This document provides an abstract and background for a research paper that analyzes historical accounts linking Dr. Jose Rizal and the Katipunan society in the lead up to the Philippine Revolution of 1896. Specifically, it examines conspiracy theories that the Katipunan foresaw Rizal's unwillingness to support their armed uprising and may have contributed to his exile and eventual execution in order to further fuel the revolution. The paper aims to determine Rizal's true stance on the revolution based on testimonies of his meeting with a Katipunan member and how the group viewed his refusal to support them. It outlines the scope, objectives and significance of gaining a new perspective on Rizal's role as a catalyst

1. AN ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON
THE DEATH OF RIZAL AND THE REVOLUTION OF 1896
A Tertiary-Level Research Paper
Presented to
The Faculty of Ateneo de Manila University
Katipunan Avenue, Barangay Loyola Heights, Quezon City
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Course ​Rizal and the Emergence of the Philippine Nation
By
ANTONIO, Ma. Sofia Isabelle D.
PE​ÑAFLOR, Jankris Tiffany V.
SIA, Tafline Grace B.
TOLENTINO, Amanda Mikaela Celestine D.
WONG, Clarisse H.
HISTO 11 - Q
MAY 2019

2. Abstract
As the Philippines’ national hero, Dr. Jose Rizal is regarded with great respect, most notably for
his self-sacrifice for the greater good of the nation. Contrarily, little importance is granted to the logic
and purpose of his execution, thus subjecting this act of heroism to blind veneration. To account for
this shortcoming, several conspiracy theories exist pointing towards the Katipunan’s involvement in
Rizal’s conviction. Through comparative analysis of various articles written by acclaimed Filipino
historians, this paper sought to gain an alternate perspective on the role of Rizal as the catalyst of the
revolution by clarifying certain unusual historical accounts that link the Katipunan and Rizal during his
exile in Dapitan, as well as the events leading up to his trial and eventual execution. These include the
alleged neutralization efforts of the KKK, testimonies made by Dr. Pio Valenzuela on his meeting with
Rizal, and the accounts on how the KKK ultimately viewed Rizal’s refusal to support their armed
revolution.
Based primarily on secondary sources and secondarily on primary sources, it is possible that
the Katipunan, even before the revolution broke out, foresaw Rizal’s unwillingness to cooperate with
them with regards to their planned bloody uprising, and thought his death would both silence him and
fuel the revolution. Given that there were inconsistencies and discrepancies in the secondary
resources, to select a single narrative based solely on secondary information is beyond the
researchers’ credibility. Nonetheless, noteworthy facts and opinions were collected on this topic to be
used as a vantage point for future studies, ideally synthesized with primary sources.
Keywords​: Catalyst, comparative analysis, Jose Rizal, Katipunan, neutralization efforts, Pio
Valenzuela, revolution, testimonies.
Background of the Study
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3. The Rizal Law requires every tertiary-level Filipino to be acquainted with the life and works of
Jose Rizal. It is customary for young students to pay tribute to his execution in Bagumbayan by
focusing on the connection between his noble sacrifice and the final line of the national anthem, “…Ang
mamatay nang dahil sayo.” Unfortunately, the events leading up to his death are not accorded an equal
amount of importance. To illustrate, there still exists a popular conspiracy theory implicating the
Katipunan in Rizal’s conviction, despite there being many events that seem to affirm this allegation.
There is a possibility that the Katipunan contrived to bring about Rizal’s death to neutralise a
noncooperative and fan the flames of the Revolution. Aside from his appointment as the society’s
leader, another point of controversy was his talk with Pio Valenzuela, who was sent by Andres
Bonifacio to ask for his support in the planned armed uprising against the Spaniards. However,
according to Valenzuela’s early account, Rizal was against it because he believed that the Philippines
was not yet prepared. Instead, Rizal suggested first obtaining support from the Ilustrados or, should
they choose to not join any side, ensure that they are neutralized. This topic was met with anger and
hostility from both Bonifacio and Rizal himself.
Statement of the Problem
The main problem of this study is to determine whether or not the Katipunan foresaw and
intended Rizal’s death, based on historical facts and evidence surrounding his arrest. Specifically, this
paper will answer the following questions:
1. In light of the neutralization efforts of the Katipunan, were Rizal’s exile and eventual execution
possibly brought about by the Katipunan?
2. What is Rizal’s true stand on the Revolution as revealed through the testimonies of Pio
Valenzuela?
