Dr. Dave Wright - Preparing for a Foreign Animal Disease: An overview of the Secure Pork Supply Plan

Secure Pork Supply Plan Overview
Preparing for a Foreign Animal Disease
Dave Wright DVM
MN Secure Pork Supply Coordinator
Healthy animals for healthy people and communities |
mn.gov/bah
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Secure Pork Supply Plan
Preparation for Foreign Animal Disease Outbreak
Purpose: To provide a workable continuity
of business plan for commercial pork
producers that is acceptable to state and
federal animal health officials while
providing a safe supply of pork for
customers

Cooperative Plan
Work in Progress
• Industry-State-Federal-Academia
partnership
• Funded by USDA APHIS and NPB
• Voluntary participation
• Enable movements either to
slaughter or to the next stage
of production (Movement=COB)
• Revise, pilot test, lessons learned
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Nutshell Goals
• To lay out the expectations of
animal health officials that will give
producers the highest probability of
being able to move their pigs
• To give producers the tools to
respond to a FAD crisis
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Acknowledgements and Thanks
• Minnesota Pork Board
• National Pork Board
• Dr. Greg Suskovic & Dr. Beth Thompson-MN BAH
• Dr. Pam Zaabel-ISU, SPS
• Dr. Marie Culhane-U of M
• Dr. Clayton Johnson-Carthage System
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Coordinator Role
Implementing SPS Plan
• Generate awareness:
Overview Power Point available to producers, vet
clinics, meetings, tabletop exercises
• Facilitate participation
Producers and Systems
3 module completion
“Preliminary compliance”
• Eventual enrollment in SPS plan
• Gather feedback: work in progress

Goals of Today’s Presentation:
• Explain risk: Anticipated cost, implications
and risks of a Foreign Animal Disease (FAD)
outbreak; identify swine FAD’s
• FAD Outbreak Scenario
• Encourage preparation: Secure Pork Supply
Plan for Continuity of Business

Cost of FAD: What’s at stake?
• 60,000 pork producers market 110 million hogs
• Gross receipts: $23.4 billion
• Supports 550,000 jobs
• Contributes $39 billion to U.S. GDP
• Pork exports = 27% of U.S. production
(May expand to 33% in 5 years)
• Limited Shackle Space in Minnesota
(Requiring interstate movement to market)
AASV News Archive 4/24/17
Challenges in Defining "The Greater Good": An Integrated Pork Producer's
Perspective - Gary Louis and Luc Dufresne-2017 Leman Conference

Anticipated Cost of FAD Outbreak
• “Revenue losses to U.S. pork and beef industries from an
FMD outbreak would run $12.8 billion per year or $128
billion over a 10-year period.”
• “Related losses to corn and soybean markets over a
decade would be $44 billion and $24.9 billion,
respectively.”
• $200 billion impact over ten years.”
Iowa State University study

Cost of 2015 High Path Avian Influenza
Outbreak
• 21 states identified HPAI
• 232 premises infected
• Depopulation of 50 million birds
• Cost to taxpayers: $1 billion
• “Worst animal disease event in U.S. history”
-Dr. Greg Suskovic
Feedstuffs 6/5/17

Emotional Cost
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Emotional Cost
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Emotional Cost
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FDA Response prepared with sensitivity
and compassion
• “Workers and owners may not be prepared to deal with
the loss of animals that have been a part of their lives and
a source of livelihood. Returning to an empty farm in
subsequent days/weeks may also be another
psychologically upsetting situation. Providing a support
network for owners and their workers, again in an
ethnically and culturally acceptable format, needs to be
part of preparedness plans at the local level.”
Swine Industry Manual
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Swine FADs of Concern
• Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD)
• Classical Swine Fever (CSF)
Hog Cholera
• African Swine Fever (ASF)
• All Reportable to OIE (Office of
International Epizootics)
• Not a public health or food
safety concern
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FMD: The MOST Contagious
Disease of Animals
• Affects all cloven
hoofed animals
• Hardy virus
• Pigs-multiplier(sheds
via aerosol)
• Sheep-silent carrier
• Cattle-variable signs
• Clinical signs
-Blisters on the feet and
the snout; lameness,
fever, and going off feed
-Never return to full
production

