/onlineteaching
Chapter 5: Discrete Probability Distribution
5.2 - Binomial Probability Distributions
Solution to the practice test ch 8 hypothesis testing ch 9 two populationsLong Beach City College
Please Subscribe to this Channel for more solutions and lectures
http://www.youtube.com/onlineteaching
Elementary Statistics Practice Test 4
Module 4:
Chapter 8, Hypothesis Testing
Chapter 9: Two Populations
Descriptive Statistics Formula Sheet Sample Populatio.docxsimonithomas47935
Descriptive Statistics Formula Sheet
Sample Population
Characteristic statistic Parameter
raw scores x, y, . . . . . X, Y, . . . . .
mean (central tendency) M =
∑ x
n
μ =
∑ X
N
range (interval/ratio data) highest minus lowest value highest minus lowest value
deviation (distance from mean) Deviation = (x − M ) Deviation = (X − μ )
average deviation (average
distance from mean)
∑(x − M )
n
= 0
∑(X − μ )
N
sum of the squares (SS)
(computational formula) SS = ∑ x
2 −
(∑ x)2
n
SS = ∑ X2 −
(∑ X)2
N
variance ( average deviation2 or
standard deviation
2
)
(computational formula)
s2 =
∑ x2 −
(∑ x)2
n
n − 1
=
SS
df
σ2 =
∑ X2 −
(∑ X)2
N
N
standard deviation (average
deviation or distance from mean)
(computational formula) s =
√∑ x
2 −
(∑ x)2
n
n − 1
σ =
√∑ X
2 −
(∑ X)2
N
N
Z scores (standard scores)
mean = 0
standard deviation = ± 1.0
Z =
x − M
s
=
deviation
stand. dev.
X = M + Zs
Z =
X − μ
σ
X = μ + Zσ
Area Under the Normal Curve -1s to +1s = 68.3%
-2s to +2s = 95.4%
-3s to +3s = 99.7%
Using Z Score Table for Normal Distribution
(Note: see graph and table in A-23)
for percentiles (proportion or %) below X
for positive Z scores – use body column
for negative Z scores – use tail column
for proportions or percentage above X
for positive Z scores – use tail column
for negative Z scores – use body column
to discover percentage / proportion between two X values
1. Convert each X to Z score
2. Find appropriate area (body or tail) for each Z score
3. Subtract or add areas as appropriate
4. Change area to % (area × 100 = %)
Regression lines
(central tendency line for all
points; used for predictions
only) formula uses raw
scores
b = slope
a = y-intercept
y = bx + a
(plug in x
to predict y)
b =
∑ xy −
(∑ x)(∑ y)
n
∑ x2 −
(∑ x)2
n
a = My - bMx
where My is mean of y
and Mx is mean of x
SEest (measures accuracy of predictions; same properties as standard deviation)
Pearson Correlation Coefficient
(used to measure relationship;
uses Z scores)
r =
∑ xy−
(∑ x)(∑ y)
n
√(∑ x2−
(∑ x)2
n
)(∑ y2−
(∑ y)2
n
)
r =
degree x & 𝑦 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑡𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟
degree x & 𝑦 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑦
r
2
= estimate or % of accuracy of predictions
PSYC 2317 Mark W. Tengler, M.S.
Assignment #9
Hypothesis Testing
9.1 Briefly explain in your own words the advantage of using an alpha level (α) = .01
versus an α = .05. In general, what is the disadvantage of using a smaller alpha
level?
9.2 Discuss in your own words the errors that can be made in hypothesis testing.
a. What is a type I error? Why might it occur?
b. What is a type II error? How does it happen?
9.3 The term error is used in two different ways in the context of a hypothesis test.
First, there is the concept of sta
The signed-rank test, also known as the Wilcoxon signed-rank test, is a non-parametric statistical test used to compare two related or paired samples. It is an alternative to the paired t-test when the assumptions of the t-test are not met, such as when the data is not normally distributed or when outliers are present.
The signed-rank test is typically used when the data is measured on an ordinal or interval scale. It tests whether the median difference between the paired observations is significantly different from zero. The test does not assume any specific distribution of the data, making it robust against violations of normality assumptions.
Here's a step-by-step overview of how the signed-rank test is conducted:
1. Hypotheses:
- Null Hypothesis (H₀): There is no significant difference between the paired observations.
- Alternative Hypothesis (H₁): There is a significant difference between the paired observations.
2. Data Preparation:
- Take the differences between the paired observations.
- Discard any zero differences (no change) as they do not contribute to the test.
3. Rank the Absolute Differences:
- Rank the absolute differences, disregarding the sign.
- Assign the smallest absolute difference the rank of 1, the second smallest the rank of 2, and so on.
- If there are ties (two or more absolute differences are equal), assign the average rank to each tied observation.
4. Calculate the Test Statistic:
- Calculate the sum of the ranks of the positive differences (R⁺) and the sum of the ranks of the negative differences (R⁻).
- Take the smaller of R⁺ and R⁻ as the test statistic (T).
5. Calculate the Critical Value:
- Determine the critical value or p-value associated with the chosen significance level (e.g., α = 0.05) from the signed-rank table or using statistical software.
6. Compare the Test Statistic with the Critical Value:
- If the absolute value of the test statistic (|T|) is greater than or equal to the critical value, reject the null hypothesis. There is sufficient evidence to conclude that there is a significant difference between the paired observations.
- If the absolute value of the test statistic is less than the critical value, fail to reject the null hypothesis. There is not enough evidence to conclude a significant difference between the paired observations.
Reporting Results:
When reporting the results of the signed-rank test, it is common to include the test statistic (T), the p-value, and the decision (reject or fail to reject the null hypothesis) based on the chosen significance level.
Additionally, you may provide information about the direction and magnitude of the effect, along with any effect size measures used.
Remember, it's always a good practice to consult with a statistician or data analysis expert to ensure you are selecting the appropriate statistical test and correctly interpreting the results for your specific research or analysis.
It's important to note that
I am Ben R. I am a Statistics Assignment Expert at statisticshomeworkhelper.com. I hold a Ph.D. in Statistics, from University of Denver, USA. I have been helping students with their homework for the past 5 years. I solve assignments related to Statistics.
