241573114 persons-cases

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PT&T vs. NLRC
272 SCRA 596
Facts:
Grace de Guzman, private respondent, was initially hired as a reliever by PT&T,
petitioner, specifically as a “Supernumerary Project Worker, for a fixed period due to a
certain employee who’s having a maternity leave. Under the agreement she signed, her
employment was to immediately terminate upon the expiration of the agreed period.
Thereafter, PT&T again hired Grace as reliever for the succeeding periods, this time as a
replacement to an employee who went on leave. The reliever status was then formally
completed until she was asked again to join PT&T as a probationary employee covering 150
days. In the job application form, she indicated in the portion of the civil status therein that
she was single although she had contracted marriage a few months earlier. Grace has also
made the same representation on her two successive reliever agreements. The branch
supervisor of PT&T having discovered the discrepancy sent Grace a memorandum requiring
her to explain the said discrepancy and she was reminded about the company’s policy of not
accepting married women for employment. In her reply, she stated that she wasn’t aware of
such policy at that time and all along she hadn’t deliberately hidden her true civil status.
However, PT&T remained unconvinced of this reasoning pledge by Grace and thus she was
dismissed from the company. Grace contested by initiating a complaint for illegal dismissal
and with a claim for non-payment of cost of living allowances.
Issue:
Whether or not PT&T is liable against Grace’s illegal dismissal due to certain
company policy.
Ruling:
Marriage as a special contract cannot be restricted by discriminatory policies of
private individuals or corporations. Where’s a company policy disqualified from work any
woman worker who contracts marriage, the Supreme Court invalidated such policy as it not
only runs afoul the constitutional provision on equal protection but also on the fundamental
policy of the State toward marriage.
The danger of such policy against marriage followed by PT&T is that it strike at the
very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution and ultimately
of the family as the foundation of the nation. Therefore, PT&T is deemed liable for Grace’s
illegal dismissal and the latter shall claim for damages.
Estrada vs. Escritor
A.M. P-02-1651 August 4, 2003

Facts:
In a sworn letter-complaint, Alejandro Estrada, complainant, wrote to Judge
Caoibes Jr. requesting for an investigation of rumors that respondent Soledad Escritor, court
interpreter of Las Piñas, is living with a man not her husband. Judge Caoibes referred the
letter to Escritor, who stated that “there is no truth as to the veracity of the allegation” and
challenged Estrada, “to appear in the open and prove his allegation in the proper court”.
Judge Caoibes set a preliminary conference and Escritor move for inhibition to avoid bias and
suspicion in hearing her case. In the conference, Estrada confirmed that he filed a letter-
complaint for “disgraceful and immoral conduct” under the Revised Administrative Code
against Escritor for that his frequent visit in the Hall of Justice in Las Piñas learned Escritor is
cohabiting with another man not his husband.
Escritor testified that when she entered judiciary in 1999, she was already a widow
since 1998. She admitted that she’s been living with Luciano Quilapo Jr. without the benefit
of marriage for 20 years and that they have a son. Escritor asserted that as a member of the
religious sect known as Jehovah’s Witnesses, and having executed a “Declaration of Pledging
Faithfulness” (which allows members of the congregation who have been abandoned by
their spouses to enter into marital relations) jointly with Quilapo after ten years of living
together, her conjugal arrangement is in conformity with her religious beliefs and has the
approval of the congregation, therefore not constituting disgraceful and immoral conduct.
Issue:
Whether or not Escritor is administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral
conduct.
Ruling:
Escritor cannot be penalized. The Constitution adheres to the benevolent neutrality
approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free
Exercise Clause, provided that it does not offend compelling state interests. The OSG must
then demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means possible so that the free
exercise clause is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the
state. In this case, with no iota of evidence offered, the records are bereft of even a feeble
attempt to show that the state adopted the least intrusive means. With the Solicitor General
utterly failing to prove this element of the test, and under these distinct circumstances,
Escritor cannot be penalized.
The Constitution itself mandates the Court to make exemptions in cases involving
criminal laws of general application, and under these distinct circumstances, such conjugal
arrangement cannot be penalized for there is a case for exemption from the law based on
the fundamental right to freedom of religion. In the area of religious exercise as a preferred
freedom, man stands accountable to an authority higher than the state.
Goitia vs. Campos-Rueda
35 Phil. 252
Facts:
Article 1; Eloisa Goitia, plaintiff-appellant, and Jose Campos-Rueda, defendant,
were legally married in the city of Manila. They established their residence 115 Calle San
Marcelino, where they lived together for about a month. However, the plaintiff returned to
the home of her parents.
The allegations of the complaint were that the defendant, one month after they
had contracted marriage, demanded plaintiff to perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his
genital organs in which the latter reject the said demands. With these refusals, the defendant
got irritated and provoked to maltreat the plaintiff by word and deed. Unable to induce the
defendant to desist from his repugnant desires and cease of maltreating her, plaintiff was
obliged to leave the conjugal abode and take refuge in the home of her parents.
The plaintiff appeals for a complaint against her husband for support outside of the
conjugal domicile. However, the defendant objects that the facts alleged in the complaint do
not state a cause of action.
Issue:
Whether or not Goitia can claim for support outside of the conjugal domicile.
Ruling:
Marriage is something more than a mere contract. It is a new relation, the rights,
duties and obligations of which rest not upon the agreement of the parties but upon the
general law which defines and prescribes those rights, duties and obligations. When the
object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties
and productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way should be
obtainable.
The law provides that defendant, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill this
obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home at his
option. However, the option given by law is not absolute. The law will not permit the
defendant to evade or terminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife was forced to
leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and physical assaults of the defendant,
Beatriz may claim support from the defendant for separate maintenance even outside of the
conjugal home.
Balogbog vs. CA
G.R. No. 83598 March 7, 1997

Facts:
Petitioners Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog are the children of Basilio Balogbog and
Genoveva Arzibal who died intestate in 1951 and 1961, respectively. They had an older
brother, Gavino, but he died in 1935, predeceasing their parents. In 1968, private
respondents Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog brought an action for partition and
accounting against petitioners, claiming that they were the legitimate children of Gavino by
Catalina Ubas and that, as such, they were entitled to the one-third share of Gavino in the
estate of their grandparents. In their answer, petitioners denied knowing private
respondents. They alleged that their brother Gavino died single and without issue in their
parents' residence at Tag-amakan, Asturias, Cebu. The Court of First Instance of Cebu City
rendered judgment for private respondents, ordering petitioners to render an accounting
from 1960 until the finality of its judgment, to partition the estate and deliver to private
respondents one-third of the estate of Basilio and Genoveva, and to pay attorney's fees and
costs. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage between Gavino and Catalina is valid even in the
absence of marriage certificate.
Ruling:
Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a woman conducting
themselves as husband and wife are legally married. This presumption may be rebutted only
by cogent proof to the contrary. In this case, petitioners' claim that the certification
presented by private respondents, to the effect that the record of the marriage had been lost
or destroyed during the war, was belied by the production of the Book of Marriages by the
assistant municipal treasurer of Asturias. Petitioners argue that this book does not contain
any entry pertaining to the alleged marriage of private respondents' parents. This contention
has no merit. Although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, the
failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place. Other evidence may be
presented to prove marriage.
Here, private respondents proved, through testimonial evidence, that Gavino and
Catalina were married in 1929; that they had three children, one of whom died in infancy;
that their marriage subsisted until 1935 when Gavino died; and that their children, private
respondents herein, were recognized by Gavino's family and by the public as the legitimate
children of Gavino. Hence, the marriage between Gavino and Catalina is valid.
Eugenio Sr. vs. Velez
185 SCRA 425
Facts:
Unaware of the death on 28 August 1988 of Vitaliana Vargas, her full blood
brothers and sisters, herein private respondents filed a petition for habeas corpus before the
RTC of Misamis Oriental alleging that Vitaliana was forcibly taken from her residence
sometime in 1987 and confined by herein petitioner in his palacial residence in Jasaan,
Misamis Oriental. Despite her desire to escape, Vitaliana was allegedly deprived of her liberty
without any legal authority. At the time the petition was filed, it was alleged that Vitaliana
was 25 years of age, single, and living with petitioner Tomas Eugenio. Petitioner refused to
surrender the body of Vitaliana (who had died on 28 August 1988) to the respondent sheriff.
As her common law husband, petitioner claimed legal custody of her body. Private
respondents (Vargases) alleged that petitioner Tomas Eugenio, who is not in any way related
to Vitaliana was wrongfully interfering with their (Vargases') duty to bury her. Invoking Arts.
305 and 308 of the Civil Code, the Vargases contended that, as the next of kin in the
Philippines, they are the legal custodians of the dead body of their sister Vitaliana. An
exchange of pleadings followed. Petitioner claims he is the spouse contemplated under Art.
294 of the Civil Code, the term spouse used therein not being preceded by any qualification;
hence, in the absence of such qualification, he is the rightful custodian of Vitaliana's body.
Vitaliana's brothers and sisters contend otherwise.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner can be considered as a spouse of Vitaliana Vargas.
Ruling:
There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the term "spouse"
embraces common law relation for purposes of exemption from criminal liability in cases of
theft, swindling and malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by spouses. The Penal
Code article, it is said, makes no distinction between a couple whose cohabitation is
sanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie and another who are husband and wife de facto. But
this view cannot even apply to the facts of the case at bar. We hold that the provisions of the
Civil Code, unless expressly providing to the contrary as in Article 144, when referring to a
"spouse" contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse. Petitioner vis-à-vis Vitaliana was not a
lawfully wedded spouse; in fact, he was not legally capacitated to marry her in her lifetime.
Custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to her surviving
brothers and sisters (the Vargases).
Cosca vs. Palaypayon
237 SCRA 249