3. How did the Katipunan view Rizal’s refusal to support the Revolution?
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4. Objectives of the Study
Based on the historical facts and evidence surrounding his arrest, this paper aims to determine
whether or not the Katipunan foresaw and intended Rizal’s death. Specifically, the objectives of this
paper are:
1. Relate the significance of the neutralization efforts of the Katipunan to Rizal’s exile and
eventual execution.
2. Identify Rizal’s true stand on the Revolution by deconstructing the testimonies of Pio
Valenzuela.
3. Deduce how the Katipunan viewed Rizal’s refusal to support the Revolution.
Significance of the Study
The question of whether or not Rizal was truly against the Revolution is one that continues to
puzzle many academics to this day. The answer to this inquiry would provide insight into the events that
occured before his death, as well as the events following it. In this premise, the Katipunan plays a
significant role. If it were true that the KKK was involved and even more so, intended Rizal’s death, then
it would provide an entirely new perspective on the role of Rizal as the “catalyst of the revolution.”
If this were also true, the question of Rizal’s awareness of this interference would shed light on
the true ​fons et origo of the Revolution—particularly, if it was truly Rizal’s death that urged the
Katipuneros to revolt, or if Rizal’s death itself was used by the leaders of the Katipunan as an excuse to
spark the Revolution, of which Rizal was greatly opposed to. A better understanding of these events
would help the ordinary Filipino better understand the socio-political developments in the country at
present and address issues involved in the system, so as to prevent similar conflicts from resurfacing.
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5. Rizal’s name has been given much regard. For some, this is observed even to the point of blind
hero-worship. As argued by Renato Constantino in ​Veneration Without Understanding​, Filipinos turned
to following the example of Rizal after true de-colonization of the Philippines was not
achieved—following the revolution against the Spaniards—not really considering the historical context
of his actions. This led to a kind of ​identity crisis among the Filipinos, and to this day, the inability of the
Filipino people to distinguish his/her identity as a developing concept rather than a mere product of their
past adversaries has led them to developmental stagnation. A new take on the role of Rizal in
instigating the revolution of the Katipunan could potentially warrant a more critical approach to
examining Rizal’s life and works, not only as artifacts of the Spanish colonization period, but as a
vantage point for the development of the Filipino identity through the past centuries.
Scope and Limitations
This study concerns the involvement of Rizal with the Katipunan and its consequent influence
on the Philippine revolution. The scope of this study consists of the events that transpired shortly prior
to the death of Rizal, when his affiliation with the Katipunan first became known. This was done through
the analysis of secondary sources composed by well-known Filipino historians including, but not limited
to, the following: Gregorio Zaide, Teodoro Agoncillo, Jose Arcilla, Leon Ma. Guerrero, Wenceslao E.
Retana, John Schumacher, Ambeth Ocampo, Miguel Bernad, Floro Quibuyen, and Renato
Constantino. Although there were some of the works had conflicting accounts of the events, the limited
amount of resources available on the topic and the inability of the researchers to conduct an interview
with a knowledgeable source prevented clarification on the topic.
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6. Review of Related Literature
Rizal: Reformist or Revolutionary?
Constantino wrote that the Propaganda Movement was composed of Ilustrados, including
Rizal, who campaigned for cultural assimilation and transformation of the Philippines as Spanish
province, along with the appropriate administrative reforms and the recognition of the Filipino’s right to
Spanish culture. The ilustrados, being members of the privileged elite, campaigned for reforms in the
colonial administration due to noble and selfish reasons. Their status came not from their Filipino blood,
but their Hispanic roots; their power and influence was less than that of the peninsulares but rather
more than the indios​. Their noble campaign for the curtailment of the abuses of the Filipino was
accompanied by a less noble desire to secure more political power and economic benefits for
themselves. Therefore Rizal was, according to Constantino, an assimilationist reformist to the end.
Contrary to this notion, John Schumacher (1991) wrote that Rizal was not, strictly speaking,
against the idea of a revolution. Although Rizal wrote the ​Noli Me Tangere with the intention of
impressing the need for ultimate separation from Spain, he did not support Bonifacio’s revolution
because he thought that the Filipino people were not yet ready for a revolution. Schumacher (1991)
further argued that Rizal was opposed to Bonifacio’s revolution and campaigned for emancipation from
Spanish rule through nonviolent means, wanting Filipinos to have an undiluted love for country. Rizal
rejected the ideals of the Propaganda Movement because he had by then realised the sterility of further
campaigns for reforms, yet he was vehemently opposed to the 1896 revolution because he predicted its
failure and the widespread suffering that would ensue in its aftermath.
