EuFMDiS Meetings Rome, Italy - FAO HQ 27 - 31/01/2020 Communications\Webinars-photos-visibility-ppts\Presentations\2020\2020 - 01 EuFMDiS Meetings Rome January\

1. Control measures of ASF in
wild boars
And its adaptation for CSF
model in EuFMDiS
Germán Cáceres Garrido
Epidemiology Department
MAPA

2. Summary
• CSF vs ASF
• ASF Epidemiology
• EU legal framework
• Spanish contingency planning
• Experience of affected MMEE

3. CSF vs ASF
What are the main differences and similarities

4. ASF CSF BOTH
VIRUS
Virus ADN, large and
complex
Family Asfarviridae. G.
Asfivirus
Virus ARN small and
simple
Family Flaviviridae, G.
Pestivirus
PATHOLOGY AND
CLINICAL SIGNS
Fever and haemorrhagic
syndrome
IMMUNITY
No neutralizing
antibodies. No
heterologous cross
immunity. Cellular
mediated immunity
Neutralizing antibodies.
Heterologous cross
immunity. Humoral and
cellular immunity
TRANSMISSIBILITY
Closed contact needed
(blood most efficient). No
trans placental
transmission
Presence in all excretion
and secretions. Trans
placental transmission
(persistently infected
piglets)
High biosecurity avoiding
contact with wild boars.
No swill feeding.

5. ASF CSF BOTH
VECTOR TICK INVOLVED
Yes (Genus Ornithodorus
or soft ticks)
No
STABILITY IN THE
ENVIRONMENT
Relatively stable (blood
and organic matter)
Relatively stable
(fomites)
Very sensitive to pH
changes, heat and
normal disinfectants.
More stable in organic
matter and cold weather
CONTROL MEASURES
No effective vaccine
available, culling of
affected herds.
DIVA vaccine available,
Ring culling 1 km?
Biosecurity (contact with
wild boars), important
role of kitchen wastes.
Zoning and restrictions
RESERVOIRS
Wild boars role as carrier
Wild boars role as
reservoir only in Africa
No
HISTORY
Endemic in Africa. 60s
genotype I spread into
Europe and America.
2007 current outbreak
genotype II in Europa
and Asia
Long-term epidemics in
wild boar and sporadic
cases in domestic.
Currently no outbreaks
reported in EU.

6. Contagiousness
Percentage of animals which get infected
after virus contact
Low Medium High
< 33% ~ 50% > 66%
ASF CSF FMD
Different contagiosity: ASF, CSF, FMD
Endemic situation,
slow spread, does not fade
out even with control
measures in place
Fades out
after vaccination and
other control
measures
Fades out
Spontaneously
without any control
measure
ASF faded out without measures from wild boars in
Spain in the 60s

7. ASF Epidemiology in
wild boars
What has changed in the
EU?

8. Hosts: Family suidae (pigs and wild boars)
Wild boars crucial role in the spread and transmission of the disease
Soft ticks involved can maintain the virus for years in a stable
Transmission cycles:
– Sylvatic
– Domestic
– Plus Ticks

10. Other mechanical vectors?
Denmark study: Infection of pigs with African swine fever virus via ingestion of stable flies (Stomoxys
calcitrans). Transboundary and Emerging Diseases. 65. 10.1111/tbed.12918.

11. Introduction pathways…past outbreaks
Kitchen waste from international airplanes and vessels:
– Portugal 1957
– Malta 1978
– Sardinia 1978
– Georgia 2007
– Belgium 2018 (¿?)
Animal and animal products movement : Biosecurity gaps
– Spain, 1960
– Italia 1983
– Belgium 1985
– Russia 2008
Illegal movement of wild boars, pigs and products
Animal products in travellers luggage

12. ASF virus stability
3 hours at 50°C.
10 days in feces
70 days in blood at ambient temperature
15 weeks in refrigerated meat
6 months in animal products
18 months in refrigerated blood
Several years in frozen meat
Virus destruction:
Heat treatment 60º C / 30 min
Disinfectants: acetic acid, hypochlorite, iodine
HIGH STABILITY IN PRESENCE OF ORGANIC MATTER (BLOOD) AND IN COLD
WEATHER CONDITIONS
Able to winter in frozen carcases