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Statistical inference: Hypothesis Testing and t-testsEugene Yan Ziyou
This deck was used in the IDA facilitation of the John Hopkins' Data Science Specialization course for Statistical Inference. It covers the topics in week 3 (hypothesis testing and t tests).
The data and R script for the lab session can be found here: https://github.com/eugeneyan/Statistical-Inference
I am Jacinta Lawrence Currently associated with statisticsassignmenthelp.com as a Probability and Statistics assignment helper. After completing my master's from Princeton University, USA. I was in search of an opportunity that would expand my area of knowledge hence I decided to help students with their assignments. I have written several statistics assignments to date to help students overcome numerous difficulties they face.
Uncertainty & Probability
Baye's rule
Choosing Hypotheses- Maximum a posteriori
Maximum Likelihood - Baye's concept learning
Maximum Likelihood of real valued function
Bayes optimal Classifier
Joint distributions
Naive Bayes Classifier
Test of significance (t-test, proportion test, chi-square test)Ramnath Takiar
The presentation discusses the concept of test of significance including the test of significance examples of t-test, proportion test and chi-square test.
“The importance of philosophy of science for statistical science and vice versa”jemille6
My paper “The importance of philosophy of science for statistical science and vice
versa” presented (zoom) at the conference: IS PHILOSOPHY USEFUL FOR SCIENCE, AND/OR VICE VERSA? January 30 - February 2, 2024 at Chapman University, Schmid College of Science and Technology.
Statistical Inference as Severe Testing: Beyond Performance and Probabilismjemille6
A talk given by Deborah G Mayo
(Dept of Philosophy, Virginia Tech) to the Seminar in Advanced Research Methods at the Dept of Psychology, Princeton University on
November 14, 2023
TITLE: Statistical Inference as Severe Testing: Beyond Probabilism and Performance
ABSTRACT: I develop a statistical philosophy in which error probabilities of methods may be used to evaluate and control the stringency or severity of tests. A claim is severely tested to the extent it has been subjected to and passes a test that probably would have found flaws, were they present. The severe-testing requirement leads to reformulating statistical significance tests to avoid familiar criticisms and abuses. While high-profile failures of replication in the social and biological sciences stem from biasing selection effects—data dredging, multiple testing, optional stopping—some reforms and proposed alternatives to statistical significance tests conflict with the error control that is required to satisfy severity. I discuss recent arguments to redefine, abandon, or replace statistical significance.
D. Mayo (Dept of Philosophy, VT)
Sir David Cox’s Statistical Philosophy and Its Relevance to Today’s Statistical Controversies
ABSTRACT: This talk will explain Sir David Cox's views of the nature and importance of statistical foundations and their relevance to today's controversies about statistical inference, particularly in using statistical significance testing and confidence intervals. Two key themes of Cox's statistical philosophy are: first, the importance of calibrating methods by considering their behavior in (actual or hypothetical) repeated sampling, and second, ensuring the calibration is relevant to the specific data and inquiry. A question that arises is: How can the frequentist calibration provide a genuinely epistemic assessment of what is learned from data? Building on our jointly written papers, Mayo and Cox (2006) and Cox and Mayo (2010), I will argue that relevant error probabilities may serve to assess how well-corroborated or severely tested statistical claims are.
Nancy Reid, Dept. of Statistics, University of Toronto. Inaugural receiptant of the "David R. Cox Foundations of Statistics Award".
Slides from Invited presentation at 2023 JSM: “The Importance of Foundations in Statistical Science“
Ronald Wasserstein, Chair (American Statistical Association)
ABSTRACT: David Cox wrote “A healthy interplay between theory and application is crucial for statistics… This is particularly the case when by theory we mean foundations of statistical analysis, rather than the theoretical analysis of specific statistical methods.” These foundations distinguish statistical science from the many fields of research in which statistical thinking is a key intellectual component. In this talk I will emphasize the ongoing importance and relevance of theoretical advances and theoretical thinking through some illustrative examples.
Errors of the Error Gatekeepers: The case of Statistical Significance 2016-2022jemille6
ABSTRACT: Statistical significance tests serve in gatekeeping against being fooled by randomness, but recent attempts to gatekeep these tools have themselves malfunctioned. Warranted gatekeepers formulate statistical tests so as to avoid fallacies and misuses of P-values. They highlight how multiplicity, optional stopping, and data-dredging can readily invalidate error probabilities. It is unwarranted, however, to argue that statistical significance and P-value thresholds be abandoned because they can be misused. Nor is it warranted to argue for abandoning statistical significance based on presuppositions about evidence and probability that are at odds with those underlying statistical significance tests. When statistical gatekeeping malfunctions, I argue, it undermines a central role to which scientists look to statistics. In order to combat the dangers of unthinking, bandwagon effects, statistical practitioners and consumers need to be in a position to critically evaluate the ramifications of proposed "reforms” (“stat activism”). I analyze what may be learned from three recent episodes of gatekeeping (and meta-gatekeeping) at the American Statistical Association (ASA).
Causal inference is not statistical inferencejemille6
Jon Williamson (University of Kent)
ABSTRACT: Many methods for testing causal claims are couched as statistical methods: e.g.,
randomised controlled trials, various kinds of observational study, meta-analysis, and
model-based approaches such as structural equation modelling and graphical causal
modelling. I argue that this is a mistake: causal inference is not a purely statistical
problem. When we look at causal inference from a general point of view, we see that
methods for causal inference fit into the framework of Evidential Pluralism: causal
inference is properly understood as requiring mechanistic inference in addition to
statistical inference.
Evidential Pluralism also offers a new perspective on the replication crisis. That
observed associations are not replicated by subsequent studies is a part of normal
science. A problem only arises when those associations are taken to establish causal
claims: a science whose established causal claims are constantly overturned is indeed
in crisis. However, if we understand causal inference as involving mechanistic inference
alongside statistical inference, as Evidential Pluralism suggests, we avoid fallacious
inferences from association to causation. Thus, Evidential Pluralism offers the means to
prevent the drama of science from turning into a crisis.