Quibuyen (1997) contested the view of Rizal that Constantino explicated in his writing. In
tracing its origins, he noted that Rizal’s friend, Trinidad H. Pardo de Tavera, provided the Schumarch
Commission with an image of Rizal as an accomplished, liberal, assimilationist reformist and
intellectual. This, and the combined influence of Wenceslao E. Retana and Austin Craig’s
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7. widely-circulated biographies of Rizal, helped the Americans paint a picture of Rizal as an
anti-revolutionary reformist whose loyalties had lain with Spain and not the Philippines. Both Retana
and Pardo de Tavera thought that Rizal did not approve of Bonifacio’s revolution because its principles
and methods did not fit with his ideas of peaceful assimilation and reform (Quibuyen, 1997).
Schumacher (2001) opined that Rizal was open to the idea of a revolution to achieve emancipation
from Spain, though he was against the use of violence.
Another Rizal scholar, Gregorio Zaide, posited that Rizal had supported the Revolution after
having read Valenzuela’s memoir and obtained a testimony from the Katipunero himself Quibuyen
(1997). In contrast, Agoncillo (1990) referenced Valenzuela’s 1917 testimony to support his conclusion
that Rizal opposed the Katipunan’s revolutionary plot not because he was against the idea of a
revolution, but because he ​predicted its failure.
The Revolutionists
The debate about Rizal’s stance regarding the idea of a revolution, whether or not under the
leadership of Bonifacio, notwithstanding, the Propaganda Movement, though unsuccessful in its
campaign for reforms, laid the backbone for the Revolution because the truth of the propagandists’
observations and condemnations influenced the direction of the revolutionaries’ thoughts. Influenced by
Rizal’s books and treatises, Bonifacio sent Valenzuela to Dapitan to seek Rizal’s advice and
endorsement for the planned armed uprising. But Valenzuela’s testimonies over time differ in both
content and intent. In some versions, Bonifacio is described as an ardent fan and follower of Rizal, and
this reverence was what got Rizal into trouble (Ocampo, 1990). In other versions, such as Valenzuela’s
Memoirs of the KKK and the Philippine Revolution, Bonifacio is described less favorably​—rather ​critical
of Rizal upon hearing that Rizal did not support the revolution (Ocampo, 1990).
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8. Rizal’s Exile
After arriving in Manila following a sojourn in Hong Kong, the constabulary raided Rizal’s house
and seized anti-government, subversive leaflets​—​caricatures of the friars—​from Rizal’s luggage. The
enraged Governor-General then exiled Rizal to Dapitan. The source of the leaflets remains a popular
point of contention, as nobody can adequately prove the consensus that Rizal’s enemies planted false
evidence to implicate him (Arcilla, 1991).
Liberty, equality, fraternity: the founding of the Katipunan
Following Rizal’s departure for Dapitan in 1892, the Katipunan was founded (Arcilla, 1991),
mainly to unite the Filipinos by instilling in them a sense of nationalism and patriotism (Zaide, 1939).
The following were the goals of the Katipunan:
1. To unify the regions and peoples of the Philippines into one nation and one people.
2. To win Philippine independence from Spain by means of a revolution wherein a petition for
political representation in the Cortes and equality rights for Filipinos would be delivered to the
mother country.
3. To establish a communist republic under the protection of the Japanese Empire and collect
enough money with which an uprising for Philippine independence will be provoked, should
Spain deny independence to the Philippine, as stated by Dr. Valenzuela (Retana, 1862-1924).
Zaide (1939) also alleged that neither Bonifacio nor Jacinto mentioned anything in Katipunan
documents relating to a desire for separation from Spain through a revolution or a massacre of all
Spaniards. However, Zaide’s depiction of the Katipunan does not align with Arcilla’s, who described the
Katipunan as a society aiming to unite all Tagalogs and thereafter stage a violent uprising to overthrow
the colonial government (Arcilla, 1991).
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9. The Katipuneros Consult Rizal
Commissioned by Bonifacio to seek Rizal’s advice and endorsement for the Revolution,
Katipunero Pio Valenzuela secretly informed Rizal about the group’s founding and its ideologies.
Valenzuela, however, wrote four conflicting accounts of his meeting with Rizal​: two in September and
October 1896 and two more in 1917 and 1935.