Facts:
Ramon C. Sambo and other complainants filed an administrative complaint to the
Office of the Court Administrator against Judge Lucio Palaypayon and Nelia Baroy,
respondents, for the following offenses:
1. Illegal solemnization of marriage
2. Falsification of the monthly reports of cases
3. Bribery in consideration of an appointment in court
4. Non-issuance of receipt for cash bond received
5. Infidelity in the custody of detained prisoners, and
6. Requiring payment of filing fees from exempted entities
Complainants allege that respondent judge solemnized marriages even without the
requisite of marriage license. Thus, several couples were able to get married by the simple
expedient of paying the marriage fees to respondent Baroy, despite the absence of marriage
license. As a consequence, their marriage contracts did not reflect any marriage license
number. In addition, the respondent judge did not sign their marriage contracts and did not
indicate the date of solemnization, the reason being that he allegedly had to wait for the
marriage license to be submitted by the parties which was usually several days after the
ceremony. Indubitably, the marriage contracts were not filed with the local civil registrar.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent judge is liable of illegal solemnization of marriage.
Ruling:
On the charge regarding illegal marriages, the Family Code pertinently provides
that the formal requisite of marriage, inter alia, a valid marriage license except in the cases
provided for therein. Complementarily, it declares that the absence of any of the essential or
formal requisites shall generally render the marriage void ab initio and that, while an
irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage, the party or
parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
Thus, respondent judge is liable for illegal solemnization of marriage.
Wassmer vs. Velez
12 SCRA 648
Facts:
Francisco Velez, defendant, and Beatriz Wassmer, plaintiff-appellant, following
their mutual love, decided to get married on September 4, 1954. Two days before the
wedding, defendant left a note to Beatriz stating therein the postponement of their wedding
due to opposition of defendant’s mother and that he will be leaving. But on September 3,
1954, defendant sent another telegram stated that he will be returning very soon for the
wedding. However, defendant did not appear nor was he heard from again.
Beatriz sued defendant for damages and in silence of the defendant, trial court
granted the petition and ordered the defendant to pay Beatriz actual, moral and exemplary
damages. On June 21, 1955 defendant filed a “petition for relief from orders, judgments and
proceedings and motion for new trial and reconsideration.” Beatriz moved to strike it cut but
the court ordered the parties and their attorneys to appear for the stage of possibility of
arriving at an amicable settlement. Defendant wasn’t able to appear but instead on the
following day his counsel filed a motion to defer for two weeks the resolution on defendant’s
petition for relief. It was granted but again defendant and his counsel failed to appear.
Another chance for amicable settlement was given by the court but this time defendant’s
counsel informed the court that chances of settling case amicably were nil.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff
damages.
Ruling:
The case at bar is not a mere breach of promise to marry because it is not
considered an actionable wrong. The mere fact the couple have already filed a marriage
license and already spent for invitations, wedding apparels, gives the plaintiff reason to
demand for payment of damages. The court affirmed the previous judgment and ordered the
defendant to pay the plaintiff moral damages for the humiliation she suffered, actual
damages for the expenses incurred and exemplary damages because the defendant acted
fraudulently in making the plaintiff believe that he will come back and the wedding will push
through.

Navarro vs. Judge Domagtoy
A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088 July 19, 1996
Facts:
Mayor Rodolfo Navarro filed an administrative case against Municipal Circuit Trial
Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy. Complainant contended that Domagtoy displayed gross
misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law when he solemnized the
weddings of Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is
merely separated from his first wife, and Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario,
which was solemnized at the respondent’s residence which does not fall within his
jurisdictional area.
Respondent judge seeks exculpation from his act of having solemnized the
marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated from his wife, and Arlyn Borga
by stating that he merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey,
Samar, confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for
almost seven years. With respect to the second charge, he maintains that in solemnizing the
marriage between Sumaylo and Del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the
Family Code and that article 8 thereof applies to the case in question.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent judge may be held liable for solemnizing marriages
which did not comply with the requisites in the FC.
Ruling:
The Court held that even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the
present spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage. In this case, Tagadan was not
able to present a summary proceeding for the declaration of the first wife’s presumptive
death thus, he is still considered married to his first wife.
A marriage can only be considered beyond the boundaries of the jurisdiction of the
judge in the following instances: (1) at the point of death; (2) in remote places; or (3) upon
request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect. None of these were
complied with therefore there is an irregularity.
Arañes vs. Judge Occiano
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1309 April 11, 2002
Facts:
Petitioner Mercedita Mata charged respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the
Law, via a sworn Letter-Complaint, for solemnizing the marriage between petitioner and her
late groom (Ret.) Commodore Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license,
among others.
Since the marriage is a nullity, petitioner’s right, upon Orobia’s death, to inherit the
“vast properties” left by Orobia was not recognized. Petitioner was likewise deprived of
receiving the pensions of Orobia. Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against
respondent for his illegal acts and unethical misrepresentations, which caused her so much
hardships, embarrassment and sufferings. The case was referred by the Office of the Chief
Justice to the Office of the Court Administrator, which required the respondent to comment
on the complaint.
Respondent averred, among others, that before starting the ceremony, he
examined the documents submitted to him by the petitioner and he discovered that the
parties did not possess the requisite marriage license so he refused to solemnize the
marriage. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors, and the
delivery of the provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of
human compassion. After the solemnization, respondent reiterated the need for the
marriage license and admonished the parties that their failure to give it would render the
marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia assured the respondent that they would give the license
to him, but they never did. He attributed the hardships and embarrassment petitioner
suffered as due to her own fault and negligence.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent’s guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a marriage
license and outside his territorial jurisdiction.
Ruling:
Respondent judge should be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the
requisite marriage license. In People vs. Lara, the Supreme Court held that a marriage, which
preceded the issuance of the marriage license, is void, and that subsequent issuance of such
license cannot render or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases
provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to
conduct marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he solemnized the
marriage of the petitioner. Judges, who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate
in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage
outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite, which
while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to
administrative liability.