Stephan Guttinger (Lecturer in Philosophy of Data/Data Ethics, University of Exeter, UK)
ABSTRACT: The idea of “questionable research practices” (QRPs) is central to the narrative of a replication crisis in the experimental sciences. According to this narrative the low replicability of scientific findings is not simply due to fraud or incompetence, but in large part to the widespread use of QRPs, such as “p-hacking” or the lack of adequate experimental controls. The claim is that such flawed practices generate flawed output. The reduction – or even elimination – of QRPs is therefore one of the main strategies proposed by policymakers and scientists to tackle the replication crisis.
What counts as a QRP, however, is not clear. As I will discuss in the first part of this paper, there is no consensus on how to define the term, and ascriptions of the qualifier “questionable” often vary across disciplines, time, and even within single laboratories. This lack of clarity matters as it creates the risk of introducing methodological constraints that might create more harm than good. Practices labelled as ‘QRPs’ can be both beneficial and problematic for research practice and targeting them without a sound understanding of their dynamic and context-dependent nature risks creating unnecessary casualties in the fight for a more reliable scientific practice.
To start developing a more situated and dynamic picture of QRPs I will then turn my attention to a specific example of a dynamic QRP in the experimental life sciences, namely, the so-called “Far Western Blot” (FWB). The FWB is an experimental system that can be used to study protein-protein interactions but which for most of its existence has not seen a wide uptake in the community because it was seen as a QRP. This was mainly due to its (alleged) propensity to generate high levels of false positives and negatives. Interestingly, however, it seems that over the last few years the FWB slowly moved into the space of acceptable research practices. Analysing this shift and the reasons underlying it, I will argue a) that suppressing this practice deprived the research community of a powerful experimental tool and b) that the original judgment of the FWB was based on a simplistic and non-empirical assessment of its error-generating potential. Ultimately, it seems like the key QRP at work in the FWB case was the way in which the label “questionable” was assigned in the first place. I will argue that findings from this case can be extended to other QRPs in the experimental life sciences and that they point to a larger issue with how researchers judge the error-potential of new research practices.
David Hand (Professor Emeritus and Senior Research Investigator, Department of Mathematics,
Faculty of Natural Sciences, Imperial College London.)
ABSTRACT: Science progresses through an iterative process of formulating theories and comparing
them with empirical real-world data. Different camps of scientists will favour different
theories, until accumulating evidence renders one or more untenable. Not unnaturally,
people become attached to theories. Perhaps they invented a theory, and kudos arises
from being the originator of a generally accepted theory. A theory might represent a
life's work, so that being found wanting might be interpreted as failure. Perhaps
researchers were trained in a particular school, and acknowledging its shortcomings is
difficult. Because of this, tensions can arise between proponents of different theories.
The discipline of statistics is susceptible to precisely the same tensions. Here, however,
the tensions are not between different theories of "what is", but between different
strategies for shedding light on the real world from limited empirical data. This can be in
the form of how one measures discrepancy between the theory's predictions and
observations. It can be in the form of different ways of looking at empirical results. It can
be, at a higher level, because of differences between what is regarded as important in a
particular context. Or it can be for other reasons.
Perhaps the most familiar example of this tension within statistics is between different
approaches to inference. However, there are many other examples of such tensions.
This paper illustrates with several examples. We argue that the tension generally arises
as a consequence of inadequate care being taken in question formulation. That is,
insufficient thought is given to deciding exactly what one wants to know - to determining
"What is the question?".
The ideas and disagreements are illustrated with several examples.
The neglected importance of complexity in statistics and Metasciencejemille6
Daniele Fanelli
London School of Economics Fellow in Quantitative Methodology, Department of
Methodology, London School of Economics and Political Science.
ABSTRACT: Statistics is at war, and Metascience is ailing. This is partially due, the talk will argue, to
a paradigmatic blind-spot: the assumption that one can draw general conclusions about
empirical findings without considering the role played by context, conditions,
assumptions, and the complexity of methods and theories. Whilst ideally these
particularities should be unimportant in science, in practice they cannot be neglected in
most research fields, let alone in research-on-research.
This neglected importance of complexity is supported by theoretical arguments and
empirical findings (or the lack thereof) in the recent meta-analytical and metascientific
literature. The talk will overview this background and suggest how the complexity of
theories and methodologies may be explicitly factored into particular methodologies of
statistics and Metaresearch. The talk will then give examples of how this approach may
usefully complement existing paradigms, by translating results, methods and theories
into quantities of information that are evaluated using an information-compression logic.
Mathematically Elegant Answers to Research Questions No One is Asking (meta-a...jemille6
Uri Simonsohn (Professor, Department of Operations, Innovation and Data Sciences at Esade)
ABSTRACT: The statistical tools listed in the title share that a mathematically elegant solution has
become the consensus advice of statisticians, methodologists and some
mathematically sophisticated researchers writing tutorials and textbooks, and yet,
they lead research workers to meaningless answers, that are often also statistically
invalid. Part of the problem is that advice givers take the mathematical abstractions
of the tools they advocate for literally, instead of taking the actual behavior of
researchers seriously.
On Severity, the Weight of Evidence, and the Relationship Between the Twojemille6
Margherita Harris
Visiting fellow in the Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method at the London
School of Economics and Political Science.
ABSTRACT: According to the severe tester, one is justified in declaring to have evidence in support of a
hypothesis just in case the hypothesis in question has passed a severe test, one that it would be very
unlikely to pass so well if the hypothesis were false. Deborah Mayo (2018) calls this the strong
severity principle. The Bayesian, however, can declare to have evidence for a hypothesis despite not
having done anything to test it severely. The core reason for this has to do with the
(infamous) likelihood principle, whose violation is not an option for anyone who subscribes to the
Bayesian paradigm. Although the Bayesian is largely unmoved by the incompatibility between
the strong severity principle and the likelihood principle, I will argue that the Bayesian’s never-ending
quest to account for yet an other notion, one that is often attributed to Keynes (1921) and that is
usually referred to as the weight of evidence, betrays the Bayesian’s confidence in the likelihood
principle after all. Indeed, I will argue that the weight of evidence and severity may be thought of as
two (very different) sides of the same coin: they are two unrelated notions, but what brings them
together is the fact that they both make trouble for the likelihood principle, a principle at the core of
Bayesian inference. I will relate this conclusion to current debates on how to best conceptualise
uncertainty by the IPCC in particular. I will argue that failure to fully grasp the limitations of an
epistemology that envisions the role of probability to be that of quantifying the degree of belief to
assign to a hypothesis given the available evidence can be (and has been) detrimental to an
adequate communication of uncertainty.