13. The 4 phases of a transmissible diseases
Epidemic
Endemic
Introduction
Invasion
Fade out
Vittorio Guberti, ISPRA, Italy

14. Phase 1 Invasion and endemicity
Epidemic
EndemicIntroduction
Pre epidemic peak
Threshold density (Nt)
Critical community size (CCS)
Vittorio Guberti, ISPRA, Italy

15. Rarely the infection fades out
lucky and rare event
Epidemic
Introduction
Invasion
Fade out
Vittorio Guberti, ISPRA, Italy

16. Persistency of ASF
Low contagiosity: only few animals get infected
High case fatality: very few survivors and insufficient immunological
protection
High tenacity: long time survival of virus in the environment, long
exposer time (frozen carcasses)

17. Why an epidemic evolves endemic?
A CRITICAL COMMUNITY SIZE (CCS) is still present;
It is the minimum size of a population with its specific demographic
parameters that allows virus persistence;
IT IS NOT a NUMBER of individuals…is a POPULATION parameter
CCS: depends on:
Virus transmissibility, lethality and recovery
Host population density, fertility, turn over, age and gender classes,
management (including feeding, hunting quotas and seasons etc.
etc.)
Mathematically the CCS is the population size at which the
infection has 50% probability to fade out spontaneously;

18. Persistence duration estimation
Knowledge of the needed demographic parameters
Precise estimate of the Host population size
CCS precise estimate
Evaluate feasibility and sustainability
Hunt under biosecurity otherwise any hunting will be
counteractive;
Hunt addresses the reduction of the CCS till eradication of the
infection
Baseline population / % dead WB extracted / Nº Family groups and
interaction
Wb/domestic interaction and human factors

19. ASFV genotype I in 1960
In Spain wild boars did not play an important role?
30 years with the disease

20. Up to 100 m around the “zahúrdas”
Tick role in the free range areas was crucial
Tick role associated to old husbandry system called “zahurdas” that
were a perfect habitat for the ticks

21. Wild boar role in the Spanish outbreak
The role of WB was not of great significance
We did not take control measure on WB even with an
extensive sector
Vultures and other scavenger communities in 80% of the country
Sun and moderate weather (no wintering ability in frozen carcasses)

22. Have WB changed their role in the current
outbreak of the EU?
ASFV is able to maintain itself in low wild boar density zones (Estonia)
 % of frozen carcasses remain in the forest?
ASF spread seemed to speed up in Belgium at first compared to Eastern
countries
 No immediate effective measures? Higher wild boar densities?
ASF able to jump suddenly toward far away destinations (Check Republic,
Belgium, other?)
 Human factor
One thing in common in the whole EU
We have many more wild boars

23. Factors involved

24. Rural depopulation and increased forest areas
Plenty of perfect places to hide away!

25. Plenty of food all year
around

26. Reduced hunting and predation pressure

27. Society against drastic measures needed
Controverial political decision

28. EU Legal framework
Directive  New Regulation (April 2021)
Experience and data from affected countries
EFSA scientific opinions
UE strategy
National contingency planning
(Spanish plan updated in November 2018)
https://ec.europa.eu/food/animals/animal-diseases/control-
measures/asf_en

29. COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 2001/89/EC of 23 October 2001 on Community measures
for the control of classical swine fever
COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 2002/60/EC of 27 June 2002
laying down specific provisions for the control of African swine fever and
amending Directive 92/119/EEC as regards Teschen disease and African swine
fever
REGULATION (EU) 2016/429 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE
COUNCIL of 9 March 2016 on transmissible animal diseases and amending and
repealing certain acts in the area of animal health (‘EU Animal Health Law’)
EFSA opinions: EU outbreak characterization, ASF epidemiology in wild boars
and control measures for ASF in wild boars
UE ASF control strategy (ongoing discussion on pig side; ASF control in wild
boars defined) (SANTE/7113/2015 – Rev 11!!)