Vda. De Chua vs. CA
G.R. No. 116835 March 5, 1998
Facts:
Roberto Chua was the common-law husband of Florita A. Vallejo and had two
illegitimate sons with her. On 28 May 1992, Roberto Chua died intestate in Davao City. Upon
the death of Roberto, Vallejo filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City a petition for
the guardianship and administration over the persons and properties of the two minors.
Herein petitioner filed for its dismissal, claiming that she was the sole surviving heir of the
decedent being his wife; and that the decedent was a resident of Davao City and not
Cotabato City, which means that the said court was not the proper forum to settle said
matters.
The petitioner failed to submit the original copy of the marriage contract and the
evidences that she used were: a photocopy of said marriage contract, Transfer Certificate of
Title issued in the name of Roberto L. Chua married to Antonietta Garcia, and a resident of
Davao City; Residence Certificates from 1988 and 1989 issued at Davao City indicating that he
was married and was born in Cotabato City; Income Tax Returns for 1990 and 1991 filed in
Davao City where the status of the decedent was stated as married; passport of the decedent
specifying that he was married and his residence was Davao City. The trial court ruled that
she failed to establish the validity of marriage, and even denied her petition. This was latter
appealed to the appellate court, but it decided in favor of herein respondents.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial and appellate court is correct on their ruling on the validity
of marriage of Antonietta Garcia to Roberto Chua.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the lower court and the appellate court are correct in
holding that petitioner herein failed to establish the truth of her allegation that she was the
lawful wife of the decedent. The best evidence is a valid marriage contract which the
petitioner failed to produce. Transfer Certificates of Title, Residence Certificates, passports
and other similar documents cannot prove marriage especially so when the petitioner has
submitted a certification from the Local Civil Registrar concerned that the alleged marriage
was not registered and a letter from the judge alleged to have solemnized the marriage that
he has not solemnized said alleged marriage. The lower court correctly disregarded the
Photostat copy of the marriage certificate which she presented, this being a violation of the
best evidence rule, together with other worthless pieces of evidence. A valid, original
marriage contract would be the best evidence that the petitioner should have presented.
Failure to present it as evidence would make the marriage dubious.
Republic of the Philippines vs. CA and Castro
G.R. No. 103047 September 12, 1994
Facts:
On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil
ceremony performed by Judge Pablo M. Malvar, City Court Judge of Pasay City. The marriage
was celebrated without the knowledge of Castro’s parents. Defendant Cardenas personally
attended to the processing of the documents required for the celebration of the marriage,
including the procurement of the marriage license. In fact, the marriage contract itself states
that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued in the name of the contracting parties on June
24, 1970 in Pasig, Metro Manila.
The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife since the
marriage was unknown to Castro’s parents. Thus, it was only in March 1971, when Castro
discovered she was pregnant, that the couple decided to live together. However, their
cohabitation lasted only for four (4) months. Thereafter, the couple parted ways. On October
19, 1971, Castro gave birth. The baby was adopted by Castro’s brother, with the consent of
Cardenas.
Issue:
Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidences presented by private
respondent are sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued by the Civil
Registrar of Pasig prior to the celebration of the marriage of private respondent to Edwin F.
Cardenas.
Ruling:
The law provides that no marriage shall be solemnized without a marriage license
first issued by a local registrar. Being one of the essential requisites of a valid marriage,
absence to the parties is not adequate to prove its non-issuance. The above rule authorized
the custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent search, a particular document
does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not being found
in a registrar. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers charged
with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all
applications for marriage license, including the names of the applicants, the date the
marriage license was issued and such other relevant data.
The certification of due search and inability to find issued by the civil registrar of
Pasig enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of
all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Unaccompanied by any circumstance of
suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of due
search and inability to find sufficiently proved that his office did not issue marriage license
no. 1396182 to the contracting parties. There being no marriage license, the marriage of
Angelina and Edwin is void ab initio.

Garcia vs. Recio
G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001
Facts:
Article 26; The respondent, Rederick Recio, a Filipino was married to Editha
Samson, an Australian citizen, in Rizal in 1987. They lived together as husband and wife in
Australia. In 1989, the Australian family court issued a decree of divorce supposedly
dissolving the marriage. In 1992, respondent acquired Australian citizenship. In 1994, he
married Grace Garcia, a Filipina, herein petitioner, in Cabanatuan City. In their application for
marriage license, respondent was declared as “single” and “Filipino.” Since October 1995,
they lived separately, and in 1996 while in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided.
In 1998, petitioner filed Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the
ground of bigamy, claiming that she learned of the respondent’s former marriage only in
November. On the other hand, respondent claims that he told petitioner of his prior
marriage in 1993, before they were married. Respondent also contended that his first
marriage was dissolved by a divorce a decree obtained in Australia in 1989 and hence, he was
legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994. The trial court declared that the first marriage
was dissolved on the ground of the divorce issued in Australia as valid and recognized in the
Philippines. Hence, this petition was forwarded before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent has legal capacity to marry Grace Garcia.
Ruling:
In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family
Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is “validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.” A divorce obtained
abroad by two aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with
their respective laws. Therefore, before our courts can recognize a foreign divorce, the party
pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign
law allowing it.
In this case, the divorce decree between the respondent and Samson appears to be
authentic, issued by an Australian family court. Although, appearance is not sufficient, and
compliance with the rules on evidence regarding alleged foreign laws must be demonstrated,
the decree was admitted on account of petitioner’s failure to object properly because he
objected to the fact that it was not registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City,
not to its admissibility.
Respondent claims that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted
as evidence, adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law. Even
after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes, still restrict
remarriage. Respondent also failed to produce sufficient evidence showing the foreign law
governing his status. Together with other evidences submitted, they don’t absolutely
establish his legal capacity to remarry.
Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera
174 SCRA 653
Facts:
Article 26; On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and
private respondent Erich Geiling, a German national, were married in the Federal Republic of
Germany. The marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for some
time in Malate, Manila. Thereafter, marital discord set in, followed by a separation de facto
between them. After about three and a half years of marriage, private respondent initiating a
divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany. He claimed that there was failure of their
marriage and that they had been living apart since April 1982. On January 15, 1986,
Schoneberg Local Court promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage
of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to petitioner. Petitioner, on the other
hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila on January 23, 1983.
More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent
filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still
married to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as
1982 and with yet another man named James Chua sometime in 1983". On October 27, 1987,
petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a
temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying
her motion to quash.
Issue:
Whether or not the criminal cases filed by the German ex-spouse may prosper.
Ruling:
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of adultery cannot be
prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. Corollary to
such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily
follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at
the time of the filing of the criminal action. Hence, Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus
presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the
criminal action for adultery.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his
country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may
be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the
nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons. Private respondent,
being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery
case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

Van Dorn vs. Romillo Jr.
139 SCRA 139
Facts:
Alice Reyes, a Filipina, married Richard Upton, an American, in Hongkong in 1972.
They established residence in the Philippines and had two children. In 1982, the wife sued for
divorce in Nevada, U.S.A., on the ground of incompatibility. She later married Theodore Van
Dorn in Nevada in 1983. Upton sued her before RTC, Branch LXV in Pasay City asking that she
be ordered to render an accounting of her business, which Upton alleged to be conjugal
property. He also prayed that he be declared with a right to manage the conjugal property.
The defendant wife moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the cause of action
was barred by a previous judgment in the divorce proceedings wherein he had acknowledged
that the couple had no “community property”.
Issue:
Whether or not absolute divorce decree granted by U.S. court, between Filipina
wife and American husband held binding upon the latter.
Ruling:
The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada Divorce of the parties. There can be no
question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any states of the U.S. The decree is
binding on Upton as an American citizen. Hence, he cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in
any state of the United States. It is true that owing to the nationality principle under article
15 of the civil code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute
divorce abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released Upton from the
marriage from the standards of American law. Thus, pursuant to his national law, he is no
longer the husband of the petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case as
petitioner husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is also estopped by
his own representation before the Nevada court from asserting his right over the alleged
conjugal property. He should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to
conjugal property.
Republic vs. Orbecido
472 SCRA 114
Facts:
Cipriano Orbecido III and Lady Myros M. Villanueva were married with two
children. Lady Myros the left for the United States with one son and 1st became a naturalized
American citizen, 2nd obtained a valid divorce decree in 2000 capacitating her to remarry,
and 3rd contracted a marriage with Innocent Stanley, an American.
Cipriano then filed a petition for authority to remarry under Article 26(2) of the
Family Code The Office of the Solicitor General contends that the invoked article was not
applicable and raises this pure question of law, they further posit that Orbecido should file
for Legal Separation or Annulment instead.
Issue:
Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26(2).
Ruling:
YES. Article 26(2) should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been
divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. To
rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice.
For the application of Article 26(2), there must have been (1) a valid marriage
celebrated between a Filipino and a foreigner, and that (2) a valid divorce decree is obtained
by the alien spouse capacitating her to remarry.
Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the following
must be proven: (1) divorce as a fact, (2) foreign law, (3) divorce decree capacitated one to
remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained by the
alien spouse.
Annulment or Legal Separation need not be the proper remedies for such would be
in the case of the former, long, tedious, and infeasible, and in the case of the latter, is futile
to sever marital ties.

