This document discusses India's ballistic missile defense (BMD) program. It provides background on the origins and development of India's BMD systems. The current systems include the Prithvi Air Defense system for exo-atmospheric interception and the Advanced Air Defense system for endo-atmospheric interception. Future plans include developing a 5,000km interceptor capability. Oversight of the program is conducted by the DRDO, but they resist military involvement and independent verification. The document also examines India's perceptions of threats from Pakistan and China's growing missile capabilities. It recommends increasing political oversight of BMD and linking objectives to a strategic defense review to strengthen the program's credibility.

1. Frank O’Donnell
Indian Ballistic Missile Def
Perceptions
Frank O’Donnell
Department of Defence Studies
King’s College London
Frank O’Donnell
Defence and Missile Threat
Perceptions
Frank O’Donnell
Department of Defence Studies
King’s College London

2. Structure
Origins of India’s BMD Programme
Current BMD Systems and Future Plans
Oversight of BMD Programme
Indian Missile and StrategicThreat PerceptionsIndian Missile and StrategicThreat Perceptions
Integrating Ballistic Missile D
Origins of India’s BMD Programme
Current BMD Systems and Future Plans
Oversight of BMD Programme
Indian Missile and StrategicThreat PerceptionsIndian Missile and StrategicThreat Perceptions
le Defence into National Defence

3. Argument
India’s BMD programme is making important technological
advancements, but lacks a vision
national defence.
Oversight of the BMD programme needs to be significantlyOversight of the BMD programme needs to be significantly
strengthened to improve its cre
other Indian defence expenditures.
An Indian strategic defence revi
the BMD programme by nation
its role within Indian national defence.
India’s BMD programme is making important technological
sion of its ultimate role within Indian
Oversight of the BMD programme needs to be significantlyOversight of the BMD programme needs to be significantly
credibility and balance its costs against
other Indian defence expenditures.
eview should be conducted to guide
ional strategic objectives and identify
its role within Indian national defence.

4. Origins of India’s BMD Programme
Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (IGMDP)
– 1983
IGMDPAkash SAM projectIGMDPAkash SAM project
DRDO begins planning missile defence system
DRDO announces development
shield” – May 7, 2012
Ten BMD tests conducted as of September 2014
Origins of India’s BMD Programme
Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (IGMDP)
DRDO begins planning missile defence system – 1990s
ent of a deployable “missile defence
Ten BMD tests conducted as of September 2014

5. India’s BMD System Today
Two-layered system:
Exo-atmospheric interception: Prithvi Air Defence (PAD)
Based upon Prithvi short-range ballistic missiles
Intercepts missiles at range of 80Intercepts missiles at range of 80
Endo-atmospheric interception:Advanced Air Defence (AAD)
Based uponAkash SAM
Intercepts missiles at range of 15
Present claimed capabilities: can
2,000km and travelling from Mach 3
India’s BMD System Today
atmospheric interception: Prithvi Air Defence (PAD)
range ballistic missiles
Intercepts missiles at range of 80-120kmIntercepts missiles at range of 80-120km
atmospheric interception:Advanced Air Defence (AAD)
Intercepts missiles at range of 15-30km
can intercept missiles with range close to
2,000km and travelling from Mach 3-8

6. Future Plans
DRDO claims the above systems,
and deployable to protect Delhi and Mumbai
DRDO now working on “Phase 2”:
Developing capability to intercept missiles with range of 5,000kmDeveloping capability to intercept missiles with range of 5,000km
approaching ICBM range
Extending range of radars from present 600
Utilising geo-stationary satellite
PDV interceptor, to replace PAD, testedApril 2014
compared to PAD range of 80-120km
AD-1 andAD-2 long-range interceptors in development
s, now termed “Phase 1”, are complete
and deployable to protect Delhi and Mumbai – May 2012
DRDO now working on “Phase 2”:
Developing capability to intercept missiles with range of 5,000km –Developing capability to intercept missiles with range of 5,000km –
Extending range of radars from present 600-800km to 1,500km
lites to monitor missile launch activities
PDV interceptor, to replace PAD, testedApril 2014 – range of 150km
120km
range interceptors in development

7. Oversight: Design and Consequences
DRDO granted broad operation
its projects
Receives block grant from centr
grant is internally allocated among projects
Resists involvement of military in BMD project designResists involvement of military in BMD project design
Claims success of PDV interceptor test
Resists independent verification
complete and credible
This raises questions about credibility and efficiency of BMD
projects
Oversight: Design and Consequences
tional and political discretion regarding
ntral government and decides how the
grant is internally allocated among projects
Resists involvement of military in BMD project designResists involvement of military in BMD project design
Claims success of PDV interceptor test – April 2014
ion of its claims that BMD systems are
This raises questions about credibility and efficiency of BMD

8. Indian Missile and Strategic Threat
Perceptions: Pakistan
Trajectory toward tactical nuclear weapons
Nasr (60km range) ballistic missile, Ra’ad (350km range) and
Babur (600km range) cruise missiles
Shaheen-III (2000km+) ballistic missile under development
Developing MIRV capabilities
Cites India’s BMD programme as justification for vertical
proliferation
Indian Missile and Strategic Threat
Perceptions: Pakistan
Trajectory toward tactical nuclear weapons
Nasr (60km range) ballistic missile, Ra’ad (350km range) and
Babur (600km range) cruise missiles
III (2000km+) ballistic missile under development
Cites India’s BMD programme as justification for vertical

9. Indian Missile and Strategic Threat
Perceptions: China
“Most active and diverse ballistic
in the world” – US National Air and Space Intelligence Center,
2013
Ballistic missiles range from DF-
(13,000+km)
Ballistic missiles range from DF-
(13,000+km)
Reportedly developing MIRV capabilities
Growing Chinese interest in Indian BMD programme, linked to
anxiety about US BMD threatening credibility of Chinese nuclear
forces
Continuing support for Pakistan’s nuclear programme
Indian Missile and Strategic Threat
stic missile development programme
US National Air and Space Intelligence Center,
-21 (2,150km) to DF-5A-21 (2,150km) to DF-5A
Reportedly developing MIRV capabilities
Growing Chinese interest in Indian BMD programme, linked to
anxiety about US BMD threatening credibility of Chinese nuclear
Continuing support for Pakistan’s nuclear programme

10. Recommendations
Greater political oversight of BM
linked to national strategic priorities
These priorities must first be de
A strategic defence review should include a general Indian threatA strategic defence review should include a general Indian threat
assessment, a matching of defenc
capability development defined
the specified threats
These measures will strengthen the credibility of India’s BMD
programme
BMD programme to set objectives as
linked to national strategic priorities
decided by a strategic defence review
A strategic defence review should include a general Indian threatA strategic defence review should include a general Indian threat
fence capabilities to each threat, and
ed by its contribution toward meeting
These measures will strengthen the credibility of India’s BMD