31. EU Regionalization
Commission Implementing
Decision of 9 October
2014 (2014/709/EU) (as
latest amended by
Commission Implementing
Decision (EU) 2020/46 of
20 January 2020) along
with Commission
Implementing Decision (EU)
2019/1334 of 7 August
2019.
SANTE/7112/2015/Rev. 3
WORKING DOCUMENT
Principles and criteria for
geographically defining ASF
regionalization

32. Spanish contingency planning
Based on
EFSA opinions
EU strategy
EU regionalization policy
Experience of EU affected countries
https://www.mapa.gob.es/es/ganaderia/temas/sanidad-animal-higiene-
ganadera/manualpracticoppa572019_tcm30-428107.pdf

33. Control measures based on
Zoning
(Risk based  Legislation)
Time phases
(Prevention  Epidemic  Endemic)
Flexible approach to adapt to local
conditions

34. Prevention phase (no in the model)
Reduction of the wild boar population
 Based on the best scientific information available (density, dynamic, geography
ecology, control methods, etc.)
 Population reduction strategy adapted to local setting.
Passive surveillance enhancement
 Early detection is crucial  Education and communication to key stakeholders
 Detection and notification to OVS of found dead wild boars, testing and disposal.
Preparation for active surveillance on dead wild boars
 Training of specific groups (veterinarians, hunters and environmental agents).
Adoption of protocol for testing and disposal of carcasses

35. Epidemic phase (I)
Infected zone boundaries definition (zoning)
 Multidisciplinary expert group.
 Geographic aspects, wild boar density and dynamics, artificial and natural barriers,
green corridors
 Risk based zoning: Infected zone (Kernel + Buffer) and surveillance or intensive
hunting zone.
Isolation of the infected zone
 Fences: electric, odor, light and sound repellents.
 Impermeable fences? (cost and time)  reduce movement (rapid and cheap)
Avoid disturbance of the affected population
 Ban on hunting, supplementary feeding and forest activities.
Monitoring of the population
 Video trapping, counting methods, etc.
 Active search and testing of carcasses

36. Epidemic phase (II)
Movement restriction and controls
 Parts I, II and III of the Annexe (Decision 2014/709/CE)
 Wild boar movement banned in the whole EU (Decision 2018/834)
 Control on illegal movements (police collaboration)
 Post mortem inspection in SH and home slaughtering.
Application of protocol for testing and disposal of carcasses (
establishment of a centralized collection center with high
biosecurity)
Surveillance in pigs farms and biosecurity assessment
 Biosecurity to avoid contact between wild boars and pigs (small farms and
backyards)
 Clinical surveillance of pig farms by OVS.

37. Endemic phase
Monitoring and surveillance of the affected population
Active searching of wild boars carcasses, testing and disposal
Zoning, isolation and restrictions maintained
Long-term of supervised hunting strategy to reduce and ultimately
eliminate the wild boars from the affected zone
Final objective  Eradication if possible
Pig sector needs eradication ASAP
Only way eliminating wild boars in the affected zone ASAP

38. Measures in the free zone
Preventive measures in hunting grounds in the rest of the country
Risk assessment + Passive surveillance + biosecurity
At least these aspects should be implemented in hunting grounds:
 Dedicated authorized dressing facility should be available in each hunting
ground;
 For each hunting ground a facility/premise should be equipped with
refrigerator (or procedures reaching equivalent results in terms of
keeping the carcass until laboratory results are available)
 Hunted wild boar should remain in the premises of the hunting ground
until tested and negative result is obtained.
 More intensive biosecurity and official control>/supervision in the area
immediately surrounding the affected zone.

39. EU affected countries experience
Different measures have been tried with
different results in different countries
per example
traps did not work in C. Republic but they did well in
Belgium

40. Zoning

41. Zoning = Surveillance + EFSA opinion + Decision 2014/709

42. Zoning adapted to new cases locations along the time

44. Hunting
regulation
timeline within
infected zones

45. Fences network

51. M. Masiulis

53. M. Masiulis

55. M. Masiulis

56. M. Masiulis

57. Mobile incineration
57M. Masiulis

58. M. Masiulis

59. Collection center in Belgium

64. The key question: when can I be sure
about the absence of the disease, declare
freedom and lift restrictions?
Logical and evidence based worries about
possibility of certain % of long term carrier wild
boars after recovery and possibility of ASF
endemicity in certain populations of WB

65. Safe side: total depopulation of wild boars but
is that possible in a large area?

66. Sorry for causing so much trouble!
But I am not the only one to blame!