Niñal vs. Bayadog
328 SCRA 122
Facts:
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their
marriage were born herein petitioners. Pepito resulting to her death on April 24, 1985 shot
Teodulfa. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 24, 1986, Pepito and
respondent Norma Bayadog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito
and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived
together as husband and wife for at least 5 years and were thus exempt from securing a
marriage license.
After Pepito’s death on February 19, 1997, petitioners filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that the said marriage
was void for lack of a marriage license.
Issue:
What nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code
(now Article 34 of the Family Code) to warrant the counting of the 5-year period in order to
exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage license.
Ruling:
The 5-year common law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date
of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence
of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the
marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity-meaning no
third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity is unbroken.
Any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall
be illegal and void, subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior
marriage was dissolved or annulled.
In this case, at the time Pepito and respondent’s marriage, it cannot be said that
they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least 5 years prior to their
wedding day. From the time Pepito’s first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage
with respondent, only about 20 months had elapsed. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the
time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with
each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse.
The subsistence of the marriage even where there is was actual severance of the
filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse
with any third party as being one as “husband and wife”.
Having determined that the second marriage involve in this case is not covered by
the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the
absence of such element.
Manzano vs. Sanchez
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329 March 8, 2001
Facts:
Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having
been married to him in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City. Four
children were born out of that marriage. However, her husband contracted another marriage
with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. When respondent Judge solemnized
said marriage, he knew or ought to know that the same was void and bigamous, as the
marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were "separated."
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims that when he officiated the marriage
between Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally married. What he
knew was that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years already
without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit. According to him, had
he known that the late Manzano was married, he would have advised the latter not to marry
again; otherwise, he (Manzano) could be charged with bigamy. He then prayed that the
complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and for being designed merely to harass him.
After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court Administrator
recommended that respondent Judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be
ordered to pay a fine of P2,000, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act
would be dealt with more severely.
Issues:
1) Whether or not convalidation of the second union of the respondent falls under
the purview of Article 34 of the Family Code.
2) Whether or not Respondent Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
Ruling:
For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following
requisites must concur:
1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least
five years before the marriage; 2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of

marriage; 4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least
five years and are without legal impediment to marry each other; and 5. The solemnizing officer
must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that
he had found no legal impediment to their marriage.
Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note that
in their separate affidavits executed on 22 March 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge
himself, David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of their prior existing
marriage. Also, in their marriage contract, it was indicated that both were "separated."
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment
impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and void.
Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and
Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years. Just
like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five years does
not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross
ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage.
Cosca vs. Palaypayon
237 SCRA 249
Facts:
Same. Article 27-34; Emphasis to the marriage of Abellano and Edralin, Judge Palaypayon
admitted that he solemnized their marriage, but he claims that it was under Article 34 of the
Family Code, so a marriage license was not required. The contracting parties here executed a
joint affidavit that they have been living together as husband and wife for almost six (6) years
already.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent judge solemnization of such marriage with the
exception of a marriage license under Article 34 of the Family Code is valid.
Ruling:
In their marriage contract which did not bear any date either when it was
solemnized, it was stated that Abellano was only 18 years, 2 months and 7 days old. If he and
Edralin had been living together as husband and wife for almost 6 years already before they
got married as they stated in their joint affidavit, Abellano must have been less than 13 years
old when he started living with Edralin as his wife and this is hard to believe. Judge
Palaypayon should have been aware of this when he solemnized their marriage as it was his
duty to ascertain the qualification of the contracting parties who might have executed a false
joint affidavit in order to have an instant marriage by avoiding the marriage license
requirement.
This act of Judge Palaypayon of solemnizing the marriage of Abellano and Edralin
for the second time with a marriage license already only gave rise to the suspicion that the
first time he solemnized the marriage it was only made to appear that it was solemnized
under exceptional character as there was not marriage license and Judge Palaypayon had
already signed the marriage certificate.
Mariategui vs. CA
G.R. No. L-57062 January 24, 1992
Facts:
Lupo Mariategui contracted three marriages during his lifetime. On his first wife,
Eusebia Montellano, who died on November 8, 1904, he begot four children, Baldomera,
Maria del Rosario, Urbana and Ireneo. With his second wife, Flaviana Montellano, he begot a
daughter named Cresenciana. And his third wife, Felipa Velasco, he begot three children,
namely Jacinto, Julian and Paulina.
At the time of Lupo’s death he left certain properties with which he acquired when
he was still unmarried. Lupo died without a will. Upon his death, descendants from his first
and second marriages executed a deed of extrajudicial partition on Lot No. 163. However,
the children on Lupo’s third marriage filed with the lower court an amended complaint
claiming that they were deprive on the partition of Lot No. 163 which were owned by their
common father. The petitioners, children on first and second marriage, filed a counterclaim
to dismiss the said complaint. Trial court denied the motion to dismiss and also the complaint
by the respondents, children on third marriage.
Respondents elevated the case on CA on the ground that the trial court committed
an error for not finding the third marriage to be lawfully married and also in holding
respondents are not legitimate children of their said parents. CA rendered a decision
declaring all the children and descendants of Lupo, including the respondents, are entitled to
equal shares of estate of their father. However, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
of said decision.
Issue:
Whether or not respondents were able to prove their succession rights over the
said estate.

Ruling:
With respect to the legal basis of private respondents' demand for partition of the
estate of Lupo Mariategui, the Court of Appeals aptly held that the private respondents are
legitimate children of the deceased.
Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco were alleged to have been lawfully married in
or about 1930. This fact is based on the declaration communicated by Lupo Mariategui to
Jacinto who testified that "when his father was still living, he was able to mention to him that
he and his mother were able to get married before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig, Rizal."
The spouses deported themselves as husband and wife, and were known in the community
to be such. Although no marriage certificate was introduced to this effect, no evidence was
likewise offered to controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no record of the
marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are
present.
Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place
between Lupo and Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a woman, deporting themselves
as husband and wife, have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in
lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and
that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary
habits of life.
Domingo vs. CA
226 SCRA 572
Facts:
Delia Domingo, private respondent, filed a petition before RTC of Pasig for the
declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of property against Roberto Domingo,
petitioner. She alleged that they were married at Carmona, Cavite with evidences of
marriage certificate and marriage license, unknown to her, petitioner had a previous
marriage with Emerlina dela Paz which is still valid and existing. She came to know the prior
marriage when Emerlina sued them for bigamy. She prays that their marriage be declared
null and void and, as a consequence, to declare that she is the exclusive owner of all
properties she acquired during the marriage and to recover them from him.
Roberto moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the marriage being void
ab initio, the petition of declaration of nullity is unnecessary. It added that private
respondent has no property which in his possession.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent may claim for the declaration of nullity of marriage and
separation of property against petitioner on the ground of bigamy.
Ruling:
There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private respondent
celebrated while the former's previous marriage with one Emerlina de la Paz was still
subsisting is bigamous. As such, it is from the beginning. Petitioner himself does not dispute
the absolute nullity of their marriage. The Court had ruled that no judicial decree is necessary
to establish the invalidity of a void, bigamous marriage.
The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of
marriage, one of which is the separation of property according to the regime of property
relations governing them. It stands to reason that the lower court before whom the issue of
nullity of a first marriage is brought is likewise clothed with jurisdiction to decide the
incidental questions regarding the couple's properties.
Niñal vs. Bayadog
328 SCRA 122
Facts:
Same. Article 35
Issue:
Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs' deceased father with defendant
is null and void ab initio.
Ruling:
Any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall
be illegal and void, subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior
marriage was dissolved or annulled. The subsistence of the marriage even where there is was
actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any
cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as “husband and wife”.
Having determined that the second marriage involve in this case is not covered by
the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the
absence of such element.