In his September 1896 testimony, Rizal was described as against the revolution, losing his
composure and angrily spewing profanity. Upon hearing this, Bonifacio allegedly “flew into a rage” and
called Rizal a coward, instructing Valenzuela not to spread word of the conference. To corroborate this
further, on October 6, 1896, when the Spanish military interrogated Valenzuela under duress for the
second time, he recounted the same things he had just a month earlier, but with few changes.
Apparently, at the mention of the revolution, Rizal reacted violently but without profanities, while
Bonifacio cursed Rizal profusely upon receiving the report (Ocampo,​ 1990​).
In contrast, Valenzuela’s 1917 testimony described Rizal as against Bonifacio’s revolution only
because he thought it premature and ill-timed, citing the first Cuban revolution against Spain where
their lack of arms resulted in their defeat. Rizal argued that for a successful revolution, wealthy Filipinos
must be sympathetic to the cause and offer their intellectual and financial resources (Agoncillo, 1990).
When Bonifacio heard this, he allegedly exclaimed in anger (Ocampo, 1990). His 1935 testimony,
published in ​Memoirs of the K.K.K. and the Philippine Revolution​, only reaffirmed everything in the one
that preceded it (Ocampo, 1990, 2001).
As maintained by the historians Carlos Quirino, P.A. Zapanta, and Teodoro Agoncillo,
Valenzuela made these testimonies under duress at Rizal’s trial in order to save him. When Agoncillo
asked Valenzuela about his statements at the court-martial, Valenzuela invalidated the testimonies he
had made in 1896 by positing that his statements, some of them having been extracted from him
forcibly while he was subjected to intimidation and torture, were untrue (Ocampo, 1990). Earlier,
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10. however, Rizal had cited his earlier meeting with Valenzuela to disprove the allegation that he, privy to
the revolutionary plot of the Katipunan, had collaborated with the Katipuneros for its conception and
development (Bernad, 1998; Retana, 1961). To Rizal’s great disadvantage, however, he was kept
ignorant of all witness testimonies and denied the opportunity to cross-examine them (Zapanta, 1987;
Ocampo, 2001; Guerrero, 2010).
The Discovery of the Katipunan
Rumors about a secret revolutionary society whose members regularly met reached Spanish
authorities. Eventually, Teodoro Pati​ñ​o, a Katipunero working at ​Diario de Manila​, unintentionally
disclosed the ideals and the goals of the Katipunan to a nun at his sister’s orphanage and Fr. Mariano
Gil, who, along with an officer of the Civil Guard, searched the premises of Pati​ñ​o’s workplace, where
they confirmed the existence of the group (Arcilla, 1991).
Before the discovery of the Katipunan, its members had tried to win the sympathy and support
of wealthy and prominent Filipinos, who refused to cooperate and threatened to tip the Spanish
authorities of their existence. Angered and convinced that they were not trustworthy, Bonifacio and the
rest of the Katipunan forged signatures of wealthy, influential Filipinos on the documents that would
later be discovered by Gil. In the aftermath of the discovery, the people who signed, both innocent and
guilty, were rounded up and convicted. Afterward, Bonifacio and the rest of the Katipuneros were left
with no choice but to proceed with the revolution (Agoncillo, 1990; Constantino, 1975; Ocampo, 1990).
The Soul of the Rebellion
Three weeks after Rizal’s confinement to Fort Santiago in 1896, Francisco Olivé, who officiated
a preliminary investigation of Rizal, forwarded the transcript of the investigation along with supporting
evidence to Governor-General Ramon Blanco (Bernad, 1998). To formally commence the judicial
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11. process proper, Blanco had the case endorsed to Rafael Dominguez, a ​juez instructor​, who was
instructed to work quickly supposedly due to Blanco’s nearing retirement (Bernad, 1998). Nonetheless,
the case opened on December 3, with Dominguez submitting a rushed, incomplete report two days
later (Bernad, 1998).
Unbeknownst to Rizal, he had been made the honorary president of the Katipunan. According
to Retana’s transcribed statements of from the witnesses, Rizal was considered as the “honorary
president of the Katipunan” and was supposed to be the Supreme Head of the Katipunan upon the
success of the revolution (Retana, ​1961​). These statements were supported by the presence of Rizal’s
photos being carried around by some Katipuneros and hung in the Katipunan’s rendezvous place,
specifically in the session hall of the Supreme Court, as well as the fact that his name had been used
as a rallying cry and as one of the passwords of the Katipunan (Ocampo​, 1990​; Retana, ​1961​).