Revisiting the Two Cultures in Statistical Modeling and Inference as they rel...jemille6
Aris Spanos (Wilson Schmidt Professor of Economics, Virginia Tech)
ABSTRACT: The discussion places the two cultures, the model-driven statistical modeling and the
algorithm-driven modeling associated with Machine Learning (ML) and Statistical
Learning Theory (SLT) in a broader context of paradigm shifts in 20th-century statistics,
which includes Fisher’s model-based induction of the 1920s and variations/extensions
thereof, the Data Science (ML, STL, etc.) and the Graphical Causal modeling in the
1990s. The primary objective is to compare and contrast the effectiveness of different
approaches to statistics in learning from data about phenomena of interest and relate
that to the current discussions pertaining to the statistics wars and their potential
casualties.
Comparing Frequentists and Bayesian Control of Multiple Testingjemille6
James Berger
ABSTRACT: A problem that is common to many sciences is that of having to deal with a multiplicity of statistical inferences. For instance, in GWAS (Genome Wide Association Studies), an experiment might consider 20 diseases and 100,000 genes, and conduct statistical tests of the 20x100,000=2,000,000 null hypotheses that a specific disease is associated with a specific gene. The issue is that selective reporting of only the ‘highly significant’ results could lead to many claimed disease/gene associations that turn out to be false, simply because of statistical randomness. In 2007, the seriousness of this problem was recognized in GWAS and extremely stringent standards were employed to resolve it. Indeed, it was recommended that tests for association should be conducted at an error probability of 5 x 10—7. Particle physicists similarly learned that a discovery would be reliably replicated only if the p-value of the relevant test was less than 5.7 x 10—7. This was because they had to account for a huge number of multiplicities in their analyses. Other sciences have continuing issues with multiplicity. In the Social Sciences, p-hacking and data dredging are common, which involve multiple analyses of data. Stopping rules in social sciences are often ignored, even though it has been known since 1933 that, if one keeps collecting data and computing the p-value, one is guaranteed to obtain a p-value less than 0.05 (or, indeed, any specified value), even if the null hypothesis is true. In medical studies that occur with strong oversight (e.g., by the FDA), control for multiplicity is mandated. There is also typically a large amount of replication, resulting in meta-analysis. But there are many situations where multiplicity is not handled well, such as subgroup analysis: one first tests for an overall treatment effect in the population; failing to find that, one tests for an effect among men or among women; failing to find that, one tests for an effect among old men or young men, or among old women or young women; …. I will argue that there is a single method that can address any such problems of multiplicity: Bayesian analysis, with the multiplicity being addressed through choice of prior probabilities of hypotheses. ... There are, of course, also frequentist error approaches (such as Bonferroni and FDR) for handling multiplicity of statistical inferences; indeed, these are much more familiar than the Bayesian approach. These are, however, targeted solutions for specific classes of problems and are not easily generalizable to new problems.
Clark Glamour
ABSTRACT: "Data dredging"--searching non experimental data for causal and other relationships and taking that same data to be evidence for those relationships--was historically common in the natural sciences--the works of Kepler, Cannizzaro and Mendeleev are examples. Nowadays, "data dredging"--using data to bring hypotheses into consideration and regarding that same data as evidence bearing on their truth or falsity--is widely denounced by both philosophical and statistical methodologists. Notwithstanding, "data dredging" is routinely practiced in the human sciences using "traditional" methods--various forms of regression for example. The main thesis of my talk is that, in the spirit and letter of Mayo's and Spanos’ notion of severe testing, modern computational algorithms that search data for causal relations severely test their resulting models in the process of "constructing" them. My claim is that in many investigations, principled computerized search is invaluable for reliable, generalizable, informative, scientific inquiry. The possible failures of traditional search methods for causal relations, multiple regression for example, are easily demonstrated by simulation in cases where even the earliest consistent graphical model search algorithms succeed. ... These and other examples raise a number of issues about using multiple hypothesis tests in strategies for severe testing, notably, the interpretation of standard errors and confidence levels as error probabilities when the structures assumed in parameter estimation are uncertain. Commonly used regression methods, I will argue, are bad data dredging methods that do not severely, or appropriately, test their results. I argue that various traditional and proposed methodological norms, including pre-specification of experimental outcomes and error probabilities for regression estimates of causal effects, are unnecessary or illusory in application. Statistics wants a number, or at least an interval, to express a normative virtue, the value of data as evidence for a hypothesis, how well the data pushes us toward the true or away from the false. Good when you can get it, but there are many circumstances where you have evidence but there is no number or interval to express it other than phony numbers with no logical connection with truth guidance. Kepler, Darwin, Cannizarro, Mendeleev had no such numbers, but they severely tested their claims by combining data dredging with severe testing.
The Duality of Parameters and the Duality of Probabilityjemille6
Suzanne Thornton
ABSTRACT: Under any inferential paradigm, statistical inference is connected to the logic of probability. Well-known debates among these various paradigms emerge from conflicting views on the notion of probability. One dominant view understands the logic of probability as a representation of variability (frequentism), and another prominent view understands probability as a measurement of belief (Bayesianism). The first camp generally describes model parameters as fixed values, whereas the second camp views parameters as random. Just as calibration (Reid and Cox 2015, “On Some Principles of Statistical Inference,” International Statistical Review 83(2), 293-308)--the behavior of a procedure under hypothetical repetition--bypasses the need for different versions of probability, I propose that an inferential approach based on confidence distributions (CD), which I will explain, bypasses the analogous conflicting perspectives on parameters. Frequentist inference is connected to the logic of probability through the notion of empirical randomness. Sample estimates are useful only insofar as one has a sense of the extent to which the estimator may vary from one random sample to another. The bounds of a confidence interval are thus particular observations of a random variable, where the randomness is inherited by the random sampling of the data. For example, 95% confidence intervals for parameter θ can be calculated for any random sample from a Normal N(θ, 1) distribution. With repeated sampling, approximately 95% of these intervals are guaranteed to yield an interval covering the fixed value of θ. Bayesian inference produces a probability distribution for the different values of a particular parameter. However, the quality of this distribution is difficult to assess without invoking an appeal to the notion of repeated performance. ... In contrast to a posterior distribution, a CD is not a probabilistic statement about the parameter, rather it is a data-dependent estimate for a fixed parameter for which a particular behavioral property holds. The Normal distribution itself, centered around the observed average of the data (e.g. average recovery times), can be a CD for θ. It can give any level of confidence. Such estimators can be derived through Bayesian or frequentist inductive procedures, and any CD, regardless of how it is obtained, guarantees performance of the estimator under replication for a fixed target, while simultaneously producing a random estimate for the possible values of θ.