Republic vs. CA and Molina
February 13, 1997
Facts:
On April 14, 1985, plaintiff Roridel O. Molina married Reynaldo Molina which union
bore a son. After a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and
irresponsibility" as a husband and a father as he preferred to spend more time with his peers
and friends, depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his
wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them. The RTC
granted Roridel petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage which was affirmed by the
CA.
Issue:
Whether or not irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities constitute
psychological incapacity.
Ruling:
The following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the
Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of
the marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to
71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of
the same Code in regard to parents and their children.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state.
Leouel Santos vs. CA
G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995
Facts:
Leouel first met Julia in Iloilo City. The meeting later proved to be an eventful day
for both of them for they got married on September 20, 1986. Leouel and Julia lived with the
latter’s parents. The ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was bound to happen, Leouel
averred, because of the frequent interference by Julia’s parents into the young spouses’
family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start a “quarrel” over a number of things
like when and where the couple should start living independently from Julia’s parents or
whenever Julia would express resentment on Leouel’s spending a few days with his own
parents.
On May 18, 1988, Julia finally left for the U.S. to work as a nurse despite his
husband’s pleas to so dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, Julia called Leouel for
the first time. She promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract but she
never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the U.S., where he underwent a training

program under the auspices of the Armed Forces of the Philippines he desperately tried to
locate, or to somehow get in touch with Julia, but all his efforts were of no avail.
Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to
communicate with him, for more than five years are circumstances that clearly show her
being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life.
Issue:
Whether or not Julia is psychologically incapacitated under Article 36 of the FC.
Ruling:
The use of the phrase “psychological incapacity” under Article 36 of the Code has
not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned
by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity and like
circumstances. Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be construed independently of but must
stand in conjunction with existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus, correlated,
psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must
be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article
68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of
the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the
time the marriage is celebrated.
Republic vs. Quintero-Hamano
G.R. No. 149498 May 20, 2004
Facts:
Respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of
her marriage to her husband Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of
psychological incapacity. Respondent alleged that she and Toshio started a common-law
relationship in Japan. They later lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went
back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. On November 16, 1987, she gave birth to
their child.
On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married by Judge Isauro M. Balderia of
the Municipal Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite. Unknown to respondent, Toshio was
psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities, which incapacity became
manifest only after the marriage. One month after their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan
and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family. After sending
money to respondent for two months, Toshio stopped giving financial support. She wrote
him several times but he never responded. Sometime in 1991, respondent learned from her
friends that Toshio visited the Philippines but he did not bother to see her and their child.
Issue:
Whether or not abandonment by one spouse tantamount to psychological
incapacity.
Ruling:
The court find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that
Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities. Toshio’s act
of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due
to some kind of psychological illness. After respondent testified on how Toshio abandoned
his family, no other evidence was presented showing that his behavior was caused by a
psychological disorder.
Abandonment is also a ground for legal separation. There was no showing that the
case at bar was not just an instance of abandonment in the context of legal separation. It
cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact that Toshio abandoned his family
immediately after the celebration of the marriage. It is not enough to prove that a spouse
failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be
shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not physical, illness. There was
no proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element
in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates a person from accepting and
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
In proving psychological incapacity, the court finds no distinction between an alien
spouse and a Filipino spouse. It cannot be lenient in the application of the rules merely
because the spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated happens to be a foreign
national. The medical and clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity were
formulated on the basis of studies of human behavior in general. Hence, the norms used for
determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person regardless of nationality.
Choa vs. Choa
G.R. No. 143376 November 26, 2002
Facts:
Leni Choa, petitioner, and Alfonso Choa, respondent, were married on March 15,
1981. Out of this union, two children were born. On October 27, 1993, respondent filed a
complaint for the annulment of his marriage to petitioner. Also filed an amended complaint
for the declaration of nullity of his marriage based on her alleged psychological incapacity.
The case went on trial with the respondent presenting his evidence. However, petitioner filed
a motion to dismiss the evidence. RTC denied petitioner’s demurrer to evidence on the
ground that petitioner must controvert the established quantum evidence of respondent.
Petitioner elevated the case to CA after the motion of reconsideration was denied. CA held
that denial of the demurrer was merely interlocutory and petitioner in her defense must
present evidence.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner’s obligated to present her evidence despite the
inadequate evidence of respondent in the annulment of marriage case grounded on
psychological incapacity.
Ruling:
The petition is meritorious. However, the evidence against petitioner is grossly
insufficient to support any finding of psychological incapacity that would warrant a
declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage.
Respondent claims that the filing by petitioner of a series of charges against him
are proof of the latter’s psychological incapacity to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage. These charges included Complaints for perjury, false testimony, concubinage and
deportation.
The documents presented by respondent during the trial do not in any way show
the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife. It is the height of absurdity and inequity to
condemn her as psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her marital obligations, simply
because she filed cases against him. The evidence presented merely establishes the
prosecution of the cases against him. To rule that the filings are sufficient to establish her
psychological incapacity is not only totally erroneous, but also grave abuse of discretion
bordering on absurdity.
Court clearly explained that "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability. The evidence adduced by respondent
merely shows that he and his wife could not get along with each other. There was absolutely
no showing of the gravity or juridical antecedence or incurability of the problems besetting
their marital union.
Antonio vs. Reyes
G.R. No. 155800 March 10, 2006
Facts:
Leonilo Antonio, petitioner, filed a petition to have his marriage to Marie Reyes,
respondent, declared null and void. He anchored his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the
Family Code alleging that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage. He asserted that respondent’s incapacity existed at
the time their marriage was celebrated and still subsists up to the present.
As manifestations of respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner
claimed that respondent persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her
occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or things.
In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Abcede, a psychiatrist, and Dr.
Lopez, a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they conducted, that petitioner
was essentially a normal, introspective, shy and conservative type of person. On the other
hand, they observed that respondent’s persistent and constant lying to petitioner was
abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic relationship that should be based on love,
trust and respect. They further asserted that respondent’s extreme jealousy was also
pathological. It reached the point of paranoia since there was no actual basis for her to
suspect that petitioner was having an affair with another woman. They concluded based on
the foregoing that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential
marital obligations.
After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioner’s evidence and held that
respondent’s propensity to lying about almost anything−her occupation, state of health,
singing abilities and her income, among others−had been duly established. According to the
trial court, respondent’s fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities
enabled her to live in a world of make-believe. This made her psychologically incapacitated as
it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage. The trial court
thus declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void.
Issue:
Whether or not there is sufficient basis/showing of psychological incapacity as to
render the marriage null and void.
Ruling:
It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted as false
pretenses in order to induce petitioner into marriage. More disturbingly, they indicate a failure on
the part of respondent to distinguish truth from fiction, or at least abide by the truth. Petitioner’s
witnesses and the trial court were emphatic on respondent’s inveterate proclivity to telling lies
and the pathologic nature of her mistruths, which according to them, were revelatory of
respondent’s inability to understand and perform the essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, a
person unable to distinguish between fantasy and reality would similarly be unable to comprehend
the legal nature of the marital bond, much less its psychic meaning, and the corresponding
obligations attached to marriage, including parenting. One unable to adhere to reality cannot be
expected to adhere as well to any legal or emotional commitments.
Clearly in this case, there was no categorical averment from the expert witnesses that
respondent’s psychological incapacity was curable or incurable. From the totality of the evidence,
however, the court is sufficiently convinced that the incurability of respondent’s psychological
incapacity has been established by the petitioner.
Chi Ming Tsoi vs. CA
G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997
Facts:
Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao were married on May 22, 1988. Until their separation
on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual contact between them. Hence, Gina (wife) filed a
petition for the declaration of nullity of their marriage. Medical examinations showed that
the wife was healthy, normal and still a virgin, while the husband was found to be capable of
having sexual intercourse since he was not impotent.