Moreover, documents belonging to Bonifacio, which were either letters about Rizal or from Rizal
himself, were found in a warehouse (Retana, ​1961​). Rizal did not agree with the depositions made by
the investigating officer as well as the summarization of most of the supposed documents of Bonifacio,
except his poem ​To Talisay​, the letter to the Masons, and the letter written to his family from Madrid
(Retana, ​1961​). Not wanting to be associated with the revolution, the imprisoned Rizal was given
permission by Blanco and his successor, Lieutenant Camilo ​García de ​Polavieja, to publicly release a
manifesto clearing his name, which, however, was later interpreted as a stimulant for future rebellion
and, consequently, not published (Retana, ​1961​). Despite Rizal’s repeated denials of his association
with the Katipunan, he was found guilty of treason against Spain (Retana, ​1961​).
Qualitative Methodology
This study employed qualitative research, a process that seeks to understand social
phenomena within their natural context (Edith Cowan University) and measure the quality of something
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12. rather than its quantity through the use of multiple systems to study how, when, or why a certain
phenomena occur. As such, this study utilised historical analysis, which requires investigating past
events and synthesizing them into a coherent whole, followed by comparative analysis. This was done
by gathering literary works about Rizal’s life, works, ideologies, and connections to the Katipunan
written by acclaimed Filipino historians. Through these analyses, the gathered data were evaluated to
either accept or reject the proposed hypothesis of the study along with a detailed analysis and
explanation in defense to the conclusions made.
Discussion
I. Was Rizal a fence sitter?
The Spaniards, along with Zaide, painted Rizal as a revolutionist. In contrast, the Americans,
along with Pardo de Tavera and his biographer Austin Craig, characterized him as a pacifist. When
Valenzuela was interrogated by the Spanish military in September and October 1896, he testified under
duress that Rizal was impassionately against the Katipunan’s planned revolution. However, on
September 18, 1917, Valenzuela became a prosecution witness in a libel suit, where he testified that
although ​Rizal was to opposed the revolution, he had advised the Katipunan to wait for a better
opportunity, seek the support of the educated and wealthy, and neutralise them should they refuse to
cooperate ​(Crisostomo, 2001), in accordance with Schumacher’s evaluation of Rizal’s stand on
revolution (1991). Ocampo (1990) wrote that Rizal’s ambivalence towards the revolution made him
subject to different interpretations, and that it is difficult to ascertain his attitude and complicity in
Bonifacio’s revolution from existing primary and secondary sources. He surmised that Rizal was a fence
sitter, meaning he was for and against revolution because he did not want to openly favor reform or
revolution. This corroborated the existing point made by Guerrero, who characterised Rizal as a
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13. “reluctant revolutionary” (2010) who was unsure of the correct course to take or was wise enough to not
openly throw his support for revolution (Guerrero, 2010).
However, Schumacher (1991) criticised Guerrero’s description of Rizal’s stance, citing Rizal’s
1897 letter to Blumentritt as evidence that Rizal wished to avoid arousing the people to revolution
because he felt that the conditions for a successful revolution to occur had not yet been satisfied.
Before Schumacher, Agoncillo (1990) had referenced Valenzuela’s 1917 testimony to support his
conclusion that Rizal opposed the Katipunan’s revolutionary plot only because he ​predicted its failure.
Though he made no mention of Agoncillo’s Rizal, the Rizal that he elucidated seems to resemble
Agoncillo’s on the following points:
1. Rizal was not against revolution ​per se
2. Rizal was against Bonifacio’s revolution because he deemed it premature
Schumacher’s Rizal is not, however, a mirror image of Agoncillo’s. In the introductory
paragraph of his essay, he explained the wording of the title. Furthermore, he maintained that Rizal
wrote the ​Noli intending to start the process that would lead to the emancipation of the Philippines. He
reconciled the two opposing interpretations of Rizal’s ambivalence toward the revolution by explaining
that Rizal had withheld support for Bonifacio’s revolution not because he had seen it as an exercise in
futility, nor because he had foreseen its failure, but because his revolutionary goal was to instill in
Filipinos a sense of national dignity, love for country, and pride in their ancestral past in place of the
colonial mentality that had beleaguered the development of a Filipino national consciousness
(Schumacher, 1991). Of all the scholars who have weighed in on Rizal’s attitude towards revolution, it
seems that Schumacher’s Rizal is the most plausible. Writing after Agoncillo, Constantino, Zaide, Pardo
de Tavera, Craig, and Guerrero, Schumacher naturally had the advantage of being able to evaluate
their life stories in connection to their works and examine their inherent biases, so as to be able to draw
supports for his own conclusions. A fellow Jesuit historian, Jose Arcilla, also laid out a Rizal which
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14. seems to closely resemble that of Schumacher. Floro Quibuyen’s critique of the viewpoints of the
aforementioned historians also adds to the veracity of Schumacher’s interpretation. Finally, in his
unpublished ​Manifesto ​Rizal himself repudiated Bonifacio’s Revolution, but he did not outright declare
his loyalty to Spain, nor did he stamp on the possibility of staging another revolution at a better time,
with the necessary preparations. Rizal even boldly asserted the inevitability of Philippine independence
from Spain, both in his ​Manifesto and in his essay ​The Philippines: A Century Hence. The Spaniards,
deeply unsatisfied, had him executed on grounds of treason against Spain. Together these work to
support Schumacher’s scholarly opinion on the bones of contention surrounding Rizal and revolution.