FMD: Clinical Presentation
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Easily confused with
Seneca Valley Virus (Senecavirus A)
• Clinical signs indistinguishable from FMD
• Must assume it could be FMD until diagnosis
is confirmed that it is not
• Endemic disease in pigs present since 1980’s
but series of clinical outbreaks since 2015
• Exercise to prepare the industry-worry about
complacency
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“US livestock industries have
changed dramatically since 1929”
FMD eradicated from U.S. in 1929

FMD found in more than 2/3 of
the world
• Parts of South America, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East
• NOT in United States, Canada, Mexico, or Central America

Classical Swine Fever (CSF)
(Hog Cholera) eradicated in ‘78
• Recognized in 35
other countries: Asia,
South and Central
America, Caribbean.
• Clinical signs
– Reddened and crusty eyes
– Skin discoloration
– Fever
– Constipation followed
by diarrhea
– Huddling
– Unsteadiness
– Going off-feed

African Swine Fever (ASF)
• South Africa and island
of Sardinia (Italy),
Russia and former
Soviet states, Eastern
Europe
• Clinical signs-CSF on
steroids
– Skin discoloration,
Diarrhea, Piling,
Abortion, off feed
– 100% death loss early
– Carriers for life
PIADC
PIADC

Early recognition critical!
• Report any suspicion of FAD immediately
Vesicles-blisters
Unexplained septicemia
Unexplained death loss
• Indemnity payments only apply to live animals, not
mortality losses
• It’s the law to report suspected cases!

Risk of FAD Entering the
U.S.
•FAD’s common around the world
FMD-Asia, Africa, Mid Ease, South America
CSF-Asia, Central and S. Am, Carrib; ASF-Russia, E Europe
•International travel - People, clothing,
equipment and food
•Importation of feedstuffs: Dr. Scott Dee
research on virus viability in feed
ingredients.
•1 million pigs on the road daily; 7.5 million
into MN annually
•Naïve population-no immunity
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FOREIGN ANIMAL
DISEASE OUTBREAK
SCENARIO
IMMEDIATE IMPLICATIONS TO
INDUSTRY

Day One of a FAD Outbreak
• Notification of Office of International
Epizootics (OIE) and member countries
– FMD: All exports of cattle, swine, sheep,
goats and their uncooked products will
be STOPPED
– CSF & ASF: All exports of swine and their
uncooked products will be STOPPED
• Prices will drop
• Consumer confidence at risk

USDA FAD Response Plans
“Top Down”

Tools for Control of FADs
• Stop Movement-prevent FAD from leaving
• Biosecurity-prevent FAD from arriving
• Stamping Out
– Depopulate all clinically affected and in-contact
susceptible animals (within 24 hours or as
soon as possible)
• Trace-back/Trace-forward-understand
source and new infected premises
– 28 days prior to outbreak
• Rapid Diagnostics
• Vaccination
– Vaccinate to kill/slaughter; Vaccinate to live

• FMD and CSF
– Vaccine will not be immediately
available, and will be in short
supply when available
• ASF
– No vaccine
Vaccination will not be a viable
option for initial rapid control
of these FADs in a large FAD
outbreak
Vaccine Availability
Ramirez

Movement Restrictions
Imposed
• Control Area(s) established to manage
movements
• No new movements initiated from FAD Control
Area
• Animals already in transit need to land
somewhere
Continue on to their destination
Return to site of origin
Handled somewhere in between
• Producers may need to manage their animals
without moving animals for several days to
weeks

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Classification: Phases and Types
of FAD Response
• Strategies for the
management of a
FAD are variable
and will change
as the outbreak
progresses
• Will depend upon
the magnitude,
location and other
characteristics
www.cfsph.iastate.edu/pdf/phases-and-types-of-an-fmd-outbreak

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2001 FMD Outbreak in United Kingdom
“Stamping Out” Approach
•U.K. initiated a “Stamping Out”
approach, culling about 10 million
animals at a direct cost of about $9
billion ($16 billion-Wikipedia)
John Maday, Editor, Bovine Veterinarian July 06, 2017

2001 FMD Outbreak in Uruguay
Vaccination approach
•Uruguay: Vaccination as a primary
control strategy. The country culled
fewer than 7,000 animals and kept
direct costs for the outbreak to
around $240 million
John Maday, Editor, Bovine Veterinarian July 06, 2017