The wife claimed that her husband was impotent, and was a closet homosexual as
he did not show his penis and since he was using his mother’s eyebrow pencil and cleansing
cream. She also claimed that her husband married her, a Filipino citizen, in order to acquire
or maintain his residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the appearance
of a normal man. On the other hand, the husband claimed that it was his wife who was
psychologically incapacitated to perform basic marital obligations. He asserts that his wife
avoided him whenever he wants to have sexual intercourse with her. He further claimed that
his wife filed the case because she was afraid that she would be forced to return the pieces
of jewelry of his mother, and that he might consummate their marriage. He also insisted that
their marriage would remain valid because they are still very young and there is still a chance
to overcome their differences.
The trial court declared their marriage void on account of psychological incapacity
of the husband. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not the prolonged refusal of the husband to have sexual cooperation
for the procreation of children with his wife is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
Ruling:
Yes. The prolonged refusal of the husband to have sexual cooperation for the
procreation of children with his wife is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her
essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, the Catholic
marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal.
The husband’s senseless and protracted refusal to fulfill his marital obligations is equivalent
to psychological incapacity.
One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is to “procreate
children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual
cooperation is the basic end of marriage. Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will
finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. Decision affirmed and petition
denied for lack of merit.
Morigo vs. People of the Philippines
G. R. No. 145226 February 6, 2004
Facts:
Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of
Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran City, for a period of four years. After school year, Lucio Morigo
and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each other. In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to
receive a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore. The former replied and after an exchange
of letters, they became sweethearts. In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again
for Canada to work there. While in Canada, they maintained constant communication. In
1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her in
Canada. Both agreed to get married. Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving
appellant Lucio behind.
On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court a petition for divorce against
appellant which was granted by the court. Appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha
Lumbago at Tagbilaran City. Lucio filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol. The complaint seeks among others, the
declaration of nullity of Lucio’s marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage
ceremony actually took place. Appellant was charged with Bigamy in information filed by the
City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran City, with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.
Lucio Morigo moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil
case for judicial nullification of his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the
bigamy case. His motion was granted, but subsequently denied upon motion for
reconsideration by the prosecution. When arraigned in the bigamy case, Lucio pleaded not
guilty to the charge.
Issue:
Whether or not Lucio Morigo committed bigamy even with his defense of good
faith.
Ruling:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a
subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage
without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even
if the earlier union is characterized by statutes as "void."
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly
authorized solemnizing officer. Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage
contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no
semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act
alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which
Lucio might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity
before he contracts a subsequent marriage.
The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal
statute in favor of an accused and weigh every circumstance in favor of the presumption of
innocence to ensure that justice is done. Under the circumstances of the present case,
Supreme Court held that petitioner has not committed bigamy and that it need not tarry on
the issue of the validity of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent, which is now
moot and academic.
Lapuz-Sy vs. Eufemio
43 SCRA 177
Facts:
Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio, married
civilly on September 21, 1934 and canonically on September 30, 1943. In 1943, her husband
abandoned her. Carmen discovered Eufemio cohabiting with a Chinese woman, Go Hiok.

Carmen prayed for the issuance of the decree of legal separation. Eufemio amended answer
to the petition and alleged affirmative.
Before the trial could be completed, petitioner died in a vehicular accident. With
these respondent moved to dismiss the petition for legal separation on two grounds; the
petition was filed beyond 1-year period and the death of petitioner abated the acted for legal
separation.
Issue:
Whether or not the death of plaintiff in action for legal separation before final
decree abated the action.
Ruling:
An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-and-board
separation of the spouses is purely personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes this
in its Article 100, by allowing only the innocent spouse and no one else to claim legal
separation; and in its Article 108, by providing that the spouses can, by their reconciliation,
stop or abate the proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal separation already
rendered. Being personal in character, it follows that the death of one party to the action
causes the death of the action itself actio personalis moritur cum persona.
Gandionco vs. Peñaranda
G.R. No. L-72984 November 27, 1987
Facts:
Teresita Gandionco, legal wife of the petitioner, Froilan Gandionco, filed with the
RTC of Misamis Oriental a complaint against petitioner for legal separation on the ground of
concubinage with a petition for support and payment of damages. Teresita also filed a
complaint for concubinage against petitioner with MTC of General Santos City. And again for
the application for the provisional remedy of support pendente lite. The respondent Judge
Peñaranda ordered the payment of support pendente lite.
Petitioner contends that the civil action for legal separation and the incidents
thereto should be suspended in view of the criminal case for concubinage.
Issue:
Whether or not the civil action for legal separation shall be suspended on the case
of concubinage.
Ruling:
Petition is dismissed. A civil action for legal separation based on concubinage may
proceed ahead of or simultaneously with a criminal action for concubinage for the action for
legal separation is not to recover civil liability arising from the offense.
Civil action is not one “to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense” even if
both the civil and criminal actions arise from or are related to the same offense. Support
pendente lite, as a remedy, can be availed of in an action for legal separation and granted at
the discretion of the judge.

Bugayong vs. Ginez
G.R. No. L-10033 December 28, 1956
Facts:
Benjamin Bugayong, serviceman in the US Navy was married to defendant Leonila
Ginez in Pangasinan, while on furlough leave. After marriage, the couples live with the sisters
of the husband, before the latter left to report back to duty, the couple came to an
agreement that Leonila would stay with Benjamin’s sisters.
Leonila left the dwelling of her sisters-in-law which she informed her husband by
letter that she had gone to reside with her mother in Pangasinan. Early in July 1951,
Benjamin receive letters from his sister Valeriana Polangco that her wife informing him of
alleged acts of infidelity. Benjamin went to Pangasinan and sought for his wife whom he met
in the house of Leonila’s godmother. They lived again as husband and wife and stayed in the
house of Pedro Bugayong, cousin of the plaintiff-husband. On the second day, he tried to
verify from his wife the truth of the information he received but instead of answering,
Leonila packed up and left him which Benjamin concluded as a confirmation of the acts of
infidelity. After he tried to locate her and upon failing he went to Ilocos Norte. Benjamin filed
in CIF of Pangasinan a complaint for legal separation against Leonila, who timely filed an
answer vehemently denying the averments of the complaint.
Issue:
Whether or not the acts charged in line with the truth of allegations of the
commission of acts of infidelity amounting to adultery have been condoned by the plaintiff-
husband.
Ruling:
Granting that infidelities amounting to adultery were commited by the wife, the act
of the husband in persuading her to come along with him and the fact that she went with
him and together they slept as husband and wife deprives him as the alleged offended
spouse of any action for legal separation against the offending wife because his said conduct
comes within the restriction of Article 100 of Civil Code.
Pacete vs. Cariaga
231 SCRA 321
Facts:
Concepcion Alanis filed with the court below a complaint for the declaration of
nullity of the marriage between her erstwhile husband Enrico Pacete and one Clarita de la
Concepcion, as well as for legal separation (between Alanis and Pacete), accounting and
separation of property. In her complaint, she averred that she was married to Pacete before
the Justice of the Peace of Cotabato; that they had a child named Consuelo; that Pacete
subsequently contracted in 1948 a second marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion in North
Cotabato; that she learned of such marriage only on 1979; that during her marriage to
Pacete, the latter acquired vast property consisting of large tracts of land, fishponds and
several motor vehicles; that he fraudulently placed the several pieces of property either in
his name and Clarita or in the names of his children with Clarita and other "dummies;" that
Pacete ignored overtures for an amicable settlement; and that reconciliation between her
and Pacete was impossible since he evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita.
Issue:
Whether or not RTC of Cotabato City gravely abused its discretion in denying
petitioners' motion for extension of time to file their answer on the decree of legal
separation.
Ruling:
Petition is granted. The special prescriptions on actions that can put the integrity of
marriage to possible jeopardy are impelled by no less than the State's interest in the
marriage relation and its avowed intention not to leave the matter within the exclusive
domain and the vagaries of the parties to alone dictate.
It is clear that the petitioner did, in fact, specifically pray for legal separation. That
other remedy, whether principal or incidental, have likewise been sought in the same action
cannot dispense, nor excuse compliance, with any of the statutory requirements
aforequoted.
An action for legal separation must "in no case be tried before six months shall
have elapsed since the filing of the petition," obviously in order to provide the parties a
"cooling-off" period. In this interim, the court should take steps toward getting the parties to
reconcile.

Macadangdang vs. CA
108 SCRA 314
Facts:
Respondent Elizabeth Mejias is a married woman, her husband being Crispin
Anahaw. She allegedly had intercourse with petitioner Antonio Macadangdang sometime in
March, 1967. She also alleges that due to the affair, she and her husband separated in 1967.
She gave birth to a baby boy who was named Rolando Macadangdang in baptismal rites.
Respondent, then plaintiff, filed a complaint for recognition and support against petitioner,
then defendant, with the CIF of Davao. Defendant, now petitioner, Macadangdang filed his
answer, opposing plaintiff's claim and praying for its dismissal.
The lower court in a pre-trial conference, issued a Pre-trial Order formalizing
certain stipulations, admissions and factual issues on which both parties agreed.
Correspondingly, upon agreement of the parties, an amended complaint was filed by
plaintiff. In its decision rendered, the lower court dismissed the complaint. The decision
invoked positive provisions of the Civil Code and Rules of Court and authorities.
Issue:
Whether or not the wife may institute an action that would bastardize her child
without giving her husband, the legally presumed father, an opportunity to be heard.
Ruling:
SC find no merit in petitioner’s submission that the questioned decision had not
become final and executory since the law explicitly and clearly provides for the dissolution
and liquidation of the conjugal partnership as among the effects of the final decree of legal
separation.
It also appears that her claim against petitioner is a disguised attempt to evade the
responsibility and consequence of her reckless behavior at the expense of her husband, her
illicit lover and above all her own son. For this Court to allow, much less consent to, the
bastardization of respondent's son would give rise to serious and far-reaching consequences
on society. This Court will not tolerate scheming married women who would indulge in illicit
affairs with married men and then exploit the children born during such immoral relations by
using them to collect from such moneyed paramours. This would be the form of wrecking the
stability of two families. This would be a severe assault on morality.
Potenciano vs. CA
G.R. No. 139789, 139808 July 19, 2001
Facts:
Erlinda Ilusorio, the matriarch who was so lovingly inseparable from her husband
some years ago, filed a petition with the Court of Appeals for habeas corpus to have custody
of her husband in consortium. However, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision
dismissing the petition for lack of unlawful restraint or detention of the subject, Potenciano
Ilusorio.
Erlinda Ilusorio filed with the Supreme Court an appeal via certiorari pursuing her
desire to have custody of her husband Potenciano Ilusorio. This case was consolidated with
another case filed by Potenciano Ilusorio and his children, Erlinda Bildner and Sylvia Ilusorio
appealing from the order giving visitation rights to his wife, asserting that he never refused to
see her. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus for lack of merit, and
granted the petition to nullify the Court of Appeals' ruling giving visitation rights to Erlinda
Ilusorio.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner can assert Article 68 and 69 of Family Code to have
custody of her husband in consortium.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court agrees that as spouses, they are duty bound to live together
and care for each other as provided by Article 68 and 69. However, there was absence of
empathy between spouses Erlinda and Potenciano, having separated from bed and board
since 1972. Only the moral obligation of the spouses constitutes the motivating factor for
making them observe the said duties and obligations which are highly personal. Therefore,
they deny the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

Goitia vs. Campos-Rueda
35 Phil. 252
Facts:
Same. Article 68
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner may claim support from her husband outside of the
conjugal domicile.
Ruling:
The law provides that defendant, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill this
option. The law provides that defendant, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill this
option.
However, the option given by law is not absolute. The law will not permit the
defendant to evade or terminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife was forced to
leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and physical assaults of the defendant,
Article 68 emphasize mutual love, respect and fidelity among husband and wife.
Ty vs. CA
G.R. No. 127406 November 27, 2000
Facts:
Edgardo Reyes, private respondent, married to Anna Maria Villanueva both in a
civil and church ceremony respectively. However, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
of Quezon City declared their marriage null and void ab initio for lack of marriage of license.
Before the decree of was issued in nullifying the marriage of said spouses, private
respondent wed Ofelia Ty, petitioner, in the City Court of Pasay and thereafter in a church
wedding in Makati. Out of their union bore two daughters. Until private respondent petition
that their marriage be declared null and void for lack of marriage of license and that at the
time they got married, he was still married to Anna Maria. He stated that at the time he
married petitioner the decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria had not been issued.
Ofelia defended that lack of marriage license in their marriage is untrue. She
submitted the marriage license in court and private respondent did not question the
evidence. However, RTC and CA affirmed their decision in favor of private respondent.
Issue:

Whether or not petitioner may claim damages for failure to comply with marital
obligations of the respondent.
Ruling:
There can be no action for damages merely because of a breach of marital
obligation. Supreme Court also viewed that no damages should be awarded in the present
case, but for another reason. Petitioner wants her marriage to private respondent held valid
and subsisting. She is suing to maintain her status as legitimate wife. In the same breath,
she asks for damages from her husband for filing a baseless complaint for annulment of their
marriage which caused her mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation, social
humiliation and alienation from her parents.
Should they grant her prayer, they would have a situation where the husband pays
the wife damages from conjugal or common funds. To do so, would make the application of
the law absurd. Logic, if not common sense, militates against such incongruity.
Ilusorio vs. Bildner
G.R. No. 139789 May 12, 2000
Facts:
Erlinda Kalaw and Potenciano Ilusorio contracted matrimony and lived together for
a period of thirty years. Out of their marriage, the spouses had six children. In 1972, they
separated from bed and board for undisclosed reasons. Potenciano lived in Makati when he
was in Manila and in Ilusorio penthouse when he was in Baguio City. On the other hand,
Erlinda lived in Antipolo City.
When Potenciano arrived from United States and lived with Erlinda in Antipolo City
for five months. The children, Sylvia and Lin, alleged that their mother overdosed their father
with an antidepressant drug which the latter’s health deteriorated. Erlinda filed with RTC of
Antipolo City a petition for guardianship over the person and property of her husband due to
the latter’s advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment.
Potenciano did not return to Antipolo City and instead lived in a condominium in
Makati City after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio City. With these, Erlinda filed with
CA a petition for habeas corpus to have custody of her husband and also for the reason that
respondent refused petitioner’s demands to see and visit her husband and prohibiting
Potenciano from living with her in Antipolo City.
Issue:
Whether or not Erlinda Ilusorio may secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her
husband to live with her in conjugal bliss.
Ruling:
The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all
manner of involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal.
To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be an illegal and involuntary
deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective,
not merely nominal or moral.
No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his
wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by
sheriffs or by any other mesne process. That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best
left to the man and woman’s free choice. Therefore, a petition for writ of habeas corpus is
denied.
Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC
248 SCRA 300
Facts:
Article 69; Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, filed her certificate of candidacy for the
position of Representative of Leyte First District. On March 23, 1995, private respondent
Cirilio Montejo, also a candidate for the same position, filed a petition for disqualification of
the petitioner with COMELEC on the ground that petitioner did not meet the constitutional
requirement for residency.
On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an amended certificate of candidacy, changing
the entry of seven months to “since childhood” in item no. 8 in said certificate. However, the
amended certificate was not received since it was already past deadline. She claimed that
she always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile and residence. The Second Division of

the COMELEC with a vote of 2 to 1 came up with a resolution finding private respondent’s
petition for disqualification meritorious.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result
of her marriage to the late President Marcos.
Ruling:
It cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation
of law. The presumption that the wife automatically gains the husband's domicile by
operation of law but never automatically loses her domicile of origin.
The right of the husband to fix the actual residence is in harmony with the
intention of the law to strengthen and unify the family, recognizing the fact that the husband
and the wife bring into the marriage different domiciles of origin. This difference could, for
the sake of family unity, be reconciled only by allowing the husband to fix a single place of
actual residence.
Ayala Investments vs. CA
G.R. No. 118305 February 12, 1998
Facts:
Article 73; Philippine Blooming Mills loan from petitioner Ayala Investment. As an
added security for the credit line extended to PBM, respondent Alfredo Ching – Exec. VP,
executed security agreements and making himself jointly and severally answerable with
PBM’s indebtedness to Ayala Investments.
PBM failed to pay the loan. Thus, Ayala Investments filed a case for sum of money
against PBM and Alfredo Ching. The lower court issued a writ of execution of pending appeal.
Thereafter, deputy sheriff Magsajo caused issuance and service upon respondents-spouses of
a notice of sheriff sale on three of their conjugal properties.
Private respondents, spouses Ching, filed a case of injunction against petitioners
alleging that petitioners cannot enforce the judgment against conjugal partnership levied on
the ground that the subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the said conjugal
partnership. Upon application of private respondents, the lower court issued a temporary
restraining order to prevent Magsajo from proceeding with the enforcement of the writ of
execution and with the sale of the said properties at public auction.
Issue:
Whether or not loan acquired by PBM from Ayala Investments as guaranteed by
Alfredo Ching be redounded to the conjugal partnership of the spouses.
Ruling:
The husband and the wife can engage in any lawful enterprise or profession. While
it is but natural for the husband and the wife to consult each other, the law does not make it
a requirement that a spouse has to get the prior consent of the other before entering into
any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity. The exercise by a spouse of a
legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity is always considered to redound to the
benefit of the family.
But an isolated transaction of a spouse such as being guarantor for a third person’s
debt is not per se considered as redounding to the benefit of the family. Therefore, to hold
the absolute community or the conjugal partnership property liable for any loss resulting
from such isolated activity, proofs showing a direct benefit to the family must be presented.
Agapay vs. Palang
276 SCRA 341
Facts:
Article 87; Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage to Carlina Vallesterol in the
church at Pangasinan. A few months after the wedding, he left to work in Hawaii. Out their
union was born Herminia Palang, respondent. Miguel returned to the Philippines but he
stayed in Zambales with his brother during the entire duration of his year-long sojourn, not

with his wife or child. Miguel had also attempted to divorce Carlina in Hawaii. When he
returned for good, he refused to live with his wife and child.
When Miguel was then 63 yrs. old, he contracted his second marriage with a
nineteen year old Erlinda Agapay, petitioner. As evidenced by deed of sale, both jointly
purchased a parcel of agricultural land located at Binalonan. A house and lot was likewise
purchased allegedly by Erlinda as the sole vendee.
To settle and end a case filed by the first wife, Miguel and Cornelia executed a
Deed of Donation as a form of compromise agreement. The parties agreed to donate their
conjugal property consisting of six parcels of land to their only child, Herminia Palang.
Miguel and Erlinda’s cohabitation produced a son and then two years later Miguel
died. Thereafter, Carlina filed a complaint of concubinage on the previous party.
Respondents sought to get back the riceland and the house and lot allegedly purchased by
Miguel during his cohabitation with petitioner. Petitioner contended that she had already
given her half of the riceland property to their son and that the house and lot is her sole
property having bought with her own money. RTC affirmed in favor of the petitioner while
CA reversed the said decision.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner may own the two parcels of land acquired during the
cohabitation of petitioner and Miguel Palang.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the conveyance of the property was not by way of
sale but was a donation and therefore void. The transaction was properly a donation made
by Miguel to Erlinda, but one which was clearly void and inexistent by express provision of
law because it was made between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of
the donation.
Arcaba vs. Tabancura Vda. De Batocael
G.R. No. 146683 November 22, 2001
Facts:
Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered owners of
two lots in Zamboanga del Norte. After the death of Zosima, Francisco and his mother-in-law
executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights, in which the latter waived her
¼ share of the property. Thereafter, Francisco registered the lot in his name. Having no
children to take care of him after his retirement, Francisco asked his niece Leticia, the latter’s
cousin Luzviminda and petitioner Cirila Arcaba, to take care of his house and store.
Conflicting testimonies were offered as to the nature of the relationship between
Cirila and Francisco. Leticia said that the previous party was lovers since they slept in the
same room while Erlinda claimed that Francisco told her that Cirila was his mistress. On the
other hand, Cirila said she was mere helper and that Francisco was too old for her.
A few months before Francisco’s death, he executed an instrument denominated
“Deed of Donation Inter Vivos” in which he ceded a portion of the lot together with is house
to Cirila, who accepted the donation in the same instrument. The deed stated that the
donation was being made in consideration of the “faithful services she had rendered over the
past ten years.” Thereafter, Francisco died and the respondents filed a complaint against
Cirila for declaration of nullity of a deed of donation inter vivos, recovery of possession and
damages. Respondents, who are nieces, nephews and heirs by intestate succession of
Francisco, alleged that Cirila was the common-law wife of Francisco and the donation inert
vivos is void under Article 87 of the Family Code.
Issue:
Whether or not the deed of donation inter vivos executed by the late Francisco Comille be
declared void under Article 87 of the Family Code.
Ruling:
Where it has been established by preponderance of evidence that two persons
lived together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, the inescapable conclusion is
that the donation made by one in favor of the other is void under Article 87 of the Family
Code.
Therefore, respondents having proven by preponderance of evidence that Cirila
and Francisco lived together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, the donation
inter vivos is considered null and void.
Uy vs. CA
G.R. No. 109557 November 29, 2000
Facts:
Teodoro Jardeleza, petitioner, filed a petition in the matter of the guardianship of
Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., upon learning that one piece of real property belonging to the
latter spouses was about to be sold. The petitioner averred therein that the present physical
and mental incapacity of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza Sr. prevent him from competently

administering his properties, in order to prevent the loss and dissipation of the Jardeleza’s
real and personal assets, there was a need for a court-appointed guardian to administer said
properties.
Gilda Jardeleza, respondent, filed a petition regarding the declaration of incapacity
of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza Sr., assumption of sole powers of administration of conjugal
properties and authorization to sell the property. She alleged that her husband’s medical
treatment and hospitalization expenses were piling up and that she need to sell one piece of
real property and its improvements. She prayed for authorization from the court to sell said
property.
RTC of Iloilo City rendered its decision, finding that it was convinced that Dr.
Ernesto Jardeleza Sr. was truly incapacitated to participate in the administration of the
conjugal properties. However, Teodoro filed his opposition to the proceedings being
unaware and not knowing that a decision has already been rendered on the case. He also
questioned the propriety of the sale of the lot and its improvements thereon supposedly to
pay the accumulated financial obligations and hospitalization.
Issue:
Whether or not Gilda Jardeleza may assume sole powers of administration of the
conjugal property.
Ruling:
The CA, which the SC affirmed, ruled that in the condition of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza
Sr., the procedural rules on summary proceedings in relation to Article 124 of the Family
Code are not applicable. Because he was unable to take care of himself and manage the
conjugal property due to illness that had rendered him comatose. In such case, the proper
remedy is a judicial guardianship proceeding under Rule 93 of the 1964 Revised Rules of
Court.
De La Cruz vs. De La Cruz
130 Phil 324
Facts:
Estrella de la Cruz, petitioner, was married to Severino de la Cruz, defendant, at
Bacolod City. During their coverture they acquire seven parcels of land in Bacolod Cadastre
and three parcels of land at Silay Cadastre. They are also engaged in varied business
ventures.
The defendant started living in Manila, although he occasionally returned to
Bacolod City, sleeping in his office at the Philippine Texboard Factory in Mandalagan, instead
of in the conjugal home at Bacolod City. Estrella then filed a petition on the ground of
abandonment upon the defendant who had never visited their conjugal abode. She also
began to suspect the defendant in having an illicit relation while in Manila to a certain Nenita
Hernandez, which she confirmed upon getting several pieces of evidence on the defendant’s
polo shirt and iron safe.
The defendant denied the allegations of the petitioner and that the reason he
transferred his living quarters to his office in Mandalagan, Bacolod City was to teach her a
lesson as she was quarrelsome and extremely jealous of every woman. He decided to live
apart from his wife temporarily because at home he could not concentrate on his work. The
defendant, with vehemence, denied that he has abandoned his wife and family, averring that
he has never failed, even for a single month, to give them financial support. In point of fact,
his wife and children continued to draw allowances from his office and he financed the
education of their children, two of whom were studying in Manila.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent abandoned his family and failed to comply with his
obligations.
Ruling:
The SC have made a searching scrutiny of the record, and it is considered view that
the defendant is not guilty of abandonment of his wife, nor of such abuse of his powers of
administration of the conjugal partnership, as to warrant division of the conjugal assets.
There must be real abandonment, and not mere separation.The abandonment must not only
be physical estrangement but also amount to financial and moral desertion.
Therefore, physical separation alone is not the full meaning of the term
"abandonment", if the husband, despite his voluntary departure from the society of his
spouse, neither neglects the management of the conjugal partnership nor ceases to give
support to his wife. The fact that the defendant never ceased to give support to his wife and
children negatives any intent on his part not to return to the conjugal abode and resume his
marital duties and rights.
Partosa-Jo vs. CA
216 SCRA 692
Facts:

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