Paper given at PSA 22 Symposium: Multiplicity, Data-Dredging and Error Control
MAYO ABSTRACT: I put forward a general principle for evidence: an error-prone claim C is warranted to the extent it has been subjected to, and passes, an analysis that very probably would have found evidence of flaws in C just if they are present. This probability is the severity with which C has passed the test. When a test’s error probabilities quantify the capacity of tests to probe errors in C, I argue, they can be used to assess what has been learned from the data about C. A claim can be probable or even known to be true, yet poorly probed by the data and model at hand. The severe testing account leads to a reformulation of statistical significance tests: Moving away from a binary interpretation, we test several discrepancies from any reference hypothesis and report those well or poorly warranted. A probative test will generally involve combining several subsidiary tests, deliberately designed to unearth different flaws. The approach relates to confidence interval estimation, but, like confidence distributions (CD) (Thornton), a series of different confidence levels is considered. A 95% confidence interval method, say using the mean M of a random sample to estimate the population mean μ of a Normal distribution, will cover the true, but unknown, value of μ 95% of the time in a hypothetical series of applications. However, we cannot take .95 as the probability that a particular interval estimate (a ≤ μ ≤ b) is correct—at least not without a prior probability to μ. In the severity interpretation I propose, we can nevertheless give an inferential construal post-data, while still regarding μ as fixed. For example, there is good evidence μ ≥ a (the lower estimation limit) because if μ < a, then with high probability .95 (or .975 if viewed as one-sided) we would have observed a smaller value of M than we did. Likewise for inferring μ ≤ b. To understand a method’s capability to probe flaws in the case at hand, we cannot just consider the observed data, unlike in strict Bayesian accounts. We need to consider what the method would have inferred if other data had been observed. For each point μ’ in the interval, we assess how severely the claim μ > μ’ has been probed. I apply the severity account to the problems discussed by earlier speakers in our session. The problem with multiple testing (and selective reporting) when attempting to distinguish genuine effects from noise, is not merely that it would, if regularly applied, lead to inferences that were often wrong. Rather, it renders the method incapable, or practically so, of probing the relevant mistaken inference in the case at hand. In other cases, by contrast, (e.g., DNA matching) the searching can increase the test’s probative capacity. In this way the severe testing account can explain competing intuitions about multiplicity and data-dredging, while blocking inferences based on problematic data-dredging
The Statistics Wars and Their Causalities (refs)jemille6
High-profile failures of replication in the social and biological sciences underwrite a
minimal requirement of evidence: If little or nothing has been done to rule out flaws in inferring a claim, then it has not passed a severe test. A claim is severely tested to the extent it has been subjected to and passes a test that probably would have found flaws, were they present. This probability is the severity with which a claim has passed. The goal of highly well-tested claims differs from that of highly probable ones, explaining why experts so often disagree about statistical reforms. Even where today’s statistical test critics see themselves as merely objecting to misuses and misinterpretations, the reforms they recommend often grow out of presuppositions about the role of probability in inductive-statistical inference. Paradoxically, I will argue, some of the reforms intended to replace or improve on statistical significance tests enable rather than reveal illicit inferences due to cherry-picking, multiple testing, and data-dredging. Some preclude testing and falsifying claims altogether. These are the “casualties” on which I will focus. I will consider Fisherian vs Neyman-Pearson tests, Bayes factors, Bayesian posteriors, likelihoodist assessments, and the “screening model” of tests (a quasiBayesian-frequentist assessment). Whether one accepts this philosophy of evidence, I argue, that it provides a standpoint for avoiding both the fallacies of statistical testing and the casualties of today’s statistics wars.
The Statistics Wars and Their Casualties (w/refs)jemille6
High-profile failures of replication in the social and biological sciences underwrite a minimal requirement of evidence: If little or nothing has been done to rule out flaws in inferring a claim, then it has not passed a severe test. A claim is severely tested to the extent it has been subjected to and passes a test that probably would have found flaws, were they present. This probability is the severity with which a claim has passed. The goal of highly well-tested claims differs from that of highly probable ones, explaining why experts so often disagree about statistical reforms. Even where today’s statistical test critics see themselves as merely objecting to misuses and misinterpretations, the reforms they recommend often grow out of presuppositions about the role of probability in inductive-statistical inference. Paradoxically, I will argue, some of the reforms intended to replace or improve on statistical significance tests enable rather than reveal illicit inferences due to cherry-picking, multiple testing, and data-dredging. Some preclude testing and falsifying claims altogether. These are the “casualties” on which I will focus. I will consider Fisherian vs Neyman-Pearson tests, Bayes factors, Bayesian posteriors, likelihoodist assessments, and the “screening model” of tests (a quasi-Bayesian-frequentist assessment). Whether one accepts this philosophy of evidence, I argue, that it provides a standpoint for avoiding both the fallacies of statistical testing and the casualties of today’s statistics wars.
On the interpretation of the mathematical characteristics of statistical test...jemille6
Statistical hypothesis tests are often misused and misinterpreted. Here I focus on one
source of such misinterpretation, namely an inappropriate notion regarding what the
mathematical theory of tests implies, and does not imply, when it comes to the
application of tests in practice. The view taken here is that it is helpful and instructive to be consciously aware of the essential difference between mathematical model and
reality, and to appreciate the mathematical model and its implications as a tool for
thinking rather than something that has a truth value regarding reality. Insights are presented regarding the role of model assumptions, unbiasedness and the alternative hypothesis, Neyman-Pearson optimality, multiple and data dependent testing.