II. What were the intentions of the Katipunan?
Shortly after Rizal’s exile to Dapitan was made public on July 7, 1892, radical Filipino patriots
met and founded the Katipunan. However, there are different versions of what the true intention of its
founding was at the time. In Zaide’s account, the Katipunan aimed to unite the Filipinos, to win
Philippine independence by peaceful political negotiations, and if and only if cornered will the Filipinos
have an armed uprising, suggesting that the original intention of the Katipunan was not immediately to
stage a violent uprising against the Spaniards (1939). An armed revolution would only serve as a last
resort once all other means have been exhausted in the quest for Philippine independence. By contrast,
Arcilla described the Katipunan as a society that aimed to unite all Tagalogs and thereafter stage a
violent uprising to overthrow the colonial government (1991). Notwithstanding the conflicting
descriptions of the Katipunan’s goals, the idea that it was founded in order to unite all Tagalogs and
work for the eventual separation of the Philippines from Spain, be it whether through a peaceful or a
bloodbath revolution, still holds true for both Zaide and Arcilla’s depiction.
Understanding the original intention behind the establishment of the Katipunan is key in
unraveling the true attitude of Andres Bonifacio towards Rizal’s alleged opposition to the armed
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15. revolution. It is a question of whether this attitude was fanaticism or criticism against Rizal’s views, and
how such an attitude may have influenced the succeeding actions of the revolutionaries. If Zaide’s
version were true, then it may be more apt to say that the consultation of Valenzuela with Rizal was a
genuine attempt at seeking advice for the next move of the Katipunan, and that Bonifacio trusted Rizal’s
judgement. On the other hand, if Arcilla’s version was more accurate, then the Katipunan would have
pushed through with an armed revolution regardless of Rizal’s input on the matter. In such a case, the
role of Rizal as the catalyst of the revolution would be put into question.
Needless to say, as the Katipunan’s appointed honorary president, Rizal’s opinion seems to
have been highly valued. In line with this, the Katipuneros sent Valenzuela to Dapitan to inform him
about the ideologies and the contemplated uprising of the Katipunan against the Spanish government
and ask for his verdict. However, Valenzuela left behind four conflicting accounts of his meeting with
Rizal in Dapitan. In his first two testimonies in September and October 1896, Rizal reportedly reacted
violently to the mention of the revolution while Bonifacio flew in impulsive anger (Ocampo, 1990). In his
third testimony in 1917, Valenzuela purported that Rizal was not against Bonifacio’s revolution ​per
se​—rather, he was against its timing. Moreover, Valenzuela alleged that Rizal had wanted the uprising
to be stalled until arms had arrived and the good will of the influential and wealthy people had been won
over—or at least neutralized. Should the Katipunan be discovered before the time was right, they were
to take to the field and not allow themselves to be killed (Katipunan, 1996). His last testimony in 1935
only reaffirmed everything in the one that preceded it (Ocampo, 1990).
Among the four accounts, historians Carlos Quirino, P. A. Zapanta, and Agoncillo opined that
the first two accounts made by Valenzuela should not be taken as the truth, as they were given under
duress, intimidation, and torture (Crisostomo, 2001). It is interesting to note that Valenzuela is said to
have taken an anti-revolutionary stance to save his skin (Ocampo, 2001). If this is so, does it proceed
that he did the same for Rizal?
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16. III. The Trial of Rizal
When the Revolution broke out after the Katipunan was discovered, Spanish authorities
immediately launched a general inquiry to pinpoint those involved. Governor-General Blanco offered
amnesty as an inducement for people to provide information that might help in the investigation. Those
who had been caught, along those who came out as informers, issued statements that implicated Rizal.