U.K. losses from “stamping out”:
Excessive culling
• 2 million of these culls may have been unnecessary:
“These 2 million animals represent the potentially
non-infected population that were killed due to the
lack of a prepared response that includes continuity
of business (COB) considerations for the permitted
movement of non-infected animals and animal
products.”
-Another estimate: up to 45% of animals may have
been killed needlessly.
Goldsmith, et al January 2017

Challenges of a
Foreign Animal Disease
Outbreak

Challenges from a Producer/Production
System Perspective
• Implementation of biosecurity
• Management of animals if
movement is not allowed for
several days or weeks
• Willingness to accept animals
from a Control Area

Challenges from a Producer/Production
System Perspective
• Increased mortality
• Reduced performance
• No indemnity if no mandated depopulation
• Increased treatment costs and other expenses
• Dramatic drop in price for pork due to loss of
export markets and potential decrease in
domestic consumption
• Flexibility in contract arrangements will be
needed
• Contract feeding
• Delivery to packers
• Feed purchases

Challenges from State Animal
Health Officials’ Perspective
• Resources to manage outbreak
• Information needed to approve
movement permit
– To processing
– To another stage of production
– Within Control Area?
– Out of Control Area?
– Into their state
• Into a Control Area?
• Into a Free Area?

Challenges from USDA Perspective
• Access to sufficient responders and
resources
• Size of Control Area
• Trace-back and trace-forward
• Information management
• Control cost of responding
to outbreak

Challenges from a
Packers/Processors’ Perspective
• Protect their “Brand”
• Market for processed product
• Biosecurity
– Trucks and drivers
– Employees
• Flexibility in Contracts
– Receiving hogs
– Delivery of products
– Employee contracts

To aid those herds which are affected by the
outbreak but not infected by the disease
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Secure Pork Supply Plan
(Funded by USDA APHIS VS and NPB)
Purpose: To provide a workable continuity
of business plan for commercial pork
producers that is acceptable to state and
federal animal health officials while
providing a safe supply of pork for
customers

Secure Food Supply Plans
Movement from Premises with No Evidence of Infection
• Secure Milk Supply (2009)
–Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD)
• Secure Pork Supply* (2010)
–FMD, Classical Swine Fever,
African Swine Fever, SVD
• Secure Beef Supply (2014)
• Secure Poultry Supply
Eggs, Broilers, Turkeys
All funded by USDA APHIS
*Some funding also provided by National Pork Board

Overall Goals of SPS Plans:
Pre-outbreak voluntary
preparedness
Prevent, Detect, Control, Contain

Continuity of Business Planning
• Minimize the unintended negative effects of
disease and disease response while
achieving response goals
• Enhance communication and coordination
• Provide risk-based solutions derived from
scientific data
• Control or eradicate disease without
“destroying” the industry

SPS Plan Information
• SPS Plan Summary
available on the
secure pork website
www.securepork.org
• Preparation
• Information to
request a
movement permit

Three Modules SPS Plan
• #1 Traceability and Movement
Management (Premises ID,
Transport and Records)
• #2 Enhanced Biosecurity
• #3 FAD Training and Response
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#1 Traceability and
Movement Management
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Balance the benefits of
restricting movements
(proven to reduce the
spread of disease) with the
cost of interrupting business
and the threat to animal
welfare

USDA FAD PReP
Movement Guidelines
• Establish Control Area
– Infected and Buffer Zone
– Quarantine
– Movement by permit
only, based on risk
– Movement controls
in place until Control
Area released
– Secure Food Supply Plans
working on domestic movement

Traceability and Movement
• Obtain National Premises ID
(PIN) from state BAH
• Maintain transport records for
swine, semen, human traffic
• Details and sample forms available
at www.securepork.org
• Cannot over-emphasize value of
daily use of PIN
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Prem ID Barcode & Premises
Verification
• www.pork.org
• Go to “Programs”
• Click “Premises Verification”
• Follow instructions to generate a
PDF barcode file
• Barcodes recognized by all
veterinary diagnostic labs
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Validate Premises Location
• Validate PIN with National Pork
Board (at same site for obtaining
bar code)
• Confirm latitude, longitude, and
911 address with site geo-location
that matches animal location
• Information compatible with
Emergency Management Response
System (EMRS)
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Traceability and Movement
• Identify all breeding stock and
animal groups prior to movement
• Prepare all CVI’s and Health
Production Plan movement reports
in electronic format-options found
at BAH website (eVCI)
• Complete epidemiological
questionnaire
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SPS Epidemiology Plan
Record Keeping Questionnaire