The role of background assumptions in severity appraisal (jemille6
In the past decade discussions around the reproducibility of scientific findings have led to a re-appreciation of the importance of guaranteeing claims are severely tested. The inflation of Type 1 error rates due to flexibility in the data analysis is widely considered
one of the underlying causes of low replicability rates. Solutions, such as study preregistration, are becoming increasingly popular to combat this problem. Preregistration only allows researchers to evaluate the severity of a test, but not all
preregistered studies provide a severe test of a claim. The appraisal of the severity of a
test depends on background information, such as assumptions about the data generating process, and auxiliary hypotheses that influence the final choice for the
design of the test. In this article, I will discuss the difference between subjective and
inter-subjectively testable assumptions underlying scientific claims, and the importance
of separating the two. I will stress the role of justifications in statistical inferences, the
conditional nature of scientific conclusions following these justifications, and highlight
how severe tests could lead to inter-subjective agreement, based on a philosophical approach grounded in methodological falsificationism. Appreciating the role of background assumptions in the appraisal of severity should shed light on current discussions about the role of preregistration, interpreting the results of replication studies, and proposals to reform statistical inferences.
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The people of Punjab felt alienated from main stream due to denial of their just demands during a long democratic struggle since independence. As it happen all over the word, it led to militant struggle with great loss of lives of military, police and civilian personnel. Killing of Indira Gandhi and massacre of innocent Sikhs in Delhi and other India cities was also associated with this movement.
Biological screening of herbal drugs: Introduction and Need for
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Antifertility, Toxicity studies as per OECD guidelines
Safalta Digital marketing institute in Noida, provide complete applications that encompass a huge range of virtual advertising and marketing additives, which includes search engine optimization, virtual communication advertising, pay-per-click on marketing, content material advertising, internet analytics, and greater. These university courses are designed for students who possess a comprehensive understanding of virtual marketing strategies and attributes.Safalta Digital Marketing Institute in Noida is a first choice for young individuals or students who are looking to start their careers in the field of digital advertising. The institute gives specialized courses designed and certification.
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This slides describes the basic concepts of ICT, basics of Email, Emerging Technology and Digital Initiatives in Education. This presentations aligns with the UGC Paper I syllabus.
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A Strategic Approach: GenAI in EducationPeter Windle
Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies such as Generative AI, Image Generators and Large Language Models have had a dramatic impact on teaching, learning and assessment over the past 18 months. The most immediate threat AI posed was to Academic Integrity with Higher Education Institutes (HEIs) focusing their efforts on combating the use of GenAI in assessment. Guidelines were developed for staff and students, policies put in place too. Innovative educators have forged paths in the use of Generative AI for teaching, learning and assessments leading to pockets of transformation springing up across HEIs, often with little or no top-down guidance, support or direction.
This Gasta posits a strategic approach to integrating AI into HEIs to prepare staff, students and the curriculum for an evolving world and workplace. We will highlight the advantages of working with these technologies beyond the realm of teaching, learning and assessment by considering prompt engineering skills, industry impact, curriculum changes, and the need for staff upskilling. In contrast, not engaging strategically with Generative AI poses risks, including falling behind peers, missed opportunities and failing to ensure our graduates remain employable. The rapid evolution of AI technologies necessitates a proactive and strategic approach if we are to remain relevant.
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Read| The latest issue of The Challenger is here! We are thrilled to announce that our school paper has qualified for the NATIONAL SCHOOLS PRESS CONFERENCE (NSPC) 2024. Thank you for your unwavering support and trust. Dive into the stories that made us stand out!
1. Meeting 2 (May 28) Tour I
Ingenious and Severe Tests
Tour I Ingenious and Severe Tests p. 119
1
2. But first, a bit on the goals of our
seminar
This research seminar is intended as a lead-up to
the workshop: The Statistics Wars and Their
Casualties:
https://phil-stat-wars.com/2020/02/16/99/.
• to galvanize you to contribute to the ongoing
evidence-policy controversies now taking place.
2
4. Some Questions
• What is the “replication crisis”? Are we in one? (2010-20)
• Should replication be required?
• Should we change “perverse incentives”? (open science,
badges, preregistration)
• Do data dredging and P-hacking alter the import of data?
Always? Sometimes?)
• Should P-values be redefined (lowered)? Banned/
replaced with (confidence intervals, Bayes factors)
• Should we stop saying “significant”?
4
5. American Statistical Society
(ASA): Statement on P-values
“The statistical community has been deeply
concerned about issues of reproducibility and
replicability of scientific conclusions. …. much
confusion and even doubt about the validity of
science is arising. Such doubt can lead to
radical choices such as…to ban P-
values…(ASA 2016)
Is philosophy of science relevant?
5
6. I was a philosophical observer at
the ASA P-value “pow wow”
6
7. “Don’t throw out the error control
baby with the bad statistics
bathwater”
The American Statistician
7
8. 8
The [ASA] is to be credited with opening up a
discussion into p-values; …We should oust recipe-like
uses of P-values that have long been lampooned, but
without understanding their valuable (if limited) roles,
there’s a danger of blithely substituting “alternative
measures of evidence” that throw out the error control
baby with the bad statistics bathwater”.
They only give an informal treatment based on a
popular variant on simple (Fisherian) tests (NHST)
9. A bit of history: Where are members
of our cast of characters in 1919?
Fisher
In 1919, Fisher accepts a job as a statistician at
Rothamsted Experimental Station.
• A more secure offer by Karl Pearson (KP)
required KP to approve everything Fisher taught
or published
• A subsistence farmer
9
11. Neyman
In 1919 Neyman is living a hardscrabble life in
Poland, sent to jail for a short time for selling
matches for food,
• Sent to KP in 1925 to have his work appraised.
11
12. Pearson
Pearson (Egon) gets his B.A. in 1919.
12
He describes the psychological crisis he’s going
through when Neyman arrives in London:
“I was torn between conflicting emotions: a. finding it
difficult to understand R.A.F., b. hating [Fisher] for his
attacks on my paternal ‘god,’ c. realizing that in some
things at least he was right” (Reid, C. 1997, p. 56).
13. N-P Tests: Putting Fisherian Tests on
a Logical Footing
After Neyman’s year at University College (1925/6),
Pearson is suddenly “smitten” with doubts due to
Fisher
For the Fisherian simple or “pure” significance test,
alternatives to the null “lurk in the undergrowth but are
not explicitly formulated probabilistically” (Mayo and
Cox 2006, p. 81).