Despite Blanco’s letters of recommendation that had previously absolved Rizal of all blame, the
testimonies were deemed too damning to be overlooked. Thus Rizal was arrested and ordered to return
to the Philippines (Guerrero, 2010; Ocampo​, 1990​).
Although Rizal was informed of the evidence that led to charges being filed against him, he was
not allowed to cross-examine the witnesses who had testified nor issue a formal defense. The
allegations of the witnesses alone were deemed sufficient to prove that Rizal was guilty (Bernad, 1998).
However, the veracity and impartiality of the testimonies were, in the eyes of Rizal’s lawyer
questionable because they seemed as though they were from someone who was trying to incriminate
Rizal as if it would lightened their own responsibility (Guerrero, 2010)​. ​Rizal made no objection on
grounds of jurisdiction of the court-martial over him. The results of the inquiry, both oral testimonies and
written documents, specifically those of Bonifacio from the warehouse, were used to justify the case
(​Guerrero, 2010; Ocampo, 2001).
Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt: The Trial Proceedings
According to some Katipuneros, Rizal was the society’s honorary president and the intended
Supreme Head of the group once the revolution was won (Retana, ​1961​). These statements were
supported by the presence of Rizal’s photos being carried around by some members and hung in the
group’s rendezvous place, as well as the fact that his name had been used as a rallying cry and as one
15

17. of the group’s passwords (Ocampo​, 1990​; Retana, ​1961​). Although the Katipunan and Rizal both had
the objective of obtaining national unity, this mutuality might have endangered Rizal’s life as these were
made to justify the claim that he was the mastermind of the Revolution.
Furthermore, the found documents belonging to Bonifacio—either letters about Rizal or from
Rizal himself—were originally in Tagalog but had been translated into Spanish for the trial (Retana,
1961​). Additionally, the mere possession of Bonifacio of these documents begs a few questions: Given
the personal nature of the letters, some of which having been ​private correspondences between Rizal
and his family, how did they come to Bonifacio’s possession? Moreover, who had translated the
documents from their original Spanish? ​In translating works, discrepancies can arise due to subjectivity
(Farahzad, 2003), which explains why Rizal did not agree with the summarization of the documents,
except a few (Retana, ​1961​). Since his letters and works had been translated several times, each might
have intentionally received mistranslations. After all, Bonifacio, a situationist and political agitator who
had adopted the revolutionary views of an Ilustrado, was known for having attempted to exploit religious
experience to spread his influence and optimizing his status as a plebian to understand the experiences
of other commoners (Gripaldo, 2009).
Days later, Judge Advocate Lieutenant Enrique de Alcocer ruled that there was sufficient
evidence to establish the fact that Rizal was guilty of rebellion through illegal association, but Rizal
pleaded not guilty and admitted only that he had written the statutes of the Liga for the development of
commerce and industry, stating that he had not been politically active since his exile (Guerrero, 2010).
Aware of how his name was being used as the battle cry, Rizal, with permission from Blanco and
Governor General Polavieja, composed a public statement condemning the disturbances due to the
revolt, explaining how he never explicitly gave permission for them to use his name in such a manner,
and clarifying his stance on the Revolution (Retana, ​1961​). The finished manifesto, however, was only
interpreted as a stimulant for future rebellion and, consequently, left unpublished (Retana, ​1961​).
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18. Despite Rizal’s denials of his association with the Katipunan, he was found guilty of treason and
sentenced to death (Guerrero, 2010).
Hasty Trial
According to Bernad (1998), Blanco had instructed Captain Rafael Dominguez, the special
Judge Advocate, to commence the judicial process “with all possible speed,” causing Dominguez to
submit a hurried report lacking certain documents. Although it is suspected that Blanco’s request for
urgency can be attributed to his nearing retirement, the speedy proceeding of the trial was not affected
despite his replacement by de Polavieja (Bernad, 1998). With the trial taking place in December, where
many Catholic holidays take place, coupled with a replacement in the administration, something else
could have easily motivated the officials to rush the trial, such as preventing the revolution from
spreading across the country, particularly Cavite (Bernad, 1998). Perhaps this is why the Spaniards,
painfully aware of the revolutionary frenzy that had lately possessed the Filipinos and which threatened
to strip them of power, thought that the only recourse left was to attack the revolution at its purported
source: Rizal. But instead of dying down after Rizal’s execution, the flames of the insurrection grew to
engulf Spain until she was overcome. ​It is clear from Rizal’s ​Manifesto that he was not a co-conspirator
in the Katipunan’s revolutionary plans, nor did he sympathize with their brand of revolution, as evinced
by his withholding approval that which the Katipunan, through Valenzuela, had earlier sought to obtain.