Contain: Animal Movement
Plans

Controlled Movement
• Site designated as
Monitored Premises:
• Movement resumes
after permit for
movement is issued

Decision to Issue Movement Permits for
Animals with No Evidence of Infection in a
Control Area
• For movement of live animals to another production site, the
premises of destination must agree to accept the risk of
receiving the animals and the owners of the production site of
origin must request a movement permit
• For movement to slaughter, the owners of the slaughter facility
must agree to accept the animals and the owners of the
production site of origin must request a movement permit
• Unified Incident Command Officials must be willing to let the
animals leave the premises (and Control Area)
• State Animal Health Officials in the state of origin and the state
of destination must agree to the movement

Decision to Approve Movement
May Be Influenced By
• Degree of confidence that animals are not infected
• Phase and Type of FMD, CSF, or ASF response
• FAD status of the states of transit, destination
• Final destination
– In a Control Area
– Slaughter
– Another production site
• Vaccination
• Animals recovered from infection
• Consequences of not allowing movement

Caveat
• Participation offers the highest
probability of obtaining movement
permit
• Ultimate decision by State Animal
Health Official (SAHO)
• Standardized expectations under
discussion
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#2 Enhanced Biosecurity
Four concepts emphasized
• Biosecurity Manager
• Written site-specific biosecurity plan with
documented training
• Defined Perimeter Buffer Area
• Defined Line of Separation

Biosecurity to Prevent Introduction
of FAD
More stringent for FAD than endemic
diseases
• Endemic diseases
– There is herd immunity
– Low levels of pathogen shedding and high
levels of resistance
• Newly introduced highly contagious disease
(FAD’s)
– No herd immunity
– High levels of pathogen shedding and low
levels of resistance

Biosecurity
• Producers’ responsibility
– Protect their herds by keeping the
disease off the farm
• Regulatory Officials’ responsibility
– Protect the US herd by keeping the
disease from spreading
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Biosecurity Self-Assessment
Checklist
• Biosecurity Manager and
Written Plan
• Training
• Protecting the Pig Herd
• Vehicles and Equipment
• Personnel
• Animal and Semen Movement
• Carcass Disposal
• Manure Management
• Rodent, Wildlife, and Other
Animal Control
• Feed
In place In progress Not In place

Information Manual
Information Manual
For Enhanced
Biosecurity:
Swine Raised Indoors

Biosecurity Manager
Responsibilities
• Understand infectious diseases and
production animal agriculture, familiar
with facility
• Use the Self-Assessment Checklist,
Information Manual and Template
• Write site-specific biosecurity plan (with
the assistance of the herd veterinarian)
• Responsible for employee training
• Ensure compliance on the site
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SPS Plan Biosecurity
Create a Site-Specific
Biosecurity plan
• explain how the
site meets all
the biosecurity
measures listed
in the checklist

Perimeter Buffer Area (PBA)
Line of Separation (LOS)

Perimeter Buffer Area (PBA)
• Established around all
animal buildings serving
as an outer control
boundary to minimize
contamination near
the buildings
• Enter the PBA only
through a clearly
marked and controlled
PBA Access Point(s)
following appropriate
biosecurity measures

PBA Access Point(s)
• Designated areas where vehicles,
people, equipment or supplies cross
into the PBA
• Movement of equipment and
supplies into the PBA requires
cleaning and disinfection
• Movement of people through the
PBA Access Point(s) requires
following biosecurity measures

Line of Separation (LOS)
• Walls of the building
housing the pigs
• People and items
only cross the LOS
through a clearly
marked and
controlled LOS
Access Point(s)
following appropriate
biosecurity measures