13
14. So What’s in a Test? (p. 129-130):
We proceed by setting up a specific hypothesis to
test, H0 in Neyman’s and my terminology, the null
hypothesis in R. A. Fishers…in choosing the test, we
take into account alternatives to H0 which we believe
possible or at any rate consider it most important to
be on the look out for….:
Step 1. We must first specify the set of results
Step 2. We then divide this set by a system of
ordered boundaries …such that as we pass across
one boundary and proceed to the next, we come to a
class of results which makes us more and more
inclined on the information available, to reject the
hypothesis tested in favour of alternatives which differ
from it by increasing amounts. 14
15. Step 3. We then, if possible, associate with each contour
level the chance that, if H0 is true, a result will occur in
random sampling lying beyond that level….
In our first papers [in 1928] we suggested that the likelihood
ratio criterion, λ, was a very useful one… Thus Step 2
proceeded Step 3. In later papers [1933-1938] we started
with a fixed value for the chance, ε, of Step 3… However,
although the mathematical procedure may put Step 3
before 2, we cannot put this into operation before we
have decided, under Step 2, on the guiding principle to
be used in choosing the contour system. That is why I
have numbered the steps in this order. (Egon Pearson
1947, p. 143)
15
17. They were not intended to be used as
Accept-Reject Routines
(behavioristic performance)
‘[U]nlike Fisher, Neyman and Pearson (1933, p. 296) did
not recommend a standard level but suggested that ‘ how
the balance [between the two kinds of error] should be
struck must be left to the investigator’” (Lehmann 1993b,
p. 1244).
Neyman and Pearson stressed that the tests were to be
“used with discretion and understanding” depending on
the context (Neyman and Pearson 1928, p. 58).
17
18. Water Plant (SIST p. 142)
1-sided normal testing
H0: μ ≤ 150 vs. H1: μ > 150 (Let σ = 10, n = 100)
let significance level α = .025
Reject H0 whenever M ≥ 150 + 2σ/√n: M ≥ 152
M is the sample mean, !𝑋, its value is M0.
1SE = σ/√n = 1
18
19. Rejection rules:
Reject iff M > 150 + 2SE (N-P)
In terms of the P-value:
Reject iff P-value ≤ .025 (Fisher)
(P-value a distance measure, but inverted)
Let M = 152, so I reject H0.
19
20. SOME P –VALUES
Let M = 152
Z = (152 – 150)/1 = 2
Z = (mean obs – H0)/1 = 2
The P-value is Pr(Z > 2) = .025
20
21. SOME P –VALUES
Let M = 151
Z = (151 – 150)/1 = 1
The P-value is Pr(Z > 1) = .16
21
22. SOME P –VALUES
Let M = 150.5
Z = (150.5 – 150)/1 = .5
The P-value is Pr(Z > .5) = .3
22
23. SOME P –VALUES
Let M = 150
Z = (150 – 150)/1 = 0
The P-value is Pr(Z > 0) = .5
(important benchmark)
23
24. Major Criticism: P-values Don’t
Measure an Effect Size!
“A p-value, or statistical significance, does not
measure the size of an effect or the importance of
a result”. (ASA Statement)
True, a P-value is a probability.
24
25. Reformulation
Severity function: SEV(Test T, data x, claim C)
• Tests are reformulated in terms of a discrepancy γ
from H0
• Instead of a binary cut-off (significant or not) the
particular outcome is used to infer discrepancies
that are or are not warranted
25
26. H0: μ ≤ 150 vs. H1: μ > 150 (Let σ = 10, n = 100)
The usual test infers there’s an indication of some
positive discrepancy from 150 because
Pr(M < 152: H0) = .97
Not very informative
Are we warranted in inferring μ > 153 say?
26
27. • Note: Our inferences are not to point values,
but we agree to the need to block inferences to
discrepancies beyond those warranted with
severity.
27
28. Consider: How severely has μ > 153 passed the test?
SEV(μ > 153 ) (p. 143)
M = 152, as before, claim C: μ > 153
The data “accord with C” but there needs to be a
reasonable probability of a worse fit with C, if C is false
Pr(“a worse fit”; C is false)
Pr(M ≤ 152; μ ≤ 153)
Evaluate at μ = 153, as the prob is greater for μ < 153.
28
29. Consider: How severely has μ > 153 passed the
test?
To get Pr(M ≤ 152: μ = 153), standardize:
Z = √100 (152- 153)/1 = -1
Pr(Z < -1) = .16 Terrible evidence
29
30. Consider: How severely has μ > 150 passed the test?
To get Pr(M ≤ 152: μ = 150), standardize:
Z = √100 (152- 150)/1 = 2
Pr(Z < 2) = .97
Notice it’s 1 – P-value
30
31. Now consider SEV(μ > 150.5) (still with M = 152)
Pr (A worse fit with C; claim is false) = .97
Pr(M < 152; μ = 150.5)
Z = (152 – 150.5) /1 = 1.5
Pr (Z < 1.5)= .93 Fairly good indication μ > 150.5
31
33. FOR PRACTICE:
Now consider SEV(μ > 151) (still with M = 152)
Pr (A worse fit with C; claim is false) = __
Pr(M < 152; μ = 151)
Z = (152 – 151) /1 = 1
Pr (Z < 1)= .84
33
34. MORE PRACTICE:
Now consider SEV(μ > 152) (still with M = 152)
Pr (A worse fit with C; claim is false) = __
Pr(M < 152; μ = 152)
Z = 0
Pr (Z < 0)= .5–important benchmark
Terrible evidence that μ > 152
Table 3.2 has exs with M = 153. 34
35. Example for you (change sample size)
1-sided normal testing
H0: μ ≤ 150 vs. H1: μ > 150 (Let σ = 10, n = 25)
let significance level α = .025
Reject H0 whenever M ≥ 150 + 2σ/√n:
Assess SEV for the claims in Table 3.1 (p. 144)
35
36. Criticism: a P-value with a large
sample size may indicate a trivial
discrepancy or effect size
• Fixing the P-value, increasing sample size n,
the cut-off gets smaller
• Get to a point where x is closer to the null than
various alternatives
• Many would lower the P-value requirement as n
increases-can always avoid inferring a
discrepancy beyond what’s warranted: 36
37. Severity tells us:
• an α-significant difference indicates less of a
discrepancy from the null if it results from larger (n1)
rather than a smaller (n2) sample size (n1 > n2 )
• What’s more indicative of a large effect (fire), a fire
alarm that goes off with burnt toast or one that
doesn’t go off unless the house is fully ablaze?