With the Spaniards pursuing them, Bonifacio and other Katipuneros had no choice but to commence
their plans to revolt. The revolution broke out in Manila and quickly gained traction in the neighboring
provinces of Cavite, Laguna, Batangas, Bulacan, Pampanga, Tarlac, and Nueva Ecija. This, along with
the statements obtained from the witnesses, was to the Spaniards a clear sign of the dangers of
keeping Rizal—with his wide sphere of influence and plethora of anti-clerical, patriotic writings—alive.
Although they executed him, believing that it would end the insurrection, they were sadly mistaken.
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19. With this in mind, is it possible that, as Ocampo (1990) hypothesized, the Katipunan,
foreseeing the consequences of Rizal’s execution​, made sure to attribute the conception of their plans
to Rizal? His staunch opposition to the Katipunan’s brand of revolution may have made him a
noncooperative in the eyes of the Katipunan, and so it is possible that, just as they had done to the
wealthy Francisco Roxas and others who had withheld support for the planned revolution, they set out
to implicate the man, seeing as he would be more useful to their cause dead than alive, and correctly
suspecting that his death would trigger a fresh wave of bitterness against the Spaniards and push more
Filipinos to join the resistance. If Rizal, an advocate for a peaceful revolution, were to remain alive, he
could potentially issue more pronouncements decrying their bloody and violent revolution, such that the
fervor of the revolutionaries would be dampened, and the insurrection would ultimately die down.
Synthesis and Conclusion
Many scholars have weighed in on the subject of Rizal’s stance on revolution. However, their
interpretations of Rizal may have been skewed and limited due to their inherent biases, which may
have arisen due to, or exacerbated by, the prevailing mindset in the time period in which they lived. On
the leftist side, Constantino and other like-minded historians used Rizal’s ​Manifesto to support the
notion that Rizal was loyal to Spain, while others, like Guerrero and Ocampo, wrote that Rizal was
probably unsure of his stance on revolution. Schumacher, Arcilla, and Quibuyen disagreed with the
pacifist, reformist Rizal explicated in the writings of the anti-imperialist Constantino and the
pro-American Pardo de Tavera and Craig, and the ambivalent Rizal suggested by both Guerrero and
Ocampo. They proposed that, in the years leading to his death, Rizal had already realised the sterility of
the campaigns for reforms, and thus had sought to impress upon his countrymen the need for
emancipation from Spain. He had outlined his plan to secure independence from Spain in his books
and essays, but he had not been privy to the Katipunan’s plans and actions. All he had known about the
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20. Katipunan was what Pio Valenzuela had confided to him during their conference in June 1896, barely
two months before Pati​ñ​o’s betrayal.
Nevertheless, when the Katipunan was discovered, and those suspected of being sympathetic
to its revolutionary cause were rounded up and interrogated, Rizal was implicated in the statements
these suspects gave. He, a civilian, was summoned to a military court, where he was informed of the
charges that had been made against him​—that he was guilty of rebellion through illegal association with
the Katipunan​. Not only were the statements of the witnesses not fact-checked, but Rizal was deprived
of the liberty to cross-examine the witnesses who had testified against him. Rizal issued a manifesto
denouncing the insurrection, absolving himself of blame with regards to its conception and
development, and speaking of his hopes for the Philippines. But the Spaniards ignored his disavowals,
thinking that he was, despite his denials, the soul of the rebellion, and thus had him executed on the
grounds of rebellion through illegal association.
Thus, based primarily on secondary sources and secondarily on primary sources, it is possible
that the Katipunan, even before the revolution broke out, foresaw two things​—​one, that Rizal would
never cooperate willingly with them in regard to the bloody uprising they had planned, and two, that
Rizal’s death would both silence the man forever and fan the flames of the revolution. Thus even before
they were betrayed by Teodoro Pati​ño, they had already actualised their plans to render Rizal
incapable of opposing their revolution once it broke out by engineering his death, and use the fact of his
demise as a rallying point for the fire of the revolution to continue burning until the Spaniards were
overcome. This being said, as the bulk of the historical data presented in this research was obtained
from secondary sources, future researchers are highly encouraged to examine primary sources,
formulate their hypotheses from these sources, and consult reputable Rizal scholars to ask for help and
guidance in interpreting the primary sources and probing the veracity of the content, and to ask for
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21. recommendations for other primary sources that may help in furthering the development of the research
topic.
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