LOS Access Point(s)
• Designated areas where people,
equipment or supplies cross LOS
• Movement of equipment and
supplies across the LOS requires
cleaning and disinfection
• Movement of people through LOS
access point(s) requires following
specific biosecurity measures

Cleaning & Disinfection Station
Options
• Sheltered C&D Station on the
premises (but outside of the PBA)
• Off-site location, such as a nearby
truck wash
• Portable power washer with
disinfectant in an well-drained area

Disposal Options
• Burial
• Incineration
• Composting
• Rendering
• Seek guidance from regulatory
officials. Regulations may change
after a FAD
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Rodent, Wildlife, and Other
Animal Control

Feed
• Transport
• Storage
• Spills

Employee Biosecurity Training
‘Do Not Bring
Disease to the Site’
Each module
includes a quiz

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#3 Foreign Animal
Disease Training,
Response and
Surveillance

FAD identification
www.securepork.org

FMD, CSF, and ASF
Lesion Posters

Surveillance: Visual Inspection
• Active
Observational
Surveillance
(AOS)-visual
• Documentation

Surveillance: Sample
Collection and Testing
Details pending
• PCR
• Sample type?
• blood
• oral fluids
• nasal swabs
• tonsils
Ramirez
Ramirez

Surveillance Testing
Protocols Pending
• Many sites conduct routine
surveillance for other diseases
• While details of surveillance are
pending, maintain sample aliquots
on site or at lab for retrospective
testing
• Serial testing over time generally
offers the most reliable assurance
of negative status
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Sample Collection
www.securepork.org/training-materials.php

Written Contingency Plan for
Interrupted Animal Movement
• Alternate
delivery options
• Housing
• Welfare
• Euthanasia
• Disposal
• Manure Storage
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Plan for inclement
weather

The SPS plan can become Urgent
Overnight!
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The SPS plan is
currently Important but
Not Urgent

Address Roadblocks to
Participation
• “It will never happen to me.”
• Inconvenience
• Cost
• Compare FAD with PRRS
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“We have the tools to prevent
PRRSv introduction!”
-Clayton Johnson 2017 Leman
Conference
96

Why Aren’t we Preventing PRRSv
Introduction?
• Biosecurity
– Exclusion
– Segregation
– Hygiene/Sanitation
• Critical Control Points
– Employee Entry
– Supply Entry
– Animal Entry
– Wean/Cull Exit
– Mortality Exit
– Visitor Entry
– Feed/Water Entry
– Air Filtration
97
$$
$$$$
$$
$$
$$
$$
$$
$$
$$$$
$
Clayton Johnson, Carthage System

Clayton Johnson Conclusions
• Individual tools cannot be haphazardly
implemented – Must be a System Approach
• PRRSv prevention strategies aren’t always cost
effective
• Older Farms not designed with all tools
• Compliance with tool usage will never be
100%
98

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A FAD will be a strong
incentive to implement
all the tools available
for PRRS prevention

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The inconvenience of this
exercise will be easier to
accept if you imagine that
your neighbor has been
diagnosed with FMD.

Value of Prevention
• Prevention of a Foot and Mouth outbreak is
estimated to be worth $137 million per year to
the U.S. pork industry.
• Freedom from diseases such as Classical
Swine Fever (CSF), African Swine Fever
(ASF) and FMD provide more than a $55-per-
head value to U.S. pork producers.
Checkoff funded study: Economy Wide Impacts of a Foreign Animal
Disease in the United States; Working Paper 11-WP 525, November 2011

Take the next steps!
• Validate and use PINs
• Generate bar codes for use on CVIs and lab reports
• Identify a biosecurity manager for each site
• Go to www.securepork.org to learn the details
• Contact me to assist in facilitation
Three Power Point modules available for use
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Take-home Messages
• A Foreign Animal Disease outbreak in the U.S. is reasonably
likely to happen.
• Consequences could be catastrophic
• Identify and report any suspicion of FAD early (vesicular
disease, unexplained death loss, septicemia)
• Secure Pork Supply Plan is available to minimize
consequences
• Voluntary participation in the SPS plan will reduce the
impact and maintain continuity of business
• Preparation is a good investment!

Thanks!
Dave Wright, DVM
wright2me.dave@gmail.com
763-242-7535

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12-5-17 SCHIC
Swine Disease Surveillance Report
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