• [The larger sample size is like the one that goes off
with burnt toast] 37
38. Compare n = 100 with n = 10,000
H0: μ ≤ 150 vs. H1: μ > 150 (Let σ = 10, n = 10,000)
Reject H0 whenever M ≥ 2SE: M ≥ 150.2
M is the sample mean (significance level = .025)
1SE = σ/√n = 10/√10,000 = .1
Let M = 150.2, so I reject H0.
(return to in Meeting 4)
38
39. Comparing n = 100 with n = 10,000
Reject H0 whenever M ≥ 2SE: M ≥ 150.2
SEV10,000(μ > 150.5) = 0.001
Z = (150.2 – 150.5) /.1 = -.3/.1 = -3
P(Z < -3) = .001
Corresponding 95% CI: [0, 150.4]
A .025 result is terrible indication μ > 150.5
When reached with n = 10,000
While SEV100(μ > 150.5) = 0.93 39
40. Fallacies of Non-rejection.
Let M = 151, the test does not reject H0.
We want to be alert to a fallacious interpretation of a
“negative” result: inferring there’s no positive
discrepancy from μ = 150.
Is there evidence of compliance? μ ≤ 150?
The data “accord with” H0, but what if the test had little
capacity to have alerted us to discrepancies from 150?
40
41. No evidence against H0 is not evidence for it
(Postcard).
We need to consider Pr(X > 151; 150), which is only
.16.
41
42. Computation for SEV(T, M = 151, C: μ ≤ 150)
Z = (151 – 150)/1 = 1
Pr(Z > 1) = .16
SEV(C: μ ≤ 150) = low (.16).
• So there’s poor indication of H0
42
43. Can they say M = 151 is a good indication that μ ≤
150.5?
No, SEV(T, M = 151, C: μ ≤ 150.5) = ~.3.
[Z = 151 – 150.5 = .5]
But M = 151 is a good indication that μ ≤ 152
[Z = 151 – 152 = -1; Pr (Z > -1) = .84 ]
SEV(μ ≤ 152) = .84
It’s an even better indication μ ≤ 153 (Table 3.3, p. 145)
[Z = 151 – 153 = -2; Pr (Z > -2) = .97 ] 43
44. Retire Statistical Significance?
“researchers have been warned that a statistically
non-significant result does not ‘prove’ the null
hypothesis”
“…. we should never conclude there is ‘no
difference’ or ‘no association’ just because a P
value is larger than a threshold such as 0.05.
(Amrhein et al., 2019)
Agreed
44
45. Neyman’s fault?
The term “ acceptance,” Neyman tells us, was
merely shorthand: “ The phrase ‘ do not reject H’
is longish and cumbersome . . . My own
preferred substitute for ‘ do not reject H’ is ‘ no
evidence against H is found’” (Neyman 1976, p.
749).
But he also set upper bounds (confidence
intervals, power analysis)
45
46. FEV: Frequentist Principle of Evidence; Mayo and
Cox (2006); SEV: Mayo 1991, Mayo and Spanos
(2006)
FEV/SEV A small P-value indicates discrepancy γ from H0, if
and only if, there is a high probability the test would have
resulted in a larger P-value were a discrepancy as large as γ
absent.
FEV/SEV A moderate P-value indicates the absence of a
discrepancy γ from H0, only if there is a high probability
the test would have given a worse fit with H0 (i.e., a
smaller P-value) were a discrepancy γ present.
46
47. Frequentist Evidential Principle:
FEV
FEV (i). x is evidence against H0 (i.e., evidence of
discrepancy from H0), if and only if the P-value Pr(d >
d0; H0) is very low (equivalently, Pr(d < d0; H0)= 1 - P
is very high).
47
48. Contraposing FEV(i) we get our minimal principle
FEV (ia) x are poor evidence against H0 (poor
evidence of discrepancy from H0), if there’s a high
probability the test would yield a more discordant
result, if H0 is correct.
Note the one-directional ‘if’ claim in FEV (1a)
(i) is not the only way x can be BENT.
48
49. P-value “moderate” (non-significance)
FEV(ii): A moderate p value is evidence of the absence
of a discrepancy γ from H0, only if there is a high
probability the test would have given a worse fit with H0
(i.e., smaller P- value) were a discrepancy γ to exist.
In the Neyman-Pearson theory of tests, the
sensitivity of a test is assessed by the notion of
power, defined as the probability of reaching a preset
level of significance …for various alternative
hypotheses. In the approach adopted here the
assessment is via the distribution of the random
variable P, again considered for various alternatives
(Cox 2006, p. 25) 49
50. Π(γ): “sensitivity function”
Computing Π(γ) views the P-value as a statistic.
Π(γ) = Pr(P < pobs; µ0 + γ).
The alternative µ1 = µ0 + γ.
Given that P-value inverts the distance, it is less
confusing to write Π(γ)
Π(γ) = Pr(d > d0; µ0 + γ).
Compare to the power of a test:
POW(γ) = Pr(d > cα; µ0 + γ) the N-P cut-off cα.
50
51. The following slides are extra
FEV(ii) in terms of Π(γ)
P-value is modest (not small): Since the data
accord with the null hypothesis, FEV directs us to
examine the probability of observing a result more
discordant from H0 if µ = µ0 +γ:
If Π(γ) = Pr(d > d0; µ0 + γ) is very high, the data
indicate that µ< µ0 +γ.
Here Π(γ) gives the severity with which the test has
probed the discrepancy γ.
51
52. FEV (ia) in terms of Π(γ)
If Π(γ) = Pr(d > do; µ0 +γ) = moderately high (greater
than .3, .4, .5), then there’s poor grounds for
inferring µ > µ0 + γ.
This is equivalent to saying the SEV(µ > µ0 +γ) is
poor.
52