This presentation argues that CEMA should be elevated from a secondary capability due to its ability to deliver 'fire and manoeuvre' in the information battlespace in order to slow down or break kill chains.

1. CEMA and Information Manoeuvre in the A2/AD
Battlespace
6th June 2018
Sam Qaisar
Capability Engineer (TVACD/RF Cyber)

2. 2
© 2018 Leonardo MW Ltd – All rights reserved
Information Warfare
• Adversarial pursuit of a competitive information advantage
• Typically seeks to degrade, remove, or control an adversary’s situational awareness
CommsC2 Nodes
Sensors Doctrine
Key
Personnel
Information
Processing

3. 3
© 2018 Leonardo MW Ltd – All rights reserved
Information Manoeuvre (1)
• Need to find a way to integrate Information Warfare into existing warfighting doctrine
• In particular, we must link Information Warfare to the physical domain
• The current model focusses on kinetic effects and manoeuvre in the physical domain
• This not sufficient for future operating environments
Fire
Offensive
Support
Physical
Manoeuvre

4. 4
© 2018 Leonardo MW Ltd – All rights reserved
Information Manoeuvre (2)
• As a result, Information Manoeuvre is currently very poorly integrated into many armed forces
• There are two main approaches:
Intelligence
• Identify enemy dispositions and intent
• Predict and manipulate future behaviour
Plans
• Generate decision points
• Use of deception plans
Execution
• Information and sensor feeds back to intelligence
function to help refine future plans
Planning Focussed or “J25” Approach
Intelligence
•Identify weaknesses in enemy doctrine
and processes
Targeting
•Exploit weaknesses to identify and
target positions of enemy units
Execution
•Destruction of enemy using fires
•Create maximum confusion to degrade
enemy response
Targeting Focussed or “J23” Approach

5. 5
© 2018 Leonardo MW Ltd – All rights reserved
Information Manoeuvre (3)
• Neither implementations is sufficient
• “Planning focussed” – too rigid and slow, unable to seize the initiative
• “Targeting focussed” – unable to turn tactical success into strategic victory
• Both implementations suffer from being “enemy focussed” and reliant on kinetic effects
• A better approach is to apply the principles of manoeuvre warfare and develop an “effects
focussed” method that can operate at all levels in the information domain
• Delay decision making
• Degrade situational awareness
• Deny sensor feeds

6. 6
© 2018 Leonardo MW Ltd – All rights reserved
Cyber Electromagnetic Activity (CEMA)
• These effects can be achieved through the use of electronic warfare and cyber techniques
• The integration of these techniques is referred to as Cyber Electromagnetic Activity (CEMA)
• CEMA can be used to attack almost any piece of equipment with a sensor or communications link
• Allows military units to manoeuvre through the information domain in a similar manner to the
physical domain
• Particularly useful in environments with highly networked threat systems and sensors
• CEMA is not an “all in one” solution to information manoeuvre, but offers very good capability that
maps well to existing tactics and doctrine

7. 7
© 2018 Leonardo MW Ltd – All rights reserved
Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2AD) Environments
• Many nations are developing Anti-Access/Area-Denial capabilities. China is a good example
• Dense threat environment of air defence assets, cruise missiles, warships, aircraft, and satellites
• Threat environment is dense and unpredictable, unable to plan for every eventuality or destroy
every enemy asset
• Extensive use of networking and sensors allows A2AD environment to react quickly
• Use CEMA to attack the network rather than the individual nodes
Image taken from IISS

8. 8
© 2018 Leonardo MW Ltd – All rights reserved
Implementing a CEMA Capability
• Counter-A2AD warfighting is expeditionary
• Low combat mass
• Long supply lines
• Limited ISTAR
• Advantageous to have maximum capability per platform, and mutually reinforcing capabilities
• Ideally, CEMA capability should be:
• Distributed
• Networked
• Re-taskable
• Planned for at the highest level, and enabled at the lowest level
• The use of CEMA in A2AD therefore allows for increased:
• Operational effect from each platform
• Survivability of platforms and formations
• Tempo and mission coverage

9. 9
© 2018 Leonardo MW Ltd – All rights reserved
Using CEMA in A2AD Environments
• Attack strategic ISTAR collection capabilities (satellites, comms, open source, sensors)
• Enemy will struggle to deploy appropriate troops or conduct strategic fires
• Electronic deception to create fake troop positions or spoof equipment signatures
• Difficult to identify real targets and their associated equipment
• Deploy offensive CEMA payloads against enemy comms networks
• Slower decision making, degrade sensor fusion between networked equipment
• Self protection CEMA capabilities to enhance platform survivability
• Unable to reliably detect or engage targets
• Attack of key equipment and network nodes using CEMA and kinetic effects (network based targeting) in order to
degrade situational awareness
• Disproportionate degradation of A2AD network and loss of freedom of manoeuvre
• Kinetic strikes against military targets
• Manipulation of sensors, comms, and open source to prevent accurate enemy damage assessment
• Over/under commitment of forces in response to attack
STRATEGIC
TACTICAL
Enduring
tasks
On
demand/
Mission
specific
tasks

10. 10
© 2018 Leonardo MW Ltd – All rights reserved
Leonardo Strategy
• Leonardo is investing in new technologies and tools to achieve information manoeuvre
• Electronic Warfare line of business is now following a “Suppression of Enemy Air Defence”
(SEAD) strategy
• Novel electronic warfare equipment and technology
• Mission planning tools
• Enterprise level support such as mission data management
• All Leonardo divisions across Land, Air, and Maritime are working together to achieve mutually
supporting capabilities
• Underpinned by CEMA expertise from Security and Information Systems division
• A single supplier for the entirety of information manoeuvre

11. THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION