Download as DOCX, PPTX
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Bring as as he wasalreadyappointedas a CISagent. Evenifthe case ofPeoplevs. Mapa revoked
the doctrine in the Macarandang case, thiswas made onlyon 30 August 1967, years after the
accusedwas charged. Under the Macarandang rule therefore obtaining at the time ofappellant’s
appointment as secret agent, he incurred nocriminal liabilityfor possessionof the pistol in
question. The Supreme Court reversed the appealeddecision, conformablywiththe
recommendation ofthe Solicitor General, andacquittedJesus Santayana, canceling the bondfor
his provisional release; with costs de oficio.
People ofthe Philippines vs. M. Mapa
Facts:
The accusedwas convicted in violation ofSec. 878 inconnection to Sec. 2692 of the Revised
Administrative Code as amendedbyCommonwealthAct No. 56 and further amendedbyR.A. 4.
On August 13, 1962, the accused wasdiscoveredto have inits possessionandcontrol a home-
made revolver cal. 22 withno license permit. Inthe court proceeding, the accused admittedthat
he owns the gunandaffirmed that it hasno license. The accused further stated that he is a secret
agent appointedbyGov. Leviste ofBatangasand showedevidences ofappointment. Inhis
defense, the accusedpresentedthe case ofPeople vs. Macarandang, stating that he must
acquitted because he is a secret agent andwhich mayqualifyintopeace officers equivalent to
municipal police whichis covered byArt. 879.
Issue:
Whether or not holdinga positionof secret agent ofthe Governor is a proper defense to illegal
possession offirearms.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court inits decision affirmedthe lower court’s decision. It statedthat the law is
explicit that except as thereafter specificallyallowed, "it shall be unlawful for anyperson to . . .
possessanyfirearm, detachedparts offirearms or ammunitiontherefor, or anyinstrument or
implement usedor intendedto be usedinthe manufacture offirearms, parts offirearms, or
ammunition." The next section provides that "firearms andammunitionregularlyand lawfully
issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines[of the ArmedForces of the Philippines], the
Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureauof Prisons, municipal police,
provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincialtreasurers, municipaltreasurers, municipal
mayors, andguards ofprovincial prisoners andjails,"are not covered"whensuchfirearms are in
possession ofsuch officials andpublic servants for use inthe performance of their officialduties.
The Court construedthat there is no provisionfor the secret agent;includingit in the list therefore
the accusedis not exempted.
As determined through Construction
**General Rule: Statutemust be capable of construction, otherwise inoperative
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs.COMELEC
G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997
FACTS:
In 1996, Atty. Jesus DelfinfiledwithCOMELECa petitionto amend Constitution, to lift term limits
of elective officials, bypeople’s initiative. DelfinwantedCOMELECto control andsupervise said
people’s initiative the signature-gatheringall over the country. The propositionis:“Do you
approve of lifting the term limits of all elective government officials, amending for the purpose
Sections 4 ) and7 of Article VI, Section4 of Article VII, and Section8 of Article 8 of Article Xof the
1987 Philippine Constitution?” SaidPetitionfor Initiative will first be submittedto the people, and
after it is signed byat least 12% total number of registeredvoters inthe country, it will be formally
filedwiththe COMELEC.
COMELEC in turn orderedDelfin for publicationof the petition. Petitioners Sen. Rocoet al moved
for dismissal of the DelfinPetitionon the groundthat it is not the initiatorypetition properly
cognizable bythe COMELEC.
a. Constitutionalprovisiononpeople’s initiative to amendthe Constitutioncanonlybe
implemented bylaw to be passedbyCongress. No such lawhas beenpassed.
b. Republic Act No. 6735 providesfor 3 systems oninitiative but failed to provide anysubtitle on
initiative onthe Constitution, unlike inthe other modes of initiative. Thisdeliberate omission
indicates matter of people’s initiative was left to some future law.
c. COMELEC has nopower to provide rulesandregulations for the exercise of people’s initiative.
OnlyCongressis authorizedbythe Constitutionto pass the implementinglaw.
d. People’s initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revisionthereof.
Extendingor liftingof termlimits constitutes a revision.
e. Congress nor anygovernment agencyhas not yet appropriatedfunds for people’s initiative.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the people candirectlypropose amendments to the Constitution throughthe
systemof initiative under Section2 of Article XVII ofthe 1987 Constitution.
HELD:
REPUBLICACT NO. 6735
It was intendedto include or cover people’s initiative onamendments to the Constitution but, as
worded, it doesnot adequatelycover such intiative. Article XVII Section2 of the 1987 Constitution
providing for amendments to Constitution, is not self-executory. While the Constitutionhas
recognizedor grantedthe right of the people to directlypropose amendments to the Constitution
via PI, the people cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide for its
implementation.
FIRST:Contraryto the assertionof COMELEC, Section2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative on
amendments to the Constitution. The inclusionof the word“Constitution” therein wasa delayed
afterthought. The word is not relevant to the sectionwhichis silent as to amendments ofthe
Constitution.
SECOND:Unlike in the case ofthe other systems of initiative, the Act does not provide for the
contents ofa petitionfor initiative on the Constitution. Sec 5(c) does not include the provisions of
the Constitutionsought to be amended, inthe case of initiative on the Constitution.
THIRD:No subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the
latter simplymeans that the mainthrust of the Act is initiative andreferendumon nationaland
local laws. The argument that the initiative onamendments to the Constitutionis not acceptedto
be subsumedunder the subtitle onNational Initiative and Referendumbecause it is nationalin
scope. Under Subtitle II andIII, the classification is not basedonthe scope of the initiative
involved, but onits nature and character.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/241941333-case-digest-statcon-150913073807-lva1-app6892/85/241941333-case-digest-statcon-4-320.jpg)
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Nationalinitiative – what is proposedto be enactedis a national law, or a law which onlyCongress
can pass.
Local initiative – what is proposed to be adoptedor enacted is a law, ordinance or resolution
which onlylegislative bodies of the governments ofthe autonomous regions, provinces, cities,
municipalities, andbarangays canpass.
Potestas delegata non delegari potest
What has been delegated, cannot be delegated. The recognized exceptions to the rule are: [1]
Delegationof tariffpowers to the President;[2] Delegationof emergencypowers to the President;
[3] Delegationto the people at large; [4] Delegationto localgovernments;and[5] Delegation to
administrative bodies.
COMELEC
Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative bodyexercisingquasi judicial functions, to
promulgate rules and regulations is a form of delegationof legislative authority. Ineverycase of
permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegationitself is valid. It is validonlyif
the law
(a) is complete initself, setting forththereinthe policyto be executed, carriedout, or
implemented bythe delegate;and
(b) fixes a standard – the limits of which are sufficientlydeterminate anddeterminable – to which
the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. Republic Act No. 6735 failedto
satisfyboth requirements insubordinate legislation. The delegationof the power to the COMELEC
is then invalid.
COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300
Insofar as it prescribesrules andregulations onthe conduct of initiative onamendments to the
Constitutionis void. COMELECcannot validlypromulgate rules andregulations to implement the
exercise of the right of the people to directlypropose amendments to the Constitution through
the systemof initiative. It does not have that power under Republic Act No. 6735.
Whether the COMELECcan take cognizance of, or has jurisdictionover, a petitionsolelyintended
to obtain anorder:
(a) fixing the time anddatesfor signature gathering;
(b) instructingmunicipal election officers to assist Delfin’s movement andvolunteers in
establishing signature stations;and
(c) directing or causing the publicationof the unsigned proposedPetitionfor Initiative on the 1987
Constitution.
DELFIN PETITION
COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
ENTERTAINING THE DELFIN PETITION. Even if it be concededex gratia that RA 6735 is a full
compliance withthe power of Congress to implement the right to initiate constitutional
amendments, or that it has validlyvested uponthe COMELECthe power of subordinate legislation
and that COMELECResolutionNo. 2300 is valid, the COMELECacted without jurisdiction or with
grave abuse ofdiscretion inentertaining the Delfin Petition.
The Delfin Petition does not containsignaturesof the requirednumber of voters. Without the
requiredsignatures, the petitioncannot be deemed validlyinitiated. The COMELECrequires
jurisdictionover a petition for initiative onlyafter its filing. The petitionthenis the initiatory
pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable bythe COMELEC, sitting enbanc.
Since the DelfinPetitionis not the initiatorypetitionunder RA6735 andCOMELECResolution No.
2300, it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of bythe COMELEC. The petitionwas merely
entered as UND, meaning undocketed. It was nothingmore thana mere scrap ofpaper, which
should not have been dignified bythe Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on12 December
1996, and the order directing Delfinand the oppositors to file their memoranda to file their
memoranda or oppositions. In sodignifying it, the COMELECacted without jurisdiction or with
grave abuse ofdiscretion and merelywastedits time, energy, andresources.
Therefore, Republic Act No. 6735 did not applyto constitutional amendment.
** 2. Specific Rules
a. Mens Legislatoris: Ascertain spirit/intent/purposeof thelaw
Prasnik v. Republic of the Philippines
G.R. No. L-8639 (March 23, 1956)
FACTS:
Petitioner seeks to adopt four childrenwhich he claims to be his andPaz Vasquez’ children
without the benefit of marriage. The Solicitor General opposedthis statingthat Art. 338 of the
Civil Code allows a natural childto be adopted byhis father refers onlyto a childwho
has not beenacknowledgedas natural child. It maintains that inorder that a natural child may
be adoptedbyhis natural father or mother there shouldnot be anacknowledgment of the status
of the natural child for it will goagainst Art. 335.
ISSUE:
W/N the Civil Code allows for the adoptionof acknowledgednatural children of the father or
mother.
HELD:
The law intends to allow adoption whether the child be recognizedor not. If the intentionwere to
allowadoptiononlyto unrecognizedchildren, Article 338 would be of nouseful purpose. The
rights ofanacknowledgednatural child are muchless thanthose of a legitimated child.
Contendingthat this is unnecessarywoulddenythe illegitimate childrenthe chance to acquire
these rights. The trend when it comesto adoptionof childrentends to go toward the liberal. The
law does not prohibit the adoption of anacknowledgednatural child whichwhencomparedto a
natural childis equitable. An acknowledgednatural childis a naturalchildalso and following the
words of the law, theyshouldbe allowed adoption.
CORNELIA MATABUENA vs.PETRONILA CERVANTES
L-2877 (38 SCRA 284)
March 31, 1971
FACTS:
In 1956, hereinappellant’s brother Felix Matabuena donateda piece of lot to his
common-law spouse, hereinappellee Petronila Cervantes. Felix andPetronila got marriedonlyin](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/241941333-case-digest-statcon-150913073807-lva1-app6892/85/241941333-case-digest-statcon-5-320.jpg)
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Backwagesunder RA 875. Under RA 875, the Court of IndustrialRelations (CIR) was given wide
discretionto grant or disallow payment of backpay(backwages) to an employee, it alsohad the
impliedpower of reducing the backpaywhere backpaywas allowed. Inthe exercise of its
jurisdiction, the CIR canincrease or diminish the awardof backpay, dependingon several
circumstances, among them, the goodfaithof the employer, the employee’s employment in other
establishments during the period ofillegaldismissal, or the probabilitythat the employee could
have realized net earnings fromoutside employment if he had exercised due diligence to search
for outside employment.
This methodcaused undue delayinthe dispositionof illegal dismissal cases. Cases are usuallyheld
up in the determinationof whether or not the computationof the awardof backwages is correct.
Mercury Drug Rule . Inorder prevent undue delayin the disposition ofillegaldismissal cases, the
SC found occasion inthe case ofMercuryDrug Co vs. CIR, 1974, to rule that a fixed amount of
backwageswithout further qualifications shouldbe awarded to anillegallydismissedemployee.
In subsequent cases (adopting the proposal of Justice Teehankee), backwages equivalent to three
years (unless the case is not terminated sooner) wasmade the base figure for suchawards
without deduction, subject to deduction where there are mitigating circumstancesinfavor of the
employer but subject to increase bywayof exemplarydamageswhere there are aggravating
circumstances (e.g. oppressionor dilatoryappeals) onthe employer’s part.
On 1 November 1974, the Labor Code of the Philippines took effect. Article 279 of the saidcode
provides:
“[...] An employee whois unjustlydismissed from workshall be entitledto reinstatement without
loss of seniorityrights and to hisback wages computed fromthe time his compensationwas was
withheldfromhim up to the time of his reinstatement.”
The above provisionnothwithstanding, the rule generallyappliedbythe Court after the
promulgationof theMercuryDrug case, and during the effectivityof P.D. No. 442 was still
the MercuryDrug rule. Ineffect, this qualifiedthe provisionunder P.D. No. 442 bylimiting the
award ofbackwagesto 3 years.
“Deductionof Earnings Elsewhere” Rule. When RA 6715 took effect on21 March 1989, the
pertinent portionof Article 279 of the Labor Code wasamendedto readas follows:
“[...] An employee whounjustlydismissedfrom work shall be entitledto reinstatement without
loss of seniorityrights and other privilegesand to his fullbackwages, inclusive of allowances, and
to his other benefits or their monetaryequivalent computedfrom the time hiscompensationwas
withheldfromhim upto the time of his actual reinstatement.”
In accordance withthe above provision, anillegallydismissedemployee is entitledto his full
backwagesfrom the time of his illegal dismissal upto the time of hisactual reinstatement.
Despite the amendment, however, ina subsequent case, Pines CityEducational Center vs. NLRC,
1993, the Court returnedto the rule prior to the MercuryDrug rule that the total amount derived
from employment elsewhere bythe employee from the date ofdismissal upto the date of
reinstatement, if any, shouldbe deductedfrom backwages.
The rationale for such rulingwas that, the earning derivedelsewhere bythe dismissedemployee
while litigating the legalityof his dismissal, should be deducted fromthe fullamount of backwages
which the law grants him upon reinstatement, so as not to undulyor unjustlyenrichthe employee
at the expense of the employer.
Issue
Whether or not the income derivedbythe employee elsewhere duringthe periodof his illegal
dismissal shouldbe deductedfrom the awardof backwages.
Ruling
Conformablywiththe evident legislative intent of RA 6715, backwages to be awarded to an
illegallydismissedemployee, should not, as a general rule, be diminishedor reducedbythe
earnings derivedbyhimelsewhere duringthe periodof hisillegaldismissal.
The underlying reason for this ruling is that the employee, while litigating the legality(illegality) of
his dismissal, must stillearna livingto support himself and family, whilefull backwages have to be
paidbythe employer as part of the price or penaltyhe has to payfor illegallydismissing his
employee.
The clear legislative intent of the amendment inRA 6715 is to give more benefits to workers than
was previouslygiven themunder the MercuryDrug rule or the “deduction ofearnings elsewhere”
rule.
Thus, a closer adherence to the legislative policybehindRA 6715 points to “full backwages” as
meaningexactlythat, i.e., without deducting from backwagesthe earnings derivedelsewhere by
the concerned employee during the periodof his illegal dismissal. In other words, the provision
calling for “full backwages” to illegallydismissedemployees is clear, plainandfree from ambiguity
and, therefore, must be appliedwithout attempted or strained interpretation. Index animi sermo
est (literally“speechis the index ofintention”).
US v. Toribio
Full Text: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1910/jan1910/gr_l-5060_1910.html
Facts:
The appellant slaughteredor causedto be slaughteredfor humanconsumption the carabao
described inthe information, without a permit from the municipal treasurer of the municipality
whereinit wasslaughtered, in violationof the provisions of sections 30 and33 of Act No. 1147, an
Act regulating the registration, branding, andslaughter of large cattle.
It appears that inthe townof Carmen, in the Province ofBohol, whereinthe animal was
slaughteredthere is no municipal slaughterhouse, andcounsel for appellant contends that under
such circumstances the provisions of Act No. 1147 do not prohibit nor penalize the slaughter of
large cattle without a permit ofthe municipal treasure.
Issue:
Whether or not the proper constructionof the language of these provisions limit the prohibition
containedin Section30 andthe penaltyimposedinSection 33 to cases:
(1) of slaughter of large cattles for humanconsumptionin a municipalslaughter house without a
permit dulysecured from the municipaltreasurer, and
(2) cases of killing of large cattle for foodina municipal slaughter-house without a permit duly
secured from the municipaltreasurer.
Held:
The prohibitioncontained in section30 refers
(1) to the slaughter of large cattle for human consumption, anywhere, without a permit duly
secured from the municipaltreasurer, and
(2) expresslyandspecificallyto the killingfor food oflarge cattle at a municipal slaughterhouse
without suchpermit;andthat the penaltyprovided insection33 appliesgenerallyto the slaughter](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/241941333-case-digest-statcon-150913073807-lva1-app6892/85/241941333-case-digest-statcon-7-320.jpg)
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of large cattle for humanconsumption, anywhere, without a permit dulysecuredfromthe
municipal treasurer, and specificallyto the killing for foodof large cattle at a municipal
slaughterhouse without suchpermit.
Sections 30 and 33 prohibit andpenalize the slaughter for humanconsumption or killing for food
at a municipal slaughterhouse ofsuchanimals without a permit issuedbythe municipal treasurer,
and section32 provides for the keeping of detailedrecords ofallsuchpermits inthe office ofthe
municipal and alsoof the provincial treasurer.
Where the language of a statute is fairlysusceptible oftwo or more constructions, that
constructionshouldbe adopted whichwill most tend to give effect to the manifest intent of the
lawmaker andpromote the object for which the statute was enacted, anda construction should
be rejectedwhichwouldtendto render abortive other provisions ofthe statute andto defeat the
object whichthe legislator sought to attainbyits enactment. Therefore, sections 30 and33 of the
Act prohibit andpenalize the slaughteringor causing to be slaughteredfor humanconsumptionof
large cattle at anyplace without the permit providedfor insection30.
PLANTERS ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHERN NEGROS INC., petitioner, vs. HON. BERNARDO T.
PONFERRADA, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, BRANCH
42; HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT; BINALBAGAN – ISABELA SUGAR
COMPANY, INC., and NATIONAL CONGRESS OF UNIONS IN THE SUGAR INDUSTRYOF THE
PHILIPPINES (NACUSIP),respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PURISIMA, J.:
“Nowhere is the economic disparity between labor and capital so evident than in the sugar
industry. While it is the lowlyfarm worker who must toil in the field under the harshness of
conditions, it is the planter who gets to enjoy more the fruits of production. While the planter lives
in the comfort of his palatial home, the living condition of the sugar farm worker more often than
not defies the basic tenets of human dignity.”[1]
At bar is a Petition for Reviewon Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules ofCourt seeking to
review andset aside the August 8, 1993 Decision[2] andJanuary21, 1994 Resolution[3] of the
Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental, Branch 42,[4] BacolodCity, inCivil Case No. 6894 for
DeclaratoryRelief.
The antecedent facts that matter canbe culledas follows:
Prior to the passage of Republic Act No. 6982, entitled An Act Strengthening the Sugar
Amelioration Program in the Sugar Industry, Providing the Mechanics for its Implementation, and
for other Purposes, there were two principal laws providing additional financialbenefits to sugar
farm workers, namely: Republic Act No. 809 andPresidential Decree No. 621.
Republic Act No. 809[5] (implementable in milling districts with anannualgross productionof
150,000 piculs or more), institutionalizedproduction sharing scheme, inthe absence of any
private agreement betweenthe planters andfarm workers, depending onthe mill’s total
productionfor each immediatelypreceding cropyear;andspecificallyproviding that anyincrease
in the planters’ share shallbe dividedin the following manner: 40% of the increase shall accrue to
the planter and60% to the farm workers.[6]
On the other hand, Presidential Decree No. 621,[7] as amended, charged a lien ofP2.00 per picul
on all sugar produced, to be pooledintoa fundfor subsequent distributionas bonuses to sugar
workers.[8]
Thus, before R.A. No.6982, there were two sets of beneficiaries under the social amelioration
program in the sugar industry:
1) Beneficiaries under R.A. No. 809 andP.D. No. 621;and
2) Beneficiaries under P.D. No. 621 only. (Inmilling districts where the annual gross production is
less than150,000 piculs)
On May24, 1991, Republic Act No. 6982 took effect. It imposeda lien of P5.00 per picul onthe
gross productionof sugar beginning sugar crop year 1991-1992, withanautomatic additional lien
of P1.00 for everytwo (2) years for the succeeding ten(10) years fromthe effectivityof the Act
subject to the discretionof the Secretaryof Labor andEmployment anduponrecommendationof
the Sugar Tripartite Council.[9]
Directlyaddressing the effect of the newP5.00 per picul lienvis-à-vis the twopreviouslyexisting
laws, Section12 of R.A. No. 6982, provides:
“Section. 12. Benefits under Republic Act No. 809 and P.D. 621, as Amended. - All liens and other
forms of production sharing in favor of the workers in the sugar industry under Republic Act No.
809 and Presidential Decree No. 621, as amended, are hereby substituted by the benefits under
this Act: Provided, That cases arising from such laws pending in the courts or administrative bodies
at the time of the effectivityof this Act shall not be affected thereby.
In connection therewith, Section14 of the same Act further states:
“Section 14. Non-Diminution of Benefits.-The provisions of Section 12 hereof notwithstanding,
nothing in this Act shall be construed to reduce any benefit, interest, right or participation enjoyed
by the workers at the time of the enactment of this Act, and no amount received by any beneficiary
under this Act shall be subject to any form of taxation.”
Private respondent Binalbagan-Isabela Sugar Company(BISCOM) is engagedinthe businessof,
among others, milling rawsugar cane ofvarious sugar plantations intheir millingdistrict. For the
crop year 1991–1992, the sugar farm workers’ share inBISCOM, under R.A. No. 809 amounted
to P30, 590,086.92.[10]
Under P.D. No.621, the workers’ benefit for the same crop year amountedto P2,233,285.26,
computedas follows:
Gross productionof BISCOM 1,595,184.46
(In Piculs)
Less: 30% BISCOMShare 478,555.33
70% Planter Share 2,116,626.13
MultipliedbyP2.00 lien x P2.00
TOTAL P2,233,258.26[11]
But considering that the P2.00 lienunder P.D. No.621 is obviouslylesser thanthe P5.00 lien under
R.A. No.6982, the same was no longer imposedbyBISCOMpursuant to R.A. No.6982.
Hence, before R.A. No.6982 tookeffect, the total farm workers’ benefit was:
Under R.A. No. 809 P30,590,086.92
Under P.D. No. 621 2,233,258.16
P32,823,345.18
Upon the effectivityof R.A. No.6982, the total workers’ benefit inBISCOM’s milling district was
computedas follows:
Gross Productionof BISCOM 1,595,184.46
(In Piculs)
Less: 30% BISCOMshare 478,555.34
70% Planter Share 1,116,629.12
Multiplied by P5.00 lien x P5.00
TOTAL FARMWORKERS’ BENEFIT P5,583,145.61[12]
Meanwhile, pending a definite ruling onthe effect of R.A. No. 6982 to R.A. No. 809 and P.D. No.
621, respondent Secretaryof Labor issued Department Order No.2 (1992),[13] directing, inter alia,
the three milling districts in Negros Occidental, namely: SONDECO, SanCarlos andhereinprivate](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/241941333-case-digest-statcon-150913073807-lva1-app6892/85/241941333-case-digest-statcon-8-320.jpg)
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respondent BISCOM, to continue implementingR.A. No.809 per recommendationof the Sugar
Tripartite Council.
Consequently, the petitioner, Planters Associationof Southern Negros Inc. (PASON), an
organizationof sugar farm plantationowners milling withprivate respondent BISCOM, filedwith
the respondent court a Petition for DeclaratoryReliefagainst the implementationof the saidD.O.
No. 2. It theorized that inview ofthe substitution ofbenefits under Section12 of R.A. No. 6982,
whatever monetaryrewards previouslygranted to the sugar farm workers under R.A. No. 809 and
P.D. No. 621 were deemed totallyabrogatedand/or superseded.[14]
On August 18, 1993, the respondent Court came out with the assailedDecision;the dispositive
portionof which held:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby declares:
1. That the benefits under RA 6982 do not and cannot supersede or substitute the benefits under
RA 809 in milling districts where the latter law was already in implementation at the time of the
effectivityof RA 6982; and
2. That the sugarcane workers in the BISCOM milling district shall continue to enjoy the benefits
under RA 809 in addition to the benefits that will henceforth be provided for by RA 6982 now being
implemented byprivate respondent.
SO ORDERED.”[15]
With the denialof its motionto reconsider the aforesaidDecision, petitioner foundits wayto this
Court via the present petition.
The petitionis not visited bymerit.
From a cursoryreading ofSection12[16] of R.A. No. 6892, the inevitable conclusionwouldbe that
the benefits under R.A. No.809 andP.D. No. 621 have been supersededbythose grantedunder
the new law. This substitution, however, appears to be qualified bySection 14[17] whichdisallows
substitution if its effect wouldbe to diminishor reduce whatever financial benefits the sugar farm
workers are receiving under existing laws at the time ofthe effectivityof R.A. No. 6289.
How then shouldSection12 of R.A. No. 6982 be interpretedinlight of the qualificationunder
Section14 of the same Act?
Petitioner insists that the word“substitution” inSection12 shouldbe takeninits literalsense
consideringthat the intention ofCongressto effect a substitutionof benefits is clear and
unequivocal. Under this interpretationof “unqualifiedsubstitution”, the sugar farmworkers in
the subject milling district will receive onlyP5,583,145.61 under R.A. No.6289, as against
the P32,823,345.18 to which the workers were entitledunder P.D. 621 and R.A. No. 809.
So also, invoking the Opinion[18] “It is believedthat the benefits conferreduponlabor byRA 809
have been supersededbythose granted to it under RA 6982. This conclusionis inescapable froma
reading of Section12 of the latter law, as well as its repealing clause (Sec. 16). Indeed, the
production-sharingscheme decreedinRA 809 cannot remainin force upon the effectivityof the
new production-sharing procedure prescribed inRA 6982;otherwise, sugar workers wouldbe
receiving two kinds of financial benefits simultaneously.
The substitution, however, of sugar workers benefits under RA 809 byRA 6982 is qualified by
Section14 of the latter. This sectionprovides that if the effect ofsuch substitution willbe to
diminishor reduce whatever monetaryrewards sugar industrylaborers are receivingunder RA
809, then such workers shall continue to be entitledto the benefits providedinsuch
law. Expressed otherwise the production-sharing scheme inRA 6982 does not applyto sugar
industryworkers inmillingdistricts where its applicationwouldbe financiallydisadvantageous to
them, in whichcase the existing production-sharing agreement based onRA 809 shall still govern.”
(OpinionNo. 115, S. 1992 dated September 2, 1992, signedbyJustice SecretaryFranklin
Drilon.)18 of the Secretaryof Justice, petitioner contends, inthe alternative, that the application
of R.A. No. 809 can be maintainedbut inno case shouldthe benefits thereunder be implemented
in additionto R.A. No. 6982. Applyingthis interpretation, the share of the sugar farm workers
wouldamount toP30,590,086.92.
On the other hand, under the interpretation espousedbythe public respondent (that the benefits
conferredbyR.A. No.6982 shouldcomplement those grantedbyR.A. No. 809 whichcannot be
superseded bythe former Act since Section14 thereof prohibits diminutionof benefits), the total
worker’s benefit wouldbe as follows:
R.A. No. 809 P30,590,086.92
R.A. No. 6982 __,583,145.61
P36,173,232.53
It is a well-settledrule of legal hermeneutics that each provisionof law shouldbe construedin
connection witheveryother part so as to produce a harmonious whole and everymeaning to be
given to eachwordor phrase is ascertainedfromthe context of the bodyof the statute.[19] Ut
magis valeat quam pereat.[20]Consequently, laws are givena reasonable construction such that
apparentlyconflictingprovisions are allowed to standandgiveneffect byreconciling them,
reference being hadto the moving spirit behindthe enactment of the statute.[21]
Applyingthe abovestated doctrine, Section12 therefore, whichapparentlymandates a total
substitution byR. A. No. 6982 of all the benefits under R.A. No. 809 andP.D. No. 621 existing at
the time of the effectivityof R.A. No. 6982, can not be construed apart from Section14 which
prohibits such substitutionif the effect thereofwouldbe to reduce anybenefit, interest, right or
participationenjoyedbythe worker at the time R.A. No. 6982 took effect. The Court finds as
untenable the interpretationof the petitioner basedanunqualifiedsubstitutionof the benefits
under R.A. No. 809 andP.D. No. 621 bythe monertaryrewards conferredbyR.A. No. 6982 in the
amount of P5,583,145.61 as against the P36,173,232.53 previouslyenjoyedbythe sugar farm
workers under the former laws.
It bears stressingthat the primordial objective behindthe enactment ofR.A. No. 6982 was to
augment the income of sugar workers byestablishing a social ameliorationprogramincases
where sugar farm workers hadnone, andat the same time, to improve whatever amelioration
schemesalreadyexistinginthe sugar districts concerned.[22] In recognitionof the avowed
guarantee under Section3, Article 13 of the Constitutionto upholdthe right of workers to a just
share in the fruits of production, the policyof R.A. No. 6982 states:
“Section 1. Policy. – It is the policy of the State to further strengthen the rights of workers in the
sugar industry to their just share in the fruits of production by augmenting their income and,
among other schemes, institutionalizing the mechanism among the partners in the sugar
industry to enable the workers and their families to enjoy a decent living.” (Emphasis supplied)
The foregoing studiedlyconsidered, there can be noother construction that wouldbest promote
the welfare of the sugar farm workers, thanthe interpretation ofthe public respondent,
implementing R.A. No. 6982 as a complement to R.A. No. 809.
Citing the floor deliberations ofCongress,[23] petitioner insists that the non-diminutionof benefits
referredto inSection14 pertains onlyto pending claims of the workers at the time of the
effectivityof the Act. Stateddifferently, it is contendedthat the benefits to whichthe workers are
entitledunder R.A. No. 809 andP.D. No. 601 can be validlydiminishedbyvirtue of the application
of R.A. No. 6982, because the non-diminution provision inSection14 thereof refers to pending
claims accruingunder P.D. 621 and R.A. No. 809, and not to the verybenefits previouslyenjoyed
bythe workers under the saidlaws. With this construction, from a total benefit ofP32,823,345.18
conferredbyR.A. No. 809 and P.D. No. 621, the sugar workers wouldonlybe entitled to a meager
amount of P5,583,145.61.
The contentionis barrenof sustainable merit. To limit the applicationof the non-diminution
principle onlyto pendingclaims would be repulsive not onlyto the policyof the Act but alsoto the
salutoryprovisions of the Constitution. Verily, the glaring disparity](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/241941333-case-digest-statcon-150913073807-lva1-app6892/85/241941333-case-digest-statcon-9-320.jpg)
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of P27,240,199.57 between P32,823,345.18 andP5,583,145.61 wouldnot warrant suchan
interpretation. As aptlyratiocinated[24] bythe respondent Court, the evolutionof legislation inthe
sugar industryhadalways hadfor its foremost concern the advancement of the lot of the sugar
farm worker. Hence, through the years everylaw or decree enacted pursuant thereto had always
provided for anincrease inwages andbenefits. The reasonis obvious. Amidst the rapidly
changing, if not worsening, economic conditions prevalent in the industry, the sugar worker can
hardlycope with his meager income to leanon.
Equallywantingof merit is the allegeddouble recoveryunder the interpretation subscribedbythe
public respondent. Note that hadnot R.A. No. 6982 beenenacted, sugar farmworkers would be
entitledto a total a share of P32,823,345.18 under R.A. No. 809 andP.D. No. 621;whereas under
the alternative viewof the petitioner, maintaining the benefits (P30, 509,086.92) grantedbyR.A.
No. 809 to the exclusion of the benefits providedbyR.A.No. 6982, sugar farm workers standto
lose the difference of P2,233,258.56, from a total of P32,823,345.18 which theywere entitled
before RA 6982 took effect. Certainly, such a disadvantageous constructioncannot be
countenanced, beingviolative of the non-diminutionprinciple under Section14 of R.A. No. 6982.
In view ofthe foregoing, the additionof the monetaryrewards under R.A. No. 6982 to the benefits
grantedbyR.A. No. 809, is what is called for inthe case under consideration. While it is true that
“addition” is different from “substitution”, the circumstancesinvolving subject milling districts
(where the sugar farm workers are enjoying benefits bothfrom R.A. No. 809 and P.D. No. 621
prior to the effectivityof R.A. No. 6982), necessitate the grant of pecuniaryadvantage under R.A.
No. 809 as a complement to R.A. No. 6982. Otherwise, the workers would suffer a diminutionof
benefits. Therefore, the increase of monetaryadvantage infavor of the sugar farm workers, as a
consequence of suchinterpretation, is merelyincidentalto the applicationof the non-diminution
policyof R.A. No. 6982, a labor provision which shouldbe liberallyconstruedto further its
purpose.[25]
Neither does the Court find convincingthe interpretationproposedbyprivate respondent
BISCOM. While maintaining the applicationof R.A.No.809 and P.D. No. 621 (where the total
share of the workers is P32,823,345.18), anddisregarding R.A. No. 6892, would be beneficial to
the sugar farm workers, to the mindof the Court, the assailedconstruction ofthe public
respondent (where the totalshare of the workers is P36,173,232.53), wouldbe more inkeeping
with the spirit of R.A. No. 6982 which is: to improve the living conditionof workers inthe sugar
industry. Betweentwostatutoryinterpretations, that which better serves the purpose ofthe law
should prevail.[26]
Premises studiedlyconsidered, the Court is of the ineluctable conclusion, andsoholds, that the
respondent Court ventured not in anyjudicial legislation but merelygave life to the avowedpolicy
of the State under Section 18, Article 2 of the 1987 Constitution, whichstates:
“Sec. 18. The state affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall guarantee the rights
of workers and promote their welfare.”
WHEREFORE, the Petitionis DENIED;and the assailedDecisioninCivil Case No. 6894, dated
August 18, 1993, of the RegionalTrialCourt of Negros Occidental, Branch42, Bacolod City,
AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Villanueva v. COMELECCase Digest
**When literal import must yield to spirit/intent
Villanueva v. COMELEC
No. L – 54718 (December 4, 1986)
FACTS:
On January25, 1980, Petitioner fileda certificate of candidacyfor Vice Mayor of Doloresfor the
January30 elections in substitution for his companion Mendoza whowithdrew candidacy
without oathuponfiling onJanuary4. Petitioner won inthe electionbut Respondent Board
disregardedall his votes and proclaimed Respondent Candidate as the winner on the
presumption that Petitioner’s candidacywas not dulyapprovedbyRespondent. Petitioner filed
a petitionfor the annulment of the proclamationbut was dismissedbyRespondent Commission
on the
grounds that Mendoza’s unsworn withdrawal had no legal effect, and that assuming it was e
ffective, Petitioner’s candidacywas not valid since Mendoza did not withdrawafter January4.
ISSUE:
W/N Petitioner shouldbe disqualifiedon the ground of formal or technicaldefects.
HELD:
No. The fact that Mendoza’s withdrawal was not sworn is a technicality, which shouldnot be used
to frustrate the people’s will infavor of Petitioner as the
substitute candidate. Also, his withdrawal right on the very same day that he filed hiscandi
dacyshouldbe considered as havingbeen made substantiallyandintruth after the last day, even
going bythe literal readingof the provisionbyRespondent Commission. The spirit of the law
rather thanits literal reading shouldhave
guidedRespondent Commission in resolving the issue of last-
minute withdrawal andsubstitutionof other persons as candidates.
**When thereason of thelaw ceases, the law itself ceases
COMMENDADOR VS. DE VILLA [200 SCRA 80; G.R. NO. 93177; 2 AUG 1991]
Thursday, February12, 2009 PostedbyCoffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, PoliticalLaw
Facts:The petitioners inG.R. Nos. 93177 and96948 who are officers ofthe AFPwere directed to
appear inperson before the Pre-Trial Investigating Officers for the allegedparticipationthe failed
coup on December 1 to 9, 1989. Petitioners nowclaim that there was nopre-trial investigation of
the charges as mandated byArticle of War 71. A motionfor dismissal wasdenied. Now, their
motionfor reconsideration. Allegingdenial of due process.
In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot appliedfor bailon June 5, 1990, but the applicationwas denied
byGCM No.14. He filedwiththe RTCa petition for certiorari and mandamus withprayer for
provisional libertyanda writ ofpreliminaryinjunction. Judge ofGCMthen grantedthe provisional
liberty. However he was not released immediately. The RTCnowdeclared that even militarymen
facingcourt martialproceedings canavail the right to bail.
The private respondents inG.R. No. 97454 filedwithSCa petition for habeas corpus onthe
ground that theywere beingdetained inCampCrame without charges. The petitionwas referred
to RTC. Findingafter hearing that noformalcharges had beenfiledagainst the petitioners after
more thana year after their arrest, the trial court orderedtheir release.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/241941333-case-digest-statcon-150913073807-lva1-app6892/85/241941333-case-digest-statcon-10-320.jpg)
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Under the leaseholdsystemthe prohibitionagainst pre-threshing hasno, more raisond'etre
because the lessee is obligated to paya fixedrental as prescribedinsection34 of the Agricultural
Land ReformCode, or the Code of AgrarianReforms, as redesignatedinRepublic Act No. 6389
which took effect onSeptember 10, 1971. Thus, the legalmaxim, cessante ratione legis, cessat
ipsa lex (the reason for the lawceasing, the lawitself alsoceases). applies to thiscase.chanrobles
virtual law library
Section4 of the Code of AgrarianReforms declaredagricultural share tenancythroughout the
countryas contraryto public policyand automaticallyconvertedit to agricultural leasehold.
Presidential Decree No. 2 proclaimedthe entire country"as a landreform area". Presidential
Decree No. 27 emancipatedthe tenant fromthe bondage ofthe soil. AndPresidentialDecree No.
316 interdicted the ejectment or removal of the tenant-farmer fromhis farmholdinguntil the
promulgationof the rules and regulations implementing PresidentialDecree No. 27. (See People
vs. Adillo, supra).chanrobles virtual law library
The legislative intent not to punishanymore the tenant's act ofpre- reaping andpre-threshing
without notice to the landlordis inferable from the fact that, as alreadynoted, the Code of
Agrarian Reforms didnot reenact section 39 of the Agricultural TenancyLaw andthat it abolished
share tenancywhichis the basisfor penalizingclandestine pre-reaping and pre-
threshing.chanrobles virtual law library
All indications point to a deliberate andmanifest legislative designto replace the Agricultural
TenancyLaw withthe Code of AgrarianReforms, formerlythe Agricultural LandReform Code, at
least as far as ricelands are concerned.chanrobles virtual law library
As held inthe Adillocase, the act of pre-reapingandpre-threshingwithout notice to the landlord,
which is anoffense under the Agricultural TenancyLaw, hadceased to be anoffense under the
subsequent law, the Code of AgrarianReforms. To prosecute it as anoffense whenthe Code of
Agrarian Reforms is alreadyinforce wouldbe repugnant or abhorrent to the policyandspirit of
that Code andwouldsubvert the manifest legislative intent not to punishanymore pre -reaping
and pre-threshingwithout notice to landholder.chanrobles virtual law library
It is a rule oflegal hermeneutics that "anact which purports to set out infullallthat it intends to
contain operates as a repeal of anything omittedwhichwas containinthe oldact and not
included in the amendatoryact" (Crawford, Construction ofStatutes, p. 621 citedinthe Adillo
case).chanrobles virtual law library
A subsequent statute, revising the whole subject matter of a former statute, andevidently
intendedas a substitute for it, operates to repealthe former statute" (82 C.J.S. 499). 'The revising
statute is in effect a 'legislative declarationthat whatever is embracedin the newstatute shall
prevail, andwhatever is excludedtherefrom shall be discarded" (82 C.J.S. 500).chanrobles virtual
law library
The repeal of appeal law deprives the courts ofjurisdictionto punishpersons chargedwitha
violationof the oldpenal law prior to its repeal(People vs. Tamayo, 61 Phil. 225;People vs.
Sindiong andPastor, 77 Phil. 1000;People vs. Binuya, 61 Phil. 208;U.S. vs. Reyes, 10 Phil. 423;U.S.
vs. Academia, 10 Phil. 431. See dissent inLagrimasvs. Director ofPrisons, 57 Phil. 247, 252,
254).chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissalis affirmedwith costs de oficio.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
SO ORDERED.
Fernando (Chairman), Antonio, Concepcion, Jr. and Martin, JJ., concur.chanrobles virtual law
library
Barredo, J., took no part.chanrobles virtual law library
Martin, J., was designated to sit in the Second Division.
Endnotes:
* Appellees' contentionthat the Court of First Instance had nojurisdictionover the offense
because inferior courts have jurisdiction over offenseinwhichthe penaltyis imprisonment for not
more thanthree years, or a fine of not more three thousandpesos, or both such fine and
imprisonment andthat it is the Muñoz municipalcourt that hasjurisdictionis wrong. The Court of
First Instance has concurrent jurisdictionwiththe inferior court in mm inwhichthe penalty
provided bylaw is imprisonment for more thansix months, or a fine of-more thantwo hundred
pesos (Sec. 44[f], JudiciaryLaw).
Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC
TITLE: Romualdez-Marcos vs.COMELEC
CITATION: 248 SCRA300
FACTS:
Imelda, a little over 8 years old, inor about 1938, establishedher domicile inTacloban, Leyte
where she studied andgraduatedhigh school in the HolyInfant Academyfrom 1938 to 1949. She
then pursuedher college degree, education, inSt. Paul’s College nowDivine Word Universityalso
in Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still inTacloban. She went to
manila during 1952 to work withher cousin, the late speaker Daniel Romualdez inhisoffice inthe
House ofRepresentatives. In 1954, she married late President FerdinandMarcos whenhe was
still a Congressmanof Ilocos Norte and wasregisteredthere as a voter. WhenPres. Marcos was
electedas Senator in1959, theylivedtogether inSanJuan, Rizal where she registered as a voter.
In 1965, when Marcos wonpresidency, theylivedinMalacanangPalace and registeredas a voter
in SanMiguel Manila. She served as member of the Batasang Pambansa andGovernor of Metro
Manila during 1978.
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position ofRepresentative of the First District of
Leyte for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo RoyMontejo, the incumbent Representative of the First
District of Leyte andalsoa candidate for the same position, filed a “Petitionfor Cancellationand
Disqualification" with the CommissiononElections alleging that petitioner didnot meet the
constitutionalrequirement for residency. The petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote
sevenmonths under residency, whichshe sought to rectifybyaddingthe words "since childhood"
in her Amended/CorrectedCertificate ofCandidacyfiledon March29, 1995 and that "she has
always maintainedTaclobanCityas her domicile or residence. She arrived at the sevenmonths
residencydue to the fact that she became a resident ofthe Municipalityof Tolosa insaid months.
ISSUE:Whether petitioner has satisfiedthe 1year residencyrequirement to be eligible inrunning
as representative ofthe First District of Leyte.
HELD:
Residence is used synonymouslywithdomicile for election purposes. The court are in favor ofa
conclusionsupporting petitoner’s claimof legal residence or domicile inthe First District of Leyte
despite her owndeclarationof 7 months residencyin the district for the following reasons:
1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Taclobanbecame Imelda’s domicile of origin by
operationof lawwhenher father brought them to Leyte;](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/241941333-case-digest-statcon-150913073807-lva1-app6892/85/241941333-case-digest-statcon-12-320.jpg)
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2. Domicile of origin is onlylost when there is actualremoval or change of domicile, a bona fide
intention ofabandoning the former residence and establishinga newone, andacts which
correspond withthe purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these,domicile oforigin
should be deemed to continue.
3. A wife doesnot automaticallygain the husband’s domicile because the term “residence” in Civil
Law does not meanthe same thing in Political Law. WhenImelda marriedlate President Marcos
in 1954, she kept her domicile oforiginandmerelygaineda newhome andnot domicilium
necessarium.
4. Assumingthat Imelda gaineda new domicile after her marriage andacquired right to choose a
new one onlyafter the deathof Pres. Marcos, her actions uponreturning to the countryclearly
indicatedthat she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add,
petitioner evenobtainedher residence certificate in1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living inher
brother’s house, anact, whichsupports the domiciliaryintentionclearlymanifested. She even
kept close tiesbyestablishing residencesinTacloban, celebratingher birthdays andother
important milestones.
WHEREFORE, havingdeterminedthat petitioner possessesthe necessaryresidence qualifications
to run for a seat inthe House ofRepresentatives inthe First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's
questionedResolutions datedApril 24, May7, May11, and May25, 1995 are herebySET ASIDE.
Respondent COMELECis herebydirected to order the Provincial Boardof Canvassers to proclaim
petitioner as the dulyelectedRepresentative ofthe First District of Leyte.
**b. ut magis valeat quam pereat: construe statuteas a whole
i. Harmonize and give effects to all provisions whenever possible;reconcile apparently conflicting
provisions
NATIONAL TOBACCO ADMINISTRATION represented herein by Administrator AMANTE SIAPNO,
EVANGELISTA A. GARCIA, RICARDO BRIONES, CLARITA B. CASTRO, CRISTINA LOPEZ, JESUS C.
BONDOC and ROSALINA C. CARINO, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PURISIMA, J.:
At bar is a petition for reviewon certiorari under Rule 45 of the RevisedRulesof Court to review
and set aside the decisionof the Commission onAudit[1]dated February7, 1995 in COA Decision
No. 95-108.[2]
The NationalTobacco Administration(NTA, for short), under Executive Order No. 116, as amended
byExecutive Order No. 245,[3] is a government-ownedandcontrolledcorporation (GOCC, for
brevity) tasked to supervise andimprove the viabilityof the tobaccoindustryin thiscountry.
On August 9, 1989, Congress passedRepublic Act No. 6758,[4] entitled “An Act Prescribing a
Revised Compensation and Position Classification in the Government and for Other Purposes.” On
October 2, 1989, pursuant to Section23 of saidlaw, the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) issuedCorporate Compensation Circular No. 10 (CCC No. 10) to serve as the
ImplementingRulesandRegulations of R.A. No. 6758.
Pertinent records show that evenprior to the effectivityof Republic Act No. 6758, officialsand
employees of the NTA have been enjoying Mid-Year Social Amelioration Benefit equivalent to one-
and-a half (1 1/2) monthof their basic salary. From1989 to 1993, however, the saidbenefit was
reducedto one (1) monthof the basic salarydue to financial/budgetaryconstraints. In May, 1993,
the nomenclature ofsubject social amelioration benefit was changedto educational assistance in
order to reflect the rationale behind the same, whichis to encourage its beneficiaries to pursue
graduate studiesand to finance the schooling of their children.
Sometime in February, 1994, Miss DalisayE. Aracan, Resident Auditor of NTA, issueda Notice of
Disallowance of the payment of the educational assistance for calendar year 1993, opining that
the NTA has no statutoryauthority to grant the incentive. InJanuary, 1995, the same Resident
Auditor caused the disallowance of the same benefit paidin1994, for the same reason.
On April 25, 1994, the petitioners appealed to the CommissiononAudit, praying for the lifting of
the disallowance inquestion, pointingout that: (1) Benefits received byemployees as of July1,
1989 not integratedinto the standardizedsalaryrates shall continue to be authorized, pursuant to
Section12 of R.A. 6758; (2)the benefit having beenreceived for somanyyears, even prior to the
effectivityof the SalaryStandardizationLawof 1989, has been a vestedright, onthe part of the
recipients and (3) suchallowance regularlygranted, forms part of the totalcompensation package
of NTA Officers andemployees, and, therefore, the disallowance thereof amounts to unathorized
diminutionof pay.
On February7, 1995, the Commission onAudit came out withits questionedDecisionthe
pertinent portionof which, reads:
“After a thorough evaluation, this Office believes and so holds that the disallowance of the Auditor
on the payment of the mid-year social amelioration benefits or the educational assistance benefits
is in order. It bears stress that Sec. 5.6 of CCC No. 10 (Implementing R.A. 6758) is so explicit when
it provides that:
‘Payment of other allowances/fringe benefit and all other forms of compensation granted on top
of basic salary, whether in cash or in kind, not mentioned in Sub-Paragraphs 5.4 and 5.5 above
shall be discontinued effective November 1, 1989. Payment made for such allowance/fringe
benefits after said date shall be considered as illegal disbursement of public Funds.’
Since the educational assistance or the mid- year social amelioration is not among those
allowances mentioned in Sub-pars. 5.4 and 5.5 of CCC No. 10, the same shall be discontinued
effective November 1, 1989 and considering that NTA paid its officials/employees this type of
allowance, such payment shall be considered as illegal disbursement of public funds.
The provision of Sec. 12 second sentence thereof as invoked by the Administrator should be read in
conjunction with the first sentence thus -
‘Consolidation of Allowances and Compensation - All allowances except for representation and
transportation allowances;clothing and laundry allowances;subistence [sic] allowance of marine
officers and crew on board government vessels and hospital personnel; hazard pay; allowances of
foreign service personnel stationed abroad; and such other additional compensation not otherwise
specified herein as may be determined by the DBMshall be deemed included in the standardized
salary rates herein prescribed. Such other additional compensation, whether in cash or in kind,
being received by incumbents only as of July1, 1989 not integrated into the standardized salary
rates shall continue to be authorized.” xxx
xxx xxx xxx
Premises considered and for lack of legal basis, the herein request of the Administrator, NTA for
the lifting of the disallowance in question, may not be given due course.”[5] [Underscoring;
supplied]
Undaunted, petitioners found their wayto this Court via the present Petition for Review
on Certiorari, filed onApril 24, 1995, seekingthe annulment of the saidCOA Decision;theorizing
that the respondent Commissionon Audit erred:
I.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/241941333-case-digest-statcon-150913073807-lva1-app6892/85/241941333-case-digest-statcon-13-320.jpg)
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IN HOLDING THAT THEPAYMENT OF SUBJECT SOCIAL AMELIORATION /EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE
BENEFIT - A BENEFIT CONTINUOUSLY BEINGRECEIVED BY INDIVIDUAL PETITIONERS AND OTHER
NTA EMPLOYEES STARTING WAY BEFORE THEEFFECTIVITY OF THE SALARYSTANDARDIZATION
LAW (R.A. 6758) ON 1 JULY 1989 - IS NOT AUTHORIZED UNDER THESAME LAW (R.A. 6758) OR IS
OTHERWISE WITHOUT LEGAL BASIS;
II.
IN FAILINGTO REALIZEAND CONSIDERTHAT THE DISALLOWANCE OF THE PAYMENT OF SUBJECT
SOCIAL AMELIORATION/EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE BENEFITIS CONSTITUTIVE OF DIMINUTION OF
COMPENSATION PROSCRIBEDUNDEREXISTING LAWSAND IN VIOLATION OF THE GENERAL
WELFARE CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION;
III.
IN FAILINGTO RECOGNIZE THAT INDIVIDUAL PETITIONERS AND OTHERSIMILARLY SITUATEDNTA
EMPLOYEES HAVE ACQUIRED A VESTED RIGHT OVER SAIDSOCIAL AMELIORATION/EDUCATIONAL
ASSISTANCE BENEFITAND COA’s DISALLOWANCE THEREOF ISAN ILLEGAL VIOLATION OF SUCH
RIGHT.
Petitioners raise the pivotalissues: (1) whether or not the social ameliorationor educational
assistance benefit givento the individualpetitioners prior to enactment of R.A. 6758 is authorized
under the law, (2) whether or not the disallowance of the saidbenefit is tantamount to diminution
of pay, and (3) whether or not the individual petitioners have acquired a vestedright thereover.
First Issue:
Proper Interpretation of Sections 12 and 17 of R.A. 6758 in Relation to Sub-paragraphs 4.1,
5.4 and 5.5 of Corporate Compensation Circular No.10, the Implementing Rules and Regulation of
R.A. 6758.
A. Sections 12 and17 of R. A. 6758, read:
“Section 12: Consolidation of Allowances and Compensation - All allowances, except for
representation and transportation allowances;clothing and laundry allowances;subsistence
allowance of marine officers and crew on board government vessels and hospital personnel;
hazard pay; allowances of foreign service personnel stationed abroad; and such other additional
compensation not otherwise specified herein as may be determined by the DBM, shall be deemed
included in the standardized salary rates herein prescribed. Such other additional compensation,
whether in cash or in kind, being received by incumbents only as of July 1, 1989 not integrated into
the standardized salary rates shall continue to be authorized.
Existing additional compensation of any national government official or employee paid from local
funds of a local government unit shall be absorbed into the basic salary of said official or employee
and shall be paid by the National Government.”
while
“Section17. Salaries ofIncumbents - Incumbents of positions presentlyreceiving salaries and
additional compensation/fringe benefits including those absorbed from local government units and
other emoluments, the aggregate of which exceeds the standardized salary rate as herein
prescribed, shall continue to receive such excess compensation, which shall be referred to as
transition allowance. The transition allowance shall be reduced by the amount of salary
adjustment that the incumbent shall received [sic] in the future.”
B. Section4.1 of CCCNo. 10:
4.0 DEFINITION OF TERMS
4.1 The present salary of an incumbent for purposes of this Circular shall refer to the sum total
of actual basic salary including allowances enumerated hereunder, being received as of June 30,
1989 and certified and authorized by the DBM.
4.1.1 Cost-of-Living Allowance (COLA)/BankEquity Pay (BEP) equivalent to forty percent (40%)
of basic salary or P300.00 per month, whichever is higher;
4.1.2 Amelioration Allowance equivalent to ten percent (10%) of basic salary or P150.00 per
month, which ever is higher;
4.1.3 COLA granted to GOCCs/GFIs covered by the Compensation and Position Classification
Plan for the regular agencies/offices of the National Government and to GOCCs/GFIs following the
Compensation and Position Classification Plan under LOImp. No. 104/CCC No. 1 and LOImp. No.
97/CCC No. 2, in the amount of P550.00 per month for those whose monthlybasic salary is
P1,500.00 and below, and P500.00 for those whose monthlybasic salary is P1,501.00 and above,
granted on top of the COLA/BEPmentioned in Item 4.1.1 above;
4.1.4 Stabilization Allowance; and
4.1.5 Allowance/fringe benefits converted into “Transition Allowance” pursuant to
Memorandum Order No. 177, as implemented byCorporate Budget Circular No. 15, both series of
1988.
4.2 Allowances enumerated above are deemed integrated into the basic salary for the
position effective July1, 1989.
4.3 Transition allowance, for purposes of this circular shall mean the excess of the present
salary of the incumbent defined in Item 4.1 hereinabove, over the eighth step of the Salary Grade
to which his position is allocated.
C. Sub-Paragraphs 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6 of CCC. No. 10:
5.0 IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES
xxx xxx xxx
5.4 The rates of the following allowances/fringe benefits which are not integrated into the
basic salary and which are allowed to be continued after June 30, 1989 shall be subject to the
condition that the grant of such benefit is covered by statutory authority.
5.4.1 Representation and Transportation Allowances (RATA) of incumbent of the position
authorized to receive the same at the highest amount legally authorized as of June 30, 1989 of the
level of his position within the particular GOCC/GFI;
5.4.2 Uniform and Clothing Allowance at a rate as previously authorized;
5.4.3 Hazard Pay as authorized by law;
5.4.4 Honoraria/additional compensation for employees on detail with special projects of inter-
agency undertakings;
5.4.5 Honoraria for services rendered by researchers, experts and specialists who are of
acknowledged authorities in their field of specialization;
5.4.6 Honoraria for lecturers and resource persons/speakers;
5.4.7 Overtime Pay in accordance to Memorandum Order No. 228;
5.4.8 Clothing/laundry allowances and subsistence of marine officers and crew on board
GOCCs/GFIs owned vessels and used in their operations, and of hospital personnel who attend
directly to patients and who by nature of their duties are required to wear uniforms;
5.4.9 Quarters Allowance of officials and employees who are presentlyentitled to the same;
5.4.10 Overseas, Living Quarters and other allowances presentlyauthorized for personnel
stationed abroad;
5.4.11 Night Differential of personnel on night duty;
5.4.12 Per Diems of members of governing Boards of GOCCs/GFIs at the rate as prescribed in
their respective Charters;
5.4.13 Flying Pay of personnel undertaking aerial flights;
5.4.14 Per Diems/Allowances of Chairman and Members/Staff of collegial bodies and
Committees;and
5.4.15 Per Diems/Allowances of officials and employees on official foreign and local travel
outside of their official station;](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/241941333-case-digest-statcon-150913073807-lva1-app6892/85/241941333-case-digest-statcon-14-320.jpg)
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5.5 Other allowances/fringe benefits not likewise Integrated into the basic salary and allowed to
be continued only for incumbents as of June 30, 1989 subject to the condition that the grant of the
same is with appropriate authorization either from the DBM, Office of the President or legislative
issuances are as follows:
5.5.1 Rice Subsidy;
5.5.2 Sugar Subsidy;
5.5.3 Death Benefits other than those granted by the GSIS;
5.5.4 Medical/Dental/Optical Allowances/Benefits;
5.5.5 Children’s Allowance;
5.5.6 Special Duty Pay/Allowance;
5.5.7 Meal Subsidy;
5.5.8 Longevity Pay; and
5.5.9 Teller’s Allowance.
5.6 Payment of other allowances/fringe benefits and all other forms of compensation granted on
top of basic salary, whether in cash or in kind, not mentioned in Sub-paragraphs 5.4 and 5.5 above
shall be discontinued effective November 1, 1989. Payment made for such allowances/fringe
benefits after said date shall be considered as illegal disbursement of public funds.”
Petitioners maintain“that since theyhave beenreceivingthe socialamelioration or educational
assistance benefit before July1, 1989, when R.A. No. 6758 took effect, and the benefit was not
integrated into their standardizedsalaryrate, theyare entitledto receive it evenafter the
effectivityof the said Act.”[6] Theybase their claim onthe second sentence ofSection12 andon
Section17 of the SalaryStandardizationLawwhich, for the sake ofthoroughness andclarityof
discussion, we deem it expedient to quote again, to wit:
“Second Sentence of Section12, R.A. 6758 - xxx. Such other additional compensation, whether in
cash or in kind, being received by incumbents only as of July 1, 1989 not integrated into the
standardized salary rates shall continue to be authorized;”
x x x
“Section17: Salaries of Incumbents - Incumbents of positions presentlyreceiving salaries and
additional compensation /fringe benefits including those absorbed from local government units
and other emoluments, the aggregate of which exceeds the standardized salary rate as herein
prescribed, shall continue to receive such excess compensation, which shall be referred as
transition allowance. The transition allowance shall be reduced by the amount of salary
adjustment that the incumbent shall received in the future.”
It is the submissionof the Commissionon Audit that payment ofthe educationalassistance in
question is not authorizedunder Republic Act No. 6758, arguing “that the provisionof Sec. 12,
second sentence thereof as invokedbythe Administrator [representing the petitioner herein]
should be read inconjunctionwiththe first sentence...;”[7] and if the entire Section12 is further
consideredin relationto sub-paragraphs 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6 of CCCNo. 10, respondent concluded
that the grant ofsubject educationalassistance wouldhave nolegal basis at all.
Confusionas to the proper interpretationof Section12 springs from two seeminglycontradictory
provisions. The last clause ofthe first sentence of Section 12, reads:
[A]nd such other additional compensation not otherwise specified herein as maybe determined by
the DBM shall be deemed included in the standardized salary rates herein prescribed;”
while the second sentence of Section12 is to the followingeffect:
“Such other additional compensation, whether in cash or in kind, being received by incumbents
only as of July 1, 1989 not integrated into the standardized salary rates shall continue to be
authorized.”
Before proceedingto rule on the proper interpretationof the two provisos aforecited, the salient
features ofthe provisionas a whole shouldfirst be pondered upon and tackled.
Under the first sentence ofSection12, all allowances are integrated intothe prescribedsalary
rates, except:
(1) representation and transportationallowances (RATA);
(2) clothing andlaundryallowances;
(3) subsistence allowancesof marine officers andcrew onboard government vessels;
(4) subsistence allowance ofhospital personnel;
(5) hazard pay;
(6) allowance of foreignservice personnel stationed abroad;and
(7) such other additionalcompensation not otherwise specified in Section12 as may be
determined by the DBM.
Analyzing No. 7, whichis the last clause of the first sentence of Section 12, in relationto the other
benefits thereinenumerated, it canbe gleanedunerringlythat it is a “catch-all proviso.” Further
reflectiononthe nature ofsubject fringe benefits indicatesthat all of themhave one thing in
common - theybelong to one category of privilege called allowances which are usuallygrantedto
officialsand employeesof the government to defrayor reimburse the expensesincurredinthe
performance of their officialfunctions. InPhilippine Ports Authority vs. Commissionon
Audit,[8] this Court rationalizedthat “if theseallowances are consolidatedwith the standardized
rate, thenthe government official or employee will be compelledto spendhis personal funds in
attending to his duties.”
The conclusion - that the enumeratedfringe benefits are inthe nature of allowance - finds support
in sub-paragraphs 5.4 and 5.5 of CCCNo. 10.
Sub-paragraph5.4 enumeratesthe allowance/fringe benefits which are not integratedintothe
basic salaryandwhich maybe continuedafter June 30, 1989 subject to the condition that the
grant of such benefit is covered bystatutoryauthority, to wit:
(1) RATA;
(2) Uniform and Clothing allowances;
(3) Hazardpay;
(4) Honoraria/additional compensationfor employees ondetailwith special projects or inter-
agencyundertakings;
(5) Honoraria for services renderedbyresearchers, experts and specialists whoare of
acknowledgedauthoritiesintheir fields of specialization;
(6) Honoraria for lectures andresource persons or speakers;
(7) Overtime payinaccordance to Memorandum Order No. 228;
(8) Clothing/laundryallowances andsubsistence allowance ofmarine officers and crewon board
GOCCs/GFIs owned vessels and used intheir operations, andof hospital personnel who attend
directlyto patients andwhobynature of their dutiesare required to wear uniforms;
(9) Quarters Allowance of officialsandemployees whoare presentlyentitledto the same;
(10) Overseas, LivingQuarters andother allowances presentlyauthorizedfor personnel stationed
abroad;
(11) Night differentialof personnel onnight duty;
(12) Per Diems ofmembers of the governing Boards ofGOCCs/GFIs at the rate as prescribedin
their respective Charters;
(13) Flying payof personnel undertaking aerial flights;
(14) Per Diems/Allowancesof ChairmanandMembers or Staffof collegial bodies and Committees;
and
(15) Per Diems/Allowancesof officialsandemployees on official foreign and local travel outside of
their official station.
In addition, sub-paragraph5.5 of the same Implementing Rules providesfor the other
allowances/fringe benefits not likewise integratedintothe basic salaryandallowedto be](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/241941333-case-digest-statcon-150913073807-lva1-app6892/85/241941333-case-digest-statcon-15-320.jpg)
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continuedonlyfor incumbents as of June 30, 1989 subject to the condition that the grant of the
same is with appropriate authorizationeither from the DBM, Office ofthe President or legislative
issuances, as follows:
(1) Rice Subsidy;
(2) Sugar Subsidy;
(3) Death Benefits other than those granted bythe GSIS;
(4) Medical/Dental/Optical Allowances/Benefits;
(5) Children’s Allowances;
(6) Special DutyPay/Allowance;
(7) Meal Subsidy;
(8) LongevityPay;and
(9) Teller’s Allowance.
On the other hand, the challenged financial incentive is awarded bythe government inorder to
encourage the beneficiariesto pursue further studies andto helpthem underwrite the expenses
for the education oftheir children anddependents. In other words, subject benefit is in the
nature offinancial assistance andnot of an allowance. For the former, reimbursement is not
necessarywhile for the latter, reimbursement is required. Not onlythat, the former is basically
an incentive wage which is defined as “a bonus or other payment made to employeesinaddition
to guaranteedhourlywages”[9] while the latter cannot be reckonedwithas abonus or additional
income, strictlyspeaking.
It is indeed decisivelyclear that the benefits mentionedinthe first sentence of Section12 and
sub-paragraphs 5.4 and5.5 of CCCNo. 10 are entirelydifferent from the benefit indispute,
denominated as Educational Assistance. The distinctionelucidateduponis material inarriving at
the correct interpretationof the two seeminglycontradictoryprovisions ofSection12.
Cardinal is the rule instatutoryconstruction “that the particular words, clauses andphrases
should not be studiedas detached andisolatedexpressions, but thewhole andeverypart of the
statute must be considered in fixing the meaning ofanyof its parts andinorder to produce a
harmonious whole. A statute must soconstruedas to harmonize andgive effect to all its
provisions whenever possible.”[10] And the rule - that statute must be construedas a whole -
requiresthat apparentlyconflicting provisions shouldbe reconciled and harmonized, if at all
possible.[11] It is likewise a basic precept in statutoryconstructionthat the intent of the legislature
is the controlling factor in the interpretationof the subject statute.[12] With these rulesandthe
foregoing distinctionelaboratedupon, it is evident that the two seeminglyirreconcilable
propositions are susceptible to perfect harmony. Accordingly, the Court concludes that under the
aforesaid “catch-all proviso,” the legislative intent is just to include the fringe benefits which are in
the nature ofallowances andsince the benefit under controversyis not inthe same category, it is
safe to hold that subject educationalassistance is not one ofthe fringe benefits within the
contemplation ofthe first sentence of Section 12 but rather, of the secondsentence of Section 12,
in relationto Section 17 of R.A. No. 6758, consideringthat (1) the recipients were incumbents
when R.A. No. 6758 took effect on July1, 1989, (2) were, in fact, receiving the same, at the time,
and (3) such additionalcompensationis distinct andseparate fromthe specific allowances above-
listed, as the former is not integrated into the standardizeds alaryrate. Simplystated, the
challengedbenefit is covered bythe second sentence ofSection12 of R.A. No. 6758, the
applicationof sub-paragraphs 5.4 and5.5 of CCC No. 10 beingonlyconfinedto the first sentence
of Section 12, particularlythe last clause thereof which amplifies the “catch-all proviso.”
Furthermore, the non-inclusionbythe Department of Budget andManagement ofthe
controvertededucational assistance inSub-paragraphs 5.4 and5.5 of CCCNo. 10 is expected since
the term allowance does not include the questionedbenefit which belongs to a
different genus. The argument that the said fringe benefit shouldbe disallowedonthe ground
that it is not mentionedinthe ImplementingRules of the Statute is consequentlyfallacious. It is a
settled rule oflegal hermeneutics that the implementingrules andregulations (CCCNo. 10, in this
case) cannot amendthe act of Congress (R.A. 6758). The secondsentence of R.A. No. 6758
expresslyprovides that “such additional compensation ... beingreceived byincumbents ... not
integratedintothe standardizedsalaryrates shall continue to be authorized.” To be sure, the said
Circular cannot go beyondthe terms andprovisions ofthe statute as to prohibit something
permittedandallowedbylaw.[13] The Circular cannot extend the law or expandits coverage as the
power to amendor repeal a statute is vestedinthe legislature.[14]
Conformably, as mandatedbythe secondsentence of Section12, in relation to Section17 of the
Republic Act under interpretation, the mid-year educational assistance shouldcontinue to be
authorized.
THE SECOND AND THE THIRD ISSUES:
That the Disallowance of the Payment of Subject Educational Assistance Constitutes Diminution of
Compensation; That the NTA Employees Have Already Acquired a Vested Right Over the Same.
Gleanable from the wordings of the secondsentence of Section 12 of R.A. No. 6758 is the
intention ofCongressto prevent anydiminution ofthe payand benefits being receivedby
incumbents at the time of the enactment of the SalaryStandardization Law. Verily, disallowing
anysuch benefit is against the spirit ofthe Statute and is inconsistent withthe principle of equity
which “regards the spirit andnot the letter...”[15] of the law. Hence, while it cannot be saidthat
the NTA employeeshave acquireda vestedright over the educational assistance indispute as it is
always subject to availabilityof funds,[16] nevertheless, disallowing the same, where funds are
available as inthe case under consideration, would be violative ofthe principle of equity.
WHEREFORE, the petitionis herebyGRANTED;the assailed COA Decision No. 95 - 108 is SET
ASIDE, andthe disallowance inquestion LIFTED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo,
Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), and
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ACIL
CORPORATION,respondents.
D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
Private respondent Acil Corporationowned several hectares ofLand Linoan, Montevista, Davao
del Norte, which the government tookpursuant to the Comprehensive AgrarianReform Law (R.A.
No. 6657). Private respondent’s certificates of title were cancelledandnew ones were issued and
distributed to farmer-beneficiaries.
The lands were valuedbythe LandBank ofthe Philippinesat P19,312.24 per hectare for the
ricelandand P4,267.68 per hectare for brushland, or for a total of P439,105.39. It appears,
however, that inthe Statement of AgriculturalLandholdings (“LISTASAKA”) whichprivate
respondent hadearlier filedwiththe Department ofAgrarian Reform (DAR), a lower “Fair Value
Acceptable to Landowner” was statedandthat based onthis statement, the Land Bankof the
Philippines valuedprivate respondent’s lands uniformlyat P15,311.79 per hectare andfixed the
amount of P390,557.84 as the totalcompensation to be paidfor the lands.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/241941333-case-digest-statcon-150913073807-lva1-app6892/85/241941333-case-digest-statcon-16-320.jpg)
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Private respondent rejected the government’s offer, pointingout that nearbylands plantedto the
same crops were valuedat the higher price of P24,717.40 per hectare. The matter was brought
before the Provincial AgrarianReform Adjudicator (PARAD) who, on October 8, 1992, sustained
the initial valuationmade bythe LBP.
On December 12, 1992, private respondent filed a Petitionfor Just Compensationinthe Regional
Trial Court of Tagum, Davaodel Norte, sitting as a SpecialAgrarian Court. Private respondent
prayed that DARbe orderedto pay P24,717.40 per hectare. However, the RTCdismissed its
petitionon the ground that private respondent shouldhave appealedto the Department of
Agrarian Reform AdjudicationBoard (DARAB), pursuant to the latter’s RevisedRulesof Procedure,
before recourse to it (the RTC) could be had. In additionthe RTCfoundthat, in violation ofthe
DARAB’s rules ofprocedure the petitionhadbeenfiledmore thanfifteen(15) days after notice of
the decisionof the PARAD.
Private respondent moved for reconsiderationbut its motionwas deniedon October 13,
1994. Private respondent therefore filed a petitionfor certiorari withthe Court of Appeals,
contending that a petition for just compensationunder R.A. No. 6657 §§56-57 falls under the
exclusive andoriginaljurisdiction ofthe RTC. His contentionwas sustained bythe Court of
Appeals which, inits decision[1] of October 4, 1995, set aside the order ofdismissal of the
RTC. Accordingly, the case was remandedto the RTCfor further proceedings.
In turn the government, representedbythe Department ofAgrarian Reform, filed thispetitionfor
review on certiorari, raising as the issue whether incases involvingclaims for just compensation
under R.A. No. 6657 an appeal from the decisionof the provincial adjudicator to the DARAB must
first be made before a landowner canresort to the RTCunder §57. Petitioners sustain the
affirmative proposition. Theycite §50 of R.A. No. 6657 which inpertinent part provides:
§50. Quasi-judicial Powers of the Dar. – The DAR is herebyvestedwithprimaryjurisdictionto
determine andadjudicate agrarianreform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction
over all matters involvingthe implementationof agrarianreform, except those falling under the
exclusive jurisdictionof the Department of Agriculture (DA) andthe Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR)….
and argue that the fixing of just compensationfor the taking of lands under R.A. No. 6657 is a
“[matter] involvingthe implementation ofagrarianreform” withinthe contemplation ofthis
provision. Theyinvoke §16(f) of R.A. No. 6657, whichprovides that “anypartywho disagreesto
the decision[of the DAR] maybringthe matter to the court of proper jurisdictionfor final
determinationof just compensation,” as confirmingtheir constructionof §50.
The contentionhas nomerit.
It is true that §50 grants the DAR primaryjurisdictionto determine andadjudicate “agrarian
reform matters” andexclusive original jurisdictionover “all matters involvingthe implementation
of agrarianreform,” except those fallingunder the exclusive jurisdictionof the Department of
Agriculture andthe Department of Environment andNaturalResources. It is also true, however,
that §57 provides:
§57. Special jurisdiction. – The SpecialAgrarian Court shall have original andexclusive jurisdiction
over all petitions for the determination ofjust compensationto landowners, andthe prosecution
of all criminal offenses under this Act. the Rules ofCourt shallapplyto all proceedings before the
Special AgrarianCourts, unlessmodifiedbythis Act.
The Special AgrarianCourts shall decide all appropriate casesunder their special jurisdiction
within thirty(30) days from submissionof the case for decision.
Thus Special Agrarian Courts, which are Regional Trial Courts, are givenoriginalandexclusive
jurisdictionover two categories ofcases, to wit:
(1) “all petitions for the determinationof just compensation to landowners” and
(2) “the prosecutionof all criminal offenses under [R.A. No. 6657].”[2] The provisions of §50 must
be construedinharmonywiththisprovisionbyconsidering cases involving the determinationof
just compensationandcriminal cases for violations ofR.A. No. 6657 as exceptedfrom the
plenitude ofpower conferredon the DAR. Indeed, there is a reasonfor this distinction. The DAR
is anadministrative agencywhichcannot be grantedjurisdictionover cases of eminent domain
(for such are takings under R.A. No. 6657) and over criminal cases. Thus, inEPZA v.
Dulay[3] and Sumulong v. Guerrero[4] we heldthat the valuationof propertyin eminent domainis
essentiallya judicial functionwhichcannot be vested in administrative agencies, whilein Scoty’s
Department Store v. Micaller[5] we struck downa law granting the thenCourt of Industrial
Relations jurisdictionto trycriminal casesfor violations of the Industrial Peace Act.
Petitioners alsocite Rule II, §5 andRule XIII, §1 of the DARAB Rules ofProcedure insupport of
their contentionthat decisions of agrarian reform adjudicators mayonlybe appealedto the
DARAB. These rulesprovide:
Rule II §5. Appellate Jurisdiction. The Board shall have exclusive appellate jurisdictionto review,
reverse, modify, alter or affirm resolutions, orders, decisions, andother dispositions ofits
[regionalandprovincial agrarianreform adjudicators].
Rule XIII, §1. Appeal to the Board. – a) An appeal maybe takenfromanorder or decisionof the
Regional or Provincial Adjudicator to the Boardbyeither of the parties or both, bygivingor stating
a writtenor oral appeal withina periodof fifteen(15) days from the receipt ofthe resolution,
order or decisionappealedfrom, and servinga copythereof onthe opposite or adverse party, if
the appeal is in writing.
b) An oral appeal shall be reduced intowriting bythe Adjudicator to be signedbythe appellant,
and a copythereof shall be serveduponthe opposite or adverse partywithin ten (10) days from
the taking of oralappeal.
Apart from the fact that onlya statute canconfer jurisdictionon courts andadministrative
agencies – rules ofprocedure cannot – it is noteworthythat the New Rulesof Procedure of the
DARAB, whichwas adopted onMay30, 1994, now provide that in the event a landowner is not
satisfied witha decisionof anagrarianadjudicator, the landowner canbringthe matter directlyto
the Regional Trial Court sitting as Special AgrarianCourt. Thus Rule XIII, §11 of the newrules
provides:
§11. Land Valuation and PreliminaryDetermination and Payment of Just Compensation. The
decisionof the Adjudicator on land valuationandpreliminarydetermination and payment ofjust
compensation shallnot be appealable to the Boardbut shallbe brought directlyto the Regional
Trial Courts designatedas SpecialAgrarian Courts within fifteen(15) days fromreceipt of the
notice thereof. Anypartyshall be entitledto onlyone motionfor reconsideration. (Emphasis
supplied)
This is an acknowledgment bythe DARAB that the decision ofjust compensationcases for the
taking of lands under R.A. No. 6657 is a power vestedin the courts.
Thus, under the law, the LandBank ofthe Philippinesis chargedwith the initial responsibilityof
determining the value oflands placedunder land reform andthe compensationto be paidfor
their taking.[6] Through notice sent to the landowner pursuant to §16(a)of R.A. No. 6657, the DAR
makes anoffer. In case the landowner rejects the offer, a summaryadministrative proceedingis
held[7] andafterward the provincial (PARAD), the regional(RARAD) or the central (DARAB)
adjudicator as the case maybe, depending onthe value of the land, fixes the price to be paidfor
the land. Ifthe landowner does not agree to the price fixed, he maybringthe matter to the RTC
acting as Special AgrarianCourt.[8]Thisinessence is the procedure for the determinationof
compensationcasesunder R.A. No. 6657. In accordance withit, the private respondent’s case was
properlybrought byit inthe RTC, and it was error for the latter court to have dismissedthe
case. Inthe terminologyof §57, the RTC, sittingas a Special AgrarianCourt, has“original and](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/241941333-case-digest-statcon-150913073807-lva1-app6892/85/241941333-case-digest-statcon-17-320.jpg)
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exclusive jurisdictionover all petitions for the determination ofjust compensationto
landowners.”[9] It wouldsubvert this “originalandexclusive” jurisdictionof the RTCfor the DARto
vest originaljurisdictionincompensationcasesinadministrative officialsandmake the RTCan
appellate court for the review ofadministrative decisions.
Consequently, althoughthe new rules speakof directly appealingthe decisionof adjudicators to
the RTCs sittingas SpecialAgrarian Courts, it is clear from §57 that
the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine such casesis inthe RTCs. Anyeffort to transfer
such jurisdictionto the adjudicators and to convert the original jurisdictionof the RTCs into
appellate jurisdiction would be contraryto §57 and therefore wouldbe void. What adjudicators
are empoweredto dois onlyto determine in a preliminarymanner the reasonable compensation
to be paid to landowners, leavingto the courts the ultimate power to decide this question.
WHEREFORE the petitionfor review on certiorari is DENIEDandthe decisionof the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado (Chairman), Romero, Puno, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION, INC. VS CLEOFE JANIOLA AND HON. ARTHUR FAMINI, GR NO
184861, JUNE 30, 2009
FACTS
Petitioner, filed a Complaint Affidavit against private respondent withthe Office of the City
Prosecutor of Las Piñas Cityfor violationof Batas PambansaBilang 22. Afterwards, private
respondent, together withher husband, fileda complaint against petitioner for the rescissionof
an allegedconstructionagreement betweenthe parties, as wellas for damages. Thereafter,
private respondent filed for a Motion to Suspendproceedings alleging that for the rescission ofan
allegedconstructionagreement betweenthe parties, as well as for damages.
ISSUE
WON the court seriouslyerredinnot perceivinggrave abuse of discretion onthe part of the
inferior court when the latter ruledto suspend proceddings inCriminalCase Nos. 55554-61 on the
basiso f “prejudicialquestion” in CivilCase No. LP-06-0197.[
RULING
Private respondent cites Article 36 of the Civil Code. The Court does not agree withprivate
respondent’s argument that a prejudicial questionexists whenthe civil actionis filed either before
the institutionof the criminal actionor duringthe pendencyof the criminalactionandthat there
is anapparent conflict inthe provisions ofthe Rulesof Court andthe Civil Code inthat the latter
considers a civil caseto have presenteda prejudicialquestionevenifthe criminalcase preceded
the filing of the civil case.
it is a basic precept instatutoryconstruction that a “change in phraseologybyamendment of a
provisionof law indicates a legislative intent to change the meaning ofthe provisionfrom that it
originallyhad.”Inthe instant case, the phrase, “previouslyinstituted,” wasinsertedto qualifythe
nature ofthe civil action involved ina prejudicial questioninrelation to the criminal action. This
interpretationis further buttressed bythe insertionof “subsequent” directly before the term
criminal action. There is no other logical explanationfor the amendments except to qualifythe
relationshipof the civil andcriminalactions, that the civil actionmust precede the criminal action.
Additionally, it is a principle instatutoryconstructionthat “a statute shouldbe construednot only
to be consistent with itselfbut also to harmonize withother laws onthe same subject matter, as
to form a complete, coherent andintelligiblesystem.”Thisprinciple is consistent withthe
maxim, interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus or everystatute
must be soconstruedandharmonizedwith other statutesas to form a uniformsystem of
jurisprudence.[17]In other words, everyeffort must be made to harmonize seeminglyconflicting
laws. It is onlywhenharmonizationis impossible that resort must be made to choosing which law
to apply.
In the instant case, Art. 36 of the Civil Code andSec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court are
susceptible of aninterpretation that would harmonize bothprovisions oflaw. The phrase
“previouslyinstitutedcivil action” inSec. 7 of Rule 111 is plainlyworded and is not susceptible of
alternative interpretations. The clause “before anycriminal prosecution maybe institutedor may
proceed” inArt. 36 of the Civil Code may, however, be interpreted to meanthat the motionto
suspend the criminal actionmaybe filedduringthe preliminaryinvestigation withthe public
prosecutor or court conducting the investigation, or during the trialwith the court hearing the
case.
This interpretationwouldharmonize all the mentionedlaws. Thus, under the principlesof
statutoryconstruction, it is this interpretation ofArt. 36 of the Civil Code that should governin
order to give effect to all the relevant provisions of law.
Laguna Lake Development Authority vs.Court of Appeals
Posted onNovember 18, 2012
G.R.No. 120865-71
December 7, 1995
Facts:
The Laguna Lake Development Authority(LLDA) was created throughRA No. 4850 in order to
execute the policytowards environmental protectionandsustainable development soas to
accelerate the development andbalancedgrowthof the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding
provinces andtowns.
PD No. 813 amendedcertainsections ofRA 4850 since water qualitystudies have shownthat the
lake willdeteriorate further ifsteps are not takento checkthe same.
EO 927 further definedandenlargedthe functions andpowers of the LLDA andenumeratedthe
towns, cities andprovinces encompassed bythe term“Laguna de BayRegion”.
Upon implementation of RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991), the municipalities assumed
exclusive jurisdiction& authorityto issue fishing privilegeswithin their municipal waters since
Sec.149 thereof provides:“Municipal corporations shall have the authorityto grant fishery
privilegesinthe municipal waters and impose rental fees or chargestherefore…”
Big fishpen operators tookadvantage ofthe occasionto establishfishpens & fishcages to the
consternationof the LLDA.
The implementationof separate independent policies in fishcages & fishpenoperation andthe
indiscriminate grant of fishpenpermits bythe lakeshore municipalities have saturated the lake
with fishpens, therebyaggravating the current environmental problems and ecological stress of
Laguna Lake.
The LLDA then servednotice to the generalpublic that (1) fishpens, cages & other aqua-culture
structures unregistered withthe LLDA as of March31, 1993 are declaredillegal;(2) those declared
illegalshallbe subject to demolitionbythe Presidential Task Force for Illegal FishpenandIllegal
Fishing;and(3) owners of those declaredillegal shall be criminallychargedwithviolation of
Sec.39-A of RA 4850 as amendedbyPD 813.
A month later, the LLDA sent noticesadvising the owners ofthe illegallyconstructed fishpens,
fishcages and other aqua-culture structures advising themto dismantle their respective structures
otherwise demolition shall be effected.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/241941333-case-digest-statcon-150913073807-lva1-app6892/85/241941333-case-digest-statcon-18-320.jpg)
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Liability
The parents (father andmother of juvenile Frank) andhisteacher-in-charge at the Cabug-Cabug
NationalHighSchool of President Roxas, Capiz, are jointlysubsidiarilyliable incase of insolvency,
as the crime was established to have beencommitted inside the classroomof Cabug-Cabug
NationalHighSchool andduring school hours.
SPO3 NOEL CABADA and SPO3 RODOLFO G. DE GUZMAN, petitioners, vs. HON. RAFAEL M.
ALUNAN III, Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government & Chairman,
National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM); HON. ALEXIS CANONIZADO, Commissioner,
NAPOLCOM, Manila; Chairman LEODEGARIO ALFARO, Regional Appellate Board VIII; Regional
Director EDMUNDO LAVILLA LARROZA, Philippine National Police (PNP) Regional Command VIII;
and MARIO VALDEZ,respondents.
D E C I S I O N
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court[1] to set aside
the decision (in the formof a letter) of 24 March 1995[2] of public respondent National Police
Commission(NAPOLCOM), which denieddue course for lackof jurisdiction the appeal and the
petitionfor review filed by petitioners SPO3 Noel Cabada and SPO3 Rodolfo G. de Guzman,
respectively. Challengedinthe said appeal andpetitionfor review were the decisionof 15 August
1994[3] and resolution of25 October 1994[4] of the RegionalAppellate Board ofthe EighthRegional
Command (RAB 8), which affirmed their dismissal from the service.
The pleadings andannexes filed bythe parties disclose the following factual and procedural
backdrop of this case:
On 29 October 1993, a complaint against the petitioners for Grave Misconduct, Arbitrary
Detention, andDishonestywas filed with the Office of the Commission on Human Rights in
TaclobanCitybyprivate respondent MarioValdez.[5] The complaint wasreferred to the Philippine
National Police Eighth Regional Command (PNP-RECOM 8) which, after conducting its own
investigation, filedan administrative charge of Grave Misconduct against the petitioners and
instituted summary dismissal proceedings.
On 7 April 1994, the Regional Director of PNP-RECOM 8 handed down a decision[6] finding the
petitioners guilty of grave misconduct and ordering their dismissal from the police
service. Pursuant to this decision, Special Order No. 174, dated 23 April 1994,[7] was issued
ordering, among other things, the dismissal of the petitioners from the service.
The petitioners claimedthat theywere not formallyfurnished witha copyof the decisionandthat
theywere able to secure a copythereof “thru their own effort and initiative” only on 13 June
1994.[8] However, they received a copy of Special Order No. 174 on 26 April 1994.
Although they insist that the basis of the appeal before RAB 8 was Special Order No.
174,[9] petitioner Cabada statedunder oathin hisAppeal[10] filedwith the Department of Interior
and Local Government (DILG)that he infact seasonablyfileda motion for reconsideration of the
decisionof the Regional Director of PNP-RECOM 8, who, however, failed or refused to act on the
said motion, and that he asked that the said motion be treated as an appeal to the RAB.
In its decisionof 15 August 1994,[11] the RAB 8 affirmedthe decisionof the RegionalDirector. Inits
resolution of25 October 1994,[12] it denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of its
decision. The petitioners received a copy of this resolution on 26 January 1995.
Petitioners Cabada andDe Guzman then filed with the Honorable Secretary of the DILG and
Chairman of the NAPOLCOM their “Appeal”[13]dated 5 February 1995 and “Petition for
Review”[14] dated 4 February 1995, respectively.
In its decision of 24 March 1995, the NAPOLCOM, through Commissioner Alexis Canonizado,
denied due course to the petitioners’ appeal andpetition for review for lack of jurisdiction “it
appearing x x x that both the Decisionandthe Resolutionof the Regional Appellate Board had
long become final and executory and there being no showing that the RAB failed to decide
respondents’ appeal withinthe reglementary period of sixty (60) days.”[15] In support thereof,
the NAPOLCOM cited Section23, Rule IV of NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular No. 91-002 and
Section5, Rule III of NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular No. 91-006, which provide as follows:
Section23. Effect of Failure to Decide Appeal. — Failure of the Regional Appellate Board to
decide the appeal withinthe reglementaryperiod shall render the decision final and executory
without prejudice, however, to the filing of anappeal by either party with the Secretary of the
Department of the Interior and Local Government.
xxx xxx xxx
Section5. Finalityof Decision/Resolution. — The decisionof the Regional Appellate Board on an
appealedcase shallbecome final andexecutoryafter ten(10) days from receipt of a copy thereof
by the appellant, if no Motion for Reconsideration is filed within said period.
A motionfor Reconsideration may be filed by either party from a Decision rendered by the
Regional Appellate Boardon anappealedcase, providedthat the same is filed withinten(10) days
from receipt of a copy of the decision in question. However, only one (1) Motion for
Reconsideration may be allowed.
Hence, the instant petition.
The Office of the Solicitor Generalseeks to dismiss this petition on the ground of prematurity
because the petitioners failedto exhaust administrative remedies; they should have instead
appealedto the Civil Service Commission (CSC) pursuant to Section47, Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Title
I, Book V of the Administrative Code of1987 (E.O. No. 292), which vests upon the CSC appellate
jurisdictionover disciplinarycases ofgovernment personnelwhere the penalty imposed is, inter
alia, dismissal from office. The said provision reads:
Section 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. — (1) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all
administrative disciplinarycases involvingthe impositionof a penaltyof suspensionfor more than
thirtydays, or fine inan amount exceeding thirty days salary, demotion in rank or salary or
transfer, or removal or dismissal from office. x x x
(2) The Secretaries x x x shall have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving
disciplinaryactionagainst officers andemployees under their jurisdiction. x x x In case the decision
renderedbya bureau or office headis appealable to the Commission, the same may be initially
appealedto the Department and finallyto the Commissionandpendingappeal, the same shall be
executoryexcept when the penaltyis removal, in whichcase, the same shall be executory only
after confirmation by the Secretary concerned.
The Office of the Solicitor General opines that this provision covers PNP personnel, like the
petitioners;consequently, theyshould have appealed to the CSC. It alsoadvances the view that
the instant petitionshould have been filed with the proper forum, the Regional Trial Court.
The core issues that present themselves for our determination are whether
(1) the NAPOLCOM committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course, for lack of
jurisdiction, the petitioners’ appeal fromand petition for reviewof the decisionandresolution of
the RAB 8; and
(2) this special civil action was prematurely filed for failure of the petitioners to exhaust
administrative remedies.
I
Section45 of the DILGAct of 1990[16] provides for the finality of disciplinary actions against
members of the PNP as follows:](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/241941333-case-digest-statcon-150913073807-lva1-app6892/85/241941333-case-digest-statcon-23-320.jpg)
![24
SEC. 45. Finality of Disciplinary Action. — The disciplinaryaction imposedupon a member of the
PNP shall be final andexecutory: Provided, That a disciplinary action imposed by the regional
director or bythe PLEB involvingdemotion or dismissal from the service maybe appealed to the
regional appellate board withinten (10) days from receipt ofthe copyof the notice of decision:
Provided, further, That the disciplinaryactionimposedbythe Chiefof the PNPinvolvingdemotion
or dismissal maybe appealed to the National Appellate Boardwithin ten (10) days from receipt
thereof: Provided furthermore, That, the regional or National Appellate Board, as the case maybe,
shalldecide the appeal withinsixty(60) days from receipt ofthe notice ofappeal: Provided, finally,
That failure of the regional appellate board to act on the appeal within said period shall render the
decision final and executory without prejudice, however, to the filing of an appeal by either party
with the Secretary. (Italics supplied)
The last proviso of this sectionis restated in Section 23, Rule IV of NAPOLCOM Memorandum
Circular No. 91-002. And Section 3, Rule III of NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular No. 92-006
provides:
Section 3. Period Within Which to Decide Appealed Cases; Finality of RAB/NAB Decisions. — The
NAPOLCOM appellate boardconcerned shall decide the appealed cases withinsixty(60) days from
receipt of the entire records of the case from the PNPsummary dismissal authority. However,
failure of the NAPOLCOMRegional Appellate Board(RAB)to act onthe appeal withinsaid period
renders the decision final and executory without prejudice to the filing of an appeal by the
respondent-appellant with the Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local
Government. The decisionrenderedbythe NAPOLCOMNational Appellate Board(NAB) disposing
an appealedcase shall be final andexecutoryunless a timelyMotionfor Reconsideration is filed
within ten (10) days fromreceipt thereof, inwhichcase, it shall become final and executory upon
receipt bythe respondent-appellant of the resolution ofthe aforesaidboarddenying, modifying or
affirming the decision.
Section45 of the DILGAct of 1990 specificallyprovides that if a RAB fails to decide an appeal
within the reglementaryperiodof sixtydays, the appealeddecisionbecomes final and executory
without, however, prejudice to the right of the aggrieved party to appeal to the Secretary of
the DILG. The saidprovision is, however, silent as regards the availability of an appeal from a
decision rendered by a RAB within the reglementary period.
This gapinSection 45 cannot be construedto prohibit appeals fromdecisions of the RABrendered
within the reglementary period, for while the epigraph of the section is worded Finality of
Disciplinary Action, there is nothing thereinthat explicitlybars anyfurther appeal. Complementary
laws ondiscipline ofgovernment officials andemployees must thenbe inquiredinto considering
that in conformitywith the mandate of the Constitution that the PNP must be national in scope
and civilian incharacter,[17] it is nowa part, as a bureau, ofthe reorganizedDILG.[18] As such, it falls
within the definition ofthe civil service in Section2(1), Article IX-B of the Constitution.[19] For this
reason, Section 91 of the DILG Act of 1990 provides:
SEC. 91. Application of Civil Service Laws. — The Civil Service Law and its implementing rules and
regulations shall apply to all personnel of the Department.
The Civil Service Law referredto in Section91 of the DILG Act of 1990 is Subtitle A, Title I, Book V
of the Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 292). Section47 of Chapter 6 thereof provides, inter
alia, that incases where the decision rendered by a bureau or office is appealable to the
Commission, the same mayinitiallybe appealed to the department andfinallyto the Commission.
The rules and regulations implementing the Civil Service Law referred to in Section 91 of
the DILG Act of 1990 is the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292
known as the Administrative Code of 1987 promulgated by the CSC. Sections 31 and 32,
Rule XIV of the said Rules provide as follows:
SEC. 31. Except as otherwise providedbythe Constitutionor bylaw, the Commission shall have
the final authorityto passupon the removal, separation and suspension of all officers and
employees inthe civil service and upon all matters relating to the conduct, discipline and
efficiency of such officers and employees.
SEC. 32. The Secretariesandheads of agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities an d
municipalities shall have jurisdictionto investigate anddecide matters involving disciplinaryaction
against officers andemployees under their jurisdiction. Their decisions shall be final in case the
penaltyimposed is suspension for not more than thirty (30) days or fine in an amount not
exceedingthirty(30) days’ salary. In case the decision rendered by a bureau or office head is
appealable to the Commission, the same maybe initiallyappealedto the department, then to the
Merit Systems Protection Board, and finallyto the Commissionandpendingappeal, the same shall
be executoryexcept when the penaltyis removal, in whichcase the same shallbe executory only
after confirmation by the Secretary concerned.
Under Section7 of E.O. No. 262,[20] the Secretaryof the DILGhas the power of supervision and
control of his Department. His powers andfunctions thereunder are recognized and affirmed in
Section 10 of the DILG Act of 1990.[21]
In view thenof the aforementionedgapinSection45 of the DILG Act of 1990, the provisions of
the Civil Service Law andthe rules and regulations implementing it must be takeninto account in
light of the maxim interpretare concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi or everystatute must
be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of
jurisprudence.[22]
As thus construed and harmonized, it follows that if a RAB failsto decide anappealedcase within
sixtydays fromreceipt of the notice of appeal, the appealed decision is deemed final and
executory, and the aggrieved party may forthwith appeal therefrom to the Secretary of
theDILG. Likewise, ifthe RAB hasdecided the appealwithin the sixty-dayperiod, its decision may
still be appealed to the Secretary of the DILG.
In the instant case, Cabada’s appeal was addressed to “the Honorable Secretary of the
Department of the Interior andLocal Government x x x as Chairman and Presiding Officer of the
NationalPolice Commission,”[23] while De Guzman’s petition for review was addressed to “the
Honorable Secretary, Department of the Interior and LocalGovernment andChairman, National
Police Commission, Makati City, Metro Manila.”[24]
We consider the appeal and the petitionfor reviewas appeals to the Secretaryof the DILG under
Section 45 of the DILG Act of 1990.
Onlythe Secretaryof the DILG can act thereon, one way or the other. The NAPOLCOM did not
have authorityover the appealand the petition for review, andjust because bothmentioned the
Secretaryof the DILG as Chairman or Presiding Officer of the NAPOLCOM did not bring them
within the jurisdictionof the NAPOLCOM. The latter does not have such jurisdiction because
Section 14 of the DILG Act of 1990 pertinently provides as follows:
SEC. 14. Powers and Functions of the Commission. — x x x
xxx xxx xxx
(j) Affirm, reverse or modify, through the National Appellate Board, personnel disciplinary action
involving demotionor dismissal from the service imposed upon members of the Philippine
National Police by the Chief of the Philippine National Police;
(k) Exercise appellate jurisdiction throughthe regional appellate boards over administrative cases
against policemen and over decisions on claims for police benefits. x x x
This section clearly shows that the NAPOLCOM exercises appellate jurisdiction only on the
following cases and THROUGH(a) the NAB inpersonneldisciplinaryactions involvingdemotion or
dismissal fromthe service imposedbythe Chief of the PNP, and (b) the RAB in administrative](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/241941333-case-digest-statcon-150913073807-lva1-app6892/85/241941333-case-digest-statcon-24-320.jpg)
![25
cases against policemen and over decisions onclaims for police benefits. It has no appellate
jurisdiction over decisions rendered by the NAB and the RAB.
Consequently, the NAPOLCOM did not have the power or authority to issue, through
Commissioner Alexis Canonizado, the 24 March 1995decision denyingdue course to the appeal
and petition for review filedby petitioners Cabada and De Guzman, respectively, for lack of
jurisdictionbecause of Section 5, Rule III of NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular No. 91-006 and
Section23, Rule IV ofNAPOLCOMMemorandumCircular No. 91-002. The reference to these rules
suggest that the NAPOLCOM believes it has jurisdiction over appeals from decisions of the RAB if
the latter has not decided the appeal within the reglementary period of sixty days. Such a
suggestionis flawed because it would allowa ridiculous situation where the NAPOLCOM vests
upon itself an appellate jurisdictionfroma decisionrendered byit in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdictionthroughthe RAB, per Section 14(k)of the DILG Act of 1990. Moreover, Commissioner
Canonizadocannot, singly, act for the NAPOLCOM because it is a collegial body composed of a
Chairman and four Commissioners, pursuant to Section 13 of theDILG Act of 1990.
In light ofthe foregoing, the petitioners couldproperlyinvoke our originaljurisdictionto issue the
extraordinary writ of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to annual and set aside
the NAPOLCOM’s decision of 24 March 1995. It being a patent nullity, the filing ofa motionfor its
reconsiderationbefore the institution of this special civil action may be dispensed with.[25]
II
The plea ofthe Office of the Solicitor General that the instant action is premature for non-
exhaustion ofadministrative remedies is thus untenable. We would have sustained it if the
Secretaryof the DILG wasthe one who denieddue course to or dismissedthe appeal of petitioner
Cabada andthe petition for review of petitioner De Guzman. Bythen, pursuant to Section 91 of
the DILG Act of 1990;Section47, Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code
of 1987; and Sections 31 and 32 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order
No. 292, the appeal would have to be filedwith the CSC. And futile would be the petitioners’
claim in their Replyto the Comment of theOSG that their case fallswithin the exceptions to the
rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies.
In view ofallthe foregoing, a discussionon the other issues raisedbythe petitioners relating to
the merits of the case and on the issue of due process is unnecessary.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The decision (inthe form of a
letter) ofthe NationalPolice Commission of 24 March 1995 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The
Secretaryof the Department of Interior and Local Government isDIRECTED to RESOLVE with
reasonable dispatch the appeal and petition for review of petitioners SPO3 NOEL
CABADA and SPO3RODOLFO G. DE GUZMAN, respectively, from the decision of 15 August 1994
and resolution of25 October 1994 of the RegionalAppellate Board, EighthRegional Command, if
the same were filed on time.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-36049 May 31, 1976
CITY OF NAGA, VICENTE P. SIBULO, as Mayor, and JOAQUIN C. CLEOPE, as Treasurer of the City
of Naga, petitioners,
vs.
CATALINO AGNA, FELIPE AGNA and SALUD VELASCO, respondents.
Ernesto A. Miguel for petitioners.
Bonot, Cledera & Associates for respondents.
MARTIN, J.:
Petitionfor review oncertiorari, whichWe treat as special civil action, ofthe decisionof the Court
of First Instance ofCamarines Sur inCivil Case No. 7084, entitledAgna, et al. versus Cityof Naga,
et al., declaring Ordinance No. 360 of the Cityof Naga enforceable in1971 the year following its
approval andrequiring petitioners to payto private respondents the amounts sought for intheir
complaint plus attorney's fees andcosts. Includedinthe present controversyas proper parties are
Vicente P. Sibulo and JoaquinC. Cleope, the CityMayor and CityTreasurer of the Cityof Naga,
respectively.
On June 15, 1970, the Cityof Naga enactedOrdinance No. 360 changing andamendingthe
graduatedtax onquarterlygross sales of merchants prescribed inSection3 of Ordinance No. 4 of
the Cityof Naga to percentage tax on grosssales providedfor inSection 2 thereof. Pursuant to
said ordinance, private respondents paidto the Cityof Naga the following taxes ontheir gross
sales for the quarter from July1, 1970 to September 30, 1970, as follows:
CatalinoAgna paidP1,805.17 as per Official Receipt No. 1826591;
Felipe Agna paidP625.00 as per OfficialReceipt No. 1826594;and
Salud Velasco paid P129.81 as per OfficialReceipt No. 1820339.
On February13, 1971, private respondents filed withthe CityTreasurer of the Cityof Naga a claim
for refund ofthe followingamounts, together withinterests thereon fromthe date of payments:
To CatalinoAgna, P1,555.17;to Felipe Agna, P560.00;and to Salud Velasco, P127.81, representing
the difference between the amounts theypaid under Section3, Ordinance No. 4 of the Cityof
Naga, i.e., P250.00;P65.00 and P12.00 respectively. Theyallegedthat under existing law,
Ordinance No. 360, whichamendedSection 3, Ordinance No. 4 of the Cityof Naga, didnot take
effect in1970, the year it was approvedbut inthe next succeeding year after the year of its
approval, or in1971, andthat therefore, the taxestheypaid in 1970 on their gross sales for the
quarter fromJuly1, 1970 to September 30, 1970 were illegal andshould be refundedto themby
the petitioners.
The CityTreasurer denied the claimfor refund ofthe amounts inquestion. So private respondents
fileda complaint withthe Court of First Instance of Naga (Civil Case No. 7084), seeking to have
Ordinance No. 360 declaredeffective onlyinthe year following the year of its approval, that is, in
1971; to have Sections 4, 6 and 8 of Ordinance No. 360 declared unjust, oppressive andarbitrary,
and therefore, null and void;andto require petitioners to refundthe sums beingclaimedwith
interests thereonfrom the date the taxes complainedof were paidandto payalllegal costs and
attorney's feesinthe sumof P1,000.00. Private respondents further prayed that the petitioners
be enjoinedfromenforcingOrdinance No. 360.
In their answer, the petitioners among other things, claimedthat private respondents were not
"compelled" but voluntarilymade the payments of their taxes under Ordinance No. 360;that the
said ordinance was publishedinaccordance withlaw;that in accordance with Republic Act No.
305 (Charter of the Cityof Naga)anordinance takes effect after the tenthdayfollowingits
passage unlessotherwise statedinsaidordinance; that under existing law the Cityof Naga is
authorized to impose certainconditions to secure and accomplishthe collectionof salestaxes in
the most effective manner. As special andaffirmative defenses, the petitioners allege that the
private respondents have no cause of actionagainst them;that granting that the collection of
taxes canbe enjoined. the complaint does not allege facts sufficient to justifythe issuance of a
writ of preliminaryinjunction;that the refundprayedfor bythe private respondents is untenable;
that petitioners Vicente P. SibuloandJoaquin C. Cleope, the CityMayor and Treasurer of the City
of Naga, respectivelyare not proper partiesininterest;that the private respondents are estopped
from questioning the validityand/or constitutionalityof the provisions ofOrdinance No. 360.
Petitioners counterclaimedfor P20,000.00 as exemplarydamages, for the allegedunlawful and
malicious filing ofthe claim against them, insuchamount as the court maydetermine.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/241941333-case-digest-statcon-150913073807-lva1-app6892/85/241941333-case-digest-statcon-25-320.jpg)
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On July4, 1995, the NTCdeniedthe saidmotion inanOrder solelysignedbyCommissioner
SimeonKintanar.
On July17, 1995, private respondent BellTel filedwiththis court a Petition
for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibitionseeking the nullificationof the aforestatedOrder dated
July4, 1995 denying the Motionto Promulgate.
On July26, 1995, we issueda Resolutionreferring saidpetitionto the respondent Court of
Appeals for proper determination and resolutionpursuant to Section9, par. 1 of B.P. Blg. 129.
In the interim, the Solicitor Generalfiled withthe respondent appellate court a Manifestation In
Lieu of Comment 16in whichthe Solicitor General took a legal positionadverse to that of the NTC.
The Solicitor General, after a close examination ofthe laws creatingthe NTCandits predecessors
and a studious analysis of certainDepartment ofTransportation andCommunications (DOTC)
orders, NTCcirculars, andDepartment of Justice (DOJ)legal opinions pertinent to the issue of
collegialityof the NTC, made the following recommendations:
WHEREFORE, the Solicitor General respectfullyprays that thisHonorable
Court:
(a) declare respondent National Telecommunications Commissionas a
collegial body;
(b) restrainrespondent Commissioner SimeonKintanar fromarrogating unto
himself alone the powers of the saidagency;
(c) order NTC, acting as a collegial body, to resolve petitioner BellTelecom's
applicationunder NTC-94-229;
(d) declare NTCMemorandumCirculars 1-1-93 and 3-1-93 as void;[and]
(e) upholdthe legalityof DOTCDepartment Order 92-614. 17
On September 23, 1996, respondent Court of Appeals promulgatedthe hereinassailed decision
the dispositive portionof whichreads as follows:
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is herebyrenderedas
follows:
1. Petitioner's petitionfor a writ of Certiorari andProhibitionis hereby
granted. Accordingly, NTCMemorandum Circular No. 1-1-93, Annex "J" of the
Petition, MemorandumCircular No. 3-1-93, Annex "K" of the Petition and the
Order of Kintanar, Annex "L" of the Petition, are herebySET ASIDE for being
contraryto law. The Respondents andall those acting for and intheir behalf
are herebyenjoinedandprohibitedfrom implementing or enforcing the same;
[and]
2. Petitioner's petitionfor mandamus is herebyGRANTED inthat the
Respondent NTC, composed ofKintanar and deputycommissioners Perez and
Dumlao, are herebydirectedto meet en banc and to consider and act on the
draft Order, Annex "B" of the Petition, withinfifteen(15) days from the finality
of this Decision. Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 18
The hereinassailed decision beingunacceptable to petitioner Simeon Kintanar
and petitioners GMCR, Inc., Smart Communications, Inc., Isla Communications
Co., Inc. and International Communications Corporation as oppositors inthe
applicationof private respondent BellTelfor a provisional authority, theyfiled
with this court separate petitions for review.
Commissioner Kintanar's petition, docketedas G.R No. 126526, ascribes to the
respondent appellate court the followingassignment oferrors:
1. The Court of Appeals insetting aside NTCMC1-1-93 and MC3-1-93 and the
Order of the Commissiondated July4, 1995, made a collateralattackona law
which was nowhere calledfor inthe pleadings of the parties nor is authorized
bythe Rules ofCourt.
2. The Court of Appeals erredinassuming and imposing that the Commission
is a collegialbodysimplybyreasonof the fact that other bodies whichwere a
spinofffrom the defunct Public Service Commissionwere created as a
collegial body. The law that createdEO 546 erasedthe collegial character of
the proceeding before the NTC.
3. The Court of Appeals' decision contains serious contradiction;worse, it
consideredevidence not formallyoffered or incorporatedintothe records of
the case; yet failed to consider evidence submittedbypetitioner- appellant
nor on the prejudicial issue onnon-joinder of indispensable parties.
3.1 CA erred inassuming that the NTCis collegial bythe
fact that Charters ofother regulatoryagencies expressly
made themcollegial while thisexpress provisionwas
absent inNTC's charter.
3.2 CA contradicts itself byholding that DOTCMC92-614
prevails and[requires]collegiality.
3.3 The decisions byUndersecretaryLichaucosignedby
her and her 2 deputies are innowayindicative of](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/241941333-case-digest-statcon-150913073807-lva1-app6892/85/241941333-case-digest-statcon-40-320.jpg)
![42
memorandum circulars negating the collegial nature of the NTCunder Executive Order No. 146,
we are left with onlyone logicalconclusion:the NTCis a collegial bodyandwas a collegial body
even during the time whenit was actingas a one-man regime.
We thus quote with approval the encompassinglegal ruminations ofthe respondent Court of
Appeals in disposing of the issue of the collegialityof the NTC:
In resolving the issue, We recall that, onNovember 17, 1936, the National
AssemblypassedCommonwealth Act No. 146 which created the Public Service
Commission(PSC). While providing that the PSCshall consist ofa Public
Service Commissioner anda DeputyCommissioner, the law made it clear that
the PSCwas not a collegial bodybystating that the DeputyCommissioner
could act onlyon matters delegated to him bythe Public Service
Commissioner. As amendedbyRA 2677, the Public Service Commission was
transformedintoandemerged as a collegial body, composedof one Public
Service Commissioner andfive (5) Associate Commissioners. The amendment
provided that contestedcases andall cases involving the fixingof ratesshall be
decided bythe Commissionen banc.
On September 24, 1972, then President FerdinandE. Marcos signed, intolaw,
Presidential Decree No. 1 adopting andapproving the Integrated
ReorganizationPlanwhich, in turn, createdthe Boardof Communications
(BOC) in place ofthe PSC. This time, the new regulatoryboard was composed
of three (3) officers exercising quasi-judicialfunctions:
. . . The Boardof Communications shall be composedof a
full time Chairmanwhoshall be of unquestionedintegrity
and recognizedprominence in previous public and/or
private employment;two full-time members whoshallbe
competent onall aspects of communications, preferably
one of whom shall be a lawyer and the other aneconomist
. . .
On January25, 1978, the BOCpromulgatedits "Rules of Procedure and
Practice" in connectionwithapplications andproceedings before it.
On July23, 1979, President Marcos issuedExecutive Order No. 546, creating
the Ministriesof Public Works, andof Transportation and Communications,
merged the defunct Board of Communications and the Telecommunications
Control Bureauintoa single entity, the National Telecommunications
Commission(NTC). The said lawwas issued bythenPresident Marcos inthe
exercise of his legislative powers. Sec. 16 of E.O. 546 provides that —
. . . The Commission shall be composedof a Commissioner
and two DeputyCommissioners, preferablyone ofwhom
shallbe a lawyer andanother an economist. . . .
The aforementionedExecutive Order took effect onSeptember 24, 1979 . . .
However, the NTCdid not promulgate anyRules of Procedure andPractice.
Consequently, the thenexistingRules of Procedure andPractice promulgated
bythe BOCwas appliedto proceedings inthe NTC. In the meantime, the
Decisions of the NTCwere signedbythe Chairmanalone of the NTCwhich
renderedthe two (2) deputyCommissioners "non-participative" inthe task of
decision-making. This promptedthe thenMinister of Transportation and
Communication Jose P. Dans, Jr. to seek the legal opinionof the thenMinister
of Justice RicardoC. Puno, as to whether the NTCwas a collegial bodyor not.
On January11, 1984, Minister Punosent a letter-opinion . . . to the effect that
the NTCwas not a collegial bodybut a single entityandthus the then practice
of onlythe Chairmanof the NTCsigning the Decisions of the NTCwas
authorized bylaw. . . .
Admittedly, the opinionof the Secretaryof Justice is entitled to great weight . .
. . However, the same is not controlling or conclusive onthe courts . . . . We
find anddeclare, in the present recourse, that the PunoOpinionis not correct.
Admittedly, EO 546 does not specificallystate that the NTCwas a collegial
body. Neither does it provide that the NTCshould meet En Banc in deciding a
case or in exercising its adjudicatoryor quasi-judicial functions. But the
absence of suchprovisions doesnot militate against the collegialnature ofthe
NTC under the context of Section16 of EO 546 and under the Rules of
Procedure and Practice appliedbythe NTCinits proceedings. Under [Rule 15]
of saidRules, the BOC(now the NTC) sits En Banc.
. . . In everycase heard bythe Board en banc, the orders,
rulings, decisions andresolutions disposing of the merits of
the matter withinits jurisdictionshallbe reached withthe
concurrence of at least two regular members after
deliberationand consultationandthereafter assigned to a
member for the writing ofthe opinion. Anymember
dissentingfrom the order, ruling, decisionor resolution
shallstate inwritingthe reasonfor his dissent.
In all other cases, a dulyassigned Member shall issue all
orders, rulings, decisions and resolutions pertinent to the
case assignedto him. Copyof the decision onthe merit of
the case soassignedshall be furnishedthe Chairmanof the
Board.
xxx xxx xxx
Inscrutably, a case before the BOCmaybe assigned to and heardbyonlya
member thereof who is taskedto prepare andpromulgate hisDecision
thereon, or heard, En Banc, bythe full membershipof the BOCinwhich case
the concurrence of at least two (2) ofthe membership ofthe BOCis necessary
for a validDecision. . . . While it maybe true that the aforesaid Rules of](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/241941333-case-digest-statcon-150913073807-lva1-app6892/85/241941333-case-digest-statcon-42-320.jpg)
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Procedure waspromulgatedbefore the effectivityof Executive Order No. 546,
however, the Rules ofProcedure ofBOCgovernedthe rules ofpractice and
procedure before the NTCwhenit was establishedunder Executive Order No.
546. This wasenunciatedbythe Supreme Court in the case of "Philippine
Consumers Foundation, Inc. versus National Telecommunications Commission,
131 SCRA 200" when it declared that:
The Rules of Practice and Procedure promulgated on
January25, 1978 by the Board of Communications, the
immediate predecessor of respondent NTC. . . govern the
rules of practice and procedure before the BOCthen, now
respondent NTC. . . .
In the case of"Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company versus National
Telecommunications, et al., 190 SCRA 717", the Supreme Court appliedand
cited Rule 15 of the Rules of Procedure andPractice ofBOC. . . .
Hence, under its Rules ofProcedure and Practice, the Respondent NTC, as its
predecessor, the BOC, hadconsistentlybeen andremains a collegial body.
Respondents Kintanar's andNTC's pose that Respondent Kintanar, alone, is
vestedwith authorityto sign andpromulgate a Decisionof the NTCis
antitheticalto the nature of a commissionas envisaged inExecutive Order No.
546. It must be borne inmind that a Commissionis definedas:
[a] bodycomposed ofseveral persons actingunder lawful
authorityto perform some public senica (Cityof Louisville
MunicipalHousing Commission versus Public Housing
Administration, 261 Southwestern Reporter, 2nd, page
286).
A Commissionis also defined as a board or committee of officials appointed
and empoweredto performcertainacts or exercise certainjurisdictionof a
public nature or service . . . (Black, Law Dictionary, page 246). There is
persuasive authoritythat a "commission" is synonymous with"board" (State
Ex. Rel. Johnsonversus Independent School District No. 810, WabashCounty,
109 NorthwesternReporter 2nd, page 596). Indeed, as can be easilydiscerned
from the context of Section16 of Executive Order No. 546, the Commissionis
composed ofa Commissioner and two (2) deputycommissioners . . . not the
commissioner, alone, as pontificatedbyKintanar. The conjunctive word "and"
is not without anylegal significance. It is not, byanychance, a surplusage in
the law. It means "in addition to" (McCaullWebster Elevator Companyversus
Adams, 167 NorthwesternReporter, 330, page 332). The word"and", whether
it is usedto connect words, phrasesor full sentence[s], must be acceptedas
bindingtogether and as relating to one another . . . .
In interpretinga statute, everypart thereofshould be given effect onthe
theorythat it wasenactedas anintegratedlaw andnot as a combinationof
dissonant provisions. As the aphorism goes, "that the thingmayrather have
effect thanbe destroyed" . . . If it was the intention ofPresident Marcos to
constitute merelya single entity, a "one-man"governmentalbody, instead of a
commissionor a three-mancollegial body, he wouldnot have constituteda
commissionandwouldnot have specificallydecreedthat the Commissionis
composed of, not the commissioner alone, but of the commissioner and the
two (2) deputycommissioners. Irrefragably, then, the NTCis a commission
composed not onlyof Kintanar, but PerezandDumlaoas well, acting together
in the performance of their adjudicatoryor quasi-judicial functions,
conformablywiththe Rules of Procedure andPractice promulgated bythe
BOC and applicable to the NTC.
The barefacedfact that . . . of Executive Order 546 usedthe word "deputy" to
designate the two (2) other members ofthe Commission does not militate
against the collegialityof the NTC. . . . The collegialityof the NTCcannot be
disparaged bythe mere nominal designation ofthe membershipthereof.
Indeed, We are convincedthat suchnominal designations are without
functionalimplications andare designedmerelyfor the purpose of
administrative structure or hierarchyof the personnel of the NTC. . . .
In hindsight, even SecretaryGarcia was in accordwith the collegialityof the
NTC when he promulgated andissuedDepartment Order No. 92-614 . . . Even
then Commissioner MarianoBenedictoopenlyexpressedhisvehement
oppositionto the Department Order ofSecretaryGarcia andoptedto seek
refuge in the opinionof the thenMinister of Justice Puno. . . . It was only
when Commissioner BenedictoresignedandRespondent Kintanar was
designated to replace Commissioner Benedicto that SecretaryGarciaflip-
flapped[sic], and suddenlyfoundit expedient to recallhis Department Order
No. 92-614 and authorize Kintanar to decide, allbyhimself, all cases pending
with the NTCinfrontal violationof the Rules ofProcedure and Practice before
the NTC, more specificallyRule 15 thereof . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
The Respondents cannot find solace in House Bill No. 10558 to buttress their
argument . . . because under the House Bill, the NTCis transformedintoa
collegial body. Indeed, We find Respondents'posetenuous. For, it canlikewise
be argued, with justification, that House BillNo. 10558 indeed confirms the
existingcollegial nature of the NTCbyso expresslyreaffirming the same.
xxx xxx xxx
In sum, then, We findandsodeclare that NTCCircular No. 1-1-93 . . .
Memorandum Circular No. 3-1-93 . . . and the Order of Kintanar . . . declaring](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/241941333-case-digest-statcon-150913073807-lva1-app6892/85/241941333-case-digest-statcon-43-320.jpg)
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Acting on the prayer to stayexecutionduringthe pendencyof the appeal, the Office ofthe
President issuedan Order onJuly28, 1993, the pertinent portions ofwhichreadas follows:
xxx xxx xxx
The stayof the executionis governedbySection68 of R.A. No. 7160 and
Section6 of Administrative Order No. 18 dated 12 February1987, quoted
below:
Sec. 68. ExecutionPendingAppeal. — An appeal shall not prevent a decision
from becomingfinalor executory. The respondent shall be consideredas
havingbeenplacedunder preventive suspensionduring the pendencyof an
appeal in the events he wins suchappeal. In the event the appeal results in an
exoneration, he shall be paidhissalaryand such other emoluments during the
pendencyof the appeal (R.A. No. 7160).
Sec. 6 Except as otherwise provided byspecial laws, the executionof the
decision/resolution/order appealedfromis stayed uponfiling of the appeal
within the periodprescribed herein. However, inallcases, at anytime during
the pendencyof the appeal, the Office of the President maydirect or staythe
executionof the decision/resolution/order appealedfrom uponsuchterms
and conditions as it maydeem just andreasonable (Adm. Order No. 18).
xxx xxx xxx
After due consideration, and inthe light ofthe Petitionfor Reviewfiledbefore
this Office, we find that a stayof executionpendingappeal would be just and
reasonable to prevent undue prejudice to public interest.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, thisOffice herebyorders the
suspension/stayof executionof:
a) the Decisionof the Sangguniang Panlalawiganof Albay
in Administrative Case No. 02-92 dated1 July1993
suspendingMayor Naomi C. Corral from office for a period
of two (2) months, and
b) the Resolution ofthe Sangguniang Panlalawiganof
AlbayinAdministrative Case. No. 05-92 dated5 July1993
suspendingMayor Naomi C. Corral from office for a period
of three (3) months (Rollo, pp. 55-56).
Petitioner thenfileda Motionfor Reconsiderationquestioningthe aforesaidOrder ofthe Office of
the President.
On September 13, 1990, the Motionfor Reconsiderationwas denied.
Hence, thispetition.
II
Petitioner claims that the governing law in the instant case is R.A. No. 7160, whichcontains a
mandatoryprovisionthat anappeal "shallnot prevent a decisionfrom becomingfinal and
executory." He argues that administrative Order No. 18 dated February12, 1987, (entitle
"Prescribing the Rules andRegulations Governing Appealsto Office the President") authorizing the
President to staythe execution ofthe appealeddecisionat anytime duringthe pendencyof the
appeal, was repealed byR.A. No. 7160, which took effect onJanuary1, 1991 (Rollo, pp. 5-6).
The petitionis devoidof merit.
Petitioner invokes the repealing clause of Section530 (f), R.A. No. 7160, which provides:
All general andspecial laws, acts, citycharters, decrees, executive orders,
administrative regulations, part or parts thereof, which are incosistent with
anyof the provisions ofthis Code, are herebyrepealedor modified
accordingly.
The aforementionedclause is not anexpress repealof Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18
because it failedto identifyor designate the laws or executive orders that are intended to be
repealed(cf. I Sutherland, StatutoryConstruction467 [1943]).
If there is anyrepeal of Administrative Order No. 18 byR.A. No. 7160, it is throughimplication
though suchkind ofrepeal is not favored(The Philippine American Management Co., Inc. v. The
Philippine American Management Employees Association, 49 SCRA 194 [1973]). There is even a
presumption against implied repeal.
An impliedrepeal predicates the intended repeal uponthe conditionthat a substantialconflict
must be foundbetweenthe new and prior laws. Inthe absence ofanexpress repeal, a subsequent
law cannot be construed as repealing a prior law unlessanirreconcible inconsistencyand
repugnancyexists inthe terms of the new and oldlaws (Iloilo PalayandCorn Planters Association,
Inc. v. Feliciano, 13 SCRA 377 [1965]). The two laws must be absolutelyincompatible (Compania
General de Tabacos v. Collector ofCustoms, 46 Phil. 8 [1924]). There must be sucha repugnancy
betweenthe laws that theycannot be made to stand together (Crawford, Constructionof Statutes
631 [1940]).
We findthat the provisions ofSection68 of R.A. No. 7160 and Section 6 of Administrative Order
No. 18 are not irreconcillablyinconsistent andrepugnant and the twolaws must infact be read
together.
The first sentence of Section 68 merelyprovides that an"appeal shall not prevent a decisionfrom
becoming final or executory." As worded, there is roomto construe saidprovisionas giving
discretionto the reviewing officials to staythe executionof the appealeddecision. There is
nothing to infer therefromthat the reviewingofficials are deprivedof the authorityto order a stay](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/241941333-case-digest-statcon-150913073807-lva1-app6892/85/241941333-case-digest-statcon-46-320.jpg)
![47
of the appealedorder. If the intentionof Congress was to repeal Section6 of Administrative Order
No. 18, it couldhave usedmore direct language expressive ofsuch intention.
The execution of decisions pendingappeal is procedural andinthe absence ofa clear l egislative
intent to remove fromthe reviewingofficials the authorityto order a stayof execution, such
authoritycanprovidedinthe rules and regulations governing the appeals of elective officialsin
administrative cases.
The term "shall" maybe read either as mandatoryor directorydepending upona considerationof
the entire provisions in whichit is found, its object andthe consequences that would follow from
construing it one wayor the other (cf. De Mesa v. Mencias, 18 SCRA 533 [1966]). In the case at
bench, there is no basis to justifythe constructionof the wordas mandatory.
The Office of the President made a finding that the execution ofthe decisionof the Sagguniang
Panlalawigansuspendingrespondent Mayor from office might be prejudicial to the public interest.
Thus, inorder not to disrupt the renditionof service bythe mayor to the public, a stayof the
executionof the decision is in order.
WHEREFORE, the petitionis DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[G. R. No. 126496. April 30, 1997]
GMCR, INC.; SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC.; INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS CORP.; ISLA
COMMUNICATIONS CO., INC., petitioners, vs. BELL TELECOMMUNICATION
PHILIPPINES, INC.; THE NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION and HON.
SIMEON L. KINTANAR in his official capacity as Commissioner of the National
Telecommunications, respondents.
[G. R. No. 126526. April 30, 1997]
COMMISSIONER SIMEON L. KINTANAR, NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION, petitioner, vs.BELL TELECOMMUNICATION PHILIPPINES,
INC., respondent.
D E C I S I O N
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
Before us are consolidatedpetitions seeking the reviewandreversal of the decision[1] of the
respondent Court of Appeals[2] declaring the National Telecommunications Commission
(hereafter, NTC) to be a collegial bodyunder Executive Order No. 546[3] and ordering the NTC to
heretofore sit andact en banc, i.e., with the concurrence of at least two commissioners, for a valid
dispensation of its quasi-judicial functions.
Established by evidence are the following facts:
On October 19, 1993, private respondent Bell Telecommunication Philippines, Inc.
(hereafter, BellTel) filed withthe NTCan Application for a Certificate of Public Convenience and
Necessityto Procure, Install, Operate andMaintainNationwide IntegratedTelecommunications
Services and to Charge RatesTherefor and withFurther Request for the Issuance of Provisional
Authority. Thisapplicationwas docketedas NTCCase No. 93-481. At the time ofthe filing of this
application, private respondent BellTel had not beengranteda legislative franchise to engage in
the business of telecommunications service.
Since private respondent BellTel was, at that time, an unenfranchised applicant, it was
excluded in the deliberations for service area a ssignments for local exchange carrier
service[4]. Thus, onlypetitioners GMCR, Inc., Smart Communications, Inc., Isla Communications
Co., Inc. and International Communications Corporation, among others, were beneficiaries of
formal awards of service area assignments in April and May, 1994.
On March 25, 1994, Republic Act No. 7692 was enacted granting private respondent BellTel
a congressionalfranchise whichgave private respondent BellTel the right, privilege and authority
to
“carryon the businessof providing telecommunications services in and betweenprovinces, cities,
and municipalities in the Philippines and for this purpose, to establish, operate, manage, lease,
maintainandpurchase telecommunications systems, including mobile, cellular and wiredor
wireless telecommunications systems, fiber optics, satellite transmit andreceive systems, and
other telecommunications systems andtheir value-addedservices such as, but not limited to,
transmissionof voice, data, facsimile, control signals, audio and video, informationservice bureau,
and allother telecommunications systems technologies as are at present available or be made
available throughtechnical advances or innovations inthe future, or construct, acquire, lease and
operate or manage transmittingandreceivingstations and switchingstations, bothfor local and
international services, lines, cables or systems, as is, or are convenient or essentialto efficiently
carryout the purposes ofthis franchise.”[5]
On July 12, 1994, private respondent BellTel filed with the NTC a second
Application[6] prayingfor the issuance ofa Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity for the
installation, operationandmaintenance of a combined nationwide local toll (domestic and
international) andtandem telephone exchanges andfacilities using wire, wireless, microwave
radio, satellitesand fiber optic cable withPublic Calling Offices (PCOs) and very small aperture
antennas (VSATs) under an integratedsystem. Thissecond application wasdocketed as NTCCase
No. 94-229. In this second application, BellTel proposedto install 2,600,000 telephone lines in ten](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/241941333-case-digest-statcon-150913073807-lva1-app6892/85/241941333-case-digest-statcon-47-320.jpg)
![48
(10) years using the most modernandlatest state-of-the-art facilities and equipment and to
provide a 100% digital local exchange tel ephone network.
Private respondent BellTel movedto withdrawits earlier application docketed as NTC Case
No. 93-481. In an Order datedJuly11, 1994, this earlier application was ordered withdrawn,
without prejudice.
The second applicationof private respondent BellTel whichwas docketed as NTC Case No.
94-229 was assigned to a Hearing Officer for reception of private respondent BellTel’s
evidence. Writtenoppositionandother pertinent pleadings were filedbypetitioners GMCR, Inc.,
Smart Communications, Inc., Isla Communications Co., Inc. and International Communications
Corporationas oppositors. Other oppositors to private respondent BellTel’s application were
Capitol Wireless, Inc., EasternMisamis Oriental Telephone Cooperative, Liberty Broadcastin g
Network, Inc., MidsayapCommunication, Northern Telephone, PAPTELCO, Pilipino Telephone
Corporation, Philippine Global Communications, Inc., Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company, Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Corporation, Radio Communications of the
Philippines, Inc. and Extelcom and Telecommunications Office.
On December 20, 1994, private respondent BellTel completed the presentation of its
evidence-in-chief. In the course of the proceedings, the witnesses ofBellTel were cross-examined
bythe aforementioned oppositors. On December 21, 1994, BellTel filed its Formal Offer of
Evidence together with all the technical, financial and legal documents in support of its
application. Pursuant to its rules, the application was referred to the Common Carriers
Authorization Department (CCAD) for study and recommendation.
On February 6, 1995, the CCAD, through Engr. Marle Rabena, submitted to Deputy
Commissioner Fidelo Q. Dumlao, a Memorandum dated February 6, 1995[7] manifesting his
findings and recommendingthat “basedontechnical documents submitted, BellTel’s proposal is
technically feasible.”[8]
Subsequently, Mr. RaulitoSuarez, the chief of the Ratesand Regulatory Division of CCAD,
conducted a financial evaluationof the project proposal ofprivate respondent BellTel. On March
29, 1995, Mr. Suarez made the findingthat BellTel has the financial capability to support its
proposed project at least for the initial two (2) years.
Agreeingwith the findings andrecommendations of the CCAD, NTCDeputyCommissioners
Fidelo Dumlaoand ConsueloPerez adopted the same and expressly signified their approval
thereto bymakingthe followingnotationonthe aforestated Memorandum of the CCAD dated
February 6, 1995:
“With the finding of financial capability and technical feasibility, the application merits
due/favorable consideration.”[9]
Belowthis notation, DeputyCommissioners Fidelo Dumlao and Consuelo Perez affixed their
signatures and the date, “4/6/95.”
In view ofthese favorable recommendations bythe CCAD andtwo members of the NTC, the
Legal Department thereof prepareda working draft[10] of the order grantingprovisional authority
to private respondent BellTel. The said working draft was initialed by Deputy Commissioners
Fidelo Q. DumlaoandConsueloPerez but was not signed by Commissioner Simeon Kintanar.
While ordinarily, a decisionthat is concurred in bytwo ofthe three members composing a
quasi-judicial bodyis entitledto promulgation, petitioners claim that pursuant to the prevailing
policyand the corresponding procedure andpractice inthe NTC, the exclusive authority to sign,
validate andpromulgate anyand all orders, resolutions anddecisions of the NTCis lodged in the
Chairman, inthiscase, Commissioner Simeon Kintanar, and, thus, since only Commissioner
SimeonKintanar is recognized bythe NTCSecretariat as the sole authority to sign any and all
orders, resolutions anddecisions of the NTC, onlyhis vote counts;DeputyCommissioners Dumlao
and Perez have allegedlyno voting power andboth their concurrence whichactually constitutes
the majority is inutile without the assent of Commissioner Kintanar.
Anxious over the inactionof the NTCinthe matter ofits petition praying for the issuance of
a provisional authority, private respondent BellTelfiled onMay5, 1995 an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion
to Resolve Application andfor the Issuance of a Provisional Authority[11]. Reference was explicitly
made to the findings of the CCAD and recommendations of DeputyCommissioners Dumlao and
Perez that were allfavorable to private respondent BellTel. Mention was also made of the
aforementionedworkingdraft of the order granting a provisional authorityto BellTel, which draft
was made bythe Legal Department of the NTCandinitialed bythe said deputy commissioners.
No actionwas takenby the NTCon the aforecitedmotion. Thus, on May 12, 1995, private
respondent BellTel filed a Second Urgent Ex-Parte Motion[12] reiterating its earlier prayer.
Petitioners-oppositors filedan Opposition[13] to the aforestated two motions of private
respondent BellTel.
In an Order datedMay16, 1995, signedsolelybyCommissioner Simeon Kintanar, the NTC,
insteadof resolvingthe two pendingmotions of private respondent BellTel, set the said motions
for a hearingon May 29, 1995. On May 29, 1995, however, no hearing was conducted as the
same was reset on June 13, 1995.
On June 13, 1995, the dayof the hearing, private respondent BellTel filed a Motion to
Promulgate (Amending the Motion to Resolve)[14] In saidmotion, private respondent prayed for
the promulgationof the working draft ofthe order granting a provisional authority to private
respondent BellTel, onthe groundthat the saidworking draft had alreadybeensignedor initialed
byDeputyCommissioners Dumlao andPerez who, together, constitute a majorityout of the three
commissioners composing the NTC. To support its prayer, private respondent BellTel asserted
that the NTCwas a collegial bodyand that as such, twofavorable votes out of a maximum three
votes bythe members of the commission, are enough to validly promulgate an NTC decision.
On June 23, 1995, petitioners-oppositors filedtheir Joint Opposition[15] to the aforecited
motion.
On July4, 1995, the NTCdeniedthe saidmotion inanOrder solelysignedbyCommissioner
Simeon Kintanar.
On July17, 1995, private respondent BellTel filedwith this court a Petition for Certiorari,
Mandamus andProhibitionseeking the nullificationof the aforestated Order dated July 4, 1995
denying the Motion to Promulgate.
On July26, 1995, we issueda Resolutionreferring saidpetitionto the respondent Court of
Appeals for proper determination and resolution pursuant to Section 9, par. 1 of B.P. Blg. 129.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/241941333-case-digest-statcon-150913073807-lva1-app6892/85/241941333-case-digest-statcon-48-320.jpg)
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In the interim, the Solicitor General filed with the respondent appellate court a
Manifestation In Lieuof Comment[16] in which the Solicitor General took a legal position adverse
to that of the NTC. The Solicitor General, after a close examination ofthe laws creating the NTC
and its predecessors and a studious analysis of certain Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC) orders, NTCcirculars, andDepartment of Justice (DOJ) legal opinions
pertinent to the issue of collegiality of the NTC, made the following recommendations:
“WHEREFORE, the Solicitor General respectfullyprays that thisHonorable Court:
(a) declare respondent National Telecommunications Commissionas a collegialbody;
(b) restrainrespondent Commissioner Simeon Kintanar fromarrogating untohimself alone the
powers of the saidagency;
(c) order NTC, acting as a collegial body, to resolve petitioner BellTelecom’s applicationunder
NTC-94-229;
(d) declare NTCMemorandumCirculars 1-1-93 and 3-1-93 as void; [and]
(e) upholdthe legalityof DOTCDepartment Order 92-614.”[17]
On September 23, 1996, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated the herein assailed
decision the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is herebyrenderedas follows:
1. Petitioner’s petition for a writ of Certiorari and Prohibition is hereby
granted. Accordingly, NTCMemorandum Circular No. 1-1-93, Annex ‘J’ of the Petition,
Memorandum Circular No. 3-1-93, Annex ‘K’ of the Petition and the Order of
Kintanar, Annex ‘L’ of the Petition, are herebySET ASIDE for being contrary to law. The
Respondents and all those acting for and in their behalf are hereby enjoined and
prohibited from implementing or enforcing the same; [and]
2. Petitioner’s petitionfor mandamus is hereby GRANTED in that the Respondent NTC,
composed of Kintanar and deputy commissioners Perez and Dumlao, are hereby
directed to meet enbanc andto consider and act on the draft Order, Annex ‘B’ of the
Petition, within fifteen (15) days from the finality of this Decision. Without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.”[18]
The hereinassailed decision being unacceptable to petitioner Simeon Kintanar and
petitioners GMCR, Inc., Smart Communications, Inc., Isla Communications Co., Inc. and
InternationalCommunications Corporationas oppositors in the application ofprivate respondent
BellTel for a provisional authority, they filed with this court separate petitions for review.
Commissioner Kintanar’s petition, docketed as G.R. No. 126526, ascribes to the respondent
appellate court the following assignment of errors:
“1. The Court of Appeals, insetting aside NTCMC1-1-93 and MC3-1-93 and the Order of the
Commissiondated July4, 1995, made a collateralattackona law whichwas nowhere calledfor in
the pleadings ofthe parties nor is authorized bythe Rules of Court.
2. The Court of Appeals erredinassumingandimposing that the Commission is a collegial body
simplybyreasonof the fact that other bodieswhichwere a spin off from the defunct Public
Service Commissionwere created as a collegial body. The lawthat createdEO 546 erasedthe
collegial character of the proceedings before the NTC.
3. The Court of Appeals’ decision contains serious contradiction;worse, it consideredevidence
not formallyoffered or incorporatedintothe records ofthe case; yet failedto consider evidence
submittedbypetitioner-appellant nor onthe prejudicial issue on non-joinder of indispensable
parties-
3.1 CA erred in assumingthat the NTCis collegial bythe fact that Charters of other regulatory
agencies expresslymade them collegial while this express provision wasabsent inNTC’s charter.
3.2 CA contradicts itself byholding that DOTCMC92-614 prevails and[requires] collegiality.
3.3 The decisions byUndersecretaryLichaucosigned byher and her 2 deputies are innoway
indicative of collegialityand shouldnot be consideredas having anypersuasive effect xxx.
3.4 The Court of Appeals erredin applying the Board ofCommunications Rules of Practice
and Procedures.
4. The Court of Appeals erredwhenit grantedmandamus, directingandineffect controlling
Commissioner Kintanar and deputyCommissioners Dumlao and Perez, to meet enbanc to
consider and act on a ‘draft Order’ onlywhichthe Court itself recognizednolonger hadthe
approval of two(2) Commissioners while inthe same token the Court of Appeals hadset aside a
dulypromulgated Order of July4, 1995 allegedlybecauseit didnot carrythe approval of 2
commissioners.”[19]
On the other hand, petitioners-oppositors, in their petition docketed as G.R. No. 126496,
assail the decision of respondent appellate court on the following grounds:
1. The Court of Appeals erredinnot dismissingthe instant Petitionoutright for its failure to
impleadindispensable parties, inviolationof Section 5, Rule 65 and Sec. 3, Rule 7 of the
Revised Rules of Court;
2. The Court of Appeals seriouslyerredin takingcognizance of andpassing upon BellTel’s
Petition, whichonits face is premature since the Order of July4, 1996 assailedwas not a
final decision of the Commission;](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/241941333-case-digest-statcon-150913073807-lva1-app6892/85/241941333-case-digest-statcon-49-320.jpg)
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3. Even assuming arguendothat the Court of Appeals cantake cognizance of the Petition,
the dispositioninDecisionthereinwhichnullifies NTC Memorandum Circulars 1-1-93
and 3-1-93 itselfconstitutesa collateral attack onthe said laws, the validity of which
were never put inissue byanyof the parties, contrary to the clear legal requirement
that the validityof laws canbe attackedonlyindirect proceedings instituted for that
purpose;
4. It was infact improper for the Court of Appeals to pass onthe validityof NTCCircular No.
1-1-93 and Memorandum Circular No. 3-1-93 since the same was absolutely
unnecessary for the resolution of the Petition;
5. Even assuming that the Court of Appeals correctlydefinedthe prime issues as being that
of collegiality, nonetheless the Court ofAppeals committed a serious error of law in
declaring the NTCas a collegial bodydespite the clear intent of E.O. No. 546 and the
provisions ofDOTCMC95-640, and the obvious implications ofpending bills in Congress
on the reorganization of the NTC;
6. The Decision, inmandating that the NTCCommissioner and DeputyCommissioners sit to
consider the draft-andonlythe draft-inrendering its Decisionin BellTel’s application
constitutesanunwarranted, unauthorizedandunlawful interference in and canalization
of the discretionary functions of the Commission as a quasi -judicial entity; and
7. The Decision condones the illegal andunethical act of BellTelof surreptitiouslysecuringa
draft decision, andencourages andplacespremium onfuture similar illegal acts-all in
violationof the ruling andthe mandate of the Supreme Court in In Re Jurado: Adm.
Matter No. 90-5-383 (July 12, 1990).[20]
On December 16, 1996, private respondent BellTel filedanOmnibus Motion[21] praying for,
among others, the consolidation of G.R. Nos. 126496 and 126526.
On December 18, 1996, respondent BellTel filedits Comment.[22] On the same day, the NTC
and Commissioner Kintanar filed a Manifestation/Motion[23] echoing the prayer for the
consolidation of the G.R. Nos. 126496 and 126526.
On December 19, 1996, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a
Manifestation/Motion[24] reiterating that its legal stance inthis case is adverse to that of the NTC
and praying that it be excluded from filing any comment in behalf of the NTC.
In a Resolution dated February5, 1997, we resolved, among others, to excuse the Solicitor
General from filing anycomment inbehalf ofthe NTC, require the NTCto file its owncomment in
G.R. No. 126496 and to consolidate G.R. Nos. 126496 and 126526.
On March 6, 1997, the NTC and Commissioner Kintanar filed a
Manifestation/Motion[25] prayingthat the latter’s petition inG.R. No. 126526 be adoptedas their
comment in the consolidated cases .
Upon the joinder of issues inthese consolidatedcases, we perceive the fundamental issue
to be that of the collegiality of the NTC as a quasi -judicial agency.
We find the consolidated petitions wanting of merit.
First. We herebydeclare that the NTCis a collegial bodyrequiring a majorityvote out of the
three members of the commission in order to validly decide a case or any incident
therein. Corollarily, the vote alone of the chairmanof the commission, as in this case, the vote of
Commissioner Kintanar, absent the required concurring vote coming from the rest of the
membership ofthe commissionto at least arrive at a majoritydecision, is not sufficient to legally
render an NTC order, resolution or decision.
Simplyput, Commissioner Kintanar is not the National Telecommunications Commission. He
alone does not speakfor andinbehalf ofthe NTC. The NTCacts througha three-man body, and
the three members ofthe commissioneachhasone vote to cast ineverydeliberationconcerning
a case or anyincident thereinthat is subject to the jurisdictionof the NTC. Whenwe consider the
historical milieuinwhichthe NTCevolved into the quasi-judicial agencyit is now under Executive
Order No. 146 which organizedthe NTCas a three-man commission and expose the illegalityof all
memorandum circulars negating the collegial nature of the NTC under Executive Order No. 146,
we are left with onlyone logicalconclusion: the NTCis a collegial bodyandwas a collegial body
even during the time when it was acting as a one-man regime.
We thus quote with approval the encompassinglegal ruminations ofthe respondent Court
of Appeals in disposing of the issue of the collegiality of the NTC:
“In resolving the issue, We recall that, onNovember 17, 1936, the NationalAssemblypassed
CommonwealthAct No. 146 whichcreatedthe Public Service Commission(PSC). While providing
that the PSCshall consist ofa Public Service Commissioner anda DeputyCommissioner, the law
made it clear that the PSCwas not a collegialbodybystating that the DeputyCommissioner could
act onlyon matters delegatedto him bythe Public Service Commissioner. As amendedbyRA
2677, the Public Service Commissionwas transformed intoandemergedas a collegialbody,
composed ofone Public Service Commissioner and five (5) Associate Commissioners. The
amendment providedthat contestedcasesandallcasesinvolving the fixing ofrates shall be
decided bythe Commissionenbanc.
On September 24, 1972, then President FerdinandE. Marcos signed, into law, Presidential Decree
No. 1 adopting andapproving the IntegratedReorganizationPlan which, inturn, created the
Board of Communications (BOC) inplace of the PSC. This time, the newregulatoryboardwas
composed ofthree (3) officers exercising quasi-judicial functions:
‘x x x The Boardof Communications shall be composedof a full time Chairman whoshallbe of
unquestioned integrityandrecognized prominence inprevious public and/or private employment;
two full-time members whoshall be competent on all aspects of communications, preferablyone
of whom shall be a lawyer andthe other an economist x x x’
On January25, 1978, the BOCpromulgatedits ‘Rules of Procedure andPractice’ in connection
with applications andproceedings before it.
On July23, 1979, President Marcos issuedExecutive Order No. 546, creating the Ministries of
Public Works, and ofTransportation andCommunications, mergedthe defunct Boardof
Communications andthe Telecommunications Control Bureauintoa single entity, the National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC). The saidlawwas issuedbythenPresident Marcos inthe
exercise of his legislative powers. Sec. 16 of E.O. 546 provides that --](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/241941333-case-digest-statcon-150913073807-lva1-app6892/85/241941333-case-digest-statcon-50-320.jpg)
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‘x x x The Commissionshall be composedof a Commissioner andtwo DeputyCommissioners,
preferablyone of whomshall be a lawyer andanother aneconomist. x x x’
The aforementionedExecutive Order took effect onSeptember 24, 1979 x x x. However, the NTC
did not promulgate anyRules ofProcedure and Practice. Consequently, the thenexistingRulesof
Procedure and Practice promulgatedbythe BOCwas appliedto proceedings inthe NTC. In the
meantime, the Decisions ofthe NTCwere signedbythe Chairmanalone of the NTCwhich
renderedthe two (2) deputyCommissioners ‘non-participative’ inthe task of decision-
making. This prompted the thenMinister of TransportationandCommunicationJose P. Dans, Jr.
to seekthe legal opinion ofthe then Minister of Justice RicardoC. Puno, as to whether the NTC
was a collegial bodyor not. On January11, 1984, Minister Punosent a letter-opinion x x x to the
effect that the NTCwas not a collegial bodybut a single entityandthus the thenpractice of only
the Chairmanof the NTCsigningthe Decisions of the NTCwas authorized bylaw. x x x
Admittedly, the opinionof the Secretaryof Justice is entitled to great weight x x x. However, the
same is not controlling or conclusive on the courts x x x. We find and declare, inthe present
recourse, that the PunoOpinionis not correct. Admittedly, EO 546 does not specificallystate that
the NTCwas a collegial body. Neither doesit provide that the NTCshould meet En Banc in
deciding a case or inexercising its adjudicatoryor quasi-judicial functions. But the absence of such
provisions does not militate against the collegial nature of the NTCunder the context of Section16
of EO 546 and under the Rulesof Procedure andPractice appliedbythe NTCinits
proceedings. Under [Rule 15] of saidRules, the BOC(nowthe NTC) sits En Banc:
‘x x x In everycase heardbythe Board en banc, the orders, rulings, decisions andresolutions
disposing of the merits of the matter withinits jurisdictionshall be reachedwith the concurrence
of at least two regular members after deliberationandconsultation and thereafter assignedto a
member for the writing ofthe opinion. Anymember dissenting fromthe order, ruling, decision or
resolution shall state in writing the reason for his dissent.
In all other cases, a dulyassigned Member shall issue all orders, rulings, decisions andresolutions
pertinent to the case assignedto him. Copyof the decisiononthe merit ofthe case soassigned
shallbe furnishedthe Chairmanof the Board.
x x x’
Inscrutably, a case before the BOCmaybe assigned to and heardbyonlya member thereof whois
taskedto prepare and promulgate his Decisionthereon, or heard, En Banc, bythe full membership
of the BOCin whichcase the concurrence of at least two (2) ofthe membershipof the BOCis
necessaryfor a validDecisionx x x. While it maybe true that the aforesaidRules of Procedure
was promulgatedbefore the effectivityof Executive Order No. 546, however, the Rules of
Procedure ofBOCgoverned the rulesof practice andprocedure before the NTCwhenit was
established under Executive Order No. 546. This wasenunciated bythe Supreme Court in the
case of ‘Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. versus NationalTelecommunications Commission,
131 SCRA 200’ when it declared that:
‘The Rules of Practice and Procedure promulgated onJanuary25, 1978 by the Board of
Communications, the immediate predecessor of respondent NTCx x x govern the rules ofpractice
and procedure before the BOCthen, now respondent NTC.’ x x x
In the case of‘Philippine LongDistance Telephone Companyversus National Telecommunications,
et al., 190 SCRA 717’, the Supreme Court applied and cited Rule 15 of the Rules of Procedure and
Practice of BOCx x x.
Hence, under its Rules ofProcedure and Practice, the Respondent NTC, as its predecessor, the
BOC, had consistentlybeen andremains a collegialbody.
Respondents Kintanar’s andNTC’s pose that Respondent Kintanar, alone, is vestedwithauthority
to signand promulgate a Decision ofthe NTCis antitheticalto the nature ofa commission as
envisagedin Executive Order No. 546. It must be borne inmindthat a Commission is defined as:
‘[a] bodycomposed ofseveral persons actingunder lawful authorityto performsome public
service.’ (Cityof Louisville Municipal HousingCommissionversus Public Housing Administration,
261 SouthwesternReporter, 2nd, page 286).
A Commissionis also defined as a board or committee of officials appointed and empowered to
perform certainacts or exercise certainjurisdictionof a public nature or service x x x (Black, Law
Dictionary, page 246). There is persuasive authoritythat a ‘commission’ is synonymous with
‘board’ (State Ex. Rel. Johnsonversus Independent School District No. 810, WabashCounty, 109
NorthwesternReporter 2nd, page 596). Indeed, as canbe easilydiscernedfrom the context of
Section16 of Executive Order No. 546, the Commissionis composed ofa Commissioner andtwo
(2) deputycommissioners x x x not the commissioner, alone, as pontificatedbyKintanar. The
conjunctive word ‘and’ is not without anylegal significance. It is not, byanychance, a surplusage
in the law. It means ‘inadditionto’ (McCaull Webster Elevator Companyversus Adams, 167
NorthwesternReporter, 330, page 332). The word‘and’, whether it is usedto connect words,
phrases or fullsentence[s], must be acceptedas bindingtogether andas relating to one another x
x x.
In interpretinga statute, everypart thereofshould be given effect onthe theorythat it was
enactedas anintegratedlaw andnot as a combinationof dissonant provisions. As the aphorism
goes, ‘that the thingmayrather have effect thanbe destroyed’ x x x. If it was the intention of
President Marcos to constitute merelya single entity, a ‘one-man’ governmental body, instead of
a commission or a three-man collegialbody, he wouldnot have constituteda commission and
wouldnot have specificallydecreedthat the Commissionis composed of, not the commissioner
alone, but of the commissioner andthe two (2) deputycommissioners. Irrefragably, then, the NTC
is a commission composednot onlyof Kintanar, but Perez andDumlao as well, acting together in
the performance of their adjudicatoryor quasi-judicial functions, conformablywiththe Rules of
Procedure and Practice promulgatedbythe BOCandapplicable to the NTC.
The barefacedfact that x x x of Executive Order 546 usedthe word‘deputy’ to designate the two
(2) other members of the Commissiondoes not militate against the collegialityof the NTC. x x
x The collegialityof the NTCcannot be disparagedbythe mere nominaldesignationof the
membership thereof. Indeed, We are convincedthat suchnominal designations are without](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/241941333-case-digest-statcon-150913073807-lva1-app6892/85/241941333-case-digest-statcon-51-320.jpg)
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functionalimplications andare designedmerelyfor the purpose of administrative structure or
hierarchyof the personnelof the NTC. x x x
In hindsight, even SecretaryGarcia was in accordwith the collegialityof the NTCwhen he
promulgatedandissued Department Order No. 92-614 x x x. Even then Commissioner Mariano
Benedictoopenlyexpressedhis vehement opposition to the Department Order of Secretary
Garcia andoptedto seek refuge inthe opinion ofthe thenMinister of Justice Punox x x. It was
onlywhen Commissioner Benedictoresigned and Respondent Kintanar was designatedto replace
Commissioner Benedicto that SecretaryGarcia flip-flapped[sic], and suddenlyfoundit expedient
to recall his Department Order No. 92-614 andauthorize Kintanar to decide, all byhimself, all
cases pending withthe NTCinfrontal violationof the Rules of Procedure andPractice before the
NTC, more specificallyRule 15 thereof x x x.
x x x
The Respondents cannot find solace in House Bill No. 10558 to buttress their argument x x x
because under the House Bill, the NTCis transformed into a collegial body. Indeed, We find
Respondents’ pose tenuous. For, it canlikewise be argued, withjustification, that House Bill No.
10558 indeed confirms the existingcollegial nature of the NTCbyso expresslyreaffirming the
same.
x x x
In sum, then, We findandsodeclare that NTCCircular No. 1-1-93 x x x Memorandum Circular No.
3-1-93 x x x and the Order of Kintanar x x x declaring the NTCas a single entityor non-collegial
entity, are contraryto law andthus null andvoid and shouldbe, as theyare hereby, set aside.”[26]
Second. Petitioners take us to task withtheir vigorous contentionthat respondent appellate
court’s act of nullifyingNTCMemorandum Circular No. 1-1-93 issued by then Commissioner
Mariano Benedicto, Jr. and NTC Memorandum Circular No. 3-1-93 issued also by then
Commissioner Benedicto on January 6, 1993, was a collateral attack against the aforecited
circulars andan unnecessaryandabusive exercise ofthe court’s power to nullify administrative
regulations.
It must be rememberedby petitioners, however, that administrative regulations derive
their validity from the statute that they were, in the first place, intended to
implement. MemorandumCirculars 1-1-93 and 3-1-93 are ontheir face null andvoid ab initio for
being unabashedlycontraryto law. Theywere nullifiedbyrespondent Court ofAppeals because
they are absolutely illegal and, as such, are without any force and effect. The fact that
implementationof these illegal regulations has resulted in the institutionalization ofthe one-man
rule inthe NTC, is not andcannever be a ratificationof suchanillegal practice. At the least, these
illegalregulations are anerroneous interpretationof E.O. No. 546 and in the context of and its
predecessor laws. At the most, these illegal regulations are attempts to validate the one-man
rule inthe NTCas executedbypersons withthe selfishinterest ofmaintaining their illusoryholdof
power.
Since the questionedmemorandum circulars are inherentlyandpatently null and void for
being totallyviolative ofthe spirit andletter of E.O. No. 546 that constitutesthe NTCas a collegial
body, no court may shirk from its duty of striking down such illegal regulations.
Third. Inits certiorari actionbefore the respondent Court of Appeals, private respondent
BellTel wasproceeding against the NTCandCommissioner Kintanar for the former’s adherence
and defense of its one-man rule as enforcedbythe latter. Thus, onlythe NTCandCommissioner
Kintanar maybe consideredas indispensable parties. After all, it is theywhomprivate respondent
BellTel seekto be chastised andcorrected bythe court for having acted in grave abuse of their
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The oppositors in NTC Case No. 94-229 are not absolutely necessary for the final
determination of the issue of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NTC and of
Commissioner Kintanar inhis capacityas chairmanof NTC because the task of defending them
primarilylies inthe Office of the Solicitor General. Furthermore, were the court to find that
certiorari lies against the NTCand Commissioner Kintanar, the oppositors’ cause could not be
significantlyaffectedbysuch rulingbecause the issue of grave abuse of discretion goes not into
the merits of the case inwhich the oppositors are interestedbut intothe issue ofcollegiality that
requires, regardlessof the merits of a case, that the same be decidedonthe basis of a majority
vote of at least two members of the commission.
The issue inthis case is, it bears repeating, not the merits of the application of private
respondent BellTel for a provisional authority to operate what promises to be the most
technologicallyadvancedtelephone service inthe country. This court is not in anywayconcerned
with whether or not private respondent BellTel’s project proposal is technically feasible or
financiallyviable, andthis court should not, in fact, delve intothese matters which are patently
outside of its review jurisdiction. All that respondent Court of Appeals passed upon was the
question ofwhether or not the NTC and Commissioner Kintanar committed grave abuse of
discretion, andsowe must reviewand ascertain the correctness of the findings of the respondent
appellate court on this score, and this score alone.
Thus, the claim of petitioners that there is here a case of non-joinder of indispensable
parties in the persons of all of the oppositors in NTC Case No. 94-229, is untenable.
Fourth. Petitioners, inapparent paranoia, argue that what the respondent appellate court
has actually ordered, was that the NTC sit and meet en banc and forthwith grant private
respondent BellTel’s applicationfor a provisional authority. Petitioners, however, have obviously
over-read the secondpart of the dispositive portion ofthe herein assailed decision rendered by
respondent Court of Appeals.
There is no dispute that jurisprudence is settledas to the proprietyof mandamus in causing
a quasi-judicial agencyto exercise its discretionina case alreadyripe for adjudication and long-
awaiting the proper disposition. As to how this discretionis to be exercised, however, is a realm
outside the office ofthe specialcivil action ofmandamus. It is elementarylegalknowledge, after
all, that mandamus does not lie to control discretion.
When the respondent Court of Appeals directedCommissioners Kintanar, Dumlao andPerez
to meet en banc and to consider andact onthe working draft of the order granting provisional
authorityto BellTel, said court was simplyordering the NTCto sit andmeet en banc as a collegial
body, andthe subject of the deliberationof the three-man commissionwouldbe the said working
draft which embodiesone course of action that maybe taken on private respondent BellTel’s](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/241941333-case-digest-statcon-150913073807-lva1-app6892/85/241941333-case-digest-statcon-52-320.jpg)
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applicationfor a provisional authority. The respondent Court of Appeals, however, did not order
the NTCto forthwithgrant saidapplication. This is understandable since every commissioner of
the three-man NTChas a vote each to cast indisposingof private respondent BellTel’s application
and the respondent appellate court would not pre-empt the exercise by the members of the
commission of their individual discretion in private respondent BellTel’s case.
Respondent appellate court intends, however, for the NTC to promptly proceed with the
consideration of private respondent BellTel’s application for provisional authority, for the same
has beenripe for decision since December, 1994. With the markedpropensityof Commissioner
Kintanar to delayactionon the saidapplication and his insistent arrogation of sole power to
promulgate anyandall NTCdecisions, respondent Court of Appeals’ order for the NTC to sit and
meet en banc to consider private respondent BellTel’s application for a provisional authority,
attains deep significance.
Fifth. The accusation ofpetitioners that the workingdraft of the order granting provisional
authorityto private respondent BellTel, wasobtainedbythe latter through illegal means, is a
serious charge. However, not a single piece of evidence has been proffered by petitioners to
prove this charge.
Private respondent BellTel makes no secret of the source of the said working draft. In
private respondent BellTel’s Urgent Ex-Parte Motionto Resolve Application and For Issuance of
ProvisionalAuthority, it is allegedthat saidworking draft waspreparedbyAtty. BasilioBolante of
the Legal Department of the NTC.[27] Saidworking draft was initialed by the CCAD Head, Engr.
EdgardoCabarios and by Deputy Commissioners Dumlao and Perez.[28] The working draft is
attachedto the records ofNTCCase No. 94-229 whichmay be borrowed by any person for any
stated purpose.[29]
Significantly, no one among the aforementionedpersons has renounced the working draft
or declared it to be spurious. More importantly, petitioners have utterly failed to offer proof of
any illegality in the preparation or procurement of said working draft.
The more critical point that matters most, however, is that we cannot be diverted from the
principal issue inthis case concerning the collegialityof the NTC. Inthe ultimate, the issue of the
procurement of the working draft is more apropos for a criminal or administrative investigation
than inthe instant proceedings largelyaddressedto the resolution of a purely legal question.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant consolidated petitions are herebyDISMISSED
for lack of merit.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI) v.Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC), et al., G.R.No.
171101, November 22, 2011
VELASCO, JR., J.:
I. THE FACTS
On July5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously(11-0) to DISMISS/DENY
the petitionfiled byHLI andAFFIRMwithMODIFICATIONS the resolutions of the PARC revoking
HLI’s StockDistributionPlan (SDP) and placing the subject lands in Hacienda Luisita under
compulsorycoverage of the Comprehensive AgrarianReform Program (CARP) ofthe government.
The Court however did not order outright landdistribution. Voting 6-5, the Court noted
that there are operative facts that occurredin the interim and which the Court cannot validly
ignore. Thus, the Court declared that the revocation of the SDP must, by application of the
operative fact principle, give way to the right of the original 6,296 qualified farmworkers -
beneficiaries (FWBs) to choose whether theywant to remainas HLI stockholders or [choose actual
landdistribution]. It thus ordered the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to “immediately
schedule meetings with the said 6,296 FWBs and explain to them the effects, consequences and
legal or practical implications of their choice, after which the FWBs will be asked to manifest, in
secret voting, their choices in the ballot, signing their signatures or placing their thumbmarks, as
the case may be, over their printed names.”
The parties thereafter filedtheir respective motions for reconsiderationof the Court decision.
II. THE ISSUES
(1) Is the operative fact doctrine availa ble in this case?
(2) Is Sec. 31 of RA 6657 unconstitutional?
(3) Can’t the Court order that DAR’s compulsoryacquisition of Hacienda Lusita cover the full 6,443
hectares allegedlycoveredbyRA 6657 and previouslyheld byTarlac Development Corporation
(Tadeco), and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by HLI’s SDP?
(4) Is the date of the “taking” (for purposes ofdetermining the just compensation payable to HLI)
November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLI’s SDP?
(5) Has the 10-year periodprohibition on the transfer of awardedlands under RA 6657 lapsed on May
10, 1999 (since Hacienda Luisita were placedunder CARPcoverage throughthe SDOA scheme on
May11, 1989), and thus the qualifiedFWBs shouldnow be allowedto sell their land interests in
Hacienda Luisita to third parties, whether they have fully paid for the lands or not?
(6) THE CRUCIAL ISSUE: Shouldthe ruling in the July5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be given
an option to remain as stockholders of HLI be reconsidered?
III. THE RULING
[The Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the motions for reconsideration of respondents PARC, et
al. with respect to the option granted to the original farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs)of Hacienda
Luisita to remain with petitioner HLI, which option the Court thereby RECALLED and SET ASIDE.
It reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given an option to remain as
stockholders of HLI, and UNANIMOUSLY directed immediate land distribution to the qualified
FWBs.]](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/241941333-case-digest-statcon-150913073807-lva1-app6892/85/241941333-case-digest-statcon-53-320.jpg)
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1. YES, the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case.
[The Court maintained its stance that the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case
since, contrary to the suggestion of the minority, the doctrine is not limited only to invalid or
unconstitutional laws but also applies to decisions made by the President or the administrative
agencies that have the force and effect of laws. Prior to the nullification or recall of said decisions,
they may have produced acts and consequences that must be respected. It is on this score that the
operative fact doctrine should be applied to acts and consequences that resulted from the
implementation of the PARC Resolution approving the SDP of HLI. The majority stressed that the
application of the operative fact doctrine by the Court in its July 5, 2011 decision was in fact
favorable to the FWBs because not only were they allowed to retain the benefits and homelots
they received under the stock distribution scheme, they were also given the option to choose for
themselves whether they want to remain as stockholders of HLI or not.]
2. NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 NOT unconstitutional.
[The Court maintained that the Court is NOT compelled to rule on the constitutionality of
Sec. 31 of RA 6657, reiterating that it was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the
resolution thereof is not the lis mota of the case. Moreover, the issue has been rendered moot and
academic since SDO is no longer one of the modes of acquisition under RA 9700. The majority
clarified that in its July 5, 2011 decision, it made no ruling in favor of the constitutionality of Sec. 31
of RA 6657, but found nonetheless that there was no apparent grave violation of the Constitution
that may justify the resolution of the issue of constitutionality.]
3. NO, the Court CANNOT order that DAR’s compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita cover the
full 6,443 hectares and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by HLI’s SDP.
[Since what is put in issue before the Court is the propriety of the revocation of the SDP,
which only involves 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land and not 6,443 has., then the Court is
constrained to rule only as regards the 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land.Nonetheless, this should
not prevent the DAR, under its mandate under the agrarian reform law, from subsequently
subjecting to agrarian reform other agricultural lands originallyheld by Tadeco that were allegedly
not transferred to HLI but were supposedly covered by RA 6657.
However since the area to be awarded to each FWB in the July 5, 2011 Decision appears
too restrictive – considering that there are roads, irrigation canals, and other portions of the land
that are considered commonly-owned by farmworkers, and these may necessarily result in the
decrease of the area size that may be awarded per FWB – the Court reconsiders its Decision and
resolves to give the DAR leeway in adjusting the area that may be awarded per FWB in case the
number of actual qualified FWBs decreases. In order to ensure the proper distribution of the
agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita per qualified FWB, and considering that matters involving
strictlythe administrative implementation and enforcement of agrarian reform laws are within the
jurisdiction of the DAR, it is the latter which shall determine the area with which each qualified
FWB will be awarded.
On the other hand, the majority likewise reiterated its holding that the 500-hectare
portion of Hacienda Luisita that have been validly converted to industrial use and have been
acquired by intervenors Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) and Luisita Industrial Park
Corporation (LIPCO), as well as the separate 80.51-hectare SCTEX lot acquired by the government,
should be excluded from the coverage of the assailed PARC resolution. The Court however ordered
that the unused balance of the proceeds of the sale of the 500-hectare converted land and of the
80.51-hectare land used for the SCTEX be distributed to the FWBs.]
4. YES, the date of “taking” is November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLI’s SDP.
[For the purpose of determining just compensation, the date of “taking” is November 21,
1989 (the date when PARC approved HLI’s SDP) since this is the time that the FWBs were
considered to own and possess the agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita. To be precise, these lands
became subject of the agrarian reform coverage through the stock distribution scheme only upon
the approval of the SDP, that is, on November 21, 1989. Such approval is akin to a notice of
coverage ordinarily issued under compulsory acquisition. On the contention of the minority (Justice
Sereno) that the date of the notice of coverage [after PARC’s revocation of the SDP], that is,
January 2, 2006, is determinative of the just compensation that HLI is entitled to receive, the Court
majority noted that none of the cases cited to justify this position involved the stock distribution
scheme. Thus, said cases do not squarely apply to the instant case. The foregoing
notwithstanding, it bears stressing that the DAR's land valuation is only preliminary and is not, by
any means, final and conclusive upon the landowner. The landowner can file an original action
with the RTC acting as a special agrarian court to determine just compensation. The court has the
right to review with finality the determination in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial
function.]
5. NO, the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657 has NOT
lapsed on May 10, 1999; thus, the qualified FWBs should NOT yet be allowed to sell their land
interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties.
[Under RA 6657 and DAO 1, the awarded lands may only be transferred or conveyed
after 10 years from the issuance and registration of the emancipation patent (EP) or certificate of
land ownership award (CLOA). Considering that the EPs or CLOAs have not yet been issued to the
qualified FWBs in the instant case, the 10-year prohibitive period has not even started.
Significantly, the reckoning point is the issuance of the EP or CLOA, and not the placing of the
agricultural lands under CARP coverage. Moreover, should the FWBs be immediately allowed the
option to sell or convey their interest in the subject lands, then all efforts at agrarian reform would
be rendered nugatory, since, at the end of the day, these lands will just be transferred to persons
not entitled to land distribution under CARP.]](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/241941333-case-digest-statcon-150913073807-lva1-app6892/85/241941333-case-digest-statcon-54-320.jpg)
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6. YES, the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be given an option to remain
as stockholders of HLI should be reconsidered.
[The Court reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given an
option to remain as stockholders of HLI, inasmuch as these qualified FWBs will never gain control
[over the subject lands] given the present proportion of shareholdings in HLI. The Court noted that
the share of the FWBs in the HLI capital stock is [just] 33.296%. Thus, even if all the holders of this
33.296% unanimously vote to remain as HLI stockholders, which is unlikely, control will never be in
the hands of the FWBs. Control means the majority of [sic] 50% plus at least one share of the
common shares and other voting shares. Applying the formula to the HLI stockholdings, the
number of shares that will constitute the majority is 295,112,101 shares (590,554,220 total HLI
capital shares divided by 2 plus one [1] HLI share). The 118,391,976.85 shares subject to the SDP
approved by PARC substantially fall short of the 295,112,101 shares needed by the FWBs to
acquire control over HLI.]
Gonzales vs COMELEC
G.R. No. L-28196
21 SCRA 774
November 9, 1967
Petitioner: Ramon A. Gonzalez / Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA)
Respondent: Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
FACTS: This case is composed of consolidatedcases filedseparately by Petitioner Gonzalez and
PHILCONSA assailing for the declaration of nullity of RA. No. 4913 and R.B.H. No. 1 and 3. On
March 16, 1967, the Senate andthe House of Representatives passedthe following resolutions
(Resolution of Both Houses/R.B.H.):
1. R.B.HNo. 1: Proposes that Sec 5, Art VI of Constitution be amended so as to increase the
membership ofthe House of Representatives from a maximum of 120 in accordance with the
present Constitution, to a maximumof 180, to be apportionedamong severalprovinces and that
each province shall have at least one (1) member.
2. R.B.H. No. 2: Calls for a conventionto propose amendments to the Constitution, which will be
composed oftwo (2) elective delegates from each representative district, to be "elected in the
general elections to be held on the second Tuesday of November 1971.
3. R.B.H. No. 3: Proposes that Sec 16, Art VI of the Constitution be amended so as to authorize
Senators and Members of the House of Representatives to become delegates to the
aforementionedconstitutional convention, without the need to forfeit their respective seats in
Congress.
Subsequently, Congress passeda bill, which became RA No. 4913, providing that the amendments
to the Constitutionproposedinthe aforementionedResolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for
approval bythe people at the generalelections onNovember 14, 1967. This act fixes the date and
manner of elevtion for the proposed amendments to be voted upon by the people , and
appropriates funds for said election.
Petitioners assail the validity/constitutionality of RA No. 4913 and for the prohibition with
preliminaryinjunction to restrainCOMELECfrom implementing or complying with the said law.
PHILCONSA also assails R.B.H No. 1 and 3.
ISSUE:
1.) Whether or not RA No. 4913 is unconstitutional.
2.) Whether or not the issue involves a political question.
HELD:
1.) Pursuant to Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, SCheldthat there is nothingin this provision
that states that the election referred to is special, different from the general election. The
Congress deemedit best to submit the amendments for ratification in accordance with the
provisions ofthe Constitution. It doesnot negate its authorityto submit proposed amendments
for ratification in general elections. Petition is therefore DENIED.
2.) SC also notedthat the issue is a political question because it attacks the wisdom of the action
taken byCongress andnot the authorityto take it. A political questionis not subject to review by
the Court.
Constitutional Law 1: CH 2: Constitution; Political vs Justiciable Question (Textbook: Cruz,
Professor: Atty. Usita)](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/241941333-case-digest-statcon-150913073807-lva1-app6892/85/241941333-case-digest-statcon-55-320.jpg)
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all charters, laws, decrees, rules, andprovisions exempting any branch, agency, subdivision, or
instrumentalityof the government, including government- ownedor controlledcorporations from
the civil service lawandrules is also cited to show that corporations not governed by special
charters or laws are not to be brought within civil service coverage. The discussions in the
Constitutional Convention are also mentioned. It appears that at the time the Convention
discussedgovernment-ownedor controlledcorporations, allsuch corporations were organized
only under special laws or charters.
The fact that "private" corporations ownedor controlledbythe government may be created by
specialcharter does not meanthat suchcorporations not created byspecial law are not covered
bythe civil service. Nor does the decree repealing all charters and special laws granting exemption
from the civil service law implythat government corporations not created by special law are
exempt from civil service coverage. These charters andstatutes are the only laws granting such
exemptionand, therefore, theyare the onlyones whichcould be repealed. There was no similar
exempting provision inthe general law which called for repeal. And finally, the fact that the
Constitutional Convention discussedonlycorporations created byspecial law or charter cannot be
an argument to exclude petitioner NHCfrom civil service coverage. As statedinthe cited speech
delivered during the conventionsessions of March9, 1972, all government corporations then in
existence were organizedunder special laws or charters. The convention delegates could not
possiblydiscuss government-ownedor controlledcorporations whichwere still non-existent or
about whose existence they were unaware.
SectionI ofArticle XII-B, Constitutionusesthe word "every" to modify the phrase "government-
owned or controlled corporation."
"Every" means eachone ofa group, without exception It means allpossible and all taken one by
one. Of course, our decision inthis case refers to a corporation created as a government-ownedor
controlledentity. It does not cover cases involvingprivate firms takenover bythe government in
foreclosure or similar proceedings. We reserve judgment on these latter cases when the
appropriate controversy is brought to this Court.
The infirmityof the respondents' position lies inits permitting a circumventionor emasculation of
Section 1, Article XII-B of the Constitution It would be possible for a regular ministry of
government to create a host of subsidiarycorporations under the Corporation Code funded by a
willing legislature. A government-ownedcorporation couldcreate severalsubsidiarycorporations.
These subsidiarycorporations would enjoythe best of twoworlds. Their officials and employees
wouldbe privileged individuals, free from the strict accountability required by the Civil Service
Decree and the regulations of the CommissiononAudit. Their incomes would not be subject to
the competitive restraints ofthe openmarket nor to the terms and conditions of civil service
employment. Conceivably,all government-ownedor controlledcorporations couldbe created, no
longer byspecial charters, but through incorporationunder the general law. The constitutional
amendment including such corporations in the embrace of the civil service would cease to have
application. Certainly, such a situation cannot be allowed to exist.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned decision of the respondent
NationalLabor Relations Commission is SET ASIDE. The decisionof the Labor Arbiter dismissingthe
case before it for lack of jurisdiction is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin,
Relova, De la Fuente and Cuevas, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., dissenting:
It was I, as Secretaryof Justice, who issuedOpinionNo. 62, series of 1976, for the Commissioner
of Civil Service whowantedto knowthe scope ofthe constitutionalprovisions onthe Civil Service
in respect of government-ownedor controlledcorporations. Inresponse I opined, for the reasons
stated therein, that only those corporations created by special law are contemplated.
In the case at bar the National Housing Corporation was not created by special law; it was
organizedpursuant to the CorpotationLaw — Act No. 1459 entitled, AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE
FORMATION AND ORGANIZATION OF CORPORATIONS, DEFINING THEIR POWERS, FIXING THE
DUTIES OF DIRECTORSAND OTHEROFFICERSTHEREOF, DECLARINGTHE RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES
OF SHAREHOLDERS AND MEMBERS, PRESCRIBING THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH SUCH
CORPORATIONS MAY TRANSACT BUSINESS. [Act No. 1459 has beenreplacedbyBatas Pambansa
Blg. 68 known as The New CorporationCode.] In the fight of myopinion, the National Housing
Corporationis not coveredbythe Civil Service provisions of the Constitution. Hence I dissent.
Is the National Housing Corporation covered bythe Labor Code? I am not prepared to answer this
question at this time. I dowishto emphasize that whether or not a corporation is "government-
owned or controlled" depends upon the purpose of the inquiry. A corporation may be
"government-owned or controlled" for one purpose but not for another. Inother words, it is not
possible to broadly categorize a corporation as government-owned or controlled."
It maybe asked, if the National Housing Corporation is not coveredbythe Civil Service should it
not be covered insteadbythe Labor Code?Myanswer is, not necessarily. For it may well be that
the National Housing Corporation is in limbo.
The following corporations (the list is not exhaustive) appear to be "government-owned or
controlled" not by virtue of foreclosure or similar proceedings:
Human Settlements Development Corporation
Nayon Filipino Foundation, Inc.
Philippine Aero Space Development Corporation
Philippine Associated Smelting and Refining Corporation
Petrophil Corporation Petron TBA Corporation](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/241941333-case-digest-statcon-150913073807-lva1-app6892/85/241941333-case-digest-statcon-64-320.jpg)
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Philippine National Oil Co. Food Terminal Inc.
Republic Planters Bank
QUARE:Is this Court readyto holdthat each and everyone of the above-named corporation is
government-owned or controlled for Civil Service purposes?
Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., dissenting:
It was I, as Secretaryof Justice, who issuedOpinionNo. 62, series of 1976, for the Commissioner
of Civil Service whowantedto knowthe scope ofthe constitutionalprovisions onthe Civil Service
in respect of government-ownedor controlledcorporations. Inresponse I opined, for the reasons
stated therein, that only those corporations created by special la w are contemplated.
In the case at bar the National Housing Corporation was not created by special law; it was
organizedpursuant to the CorpotationLaw — Act No. 1459 entitled, AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE
FORMATION AND ORGANIZATION OF CORPORATIONS, DEFINING THEIR POWERS, FIXING THE
DUTIES OF DIRECTORSAND OTHEROFFICERSTHEREOF, DECLARINGTHE RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES
OF SHAREHOLDERS AND MEMBERS, PRESCRIBING THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH SUCH
CORPORATIONS MAY TRANSACT BUSINESS. [Act No. 1459 has beenreplacedbyBa tas Pambansa
Blg. 68 known as The New CorporationCode.] In the fight of myopinion, the National Housing
Corporationis not coveredbythe Civil Service provisions of the Constitution. Hence I dissent.
Is the National Housing Corporation covered bythe Labor Code? I am not prepared to answer this
question at this time. I dowishto emphasize that whether or not a corporation is "government-
owned or controlled" depends upon the purpose of the inquiry. A corporation may be
"government-owned or controlled" for one purpose but not for another. Inother words, it is not
possible to broadly categorize a corporation as government-owned or controlled."
It maybe asked, if the National Housing Corporation is not coveredbythe Civil Service should it
not be covered insteadbythe Labor Code?Myanswer is, not necessarily. For it may well be that
the National Housing Corporation is in limbo.
The following corporations (the list is not exhaustive) appear to be "government-owned or
controlled" not by virtue of foreclosure or similar proceedings:
Human Settlements Development Corporation
Nayon Filipino Foundation, Inc.
Philippine Aero Space Development Corporation
Philippine Associated Smelting and Refining Corporation
Petrophil Corporation Petron TBA Corporation
Philippine National Oil Co. Food Terminal Inc.
Republic Planters Bank
QUARE:Is this Court readyto holdthat each and everyone of the above-named corporation is
government-owned or controlled for Civil Service purposes?
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. VICTOR SANTO NIÑO, Defendant-Appellee.
D E C I S I O N
WILLARD, J.:
Act No. 1780 is entitled as follows: chanrobles virtualawlibrary “An Act to regulate the
importation, acquisition, possession, use, andtransfer of firearms, andto prohibit the possession
of same except in compliance with the provisions of this Act. ”
Section 26 of this Act is in part as follows: chanrobles virtualawlibrary
“It shall be unlawful for anypersonto carryconcealedabout hispersonanybowie knife,
dirk, dagger, kris, or other deadlyweapon: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary Provided, That
this prohibitionshall not applyto firearms inpossessionof persons whohave secured a
license therefor or whoare entitled to carry same under the provisions of this Act. ”
The amended complaint in this case is as follows: chanrobles virtualawlibrary
“The undersigned accuses Victor SantoNinoof the violationof Act No. 1780, committed
as follows: chanrobles virtualawlibrary
“That on or about the 16th dayof August, 1908, in the cityof Manila, Philippine Islands,
the said Victor SantoNino, voluntarily, unlawfully, andcriminally, hadinhispossession
and concealed about his person a deadly weapon, to wit: chanrobles
virtualawlibraryOne (1) ironbar, about 15 inchesinlength providedwith aniron ball on
one endanda string onthe other to tie to the wrist, whichweaponhadbeen designed
and made for use in fighting, and as a deadly weapon.
“With violation of the provisions of section 26 of Act No. 1780 of the Philippine
Commission. ”
A demurrer to this complaint wassustainedin the court below the Government has appealed.
The basis for the holding of the court below was that —](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/241941333-case-digest-statcon-150913073807-lva1-app6892/85/241941333-case-digest-statcon-65-320.jpg)
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“The words or other deadlyweapon’ onlysignifya kindof weaponincluded within the
preceding classification. In other words, the rule of ejusdemgenerismust be applied in
the interpretationof this law, which rule is as follows: chanrobles virtualawlibrary
“‘The most frequent application of this rule is found where specific and generic
terms of the same nature are employedinthe same act, the latter following
the former. While inthe abstract, general terms are to be given their natural
and full signification, yet where theyfollow specific words of a like nature they
take their meaningfrom the latter, andare presumedto embrace only things
or persons of the kind designated by them. ’“
In short, the court below heldthat the carrying of a revolver concealedabout the person would
not be a violationof thisAct. The rule of constructionabove referred to is resortedto only for the
purpose of determiningwhat the intent of the legislature was in enacting the law. If that intent
clearlyappears fromother parts of the law, andsuchintent thus clearlymanifested is contrary to
the result which would reachedbyapplicationof the rule of ejusdem generis, the latter must give
way. In this case the provisoof the Act clearlyindicates that in the view of the legislature the
carrying of anunlicensedrevolver wouldbe a violation ofthe Act. Bythe proviso it manifested its
intention to include inthe prohibitionweapons other thanthe armas blancas therein specified.
The judgment of the court below is reversed,and the case is remanded for further proceedings.
No costs will be allowed to either party in this court. SO ORDERED.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Johnson and Carson, JJ., concur.
ALU-TUCP vs. NLRC and NSC
[G.R. No. 109902. August 02, 1994]
FACTS: Petitioners, as employees of private respondent National Steel Corporation (NSC), filed
separate complaints for unfair labor practice, regularization and monetarybenefits with the NLRC,
Sub-Regional ArbitrationBranchXII, IliganCity. The complaints were consolidatedandafter
hearing, the Labor Arbiter declaredpetitioners “regular project employeeswhoshall continue
their employment as such for as longas such [project]activityexists,” but entitled to the salaryof
a regular employee pursuant to the provisions inthe collective bargainingagreement. It also
orderedpayment of salarydifferentials.
The NLRCin its questionedresolutions modified the Labor Arbiter’s decision. It affirmedthe Labor
Arbiter’s holdingthat petitioners were project employees since theywere hiredto performwork
in a specific undertaking— the Five Years Expansion Program, the completionof whichhadbeen
determinedat the time of their engagement and whichoperationwas not directlyrelatedto the
business ofsteel manufacturing. The NLRC, however, set aside the award to petitioners ofthe
same benefits enjoyedbyregular employees for lack oflegal andfactual basis.
The law onthe matter is Article 280 of the Labor Code, where the petitioners argue that theyare
“regular” employees ofNSCbecause:(i)their jobs are “necessary, desirable andwork-relatedto
private respondent’s mainbusiness, steel-making”;and(ii) theyhave renderedservice for six (6)
or more years to private respondent NSC.
ISSUE:Whether or not petitioners are considered “permanent employees” as opposed to being
only“project employees” of NSC.
HELD:NO. Petitionfor Certiorari dismissed for lackof merit. NLRCResolutions affirmed.
RATIO: Functionof the proviso. Petitioners are not considered“permanent employees”. However,
contraryto petitioners’ apprehensions, the designation ofnamedemployees as “project
employees” andtheir assignment to a specific project are effected and implementedin goodfaith,
and not merelyas a means of evading otherwise applicable requirements oflabor laws.
On the claim that petitioners’ service to NSCof more than six (6) years shouldqualifythem as
“regular employees”, the Supreme Court believedthis claimis without legalbasis. The simple fact
that the employment of petitioners as project employeeshadgone beyond one (1) year, does not
detract from, or legallydissolve, their status as “project employees”. The secondparagraphof
Article 280 of the Labor Code, quotedabove, providing that anemployee whohas servedfor at
least one (1) year, shall be considereda regular employee, relatesto casualemployees, not to
project employees.
G.R. No. L-34024 April 5, 1978](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/241941333-case-digest-statcon-150913073807-lva1-app6892/85/241941333-case-digest-statcon-66-320.jpg)
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P12,000.00; and that the citymayor of SanCarlos Cityreceived anannual salaryof P13,200.00
which was exactlyP100.00 a month more than the salaryof the cityjudge.
During the deliberation in the Senate onHouse Bill No. 17046, which became Republic Act No.
5967, the followingdiscussiontook place:
SENATOR GANZON — Because with the bill as drafted, I recall that there will
be some cities where the city judges willreceive salaries higher than those of
the mayors. Andinall charters, Your Honor, the cityjudge is considereda
department head — theoretically, at least, under the mayor. It wouldnot be
fair for the purposes ofpublic administrationthat a citydepartment head
should receive a salaryhigher than that of the chief executive of the city.
SENATOR LAUREL. That point is verywell taken, andI wouldlike to
congratulate Your Honor.
SENATOR LAUREL. No. Mr. President, I understandthe concernof the
distinguishedgentlemanfromDavao. But inthis particular amendment
preparedbythe distinguishedladyfromLa Union, this will not require the
council to payit at P100.00 exactlyless thanthe salaryof the mayor. It is just
the limit — the maximum — but theymayfix it at much less than that. That is
whythe words "at least" were suggested bythe Committee. It need not be
exactlyjust P100.00 less. It maybe P500.00 less.
SENATOR ALMENDRAS. Your Honor, take for example the citiesof Iloilo, Cebu,
Bacolodor Manila for that matter. The Mayors are receivingat least P1,500 a
month. Now, under the amendment of the ladyfromLa Union, Nueva Ecija
and
Davao — whichhasalreadybeen accepted bythe sponsor — doesit mean
that if the salaryof the citymayor is P1,500, the cityjudgeswill receive
P1,400?
xxx xxx xxx
SENATOR ANTONINO — I wouldlike to call his attentionto lines 13 to 20. We
presented thisamendment because it says here:"For the citiesof Baguio,
Quezon, Pasayandother first class cities, the cityjudge shallreceive one
thousandpesos less than that fixedfor the district judge". So it will happen,
and myattentionwas calledbythe gentlemenfrom Iloilo — that the cityjudge
win be receivingmore salarythan the citymayor. Hence the amendment, Mr.
President.
xxx xxx xxx
I conferred withthe gentlemenfrom Iloilo and Batangas, andthiswas their
objection. We have proposed this amendment to at least solve this problem,
so that no cityjudge will be receiving more than the city mayor. So theywill be
receiving less than what is proposedinthis Bill. (Vol. IV, No. 61, Senate
Congressional Records, pages 2773-2787. (Emphasissupplied .) 4
It is clear from the deliberationof the Senate that the intention ofCongressinenacting Republic
Act No. 5967 was that the salaryof a cityjudge shouldnot be higher than the salaryof the city
mayor. The savingclause "Provided, however, That the salaryof a cityjudge shall be at least
P100.00 per month less thanthat of the citymayor" qualifies the earlier provisionwhichfixes the
salaryof cityjudges for secondandthirdclass cities at P18,000.00 per annum.
The primarypurpose of a proviso is to limit the general language of a statute. When there is
irreconcilable repugnancybetweenthe proviso and the bodyof the statute the former is given
precedence over the latter on the groundthat it is the latest expressionof the intent ofthe
legislature.
Inasmuchas the citymayor of SanCarlos City(Pangasinan) was receivinganannual salaryof
P13,200.00, the respondents cannot be compelledto provide for an annual salaryof P18,000.00
for the petitioner as cityjudge ofthe saidcity.
WHEREFORE, the petitionfor review is herebydismissed and the decision appealedfrom is
affirmed, without pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, (Chairman) Makasiar, Muñoz Palma and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
TOLENTINO VS SECRETARY
Tolentino et al is questioning the constitutionalityof RA 7716 otherwise knownas the Expanded
Value AddedTax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino averredthat thisrevenue bill did not exclusivelyoriginate
from the House of Representatives as requiredbySection24, Article 6 of the Constitution. Even
though RA 7716 originatedas HB 11197 andthat it passed the 3 readings in the HoR, the same did
not complete the 3 readings inSenate for after the 1st reading it wasreferredto the Senate Ways
& Means Committee thereafter Senate passed its ownversionknownas Senate Bill 1630.
Tolentino averredthat what Senate couldhave done is amend HB11197 by striking out its text
and substituting it w/ the text of SB 1630 in that way“the bill remains a House Bill and the Senate
version just becomes the text (onlythe text) ofthe HB”. Tolentino and co-petitioner Roco
[however] even signedthe saidSenate Bill.
ISSUE:
Whether or not EVAT originated in the HoR.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/241941333-case-digest-statcon-150913073807-lva1-app6892/85/241941333-case-digest-statcon-68-320.jpg)
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HELD:
Bya 9-6 vote, the SCrejectedthe challenge, holdingthat suchconsolidation wasconsistent with
the power of the Senate to propose or concur withamendments to the version originated in the
HoR. What the Constitutionsimplymeans, accordingto the 9 justices, is that the initiative must
come from the HoR. Note also that there were severalinstances before where Senate passed its
own version rather than having the HoR version as far as revenue and other such bills are
concerned. This practice of amendment by substitution has always been accepted. The
propositionof Tolentinoconcerns a mere matter of form. There is noshowingthat it would make
a significant difference if Senate were to adopt his over what has been done.
Dra. Brigida Buenaseda et. al. vs.Sec. Juan Flavieret. al.[G.R. No. 106719. September 21, 1993
Ponente:QUIASON, J.
FACTS:
The petitionfor Certiorari, Prohibitionand Mandamus, with Prayer for PreliminaryInjunction or
TemporaryRestrainingOrder, under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules ofCourt, seeks to nullifythe
Order of the Ombudsmandirecting the preventive suspension ofpetitioners Dr. Brigida S.
Buenaseda et.al. The questionedorder was issuedinconnectionwith the administrative complaint
filedwiththe Ombudsman(OBM-ADM-0-91-0151) bythe private respondents against the
petitioners for violationof the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The Supreme Court required
respondent Secretaryto complywiththe aforestatedstatus quo order. The Solicitor General, in
his comment, statedthat (a)“The authorityof the Ombudsmanis onlyto recommendsuspension
and he has nodirect power to suspend;” and(b)“Assuming the Ombudsman has the power to
directlysuspenda government official or employee, there are conditions required bylaw for the
exercise of such powers;[and] saidconditions have not been met inthe instant case”
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to suspend government officials andemployees
workinginoffices other than the Office of the Ombudsman, pending the investigationof the
administrative complaints filed against said officials andemployees.
HELD:
YES. Petitionwas dismissed, status quo liftedand set aside.
RATIO:
When the constitutionvestedonthe Ombudsmanthe power “to recommendthe suspension” of a
public official or employees (Sec. 13 [3]), it referredto “suspension,” as a punitive measure. All the
words associatedwith the word “suspension” in saidprovision referred to penalties in
administrative cases, e.g. removal, demotion, fine, censure. Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, the
word “suspension” shouldbe given the same sense as the other words with which it is associated.
Where a particular word is equallysusceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may
be made specific byconsideringthe companyof terms inwhichit is foundor withwhich it is
associated.
Section24 of R.A. No. 6770, whichgrants the Ombudsmanthe power to preventivelysuspend
public officials and employees facingadministrative charges before him, is a procedural, not a
penal statute. The preventive suspension is imposedafter compliance with the requisitestherein
set forth, as anaidinthe investigation ofthe administrative charges.
People vs. MagallanesG.R. Nos. 118013-14 October 11, 1995FACTS:
In the eveningof August 7, 1992, the SpousesDumancas, under the directionandcooperation of
P/Col.
Nicolas Torres whotook advantage of his positionas station commander of the PNP, with Poli ce
Inspector Abeto’s
cooperation, inducedother police officers, namely:Canuday, Pahayupan, Lamis, civilian agents:
Fernandez,Divinagracia, Delgadoand Gargallano, to abduct kidnapanddetain, Rufino Gargar and
DaniloLumangyao, with theuse ofa motor vehicle and then shot and killed the victims with
evident premeditation, treacheryandnocturnity.The other accused secretlyburiedthe victims in a
makeshift shallowgrave to conceal the crime of murder for a feeof P500.00 each.The cases were
consolidated and the accused pleaded not guilty and filed motions for bail. Theprosecution
presented Moises Grandeza, the allegedlone eyewitness and co-conspirator inthe offense. After
theprosecution restedits case, the trial court receivedevidence for the accused, but the reception
of evidence wassuspendedbecause of the motions for inhibition ofjudge Garvilles filedbyseveral
accused. Garvilles voluntarilyinhibited himself and the case was re -raffled. However, the
prosecutionmoved for the transmittal of the recors tothe Sandiganbayanbecause the offenses
chargedwere committedinrelation to the office of the accused PNPofficers. The trial court ruled
that the Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdictionbecause the informations donotstate that the](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/241941333-case-digest-statcon-150913073807-lva1-app6892/85/241941333-case-digest-statcon-69-320.jpg)
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grantedprobation. That crime wouldbe estafa onlybyissuing bouncingcheck, but not all forms of
estafa, which, incidentally, is one offense the criminal liabilityfor which is generallyseparatedbya
thin line frommere civil liability.
For those whowouldcommit the offense a secondtime or oftener, or commit anoffense of
manifest gravity, it is the long prisonterm which must be servedthat will act as deterrent to
protect society. In protectingsociety, the familyof the offender which might be dependent or the
latter to a greater or lesser extent for support or other necessitiesof life shouldnot be lost sight
of, it beingthe basic unit ofthat society. Bythe relative lightnessof the offense, as measuredby
the penaltyimposed, more thanbyits nature, as the law so ordains, the offender is not such a
serious menace to societyas to be wrestedawaytherefrom, as the more dangerous type of
criminals shouldbe.
The second reasonof respondent judge for denying petition petitioner's bidfor probation, is that
petitioner is allegedlynot a penitent offender, as shownbyhis protestation of innocence even
after his convictionbythe trial court and the affirmance of his convictionbythe Court ofAppeals.
We findthe respondent judge, likewise, in error inassuming that petitioner hasnot shown
repentance in committingthe crime ofwhichhe has beenfound guiltybyboththe trial and
appellate courts. Ifpetitioner appealed the decisionof the respondent judge to the Court of
Appeals, he cannot be blamed for insistingon his versionbywhich he couldhope either to be
acquitted or at least givena lighter penaltythat wouldentitle him to the benefits of
probation.1äwphï1.ñët The recourse he tookhas, indeed, provedto be wellworththe effort. His
penaltywas reducedonappeal which placed him withinthe benign purpose of the ProbationLaw.
By the move he took bywhichto achieve this objective, acquittal not quite being withinreach,
petitioner cannot be saidto be a non-penitent offender, under serving ofprobationbenefits. Once
the opportunitywas laidopento him, he graspedit;for insteadof appealing further to the
Supreme Court, he promptlyappliedfor probation, made possible onlybythe reducedpenalty
imposedbythe Court of Appeals. The penaltyimposedbyrespondent court placedpetitioner
beyond the pale of the ProbationLaw. How canhe be saidto be a non-penitent offender, as the
law wouldjudge one to be so, just because he appealed, as he couldnot have them appliedfor
probationeven if he wantedto? Whoknows but that if the penaltyimposedbythe trial court is
that imposed bythe Court of Appealspetitioner would have applied for probation forthwith?
Under the circumstances as just pointedout, We find nosufficient justificationfor respondent
judge's holding petitioner to be a non-penitent offender. We find, instead, that the liberalitywith
which the ProbationLaw shouldbe appliedinfavor of the applicant for its benefits affords the
better means ofachieving the purpose ofthe law, as indicatedinOur decisioninthe case
of Balleta Jr. vs. Hon. Leviste, G.R. No. L-49907, August 21, 1979, 92 SCRA 719, cited bythe
Solicitor-General who, as earlier stated, recommends granting of the instant petitionfor
probation.
WHEREFORE, the order of the respondent judge denying probationis set aside, andpetitioner is
herebydeclared admitted to probation, subject to the terms andconditions as are prescribedby
the law, andrecommended bythe probationofficer.
Makasiar (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero and Abad Santos, JJ., concur.
Aquino and Escolin, JJ., concur in the result.
Samson v. CA [Nov. 25, 1986]
24SEP
Samsonv. Court of Appeals
Fact:
AO No. 3, issuedbyMayor Samsonof CaloocanCity, summarilyterminatedthe servicesof
respondent Talens whoheldposition ofAsst. Sec. to the Mayor on the ground of“lackandloss of
confidence” andappointing Liwag to the position.
RA No. 2260 declares the positionof secretaries to citymayors non-competitive andthis was
interpretedbyMayor Samsonas to include the position ofAsst. Sec. to the Mayor.
Issue:
Legalityof Administrative Order No. 3
Held:
Secretaryto the Mayor andAsst. Secretaryto the Mayor are two separate anddistinct positions.
One is of higher categoryandrank than the other. The functions strictlyattributable to a
“secretary,” is not automaticallyvestedor transferredto an“assistant secretary,” because the
latter simplyassists or aids the former inthe accomplishment of hisduties.
CATU VS RELLOSA
FACTS: Petitioner initiated a complaint against Elizabeth Catu and Antonio Pastor who were
occupyingone ofthe units ina building in Malate which was owned by the former. The said
complaint was filedin the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay 723, Zone 79 of the 5th District of
Manila where respondent was the punong barangay. The parties, having been summoned for
conciliationproceedings and failing to arrive at an amicable settlement, were issued by the
respondent a certificationfor the filing ofthe appropriate actionincourt. Petitioner, thus, filed a
complaint for ejectment against ElizabethandPastor inthe Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila
where respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants. Because of this,
petitioner filed the instant administrative complaint against the respondent onthe groundthat he](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/241941333-case-digest-statcon-150913073807-lva1-app6892/85/241941333-case-digest-statcon-73-320.jpg)
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committed anact of improprietyas a lawyer andas a public officer whenhe stoodas counsel for
the defendants despite the fact that he presidedover the conciliationproceedings between the
litigants as punong barangay. In hisdefense, respondent claimed that as punong barangay, he
performed his task without bias andthat he accededto Elizabeth’s request to handle the case for
free as she wasfinanciallydistressed. The complaint was thenreferredto the IntegratedBar of the
Philippines (IBP) where after evaluation, theyfoundsufficient groundto discipline respondent.
According to them, respondent violatedRule 6.03 of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility and,
as anelective official, the prohibitionunder Section 7(b) (2) of RA 6713. Consequently, for the
violationof the latter prohibition, respondent committeda breachof Canon1. Consequently, for
the violationof the latter prohibition, respondent was thenrecommendedsuspension from the
practice of law for one monthwith a stern warningthat the commissionof the same or similar act
will be dealt with more severely.
ISSUE:Whether or not the foregoing findings regarding the transgressionof respondent as well as
the recommendation on the imposable penalty of the respondent were proper.
HELD:No. First, respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rul e 6.03 the Code of
Professional Responsibilityas this applies onlyto a lawyer whohas left government service and in
connectionto former government lawyers who are prohibited from accepting employment in
connectionwithanymatter inwhich [they] had intervened while in their service. In the case at
bar, respondent was anincumbent punongbarangay. Apparently, he does not fall within the
purview of the said provision.
Second, it is not Section90 of RA 7160 but Section7(b)(2) of RA 6713 whichgoverns the practice
of professionof elective local government officials. While RA 6713 generallyapplies to all public
officialsand employees, RA 7160, being a special law, constitutes an exception to RA 6713
.Moreover, while under RA 7160,certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors,
provincial board members and councilors) are expressly subjected to a total or partial
proscription to practice their professionor engage in any occupation, no such interdiction is
made onthe punong barangayand the members of the sangguniangbarangay. Expressiounius
est exclusio alterius since theyare excludedfromanyprohibition, the presumptionis that theyare
allowedto practice their profession. Respondent, therefore, is not forbidden to practice his
profession.
Third, notwithstandingall of these, respondent stillshouldhave procured a prior permission or
authorization from the headof hisDepartment, as requiredbycivil service regulations. The failure
of respondent to complywith Section12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules constitutes a
violationof his oath as a lawyer:to obeythe laws. Inacting as counsel for a party without first
securing the required writtenpermission, respondent not only engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law but alsoviolateda civil service rules whichis a breachof Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:
Rule 1.01 - Alawyershall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
For not living upto his oath as well as for not complying withthe exacting ethicalstandards of the
legal profession, respondent failed to comply with Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:
CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY ANDTHE DIGNITY OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIESOF THE INTEGRATEDBAR.
A lawyer whodisobeys the lawdisrespects it. Insodoing, he disregards legal ethics and disgraces
the dignityof the legal profession. Everylawyer shouldact and comport himself ina manner that
promotes public confidence inthe integrityof the legal profession. A member of the bar may be
disbarredor suspendedfrom hisoffice as anattorneyfor violationof the lawyer's oathand/or for
breach ofthe ethics of the legal professionas embodied inthe Code of Professional Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of professional
misconduct for violating hisoathas a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is thereforeSUSPENDED from the practice of law for a periodof six
months effective from hisreceipt of this resolution. He is sternly WARNED that any repetition of
similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
Respondent is stronglyadvisedto look upandtake to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza.
G.R. No. L-32441 March 29, 1930
DOMINADOR GOMEZ, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
HONORIO VENTURA, Secretary of the Interior of the Government of the Philippine Islands, and
the
BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, defendants-appellees.
Jose Varela Calderon for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellees.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
In this cause, the plaintiff prays for judgment, as follows:
1. Annulling andsetting aside the aforementioned investigationproceedings,
and particularly the decision of the Board of Medical Examiners of the
Philippine Islands dated March 30, 1926, forever revokingthe plaintiff's license
to practice medicine and surgery.
2. Ordering the defendants to restore the plaintiff to his status before the
investigation andthe decision ofMarch 30, 1926, that is, as if there had never
been an investigation and an adverse decision.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/241941333-case-digest-statcon-150913073807-lva1-app6892/85/241941333-case-digest-statcon-74-320.jpg)
![77
As in the case ofcourts and judicial officers, it is a rule of general application
that mandamus will not lieto reviewor control the acts of executive officers
and boards ofstate and federal governments inrespect of matters as to which
theyare vestedwithdiscretion. Inother words, theycannot be compelled to
act or render a decisioninanyparticular way, andthis is so, even though the
exercise of this discretion requires the construction and interpretation of
statutes. Where public officials exercise their discretion, it is said that their
conclusions, although disputable, are impregnable to mandamus. (38 C. J.,
659-660.)
That this actionis reallya mandamus proceeding, appears clearlyfrom the terms of the complaint
filed herein.
Finding nomerit inthe assignments of error, the judgment appealedfrom is affirmed, with costs
against the appellant. So ordered.
Malcolm, Ostrand, Johns and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
Villamor, J., reserves his vote.
Javellana vs Tayo
G.R. No. L-18919 December 29, 1962
ABELARDO JAVELLANA, TOMAS JONCO, RUDICO HABANA, EXEQUIEL GOLEZ, ALFREDO ANG, and
FILIPINAS SOLEDAD, in their capacities as Councilors of the Municipal Municipality of
Buenavista, Province of Iloilo, petitioners appellees,
vs.
SUSANO TAYO, as Mayor of the Municipal Municipality of Buenavista, Iloilo, respondent-
appellant.
FACTS: The petitioners are dulyelectedandqualifiedmembers of the Municipal Council of the
Municipalityof Buenavista, Iloilo;andthat the respondent at the time the acts hereinbelow
complainedof took place, was andstill is the duly-electedandqualified Mayor of the Municipality.
The Municipal Council ofBuenavista (Council) unanimouslyapprovedResolutionNo. 5, Seriesof
1960 which set the regular sessions of the Councilandwhichresolutionwas dulyapprovedbythe
respondent. At the time andplace set for the regular sessionof the Council, the Mayor, Vice-
Mayor, 2 Councilors, and the Secretarywere absent. The six councilors, whoare the petitioners in
this case, were present and theyproceededto elect amongthemselves a temporarypresiding
officer and ActingSecretaryto take notes of the proceedings. Havingthus electeda temporary
presiding officer anda secretaryof the Council, theyproceededto dobusiness. On the subsequent
Council meetings, the Mayor, Vice Mayor, 2 Councilors andSecretarywere still not around. When
the Minutesof the Proceeding waspresented to the Mayor, the latter refused to act uponsaid
minutes, or particularlyto approve or disapprove the resolutionas approved bythe Council, the
Mayor declaringthe sessions above referredto as null andvoid and not inaccordance with.
ISSUE: Whether or not the sessions heldbythe Councilwere valid
RULING: This Court (the trial court), after perusal of all the records of this case hasreached the
conclusionthat the sessions held bythe petitioner during the absence ofthe respondent Mayor
were perfectlyvalid and legal. The attendance of the Mayor is not essential to the validityof the
sessionas longas there is quorum constitutedinaccordance withlaw. To declare that the
proceedings ofthe petitioners were null and voidis to encourage recalcitrant public officials who
wouldfrustrate valid session for political endor consideration. Public interest will immensely
suffer, if a mayor whobelongs to one politicalgrouprefuses to call or attend a session, because
the Council is controlledbyanother political group. (And this was upheld bythe SC.)
We findsaid award proper under Article 27 of the newCivil Code, 3 considering that according to
the trial court, he (Golez)was able to prove that he sufferedthe same, as a consequence of
appellant's refusalto performhis officialduty, not withstanding the action takenbythe Provincial
Fiscal anthe Provincial Boardupholdingthe validityof the sessionin question.
DECISION: Trial Court decision affirmed.
[Digest] Lopez vs. CA (1970)
Lopez publisher and owner of Manila Chronicle and Gatbonton (Editor) v. Court of Appeals and
Cruz (1970)
Ponente: Fernando, J.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/241941333-case-digest-statcon-150913073807-lva1-app6892/85/241941333-case-digest-statcon-77-320.jpg)
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- 1. 1 Get Homework/Assignment Done Homeworkping.com Homework Help https://www.homeworkping.com/ ResearchPaper help https://www.homeworkping.com/ Online Tutoring https://www.homeworkping.com/ click here for freelancing tutoring sites 1. Ratio Legis: Spirit of the law/Legislative Intent as thePrimary Object ** As expressed in the literal reading of thetext 1. Verba legis (literal or plain meaning rule) IBAA Employees Unionv. Inciong GR L52415, 23 October 1984 (132 SCRA 663) Facts: On June 20, 1975, the Unionfiled a complaint against the bank for the payment of holidaypay before the then Department of Labor, National Labor Relations Commission, RegionalOffice IV in Manila. Conciliationhaving failed, and upon the request of bothparties, the case was certifiedfor arbitrationon 7 July1975. On 25 August 1975, Labor Arbiter Ricarte T. Sorianorendereda decision in the above-entitledcase, granting petitioner’s complaint for payment ofholidaypay. Respondent bankdidnot appealfrom the saiddecision. Instead, it compliedwiththe order of the Labor Arbiter bypaying their holidaypayup to andincluding January1976. On 16 December 1975, Presidential Decree 850 was promulgated amending, amongothers, the provisions ofthe Labor Code onthe right to holidaypay. Accordingly, on 16 February1976, by authorityof Article 5 of the same Code, the Department of Labor (nowMinistryof Labor) promulgatedthe rules andregulations for the implementationof holidays with pay. The controversial section thereof reads as “Status ofemployees paidbythe month. — Employees who are uniformlypaid bythe month, irrespective ofthe number ofworkingdays therein, witha salary of not lessthanthe statutoryor establishedminimum wage shall be presumed to be paid for all days inthe monthwhether workedor not.” On 23 April 1976, PolicyInstruction9 was issuedby the then Secretaryof Labor (nowMinister)interpreting the above-quotedrule. The bank, by reasonof the ruling laiddownbythe rule implementingArticle 94 of the Labor Code andbyPolicy Instruction9, stoppedthe payment ofholidaypayto an its employees. On 30 August 1976, the Unionfileda motion for a writ of execution to enforce the arbiter’s decisionof 25 August 1975, whichthe bank opposed. On 18 October 1976, the Labor Arbiter, insteadof issuinga writ of execution, issuedan order enjoiningthe bank to continue paying its employees their regular holidaypay. On 17 November 1976, the bank appealed fromthe order of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC. On 20 June 1978, the NLRCpromulgated its resolutionenbanc dismissingthe bank’s appeal, andordering the issuance of the proper writ of execution. On 21 February1979, the bankfiledwith the Office ofthe Minister of Labor a motion for reconsideration/appealwith urgent prayer to stayexecution. On 13 August 1979,s the NLRC issued an order directing the Chief ofResearch and Information ofthe Commission to compute the holidaypayof the IBAA employees from April 1976 to the present in accordance with the Labor Arbiter dated 25 August 1975. On 10 November 1979, the Office of the Minister ofLabor, through DeputyMinister Amado G. Inciong, issued anorder setting aside the resolution en banc of the NLRCdated20 June 1978, anddismissing the case for lack ofmerit. Hence, the petitionfor certiorari charging Inciong withabuse of discretion amountingto lack or excess of jurisdiction. Issue: Whether the Ministryof Labor is correct indetermining that monthlypaidemployees are excluded from the benefits of holidaypay. Held:
- 2. 2 From Article 92of the Labor Code, as amendedbyPresidential Decree 850, andArticle 82 of the same Code, it is clear that monthlypaidemployees are not excludedfrom the benefits of holiday pay. However, the implementing rules onholidaypaypromulgatedbythe thenSecretaryof Labor excludesmonthlypaid employeesfrom the saidbenefits byinserting, under Rule IV, BookIll ofthe implementing rules, Section2, which provides that:“employeeswhoare uniformlypaid bythe month, irrespective ofthe number ofworkingdays therein, witha salaryof not less than the statutoryor establishedminimum wage shall be presumed to be paidfor alldays inthe month whether workedor not.” Even if contemporaneous constructionplacedupona statute by executive officers whose dutyis to enforce it is givengreat weight bythe courts, still if such constructionis soerroneous, the same must be declaredas nulland void. So long, as the regulations relate solelyto carrying intoeffect the provisions ofthe law, theyare valid. Where an administrative order betrays inconsistencyor repugnancyto the provisions of the Act, the mandate ofthe Act must prevailandmust be followed. A rule is binding onthe Courts solong as the procedure fixedfor its promulgationis followedandits scope is withinthe statutoryauthority grantedbythe legislature, even if the courts are not inagreement withthe policystatedtherein or its innate wisdom. Further, administrative interpretationof the law is at best merelyadvisory, for it is the courts that finallydetermine what the lawmeans. The Supreme Court granted the petition, set aside the order of the DeputyMinister of Labor, and reinstatedthe 25 August 1975 decision ofthe Labor Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano. Power to construe THECHARTEREDBANKEMPLOYEESASSOCIATION vs. HON. BLAS F.OPLE, in his capacity as the Incumbent Secretary ofLabor, andTHECHARTEREDBANK G.R.No. L-44717 August 28, 1985Facts: On May20, 1975, the CharteredBank Employees Association, in re presentation of its monthly paid employe es/members, i nstituted a complaint with the Regional Offi ce No. I V, De partment of La bor, now Ministry of La bor and Employment (MOLE) a ga inst Chartere d Bank, for the payment of te n (10) unworked legal hol idays, a s well as for pre mium and overtime differentials for worked legal hol idays from November 1, 1974. The Mi nister of La bor dismissed the Chartere d Bank Employe es Association’s cl a im for lack of me rit basing its decision on Section 2,Rule I V, Book I ll of the I nte grated Rules a nd Pol i cy I nstruction No. 9,whichrespectivelyprovide: Sec. 2. Status of employees paid bythe month. Employees whoare uniformlypaid bythe month, irrespective of the number of working days therein, with a salaryof not less than the statutoryor established minimumwage shall be presumedto be paid for all days inthe monthwhether worked or not. POLICY INSTRUCTION NO. 9 TO:All RegionalDirectors SUBJECT: PAID LEGAL HOLIDAYS The rulesimplementingPD 850 have clarified the policy in the implementation of the ten (10) paidlegal holidays. Before PD 850, the number of workingdays a year ina firm was considered important indetermining entitlement to the benefit. Thus, where an employee wasworkingfor at least 313 days, he wasconsidered definitely alreadypaid. If he was working for less than313, there was nocertainty whether the ten(10) paidlegal holidays were already paidto him or not. The ten (10) paidlegal holidays law, to start with, is intendedto benefit principallydaily employees. Inthe case of monthly, onlythose whose monthlysalarydid not yet include payment for the ten (10) paidlegal holidays are entitledto the benefit. the rules implementing PD 850, this policyhas beenfullyclarifiedto eliminate controversieson the entitlement of monthlypaid employees. The newdetermining rule is this:'If the monthlypaidemployee is receivingnot less than P240, the maximum monthlyminimumwage, andhis monthlypayis uniform fromJanuary to December, he is presumed to be alreadypaid the ten (10) paid legal holidays. However, if deductions are made from his monthlysalaryon account ofholidays inmonths where theyoccur, then he is stillentitledto the ten(10) paidlegal holidays. These newinterpretations must be uniformlyand consistentlyupheld. Issue: Whether or not the Secretaryof Labor erredandactedcontraryto lawinpromulgatingSec. 2, Rule IV, BookIII of the IntegratedRules andPolicyInstructionNo. 9. Held: Y e s . T h e S e c r e t a r y ( M i n i s t e r ) o f L a b o r h a d e x c e e d e d h i s statutory a uthority gra nted by Arti cle 5 of the Labor Code authorizing him to promulgate the necessaryimplementingrules and regulations. While it is true that the Minister has the authorityinthe performance of his dutyto promulgate rules and regulations to implement, construe andclarifythe Labor Code, suchpower is limited byprovisions ofthe statute sought to be implemented, construed or clarified. **a. Dura lex sed lex Pascual vs. pascual-Bautista OLIVIA S. PASCUAL and HERMES S. PASCUAL, petitioners, vs. ESPERANZA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, MANUEL C. PASCUAL, JOSE C. PASCUAL, SUSANA C. PASCUAL- BAUTISTA, ERLINDA C. PASCUAL, WENCESLAO C. PASCUAL, JR., INTESTATE ESTATE OF ELEUTERIO T. PASCUAL, AVELINO PASCUAL, ISOCELES PASCUAL, LEIDA PASCUAL-MARTINES, VIRGINIA PASCUAL-NER, NONA PASCUAL-FERNANDO, OCTAVIO PASCUAL, GERANAIA PASCUAL-DUBERT, and THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE MANUEL S. PADOLINA of Br. 162, RTC, Pasig, Metro Manila, respondents. G.R. No. 84240 March 25, 1992
- 3. 3 PARAS, J.: FACTS: Petitioners OliviaandHermes Pascualare the acknowledgednatural childrenof the late Eligio Pascual, the latter being a fullbloodbrother of the decedent DonAndresPascual, who died intestate without anyissue, legitimate, acknowledgednatural, adopted or spurious children.. Adela Soldevilla Pascual the survivingspouse of the late DonAndes Pascual filedw/ the RTC Branch 162, a special proceedingcase no.7554 for administrationof the intestate estate of her late husband. Olivia andHermes are illegitimate children ofEligioPascual(althoughtheycontend that the term “illegitimate children” as describedin art 992 should be construed as “spurious children”). ISSUE: Whether or not Article992 of the Civil Code ofthe Philippines, canbe interpretedto exclude recognizednatural childrenfrom the inheritance of the deceased. HELD: Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutelya successionab intestatobetweenthe illegitimate child and the legitimate childrenandrelatives of the father or mother of saidlegitimate child. Theymayhave a naturaltie ofblood, but this is not recognizedbylaw for the purposes of Article 992. EligioPascualis a legitimate childbut petitioners are hisillegitimate children. Applyingthe above doctrine to the case at bar, respondent IACdid not err inholding that petitioners herein cannot represent their father Eligio Pascual inthe successionof the latter to the intestate estate ofthe decedent Andres Pascual, full bloodbrother of their father. Aguila v.CFI of Batangas G.R. No. L-48335. April 15, 1988 FACTS: Juliana Matienzohadtwo husbands insuccession, namely, EscolasticoAlabastro and, after his death, Daniel Aguila. The petitioner is claiming the disputedpropertyas the onlysurvivingchildof the second marriage. The private respondents are resistingthis claim as the childrenof Maria Alabastro, the sole offspring ofthe first marriage andhadsuedfor partitionanddamages against the petitioner, alleging that some properties held bythem pertainedto the first marriage as Juliana and her secondhusbandhadnot acquired anything during their marriage. On motionof the plaintiffs, the trial court then issueda writ ofexecutionpursuant to which the properties held bythe defendants were levied upon and soldat public auctionto the plaintiffs as the highest bidders. The defendants fileda complaint for reconveyance ofthe properties acquired bythe defendants in the earlier actionfor partitionin the Court of First Instance of Batangas. In their answer, the defendants alleged res judicata as one of their affirmative defenses. ISSUE: (1) Whether or not the petitioner mayrightfullyalleged res judicata in thiscase. (2) Whether or not the Court shouldallow reconveyance of the properties inthe exercise of its equityjurisdiction. HELD: (1) No since the petitioner doesnot seek to doawaywith the rule of res judicata but merely proposes to undoa grave andserious wrong perpetuatedinthe name ofjustice. As a matter of fact, he was not deniedthe opportunityto submit evidence whichthe due process guarantees. Records show that he did not have the ooprtunityto be heardbecause of the gross ineptitude of petitioner’s original counsel. (3) No. The lawon reconveyance is clear, andjurisprudence thereon is well-settled. Thisremedy is available incases where, as a result of mistake or fraud, propertyis registeredin the name of a person not its owner. However, it cannot be employed to negate the effects of a valid decision of a court of justice determining the conflictingclaims of ownership ofthe parties in anappropriate proceeding, as in Civil Case No. 1562. The decisionin that case wasa valid resolutionof the question ofownership over the disputed properties and cannot be reversednow throughthe remedyof reconveyance. Equityis describedas justice outside legality, whichsimplymeans that it cannot supplant although it may, as oftenhappens, supplement the law. All abstract arguments basedonlyon equityshould yieldto positive rules, which pre-empt andprevailover suchpersuasions. Emotional appealsfor justice, while theymaywring the heart of the Court, cannot justifydisregardof the mandate of the lawas long as it remains inforce. The applicable maxim is "aequetas nunquam contravenit legis. **Inapplicability in criminal cases People v. Santayana GR L-22291, 15 November 1976 (74 Phil 25)SecondDivision, ConcepcionJr. (p):4 concur, 1 took no part, 1 designatedto sit in2nddivision Facts: On 19 February1962, Jesus Santayana yEscudero, was appointedas “Special Agent” by then Colonel Jose C. Maristela, Chief ofthe CIS. On 9 March 1962, Col. Maristela issued an undatedcertificationto the effect that the accusedwas an accreditedmember of the CIS and the pistol describedinthe saidMemorandum Receipt was givento him byvirtue ofhis appointment as specialagent andthat he was authorizedto carryandpossess the same inthe performance of his official dutyandfor hispersonalprotection. On 29 October 1962, the accusedwas foundin Plaza Miranda inpossession ofthe firearms andammunitionwithout a license to possessthem. An investigation wasconductedandthereupon, a corresponding complaint wasfiled against the accused. The case underwent trial after whichthe accusedwas convictedof the crime charged. Hence, the case was appealed to Supreme Court. Issue: Whether Santayana, a secret agent, was liable for illegal possessionof firearms Held: The appointment ofa civilianas “secret agent to assist inthe maintenance of peace and order campaigns anddetectionof crimes sufficientlyputs him withinthe categoryof a peace officer equivalent evento a member of the municipal police expresslycovered bySection879 (People v.Macarandang). In the present case, Santayana was appointed as CISsecret agent with the authorityto carryand possess firearms. He was issued a firearm in the performance ofhis official duties andfor his personal protection. Application oflicense wasunnecessary, according to Col. Maristela, as the firearm is government property. No permit wasissued, according to Capt. Adolfo
- 4. 4 Bring as ashe wasalreadyappointedas a CISagent. Evenifthe case ofPeoplevs. Mapa revoked the doctrine in the Macarandang case, thiswas made onlyon 30 August 1967, years after the accusedwas charged. Under the Macarandang rule therefore obtaining at the time ofappellant’s appointment as secret agent, he incurred nocriminal liabilityfor possessionof the pistol in question. The Supreme Court reversed the appealeddecision, conformablywiththe recommendation ofthe Solicitor General, andacquittedJesus Santayana, canceling the bondfor his provisional release; with costs de oficio. People ofthe Philippines vs. M. Mapa Facts: The accusedwas convicted in violation ofSec. 878 inconnection to Sec. 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code as amendedbyCommonwealthAct No. 56 and further amendedbyR.A. 4. On August 13, 1962, the accused wasdiscoveredto have inits possessionandcontrol a home- made revolver cal. 22 withno license permit. Inthe court proceeding, the accused admittedthat he owns the gunandaffirmed that it hasno license. The accused further stated that he is a secret agent appointedbyGov. Leviste ofBatangasand showedevidences ofappointment. Inhis defense, the accusedpresentedthe case ofPeople vs. Macarandang, stating that he must acquitted because he is a secret agent andwhich mayqualifyintopeace officers equivalent to municipal police whichis covered byArt. 879. Issue: Whether or not holdinga positionof secret agent ofthe Governor is a proper defense to illegal possession offirearms. Ruling: The Supreme Court inits decision affirmedthe lower court’s decision. It statedthat the law is explicit that except as thereafter specificallyallowed, "it shall be unlawful for anyperson to . . . possessanyfirearm, detachedparts offirearms or ammunitiontherefor, or anyinstrument or implement usedor intendedto be usedinthe manufacture offirearms, parts offirearms, or ammunition." The next section provides that "firearms andammunitionregularlyand lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines[of the ArmedForces of the Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureauof Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincialtreasurers, municipaltreasurers, municipal mayors, andguards ofprovincial prisoners andjails,"are not covered"whensuchfirearms are in possession ofsuch officials andpublic servants for use inthe performance of their officialduties. The Court construedthat there is no provisionfor the secret agent;includingit in the list therefore the accusedis not exempted. As determined through Construction **General Rule: Statutemust be capable of construction, otherwise inoperative DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs.COMELEC G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997 FACTS: In 1996, Atty. Jesus DelfinfiledwithCOMELECa petitionto amend Constitution, to lift term limits of elective officials, bypeople’s initiative. DelfinwantedCOMELECto control andsupervise said people’s initiative the signature-gatheringall over the country. The propositionis:“Do you approve of lifting the term limits of all elective government officials, amending for the purpose Sections 4 ) and7 of Article VI, Section4 of Article VII, and Section8 of Article 8 of Article Xof the 1987 Philippine Constitution?” SaidPetitionfor Initiative will first be submittedto the people, and after it is signed byat least 12% total number of registeredvoters inthe country, it will be formally filedwiththe COMELEC. COMELEC in turn orderedDelfin for publicationof the petition. Petitioners Sen. Rocoet al moved for dismissal of the DelfinPetitionon the groundthat it is not the initiatorypetition properly cognizable bythe COMELEC. a. Constitutionalprovisiononpeople’s initiative to amendthe Constitutioncanonlybe implemented bylaw to be passedbyCongress. No such lawhas beenpassed. b. Republic Act No. 6735 providesfor 3 systems oninitiative but failed to provide anysubtitle on initiative onthe Constitution, unlike inthe other modes of initiative. Thisdeliberate omission indicates matter of people’s initiative was left to some future law. c. COMELEC has nopower to provide rulesandregulations for the exercise of people’s initiative. OnlyCongressis authorizedbythe Constitutionto pass the implementinglaw. d. People’s initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revisionthereof. Extendingor liftingof termlimits constitutes a revision. e. Congress nor anygovernment agencyhas not yet appropriatedfunds for people’s initiative. ISSUE: Whether or not the people candirectlypropose amendments to the Constitution throughthe systemof initiative under Section2 of Article XVII ofthe 1987 Constitution. HELD: REPUBLICACT NO. 6735 It was intendedto include or cover people’s initiative onamendments to the Constitution but, as worded, it doesnot adequatelycover such intiative. Article XVII Section2 of the 1987 Constitution providing for amendments to Constitution, is not self-executory. While the Constitutionhas recognizedor grantedthe right of the people to directlypropose amendments to the Constitution via PI, the people cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide for its implementation. FIRST:Contraryto the assertionof COMELEC, Section2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The inclusionof the word“Constitution” therein wasa delayed afterthought. The word is not relevant to the sectionwhichis silent as to amendments ofthe Constitution. SECOND:Unlike in the case ofthe other systems of initiative, the Act does not provide for the contents ofa petitionfor initiative on the Constitution. Sec 5(c) does not include the provisions of the Constitutionsought to be amended, inthe case of initiative on the Constitution. THIRD:No subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the latter simplymeans that the mainthrust of the Act is initiative andreferendumon nationaland local laws. The argument that the initiative onamendments to the Constitutionis not acceptedto be subsumedunder the subtitle onNational Initiative and Referendumbecause it is nationalin scope. Under Subtitle II andIII, the classification is not basedonthe scope of the initiative involved, but onits nature and character.
- 5. 5 Nationalinitiative – whatis proposedto be enactedis a national law, or a law which onlyCongress can pass. Local initiative – what is proposed to be adoptedor enacted is a law, ordinance or resolution which onlylegislative bodies of the governments ofthe autonomous regions, provinces, cities, municipalities, andbarangays canpass. Potestas delegata non delegari potest What has been delegated, cannot be delegated. The recognized exceptions to the rule are: [1] Delegationof tariffpowers to the President;[2] Delegationof emergencypowers to the President; [3] Delegationto the people at large; [4] Delegationto localgovernments;and[5] Delegation to administrative bodies. COMELEC Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative bodyexercisingquasi judicial functions, to promulgate rules and regulations is a form of delegationof legislative authority. Ineverycase of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegationitself is valid. It is validonlyif the law (a) is complete initself, setting forththereinthe policyto be executed, carriedout, or implemented bythe delegate;and (b) fixes a standard – the limits of which are sufficientlydeterminate anddeterminable – to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. Republic Act No. 6735 failedto satisfyboth requirements insubordinate legislation. The delegationof the power to the COMELEC is then invalid. COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300 Insofar as it prescribesrules andregulations onthe conduct of initiative onamendments to the Constitutionis void. COMELECcannot validlypromulgate rules andregulations to implement the exercise of the right of the people to directlypropose amendments to the Constitution through the systemof initiative. It does not have that power under Republic Act No. 6735. Whether the COMELECcan take cognizance of, or has jurisdictionover, a petitionsolelyintended to obtain anorder: (a) fixing the time anddatesfor signature gathering; (b) instructingmunicipal election officers to assist Delfin’s movement andvolunteers in establishing signature stations;and (c) directing or causing the publicationof the unsigned proposedPetitionfor Initiative on the 1987 Constitution. DELFIN PETITION COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ENTERTAINING THE DELFIN PETITION. Even if it be concededex gratia that RA 6735 is a full compliance withthe power of Congress to implement the right to initiate constitutional amendments, or that it has validlyvested uponthe COMELECthe power of subordinate legislation and that COMELECResolutionNo. 2300 is valid, the COMELECacted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse ofdiscretion inentertaining the Delfin Petition. The Delfin Petition does not containsignaturesof the requirednumber of voters. Without the requiredsignatures, the petitioncannot be deemed validlyinitiated. The COMELECrequires jurisdictionover a petition for initiative onlyafter its filing. The petitionthenis the initiatory pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable bythe COMELEC, sitting enbanc. Since the DelfinPetitionis not the initiatorypetitionunder RA6735 andCOMELECResolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of bythe COMELEC. The petitionwas merely entered as UND, meaning undocketed. It was nothingmore thana mere scrap ofpaper, which should not have been dignified bythe Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on12 December 1996, and the order directing Delfinand the oppositors to file their memoranda to file their memoranda or oppositions. In sodignifying it, the COMELECacted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse ofdiscretion and merelywastedits time, energy, andresources. Therefore, Republic Act No. 6735 did not applyto constitutional amendment. ** 2. Specific Rules a. Mens Legislatoris: Ascertain spirit/intent/purposeof thelaw Prasnik v. Republic of the Philippines G.R. No. L-8639 (March 23, 1956) FACTS: Petitioner seeks to adopt four childrenwhich he claims to be his andPaz Vasquez’ children without the benefit of marriage. The Solicitor General opposedthis statingthat Art. 338 of the Civil Code allows a natural childto be adopted byhis father refers onlyto a childwho has not beenacknowledgedas natural child. It maintains that inorder that a natural child may be adoptedbyhis natural father or mother there shouldnot be anacknowledgment of the status of the natural child for it will goagainst Art. 335. ISSUE: W/N the Civil Code allows for the adoptionof acknowledgednatural children of the father or mother. HELD: The law intends to allow adoption whether the child be recognizedor not. If the intentionwere to allowadoptiononlyto unrecognizedchildren, Article 338 would be of nouseful purpose. The rights ofanacknowledgednatural child are muchless thanthose of a legitimated child. Contendingthat this is unnecessarywoulddenythe illegitimate childrenthe chance to acquire these rights. The trend when it comesto adoptionof childrentends to go toward the liberal. The law does not prohibit the adoption of anacknowledgednatural child whichwhencomparedto a natural childis equitable. An acknowledgednatural childis a naturalchildalso and following the words of the law, theyshouldbe allowed adoption. CORNELIA MATABUENA vs.PETRONILA CERVANTES L-2877 (38 SCRA 284) March 31, 1971 FACTS: In 1956, hereinappellant’s brother Felix Matabuena donateda piece of lot to his common-law spouse, hereinappellee Petronila Cervantes. Felix andPetronila got marriedonlyin
- 6. 6 1962 or sixyears after the deedof donationwas executed. Five months later, or September 13, 1962, Felix died. Thereafter, appellant CorneliaMatabuena, byreasonof beingthe onlysister and nearest collateral relative ofthe deceased, fileda claimover the property, byvirtue of a an affidavit of self-adjudicationexecutedbyher in 1962, hadthe land declaredin her name andpaid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon. The lower court of Sorsogon declared that the donation was valid inasmuchas it was made at the time whenFelix andPetronilawere not yet s pouses, rendering Article 133 of the Civil Code inapplicable. ISSUE: Whether or not the ban ondonation between spousesduring a marriage applies to a common- law relationship. HELD: While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a donation betweenthe spouses during marriage, policyconsiderationof the most exigent character as well as the dictates of moralityrequires that the same prohibition shouldapplyto a common-lawrelationship. As stated inBuenaventura vs. Bautista (50 OG 3679, 1954), if the policyof the law is to prohibit donations infavor of the other consort andhis descendants because offear ofundue and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, thenthere is everyreasonto applythe same prohibitive policyto persons living together as husbandandwife without the benefit ofnuptials. The lackof validityof the donationbythe deceased to appellee doesnot necessarily result in appellant havingexclusive right to the disputedproperty. As a widow, Cervantes is entitledto one-half ofthe inheritance, and the surviving sister to the other half. Article 1001, Civil Code: Shouldbrothers andsisters or their childrensurvive withthe widow or widower, the latter shall be entitledto one-half of the inheritance andthe brothers and sisters or their children to the other half. KING vs HERNAEZ MACARIO KING, ET AL., petitioners-appellees, vs. PEDRO S. HERNAEZ, ETC., ETAL., respondents- appellants. FACTS MacarioKing, a naturalizedFilipinocitizen Import Meat andProduce" Philippine ColdStores, Inc permission fromthe President of the Philippines(Secretaryof Commerce and Industry)DENIED petitionfor declaratoryrelief, injunction and mandamus(Court of First Instance of Manila) writ of preliminary appeal __ (RETAIL TRADE LAW)Section 1, Republic Act No. 1180 No pe rs on who is not a ci tizen of the Philippines, a nd no association, pa rtne rship, or corporationthe capitalof whichis not whollyowned by citizens of the Philippines, shall engage directlyor indirectlyin the retail business: . ." emphasis supplied)(x) merelyto banthem fromits ownership and not fromits management control or operation. (Anti-Dummy Law )Commonwealth Act No. 108, as amended by Republic Act No.134) whi ch seeks "to punish acts of evasion of the l aws of nationalization of ce rtain ri ghts ,fra n c hi se s o r p ri vi l e g e s. " R e a d i n c o n n e c t i on w i t h t h e R e t a i l T ra d e L a w , t h e A n t i - DummyLaw would punishacts intendedto circumvent the provisions of the former law which nationalize the retail business. Itchong Case ISSUE I s the employment of a liens i n non-control position in a re tail e stablishment or tra de prohibitedbythe Anti-DummyLaw? RULING Yes, it is prohibited. Against retail trade law andAnti-dummylaw(X )unconsti-right of employer to choose The nationalization of an e conomic measure when founded on grounds of public policy c a n not b e b ra n de d a s u n j u s t , a rbi t ra ry o r o p p re s si ve o r c o n t ra ry t o t h e Co n s t i t ut i on because its aimis merelyto further the material progress and welfare of the citizens ofa country. I ndeed, in nationalizing employment in re tail tra de the ri ght of choice of an e mployer i s not i mpaired but its sphere is me rely l i mited to the ci tizens to the e xclusion of those of other nationalities. falls within the s cope of police power, thru which a nd by which the State insures i ts existence and securityand the supreme welfare of its citizens W H E R E F O R E , t h e d e c i s i on a p pe a l e d f ro m i s re ve rs e d. T h i s p re l i m i na ry i n j u n c ti o n issued bythe trial court onDecember 6, 1958 is herebylifted. The petition for mandamus is dismissed, withcosts against appellees. Bustamante vs. NLRC, 1996 Petitioner Osmalik S. Bustamante, PaulinoA. Bantayan, Fernando L. Bustamante, MarioD. Sumonod, and Sabu J. Lamaran Respondent NationalLabor Relations Commission, Fifth DivisionandEvergreenFarms, Inc. Ponente Padilla, J. Docket Number andDate of Decision G.R. No. 111651, November 28, 1996 Significance of the Case In this landmark case, the Supreme Court (SC) ruled that backwagesdue an employee on account of his illegal dismissalshould not be diminished or reduced bythe earnings derivedbyhim elsewhere during the periodof hisillegal dismissal. This case finallyabandonedthe “MercuryDrug” rule and“deduction ofearnings elsewhere” rule then prevailingat that time. Historical Backdrop Prior to the present case, SChadapplied different methods inthe computation ofbackwages.
- 7. 7 Backwagesunder RA 875.Under RA 875, the Court of IndustrialRelations (CIR) was given wide discretionto grant or disallow payment of backpay(backwages) to an employee, it alsohad the impliedpower of reducing the backpaywhere backpaywas allowed. Inthe exercise of its jurisdiction, the CIR canincrease or diminish the awardof backpay, dependingon several circumstances, among them, the goodfaithof the employer, the employee’s employment in other establishments during the period ofillegaldismissal, or the probabilitythat the employee could have realized net earnings fromoutside employment if he had exercised due diligence to search for outside employment. This methodcaused undue delayinthe dispositionof illegal dismissal cases. Cases are usuallyheld up in the determinationof whether or not the computationof the awardof backwages is correct. Mercury Drug Rule . Inorder prevent undue delayin the disposition ofillegaldismissal cases, the SC found occasion inthe case ofMercuryDrug Co vs. CIR, 1974, to rule that a fixed amount of backwageswithout further qualifications shouldbe awarded to anillegallydismissedemployee. In subsequent cases (adopting the proposal of Justice Teehankee), backwages equivalent to three years (unless the case is not terminated sooner) wasmade the base figure for suchawards without deduction, subject to deduction where there are mitigating circumstancesinfavor of the employer but subject to increase bywayof exemplarydamageswhere there are aggravating circumstances (e.g. oppressionor dilatoryappeals) onthe employer’s part. On 1 November 1974, the Labor Code of the Philippines took effect. Article 279 of the saidcode provides: “[...] An employee whois unjustlydismissed from workshall be entitledto reinstatement without loss of seniorityrights and to hisback wages computed fromthe time his compensationwas was withheldfromhim up to the time of his reinstatement.” The above provisionnothwithstanding, the rule generallyappliedbythe Court after the promulgationof theMercuryDrug case, and during the effectivityof P.D. No. 442 was still the MercuryDrug rule. Ineffect, this qualifiedthe provisionunder P.D. No. 442 bylimiting the award ofbackwagesto 3 years. “Deductionof Earnings Elsewhere” Rule. When RA 6715 took effect on21 March 1989, the pertinent portionof Article 279 of the Labor Code wasamendedto readas follows: “[...] An employee whounjustlydismissedfrom work shall be entitledto reinstatement without loss of seniorityrights and other privilegesand to his fullbackwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetaryequivalent computedfrom the time hiscompensationwas withheldfromhim upto the time of his actual reinstatement.” In accordance withthe above provision, anillegallydismissedemployee is entitledto his full backwagesfrom the time of his illegal dismissal upto the time of hisactual reinstatement. Despite the amendment, however, ina subsequent case, Pines CityEducational Center vs. NLRC, 1993, the Court returnedto the rule prior to the MercuryDrug rule that the total amount derived from employment elsewhere bythe employee from the date ofdismissal upto the date of reinstatement, if any, shouldbe deductedfrom backwages. The rationale for such rulingwas that, the earning derivedelsewhere bythe dismissedemployee while litigating the legalityof his dismissal, should be deducted fromthe fullamount of backwages which the law grants him upon reinstatement, so as not to undulyor unjustlyenrichthe employee at the expense of the employer. Issue Whether or not the income derivedbythe employee elsewhere duringthe periodof his illegal dismissal shouldbe deductedfrom the awardof backwages. Ruling Conformablywiththe evident legislative intent of RA 6715, backwages to be awarded to an illegallydismissedemployee, should not, as a general rule, be diminishedor reducedbythe earnings derivedbyhimelsewhere duringthe periodof hisillegaldismissal. The underlying reason for this ruling is that the employee, while litigating the legality(illegality) of his dismissal, must stillearna livingto support himself and family, whilefull backwages have to be paidbythe employer as part of the price or penaltyhe has to payfor illegallydismissing his employee. The clear legislative intent of the amendment inRA 6715 is to give more benefits to workers than was previouslygiven themunder the MercuryDrug rule or the “deduction ofearnings elsewhere” rule. Thus, a closer adherence to the legislative policybehindRA 6715 points to “full backwages” as meaningexactlythat, i.e., without deducting from backwagesthe earnings derivedelsewhere by the concerned employee during the periodof his illegal dismissal. In other words, the provision calling for “full backwages” to illegallydismissedemployees is clear, plainandfree from ambiguity and, therefore, must be appliedwithout attempted or strained interpretation. Index animi sermo est (literally“speechis the index ofintention”). US v. Toribio Full Text: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1910/jan1910/gr_l-5060_1910.html Facts: The appellant slaughteredor causedto be slaughteredfor humanconsumption the carabao described inthe information, without a permit from the municipal treasurer of the municipality whereinit wasslaughtered, in violationof the provisions of sections 30 and33 of Act No. 1147, an Act regulating the registration, branding, andslaughter of large cattle. It appears that inthe townof Carmen, in the Province ofBohol, whereinthe animal was slaughteredthere is no municipal slaughterhouse, andcounsel for appellant contends that under such circumstances the provisions of Act No. 1147 do not prohibit nor penalize the slaughter of large cattle without a permit ofthe municipal treasure. Issue: Whether or not the proper constructionof the language of these provisions limit the prohibition containedin Section30 andthe penaltyimposedinSection 33 to cases: (1) of slaughter of large cattles for humanconsumptionin a municipalslaughter house without a permit dulysecured from the municipaltreasurer, and (2) cases of killing of large cattle for foodina municipal slaughter-house without a permit duly secured from the municipaltreasurer. Held: The prohibitioncontained in section30 refers (1) to the slaughter of large cattle for human consumption, anywhere, without a permit duly secured from the municipaltreasurer, and (2) expresslyandspecificallyto the killingfor food oflarge cattle at a municipal slaughterhouse without suchpermit;andthat the penaltyprovided insection33 appliesgenerallyto the slaughter
- 8. 8 of large cattlefor humanconsumption, anywhere, without a permit dulysecuredfromthe municipal treasurer, and specificallyto the killing for foodof large cattle at a municipal slaughterhouse without suchpermit. Sections 30 and 33 prohibit andpenalize the slaughter for humanconsumption or killing for food at a municipal slaughterhouse ofsuchanimals without a permit issuedbythe municipal treasurer, and section32 provides for the keeping of detailedrecords ofallsuchpermits inthe office ofthe municipal and alsoof the provincial treasurer. Where the language of a statute is fairlysusceptible oftwo or more constructions, that constructionshouldbe adopted whichwill most tend to give effect to the manifest intent of the lawmaker andpromote the object for which the statute was enacted, anda construction should be rejectedwhichwouldtendto render abortive other provisions ofthe statute andto defeat the object whichthe legislator sought to attainbyits enactment. Therefore, sections 30 and33 of the Act prohibit andpenalize the slaughteringor causing to be slaughteredfor humanconsumptionof large cattle at anyplace without the permit providedfor insection30. PLANTERS ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHERN NEGROS INC., petitioner, vs. HON. BERNARDO T. PONFERRADA, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, BRANCH 42; HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT; BINALBAGAN – ISABELA SUGAR COMPANY, INC., and NATIONAL CONGRESS OF UNIONS IN THE SUGAR INDUSTRYOF THE PHILIPPINES (NACUSIP),respondents. D E C I S I O N PURISIMA, J.: “Nowhere is the economic disparity between labor and capital so evident than in the sugar industry. While it is the lowlyfarm worker who must toil in the field under the harshness of conditions, it is the planter who gets to enjoy more the fruits of production. While the planter lives in the comfort of his palatial home, the living condition of the sugar farm worker more often than not defies the basic tenets of human dignity.”[1] At bar is a Petition for Reviewon Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules ofCourt seeking to review andset aside the August 8, 1993 Decision[2] andJanuary21, 1994 Resolution[3] of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental, Branch 42,[4] BacolodCity, inCivil Case No. 6894 for DeclaratoryRelief. The antecedent facts that matter canbe culledas follows: Prior to the passage of Republic Act No. 6982, entitled An Act Strengthening the Sugar Amelioration Program in the Sugar Industry, Providing the Mechanics for its Implementation, and for other Purposes, there were two principal laws providing additional financialbenefits to sugar farm workers, namely: Republic Act No. 809 andPresidential Decree No. 621. Republic Act No. 809[5] (implementable in milling districts with anannualgross productionof 150,000 piculs or more), institutionalizedproduction sharing scheme, inthe absence of any private agreement betweenthe planters andfarm workers, depending onthe mill’s total productionfor each immediatelypreceding cropyear;andspecificallyproviding that anyincrease in the planters’ share shallbe dividedin the following manner: 40% of the increase shall accrue to the planter and60% to the farm workers.[6] On the other hand, Presidential Decree No. 621,[7] as amended, charged a lien ofP2.00 per picul on all sugar produced, to be pooledintoa fundfor subsequent distributionas bonuses to sugar workers.[8] Thus, before R.A. No.6982, there were two sets of beneficiaries under the social amelioration program in the sugar industry: 1) Beneficiaries under R.A. No. 809 andP.D. No. 621;and 2) Beneficiaries under P.D. No. 621 only. (Inmilling districts where the annual gross production is less than150,000 piculs) On May24, 1991, Republic Act No. 6982 took effect. It imposeda lien of P5.00 per picul onthe gross productionof sugar beginning sugar crop year 1991-1992, withanautomatic additional lien of P1.00 for everytwo (2) years for the succeeding ten(10) years fromthe effectivityof the Act subject to the discretionof the Secretaryof Labor andEmployment anduponrecommendationof the Sugar Tripartite Council.[9] Directlyaddressing the effect of the newP5.00 per picul lienvis-à-vis the twopreviouslyexisting laws, Section12 of R.A. No. 6982, provides: “Section. 12. Benefits under Republic Act No. 809 and P.D. 621, as Amended. - All liens and other forms of production sharing in favor of the workers in the sugar industry under Republic Act No. 809 and Presidential Decree No. 621, as amended, are hereby substituted by the benefits under this Act: Provided, That cases arising from such laws pending in the courts or administrative bodies at the time of the effectivityof this Act shall not be affected thereby. In connection therewith, Section14 of the same Act further states: “Section 14. Non-Diminution of Benefits.-The provisions of Section 12 hereof notwithstanding, nothing in this Act shall be construed to reduce any benefit, interest, right or participation enjoyed by the workers at the time of the enactment of this Act, and no amount received by any beneficiary under this Act shall be subject to any form of taxation.” Private respondent Binalbagan-Isabela Sugar Company(BISCOM) is engagedinthe businessof, among others, milling rawsugar cane ofvarious sugar plantations intheir millingdistrict. For the crop year 1991–1992, the sugar farm workers’ share inBISCOM, under R.A. No. 809 amounted to P30, 590,086.92.[10] Under P.D. No.621, the workers’ benefit for the same crop year amountedto P2,233,285.26, computedas follows: Gross productionof BISCOM 1,595,184.46 (In Piculs) Less: 30% BISCOMShare 478,555.33 70% Planter Share 2,116,626.13 MultipliedbyP2.00 lien x P2.00 TOTAL P2,233,258.26[11] But considering that the P2.00 lienunder P.D. No.621 is obviouslylesser thanthe P5.00 lien under R.A. No.6982, the same was no longer imposedbyBISCOMpursuant to R.A. No.6982. Hence, before R.A. No.6982 tookeffect, the total farm workers’ benefit was: Under R.A. No. 809 P30,590,086.92 Under P.D. No. 621 2,233,258.16 P32,823,345.18 Upon the effectivityof R.A. No.6982, the total workers’ benefit inBISCOM’s milling district was computedas follows: Gross Productionof BISCOM 1,595,184.46 (In Piculs) Less: 30% BISCOMshare 478,555.34 70% Planter Share 1,116,629.12 Multiplied by P5.00 lien x P5.00 TOTAL FARMWORKERS’ BENEFIT P5,583,145.61[12] Meanwhile, pending a definite ruling onthe effect of R.A. No. 6982 to R.A. No. 809 and P.D. No. 621, respondent Secretaryof Labor issued Department Order No.2 (1992),[13] directing, inter alia, the three milling districts in Negros Occidental, namely: SONDECO, SanCarlos andhereinprivate
- 9. 9 respondent BISCOM, tocontinue implementingR.A. No.809 per recommendationof the Sugar Tripartite Council. Consequently, the petitioner, Planters Associationof Southern Negros Inc. (PASON), an organizationof sugar farm plantationowners milling withprivate respondent BISCOM, filedwith the respondent court a Petition for DeclaratoryReliefagainst the implementationof the saidD.O. No. 2. It theorized that inview ofthe substitution ofbenefits under Section12 of R.A. No. 6982, whatever monetaryrewards previouslygranted to the sugar farm workers under R.A. No. 809 and P.D. No. 621 were deemed totallyabrogatedand/or superseded.[14] On August 18, 1993, the respondent Court came out with the assailedDecision;the dispositive portionof which held: “WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby declares: 1. That the benefits under RA 6982 do not and cannot supersede or substitute the benefits under RA 809 in milling districts where the latter law was already in implementation at the time of the effectivityof RA 6982; and 2. That the sugarcane workers in the BISCOM milling district shall continue to enjoy the benefits under RA 809 in addition to the benefits that will henceforth be provided for by RA 6982 now being implemented byprivate respondent. SO ORDERED.”[15] With the denialof its motionto reconsider the aforesaidDecision, petitioner foundits wayto this Court via the present petition. The petitionis not visited bymerit. From a cursoryreading ofSection12[16] of R.A. No. 6892, the inevitable conclusionwouldbe that the benefits under R.A. No.809 andP.D. No. 621 have been supersededbythose grantedunder the new law. This substitution, however, appears to be qualified bySection 14[17] whichdisallows substitution if its effect wouldbe to diminishor reduce whatever financial benefits the sugar farm workers are receiving under existing laws at the time ofthe effectivityof R.A. No. 6289. How then shouldSection12 of R.A. No. 6982 be interpretedinlight of the qualificationunder Section14 of the same Act? Petitioner insists that the word“substitution” inSection12 shouldbe takeninits literalsense consideringthat the intention ofCongressto effect a substitutionof benefits is clear and unequivocal. Under this interpretationof “unqualifiedsubstitution”, the sugar farmworkers in the subject milling district will receive onlyP5,583,145.61 under R.A. No.6289, as against the P32,823,345.18 to which the workers were entitledunder P.D. 621 and R.A. No. 809. So also, invoking the Opinion[18] “It is believedthat the benefits conferreduponlabor byRA 809 have been supersededbythose granted to it under RA 6982. This conclusionis inescapable froma reading of Section12 of the latter law, as well as its repealing clause (Sec. 16). Indeed, the production-sharingscheme decreedinRA 809 cannot remainin force upon the effectivityof the new production-sharing procedure prescribed inRA 6982;otherwise, sugar workers wouldbe receiving two kinds of financial benefits simultaneously. The substitution, however, of sugar workers benefits under RA 809 byRA 6982 is qualified by Section14 of the latter. This sectionprovides that if the effect ofsuch substitution willbe to diminishor reduce whatever monetaryrewards sugar industrylaborers are receivingunder RA 809, then such workers shall continue to be entitledto the benefits providedinsuch law. Expressed otherwise the production-sharing scheme inRA 6982 does not applyto sugar industryworkers inmillingdistricts where its applicationwouldbe financiallydisadvantageous to them, in whichcase the existing production-sharing agreement based onRA 809 shall still govern.” (OpinionNo. 115, S. 1992 dated September 2, 1992, signedbyJustice SecretaryFranklin Drilon.)18 of the Secretaryof Justice, petitioner contends, inthe alternative, that the application of R.A. No. 809 can be maintainedbut inno case shouldthe benefits thereunder be implemented in additionto R.A. No. 6982. Applyingthis interpretation, the share of the sugar farm workers wouldamount toP30,590,086.92. On the other hand, under the interpretation espousedbythe public respondent (that the benefits conferredbyR.A. No.6982 shouldcomplement those grantedbyR.A. No. 809 whichcannot be superseded bythe former Act since Section14 thereof prohibits diminutionof benefits), the total worker’s benefit wouldbe as follows: R.A. No. 809 P30,590,086.92 R.A. No. 6982 __,583,145.61 P36,173,232.53 It is a well-settledrule of legal hermeneutics that each provisionof law shouldbe construedin connection witheveryother part so as to produce a harmonious whole and everymeaning to be given to eachwordor phrase is ascertainedfromthe context of the bodyof the statute.[19] Ut magis valeat quam pereat.[20]Consequently, laws are givena reasonable construction such that apparentlyconflictingprovisions are allowed to standandgiveneffect byreconciling them, reference being hadto the moving spirit behindthe enactment of the statute.[21] Applyingthe abovestated doctrine, Section12 therefore, whichapparentlymandates a total substitution byR. A. No. 6982 of all the benefits under R.A. No. 809 andP.D. No. 621 existing at the time of the effectivityof R.A. No. 6982, can not be construed apart from Section14 which prohibits such substitutionif the effect thereofwouldbe to reduce anybenefit, interest, right or participationenjoyedbythe worker at the time R.A. No. 6982 took effect. The Court finds as untenable the interpretationof the petitioner basedanunqualifiedsubstitutionof the benefits under R.A. No. 809 andP.D. No. 621 bythe monertaryrewards conferredbyR.A. No. 6982 in the amount of P5,583,145.61 as against the P36,173,232.53 previouslyenjoyedbythe sugar farm workers under the former laws. It bears stressingthat the primordial objective behindthe enactment ofR.A. No. 6982 was to augment the income of sugar workers byestablishing a social ameliorationprogramincases where sugar farm workers hadnone, andat the same time, to improve whatever amelioration schemesalreadyexistinginthe sugar districts concerned.[22] In recognitionof the avowed guarantee under Section3, Article 13 of the Constitutionto upholdthe right of workers to a just share in the fruits of production, the policyof R.A. No. 6982 states: “Section 1. Policy. – It is the policy of the State to further strengthen the rights of workers in the sugar industry to their just share in the fruits of production by augmenting their income and, among other schemes, institutionalizing the mechanism among the partners in the sugar industry to enable the workers and their families to enjoy a decent living.” (Emphasis supplied) The foregoing studiedlyconsidered, there can be noother construction that wouldbest promote the welfare of the sugar farm workers, thanthe interpretation ofthe public respondent, implementing R.A. No. 6982 as a complement to R.A. No. 809. Citing the floor deliberations ofCongress,[23] petitioner insists that the non-diminutionof benefits referredto inSection14 pertains onlyto pending claims of the workers at the time of the effectivityof the Act. Stateddifferently, it is contendedthat the benefits to whichthe workers are entitledunder R.A. No. 809 andP.D. No. 601 can be validlydiminishedbyvirtue of the application of R.A. No. 6982, because the non-diminution provision inSection14 thereof refers to pending claims accruingunder P.D. 621 and R.A. No. 809, and not to the verybenefits previouslyenjoyed bythe workers under the saidlaws. With this construction, from a total benefit ofP32,823,345.18 conferredbyR.A. No. 809 and P.D. No. 621, the sugar workers wouldonlybe entitled to a meager amount of P5,583,145.61. The contentionis barrenof sustainable merit. To limit the applicationof the non-diminution principle onlyto pendingclaims would be repulsive not onlyto the policyof the Act but alsoto the salutoryprovisions of the Constitution. Verily, the glaring disparity
- 10. 10 of P27,240,199.57 betweenP32,823,345.18 andP5,583,145.61 wouldnot warrant suchan interpretation. As aptlyratiocinated[24] bythe respondent Court, the evolutionof legislation inthe sugar industryhadalways hadfor its foremost concern the advancement of the lot of the sugar farm worker. Hence, through the years everylaw or decree enacted pursuant thereto had always provided for anincrease inwages andbenefits. The reasonis obvious. Amidst the rapidly changing, if not worsening, economic conditions prevalent in the industry, the sugar worker can hardlycope with his meager income to leanon. Equallywantingof merit is the allegeddouble recoveryunder the interpretation subscribedbythe public respondent. Note that hadnot R.A. No. 6982 beenenacted, sugar farmworkers would be entitledto a total a share of P32,823,345.18 under R.A. No. 809 andP.D. No. 621;whereas under the alternative viewof the petitioner, maintaining the benefits (P30, 509,086.92) grantedbyR.A. No. 809 to the exclusion of the benefits providedbyR.A.No. 6982, sugar farm workers standto lose the difference of P2,233,258.56, from a total of P32,823,345.18 which theywere entitled before RA 6982 took effect. Certainly, such a disadvantageous constructioncannot be countenanced, beingviolative of the non-diminutionprinciple under Section14 of R.A. No. 6982. In view ofthe foregoing, the additionof the monetaryrewards under R.A. No. 6982 to the benefits grantedbyR.A. No. 809, is what is called for inthe case under consideration. While it is true that “addition” is different from “substitution”, the circumstancesinvolving subject milling districts (where the sugar farm workers are enjoying benefits bothfrom R.A. No. 809 and P.D. No. 621 prior to the effectivityof R.A. No. 6982), necessitate the grant of pecuniaryadvantage under R.A. No. 809 as a complement to R.A. No. 6982. Otherwise, the workers would suffer a diminutionof benefits. Therefore, the increase of monetaryadvantage infavor of the sugar farm workers, as a consequence of suchinterpretation, is merelyincidentalto the applicationof the non-diminution policyof R.A. No. 6982, a labor provision which shouldbe liberallyconstruedto further its purpose.[25] Neither does the Court find convincingthe interpretationproposedbyprivate respondent BISCOM. While maintaining the applicationof R.A.No.809 and P.D. No. 621 (where the total share of the workers is P32,823,345.18), anddisregarding R.A. No. 6892, would be beneficial to the sugar farm workers, to the mindof the Court, the assailedconstruction ofthe public respondent (where the totalshare of the workers is P36,173,232.53), wouldbe more inkeeping with the spirit of R.A. No. 6982 which is: to improve the living conditionof workers inthe sugar industry. Betweentwostatutoryinterpretations, that which better serves the purpose ofthe law should prevail.[26] Premises studiedlyconsidered, the Court is of the ineluctable conclusion, andsoholds, that the respondent Court ventured not in anyjudicial legislation but merelygave life to the avowedpolicy of the State under Section 18, Article 2 of the 1987 Constitution, whichstates: “Sec. 18. The state affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall guarantee the rights of workers and promote their welfare.” WHEREFORE, the Petitionis DENIED;and the assailedDecisioninCivil Case No. 6894, dated August 18, 1993, of the RegionalTrialCourt of Negros Occidental, Branch42, Bacolod City, AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur. Villanueva v. COMELECCase Digest **When literal import must yield to spirit/intent Villanueva v. COMELEC No. L – 54718 (December 4, 1986) FACTS: On January25, 1980, Petitioner fileda certificate of candidacyfor Vice Mayor of Doloresfor the January30 elections in substitution for his companion Mendoza whowithdrew candidacy without oathuponfiling onJanuary4. Petitioner won inthe electionbut Respondent Board disregardedall his votes and proclaimed Respondent Candidate as the winner on the presumption that Petitioner’s candidacywas not dulyapprovedbyRespondent. Petitioner filed a petitionfor the annulment of the proclamationbut was dismissedbyRespondent Commission on the grounds that Mendoza’s unsworn withdrawal had no legal effect, and that assuming it was e ffective, Petitioner’s candidacywas not valid since Mendoza did not withdrawafter January4. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner shouldbe disqualifiedon the ground of formal or technicaldefects. HELD: No. The fact that Mendoza’s withdrawal was not sworn is a technicality, which shouldnot be used to frustrate the people’s will infavor of Petitioner as the substitute candidate. Also, his withdrawal right on the very same day that he filed hiscandi dacyshouldbe considered as havingbeen made substantiallyandintruth after the last day, even going bythe literal readingof the provisionbyRespondent Commission. The spirit of the law rather thanits literal reading shouldhave guidedRespondent Commission in resolving the issue of last- minute withdrawal andsubstitutionof other persons as candidates. **When thereason of thelaw ceases, the law itself ceases COMMENDADOR VS. DE VILLA [200 SCRA 80; G.R. NO. 93177; 2 AUG 1991] Thursday, February12, 2009 PostedbyCoffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, PoliticalLaw Facts:The petitioners inG.R. Nos. 93177 and96948 who are officers ofthe AFPwere directed to appear inperson before the Pre-Trial Investigating Officers for the allegedparticipationthe failed coup on December 1 to 9, 1989. Petitioners nowclaim that there was nopre-trial investigation of the charges as mandated byArticle of War 71. A motionfor dismissal wasdenied. Now, their motionfor reconsideration. Allegingdenial of due process. In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot appliedfor bailon June 5, 1990, but the applicationwas denied byGCM No.14. He filedwiththe RTCa petition for certiorari and mandamus withprayer for provisional libertyanda writ ofpreliminaryinjunction. Judge ofGCMthen grantedthe provisional liberty. However he was not released immediately. The RTCnowdeclared that even militarymen facingcourt martialproceedings canavail the right to bail. The private respondents inG.R. No. 97454 filedwithSCa petition for habeas corpus onthe ground that theywere beingdetained inCampCrame without charges. The petitionwas referred to RTC. Findingafter hearing that noformalcharges had beenfiledagainst the petitioners after more thana year after their arrest, the trial court orderedtheir release.
- 11. 11 Issues: (1) Whether orNot there wasa denial ofdue process. (2) Whether or not there was a violation ofthe accusedright to bail. Held: NO denialof due process. Petitioners were givenseveral opportunities to present their side at the pre-trial investigation, first at the scheduledhearing ofFebruary12, 1990, and thenagainafter the denial of their motion ofFebruary21, 1990, when theywere givenuntil March7, 1990, to submit their counter-affidavits. On that date, theyfiledinsteada verbal motionfor reconsideration which theywere againaskedto submit inwriting. Theyhad beenexpresslywarned inthe subpoena that "failure to submit counter-affidavits onthe date specifiedshallbe deemeda waiver of their right to submit controverting evidence."Petitioners have a right to pre-emptorychallenge. (Right to challenge validityof members of G/SCM) It is arguedthat since the private respondents are officers of the Armed Forces accusedof violations of the Articles of War, the respondent courts have noauthorityto order their release and otherwise interfere withthe court-martial proceedings. This is without merit. * The Regional Trial Court has concurrent jurisdictionwith the Court of Appeals andthe Supreme Court over petitions for certiorari, prohibitionor mandamus against inferior courts andother bodies andon petitions for habeas corpus andquowarranto. The right to bail invokedbythe private respondents hastraditionallynot been recognized andis not available inthe military, as anexceptionto the generalrule embodied inthe Bill of Rights. The right to a speedytrial is givenmore emphasis inthe militarywhere the right to bail does not exist. On the contentionthat theyhad not beenchargedafter more than one year fromtheir arrest, there was substantialcompliance withthe requirements of due processandthe right to a speedy trial. The AFPSpecial Investigating Committee was able to complete the pre-charge investigation onlyafter one year because hundreds of officers andthousands ofenlistedmen were involvedin the failedcoup. Accordingly, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is dismissedfor lack of merit. InG.R. No. 96948, the petitionis granted, and the respondents are directedto allowthe petitioners to exercise the right of peremptorychallenge under article 18 of the articles of war. InG.R. Nos. 95020 and97454, the petitions are alsogranted, andthe orders of the respondent courts for the release ofthe private respondents are herebyreversedandset aside. No costs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WENCESLAO ALMUETE FERNANDO FRONDA, FAUSTO DURION and CIPRIANO FRONDA, defendants-appellees. Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio G. Ibarra and Solicitor Vicente A. Torres for appellant. Emiliano D.Castellanes for appellees. AQUINO, J.: Wenceslao Almuete FernandoFronda, CiprianoFronda andFaustoDurionwere charged witha violationof section39 of the Agricultural TenancyLaw. It was allegedin the informationthat in December, 1963, in Muñoz, Nueva Ecija the accusedbeing tenants of Margarita Fernandoinher riceland, without notice to her or without her consent, pre-thresheda portion oftheir respective harvests of five (5) cavans of palayeachto her damage inthe amount of P187.50 at P12.50 a cavan (Criminal Case No. SD-179, Court of First Instance ofNueva Ecija, Sto. DomingoBranch VI).chanroblesvirtual law library Upon arraignment the accused pleadednot guilty. Theyfiledmotionfor a bill of particulars as to the exact date of the commissionof the offense charged. The lower court denied their motion because theyhad alreadyenteredtheir plea.chanrobles virtual law library Thereafter, they-fileda motion to quashthe information onthat grounds (1) that it does not allege facts sufficient to constitute the crime charged; (2) that there is nolaw punishing it, and (3) that the court has, no jurisdiction over the allegedtime The fiscal opposed the motion. The lower court grantedthe motionanddismissedthe information in its order of August 11, 1966. It heldthat the information is basicallydeficient because it does not describe lie circumstances under which the cavans ofpalaywere foundinthe possessionof the accusedtenants;it doesnot specifythe date agreedupon for the threshing of the harvests, and it does not allege that the palayfound inthe tenants' possessionexceededtenpercent of their net share based onthe last normal harvest.The prosecutionappealedfromthe order of dismissal. The Solicitor General argues inhis briefthat the informationin thiscase alleges all the elements ofthe offense defined in section39 of Republic Act No. 1199, as amendedof Republic Act No. 2263. Sections 39 and57 of the same law reads as follows: SEC. 39. Prohibition on Pre-threshing. - It shall be unlawful for either the tenant or landholder, without mutual consent, to reapor thresh a portionof the cropat anytime previous to the date set for its threshing-That if the tenant n food for his familyand the landholder doesnot or cannot furnishsuchandrefuses to allow the tenant to reap or thresha portion ofthe crop previous to the date set for its threshing, the tenant canreapor thresh not more thantenpercent ofhis net share in the last normal harvest after givingnotice thereof to the landholder or his representative. Any violationof this situationbyeither partyshall be treatedandpenalized inaccordance withthis Act and/or under the general provisions of law applicable to that act committed. SEC. 57. Penal Provision. - Violationof the provisions of... sections thirty-nine andforty-nine of this Act shall be punishedbya fine not exceeding twothousandpesos or imprisonment not exceedingone year, or both, inthe discretionof the Court. ... * We holdthat the order of dismissal shouldbe affirmedbecause as heldin People vs. Adillo, L-23M, November 27, 1975, a case similar to the instant case, section99 was impliedlyrepealedbythe Agricultural LandReform Code of1963, as amendedbyRepublic Act No. 6389 168 O.G. 915) and as implemented byPresidential Decrees Nos. 2, 27 and 316. That Code was alreadyin force when the act complained ofwas committed. The repeal maybe rationalizedin thismanner: The prohibitionagainst pre-reaping or pre-threshing found insection39 of the Agricultural TenancyLaw of 1954 is premisedon the existence of the rice share tenancysystem. The evident purpose is to prevent the tenant andthe landholder from defrauding eachother in the division of the harvests.chanrobles virtual law library The Agricultural Land Reform Code supersededthe Agricultural TenancyLaw (except as qualified in sections 4 and 35 of the Code). The Code institutedthe leasehold system and abolished share tenancysubject to certain conditions indicatedinsection4 thereof. It is significant that section39 is not reproducedinthe Agricultural LandReform Code whose section172 repeals"all laws or part of anylaw inconsistent with" its provisions.chanrobles virtuallawlibrary
- 12. 12 Under the leaseholdsystemtheprohibitionagainst pre-threshing hasno, more raisond'etre because the lessee is obligated to paya fixedrental as prescribedinsection34 of the Agricultural Land ReformCode, or the Code of AgrarianReforms, as redesignatedinRepublic Act No. 6389 which took effect onSeptember 10, 1971. Thus, the legalmaxim, cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex (the reason for the lawceasing, the lawitself alsoceases). applies to thiscase.chanrobles virtual law library Section4 of the Code of AgrarianReforms declaredagricultural share tenancythroughout the countryas contraryto public policyand automaticallyconvertedit to agricultural leasehold. Presidential Decree No. 2 proclaimedthe entire country"as a landreform area". Presidential Decree No. 27 emancipatedthe tenant fromthe bondage ofthe soil. AndPresidentialDecree No. 316 interdicted the ejectment or removal of the tenant-farmer fromhis farmholdinguntil the promulgationof the rules and regulations implementing PresidentialDecree No. 27. (See People vs. Adillo, supra).chanrobles virtual law library The legislative intent not to punishanymore the tenant's act ofpre- reaping andpre-threshing without notice to the landlordis inferable from the fact that, as alreadynoted, the Code of Agrarian Reforms didnot reenact section 39 of the Agricultural TenancyLaw andthat it abolished share tenancywhichis the basisfor penalizingclandestine pre-reaping and pre- threshing.chanrobles virtual law library All indications point to a deliberate andmanifest legislative designto replace the Agricultural TenancyLaw withthe Code of AgrarianReforms, formerlythe Agricultural LandReform Code, at least as far as ricelands are concerned.chanrobles virtual law library As held inthe Adillocase, the act of pre-reapingandpre-threshingwithout notice to the landlord, which is anoffense under the Agricultural TenancyLaw, hadceased to be anoffense under the subsequent law, the Code of AgrarianReforms. To prosecute it as anoffense whenthe Code of Agrarian Reforms is alreadyinforce wouldbe repugnant or abhorrent to the policyandspirit of that Code andwouldsubvert the manifest legislative intent not to punishanymore pre -reaping and pre-threshingwithout notice to landholder.chanrobles virtual law library It is a rule oflegal hermeneutics that "anact which purports to set out infullallthat it intends to contain operates as a repeal of anything omittedwhichwas containinthe oldact and not included in the amendatoryact" (Crawford, Construction ofStatutes, p. 621 citedinthe Adillo case).chanrobles virtual law library A subsequent statute, revising the whole subject matter of a former statute, andevidently intendedas a substitute for it, operates to repealthe former statute" (82 C.J.S. 499). 'The revising statute is in effect a 'legislative declarationthat whatever is embracedin the newstatute shall prevail, andwhatever is excludedtherefrom shall be discarded" (82 C.J.S. 500).chanrobles virtual law library The repeal of appeal law deprives the courts ofjurisdictionto punishpersons chargedwitha violationof the oldpenal law prior to its repeal(People vs. Tamayo, 61 Phil. 225;People vs. Sindiong andPastor, 77 Phil. 1000;People vs. Binuya, 61 Phil. 208;U.S. vs. Reyes, 10 Phil. 423;U.S. vs. Academia, 10 Phil. 431. See dissent inLagrimasvs. Director ofPrisons, 57 Phil. 247, 252, 254).chanrobles virtual lawlibrary WHEREFORE, the order of dismissalis affirmedwith costs de oficio.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary SO ORDERED. Fernando (Chairman), Antonio, Concepcion, Jr. and Martin, JJ., concur.chanrobles virtual law library Barredo, J., took no part.chanrobles virtual law library Martin, J., was designated to sit in the Second Division. Endnotes: * Appellees' contentionthat the Court of First Instance had nojurisdictionover the offense because inferior courts have jurisdiction over offenseinwhichthe penaltyis imprisonment for not more thanthree years, or a fine of not more three thousandpesos, or both such fine and imprisonment andthat it is the Muñoz municipalcourt that hasjurisdictionis wrong. The Court of First Instance has concurrent jurisdictionwiththe inferior court in mm inwhichthe penalty provided bylaw is imprisonment for more thansix months, or a fine of-more thantwo hundred pesos (Sec. 44[f], JudiciaryLaw). Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC TITLE: Romualdez-Marcos vs.COMELEC CITATION: 248 SCRA300 FACTS: Imelda, a little over 8 years old, inor about 1938, establishedher domicile inTacloban, Leyte where she studied andgraduatedhigh school in the HolyInfant Academyfrom 1938 to 1949. She then pursuedher college degree, education, inSt. Paul’s College nowDivine Word Universityalso in Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still inTacloban. She went to manila during 1952 to work withher cousin, the late speaker Daniel Romualdez inhisoffice inthe House ofRepresentatives. In 1954, she married late President FerdinandMarcos whenhe was still a Congressmanof Ilocos Norte and wasregisteredthere as a voter. WhenPres. Marcos was electedas Senator in1959, theylivedtogether inSanJuan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when Marcos wonpresidency, theylivedinMalacanangPalace and registeredas a voter in SanMiguel Manila. She served as member of the Batasang Pambansa andGovernor of Metro Manila during 1978. Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position ofRepresentative of the First District of Leyte for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo RoyMontejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte andalsoa candidate for the same position, filed a “Petitionfor Cancellationand Disqualification" with the CommissiononElections alleging that petitioner didnot meet the constitutionalrequirement for residency. The petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote sevenmonths under residency, whichshe sought to rectifybyaddingthe words "since childhood" in her Amended/CorrectedCertificate ofCandidacyfiledon March29, 1995 and that "she has always maintainedTaclobanCityas her domicile or residence. She arrived at the sevenmonths residencydue to the fact that she became a resident ofthe Municipalityof Tolosa insaid months. ISSUE:Whether petitioner has satisfiedthe 1year residencyrequirement to be eligible inrunning as representative ofthe First District of Leyte. HELD: Residence is used synonymouslywithdomicile for election purposes. The court are in favor ofa conclusionsupporting petitoner’s claimof legal residence or domicile inthe First District of Leyte despite her owndeclarationof 7 months residencyin the district for the following reasons: 1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Taclobanbecame Imelda’s domicile of origin by operationof lawwhenher father brought them to Leyte;
- 13. 13 2. Domicile oforigin is onlylost when there is actualremoval or change of domicile, a bona fide intention ofabandoning the former residence and establishinga newone, andacts which correspond withthe purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these,domicile oforigin should be deemed to continue. 3. A wife doesnot automaticallygain the husband’s domicile because the term “residence” in Civil Law does not meanthe same thing in Political Law. WhenImelda marriedlate President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile oforiginandmerelygaineda newhome andnot domicilium necessarium. 4. Assumingthat Imelda gaineda new domicile after her marriage andacquired right to choose a new one onlyafter the deathof Pres. Marcos, her actions uponreturning to the countryclearly indicatedthat she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add, petitioner evenobtainedher residence certificate in1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living inher brother’s house, anact, whichsupports the domiciliaryintentionclearlymanifested. She even kept close tiesbyestablishing residencesinTacloban, celebratingher birthdays andother important milestones. WHEREFORE, havingdeterminedthat petitioner possessesthe necessaryresidence qualifications to run for a seat inthe House ofRepresentatives inthe First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questionedResolutions datedApril 24, May7, May11, and May25, 1995 are herebySET ASIDE. Respondent COMELECis herebydirected to order the Provincial Boardof Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the dulyelectedRepresentative ofthe First District of Leyte. **b. ut magis valeat quam pereat: construe statuteas a whole i. Harmonize and give effects to all provisions whenever possible;reconcile apparently conflicting provisions NATIONAL TOBACCO ADMINISTRATION represented herein by Administrator AMANTE SIAPNO, EVANGELISTA A. GARCIA, RICARDO BRIONES, CLARITA B. CASTRO, CRISTINA LOPEZ, JESUS C. BONDOC and ROSALINA C. CARINO, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent. D E C I S I O N PURISIMA, J.: At bar is a petition for reviewon certiorari under Rule 45 of the RevisedRulesof Court to review and set aside the decisionof the Commission onAudit[1]dated February7, 1995 in COA Decision No. 95-108.[2] The NationalTobacco Administration(NTA, for short), under Executive Order No. 116, as amended byExecutive Order No. 245,[3] is a government-ownedandcontrolledcorporation (GOCC, for brevity) tasked to supervise andimprove the viabilityof the tobaccoindustryin thiscountry. On August 9, 1989, Congress passedRepublic Act No. 6758,[4] entitled “An Act Prescribing a Revised Compensation and Position Classification in the Government and for Other Purposes.” On October 2, 1989, pursuant to Section23 of saidlaw, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issuedCorporate Compensation Circular No. 10 (CCC No. 10) to serve as the ImplementingRulesandRegulations of R.A. No. 6758. Pertinent records show that evenprior to the effectivityof Republic Act No. 6758, officialsand employees of the NTA have been enjoying Mid-Year Social Amelioration Benefit equivalent to one- and-a half (1 1/2) monthof their basic salary. From1989 to 1993, however, the saidbenefit was reducedto one (1) monthof the basic salarydue to financial/budgetaryconstraints. In May, 1993, the nomenclature ofsubject social amelioration benefit was changedto educational assistance in order to reflect the rationale behind the same, whichis to encourage its beneficiaries to pursue graduate studiesand to finance the schooling of their children. Sometime in February, 1994, Miss DalisayE. Aracan, Resident Auditor of NTA, issueda Notice of Disallowance of the payment of the educational assistance for calendar year 1993, opining that the NTA has no statutoryauthority to grant the incentive. InJanuary, 1995, the same Resident Auditor caused the disallowance of the same benefit paidin1994, for the same reason. On April 25, 1994, the petitioners appealed to the CommissiononAudit, praying for the lifting of the disallowance inquestion, pointingout that: (1) Benefits received byemployees as of July1, 1989 not integratedinto the standardizedsalaryrates shall continue to be authorized, pursuant to Section12 of R.A. 6758; (2)the benefit having beenreceived for somanyyears, even prior to the effectivityof the SalaryStandardizationLawof 1989, has been a vestedright, onthe part of the recipients and (3) suchallowance regularlygranted, forms part of the totalcompensation package of NTA Officers andemployees, and, therefore, the disallowance thereof amounts to unathorized diminutionof pay. On February7, 1995, the Commission onAudit came out withits questionedDecisionthe pertinent portionof which, reads: “After a thorough evaluation, this Office believes and so holds that the disallowance of the Auditor on the payment of the mid-year social amelioration benefits or the educational assistance benefits is in order. It bears stress that Sec. 5.6 of CCC No. 10 (Implementing R.A. 6758) is so explicit when it provides that: ‘Payment of other allowances/fringe benefit and all other forms of compensation granted on top of basic salary, whether in cash or in kind, not mentioned in Sub-Paragraphs 5.4 and 5.5 above shall be discontinued effective November 1, 1989. Payment made for such allowance/fringe benefits after said date shall be considered as illegal disbursement of public Funds.’ Since the educational assistance or the mid- year social amelioration is not among those allowances mentioned in Sub-pars. 5.4 and 5.5 of CCC No. 10, the same shall be discontinued effective November 1, 1989 and considering that NTA paid its officials/employees this type of allowance, such payment shall be considered as illegal disbursement of public funds. The provision of Sec. 12 second sentence thereof as invoked by the Administrator should be read in conjunction with the first sentence thus - ‘Consolidation of Allowances and Compensation - All allowances except for representation and transportation allowances;clothing and laundry allowances;subistence [sic] allowance of marine officers and crew on board government vessels and hospital personnel; hazard pay; allowances of foreign service personnel stationed abroad; and such other additional compensation not otherwise specified herein as may be determined by the DBMshall be deemed included in the standardized salary rates herein prescribed. Such other additional compensation, whether in cash or in kind, being received by incumbents only as of July1, 1989 not integrated into the standardized salary rates shall continue to be authorized.” xxx xxx xxx xxx Premises considered and for lack of legal basis, the herein request of the Administrator, NTA for the lifting of the disallowance in question, may not be given due course.”[5] [Underscoring; supplied] Undaunted, petitioners found their wayto this Court via the present Petition for Review on Certiorari, filed onApril 24, 1995, seekingthe annulment of the saidCOA Decision;theorizing that the respondent Commissionon Audit erred: I.
- 14. 14 IN HOLDING THATTHEPAYMENT OF SUBJECT SOCIAL AMELIORATION /EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE BENEFIT - A BENEFIT CONTINUOUSLY BEINGRECEIVED BY INDIVIDUAL PETITIONERS AND OTHER NTA EMPLOYEES STARTING WAY BEFORE THEEFFECTIVITY OF THE SALARYSTANDARDIZATION LAW (R.A. 6758) ON 1 JULY 1989 - IS NOT AUTHORIZED UNDER THESAME LAW (R.A. 6758) OR IS OTHERWISE WITHOUT LEGAL BASIS; II. IN FAILINGTO REALIZEAND CONSIDERTHAT THE DISALLOWANCE OF THE PAYMENT OF SUBJECT SOCIAL AMELIORATION/EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE BENEFITIS CONSTITUTIVE OF DIMINUTION OF COMPENSATION PROSCRIBEDUNDEREXISTING LAWSAND IN VIOLATION OF THE GENERAL WELFARE CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION; III. IN FAILINGTO RECOGNIZE THAT INDIVIDUAL PETITIONERS AND OTHERSIMILARLY SITUATEDNTA EMPLOYEES HAVE ACQUIRED A VESTED RIGHT OVER SAIDSOCIAL AMELIORATION/EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE BENEFITAND COA’s DISALLOWANCE THEREOF ISAN ILLEGAL VIOLATION OF SUCH RIGHT. Petitioners raise the pivotalissues: (1) whether or not the social ameliorationor educational assistance benefit givento the individualpetitioners prior to enactment of R.A. 6758 is authorized under the law, (2) whether or not the disallowance of the saidbenefit is tantamount to diminution of pay, and (3) whether or not the individual petitioners have acquired a vestedright thereover. First Issue: Proper Interpretation of Sections 12 and 17 of R.A. 6758 in Relation to Sub-paragraphs 4.1, 5.4 and 5.5 of Corporate Compensation Circular No.10, the Implementing Rules and Regulation of R.A. 6758. A. Sections 12 and17 of R. A. 6758, read: “Section 12: Consolidation of Allowances and Compensation - All allowances, except for representation and transportation allowances;clothing and laundry allowances;subsistence allowance of marine officers and crew on board government vessels and hospital personnel; hazard pay; allowances of foreign service personnel stationed abroad; and such other additional compensation not otherwise specified herein as may be determined by the DBM, shall be deemed included in the standardized salary rates herein prescribed. Such other additional compensation, whether in cash or in kind, being received by incumbents only as of July 1, 1989 not integrated into the standardized salary rates shall continue to be authorized. Existing additional compensation of any national government official or employee paid from local funds of a local government unit shall be absorbed into the basic salary of said official or employee and shall be paid by the National Government.” while “Section17. Salaries ofIncumbents - Incumbents of positions presentlyreceiving salaries and additional compensation/fringe benefits including those absorbed from local government units and other emoluments, the aggregate of which exceeds the standardized salary rate as herein prescribed, shall continue to receive such excess compensation, which shall be referred to as transition allowance. The transition allowance shall be reduced by the amount of salary adjustment that the incumbent shall received [sic] in the future.” B. Section4.1 of CCCNo. 10: 4.0 DEFINITION OF TERMS 4.1 The present salary of an incumbent for purposes of this Circular shall refer to the sum total of actual basic salary including allowances enumerated hereunder, being received as of June 30, 1989 and certified and authorized by the DBM. 4.1.1 Cost-of-Living Allowance (COLA)/BankEquity Pay (BEP) equivalent to forty percent (40%) of basic salary or P300.00 per month, whichever is higher; 4.1.2 Amelioration Allowance equivalent to ten percent (10%) of basic salary or P150.00 per month, which ever is higher; 4.1.3 COLA granted to GOCCs/GFIs covered by the Compensation and Position Classification Plan for the regular agencies/offices of the National Government and to GOCCs/GFIs following the Compensation and Position Classification Plan under LOImp. No. 104/CCC No. 1 and LOImp. No. 97/CCC No. 2, in the amount of P550.00 per month for those whose monthlybasic salary is P1,500.00 and below, and P500.00 for those whose monthlybasic salary is P1,501.00 and above, granted on top of the COLA/BEPmentioned in Item 4.1.1 above; 4.1.4 Stabilization Allowance; and 4.1.5 Allowance/fringe benefits converted into “Transition Allowance” pursuant to Memorandum Order No. 177, as implemented byCorporate Budget Circular No. 15, both series of 1988. 4.2 Allowances enumerated above are deemed integrated into the basic salary for the position effective July1, 1989. 4.3 Transition allowance, for purposes of this circular shall mean the excess of the present salary of the incumbent defined in Item 4.1 hereinabove, over the eighth step of the Salary Grade to which his position is allocated. C. Sub-Paragraphs 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6 of CCC. No. 10: 5.0 IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES xxx xxx xxx 5.4 The rates of the following allowances/fringe benefits which are not integrated into the basic salary and which are allowed to be continued after June 30, 1989 shall be subject to the condition that the grant of such benefit is covered by statutory authority. 5.4.1 Representation and Transportation Allowances (RATA) of incumbent of the position authorized to receive the same at the highest amount legally authorized as of June 30, 1989 of the level of his position within the particular GOCC/GFI; 5.4.2 Uniform and Clothing Allowance at a rate as previously authorized; 5.4.3 Hazard Pay as authorized by law; 5.4.4 Honoraria/additional compensation for employees on detail with special projects of inter- agency undertakings; 5.4.5 Honoraria for services rendered by researchers, experts and specialists who are of acknowledged authorities in their field of specialization; 5.4.6 Honoraria for lecturers and resource persons/speakers; 5.4.7 Overtime Pay in accordance to Memorandum Order No. 228; 5.4.8 Clothing/laundry allowances and subsistence of marine officers and crew on board GOCCs/GFIs owned vessels and used in their operations, and of hospital personnel who attend directly to patients and who by nature of their duties are required to wear uniforms; 5.4.9 Quarters Allowance of officials and employees who are presentlyentitled to the same; 5.4.10 Overseas, Living Quarters and other allowances presentlyauthorized for personnel stationed abroad; 5.4.11 Night Differential of personnel on night duty; 5.4.12 Per Diems of members of governing Boards of GOCCs/GFIs at the rate as prescribed in their respective Charters; 5.4.13 Flying Pay of personnel undertaking aerial flights; 5.4.14 Per Diems/Allowances of Chairman and Members/Staff of collegial bodies and Committees;and 5.4.15 Per Diems/Allowances of officials and employees on official foreign and local travel outside of their official station;
- 15. 15 5.5 Other allowances/fringebenefits not likewise Integrated into the basic salary and allowed to be continued only for incumbents as of June 30, 1989 subject to the condition that the grant of the same is with appropriate authorization either from the DBM, Office of the President or legislative issuances are as follows: 5.5.1 Rice Subsidy; 5.5.2 Sugar Subsidy; 5.5.3 Death Benefits other than those granted by the GSIS; 5.5.4 Medical/Dental/Optical Allowances/Benefits; 5.5.5 Children’s Allowance; 5.5.6 Special Duty Pay/Allowance; 5.5.7 Meal Subsidy; 5.5.8 Longevity Pay; and 5.5.9 Teller’s Allowance. 5.6 Payment of other allowances/fringe benefits and all other forms of compensation granted on top of basic salary, whether in cash or in kind, not mentioned in Sub-paragraphs 5.4 and 5.5 above shall be discontinued effective November 1, 1989. Payment made for such allowances/fringe benefits after said date shall be considered as illegal disbursement of public funds.” Petitioners maintain“that since theyhave beenreceivingthe socialamelioration or educational assistance benefit before July1, 1989, when R.A. No. 6758 took effect, and the benefit was not integrated into their standardizedsalaryrate, theyare entitledto receive it evenafter the effectivityof the said Act.”[6] Theybase their claim onthe second sentence ofSection12 andon Section17 of the SalaryStandardizationLawwhich, for the sake ofthoroughness andclarityof discussion, we deem it expedient to quote again, to wit: “Second Sentence of Section12, R.A. 6758 - xxx. Such other additional compensation, whether in cash or in kind, being received by incumbents only as of July 1, 1989 not integrated into the standardized salary rates shall continue to be authorized;” x x x “Section17: Salaries of Incumbents - Incumbents of positions presentlyreceiving salaries and additional compensation /fringe benefits including those absorbed from local government units and other emoluments, the aggregate of which exceeds the standardized salary rate as herein prescribed, shall continue to receive such excess compensation, which shall be referred as transition allowance. The transition allowance shall be reduced by the amount of salary adjustment that the incumbent shall received in the future.” It is the submissionof the Commissionon Audit that payment ofthe educationalassistance in question is not authorizedunder Republic Act No. 6758, arguing “that the provisionof Sec. 12, second sentence thereof as invokedbythe Administrator [representing the petitioner herein] should be read inconjunctionwiththe first sentence...;”[7] and if the entire Section12 is further consideredin relationto sub-paragraphs 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6 of CCCNo. 10, respondent concluded that the grant ofsubject educationalassistance wouldhave nolegal basis at all. Confusionas to the proper interpretationof Section12 springs from two seeminglycontradictory provisions. The last clause ofthe first sentence of Section 12, reads: [A]nd such other additional compensation not otherwise specified herein as maybe determined by the DBM shall be deemed included in the standardized salary rates herein prescribed;” while the second sentence of Section12 is to the followingeffect: “Such other additional compensation, whether in cash or in kind, being received by incumbents only as of July 1, 1989 not integrated into the standardized salary rates shall continue to be authorized.” Before proceedingto rule on the proper interpretationof the two provisos aforecited, the salient features ofthe provisionas a whole shouldfirst be pondered upon and tackled. Under the first sentence ofSection12, all allowances are integrated intothe prescribedsalary rates, except: (1) representation and transportationallowances (RATA); (2) clothing andlaundryallowances; (3) subsistence allowancesof marine officers andcrew onboard government vessels; (4) subsistence allowance ofhospital personnel; (5) hazard pay; (6) allowance of foreignservice personnel stationed abroad;and (7) such other additionalcompensation not otherwise specified in Section12 as may be determined by the DBM. Analyzing No. 7, whichis the last clause of the first sentence of Section 12, in relationto the other benefits thereinenumerated, it canbe gleanedunerringlythat it is a “catch-all proviso.” Further reflectiononthe nature ofsubject fringe benefits indicatesthat all of themhave one thing in common - theybelong to one category of privilege called allowances which are usuallygrantedto officialsand employeesof the government to defrayor reimburse the expensesincurredinthe performance of their officialfunctions. InPhilippine Ports Authority vs. Commissionon Audit,[8] this Court rationalizedthat “if theseallowances are consolidatedwith the standardized rate, thenthe government official or employee will be compelledto spendhis personal funds in attending to his duties.” The conclusion - that the enumeratedfringe benefits are inthe nature of allowance - finds support in sub-paragraphs 5.4 and 5.5 of CCCNo. 10. Sub-paragraph5.4 enumeratesthe allowance/fringe benefits which are not integratedintothe basic salaryandwhich maybe continuedafter June 30, 1989 subject to the condition that the grant of such benefit is covered bystatutoryauthority, to wit: (1) RATA; (2) Uniform and Clothing allowances; (3) Hazardpay; (4) Honoraria/additional compensationfor employees ondetailwith special projects or inter- agencyundertakings; (5) Honoraria for services renderedbyresearchers, experts and specialists whoare of acknowledgedauthoritiesintheir fields of specialization; (6) Honoraria for lectures andresource persons or speakers; (7) Overtime payinaccordance to Memorandum Order No. 228; (8) Clothing/laundryallowances andsubsistence allowance ofmarine officers and crewon board GOCCs/GFIs owned vessels and used intheir operations, andof hospital personnel who attend directlyto patients andwhobynature of their dutiesare required to wear uniforms; (9) Quarters Allowance of officialsandemployees whoare presentlyentitledto the same; (10) Overseas, LivingQuarters andother allowances presentlyauthorizedfor personnel stationed abroad; (11) Night differentialof personnel onnight duty; (12) Per Diems ofmembers of the governing Boards ofGOCCs/GFIs at the rate as prescribedin their respective Charters; (13) Flying payof personnel undertaking aerial flights; (14) Per Diems/Allowancesof ChairmanandMembers or Staffof collegial bodies and Committees; and (15) Per Diems/Allowancesof officialsandemployees on official foreign and local travel outside of their official station. In addition, sub-paragraph5.5 of the same Implementing Rules providesfor the other allowances/fringe benefits not likewise integratedintothe basic salaryandallowedto be
- 16. 16 continuedonlyfor incumbents asof June 30, 1989 subject to the condition that the grant of the same is with appropriate authorizationeither from the DBM, Office ofthe President or legislative issuances, as follows: (1) Rice Subsidy; (2) Sugar Subsidy; (3) Death Benefits other than those granted bythe GSIS; (4) Medical/Dental/Optical Allowances/Benefits; (5) Children’s Allowances; (6) Special DutyPay/Allowance; (7) Meal Subsidy; (8) LongevityPay;and (9) Teller’s Allowance. On the other hand, the challenged financial incentive is awarded bythe government inorder to encourage the beneficiariesto pursue further studies andto helpthem underwrite the expenses for the education oftheir children anddependents. In other words, subject benefit is in the nature offinancial assistance andnot of an allowance. For the former, reimbursement is not necessarywhile for the latter, reimbursement is required. Not onlythat, the former is basically an incentive wage which is defined as “a bonus or other payment made to employeesinaddition to guaranteedhourlywages”[9] while the latter cannot be reckonedwithas abonus or additional income, strictlyspeaking. It is indeed decisivelyclear that the benefits mentionedinthe first sentence of Section12 and sub-paragraphs 5.4 and5.5 of CCCNo. 10 are entirelydifferent from the benefit indispute, denominated as Educational Assistance. The distinctionelucidateduponis material inarriving at the correct interpretationof the two seeminglycontradictoryprovisions ofSection12. Cardinal is the rule instatutoryconstruction “that the particular words, clauses andphrases should not be studiedas detached andisolatedexpressions, but thewhole andeverypart of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning ofanyof its parts andinorder to produce a harmonious whole. A statute must soconstruedas to harmonize andgive effect to all its provisions whenever possible.”[10] And the rule - that statute must be construedas a whole - requiresthat apparentlyconflicting provisions shouldbe reconciled and harmonized, if at all possible.[11] It is likewise a basic precept in statutoryconstructionthat the intent of the legislature is the controlling factor in the interpretationof the subject statute.[12] With these rulesandthe foregoing distinctionelaboratedupon, it is evident that the two seeminglyirreconcilable propositions are susceptible to perfect harmony. Accordingly, the Court concludes that under the aforesaid “catch-all proviso,” the legislative intent is just to include the fringe benefits which are in the nature ofallowances andsince the benefit under controversyis not inthe same category, it is safe to hold that subject educationalassistance is not one ofthe fringe benefits within the contemplation ofthe first sentence of Section 12 but rather, of the secondsentence of Section 12, in relationto Section 17 of R.A. No. 6758, consideringthat (1) the recipients were incumbents when R.A. No. 6758 took effect on July1, 1989, (2) were, in fact, receiving the same, at the time, and (3) such additionalcompensationis distinct andseparate fromthe specific allowances above- listed, as the former is not integrated into the standardizeds alaryrate. Simplystated, the challengedbenefit is covered bythe second sentence ofSection12 of R.A. No. 6758, the applicationof sub-paragraphs 5.4 and5.5 of CCC No. 10 beingonlyconfinedto the first sentence of Section 12, particularlythe last clause thereof which amplifies the “catch-all proviso.” Furthermore, the non-inclusionbythe Department of Budget andManagement ofthe controvertededucational assistance inSub-paragraphs 5.4 and5.5 of CCCNo. 10 is expected since the term allowance does not include the questionedbenefit which belongs to a different genus. The argument that the said fringe benefit shouldbe disallowedonthe ground that it is not mentionedinthe ImplementingRules of the Statute is consequentlyfallacious. It is a settled rule oflegal hermeneutics that the implementingrules andregulations (CCCNo. 10, in this case) cannot amendthe act of Congress (R.A. 6758). The secondsentence of R.A. No. 6758 expresslyprovides that “such additional compensation ... beingreceived byincumbents ... not integratedintothe standardizedsalaryrates shall continue to be authorized.” To be sure, the said Circular cannot go beyondthe terms andprovisions ofthe statute as to prohibit something permittedandallowedbylaw.[13] The Circular cannot extend the law or expandits coverage as the power to amendor repeal a statute is vestedinthe legislature.[14] Conformably, as mandatedbythe secondsentence of Section12, in relation to Section17 of the Republic Act under interpretation, the mid-year educational assistance shouldcontinue to be authorized. THE SECOND AND THE THIRD ISSUES: That the Disallowance of the Payment of Subject Educational Assistance Constitutes Diminution of Compensation; That the NTA Employees Have Already Acquired a Vested Right Over the Same. Gleanable from the wordings of the secondsentence of Section 12 of R.A. No. 6758 is the intention ofCongressto prevent anydiminution ofthe payand benefits being receivedby incumbents at the time of the enactment of the SalaryStandardization Law. Verily, disallowing anysuch benefit is against the spirit ofthe Statute and is inconsistent withthe principle of equity which “regards the spirit andnot the letter...”[15] of the law. Hence, while it cannot be saidthat the NTA employeeshave acquireda vestedright over the educational assistance indispute as it is always subject to availabilityof funds,[16] nevertheless, disallowing the same, where funds are available as inthe case under consideration, would be violative ofthe principle of equity. WHEREFORE, the petitionis herebyGRANTED;the assailed COA Decision No. 95 - 108 is SET ASIDE, andthe disallowance inquestion LIFTED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), and LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ACIL CORPORATION,respondents. D E C I S I O N MENDOZA, J.: Private respondent Acil Corporationowned several hectares ofLand Linoan, Montevista, Davao del Norte, which the government tookpursuant to the Comprehensive AgrarianReform Law (R.A. No. 6657). Private respondent’s certificates of title were cancelledandnew ones were issued and distributed to farmer-beneficiaries. The lands were valuedbythe LandBank ofthe Philippinesat P19,312.24 per hectare for the ricelandand P4,267.68 per hectare for brushland, or for a total of P439,105.39. It appears, however, that inthe Statement of AgriculturalLandholdings (“LISTASAKA”) whichprivate respondent hadearlier filedwiththe Department ofAgrarian Reform (DAR), a lower “Fair Value Acceptable to Landowner” was statedandthat based onthis statement, the Land Bankof the Philippines valuedprivate respondent’s lands uniformlyat P15,311.79 per hectare andfixed the amount of P390,557.84 as the totalcompensation to be paidfor the lands.
- 17. 17 Private respondent rejectedthe government’s offer, pointingout that nearbylands plantedto the same crops were valuedat the higher price of P24,717.40 per hectare. The matter was brought before the Provincial AgrarianReform Adjudicator (PARAD) who, on October 8, 1992, sustained the initial valuationmade bythe LBP. On December 12, 1992, private respondent filed a Petitionfor Just Compensationinthe Regional Trial Court of Tagum, Davaodel Norte, sitting as a SpecialAgrarian Court. Private respondent prayed that DARbe orderedto pay P24,717.40 per hectare. However, the RTCdismissed its petitionon the ground that private respondent shouldhave appealedto the Department of Agrarian Reform AdjudicationBoard (DARAB), pursuant to the latter’s RevisedRulesof Procedure, before recourse to it (the RTC) could be had. In additionthe RTCfoundthat, in violation ofthe DARAB’s rules ofprocedure the petitionhadbeenfiledmore thanfifteen(15) days after notice of the decisionof the PARAD. Private respondent moved for reconsiderationbut its motionwas deniedon October 13, 1994. Private respondent therefore filed a petitionfor certiorari withthe Court of Appeals, contending that a petition for just compensationunder R.A. No. 6657 §§56-57 falls under the exclusive andoriginaljurisdiction ofthe RTC. His contentionwas sustained bythe Court of Appeals which, inits decision[1] of October 4, 1995, set aside the order ofdismissal of the RTC. Accordingly, the case was remandedto the RTCfor further proceedings. In turn the government, representedbythe Department ofAgrarian Reform, filed thispetitionfor review on certiorari, raising as the issue whether incases involvingclaims for just compensation under R.A. No. 6657 an appeal from the decisionof the provincial adjudicator to the DARAB must first be made before a landowner canresort to the RTCunder §57. Petitioners sustain the affirmative proposition. Theycite §50 of R.A. No. 6657 which inpertinent part provides: §50. Quasi-judicial Powers of the Dar. – The DAR is herebyvestedwithprimaryjurisdictionto determine andadjudicate agrarianreform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involvingthe implementationof agrarianreform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdictionof the Department of Agriculture (DA) andthe Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)…. and argue that the fixing of just compensationfor the taking of lands under R.A. No. 6657 is a “[matter] involvingthe implementation ofagrarianreform” withinthe contemplation ofthis provision. Theyinvoke §16(f) of R.A. No. 6657, whichprovides that “anypartywho disagreesto the decision[of the DAR] maybringthe matter to the court of proper jurisdictionfor final determinationof just compensation,” as confirmingtheir constructionof §50. The contentionhas nomerit. It is true that §50 grants the DAR primaryjurisdictionto determine andadjudicate “agrarian reform matters” andexclusive original jurisdictionover “all matters involvingthe implementation of agrarianreform,” except those fallingunder the exclusive jurisdictionof the Department of Agriculture andthe Department of Environment andNaturalResources. It is also true, however, that §57 provides: §57. Special jurisdiction. – The SpecialAgrarian Court shall have original andexclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination ofjust compensationto landowners, andthe prosecution of all criminal offenses under this Act. the Rules ofCourt shallapplyto all proceedings before the Special AgrarianCourts, unlessmodifiedbythis Act. The Special AgrarianCourts shall decide all appropriate casesunder their special jurisdiction within thirty(30) days from submissionof the case for decision. Thus Special Agrarian Courts, which are Regional Trial Courts, are givenoriginalandexclusive jurisdictionover two categories ofcases, to wit: (1) “all petitions for the determinationof just compensation to landowners” and (2) “the prosecutionof all criminal offenses under [R.A. No. 6657].”[2] The provisions of §50 must be construedinharmonywiththisprovisionbyconsidering cases involving the determinationof just compensationandcriminal cases for violations ofR.A. No. 6657 as exceptedfrom the plenitude ofpower conferredon the DAR. Indeed, there is a reasonfor this distinction. The DAR is anadministrative agencywhichcannot be grantedjurisdictionover cases of eminent domain (for such are takings under R.A. No. 6657) and over criminal cases. Thus, inEPZA v. Dulay[3] and Sumulong v. Guerrero[4] we heldthat the valuationof propertyin eminent domainis essentiallya judicial functionwhichcannot be vested in administrative agencies, whilein Scoty’s Department Store v. Micaller[5] we struck downa law granting the thenCourt of Industrial Relations jurisdictionto trycriminal casesfor violations of the Industrial Peace Act. Petitioners alsocite Rule II, §5 andRule XIII, §1 of the DARAB Rules ofProcedure insupport of their contentionthat decisions of agrarian reform adjudicators mayonlybe appealedto the DARAB. These rulesprovide: Rule II §5. Appellate Jurisdiction. The Board shall have exclusive appellate jurisdictionto review, reverse, modify, alter or affirm resolutions, orders, decisions, andother dispositions ofits [regionalandprovincial agrarianreform adjudicators]. Rule XIII, §1. Appeal to the Board. – a) An appeal maybe takenfromanorder or decisionof the Regional or Provincial Adjudicator to the Boardbyeither of the parties or both, bygivingor stating a writtenor oral appeal withina periodof fifteen(15) days from the receipt ofthe resolution, order or decisionappealedfrom, and servinga copythereof onthe opposite or adverse party, if the appeal is in writing. b) An oral appeal shall be reduced intowriting bythe Adjudicator to be signedbythe appellant, and a copythereof shall be serveduponthe opposite or adverse partywithin ten (10) days from the taking of oralappeal. Apart from the fact that onlya statute canconfer jurisdictionon courts andadministrative agencies – rules ofprocedure cannot – it is noteworthythat the New Rulesof Procedure of the DARAB, whichwas adopted onMay30, 1994, now provide that in the event a landowner is not satisfied witha decisionof anagrarianadjudicator, the landowner canbringthe matter directlyto the Regional Trial Court sitting as Special AgrarianCourt. Thus Rule XIII, §11 of the newrules provides: §11. Land Valuation and PreliminaryDetermination and Payment of Just Compensation. The decisionof the Adjudicator on land valuationandpreliminarydetermination and payment ofjust compensation shallnot be appealable to the Boardbut shallbe brought directlyto the Regional Trial Courts designatedas SpecialAgrarian Courts within fifteen(15) days fromreceipt of the notice thereof. Anypartyshall be entitledto onlyone motionfor reconsideration. (Emphasis supplied) This is an acknowledgment bythe DARAB that the decision ofjust compensationcases for the taking of lands under R.A. No. 6657 is a power vestedin the courts. Thus, under the law, the LandBank ofthe Philippinesis chargedwith the initial responsibilityof determining the value oflands placedunder land reform andthe compensationto be paidfor their taking.[6] Through notice sent to the landowner pursuant to §16(a)of R.A. No. 6657, the DAR makes anoffer. In case the landowner rejects the offer, a summaryadministrative proceedingis held[7] andafterward the provincial (PARAD), the regional(RARAD) or the central (DARAB) adjudicator as the case maybe, depending onthe value of the land, fixes the price to be paidfor the land. Ifthe landowner does not agree to the price fixed, he maybringthe matter to the RTC acting as Special AgrarianCourt.[8]Thisinessence is the procedure for the determinationof compensationcasesunder R.A. No. 6657. In accordance withit, the private respondent’s case was properlybrought byit inthe RTC, and it was error for the latter court to have dismissedthe case. Inthe terminologyof §57, the RTC, sittingas a Special AgrarianCourt, has“original and
- 18. 18 exclusive jurisdictionover allpetitions for the determination ofjust compensationto landowners.”[9] It wouldsubvert this “originalandexclusive” jurisdictionof the RTCfor the DARto vest originaljurisdictionincompensationcasesinadministrative officialsandmake the RTCan appellate court for the review ofadministrative decisions. Consequently, althoughthe new rules speakof directly appealingthe decisionof adjudicators to the RTCs sittingas SpecialAgrarian Courts, it is clear from §57 that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine such casesis inthe RTCs. Anyeffort to transfer such jurisdictionto the adjudicators and to convert the original jurisdictionof the RTCs into appellate jurisdiction would be contraryto §57 and therefore wouldbe void. What adjudicators are empoweredto dois onlyto determine in a preliminarymanner the reasonable compensation to be paid to landowners, leavingto the courts the ultimate power to decide this question. WHEREFORE the petitionfor review on certiorari is DENIEDandthe decisionof the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. Regalado (Chairman), Romero, Puno, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur. DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION, INC. VS CLEOFE JANIOLA AND HON. ARTHUR FAMINI, GR NO 184861, JUNE 30, 2009 FACTS Petitioner, filed a Complaint Affidavit against private respondent withthe Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas Cityfor violationof Batas PambansaBilang 22. Afterwards, private respondent, together withher husband, fileda complaint against petitioner for the rescissionof an allegedconstructionagreement betweenthe parties, as wellas for damages. Thereafter, private respondent filed for a Motion to Suspendproceedings alleging that for the rescission ofan allegedconstructionagreement betweenthe parties, as well as for damages. ISSUE WON the court seriouslyerredinnot perceivinggrave abuse of discretion onthe part of the inferior court when the latter ruledto suspend proceddings inCriminalCase Nos. 55554-61 on the basiso f “prejudicialquestion” in CivilCase No. LP-06-0197.[ RULING Private respondent cites Article 36 of the Civil Code. The Court does not agree withprivate respondent’s argument that a prejudicial questionexists whenthe civil actionis filed either before the institutionof the criminal actionor duringthe pendencyof the criminalactionandthat there is anapparent conflict inthe provisions ofthe Rulesof Court andthe Civil Code inthat the latter considers a civil caseto have presenteda prejudicialquestionevenifthe criminalcase preceded the filing of the civil case. it is a basic precept instatutoryconstruction that a “change in phraseologybyamendment of a provisionof law indicates a legislative intent to change the meaning ofthe provisionfrom that it originallyhad.”Inthe instant case, the phrase, “previouslyinstituted,” wasinsertedto qualifythe nature ofthe civil action involved ina prejudicial questioninrelation to the criminal action. This interpretationis further buttressed bythe insertionof “subsequent” directly before the term criminal action. There is no other logical explanationfor the amendments except to qualifythe relationshipof the civil andcriminalactions, that the civil actionmust precede the criminal action. Additionally, it is a principle instatutoryconstructionthat “a statute shouldbe construednot only to be consistent with itselfbut also to harmonize withother laws onthe same subject matter, as to form a complete, coherent andintelligiblesystem.”Thisprinciple is consistent withthe maxim, interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus or everystatute must be soconstruedandharmonizedwith other statutesas to form a uniformsystem of jurisprudence.[17]In other words, everyeffort must be made to harmonize seeminglyconflicting laws. It is onlywhenharmonizationis impossible that resort must be made to choosing which law to apply. In the instant case, Art. 36 of the Civil Code andSec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court are susceptible of aninterpretation that would harmonize bothprovisions oflaw. The phrase “previouslyinstitutedcivil action” inSec. 7 of Rule 111 is plainlyworded and is not susceptible of alternative interpretations. The clause “before anycriminal prosecution maybe institutedor may proceed” inArt. 36 of the Civil Code may, however, be interpreted to meanthat the motionto suspend the criminal actionmaybe filedduringthe preliminaryinvestigation withthe public prosecutor or court conducting the investigation, or during the trialwith the court hearing the case. This interpretationwouldharmonize all the mentionedlaws. Thus, under the principlesof statutoryconstruction, it is this interpretation ofArt. 36 of the Civil Code that should governin order to give effect to all the relevant provisions of law. Laguna Lake Development Authority vs.Court of Appeals Posted onNovember 18, 2012 G.R.No. 120865-71 December 7, 1995 Facts: The Laguna Lake Development Authority(LLDA) was created throughRA No. 4850 in order to execute the policytowards environmental protectionandsustainable development soas to accelerate the development andbalancedgrowthof the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces andtowns. PD No. 813 amendedcertainsections ofRA 4850 since water qualitystudies have shownthat the lake willdeteriorate further ifsteps are not takento checkthe same. EO 927 further definedandenlargedthe functions andpowers of the LLDA andenumeratedthe towns, cities andprovinces encompassed bythe term“Laguna de BayRegion”. Upon implementation of RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991), the municipalities assumed exclusive jurisdiction& authorityto issue fishing privilegeswithin their municipal waters since Sec.149 thereof provides:“Municipal corporations shall have the authorityto grant fishery privilegesinthe municipal waters and impose rental fees or chargestherefore…” Big fishpen operators tookadvantage ofthe occasionto establishfishpens & fishcages to the consternationof the LLDA. The implementationof separate independent policies in fishcages & fishpenoperation andthe indiscriminate grant of fishpenpermits bythe lakeshore municipalities have saturated the lake with fishpens, therebyaggravating the current environmental problems and ecological stress of Laguna Lake. The LLDA then servednotice to the generalpublic that (1) fishpens, cages & other aqua-culture structures unregistered withthe LLDA as of March31, 1993 are declaredillegal;(2) those declared illegalshallbe subject to demolitionbythe Presidential Task Force for Illegal FishpenandIllegal Fishing;and(3) owners of those declaredillegal shall be criminallychargedwithviolation of Sec.39-A of RA 4850 as amendedbyPD 813. A month later, the LLDA sent noticesadvising the owners ofthe illegallyconstructed fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures advising themto dismantle their respective structures otherwise demolition shall be effected.
- 19. 19 Issues: 1.Which agencyof thegovernment – the LLDA or the towns andmunicipalities comprising the region– shouldexercise jurisdictionover the Laguna lake andits environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fisheryprivileges is concerned? 2. Whether the LLDA is a quasi-judicial agency? Held: 1. Sec.4(k) of the charter of the LLDA, RA 4850, the provisions of PD 813,andSec.2 of EO No.927, specificallyprovide that the LLDA shall have exclusive jurisdictionto issue permits for the use of all surface water for anyprojects or activitiesinor affecting the saidregion. On the other hand, RA 7160 has granted to the municipalitiesthe exclusive authorityto grant fisheryprivileges on municipal waters.The provisions of RA7160 do not necessarily repeal the laws creating the LLDA and grantingthe latter water rights authorityover Laguna de Bayandthe lake region. Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute, latter should prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the general statute. The special law is to be taken as an exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion. Impliedrepeals are not favoredand, as muchas possible, effect must be givento all enactments ofthe legislature. Aspecial law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a subsequent general law by mere implication. The power of LGUs to issue fishing privileges was granted for revenue purposes. On the other hand, the power ofthe LLDA to grant permits for fishpens, fishcages, andother aqua-culture structures is for the purpose of effectivelyregulating & monitoringactivitiesinthe Laguna de Bay regionandfor lake control and management. It partakes of the nature of police power which is the most pervasive, least limitable and most demanding of all state powers includingthe power of taxation. Accordingly, the charter of the LLDA which embodies a valid exercise of police power should prevail over the LGC of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay. 2. The LLDA has expresspowers as a regulatoryandquasi-judicial bodyin respect to pollution cases with authorityto issue a “cease anddesist order” andon matters affectingthe construction of illegal fishpens, fish cages and other aqua-culture structuresinLaguna de Bay. Sec.149 of RA 7160 has not repealed the provisions of the charter of the LLDA, RA 4850, as amended. Thus, the LLDA has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for enjoyment of fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of municipalities situated therein and the authorityto exercise such powers as are by its charter vested on it. Magtajas Vs Pryce Properties G.R. No. 111097 July20, 1994 MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS & THE CITY OF CAGAYAN DE ORO, petitioners, vs. PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC. & PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION, FACTS: There was instant oppositionwhenPAGCOR announced the opening of a casinoin Cagayande Oro City. Civic organizations angrilydenouncedthe project.The trouble arose whenin1992, flush with its tremendous successinseveral cities, PAGCOR decidedto expandits operations to Cagayande Oro City.he reactionof the SangguniangPanlungsod ofCagayande Oro Citywas swift and hostile. On December 7, 1992, it enacted Ordinance No. 3353.Nor was thisall. On January4, 1993, it adopted a sterner Ordinance No. 3375-93Pryce assailedthe ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it wasjoined byPAGCOR as intervenor andsupplementalpetitioner. Their challenge succeeded. On March31, 1993, the Court of Appealsdeclaredthe ordinances invalid and issuedthe writ prayed for to prohibit their enforcement ISSUE:WON Ordinance 3353 and3375-93 valid HELD:No Local Government Code, localgovernment units are authorized to prevent or suppress, among others, "gambling andother prohibitedgames ofchance." Obviously, this provisionexcludes games ofchance whichare not prohibitedbut are infact permittedby law.The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances shouldnot contravene a statute is obvious.Casinogamblingis authorized byP.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified bya mere ordinance. Hence, it wasnot competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsodof Cagayande Oro Cityto enact Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use ofbuildings for the operationof a casino andOrdinance No. 3375-93 prohibitingthe operationof casinos. For all their praiseworthymotives, these ordinances are contraryto P.D. 1869 and the public policyannounced therein and are therefore ultra vires andvoid. Gaerlan vs Catubig Facts: In the 1963 elections, amongthe registered candidatesfor councilors in the eight -seatCityCouncil of Dagupanwere GregorioGaerlanandLuis Catubig. The latter obtained the third highest number of votes andwas proclaimed one of the elected councilors while the former lost his bid. Gaerlan went to the Court to challenge Catubig‘s eligibilityfor officeon the averment of non-age. Catubig was born in Dagupan Cityon May19, 1939. At the time he presented his certificate of candidacy on September 10, 1963, he was 24 years, 3 months and 22 days;on election day, November 12, 1963, he was 24 years, 5 months and24 days;andat the time he tookhis oath of office as councilor on January1, 1964,3 he was 24 years, 7 months and13 days. Whether his age be reckonedas of the date of the filingof certificate of candidacy, or the electiondate, or the date set by law for the assumptionof office the - result is the same. Whichever date is adopted, still, respondent was below 25 years of age. The judgment held Catubigineligible anddeclaredhisseat vacant. Catubig appealedand allegedthat the question of age eligibilityshouldbe governednot byR.A.170, and not byR.A. 2259. Republic Act No. 484 amending, inter alia, Section12 of the Dagupan CityCharter, took effect onJune 10, 1950; whereas, Republic Act No. 2259 became law onJune 19, 1959 - nine years later. R .A . 170, as amended Sec. 12 x xx the elective members of the MunicipalityBoard shall be qualified electors of the city, residents therein for at least one year, andnot less than twenty- three years of age. xxx" R .A .2 2 5 9 Sec. 6.No personshall be a CityMayor, Vice-Mayor, or Councilor unlesshe is at least
- 20. 20 twenty-five years ofage,resident of the cityfor one year prior to hiselectionandis a qualified voter. Issue: Whether or not Sec. 12 of R.A. 170 of the Dagupan CityCharter, as amended, hasbeen repealed bySec. 6 of R.A. 2259 Decision: Yes. The judgment appealedfromwas affirmed. The questionof whether or not a special law has been repealed or amended byone or more subsequent general laws is dependent mainlyonthe intent ofthe Congressinenacting the latter. The discussions onthe floor of Co ngress showbeyond doubt that its members intendedto amend o r repealall provisions ofspeciallaws inconsistent withthe provisions of Republic Act No. 2259, except those which are expresslyexcludedfromthe operationthereof. In fact, Section9 of R.A. 2259 states that All Acts or parts of Acts, Executive Orders, rules andregulations inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, are herebyrepealed. Section 1ofR.A. 2259 makes reference to "all charteredcitiesinthe Philippines‖, whereas Section8 excludes fromthe operationof the Act "the cities of Manila, Cavite, Trece Martires andTagaytay", andSection4 contains a proviso exclusivelyfor the Cityof Baguio, thusshowing clearlythat allcitiesnot particularlyexceptedfrom the provisions of saidAct are subject thereto. The onlyreference to DagupanCityin R.A. 2259 is found inSection2 stating that voters insaid city, and inthe City of Iloilo, are expresslyprecluded to vote for provincialofficials. Since Dagupan Cityis removed fromthe exceptions ofR.A. 2259, it stands to reason itselfthat its charter provisionon the age limit is therebyrepealed. Until Congress decrees otherwise, we are not to tamper with the present statutoryset-up. Rather, we shouldgo bywhat the legislative body has expresslyordained.It is accordinglyheldthat respondent is disqualifiedonthe groundof non - age because at the time he filedhiscertificate of candidacy, at the time of the election, and at the time he tookhis oath of office, he wasbelow the age of 25 years. City of Manila vs Genaro Teotico 22 SCRA 267 – Civil Law - Torts and Damages – Liabilityof municipal corporations in certain cases In January1958, at about 8pm, GenaroTeoticowas about to boarda jeepneyin P. Burgos, Manila when he fell intoanuncovered manhole. This causedinjuries uponhim. Thereafter he suedfor damages under Article 2189 of the Civil Code the Cityof Manila, the mayor, the cityengineer, the cityhealthofficer, the citytreasurer, and the chief of police. CFI Manila ruledagainst Teotico. The CA, on appeal, ruledthat the Cityof Manila shouldpaydamages to Teotico. The Cityof Manila assailed the decision ofthe CA on the ground that the charter of Manila states that it shall not be liable for damages causedbythe negligence of the cityofficers in enforcing the charter;that the charter is a special law andshall prevail over the Civil Code which is a general law;andthat the accident happenedinnational highway. ISSUE: Whether or not the Cityof Manilais liable inthe case at bar. HELD: Yes. It is true that incase of conflict, a special law prevailsover a general law;that the charter of Manila is a special law andthat the Civil Code is a generallaw. However, lookingat the particular provisions ofeachlawconcerned, the provisionof the Manila Charter exemptingit fromliability causedbythe negligence ofits officers is a general lawinthe sense that it exempts the cityfrom negligence of its officers ingeneral. There is noparticular exemptionbut merelya general exemption. On the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code provides a particular prescription to the effect that it makes provinces, cities, and municipalitiesliable for the damages causedto a certainperson byreasonof the “…defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other-public works under their control or supervision.” The allegationthat the incident happenedin a national highwaywas onlyraisedfor the first time in the City’s motionfor reconsideration inthe Court of Appeals, hence it cannot be given due weight. At anyrate, eventhoughit is a national highway, the law contemplates that regardlessif whether or not the roadis national, provincial, city, or municipal, so long as it is under the City’s control andsupervision, it shall be responsible for damagesbyreason ofthe defective conditions thereof. In the case at bar, the Cityadmittedtheyhave control andsupervisionover the road where Teoticofell whenthe Cityallegedthat it has beendoingconstant andregular inspectionof the city’s roads, P. Burgos included. City Government of SanPablo v. Reyes FACTS:Sec. 1 PD 551 provides that anyprovisionof law or localordinance to the contrary, the franchise tax payable byall grantees of franchise to generate, distribute, andsell electric current for light, heat, andpower shallbe 25 of their gross receipts. Sec. 137 of the LGCstates:Notwithstandinganyexemption granted byanylawor other special law, the province mayimpose a tax on business enjoyinga franchise at a rate not exceeding 50% of 1% of the gross annul receipts. RULING: the phrase is all-encompassing andclear that the legislature intended to withdraw all tax exemptions enjoyedbyfranchise holders andthis intent is made more manifest bySec. 193 of the Code, whenit provides that unlessotherwise providedinthiscode tax exemptions or incentives grantedto or presentlyenjoyed byall persons, except local water districts, cooperatives, andnon- stock and non-profit hospitals and educational institutions, are withdrawn upon the effectivityof the Code. LagmanvCityof Manila (QUICO) Lagman vs.City of Manila 17 SCRA 579 (1966) (Quico's version) Facts: Petitioner was granteda certificate ofpublic convenience bythe Public service Commissionto operate for public service fifteen (15) auti trucks withfixed routes andregular terminal for the transportationof passengers and freight. Pursuant to the saidcertificate, petitioner whois doing business under the name andstyle of“Marco Transit”, began operating twelve (12) passenger buses alonghis authorizedline. On june 17, 1964, the MunicipalBoardof respondent Cityof Manila, inpursuance to section 18, paragraphhh, ofRA no. 409, as amended(otherwise known as the RevisedCharter of the Cityof Manila), enactedordinance no. 4986, entitled“anordinance Rerouting Traffic on Roads and Streets withinthe Cityof Manila, andfor other purposes”, whichthe citymayor approved. The pertinent provisions of saidordinance includes; “Section1. As a positive measure to relieve the critical congestionin the Cityof Manila, which has grown to alarming and emergencyproportions, andinthe best interest of public welfare and convenience, xxx” Petitioner Lagmanclaims that the enactment andenforcement of ordinance no. 4986 is
- 21. 21 unconstitutional, illegal, ultravires, and null and void. He contends that regulation and control relatingto the use of andtraffic of whichare vested, under CommonwealthAct no. 548, in the Director of Public Works, subject to the approval of the Secretaryof Public Works and Communications. He also contends that the public Service Commissionhas the onlyright to enact Ordinance amending or modifying a certificate of public convenience grantedbythe saidoffice. In compliance withSec. 16(m), public service Act. Issue: WON R.A. no. 409, as amended(Revisedcharter of the Cityof Manila) prevails over CommonwealthAct no. 598 andPublic Service law (C.A. no. 146, as amended)? Held: Republic act no. 409 prevails. The said act is a special law and oflater enactment than C.A. no 548 and the Public Service law (C.A. no 146, as amended) sothat even if a conflict exist betweenthe provisions ofthe former andthe latter acts, Republic Act no. 409 shouldprevail. Although the Public Service Commission is empowered, under Sec. 16(m) ofC.A. no 146 to amend, modifyor revoke certificates of public convenience after notice and hearing, there is noprovision which canbe found inthis statute vesting power in the Public Service Commission to superintend, regulate or control the streets of the cityof manila or suspendits power to license or prohibit the occupancythereof. On the other hand, thisauthorityis conferreduponthe cityof manila. The power vestedinthe public service commissionunder section16(m) is, therefore, subordinate to the authoritygrantedto the saidcityunder section18(hh) of its revised charter. Furthermore, C.A. no. 548 does not confer anexclusive power or authorityuponthe Director of public works------topromulgate rules andregulations relating to the use ofandtraffic on national roads andstreets. This being the case, section 18(m) ofthe revisedcharter of the cityof manila is deemedenactedas anexceptionto the provisions of C.A. no. 548, for repeals byimplicationare not favored, andspecial law must be takenas intendedto constitute anexceptionto the general law, inthe absence ofspecialcircumstances forcinga contraryconclusion. Wherefore, petitionfor prohibitionis herebydismissed. Withcost against petitioner BenedictoC. Lagman. DELACRUZ VS PARAS De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators. Theyassailthe constitutionalityof Ord. No. 84, Ser. of 1975 or the Prohibition and Closure Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan. De la Cruz averredthat the said Ordinance violatestheir right to engage in a lawful business for the saidordinance would close out their business. That the hospitalitygirls theyemployed are healthyand are not allowed to go out with customers. Judge Paras however liftedthe TRO he earlier issuedagainst Ord. 84 after due hearing declaring that Ord 84. is constitutional for it is pursuant to RA 938 whichreads “AN ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND COUNCILSTHE POWER TO REGULATE THE ESTABLISHMENT,MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF CERTAINPLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVETERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS”. Paras ruledthat the prohibitionis a valid exercise of police power to promote generalwelfare. De la Cruz thenappealedciting that they were deprived ofdue process. ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacancan, prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade, the operationof night clubs, andthe pursuit ofa lawful occupation, suchclubs employing hostessespursuant to Ord 84 which is further in pursuant to RA 938. HELD: The SCruled against Paras. If night clubs were merelythenregulated andnot prohibited, certainly the assailed ordinance wouldpass the test of validity. SChadstressed reasonableness, consonant with the general powers and purposesof municipalcorporations, as wellas consistencywiththe laws or policyof the State. It cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise ofa lawmaking power byBocaue couldqualifyunder the term reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals, a worthyand desirable end can be attainedbya measure that does not encompass toowide a field. Certainlythe ordinance on its face is characterizedbyoverbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved couldhave been attainedbyreasonable restrictions rather thanbyan absolute prohibition. Pursuant to the title of the Ordinance, Bocaue shouldandcanonlyregulate not prohibit the businessof cabarets. Vda de Urbano v GSIS (2001) Vda De UrbanovGsis 2001 Facts In 1971, petitioners mortgaged their 200 sqm propertyinQ.C. to Gsis to secure a housingloan. Since theywere unable to paythe loan, GSISforeclosedthe mortgage in 1988. GSISbid154k on the propertyandemergedas the highest bidder. In 1984, the petitioners triedto reclaimtheir property. Theywrote to the GSISAcquiredAssets Department signifyingtheir intent to reclaim. On October 16, GSIS toldthem to paythe redemption price of154k in full before Nov18, 1984. The petitioners askedfor more time to recover the propertywhile the AcquiredAssets Department subsequentlytoldthem to pay174k in cashwithanextension of30 days to the November date. Failure to do soforfeitedthe reclamationof the propertyand soldina public bidding. The petitioners wrote againrequesting for remortgage through repurchase of the property. The Gsis AAD declined. The petitioners wrote to the Board for an approval to file a loanworth240,000 with the GSISreal estate department to repurchase their foreclosedproperty. Despite attempts from Vice Governor Mathayto adjust to a more liberal arrangement for the petitioners, the the petitioners were unable to pay. GSISthenissueda TCT in its favor. The respondent De La Cruz entered the picture andofferedto purchase the propertyfor 250,000 spot cash. Without knowledge of the rivaloffer, the petitioners thenoffereda 50,000 downpayment withthe 124k balance to be paidin5 years. He also enclosed10k incheck as earnest money. The Board informed themthat it had adoptedreolution881 that declinedtheir offer to repurchase. At the same time, GSISnegotiatedwithDela Cruz for the purchase of the property. Theyaccepted her offer of purchase. A newTCT was issuedto her. The petitioners, on the other hand, had their loanrequest rescindedbecause a certificate of award or sale wasnot issuedinfavor of the applicant. Moreover, the applicant, Urbanothe petitioner, was 81 years oldandno longer a member of the GSIS. It wasn’t givendue consideration. Havinglearnedabout the transaction withdela Cruz, the petitioners requestedthe formal investigation withthe GSISregarding the sale. Not satisfied, theyfiled a case with the RTCof QC branch 102. The petitionwas dismissed. The same view wasupheldbythe court of appeals.
- 22. 22 Hence thispetition. Issues: 1. Dopetitioners have a right to repurchase the subject property? 2. Does GSIS have a dutyto dispose of the subject propertythroughpublic bidding? 3. Was Gsisinbadfaithindealingwithpetitioners? Ruling: Petition Dismissed Ratio: 1. No Charter of the GSIS was PD 1146 which stipulatedthe power of the GSIS to acquire, utilize, and dispose of real or personalproperties in the Philippinesor elsewhere. It wasamendedbyPD 1981 which gave the GSIS the power to compromise or release anyclaim or settledliabilityto the system. SC- The laws grantedthe GSISBoardthe power to exercise discretionin determiningthe terms and conditionof financial accommodations to its members withthe dual purpose of making the GSIS more responsive to the needs ofGSIS members. The laws alsostipulated that the Board could exercise discretionon whether to accept or reject petitioner’s offer to repurchase the subject propertytakinginto account the dual purpose enunciatedinthe whereasclause ofPD 1981 which made the GSIS more responsive to the needs of its members. With regard to the Board’s exercise ofdiscretion, inNatinovIAC, the Court alsoheldthat repurchase offoreclosedpropertyafter redemption periodimposesno such obligationon the purchaser (the board in this case) to re-sell the propertysince the propertybelongs to him(the board as well) The board’s denial of petitioner’s request to purchase the subject propertywas not based on whim but ona factualassessment ofthe financial capacityof the petitioners to make good their repeatedoffers to purchase the subject property. Based onthe circumstances, the petitioners were repeatedlyunable to fulfill their obligations to pay. Inthe comments ofthe AAD manager, the observationwas that the petitioners lacked the capacityto payup. The petitioners are not entitledto a request for repurchase as a matter of right. The Board exercisedits discretioninaccordance withlaw in denyingtheir requests andthe GSIScan’t be faulted for their failure to repurchase as it acted under the petitioner’s applicationunder Operation Pabahay. The sale to respondent can’t be annulled onsuchinvoked “right”. 2. No. The agreement withde la Cruz was valid. Pets.- aver that Sec. 79 of PD 1445 and the COA Circular 86-264 mandated the GSIS to dispose of the assets through public bidding andonlyupon its failure, through a public sale. GSIS contendedthat SEC79 of PD 1445 did not applybecause it coveredunserviceable govt propertyandnot acquired assets. SC- Gsis was right. Why? The provision (SEC79) applies onlyto unserviceable govt propertyor those no longer needed. The house was obviouslynot unserviceable. Andit wasstill usedby petitioners. With regard to COA Circular 86-264 or the “General guidelineson the divestment or disposal of assets of government ownedcorporations” the law stipulated that it availed of an exception to the requirement of disposition through public bidding and such exception applied to sales of merchandise held for sale in the regular course of business. The Court read it inrelationto Coa circular 89-296 which providedfor “Audit Guidelines onthe Disposal ofPropertyand other Assets of Government Agencies”, whichalso did not applythe public bidding disposal requirement to merchandise or inventoryheld for sale inthe regular course of businessnor to the disposal by gov’t financialinstitutions of foreclosed assets or collateralsacquired inthe regular course of business andnot transferredto the Govt under proclamationno 50. The modes ofdisposal includedPublic auction and sale thrunegotiation. Doctrine: With regard to these 2 laws, the Court held the question whether the subject property was covered by the said Circular or falls under its exception. It held that 89-296 was to be interpreted with 86-264 in adherence with stat con wherein statutes that relate to the same thing ought to be taken in consideration in construing any one of them, and it is an established rule of law that all acts in pari material are to be taken together as if they were one law. Moreover, the court lookedintothe intent of bothlaws andheldthat these were usedto generate more revenue for GOCC’S through the disposition ofits non-preforming assets. (Look into PD 50 or the asset privatization trust inthe case) Accordingto the court, the policyintent on the dispositionof acquiredassets thengovernedthe case at bar. Was the propertycovered bythe public biddingexceptions in these laws?The court saidyes, which meant that their sale negotiationfell under the regular course of business, and thus didnot offendthe requirements of the saidcoa circulars. 3. No. GSIS denial of petitioners’ further requests for repurchase ofsubject propertywas basedon a factual determinationof the petitioners’ financial capacityandthe GSIScharter, PD 1146. Also, GSIS soldthe propertyto delaCruz onlyafter giving them one year to repurchase. The petitioners, on the strengthof the Valmonte case, can’t also impute badfaith onGSISwhenit was secretlynegotiating withDela Cruz. Inthe Valmonte case, the court held that the constitutionalright to informationwas limitedto matters of public concernto transactions involving public interest.The sale ofthe propertywas not imbuedbypublic interests as it wasa purelyprivate transaction. Pets. Can’t demand to be informedof suchpublic negotiationsince theyhad nointerest onthe subject propertysince theyfailed to complywiththe GSIS terms of repurchase andthe denialto repurchase under the GSISterms. DECLARADORVS.GUBATONG.R.No.159208,August18,2006 Facts: A 17 years oldminor was provento have committeda crime ofmurder withevident premeditationandabuse of strength ofstabbing 15 times a teacher, wife ofthe petitioner, in Cabug-Cabug National High School inPresident Roxas, Capizbut the sentencedis suspendedby the Judge automatically. A petitionthat the suspensionof sentencedwas not proper because the minor is disqualifiedas providedin Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as amended, andSection 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC. Issue: Whether or not respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretionamounting to excess ofjurisdictioninsuspendingthe sentence of a minor of a crime committedpunishable by death. Held: Crime committedbyminor, below18 years oldat the time ofthe commissionof the cri me, will be automaticallysuspendedwithout a needfor applicationexcept whenthe youthful offender was disqualifiedonanyone of the following grounds:(1) the youthful offender has once availed or enjoyedsuspensionof sentence under its provisions, (2) to one whois convictedfor an offense punishable bydeathor life imprisonment, (3) to one whois convictedfor anoffense bythe MilitaryTribunals. In the case at bar, the youthful offender’s crime of murder is punishable, not the actual sentence, bydeathor life imprisonment thus the benefit ofautomatic suspension of sentence is not applicable.
- 23. 23 Liability The parents (fatherandmother of juvenile Frank) andhisteacher-in-charge at the Cabug-Cabug NationalHighSchool of President Roxas, Capiz, are jointlysubsidiarilyliable incase of insolvency, as the crime was established to have beencommitted inside the classroomof Cabug-Cabug NationalHighSchool andduring school hours. SPO3 NOEL CABADA and SPO3 RODOLFO G. DE GUZMAN, petitioners, vs. HON. RAFAEL M. ALUNAN III, Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government & Chairman, National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM); HON. ALEXIS CANONIZADO, Commissioner, NAPOLCOM, Manila; Chairman LEODEGARIO ALFARO, Regional Appellate Board VIII; Regional Director EDMUNDO LAVILLA LARROZA, Philippine National Police (PNP) Regional Command VIII; and MARIO VALDEZ,respondents. D E C I S I O N DAVIDE, JR., J.: This is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court[1] to set aside the decision (in the formof a letter) of 24 March 1995[2] of public respondent National Police Commission(NAPOLCOM), which denieddue course for lackof jurisdiction the appeal and the petitionfor review filed by petitioners SPO3 Noel Cabada and SPO3 Rodolfo G. de Guzman, respectively. Challengedinthe said appeal andpetitionfor review were the decisionof 15 August 1994[3] and resolution of25 October 1994[4] of the RegionalAppellate Board ofthe EighthRegional Command (RAB 8), which affirmed their dismissal from the service. The pleadings andannexes filed bythe parties disclose the following factual and procedural backdrop of this case: On 29 October 1993, a complaint against the petitioners for Grave Misconduct, Arbitrary Detention, andDishonestywas filed with the Office of the Commission on Human Rights in TaclobanCitybyprivate respondent MarioValdez.[5] The complaint wasreferred to the Philippine National Police Eighth Regional Command (PNP-RECOM 8) which, after conducting its own investigation, filedan administrative charge of Grave Misconduct against the petitioners and instituted summary dismissal proceedings. On 7 April 1994, the Regional Director of PNP-RECOM 8 handed down a decision[6] finding the petitioners guilty of grave misconduct and ordering their dismissal from the police service. Pursuant to this decision, Special Order No. 174, dated 23 April 1994,[7] was issued ordering, among other things, the dismissal of the petitioners from the service. The petitioners claimedthat theywere not formallyfurnished witha copyof the decisionandthat theywere able to secure a copythereof “thru their own effort and initiative” only on 13 June 1994.[8] However, they received a copy of Special Order No. 174 on 26 April 1994. Although they insist that the basis of the appeal before RAB 8 was Special Order No. 174,[9] petitioner Cabada statedunder oathin hisAppeal[10] filedwith the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG)that he infact seasonablyfileda motion for reconsideration of the decisionof the Regional Director of PNP-RECOM 8, who, however, failed or refused to act on the said motion, and that he asked that the said motion be treated as an appeal to the RAB. In its decisionof 15 August 1994,[11] the RAB 8 affirmedthe decisionof the RegionalDirector. Inits resolution of25 October 1994,[12] it denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of its decision. The petitioners received a copy of this resolution on 26 January 1995. Petitioners Cabada andDe Guzman then filed with the Honorable Secretary of the DILG and Chairman of the NAPOLCOM their “Appeal”[13]dated 5 February 1995 and “Petition for Review”[14] dated 4 February 1995, respectively. In its decision of 24 March 1995, the NAPOLCOM, through Commissioner Alexis Canonizado, denied due course to the petitioners’ appeal andpetition for review for lack of jurisdiction “it appearing x x x that both the Decisionandthe Resolutionof the Regional Appellate Board had long become final and executory and there being no showing that the RAB failed to decide respondents’ appeal withinthe reglementary period of sixty (60) days.”[15] In support thereof, the NAPOLCOM cited Section23, Rule IV of NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular No. 91-002 and Section5, Rule III of NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular No. 91-006, which provide as follows: Section23. Effect of Failure to Decide Appeal. — Failure of the Regional Appellate Board to decide the appeal withinthe reglementaryperiod shall render the decision final and executory without prejudice, however, to the filing of anappeal by either party with the Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local Government. xxx xxx xxx Section5. Finalityof Decision/Resolution. — The decisionof the Regional Appellate Board on an appealedcase shallbecome final andexecutoryafter ten(10) days from receipt of a copy thereof by the appellant, if no Motion for Reconsideration is filed within said period. A motionfor Reconsideration may be filed by either party from a Decision rendered by the Regional Appellate Boardon anappealedcase, providedthat the same is filed withinten(10) days from receipt of a copy of the decision in question. However, only one (1) Motion for Reconsideration may be allowed. Hence, the instant petition. The Office of the Solicitor Generalseeks to dismiss this petition on the ground of prematurity because the petitioners failedto exhaust administrative remedies; they should have instead appealedto the Civil Service Commission (CSC) pursuant to Section47, Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of1987 (E.O. No. 292), which vests upon the CSC appellate jurisdictionover disciplinarycases ofgovernment personnelwhere the penalty imposed is, inter alia, dismissal from office. The said provision reads: Section 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. — (1) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinarycases involvingthe impositionof a penaltyof suspensionfor more than thirtydays, or fine inan amount exceeding thirty days salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, or removal or dismissal from office. x x x (2) The Secretaries x x x shall have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinaryactionagainst officers andemployees under their jurisdiction. x x x In case the decision renderedbya bureau or office headis appealable to the Commission, the same may be initially appealedto the Department and finallyto the Commissionandpendingappeal, the same shall be executoryexcept when the penaltyis removal, in whichcase, the same shall be executory only after confirmation by the Secretary concerned. The Office of the Solicitor General opines that this provision covers PNP personnel, like the petitioners;consequently, theyshould have appealed to the CSC. It alsoadvances the view that the instant petitionshould have been filed with the proper forum, the Regional Trial Court. The core issues that present themselves for our determination are whether (1) the NAPOLCOM committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course, for lack of jurisdiction, the petitioners’ appeal fromand petition for reviewof the decisionandresolution of the RAB 8; and (2) this special civil action was prematurely filed for failure of the petitioners to exhaust administrative remedies. I Section45 of the DILGAct of 1990[16] provides for the finality of disciplinary actions against members of the PNP as follows:
- 24. 24 SEC. 45. Finalityof Disciplinary Action. — The disciplinaryaction imposedupon a member of the PNP shall be final andexecutory: Provided, That a disciplinary action imposed by the regional director or bythe PLEB involvingdemotion or dismissal from the service maybe appealed to the regional appellate board withinten (10) days from receipt ofthe copyof the notice of decision: Provided, further, That the disciplinaryactionimposedbythe Chiefof the PNPinvolvingdemotion or dismissal maybe appealed to the National Appellate Boardwithin ten (10) days from receipt thereof: Provided furthermore, That, the regional or National Appellate Board, as the case maybe, shalldecide the appeal withinsixty(60) days from receipt ofthe notice ofappeal: Provided, finally, That failure of the regional appellate board to act on the appeal within said period shall render the decision final and executory without prejudice, however, to the filing of an appeal by either party with the Secretary. (Italics supplied) The last proviso of this sectionis restated in Section 23, Rule IV of NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular No. 91-002. And Section 3, Rule III of NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular No. 92-006 provides: Section 3. Period Within Which to Decide Appealed Cases; Finality of RAB/NAB Decisions. — The NAPOLCOM appellate boardconcerned shall decide the appealed cases withinsixty(60) days from receipt of the entire records of the case from the PNPsummary dismissal authority. However, failure of the NAPOLCOMRegional Appellate Board(RAB)to act onthe appeal withinsaid period renders the decision final and executory without prejudice to the filing of an appeal by the respondent-appellant with the Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local Government. The decisionrenderedbythe NAPOLCOMNational Appellate Board(NAB) disposing an appealedcase shall be final andexecutoryunless a timelyMotionfor Reconsideration is filed within ten (10) days fromreceipt thereof, inwhichcase, it shall become final and executory upon receipt bythe respondent-appellant of the resolution ofthe aforesaidboarddenying, modifying or affirming the decision. Section45 of the DILGAct of 1990 specificallyprovides that if a RAB fails to decide an appeal within the reglementaryperiodof sixtydays, the appealeddecisionbecomes final and executory without, however, prejudice to the right of the aggrieved party to appeal to the Secretary of the DILG. The saidprovision is, however, silent as regards the availability of an appeal from a decision rendered by a RAB within the reglementary period. This gapinSection 45 cannot be construedto prohibit appeals fromdecisions of the RABrendered within the reglementary period, for while the epigraph of the section is worded Finality of Disciplinary Action, there is nothing thereinthat explicitlybars anyfurther appeal. Complementary laws ondiscipline ofgovernment officials andemployees must thenbe inquiredinto considering that in conformitywith the mandate of the Constitution that the PNP must be national in scope and civilian incharacter,[17] it is nowa part, as a bureau, ofthe reorganizedDILG.[18] As such, it falls within the definition ofthe civil service in Section2(1), Article IX-B of the Constitution.[19] For this reason, Section 91 of the DILG Act of 1990 provides: SEC. 91. Application of Civil Service Laws. — The Civil Service Law and its implementing rules and regulations shall apply to all personnel of the Department. The Civil Service Law referredto in Section91 of the DILG Act of 1990 is Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 292). Section47 of Chapter 6 thereof provides, inter alia, that incases where the decision rendered by a bureau or office is appealable to the Commission, the same mayinitiallybe appealed to the department andfinallyto the Commission. The rules and regulations implementing the Civil Service Law referred to in Section 91 of the DILG Act of 1990 is the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 known as the Administrative Code of 1987 promulgated by the CSC. Sections 31 and 32, Rule XIV of the said Rules provide as follows: SEC. 31. Except as otherwise providedbythe Constitutionor bylaw, the Commission shall have the final authorityto passupon the removal, separation and suspension of all officers and employees inthe civil service and upon all matters relating to the conduct, discipline and efficiency of such officers and employees. SEC. 32. The Secretariesandheads of agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities an d municipalities shall have jurisdictionto investigate anddecide matters involving disciplinaryaction against officers andemployees under their jurisdiction. Their decisions shall be final in case the penaltyimposed is suspension for not more than thirty (30) days or fine in an amount not exceedingthirty(30) days’ salary. In case the decision rendered by a bureau or office head is appealable to the Commission, the same maybe initiallyappealedto the department, then to the Merit Systems Protection Board, and finallyto the Commissionandpendingappeal, the same shall be executoryexcept when the penaltyis removal, in whichcase the same shallbe executory only after confirmation by the Secretary concerned. Under Section7 of E.O. No. 262,[20] the Secretaryof the DILGhas the power of supervision and control of his Department. His powers andfunctions thereunder are recognized and affirmed in Section 10 of the DILG Act of 1990.[21] In view thenof the aforementionedgapinSection45 of the DILG Act of 1990, the provisions of the Civil Service Law andthe rules and regulations implementing it must be takeninto account in light of the maxim interpretare concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi or everystatute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence.[22] As thus construed and harmonized, it follows that if a RAB failsto decide anappealedcase within sixtydays fromreceipt of the notice of appeal, the appealed decision is deemed final and executory, and the aggrieved party may forthwith appeal therefrom to the Secretary of theDILG. Likewise, ifthe RAB hasdecided the appealwithin the sixty-dayperiod, its decision may still be appealed to the Secretary of the DILG. In the instant case, Cabada’s appeal was addressed to “the Honorable Secretary of the Department of the Interior andLocal Government x x x as Chairman and Presiding Officer of the NationalPolice Commission,”[23] while De Guzman’s petition for review was addressed to “the Honorable Secretary, Department of the Interior and LocalGovernment andChairman, National Police Commission, Makati City, Metro Manila.”[24] We consider the appeal and the petitionfor reviewas appeals to the Secretaryof the DILG under Section 45 of the DILG Act of 1990. Onlythe Secretaryof the DILG can act thereon, one way or the other. The NAPOLCOM did not have authorityover the appealand the petition for review, andjust because bothmentioned the Secretaryof the DILG as Chairman or Presiding Officer of the NAPOLCOM did not bring them within the jurisdictionof the NAPOLCOM. The latter does not have such jurisdiction because Section 14 of the DILG Act of 1990 pertinently provides as follows: SEC. 14. Powers and Functions of the Commission. — x x x xxx xxx xxx (j) Affirm, reverse or modify, through the National Appellate Board, personnel disciplinary action involving demotionor dismissal from the service imposed upon members of the Philippine National Police by the Chief of the Philippine National Police; (k) Exercise appellate jurisdiction throughthe regional appellate boards over administrative cases against policemen and over decisions on claims for police benefits. x x x This section clearly shows that the NAPOLCOM exercises appellate jurisdiction only on the following cases and THROUGH(a) the NAB inpersonneldisciplinaryactions involvingdemotion or dismissal fromthe service imposedbythe Chief of the PNP, and (b) the RAB in administrative
- 25. 25 cases against policemenand over decisions onclaims for police benefits. It has no appellate jurisdiction over decisions rendered by the NAB and the RAB. Consequently, the NAPOLCOM did not have the power or authority to issue, through Commissioner Alexis Canonizado, the 24 March 1995decision denyingdue course to the appeal and petition for review filedby petitioners Cabada and De Guzman, respectively, for lack of jurisdictionbecause of Section 5, Rule III of NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular No. 91-006 and Section23, Rule IV ofNAPOLCOMMemorandumCircular No. 91-002. The reference to these rules suggest that the NAPOLCOM believes it has jurisdiction over appeals from decisions of the RAB if the latter has not decided the appeal within the reglementary period of sixty days. Such a suggestionis flawed because it would allowa ridiculous situation where the NAPOLCOM vests upon itself an appellate jurisdictionfroma decisionrendered byit in the exercise of its appellate jurisdictionthroughthe RAB, per Section 14(k)of the DILG Act of 1990. Moreover, Commissioner Canonizadocannot, singly, act for the NAPOLCOM because it is a collegial body composed of a Chairman and four Commissioners, pursuant to Section 13 of theDILG Act of 1990. In light ofthe foregoing, the petitioners couldproperlyinvoke our originaljurisdictionto issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to annual and set aside the NAPOLCOM’s decision of 24 March 1995. It being a patent nullity, the filing ofa motionfor its reconsiderationbefore the institution of this special civil action may be dispensed with.[25] II The plea ofthe Office of the Solicitor General that the instant action is premature for non- exhaustion ofadministrative remedies is thus untenable. We would have sustained it if the Secretaryof the DILG wasthe one who denieddue course to or dismissedthe appeal of petitioner Cabada andthe petition for review of petitioner De Guzman. Bythen, pursuant to Section 91 of the DILG Act of 1990;Section47, Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987; and Sections 31 and 32 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292, the appeal would have to be filedwith the CSC. And futile would be the petitioners’ claim in their Replyto the Comment of theOSG that their case fallswithin the exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies. In view ofallthe foregoing, a discussionon the other issues raisedbythe petitioners relating to the merits of the case and on the issue of due process is unnecessary. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The decision (inthe form of a letter) ofthe NationalPolice Commission of 24 March 1995 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Secretaryof the Department of Interior and Local Government isDIRECTED to RESOLVE with reasonable dispatch the appeal and petition for review of petitioners SPO3 NOEL CABADA and SPO3RODOLFO G. DE GUZMAN, respectively, from the decision of 15 August 1994 and resolution of25 October 1994 of the RegionalAppellate Board, EighthRegional Command, if the same were filed on time. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. L-36049 May 31, 1976 CITY OF NAGA, VICENTE P. SIBULO, as Mayor, and JOAQUIN C. CLEOPE, as Treasurer of the City of Naga, petitioners, vs. CATALINO AGNA, FELIPE AGNA and SALUD VELASCO, respondents. Ernesto A. Miguel for petitioners. Bonot, Cledera & Associates for respondents. MARTIN, J.: Petitionfor review oncertiorari, whichWe treat as special civil action, ofthe decisionof the Court of First Instance ofCamarines Sur inCivil Case No. 7084, entitledAgna, et al. versus Cityof Naga, et al., declaring Ordinance No. 360 of the Cityof Naga enforceable in1971 the year following its approval andrequiring petitioners to payto private respondents the amounts sought for intheir complaint plus attorney's fees andcosts. Includedinthe present controversyas proper parties are Vicente P. Sibulo and JoaquinC. Cleope, the CityMayor and CityTreasurer of the Cityof Naga, respectively. On June 15, 1970, the Cityof Naga enactedOrdinance No. 360 changing andamendingthe graduatedtax onquarterlygross sales of merchants prescribed inSection3 of Ordinance No. 4 of the Cityof Naga to percentage tax on grosssales providedfor inSection 2 thereof. Pursuant to said ordinance, private respondents paidto the Cityof Naga the following taxes ontheir gross sales for the quarter from July1, 1970 to September 30, 1970, as follows: CatalinoAgna paidP1,805.17 as per Official Receipt No. 1826591; Felipe Agna paidP625.00 as per OfficialReceipt No. 1826594;and Salud Velasco paid P129.81 as per OfficialReceipt No. 1820339. On February13, 1971, private respondents filed withthe CityTreasurer of the Cityof Naga a claim for refund ofthe followingamounts, together withinterests thereon fromthe date of payments: To CatalinoAgna, P1,555.17;to Felipe Agna, P560.00;and to Salud Velasco, P127.81, representing the difference between the amounts theypaid under Section3, Ordinance No. 4 of the Cityof Naga, i.e., P250.00;P65.00 and P12.00 respectively. Theyallegedthat under existing law, Ordinance No. 360, whichamendedSection 3, Ordinance No. 4 of the Cityof Naga, didnot take effect in1970, the year it was approvedbut inthe next succeeding year after the year of its approval, or in1971, andthat therefore, the taxestheypaid in 1970 on their gross sales for the quarter fromJuly1, 1970 to September 30, 1970 were illegal andshould be refundedto themby the petitioners. The CityTreasurer denied the claimfor refund ofthe amounts inquestion. So private respondents fileda complaint withthe Court of First Instance of Naga (Civil Case No. 7084), seeking to have Ordinance No. 360 declaredeffective onlyinthe year following the year of its approval, that is, in 1971; to have Sections 4, 6 and 8 of Ordinance No. 360 declared unjust, oppressive andarbitrary, and therefore, null and void;andto require petitioners to refundthe sums beingclaimedwith interests thereonfrom the date the taxes complainedof were paidandto payalllegal costs and attorney's feesinthe sumof P1,000.00. Private respondents further prayed that the petitioners be enjoinedfromenforcingOrdinance No. 360. In their answer, the petitioners among other things, claimedthat private respondents were not "compelled" but voluntarilymade the payments of their taxes under Ordinance No. 360;that the said ordinance was publishedinaccordance withlaw;that in accordance with Republic Act No. 305 (Charter of the Cityof Naga)anordinance takes effect after the tenthdayfollowingits passage unlessotherwise statedinsaidordinance; that under existing law the Cityof Naga is authorized to impose certainconditions to secure and accomplishthe collectionof salestaxes in the most effective manner. As special andaffirmative defenses, the petitioners allege that the private respondents have no cause of actionagainst them;that granting that the collection of taxes canbe enjoined. the complaint does not allege facts sufficient to justifythe issuance of a writ of preliminaryinjunction;that the refundprayedfor bythe private respondents is untenable; that petitioners Vicente P. SibuloandJoaquin C. Cleope, the CityMayor and Treasurer of the City of Naga, respectivelyare not proper partiesininterest;that the private respondents are estopped from questioning the validityand/or constitutionalityof the provisions ofOrdinance No. 360. Petitioners counterclaimedfor P20,000.00 as exemplarydamages, for the allegedunlawful and malicious filing ofthe claim against them, insuchamount as the court maydetermine.
- 26. 26 During the hearingofthe petitionfor the issuance of a writ of preliminaryinjunctionandat the pre-trial conference as well as at the trial onthe merits of the case, the parties agreedon the following stipulationof facts:That on June 15, 1970, the CityBoard of the Cityof Naga e nacted Ordinance No. 360 entitled"An ordinance repealing Ordinance No. 4, as amended, imposinga sales tax on the quarterlysales or receipts onallbusinesses inthe Cityof Naga," which ordinance was transmittedto the CityMayor for approval or veto on June 25, 1970;that the ordinance was dulypostedinthe designatedplaces bythe Secretaryof the Municipal Board;that private respondents voluntarilypaid the gross sales tax, pursuant to Ordinance No. 360, but that on February15, 1971, theyfileda claimfor refund withthe CityTreasurer whodenied the same. On October 9, 1971, the respondent Judge rendered judgment holdingthat Ordinance No. 360, seriesof 1970 of the Cityof Naga was enforceable inthe year following the date ofits approval, that is, in1971 andrequiredthe petitioners to reimburse the following sums, from the date they paidtheir taxesto the Cityof Naga:to CatalinoAgna, the sum of P1,555.17;to Felipe Agna, P560.00; and to SaludVelasco, P127.81 and the corresponding interests from the filing ofthe complaint upto the reimbursement of the amounts plus the sumof P500.00 as attorney's fees and the costs of the proceedings. Petitioners' submit that Ordinance No. 360, series of 1970 of the Cityof Naga, tookeffect inthe quarter ofthe year of its approval, that is in July1970, invokingSection14 of Republic Act No. 305, 1 as amended, otherwise knownas the Charter of the Cityof Naga, which, among others, provides that "Eachapproved ordinance ... shall take effect and be enforced onandafter the 10th dayfollowingits passage unless otherwise stated insaid ordinance ... ". Theycontendthat Ordinance No. 360 was enactedbythe Municipal Board ofthe Cityof Naga onJune 15, 1970 2 and was transmittedto the CityMayor for his approval or veto onJune 25, 1970 3 but it was not acted upon bythe CityMayor until August 4, 1970. Ordinarily, pursuant to Section 14 of Republic Act No. 305, saidordinance shouldhave takeneffect after the 10th dayfollowing its passage on June 15, 1970, or on June 25, 1970. But because the ordinance itself providesthat it shall take effect upon its approval, it becomes necessaryto determine when Ordinance No. 360 was deemed approved. According to the same Section14 of Republic Act No. 305, "if within 10 days after receipt of the ordinance the Mayor doesnot return it withhis vetoor approval 4 the ordinance is deemedapproved." Since the ordinance inquestion wasnot returned bythe CityMayor withhis veto or approval within10 days after he receivedit onJune 25, 1970, the same was deemed approved after the lapse of ten(10) days fromJune 25, 1970 or on July6, 1970. On this date, the petitioners claim that Ordinance No. 360 became effective. Theyfurther contendthat evenunder Section2, of Republic Act No. 2264 (Local AutonomyActs) 5 which expresslyprovides:"A tax ordinance shall go into effect onthe fifteenth dayafter its passage unlessthe ordinance shall provide otherwise', Ordinance No. 360 couldhave takeneffect on June 30, 1970, which is the fifteenth dayafter its passage bythe MunicipalBoardof the Cityof Naga onJune 15, 1970, or as earlier explained, it could have takeneffect onJuly6, 1970, the date the ordinance was deemed approved because the ordinance itself providesthat it shall take effect upon its approval. Of the two provisions invoked bypetitioners to support their standthat the ordinance inquestion took effect inthe year of its approval, it is Section2 of Republic Act No. 2264 (Local AutonomyAct) that is more relevant because it is the provision that specificallyrefers to effectivityof a tax ordinance and beinga provision ofmuchlater lawit is deemedto have superseded Section14 of Republic Act No. 305 (Charter ofthe Cityof Naga) in sofar a s effectivityof a tax ordinance is concerned. On the other hand, private respondents contendthat Ordinance No. 360 became effective and enforceable in1971, the year following the year of its approval, invokingSection2309 of the Revised Administrative Code whichprovides: Section2309. Imposition of tax and duration of license.—A municipal license tax alreadyin existence shall be subject to change onlybyordinance enacted prior to the 15th dayof December of anyyear after the next succeeding year, but anentirelynew tax maybe created byany ordinance enactedduringthe quarter year effective at the beginningof anysubsequent quarter. Theysubmit that since Ordinance No. 360, seriesof 1970 of the Cityof Naga, is one which changes the existinggraduatedsales tax on grosssales or receipts ofdealers of merchandise andsari-sari merchants providedfor inOrdinance No. 4 of the Cityof Naga to a percentage tax on their gross sales prescribedinthe questionedordinance, the same should take effect in the next succeeding year after the year ofits approval or in1971. Evidently, the divergence of opinion as to whenOrdinance No. 360 took effect andbecame enforceable is mainlydue to the seeminglyapparent conflict betweenSection 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code andSection2 of Republic Act No. 2264 (Local AutonomyAct). Is there really such a conflict inthe above-mentionedprovisions?It willbe easilynotedthat Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code contemplates of twotypes ofmunicipal ordinances, namely:(1) a municipal ordinance whichchanges a municipallicense tax alreadyinexistence and (2) an ordinance which creates anentirelynew tax. Under the first type, a municipal license tax already in existence shall be subject to change onlybyanordinance enactedprior to the 15th dayof December of anyyear after the next succeeding year. Thismeans that the ordinance enactedprior to the 15th dayof December changingor repealing a municipal license tax alreadyinexistence will have to take effect innext succeedingyear. The evident purpose ofthe provisionis to enable the taxpayers to adjust themselves to the new charge or burdenbrought about bythe newordinance. This is different from the secondtype ofa municipal ordinance where anentirelynewtax maybe createdbyanyordinance enacted during the quarter year to be effective at the beginning of any subsequent quarter. We donot findanysuch distinction betweenanordinance which changes a municipal license tax already inexistence andan ordinance creating an entirelynewtax inSection 2 of Republic Act No. 2264 (Local AutonomyAct) which merelyrefers to a "tax ordinance" without anyqualification whatsoever. Now to the meat of the problem inthis petition. Is not Section 2309 of the RevisedAdministrative Code deemedrepealed or abrogatedbySection2 of Republic Act No. 2264 (Local AutonomyAct) in so far as effectivityof a tax ordinance is concerned?An examination ofRepublic Act No. 2264 (Local AutonomyAct) failsto show anyprovisionexpresslyrepealingSection2309 of the Revised Administrative Code. All that is mentioned thereinis Section 9 whichreads: Section9 — All acts, executive orders, administrative orders, proclamations or parts thereof, inconsistent with anyof the provisions of thisAct are herebyrepealedand modifiedaccordingly. The foregoing provision does not amount to an express repeal of Section 2309 of the Revised Administrative Code. It is a wellestablished principle in statutoryconstructionthat a statute will not be construed as repealing prior acts onthe same subject in the absence ofwords to that effect unless there is anirreconcilable repugnancybetween them, or unless the new lawis evidently intendedto supersede all prior acts onthe matter inhand and to comprise itself the sole and complete systemof legislationon that subject. Everynew statute should be construed in connectionwiththose alreadyexisting in relationto the same subject matter and all shouldbe made to harmonize andstandtogether, if theycanbe done byanyfair andreasonable interpretation... . 6 It will also be notedthat Section2309 of the RevisedAdministrative Code and Section2 of Republic Act No. 2264 (Local AutonomyAct) refer to the same subject matter- enactment andeffectivityof a tax ordinance. Inthis respect theycanbe considered in pari materia. Statutes are saidto be in pari materia whentheyrelate to the same personor thing, or to the same class ofpersons or things, or have the same purpose or object. 7 When statutes are in pari materia, the rule of statutoryconstructiondictates that theyshouldbe construedtogether. This is because enactments of the same legislature onthe same subject matter are supposed to
- 27. 27 form part ofone uniform system;that later statutesare supplementaryor complimentaryto the earlier enactments andinthe passage of its acts the legislature is supposedto have inmind the existinglegislationonthe same subject andto have enactedits newact withreference thereto. 8 Having thus in mindthe previous statutes relatingto the same subject matter, whenever the legislature enacts a new law, it is deemedto have enacted the newprovisionin accordance withthe legislative policyembodiedinthose prior statutes unless there is anexpress repeal of the old andtheyallshould be construed together. 9 In construing them the old statutes relatingto the same subject matter shouldbe comparedwiththe new provisions and if possible byreasonableconstruction, both should be soconstruedthat effect maybe given to every provisionof each. However, whenthe new provision and the oldrelating to the same subject cannot be reconciledthe former shall prevail as it is the latter expressionof the legislative will. 10 Actuallywe donot see anyconflict between Section2309 of the RevisedAdministrative Code andSection 2 of the Republic Act No. 2264 (Local AutonomyAct). The conflict, if any, is more apparent than real. It is one that is not incapable of reconciliation. And the twoprovisions can be reconciled byapplyingthe first clause ofSection2309 of the RevisedAdministrative Code when the problemrefers to the effectivityof anordinance changing or repealing a municipal license tax alreadyinexistence. But where the problemrefers to effectivityof an ordinance creating an entirelynew tax, let Section2 of Republic Act No. 2264 (Local AutonomyAct) govern. In the case before Us, the ordinance inquestion is one whichchangesthe graduatedsales tax on gross sales or receipts of dealers of merchandiseand sari-sari merchants prescribedin Section3 of Ordinance No. 4 of the Cityof Naga to percentage tax on their gross sale-an ordinance which definitelyfallswithin the clause of Section2309 of the Revised Administrative Code. Accordinglyit should be effective andenforceable inthe next succeeding year after the year of its approval or in 1971 and private respondents should be refunded ofthe taxes theyhave paidto the petitioners on their gross salesfor the quarter fromJuly1, 1970 to September 30, 1970 plus the correspondinginterests fromthe filing of the complaint until reimbursement ofthe amount. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petitionis herebydismissed. SO ORDERED. Facts: A civil case damages was filedbypetitioner SocorroRamirez inthe QuezonCityRTCalleging that the private respondent, Ester Garcia, in a confrontationinthe latter’s office, allegedlyvexed, insultedandhumiliatedher ina “hostile and furious mood” andin a manner offensive to petitioner’s dignityandpersonality,” contraryto morals, goodcustoms and public policy.” In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event andsought damages. The transcript onwhich the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording ofthe confrontationmade bypetitioner. As a result ofpetitioner’s recording of the event andalleging that the said act of secretlytaping the confrontationwas illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the PasayRTCfor violationof Republic Act 4200, entitled“An Act to prohibit andpenalize wire tappingandother relatedviolations of private communication, and other purposes.” Petitioner filed a Motionto Quashthe Information, which the RTClater on granted, onthe ground that the facts chargeddonot constitute an offense, particularlya violation ofR.A. 4200. The CA declaredthe RTC’s decisionnull andvoid anddeniedthe petitioner’s MR, hence the instant petition. Ramirez vs.CA Issue: W/N the Anti-WiretappingAct appliesinrecordings byone of the parties inthe conversation Held: Yes. Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, ” An Act to Prohibit and PenalizedWire Tapping andOther RelatedViolations ofPrivate Communication and Other Purposes,” provides: Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for anyperson, not being authorizedbyall the partiesto anyprivate communicationor spokenword, to tapanywire or cable, or byusing anyother device or arrangement, to secretlyoverhear, intercept, or record such communication or spokenword by using a device commonlyknownas a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described. The aforestated provisionclearlyandunequivocallymakesit illegal for anyperson, not authorized byall the parties to anyprivate communicationto secretlyrecordsuchcommunicationbymeans of a tape recorder. The law makes nodistinctionas to whether the partysought to be penalizedby the statute ought to be a partyother than or different from those involvedinthe private communication. The statute’s intent to penalize all persons unauthorizedto make such recording is underscoredbythe use of the qualifier “any”. Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctlyconcluded, “even a (person) privyto a communicationwhorecords his private conversationwith another without the knowledge of the latter (will)qualifyas a violator” under this provision ofR.A. 4200. A perusal ofthe Senate CongressionalRecords, moreover, supports the respondent court’s conclusionthat in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplatedto make illegal, unauthorizedtape recording ofprivate conversations or communications takeneither bythe parties themselves or bythird persons. The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violationof the statute. The substance of the same neednot be specificallyallegedinthe information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretlyoverhearing, intercepting or recording private communications bymeans of the devices enumeratedtherein. The mere allegation that anindividualmade a secret recordingof a private communicationbymeans ofa tape recorder would suffice to constitute anoffense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointedout inhis COMMENT before the respondent court: “Nowhere (in the said law)is it required that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation, as well as its communicationto a third personshouldbe professed.” Petitioner’s contentionthat the phrase “private communication” inSection 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include “private conversations” narrows the ordinarymeaningof the word“communication” to a point of absurdity. The wordcommunicate comesfrom the latinwordcommunicare, meaning “to share or to impart.” In its ordinarysignification, communicationconnotes the act ofsharing or impartingsignification, communication connotes the act of sharingor imparting, as in a conversation, or signifies the “process bywhichmeanings or thoughts are sharedbetween individuals througha commonsystemof symbols (as language signs or gestures)” These definitions are broad enoughto include verbal or non-verbal, writtenor expressive communications of “meanings or thoughts” which are likelyto include the emotionally-charged exchange, on February22, 1988, between petitioner andprivate respondent, inthe privacyof the latter’s office. Anydoubts about the legislative body’s meaningof the phrase “private communication” are, furthermore, put to rest bythe fact that the terms “conversation” and “communication” were interchangeablyusedbySenator Tañada inhis ExplanatoryNote to the Bill. GARVIDA VS.SALES
- 28. 28 n 1996, LynetteGarvida filedher candidacyto the positionof Chairmanof the Sangguniang Kabataan(SK) ofa barangayinBangui, Ilocos Norte. Her candidacywas opposedbyher rival FlorencioSales, Jr. on the ground that she is over 21 years old (21 years old, 9 months at the time of the filing). Nevertheless, the trial court ordered that she be admittedas a candidate andthe SK elections went on. Sales, inthe meantiume, fileda petitionto cancel the certificate ofcandidacy of Garvida. Whenthe elections results came in, Garvida won witha vote of 78, while Sales got 76. Garvida waseventuallyproclaimed as winner but hadto face the petition filed bySales. Garvida, in her defense, averredthat Section424 of the Local Government Code (LGC) provides that candidates for the SKmust be at least 15 years ofage and a maximumage of 21 years. Garvida states that the LGCdoes not specifythat the maximum age requirement is exactly21 years hence said provisionmust be construed as 21 years and a fractionof a year but still less than 22 years – solong as she does not exceed 22 she is still eligible because she is still, technically, 21 years of age (although she exceeds it by9 months). ISSUE:Whether or not Garvida met the age requirement. HELD: No. Section 424 of the Local Government Code provides that candidates for SKmust be: Filipinocitizen; an actualresident of the barangayfor at least six months; 15 but not more than 21 years of age;and dulyregisteredinthe list of the SangguniangKabataanor inthe officialbarangaylist. The provisionis clear. Must not be more than21 years ofage. The saidphrase is not equivalent to “less than22 years old.” The law does not state that the candidate be less than22 years on electionday. If suchwas the intentionof Congress in framingthe LGC, thentheyshouldhave expresslyprovided such. Sales claims that he obtained the second highest number of vote, hence he should be declared as the SK Chairman, is this a valid contention? No. Applyingthe ruling in Labovs COMELEC, a defeatedcandidate, thoughobtaining the second highest number of vote, is not deemed to have beenelectedbyreasonof the winner’s eventual disqualification/ineligibility. He cannot be declared as successor simplybecause he did not get the majorityor the pluralityof votes – the electorate did not choose him. It would have beendifferent if Sales was able to prove that the voters still voted for Garvida despite knowing her ineligibility, this would have renderedher votes “stray”. Under Section 435 of the LGC, the SK Chairman should be succeeded by the SK member who obtained the highest number of votes, should the SK member obtaining such vote succeed Garvida?** (**Not to be confusedwith Sales’ situation – Sales wasa candidate for SKchairmanship not SK membership.) The above argument can’t be considered inthis case because Section 435 onlyapplieswhenthe SKChairman “refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, is convictedof a felony, voluntarilyresigns, dies, is permanentlyincapacitated, is removedfrom office, or has beenabsent without leave for more thanthree (3) consecutive months.” Garvida’s caseis not what Section435 contemplates. Her removal from office byreasonof her age is a questionof eligibility. Being“eligible” means being “legallyqualified;capable of beinglegally chosen.” Ineligibility, on the other hand, refers to the lackof the qualifications prescribedinthe Constitutionor the statutesfor holdingpublic office. Ineligibilityis not one of the grounds enumerated inSection435 for succession ofthe SK Chairman. G.R. No. L-16704 VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY, INC vs. SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION Facts: On October 15,1958, the Social SecurityCommissionissued Circular No. 22 requiring all Employers in computing premiums to include inthe Employee's remuneration all bonusesandovertime pay, as well as the cashvalue of other media of remuneration. Upon receipt ofa copythereof, petitioner Victorias Milling Company, Inc., through counsel, wrote the SocialSecurityCommission in effect protesting against the circular as contradictoryto a previous Circular No. 7 datedOctober 7, 1957 expresslyexcluding overtime payandbonus inthe computationof the employers' and employees' respective monthlypremium contributions. Counselfurther questionedthe validityof the circular for lack ofautho rityon the part ofthe SocialSecurityCommission to promulgate it without the approval of the President and for lackof publicationinthe Official Gazette. Overruling the objections, the Social SecurityCommissionruled that Circular No. 22 is not a rule or regulationthat needed the approval of the President andpublication inthe Official Gazette to be effective, but a mere administrative interpretationof the statute, a mere statement of general policyor opinion as to how the law should be construed. Petitioner comesto Court on appeal. Issue: Whether or not Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulationas contemplatedinSection4(a) ofRepublic Act 1161 empoweringthe SocialSecurityCommission. Held: There canbe nodoubt that there is a distinctionbetweenan administrative rule or regulation and an administrative interpretation ofa law whose enforcement is entrustedto anadministrative body. Whenanadministrative agencypromulgatesrules andregulations, it "makes" a new law with the force and effect of a valid law, while whenit renders anopinionor gives a statement of policy, it merelyinterprets a pre-existing law. Rulesandregulations whenpromulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authorityconferred upon the administrative agencybylaw, partake of the nature of a statute, andcompliance therewith maybe enforced bya penalsanction provided therein. The details and the manner of carryingout the law are oftentimes left to the administrative agencyentrusted withits enforcement. Inthis sense, it hasbeen said that rulesand regulations are the product ofa delegatedpower to create new or additional legalprovisions that have the effect of law. Therefore, Circular No. 22 purports merelyto advise employers-members of the System of what, inthe light of the amendment of the law, theyshould include in determining the monthlycompensationof their employees uponwhich the social security contributions shouldbe based, and that such circular didnot require presidential approval and publication inthe Official Gazette for its effectivity. The Resolutionappealedfrom is hereby affirmed, withcosts against appellant. So ordered. Mataguina Integrated Wood vs.CA FACT: In 1973, license wasissuedto Milagros Matuguina to operate logging businesses under her group Matuguina LoggingEnterprises. MIWPI was establishedin 1974 with7 stockholders. Milagros Matuguina became the majoritystockholder later on. Milagros later petitionedto have MLE be transferredto MIWPI. Pendingapproval of MLE’s petition, DavaoEnterprises Corporationfileda complaint against MLE before the District Forester (Davao)alleging that MLE has encroachedupon
- 29. 29 the area allottedforDAVENCOR’s timber concession. The Investigating Committee found MLE guiltyas chargedandhadrecommended the Director to declare that MLE has done so. MLE appealedthe case to the Ministryof Natural Resources. During pendency, Milagrosawithdrew her shares fromMIWPI. Later, MNR Minister ErnestoMaceda foundMLE guiltyas charged. Pursuant to the finding, DAVENCOR and Philip Co requestedMaceda to order MLE and/or MIWPI to complywiththe ruling to paythe value in pesos of 2352.04 m3worth of timbers. The Minister then issueda writ ofexecutionagainst MIWPI. MIWPI fileda petitionfor prohibitionbefore the Davao RTC. The RTCruled in favor of MIWPI andhas ordered to enjointhe Minister frompursuing the executionof the writ. DAVENCOR appealedandthe CA reversed the rulingof the RTC. MIWPI averred that it is not a partyto the original case (as it was MLE that was sued – a separate entity). That the issuance of the order of executionbythe Minister has beenmade not onlywithout or in excess ofhis authoritybut that the same wasissued patentlywithout anyfactualor legal basis, hence, a grossviolation ofMIWPI’s constitutional rights under the due processclause. ISSUE: Whether or not MIWPI’s right to due process has beenviolated. HELD: The SCruledin favor of MIWPI. Generallyacceptedis the principle that no manshall be affected byanyproceeding to whichhe is a stranger, and strangers to a case not boundbyjudgment renderedbythe court. Inthe same manner an executioncanbe issued onlyagainst a partyand not against one who did not have his day in court. There is no basis for the issuance of the Order of Execution against the MIWPI. The same wasissuedwithout givingMIWPI anopportunityto defend itself andoppose the request of DAVENCOR for the issuance of a writ ofexecutionagainst it. In fact, it does not appear that MIWPI wasat all furnishedwitha copyof DAVENCOR’s letter requestingfor the Execution ofthe Minister’s decision against it. MIWPI wassuddenlymade liable upon the order of executionbythe respondent Secretary’s expedient conclusions that MLE and MIWPI are one andthe same, apparentlyon the basis merelyof DAVENCOR’s letter requesting for the Order, and without hearingor impleadingMIWPI. Until the issuance of the Order of execution, MIWPI was not includedor mentionedin the proceedings as havinganyparticipation in the encroachment in DAVENCOR’s timber concession. This actionof the Minister disregards the most basic tenets of due processandelementaryfairness. The liberal atmosphere whichpervades the procedure inadministrative proceedings does not empower the presidingofficer to make conclusions offact before hearingallthe parties concerned. (1996 Oct 24) MUSTANG LUMBER, INC VS. CA (Davide, Jr., 1996) A searchwarrant hasa lifetime of 10 days. It could be servedat anytime within10 days. Ifits object or purpose cannot be accomplished in 1 day, the same maybe continuedthe following day or days untilcompleted, provided it is within the 10 dayperiod. FACTS: On 1 April 1990, SpecialActions andInvestigationDivision(SAID),acting oninformation that a huge pile ofnarra flitches, shorts, andslabs were seeninside the lumberyardof Mustang Lumber, conducted a surveillance at Mustang lumberyard. The teamsawa truckloaded withlauan and almaciga lumber comingout ofthe lumberyard. Since the driver couldnot produce the required invoicesandtransport documents, the teamseizedthe truck together with its cargo and impoundedthem at DENR compound. On 3 April 1990,RTCValenzuela issueda search warrant. On same day, the teamseizedfrom the lumberyardnarra shorts, trimmings and slabs, narra lumber, and various species oflumber andshorts. On 4 April 1990, team returnedto lumber yardand placedunder administrative seizure (owner retains physicalpossession ofseized articles, onlyan inventoryis taken) the remaining lumber because Mustang Lumber failedto produce required documents upon demand. Uponrecommendationof SAIDChiefRobles, DENR Sec Factoran suspendedMustang Lumber¶s permit andconfiscated in favor of the gov¶t the seized articles. Mustang Lumber filedfor a TRO against FactoranandRobles,and questionedthe validityof the April 1 and4 seizure. RTCheld that the warrantless seizure on April1 is validas it comes within the exceptions where warrantless seizure is justified (search of a moving vehicle), and April 4seizure wasalso validpursuant to the search warrant issued onApril 3. CA affirmed. Mustang lumber fileda petitionfor reviewon certiorari. ISSUES: a) WON the search andseizure on April4 was valid. HELD: Yes. The searchandseizures made onApril 1, 3, 4 were allvalid. (1) April 1 search wasconducted ona movingvehicle, whichcould be lawfullyconducted without a searchwarrant. (2*) The search onApril 4 was a continuation ofthe search onApril 3 done under andbyvirtue of the searchwarrant issuedon 3 April 1990 byExec Judge Osorio. Under ROC Rule 126Sec 9, a search warrant ahs a lifetime of10 days. Hence, it could be served at anytime withinthe said period, andif its object or purpose cannot be accomplishedin1 day, the same maybe continued the followingdayor days until completed, providedit is stillwithin the 10-dayperiod. DISPOSITIVE:Petitionis denied. CA didnot commit anyreversible error inaffirming RTCjudgment. Search andseizure done was valid .CASE DIGEST BY Agee Romero***There were other issues inthe case: the owner of Mustang Lumber was chargedwith violation ofthe ForestryReformCode. Mustang lumber movedtoquash the informationonthe groundthat the facts comprisingthe charge didnot amount to a criminal offense (subject matter of the informationis³lumber´, whichis neither ³timber´ nor ³other forest product´ under ForestryReform Code and hence, possession thereof w/othe required legal documents is not prohibited) andto suspendthe proceedings pending the outcome of the formal challenge ofMustang Lumber regarding the legalityof the seizure. Lengthydiscussion onthe meaningof ³lumber´. But SCheld that the informationvalidly chargedanoffense because lumber is includedin the term ³timber´. Gatchalian v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 32560, 22 October 1970General words construed generally Facts: Pursuant to the request of the advertisingfirms andassociations of the Philippines, COMELEC promulgatedResolutionNo. RR 707 which states that “donations of billboards to the Commissionbyforeigners or companies or corporations ownedand
- 30. 30 controlledpartiallyor whollybyforeigners arenot coveredbySection 56 of the Revised Election Code.” The bodyalsoissuedResolution RR-731 whichstates that the banin Section46 of the Revised ElectionCode, as amended, does not cover campaignfunds andother contributions bythe Advertising Council ofthe Philippinesandother contributions by the AdvertisingCouncil of the Philippines andothers similarlysituated, during the 120 days immediatelyprecedinga regular or specialelection. Petitioner, as a candidate inthe election for delegates to the Constitutional Convention, fileda complaint with the COMELECassailing the validityof the bothresolutions, alleging that bothare violative ofSection56 of the RevisedElection Code, as amended, which provides that: No foreigner shall aidanycandidate,directlyor indirectly, or to take part in or to influence inany manner anyelections.The prohibitedactive interventionof foreigners there under mayconsist of:(1) aiding anycandidate, directlyor indirectly, in anyelection;(2) taking part in anyelection;and (3) influencing in anymanner any election. The COMELEC, however, deniedthe petitioner’s motion, declaring "that contributions by foreigners to the COMELECBillboards Committee for the purpose offinancing costs of COMELEC billboards are not made inaid or support of anyparticular candidate ina particular district and that the allocation ofspace for its candidate is allowedbylottery, nor would it inanyway influence the result of the election, ... .He then filedan appealwith the Court, contendingthat said order of the COMELECis null andvoidas contraryto law or having beenissued in excess of the powers of the CommissiononElections or ingrave abuse of its discretion, andprayingfor a writ of preliminaryas well as permanent injunction. No restraining order was issuedas COMELECitself did not implement the saidresolution. Issue: Whether or not the term “anyelections,” “foreigner,” and“anycandidate;” as well as the terms “aid,” “take part,” and“influence,” as contemplatedInSection56 of the RevisedElectionCode, had other meanings Held: The term “anyelections” definitelycomprehends or appliesto electionof delegates Constitutional Convention. “Foreigner,” on the other hand, refers to bothnatural andjuridical persons or associations or organizedgroups, as provided bySection 39 of Article 3 of the Revised ElectionCode, broadening the application ofthe term and not limiting the prohibition to natural persons only. “Anycandidate” likewise comprehends ‘some candidates’ or ‘all candidates.’ The terms “aid,” “to take part,” and“influence,” were alsoconstruedin their general sense with “aid” referring to to support, to help, to assist or to strengthenor to act in cooperation with;"to take part" means to participate or to engage in;and"influence" means to use the party's endeavors, thoughhe maynot be able to carryhis point, or to exert or have aneffect on the nature or behaviour of, or affect the actionor thought of, or modify;or to sway;to persuade; to affect;to have aneffect on the condition or development of;to modifyor act upon physically, especiallyin some gentle, subtle, or gradual way;or to exert or maintaina mental or moral power uponor over;to effect or swaybymodifications, feelings or conduct. There is nothing in the RevisedElection Code whichimpliedlyor expresslyprescribes a different meaningto the aforementioned terms. Hence, theyshouldbe understood intheir general sense. There was likewise nomanifest or expressed intentionthat the meaningof the words were to be restrictedor limited. Where generalterms are used, the terms are to be understood intheir general meaning, unless it is expressedthat theyhave acquireda special andrestricted meaning. Hence, in this case, “generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda” applies. The billboardcontributions maynot specificallyfavor a single candidate, but the effect that all candidates benefit fromthe contribution amounts to anassistance greater thanthe aid that may be givento one candidate. Allowingsuchundesirable alien influence will inevitablylead to a circumventionof the laws protecting our national interest. The practice allegedlycondonedbythe COMELEC in the subject resolutions, therefore, constitute a violation ofthe RevisedElection Code. The law penalizing corrupt electionpractices shouldbe given a reasonable constructioninthe interests ofthe purityof the elections. The resolutions of the Commissionon Elections Nos. RR- 707 and 731 promulgatedrespectivelyon August 13, 1970 and September17, 1970 are therefore declaredillegaland nullandvoid. G.R. No. L-28360 January 27, 1983 C & C COMMERCIAL CORPORATION, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANTONIO C. MENOR, as Acting General Manager of the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority, and MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON PRE-QUALIFICATION, NAWASA, defendants- appellants. Nicolas T. Benedicto, Jr., for plaintiff-appellee. Gov't. Corporate Counsel for defendants-appellants. AQUINO, J.: This case is about the requirement ofa tax clearance certificate as a prerequisite for takingpart in public biddings or contracts to sell suppliesto anygovernment agency. Judge Cloribel of the Court of First Instance of Manilainhis decision dated March 1, 1967 in Civil Case No. 66750, a mandamus case, ordered the Acting General Manager of the National Waterworks andSewerage Authorityandthe members of the Committee onPre-Qualificationto allowC& C CommercialCorporationto participate as a qualified bidder inthe public biddingfor the supplyof asbestos cement pressure pipes to the Nawasainspite of the fact that it hada pending tax case and had notax clearance certificate. By virtue of that judgment, whichbecame final becausethe Nawasa did not appeal, C& C CommercialCorporationtook part in the bidding. When the bids were openedonMay18, 1967, it was found to be the lowest bidder.
- 31. 31 In a letterdated July25, 1967, AntonioC. Menor, the actinggeneral manager of the Nawasa, requiredC& C CommercialCorporationto submit the tax clearance certificate requiredin Presidential Administrative Order No, 66 datedJune 26, 1967, 63 0. G. 6391, which reads as follows: Now, therefore, I, FerdinandE. Marcos, President ofthe Philippines, byvirtue of the powers vestedin me bylaw, do herebyorder the disqualification of any person, natural or juridical, with a pending casebefore the Bureau ofInternal Revenue or the Bureauof Customs or criminal or civil case in court pending or finallydecidedagainst him or it involving non-payment ofanytax, dutyor undertaking withthe Government, to participate inpublic biddings or inany contract withthe Government or anyof its subdivisions, branchesor instrumentalities. including government-owned or controlledcorporations, until after such case or cases are terminatedinhisor its favor, or unless the Secretaryof Finance shall certifythat suchcases are pending andnot decided without fault onthe part of the taxpayer andthe taxpayer submits bondfor payment of taxesthat maybe assessedagainst him. Government offices entities andinstrumentalitiesand local governments shall impose this conditionandshall require, inaddition, the latest certifiedcopyof BIR Letter of ConfirmationForm No. 19.65-E-I andBIR tax clearance Form No. 1761 as prerequisites to participationinany public biddingorexecution of any contract with them. Violationof thisorder shall be a groundfor administrative action. (pp. 8-9, Brief for defendants-appellants). Menor saidthat the requirement as to the tax clearance certificate was mandatoryas held bythe Government Corporate Counselinhis OpinionNo. 159, Series of1967. On that same date, July25, 1967, or long after Judge Cloribel's judgment hadbeenexecuted and when he hadno more jurisdictionto amendit, C& C Commercial Corporation filed a motionin Civil Case No. 66750 whereinit prayed that the Nawasaofficials be ordered to award to the said corporation the contract for the supplyof asbestos cement pressure pipes, that theybe restrained from awarding the contract to another bidder and that theybe required to showcause whythey should not be heldincontempt of court. In effect, that motion wasanother petition for mandamus. Judge Cloribel inhisorder of August 23, 1967 grantedthe motionand ordered Menor andthe other Nawasa officials to awardwithin ten days fromnotice the contract to C& C Commercial Corporationas the lowest bidder. From that order, the Nawasa appealedto this Court. Judge Cloribelapproved its record onappeal inhis order of November 9, 1967. Realizingthat the appeal would delaythe award andthat another bidder might be given the contract, C& C Commercial Corporation filedin the lower court another petition for mandamus datedNovember 21, 1967 whereinit prayed that the NawasaBoardof Directors, its Committee of Awards and Menor, its acting general manager, be restrainedfromawardingthe contract to another bidder and that theybe ordered to awardthe contract to C& C Commercial Corporation (pp. 29-30, Rollo). That case, Civil CaseNo. 71346, was assignedto Judge FranciscoGeronimo. Inhis order dated January8, 1968, he denied the motionof C& CCommercial Corporationfor a preliminary injunction. He saidthat the injunctionwouldbe inimical to the public interest (p. 37, Rollo). The Government Corporate Counsel ina manifestationdatedJanuary15, 1968 apprisedthe lower court that the Nawasa boardof directors inits resolution dated January11, 1968 awarded the contract to Regal Trading Corporationas the "lowest complying bidder" (p. 38, Rollo). Menor in hisletter of January16, 1968 forwardedto the President of the Philippines for examination andreviewthe contract enteredinto betweenthe NawasaandRegal Trading Corporation, actinginbehalfof the SumitomoShoji Kaisha, Ltd., for the supplyof asbestos cement pressure pipes worth$387,814.72 (p. 41, Rollo). The Presidential Economic Staff andthe Office of the President approved the contract (p. 64, Rollo). Unable to get aninjunction fromJudge Geronimo, C& C Commercial Corporation sought recourse in this Court. In its ex parte motionof January28, 1968, it asked thisCourt to enjoin the implementationof the saidcontract (p. 16, Rollo). The Nawasa opposedthe motionon the groundthat there was nothingmore to be enjoined. Its counselrevealed inits oppositionwhat C& C Commercial Corporation had suppressed:the fact that after Judge Geronimohaddeniedits petition for injunctionC& C Commercial Corporation institutedanother action (the third case) inthe Court of First Instance at Pasig, Rizal (presided over byJudge Pedro Navarro), docketed as Civil Case No. 10572, whereinit sought a declarationof the nullityof the awardto Regal TradingCorporation. Judge Navarro inhisorder datedFebruary7, 1968 restrainedMenor, the Nawasa, the Committee of Awards andRegal Trading Corporation "from goingthrough" with the said contract andfrom opening the corresponding letter of credit until the injunctionincident is resolved (pp. 58-59 and 80-81, Rollo). In contrast, this Court in its resolutionof March18, 1968 denied C& CCommercial Corporation's aforementionedmotion for the issuance ofaninjunction. As the parties hereinhadalready submittedtheir briefs, the appeal was submittedfor decision. The issue is the proprietyof Judge Cloribel's order compelling the Nawasa officials to awardthe said contract to C& C Commercial Corporation. It maybe arguedthat the issue hadbecome moot because the contract hadalreadybeen awardedto Regal Trading Corporation in 1968 and at this late hour it canbe presumedthat the contract hadbeenfullyperformedandimplemented. Nevertheless, a ruling onthe contentions of C & C Commercial Corporationis necessary, accordingto the Government Corporate Counsel, "if onlyto make the appellee-corporationstopplaying aroundwithour courts" (p. 70, Rollo). For the guidance of the bench and bar, we have to resolve the legal issues raisedbythe Nawasa. We holdthat Judge Cloribel acted without jurisdictionandwithgrave abuse ofdiscretion inissuing his erroneous order, directingthat the Nawasa officialsshould award the contract to C& C CommercialCorporation. The order is erroneous andvoidfor the followingreasons:
- 32. 32 1. The saidorderwas anamendment of a judgment that had alreadybeensatisfied. The case was closedandterminated. Judge Cloribel hadnoright andauthorityto issue suchanorder after he had lost jurisdictionover the case. The awardof the contract to C& C Commercial Corporation was not the lis mota in the mandamus case before Judge Cloribel. It was anextraneous matter that could not have beeninjectedinto that case nor resolvedtherein. What was in issue was whether C& C Commercial Corporationshould be allowedto take part in the bidding evenifit had no tax clearance certificate. 2. The Nawasa was justified in not awarding the contract- to C& C CommercialCorporation because it had notax clearance certificate. It hada pending tax case in the Bureauof Internal Revenue. The award to C& C Commercial Corporation would be ingross contraventionof Administrative Order No. 66. That was the rulingin Nawasa vs. Reyes, L-28597, February29, 1968, 22 SCRA 905, where the bidder was also the appellee herein, C& CCommercial Corporation. It was heldthereinthat C& C CommercialCorporationwas disqualifiedunder the saidorder to take part inthe biddingto supply the Nawasawith steel pipes because it had"tremendous tax liabilities". Under Administrative Order No. 66, the Nawasa officials wouldbe subject to administrative disciplinaryactioniftheyawardedthe contract to C& C Commercial Corporation inspite of its unsettledtax liabilities. The trial court erredinholdingthat Administrative Order No. 66 could not be givena retroactive effect to the bid ofC& C Commercial Corporationwhich allegedlyhadbeenallowedto bid inprior transactions withthe Nawasainspite ofits pending tax case, It erred because Administrative Order No. 66 (promulgatedafter Judge Cloribel hadrenderedhis decisionof March1, 1967) covers not only the bidding but also the "executionof anycontract with" the lowest bidder. Inthis case, at the time the said order was issued, noawardhadas yet been made andwhenthe awardwas to be made, the said order was alreadyin force. 3. Moreover, it was not the ministerialdutyof the Nawasa officials to awardthe contract to C& C CommercialCorporationevenif it was the lowest bidder, The Nawasainits addendum No.1 to the invitationto bid dated July6, 1966 reservedthe right "to reject the bidof anybidder" (p. 35, Record on Appeal). Therefore, a bidder whose bidis rejectedhas nocause for complaint nor a right to dispute the award to another bidder (Esguerra & Sons vs. Aytona, 114 Phil. 1189;Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel, L-27072, July31, 1968, 24 SCRA 491). It shouldbe notedthat "advertisements for bidders are simplyinvitations to make proposals, and the advertiser is not boundto accept the highest or lowest bidder, unless the contraryappears" (Art. 1326, Civil Code). No such contraryintentionappears inthiscase. WHEREFORE, the trialcourt's order is reversed and set aside with costs against C& C Commercial Corporation. SO ORDERED. Makasiar (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero and Escolin, JJ., concur. Separate Opinions ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring: I concur. I wishto addthat the rehabilitation ofthe waterworks system in MetroManilawas considerablydelayedbecause contractors filed baselesssuits and theywere aidedbyjudgeswho should have known better. DE CASTRO, J., dissenting: In a judgment renderedbythe Court of First Instance of ManilainCivil Case No. 66750 filed bythe C & C Commercial Corporationprincipallyagainst the NAWASA on September 7, 1966, the court orderedthe NAWASA to allow the plaintiff corporation to enter as among the qualifiedbidders in the biddingfor the supplyof asbestos cement pressure pipes on September 23, 1966. 1 The complaint was filedbecause ofthe impositionof a requirement byNAWASA for the bidders to submit a certificate to the effect that theyhave paid all taxes due with the Bureauof Internal Revenue, whichthe plaintiff questioned as illegal. 2 Choosing not to appeal the decision whichthus became final andexecutory, andincompliance therewith, the defendant NAWASA pre-qualifiedthe plaintiff corporationwhichthereupon submittedits bid. However, before NAWASA couldmake anyawardof the corresponding contract, the President of the Philippines promulgatedAdministrative Order No. 66 "disqualifying any person, natural or juridical, with a pendingcase before the Bureau ofInternalRevenue or the Bureauof Customs, or criminal or civil case incourt, pendingor finallydecidedagainst himor involving non-payment of anytax, dutyor undertaking withthe government, to participate in public bidding or in anycontract with the government or anyof its subdivision, branchesor instrumentalities including government-ownedor controlledcorporation ... byreasonof which NAWASA refused to award the contract to plaintiffcorporation, prompting the latter to file a motionprayingthat defendants award the contract calledfor to said plaintiffbeing the lowest responsible bidder. 3 Granting the motion, the court ordered the defendants to awardthe contract in favor of the plaintiff, the court observing inits Order datedAugust 23, 1967, that the plaintiff is "the lowest bidder and practicallythe onlyone whocanfurnisha Filipino or local product under the provisionof Commonwealth Act No. 138." 4 In the motionfor reconsiderationof the aforementionedorder, defendants contendedthat the matter of award ofthe contract was not includedinthe DecisiondatedMarch 1, 1967;that Administrative Order No. 66 of the President of the Philippines datedJune 26, 1967 appliesto the contract calledfor;andthat the matter of the awardof the contract inquestion rests onthe absolute discretionof the defendants, taking into considerationallthe circumstances attendant thereto. 5 This motionhaving beendenied, defendants tookthe present recourse to have the Order dated August 23, 1967 of th lower court set aside.
- 33. 33 The onlyissues raisedbythedefendants-appellants (appellants for short)are: (1) whether or not the award ofthe contract in questionmaybe deemedto have beenincluded inthe judgment of the Court of First Instance datedMarch1, 1967, or inferredtherefrom;and(2) whether or not Administrative Order No. 66 dated June 26, 1967 of the President of the Philippines appliesinthe instant case. The decisionof the Court ofFirst Instance of Manila datedMarch 1, 1967 disposed as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is herebyrendered granting the reliefprayedfor byordering the defendants to allow the plaintiffcorporation to enter as among the qualified bidders to supply the materials consisting of locallymanufacturedasbestos cement pressure pipesof different sizesfrom 12" to 24" diameter, without costs or damages. In accordance withthe foregoing decision, plaintiff-appellee (appellee for short) submitted its bid. However, despite that it was found on May 18, 1967 to have been the lowest responsible bidder, appellee wasnot forthwith giventhe finalaward ofthe corresponding contract because, as stated earlier, the President of the Philippines promulgated onJune 26, 1967 Administrative Order No. 66 pertinent provisions of which reads: NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINANDE. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vestedinme bylaw, doherebyorder the disqualification of anyperson, natural or juridical, with a pendingcase before the Bureau of InternalRevenue ofthe Bureauof Customs, or criminal or civil case incourt pending or finallydecidedagainst himor it involving non-payment of anytax, duty, or undertaking withthe Government, to participate inpublic biddings or in any contract with the Government or any of its subdivisions, branches, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations, until after such case or cases are terminatedinhisor its favor, or unless the Secretaryof Finance shall certify, that suchcases are pending andnot decided 'without fault on the part of the taxpayer and the taxpayer submits bondfor payment of taxesthat maybe assessedagainst him. Government offices, entities andinstrumentalitiesand local governments, shallimpose this conditionandshall require inaddition, the latest certified copyof BIR Letter of ConfirmationForm -No. 19.65 E-I and BIRTax Clearance Form No. 17.61 as prerequisite to participationin anypublic biddings orexecution of any contract with them. Violation ofthis Order shall be a ground for administrative action. (Emphasissupplied) What appellant AntonioC. Menor, Acting General Manager of NAWASA did wasto address a letter to appellee on July25, 1967, requesting it to complywithinten(10) days from receipt of the letter with the requirements ofthe presidential administrative order, and to submit to his office proofof said compliance. 6 On the same date, July25, 1967, plaintifffiled a "Motion"with the court belowfor the issuance of an order to compel appellants to "awardthe contract calledfor in the aforementioned bidding" in its favor. To the motion, appellants filedanopposition, despite which, the lower court issued the questionedOrder of August 23, 1967. The maincontentionof appellants inseeking the setting aside of the aforementionedquestioned order is that the subject thereof is not includedin, or inferredfrom, the judgment of March1, 1967 which merely"ordered appellants to allow the plaintiff to enter as amongthe qualified bidders."Appellants claim that the Judgment, was alreadysatisfiedwhenappellants pre-qualified the appellee andallowedit to tender its bid, andthat nothing more is to be done under the judgment. It is at this point that Section49 of the RevisedRules of Court onthe "Effect of judgment" comes into play, the pertinent provisions of whichare as follows: SECTION 49. Effect of Judgments.- The effect of a judgement or finalorder renderedbya court or judge of the Philippines, havingjurisdictionto pronounce the judgment or order, maybe as follows: (a) . . . (b) In other cases the judgment or order is, withrespect to the matter directly adjudgedor as to anyother matter that couldhave been raisedinrelation thereto, conclusive betweenthe parties and their successors in interest bytitle subsequent to the commencement of actionor specialproceeding, litigation for the same thing and under the same title and inthe same capacity; (c) In anyother litigationbetweenthe same parties or their successors in interest, that onlyis deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgement which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarilyincluded therein or necesarry thereto. Appellants contendthat the matter of the award of the contract inquestionwas not "so adjudged" inthe judgment of March 1, 1967 whichlimitedits dispositive portionto adjudging only the pre-qualification ofappellee. Appellee contends otherwise andmaintains that the awarding of the contract to it is necessarilyimpliedfromand includedinthe order inthe judgment declaring it qualified to take part inthe bidding. I find merit in the contentionof appellee. Inbringing the actionto compel appellants to allow it to take part inthe bidding inquestion, appellee necessarilymeant to be also awardedthe correspondingcontract if its bidis foundto be the lowest within the meaning ofthe term "lowest bidder" under the lawandjurisprudence. The judgment, orderingappellants to allow appellee to enter its bid would be emptyandmeaningless if despite the fact that appelleeis foundto be the "lowest bidder", the award of the contract is not made in its favor, without anyvalidre asonto reject anyor all bids as is generallyset forth in all invitations to bid. No validreasonis intimidated byappellants other than the promulgation ofPresidential Administrative Order No. 66, after the judgment has become finalandevenalreadyexecuted, at least insofar as it ordered appellants to allowappellee to enter its bid. This is evident from the fact that appellants gave appellee ten(10)
- 34. 34 days within whichtocomplywithits provision, indicatingthat ifthe requirement thereof is compliedwithbyappellee, the contract wouldbe awarded to it as the lowest bidder. For obvious reason, appellee couldnot complywith the aforementionedrequirement, for it is an admitted fact that it has pending tax cases before the Bureau ofInternalRevenue. It is precisely for this reason that appellee went to court andfiled Civil Case No. 66750 when appellants imposedonit (appellee) the same or similar requirements as those found inAdministrative Order No. 66, in order to have itselfdeclaredqualified to take part inthe bidding. When the lower court decided infavor of appellee bydeclaring it to be qualified to sotake part inthe public biddingin question, the judgment must take precedence over Administrative Order No. 66 promulgated after the judgment has become final. As maybe seen, the presidentialadministrative order disqualified a person, naturalor juridical, who has a pendingtax case, administrative or judicial, fromparticipating in public biddings or any contract withthe Government or anyof its subdivisions, branchesor instrumentalities, including government-ownedor controlledcorporation. The judgment in question, onthe other hand, qualified appellee to participate in the public bidding, which necessarilyincludes the award to him of the corresponding contract, iffoundto be the lowest bidder, otherwise taking part in the biddingwouldbe a meaningless exercise and the judgment, anemptyvictoryfor appellee.1äwphï1.ñët The judgment has become the "lawof the case," andina true sense, the judgment has become "property" of whichit maynot be deprivedwithout due process oflaw. This is exactlywhat Administrative Order No. 66 of the President of the Philippines would doifit is made to applyto the instant case, for while the Court, byfinal judgment, qualifiedappellee to participate in the bidding, the Administrative Order woulddisqualifysaidparty. This would be an illegalinterference onthe power of the judiciary. I, therefore, vote to dismiss the appeal and the order appealedfrom, affirmed, if onlyonreliance of the provisionof Section11, Article Xof the NewConstitutionfor reasons I have set forthat lengthin Malacora vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 51042, September 30, 1982, this case having been submittedmore than eighteen(18) months before the instant case couldbe decided. Separate Opinions ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring: I concur. I wishto addthat the rehabilitation ofthe waterworks system in MetroManilawas considerablydelayedbecause contractors filed baselesssuits and theywere aidedbyjudgeswho should have known better. DE CASTRO, J., dissenting: In a judgment renderedbythe Court of First Instance of ManilainCivil Case No. 66750 filed bythe C & C Commercial Corporationprincipallyagainst the NAWASA on September 7, 1966, the court orderedthe NAWASA to allow the plaintiffcorporation to enter as among the qualifiedbidders in the biddingfor the supplyof asbestos cement pressure pipes on September 23, 1966. 1 The complaint was filedbecause ofthe impositionof a requirement byNAWASA for the bidders to submit a certificate to the effect that theyhave paid all taxes due with the Bureauof Internal Revenue, whichthe plaintiff questioned as illegal. 2 Choosing not to appeal the decision which thus became final andexecutory, andincompliance therewith, the defendant NAWASA pre-qualifiedthe plaintiff corporationwhichthereupon submittedits bid. However, before NAWASA couldmake anyawardof the corresponding contract, the President of the Philippines promulgatedAdministrative Order No. 66 "disqualifying any person, natural or juridical, with a pendingcase before the Bureau ofInternalRevenue or the Bureauof Customs, or criminal or civil case incourt, pendingor finallydecidedagainst himor involving non-payment of anytax, dutyor undertaking withthe government, to participate in public bidding or in anycontract with the government or anyof its subdivision, branchesor instrumentalities including government-ownedor controlledcorporation ... byreasonof which NAWASA refused to award the contract to plaintiffcorporation, prompting the latter to file a motionprayingthat defendants award the contract calledfor to said plaintiffbeing the lowest responsible bidder. 3 Granting the motion, the court ordered the defendants to awardthe contract in favor of the plaintiff, the court observing inits Order datedAugust 23, 1967, that the plaintiff is "the lowest bidder and practicallythe onlyone whocanfurnisha Filipino or local product under the provisionof Commonwealth Act No. 138." 4 In the motionfor reconsiderationof the aforementionedorder, defendants contendedthat the matter of award ofthe contract was not includedinthe DecisiondatedMarch 1, 1967;that Administrative Order No. 66 of the President of the Philippines datedJune 26, 1967 appliesto the contract calledfor;andthat the matter of the awardof the contract inquestion rests onthe absolute discretionof the defendants, taking into considerationallthe circumstances attendant thereto. 5 This motionhaving beendenied, defendants tookthe present recourse to have the Order dated August 23, 1967 of th lower court set aside. The onlyissues raisedbythe defendants-appellants (appellants for short)are: (1) whether or not the award ofthe contract in questionmaybe deemedto have beenincludedinthe judgment of the Court of First Instance datedMarch1, 1967, or inferredtherefrom;and(2) whether or not Administrative Order No. 66 dated June 26, 1967 of the President of the Philippines appliesinthe instant case. The decisionof the Court ofFirst Instance of Manila datedMarch 1, 1967 disposed as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is herebyrendered granting the reliefprayedfor byordering the defendants to allow the plaintiffcorporation to enter as among the qualified bidders to supply the materials consisting of locallymanufacturedasbestos cement pressure pipesof different sizesfrom 12" to 24" diameter, without costs or damages. In accordance withthe foregoing decision, plaintiff-appellee (appellee for short) submitted its bid. However, despite that it was found on May 18, 1967 to have been the lowest responsible bidder, appellee wasnot forthwith giventhe finalaward ofthe corresponding contract because, as stated earlier, the President of the Philippines promulgated onJune 26, 1967 Administrative Order No. 66 pertinent provisions of which reads:
- 35. 35 NOW, THEREFORE, I,FERDINANDE. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vestedinme bylaw, doherebyorder the disqualification of anyperson, natural or juridical, with a pendingcase before the Bureau of InternalRevenue ofthe Bureauof Customs, or criminal or civil case incourt pending or finallydecidedagainst himor it involving non-payment of anytax, duty, or undertaking withthe Government, to participate inpublic biddings or in any contract with the Government or any of its subdivisions, branches, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations, until after such case or cases are terminatedinhisor its favor, or unless the Secretaryof Finance shall certify, that suchcases are pending andnot decided 'without fault on the part of the taxpayer and the taxpayer submits bondfor payment of taxesthat maybe assessedagainst him. Government offices, entities andinstrumentalitiesand local governments, shallimpose this conditionandshall require inaddition, the latest certified copyof BIR Letter of ConfirmationForm -No. 19.65 E-I and BIRTax Clearance Form No. 17.61 as prerequisite to participationin anypublic biddings orexecution of any contract with them. Violation ofthis Order shall be a ground for administrative action. (Emphasissupplied) What appellant AntonioC. Menor, Acting General Manager of NAWASA did wasto address a letter to appellee onJuly25, 1967, requesting it to complywithinten(10) days from receipt of the letter with the requirements ofthe presidential administrative order, and to submit to his office proofof said compliance. 6 On the same date, July25, 1967, plaintifffiled a "Motion"with the court belowfor the issuance of an order to compel appellants to "awardthe contract calledfor in the aforementioned bidding" in its favor. To the motion, appellants filedanopposition, despite which, the lower court issued the questionedOrder of August 23, 1967. The maincontentionof appellants inseeking the setting aside of the aforementionedquestioned order is that the subject thereof is not includedin, or inferredfrom, the judgment of March1, 1967 which merely"ordered appellants to allow the plaintiff to enter as amongthe qualified bidders."Appellants claim that the Judgment, was alreadysatisfiedwhenappellants pre-qualified the appellee and allowedit to tender its bid, andthat nothing more is to be done under the judgment. It is at this point that Section49 of the RevisedRules of Court onthe "Effect of judgment" comes into play, the pertinent provisions of whichare as follows: SECTION 49. Effect of Judgments.- The effect of a judgement or finalorder renderedbya court or judge of the Philippines, havingjurisdictionto pronounce the judgment or order, maybe as follows: (a) . . . (b) In other cases the judgment or order is, withrespect to the matter directly adjudgedor as to anyother matter that couldhave been raisedinrelation thereto, conclusive betweenthe parties and their successors in interest bytitle subsequent to the commencement of actionor specialproceeding, litigation for the same thing and under the same title and inthe same capacity; (c) In anyother litigationbetweenthe same parties or their successors in interest, that onlyis deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgement which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarilyincluded therein or necesarry thereto. Appellants contendthat the matter of the award of the contract inquestionwas not "so adjudged" inthe judgment of March 1, 1967 whichlimitedits dispositive portionto adjudging only the pre-qualification ofappellee. Appellee contends otherwise andmaintains that the awarding of the contract to it is necessarilyimpliedfromand includedinthe order inthe judgment declaring it qualified to take part inthe bidding. I find merit in the contentionof appellee. Inbringing the actionto compel appellants to allow it to take part inthe bidding inquestion, appellee necessarilymeant to be also awardedthe correspondingcontract if its bidis foundto be the lowest within the meaning ofthe term "lowest bidder" under the lawandjurisprudence. The judgment, orderingappellants to allow appellee to enter its bid would be emptyandmeaningless if despite the fact that appelleeis foundto be the "lowest bidder", the award of the contract is not made in its favor, without anyvalidreasonto reject anyor all bids as is generallyset forth in all invitations to bid. No validreasonis intimidated byappellants other than the promulgation ofPresidential Administrative Order No. 66, after the judgment has become finalandevenalreadyexecuted, at least insofar as it ordered appellants to allowappellee to enter its bid. This is evident from the fact that appellants gave appellee ten(10) days within whichto comply withits provision, indicatingthat ifthe requirement thereof is compliedwithbyappellee, the contract wouldbe awarded to it as the lowest bidder. For obvious reason, appellee couldnot complywith the aforementionedrequirement, for it is an admitted fact that it has pending tax cases before the Bureau ofInternalRevenue. It is precisely for this reason that appellee went to court andfiled Civil Case No. 66750 when appellants imposedonit (appellee) the same or similar requirements as those found inAdministrative Order No. 66, in order to have itselfdeclaredqualified to take part inthe bidding. When the lower court decided infavor of appellee bydeclaring it to be qualified to sotake part inthe public biddingin question, the judgment must take precedence over Administrative Order No. 66 promulgated after the judgment has become final. As maybe seen, the presidentialadministrative order disqualified a person, naturalor juridical, who has a pendingtax case, administrative or judicial, from participating in public biddings or any contract withthe Government or anyof its subdivisions, branchesor instrumentalities, including government-ownedor controlledcorporation. The judgment in question, onthe other hand, qualified appellee to participate in the public bidding, which necessarilyincludes the award to him of the corresponding contract, iffoundto be the lowest bidder, otherwise taking part in the biddingwouldbe a meaningless exercise and the judgment, anemptyvictoryfor appellee. The judgment has become the "lawof the case," andin a true sense, the judgment has become
- 36. 36 "property" of whichit maynot be deprivedwithout due processof law. Thisis exactlywhat Administrative Order No. 66 of the President of the Philippines woulddo ifit is made to applyto the instant case, for while the Court, byfinaljudgment, qualifiedappellee to participate inthe bidding, the Administrative Order woulddisqualifysaid party. This wouldbe anillegal interference on the power ofthe judiciary. I, therefore, vote to dismiss the appeal and the order appealedfrom, affirmed, if onlyonreliance of the provisionof Section11, Article Xof the NewConstitutionfor reasons I have set forthat lengthin Malacora vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 51042, September 30, 1982, this case having been submittedmore thaneighteen(18) months before the instant case couldbe decided. Central Bank of the Philippines v. CA (1985)Ponente: Makasiar, C.J.Topic: Delay (Art. 1169) Facts: April 28, 1965 - IslandSavings Bank(ISB)approvedthe loanapplication for P80,000 of Sulpicio Tolentino, who, asasecurityfor the loan, also executeda real estate mortgageover his100-ha land. The approvedloanapplicationcalledfor P80,000 loan, repayable insemi-annual installments for a periodof 3 years, with12% interest.May22, 1965 – a mere P17,000 partial release of theloanwas made byISB, andTolentinoandhis wife Editasigned a promissorynote for P17,000 at 12% annual interest, payable within 3 years from the date ofexecutionof thecontract at semi- annual installments ofP3,459.An advance interest for the P80,000 loancoveringa6-moperiod amounting to P4,800was deductedfrom the partial release of P17,000, but this was refunded to TolentinoonJuly23, 1965, after beinginformedbyISBthat there wasno fundyet available for the release of the P63,000 balance.Aug. 13, 1965 – the MonetaryBoardof the CentralBankissued ResolutionNo. 1049, which prohibited ISBfrommakingnew loans and investments, after finding that it wassuffering liquidityproblems.June 14, 1968 – the MonetaryBoardissuedResolutionNo. 967, which prohibitedISB fromdoingbusiness in the Philippines, after findingthat it failedto put upthe required capital to restore its solvency.Aug. 1, 1968 – ISB, in viewof non-payment of theP17,000 covered bythe promissorynote, filedanapplicationfor the extra-judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgagecovering the 100-ha land;andthe sheriff scheduledauction.Tolentino fileda petitionwiththe CFI for injunction,specific performance or rescission and damages with preliminaryinjunction, alleging that since ISBfailedto deliver the P63,000 remaining balance of the loan, he is entitledtospecific performance byorderingISBto deliver it withinterestof 12% per annumfrom April28, 1965, and if said balancecannot be delivered, to rescind the real estate mortgage.CFI issued a TRO enjoining ISB fromcontinuingwith the foreclosure ofthe mortgage, however, after findingTolentino’s petitionunmeritorious, orderedthe latter to payISBP17,000 plus legal interest andlegal chargesandliftingthe TRO sothe sheriff mayproceedwiththe foreclosure.CA, on appeal byTolentino, modifiedCFI’s decisionbyaffirming dismissal of Tolentino’s petition for specific performance, but ruledthat ISB can neither foreclose themortgage nor collect the P17,000loan. SC: The parties, inthe P80,000 loanagreement,undertook reciprocal obligations, wherein theobligation/promise ofeachpartyis the considerationfor thatof the other;a ndwhenone party has performedor is readyandwillingto performhis part of the contract, the other partywhohas not performedor is not readyandwillingto performincurs in delay(Art. 1169, CC).When Tolentino executeda real estate mortgage, hesignifiedhiswillingnessto paythe P80,000 loan, and fromsuchdate, the obligation ofISBto furnishthe loanaccrued.Thus, ISB’s delaystarted onApril 28, 1965 and lasted 3 yearsor whenResolutionNo. 967 was issuedprohibiting ISBfromdoing further business , which madit legallyimpossiblefromISBto furnishthe P63,000 of the loan.ResolutionNo. 1049 cannot interrupt the default of ISBin complying withits obligationto release the P63,000 balance because it merelyprohibitedISB frommaking newloans andinvestments, not from releasingthe balance of loanagreements previouslycontracted.The mere pecuniaryinabilityto fulfill an engagementdoes not discharge the obligationof the contract, nor does itconstitute anydefense to a decree of specific performance; andthe mere fact of insolvencyof a debtor is never anexcuse for the nonfulfillment of anobligation, but instead, is takenas a breach ofcontract.The fact that Tolentino demandedandacceptedthe refundof the pre-deducted interest cannot be takenas a waiver of hisright to collect the P63,000 balance. The act of ISBinaskingfor the advance interest was improper consideringthat onlyP17,000 out of the P80,000 loan wasreleased.The alleged discoverybyISBof the overvaluationof theloancollateral cannot exempt it fromcomplyingwith itsobligationto furnishthe entire P80,000 loan because bank officials/employees have the obligationto investigate theexistence andvaluationof the propertiesbeingofferedas aloan securitybefore approvingthe loanapplication. Issues/Held/Ratio 1) WON the actionof Tolenitnofor specific performance canprosper. NO.Since ISBwas in default under the agreement, Tolentinomaychoose between specific performance or rescission, butsince ISB is now prohibited fromdoingfurther business, theonly remedyleft is Rescissiononlyfor the P63,000 balance ofthe loan. 2) WON Tolentino is liable to paythe P17,000 debtcoveredbythe promissorynote. YES.The bank was deemed to have complied withitsreciprocal obligationto furnish a P17,000 loan. The promissorynote gave rise to Tolentino’s reciprocal obligationto paysuchloanwhen it falls due andhisfailure to paytheoverdue amortizations under the promissorynote made hima partyin default, hence not entitled to rescission (Art. 1191,CC). ISB has the right to rescindthe promissorynote, beingthe aggrievedparty.Since bothpartieswere in default inthe performance of their reciprocal obligations, bothare liable for damages. Incase bothparties have committeda breach oftheir reciprocalobligations, the liabilityof the first infractor shall be equirablytempered bythe courts (Art. 1192, CC). The liabilityof ISBfor damages in not furnishing the entire loanis offset bytheliabilityof Tolentinofor damages (penaltiesandsurcharges)for not paying his overdue P17,000 debt. Since Tolentinoderivedsome benefit for hisuse of the P17,000, he shouldaccount for the interest thereon(interest was not includedinthe offsetting). 3) WON Tolentino’s real estate mortgage can beforeclosed to satisfythe P17,000 if his liabilityto paytherefor subsists. NO. The fact that whenTolentinoexecutedhisreal estatemortgage, noconsiderationwas thenin existence, as there wasno debt yet because ISB hadnot made anyrelease onthe loan,does not make the real estate mortgage void for lackof consideration.It is not necessarythat any consideration shouldpassatthe time of the execution ofthe contract of real mortgage.Whenthe consideration is subsequent to the mortgage, thelatter cantake effect onlywhen the debt secured
- 37. 37 byit iscreated asa bindingcontract to pay. Andwhenthere is partialfailure of consideration, the mortgage becomes unenforceableto the extent of such failure. Where the indebtedness actuallyowingto the holder of the mortgage is less thanthe sumnamedinthe mortgage, the mortgage cannot be enforcedfor more thanthe actualsum due.Since ISBfailedto furnishthe P63,000 balance, the realestate mortgage of Tolentinobecame unenforceable to suchextent. P63,000 is 78.75% of P80,000, hence the mortgagecovering100 ha is unenforceable to the extent of 78.75 ha.The mortgage coveringthe remainder of 21.25 ha subsists as asecurityfor the P17,000 debt.Judgment:1)Tolentinois orderedto payISBP17,000 plus P41,210 (12% interest per annum)2)Incase Tolentino fails to pay, his real estate mortgagecovering 21.25 ha shall be foreclosedto satisfyhistotalindebtedness3)The real estate mortgage covering78.75 ha isunenforceable andorderedreleased in favor of Tolentino Director of Lands vs Court of Appeals Director of Lands vs. CA 276 SCRA 276 G. R. No. 102858 July28 1997 Facts: Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petitionfor original registrationof his title under P. D. No. 1529. However, during the pendency of his petition, applicant died. Hence his heirs representedbytheir aunt Josefa Abistado, whowas appointed their guardian ad litem, were substituted as applicants. The LandRegistrationCourt in its decision dismissed the petition “for want of jurisdiction.” However, it foundthat the applicants throughtheir predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive andpeaceful possession of the subject land since 1938. The trial court dismissed the petitionfor the reasonthat the applicants failed to publi sh the notice of Initial Hearing in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. Private Respondents appealedto CA, whichset aside the decision ofthe trial court and ordered the registration of the title in the name of Teodoro Abistado. The Director ofLands representedbythe Solicitor General, brought the case to the Supreme Court. Issue: W/N newspaper publicationof the notice of Initial Hearing in anoriginal land registration case mandatory or directory. Held: It is mandatory. The word “shall” denotes an imperative and thus indicates the mandatory character of a statute. The law used the term “shall” inprescribing the work to be done by the Commissioner of LandRegistrationuponthe latter’s receipt of the court order settingthe time for InitialHearing. While concededly such literal mandate is not an absolute rule in statutory construction, as its import ultimatelydepends uponits context inthe entire provision, we hold that in the present case the term must be understood in its normal mandatory meaning. Stat Con Principle: Whenthe lawis clear, it is not susceptible of interpretation. It must be applied regardless of who may be affected, even if the law may be harsh or erroneous. Legal Maxims: Verba Legis and Dura Lex Sed Lex CAPATI vs. OCAMPO G.R. No. L-28742 April 30, 1982 Directorystatute. It is permissive or discretionaryin nature andmerelyoutlines the act to be done in such a way that no injurycan result from ignoring it or that its purpose canbe accomplished ina manner other thanthat prescribedandsubstantiallythe same result canbe obtained. Facts: Plaintiff Virgilio Capati, a resident ofBacolor, Pampanga, was the contractor of the Feati Bankfor the constructionof its buildinginIriga, Camarines Sur. He entered into a sub-contract withthe defendant Jesus Ocampo, a resident of Naga Citywhere he undertookto construct the vault walls, exterior walls andcolumns of the saidFeati building inaccordance withthe specifications indicatedtherein. Defendant further bound himself to complete saidconstructionon or before June 5, 1967. To emphasize thistime frame Ocampoaffixedhis signature below the following stipulationin boldletters:“TIME IS ESSENTIAL, TO BE FINISHED 5 JUNE’ 67.” At the backof the contract whichreads: “14. That all actions arisingout, or relating to this contract maybe institutedinthe Court of First Instance of the Cityof Naga.” Claiming that defendant finished the construction in questiononlyon June 20, 1967, plaintiff filedinthe Court of First Instance ofPampanga anactionfor recoveryof consequentialdamages. Ocampo (defendant) filed a motionto dismiss the complaint on the groundthat venue of action was improperlylaid. Capati (plaintiff) filed an oppositionto the motion,claiming that their
- 38. 38 agreement to holdthevenue inthe Court of First Instance of Naga Citywas merelyoptional to both contractingparties. CFI of Pampanga decidedthat it is animproper venue. Issue: WON the venue of action was improper (CFI of Pampanga)?NO, it made use of the word “may”, hence onlydirectory. Held: It is well settledthat the word“may” is merelypermissive andoperates to confer discretionupon a party. Under ordinarycircumstances, the term “maybe” connotespossibility;it does not connote certainty. “May” is an auxillaryverb indicatingliberty, opportunity, permissionor possibility. The stipulationas to venue in the contract inquestionis simplypermissive. Bythe said stipulation, the partiesdid not agree to file their suits solelyandexclusivelywiththe Court of First Instance of Naga. Theymerelyagreedto submit their disputes to the saidcourt, without waivingtheir right to seek recourse inthe court specificallyindicatedinSection 2 (b), Rule 4 of the Rulesof Court. Since the complaint has beenfiledinthe Court of First Instance of Pampanga, where the plaintiff resides, the venue of actionis properlylaid inaccordance withSection2 (b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Baguio City FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 126496 April 30, 1997 GMCR, INC.; SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC.; INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS CORP.; ISLA COMMUNICATIONS CO., INC., petitioners, vs. BELL TELECOMMUNICATION PHILIPPINES, INC.; THE NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION and HON. SIMEON L. KINTANAR in his official capacity as Commissioner of the National Telecommunications, respondents. COMMISSIONER SIMEON L. KINTANAR, NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, petitioner, vs. BELL TELECOMMUNICATION PHILIPPINES, INC., respondent. HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.: Before us are consolidatedpetitions seeking the reviewandreversal of the decision 1 ofthe respondent Court of Appeals2 declaring the National Telecommunications Commission(hereafter, NTC) to be a collegial bodyunder Executive Order No. 546 3 andorderingthe NTCto heretofore sit and act en banc, i.e., with the concurrence of at least two commissioners, for a validdispensation of its quasi-judicial functions. Establishedbyevidence are the following facts: On October 19, 1993, private respondent Bell TelecommunicationPhilippines, Inc. (hereafter, BellTel)filedwith the NTCanApplicationfor a Certificate of Public Convenience andNecessityto Procure, Install, Operate andMaintainNationwide Integrated Telecommunications Services and to Charge Rates Therefor andwith Further Request for the Issuance ofProvisional Authority. This applicationwas docketedas NTCCase No. 93-481. At the time of the filingof thisapplication, private respondent BellTel had not been granteda legislative franchise to engage inthe business of telecommunications service. Since private respondent BellTel was, at that time, anunenfranchised applicant, it was excludedin the deliberations for service area assignments for local exchange carrier service 4. Thus, only petitioners GMCR, Inc., Smart Communications, Inc., Isla Communications Co., Inc. and InternationalCommunications Corporation, amongothers, were beneficiaries of formal awards of service areaassignments inApril andMay, 1994. On March 25, 1994, Republic Act No. 7692 was enacted granting private respondent BellTel a congressional franchise whichgave private respondent BellTel the right, privilege andauthorityto carryon the businessof providing telecommunications services in and betweenprovinces, cities, andmunicipalitiesinthe Philippines andfor this purpose, to establish, operate, manage, lease, maintainandpurchase telecommunications systems, includingmobile, cellular andwired or wireless telecommunications systems, fiber optics, satellite transmit andreceive systems, andother telecommunications systems andtheir value-added services such as, but not limited to, transmission ofvoice, data, facsimile, control signals, audioand video, information service bureau, andall other telecommunications systems technologiesas are at present available or be made available throughtechnical advances or innovations inthe future, or construct, acquire, lease andoperate or manage transmitting andreceiving stations and switching stations, bothfor local andinternational services, lines, cables or systems, as is, or are convenient or essential to efficientlycarryout the purposes of this franchise. 5 On July12, 1994, private respondent BellTel filedwiththe NTC a secondApplication 6 praying for the issuance ofa Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessityfor the installation, operation and maintenance of a combinednationwide local toll (domestic andinternational) andtandem telephone exchanges and facilities using wire, wireless, microwave radio, satellites andfiber optic cable withPublic CallingOffices (PCOs)andverysmallaperture antennas (VSATs)under an
- 39. 39 integratedsystem. Thissecondapplication wasdocketedas NTCCase No. 94-229. In thissecond application, BellTelproposed to install2,600,000 telephone lines inten(10) years using the most modern and latest state-of-the-art facilities andequipment and to provide a 100% digitallocal exchange telephone network Private respondent BellTel moved to withdrawits earlier application docketedas NTCCase No. 93- 481. In an Order datedJuly11, 1994, this earlier applicationwas orderedwithdrawn, without prejudice. The second applicationof private respondent BellTel whichwas docketedas NTCCase No. 94-229 was assignedto a HearingOfficer for reception ofprivate respondent BellTel's evidence. Written oppositionandother pertinent pleadings were filedbypetitioners GMCR, Inc., Smart Communications, Inc., IslaCommunications Co., Inc. andInternational Communications Corporationas oppositors. Other oppositors to private respondent BellTel's applicationwere Capitol Wireless, Inc., EasternMisamis Oriental Telephone Cooperative, LibertyBroadcasting Network, Inc., MidsayapCommunication, NorthernTelephone, PAPTELCO, PilipinoTelephone Corporation, Philippine Global Communications, Inc., Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, Philippine Telegraph andTelephone Corporation, RadioCommunications of the Philippines, Inc. andExtelcom andTelecommunications Office. On December 20, 1994, private respondent BellTel completedthe presentationof its evidence-in- chief. Inthe course of the proceedings, the witnesses ofBellTel were cross-examinedbythe aforementionedoppositors. On December 21, 1994, BellTel filed its Formal Offer of Evidence together withall the technical, financialandlegal documents insupport of its application. Pursuant to its rules, the application wasreferredto the Common Carriers Authorization Department (CCAD) for studyand recommendation. On February6, 1995, the CCAD, through Engr. Marle Rabena, submitted to DeputyCommissioner Fidelo Q. Dumlao, a Memorandum datedFebruary6, 1995 7 manifestinghis findings and recommending that "basedon technical documents submitted, BellTel's proposal is technically feasible." 8 Subsequently, Mr. RaulitoSuarez, the chief of the RatesandRegulatoryDivisionof CCAD, conducted a financial evaluationof the project proposal ofprivate respondent BellTel. On March 29, 1995, Mr. Suarez made the findingthat BellTel has the financial capabilityto support its proposedproject at least for the initial two (2) years. Agreeingwith the findings andrecommendations of the CCAD, NTCDeputyCommissioners Fidelo DumlaoandConsueloPerez adopted the same andexpresslysignifiedtheir approval theretoby making the followingnotationonthe aforestated Memorandum of the CCAD dated February6, 1995: With the findingof financial capabilityand technical feasibility, the application merits due/favorable consideration. 9 Belowthis notation, DeputyCommissioners Fidelo Dumlao and ConsueloPerezaffixed their signatures andthe date, "4/6/95." In view ofthese favorable recommendations bythe CCAD andtwo members of the NTC, the Legal Department thereof prepareda working draft 10 of the order granting provisional authorityto private respondent BellTel. The saidworking draft was initialed byDeputyCommissioners FideloQ. DumlaoandConsuelo Perez but was not signedby Commissioner Simeon Kintanar. While ordinarily, a decisionthat is concurred in bytwo ofthe three members composinga quasi- judicial bodyis entitled to promulgation, petitioners claimthat pursuant to the prevailing policy and the corresponding procedure andpractice in the NTC, the exclusive authorityto sign, validate and promulgate anyandall orders, resolutions and decisions of the NTCis lodgedin the Chairman, in this case, Commissioner SimeonKintanar, and, thus, since onlyCommissioner SimeonKintanar is recognizedbythe NTCSecretariat as the sole authorityto signanyand all orders, resolutions and decisions of the NTC, onlyhisvote counts;DeputyCommissioners Dumlao and Perezhave allegedlyno voting power andboth their concurrence whichactuallyconstitutesthe majority is inutile without the assent of Commissioner Kintanar. Anxious over the inactionof the NTCinthe matter ofits petition praying for the issuance of a provisional authority, private respondent BellTel filedon May5, 1995 an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Resolve Application andfor the Issuance of a Provisional Authority 11. Reference was explicitly made to the findings of the CCAD and recommendations of DeputyCommissioners Dumlaoand Perez that were allfavorable to private respondent BellTel. Mentionwas alsomade of the aforementionedworkingdraft of the order granting a provisional authorityto BellTel, which draft was made bythe Legal Department of the NTCandinitialed bythe saiddeputycommissioners. No actionwas takenbythe NTCon the aforecited motion. Thus, on May12, 1995, private respondent BellTel fileda Second Urgent Ex-Parte Motion 12 reiterating its earlier prayer. Petitioners-oppositors filedan Opposition 13 to the aforestated twomotions of private respondent BellTel. In an Order datedMay16, 1995, signedsolelybyCommissioner Simeon Kintanar, the NTC, instead of resolving the twopending motions ofprivate respondent BellTel, set the saidmotions for a hearing onMay29, 1995. On May29, 1995, however, nohearing was conductedas the same was reset onJune 13, 1995. On June 13, 1995, the dayof the hearing, private respondent BellTelfiled a Motionto Promulgate (Amendingthe Motionto Resolve)14. In saidmotion, private respondent prayedfor the promulgationof the working draft ofthe order grantinga provisional authorityto private respondent BellTel, onthe groundthat the saidworking draft had alreadybeensignedor initialed byDeputyCommissioners Dumlao andPerez who, together, constitute a majorityout of the three commissioners composing the NTC. To support its prayer, private respondent BellTel assertedthat the NTCwas a collegial bodyandthat as such, two favorable votes out of a maximum three votes bythe members of the commission, are enough to validlypromulgate an NTCdecision. On June 23, 1995, petitioners-oppositors filedtheir Joint Opposition 15 to the aforecitedmotion.
- 40. 40 On July4, 1995,the NTCdeniedthe saidmotion inanOrder solelysignedbyCommissioner SimeonKintanar. On July17, 1995, private respondent BellTel filedwiththis court a Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibitionseeking the nullificationof the aforestatedOrder dated July4, 1995 denying the Motionto Promulgate. On July26, 1995, we issueda Resolutionreferring saidpetitionto the respondent Court of Appeals for proper determination and resolutionpursuant to Section9, par. 1 of B.P. Blg. 129. In the interim, the Solicitor Generalfiled withthe respondent appellate court a Manifestation In Lieu of Comment 16in whichthe Solicitor General took a legal positionadverse to that of the NTC. The Solicitor General, after a close examination ofthe laws creatingthe NTCandits predecessors and a studious analysis of certainDepartment ofTransportation andCommunications (DOTC) orders, NTCcirculars, andDepartment of Justice (DOJ)legal opinions pertinent to the issue of collegialityof the NTC, made the following recommendations: WHEREFORE, the Solicitor General respectfullyprays that thisHonorable Court: (a) declare respondent National Telecommunications Commissionas a collegial body; (b) restrainrespondent Commissioner SimeonKintanar fromarrogating unto himself alone the powers of the saidagency; (c) order NTC, acting as a collegial body, to resolve petitioner BellTelecom's applicationunder NTC-94-229; (d) declare NTCMemorandumCirculars 1-1-93 and 3-1-93 as void;[and] (e) upholdthe legalityof DOTCDepartment Order 92-614. 17 On September 23, 1996, respondent Court of Appeals promulgatedthe hereinassailed decision the dispositive portionof whichreads as follows: IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is herebyrenderedas follows: 1. Petitioner's petitionfor a writ of Certiorari andProhibitionis hereby granted. Accordingly, NTCMemorandum Circular No. 1-1-93, Annex "J" of the Petition, MemorandumCircular No. 3-1-93, Annex "K" of the Petition and the Order of Kintanar, Annex "L" of the Petition, are herebySET ASIDE for being contraryto law. The Respondents andall those acting for and intheir behalf are herebyenjoinedandprohibitedfrom implementing or enforcing the same; [and] 2. Petitioner's petitionfor mandamus is herebyGRANTED inthat the Respondent NTC, composed ofKintanar and deputycommissioners Perez and Dumlao, are herebydirectedto meet en banc and to consider and act on the draft Order, Annex "B" of the Petition, withinfifteen(15) days from the finality of this Decision. Without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. 18 The hereinassailed decision beingunacceptable to petitioner Simeon Kintanar and petitioners GMCR, Inc., Smart Communications, Inc., Isla Communications Co., Inc. and International Communications Corporation as oppositors inthe applicationof private respondent BellTelfor a provisional authority, theyfiled with this court separate petitions for review. Commissioner Kintanar's petition, docketedas G.R No. 126526, ascribes to the respondent appellate court the followingassignment oferrors: 1. The Court of Appeals insetting aside NTCMC1-1-93 and MC3-1-93 and the Order of the Commissiondated July4, 1995, made a collateralattackona law which was nowhere calledfor inthe pleadings of the parties nor is authorized bythe Rules ofCourt. 2. The Court of Appeals erredinassuming and imposing that the Commission is a collegialbodysimplybyreasonof the fact that other bodies whichwere a spinofffrom the defunct Public Service Commissionwere created as a collegial body. The law that createdEO 546 erasedthe collegial character of the proceeding before the NTC. 3. The Court of Appeals' decision contains serious contradiction;worse, it consideredevidence not formallyoffered or incorporatedintothe records of the case; yet failed to consider evidence submittedbypetitioner- appellant nor on the prejudicial issue onnon-joinder of indispensable parties. 3.1 CA erred inassuming that the NTCis collegial bythe fact that Charters ofother regulatoryagencies expressly made themcollegial while thisexpress provisionwas absent inNTC's charter. 3.2 CA contradicts itself byholding that DOTCMC92-614 prevails and[requires]collegiality. 3.3 The decisions byUndersecretaryLichaucosignedby her and her 2 deputies are innowayindicative of
- 41. 41 collegialityandshould not beconsidered as having any persuasive effect . . . 3.4 The Court of Appeals erred inapplyingthe Boardof Communications Rules of Practice and Procedures. 4. The Court of Appeals erredwhenit granted mandamus, directing and in effect controlling Commissioner Kintanar anddeputyCommissioners Dumlao and Perez, to meet en banc to consider andact on a "draft Order" onlywhich the Court itself recognizednolonger hadthe approval oftwo (2) Commissioners while inthe same token the Court of Appeals hadset aside a dulypromulgated Order of July4, 1995 allegedlybecauseit didnot carrythe approval of 2 commissioners. 19 On the other hand, petitioners-oppositors, in their petition docketedas G.R No. 126496, assail the decisionof respondent appellate court onthe followinggrounds: 1. The Court of Appeals erredinnot dismissing the instant Petitionoutright for its failure to implead indispensable parties, in violation ofSection5, Rule 65 and Sec. 3, Rule 7 of the Revised Rules ofCourt; 2. The Court of Appeals seriouslyerredintaking cognizance of andpassing upon BellTel's Petition, which onits face is premature since the Order of July4, 1996 assailed wasnot a finddecisionof the Commission; 3. Even assuming arguendothat the Court of Appealscantake cognizance of the Petition, the dispositioninDecisionthereinwhichnullifies NTC Memorandum Circulars 1-1-93 and3-1-93 itself constitutes a collateralattack on the saidlaws, the validityof which were never put inissue byanyof the parties, contraryto the clear legal requirement that the validityof laws canbe attackedonlyin direct proceedings institutedfor that purpose; 4. It was infact improper for the Court of Appeals to passon the validityof NTC Circular No. 1-1-93 andMemorandum Circular No 3-1-93 since the same was absolutelyunnecessaryfor the resolution of the Petition; 5. Even assuming that the Court of Appeals correctlydefined the prime issues as beingthat of collegiality, nonethelessthe Court of Appeals committeda serious error of law indeclaringthe NTCas a collegial bodydespite the clear intent of E.O. No. 546 and the provisions of DOTCMC95-640, and the obvious implications of pending bills inCongress onthe reorganizationof the NTC; 6. The Decision, in mandating that the NTCCommissioner andDeputy Commissioners sit to consider the draft-and onlythe draft-in rendering its DecisioninBellTel's application constitutesanunwarranted, unauthorized and unlawful interference inandcanalizationof the discretionaryfunctions of the Commissionas a quasi-judicial entity;and 7. The Decisioncondones the illegal andunethical act ofBellTel of surreptitiouslysecuringa draft decision, and encouragesand places premium on future similar illegal acts-allinviolationof the ruling and the mandate of the Supreme Court in In Re Jurado:Adm. Matter No. 90-5-383 (July12, 1990). 20 On December 16, 1996, private respondent BellTel filedanOmnibus Motion 21 prayingfor, among others, the consolidationof G.R Nos. 126496 and126526. On December 18, 1996, respondent BellTel filedits Comment. 22 On the same day, the NTCand Commissioner Kintanar fileda Manifestation/Motion 23 echoingthe prayer for the consolidationof the G.R Nos. 126496 and126526. On December 19, 1996, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation/Motion 24 reiteratingthat its legal stance inthis case is adverse to that of the NTC and prayingthat it be excludedfrom filinganycomment inbehalf ofthe NTC. In a Resolution dated February5, 1997, we resolved, among others, to excuse the Solicitor General from filing anycomment inbehalf ofthe NTC, require the NTCto file its owncomment in G.R No. 126496 and to consolidate G.R Nos. 126496 and126526. On March 6, 1997, the NTCand Commissioner Kintanar filed a Manifestation/Motion 25 praying that the latter's petitioninG.R No. 126526 be adoptedas their comment inthe consolidated cases. Upon the joinder of issues inthese consolidatedcases, we perceive the fundamentalissue to be that of the collegialityof the NTCas a quasi-judicialagency. We findthe consolidated petitions wanting ofmerit. First. We herebydeclare that the NTCis a collegial bodyrequiring a majorityvote out of the three members of the commissionin order to validlydecide a case or anyincident therein. Corollarily, the vote alone ofthe chairman ofthe commission, as inthis case, the vote of Commissioner Kintanar, absent the requiredconcurring vote coming from the rest ofthe membershipof the commissionto at least arrive at a majoritydecision, is not sufficient to legallyrender anNTCorder, resolution or decision. Simplyput, Commissioner Kintanar is not the National Telecommunications Commission. He alone does not speak for and inbehalf of the NTC. The NTCacts througha three-manbody, andthe three members of the commissioneachhasone vote to cast ineverydeliberationconcerning a case or anyincident thereinthat is subject to the jurisdiction ofthe NTC. Whenwe consider the historical milieuinwhichthe NTCevolved into the quasi-judicial agencyit is now under Executive Order No. 146 which organizedthe NTCas a three-man commission and expose the illegalityof all
- 42. 42 memorandum circulars negatingthe collegial nature of the NTCunder Executive Order No. 146, we are left with onlyone logicalconclusion:the NTCis a collegial bodyandwas a collegial body even during the time whenit was actingas a one-man regime. We thus quote with approval the encompassinglegal ruminations ofthe respondent Court of Appeals in disposing of the issue of the collegialityof the NTC: In resolving the issue, We recall that, onNovember 17, 1936, the National AssemblypassedCommonwealth Act No. 146 which created the Public Service Commission(PSC). While providing that the PSCshall consist ofa Public Service Commissioner anda DeputyCommissioner, the law made it clear that the PSCwas not a collegial bodybystating that the DeputyCommissioner could act onlyon matters delegated to him bythe Public Service Commissioner. As amendedbyRA 2677, the Public Service Commission was transformedintoandemerged as a collegial body, composedof one Public Service Commissioner andfive (5) Associate Commissioners. The amendment provided that contestedcases andall cases involving the fixingof ratesshall be decided bythe Commissionen banc. On September 24, 1972, then President FerdinandE. Marcos signed, intolaw, Presidential Decree No. 1 adopting andapproving the Integrated ReorganizationPlanwhich, in turn, createdthe Boardof Communications (BOC) in place ofthe PSC. This time, the new regulatoryboard was composed of three (3) officers exercising quasi-judicialfunctions: . . . The Boardof Communications shall be composedof a full time Chairmanwhoshall be of unquestionedintegrity and recognizedprominence in previous public and/or private employment;two full-time members whoshallbe competent onall aspects of communications, preferably one of whom shall be a lawyer and the other aneconomist . . . On January25, 1978, the BOCpromulgatedits "Rules of Procedure and Practice" in connectionwithapplications andproceedings before it. On July23, 1979, President Marcos issuedExecutive Order No. 546, creating the Ministriesof Public Works, andof Transportation and Communications, merged the defunct Board of Communications and the Telecommunications Control Bureauintoa single entity, the National Telecommunications Commission(NTC). The said lawwas issued bythenPresident Marcos inthe exercise of his legislative powers. Sec. 16 of E.O. 546 provides that — . . . The Commission shall be composedof a Commissioner and two DeputyCommissioners, preferablyone ofwhom shallbe a lawyer andanother an economist. . . . The aforementionedExecutive Order took effect onSeptember 24, 1979 . . . However, the NTCdid not promulgate anyRules of Procedure andPractice. Consequently, the thenexistingRules of Procedure andPractice promulgated bythe BOCwas appliedto proceedings inthe NTC. In the meantime, the Decisions of the NTCwere signedbythe Chairmanalone of the NTCwhich renderedthe two (2) deputyCommissioners "non-participative" inthe task of decision-making. This promptedthe thenMinister of Transportation and Communication Jose P. Dans, Jr. to seek the legal opinionof the thenMinister of Justice RicardoC. Puno, as to whether the NTCwas a collegial bodyor not. On January11, 1984, Minister Punosent a letter-opinion . . . to the effect that the NTCwas not a collegial bodybut a single entityandthus the then practice of onlythe Chairmanof the NTCsigning the Decisions of the NTCwas authorized bylaw. . . . Admittedly, the opinionof the Secretaryof Justice is entitled to great weight . . . . However, the same is not controlling or conclusive onthe courts . . . . We find anddeclare, in the present recourse, that the PunoOpinionis not correct. Admittedly, EO 546 does not specificallystate that the NTCwas a collegial body. Neither does it provide that the NTCshould meet En Banc in deciding a case or in exercising its adjudicatoryor quasi-judicial functions. But the absence of suchprovisions doesnot militate against the collegialnature ofthe NTC under the context of Section16 of EO 546 and under the Rules of Procedure and Practice appliedbythe NTCinits proceedings. Under [Rule 15] of saidRules, the BOC(now the NTC) sits En Banc. . . . In everycase heard bythe Board en banc, the orders, rulings, decisions andresolutions disposing of the merits of the matter withinits jurisdictionshallbe reached withthe concurrence of at least two regular members after deliberationand consultationandthereafter assigned to a member for the writing ofthe opinion. Anymember dissentingfrom the order, ruling, decisionor resolution shallstate inwritingthe reasonfor his dissent. In all other cases, a dulyassigned Member shall issue all orders, rulings, decisions and resolutions pertinent to the case assignedto him. Copyof the decision onthe merit of the case soassignedshall be furnishedthe Chairmanof the Board. xxx xxx xxx Inscrutably, a case before the BOCmaybe assigned to and heardbyonlya member thereof who is taskedto prepare andpromulgate hisDecision thereon, or heard, En Banc, bythe full membershipof the BOCinwhich case the concurrence of at least two (2) ofthe membership ofthe BOCis necessary for a validDecision. . . . While it maybe true that the aforesaid Rules of
- 43. 43 Procedure waspromulgatedbefore theeffectivityof Executive Order No. 546, however, the Rules ofProcedure ofBOCgovernedthe rules ofpractice and procedure before the NTCwhenit was establishedunder Executive Order No. 546. This wasenunciatedbythe Supreme Court in the case of "Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. versus National Telecommunications Commission, 131 SCRA 200" when it declared that: The Rules of Practice and Procedure promulgated on January25, 1978 by the Board of Communications, the immediate predecessor of respondent NTC. . . govern the rules of practice and procedure before the BOCthen, now respondent NTC. . . . In the case of"Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company versus National Telecommunications, et al., 190 SCRA 717", the Supreme Court appliedand cited Rule 15 of the Rules of Procedure andPractice ofBOC. . . . Hence, under its Rules ofProcedure and Practice, the Respondent NTC, as its predecessor, the BOC, hadconsistentlybeen andremains a collegial body. Respondents Kintanar's andNTC's pose that Respondent Kintanar, alone, is vestedwith authorityto sign andpromulgate a Decisionof the NTCis antitheticalto the nature of a commissionas envisaged inExecutive Order No. 546. It must be borne inmind that a Commissionis definedas: [a] bodycomposed ofseveral persons actingunder lawful authorityto perform some public senica (Cityof Louisville MunicipalHousing Commission versus Public Housing Administration, 261 Southwestern Reporter, 2nd, page 286). A Commissionis also defined as a board or committee of officials appointed and empoweredto performcertainacts or exercise certainjurisdictionof a public nature or service . . . (Black, Law Dictionary, page 246). There is persuasive authoritythat a "commission" is synonymous with"board" (State Ex. Rel. Johnsonversus Independent School District No. 810, WabashCounty, 109 NorthwesternReporter 2nd, page 596). Indeed, as can be easilydiscerned from the context of Section16 of Executive Order No. 546, the Commissionis composed ofa Commissioner and two (2) deputycommissioners . . . not the commissioner, alone, as pontificatedbyKintanar. The conjunctive word "and" is not without anylegal significance. It is not, byanychance, a surplusage in the law. It means "in addition to" (McCaullWebster Elevator Companyversus Adams, 167 NorthwesternReporter, 330, page 332). The word"and", whether it is usedto connect words, phrasesor full sentence[s], must be acceptedas bindingtogether and as relating to one another . . . . In interpretinga statute, everypart thereofshould be given effect onthe theorythat it wasenactedas anintegratedlaw andnot as a combinationof dissonant provisions. As the aphorism goes, "that the thingmayrather have effect thanbe destroyed" . . . If it was the intention ofPresident Marcos to constitute merelya single entity, a "one-man"governmentalbody, instead of a commissionor a three-mancollegial body, he wouldnot have constituteda commissionandwouldnot have specificallydecreedthat the Commissionis composed of, not the commissioner alone, but of the commissioner and the two (2) deputycommissioners. Irrefragably, then, the NTCis a commission composed not onlyof Kintanar, but PerezandDumlaoas well, acting together in the performance of their adjudicatoryor quasi-judicial functions, conformablywiththe Rules of Procedure andPractice promulgated bythe BOC and applicable to the NTC. The barefacedfact that . . . of Executive Order 546 usedthe word "deputy" to designate the two (2) other members ofthe Commission does not militate against the collegialityof the NTC. . . . The collegialityof the NTCcannot be disparaged bythe mere nominal designation ofthe membershipthereof. Indeed, We are convincedthat suchnominal designations are without functionalimplications andare designedmerelyfor the purpose of administrative structure or hierarchyof the personnel of the NTC. . . . In hindsight, even SecretaryGarcia was in accordwith the collegialityof the NTC when he promulgated andissuedDepartment Order No. 92-614 . . . Even then Commissioner MarianoBenedictoopenlyexpressedhisvehement oppositionto the Department Order ofSecretaryGarcia andoptedto seek refuge in the opinionof the thenMinister of Justice Puno. . . . It was only when Commissioner BenedictoresignedandRespondent Kintanar was designated to replace Commissioner Benedicto that SecretaryGarciaflip- flapped[sic], and suddenlyfoundit expedient to recallhis Department Order No. 92-614 and authorize Kintanar to decide, allbyhimself, all cases pending with the NTCinfrontal violationof the Rules ofProcedure and Practice before the NTC, more specificallyRule 15 thereof . . . . xxx xxx xxx The Respondents cannot find solace in House Bill No. 10558 to buttress their argument . . . because under the House Bill, the NTCis transformedintoa collegial body. Indeed, We find Respondents'posetenuous. For, it canlikewise be argued, with justification, that House BillNo. 10558 indeed confirms the existingcollegial nature of the NTCbyso expresslyreaffirming the same. xxx xxx xxx In sum, then, We findandsodeclare that NTCCircular No. 1-1-93 . . . Memorandum Circular No. 3-1-93 . . . and the Order of Kintanar . . . declaring
- 44. 44 the NTCas asingleentityor non-collegial entity, are contraryto law andthus null andvoid andshouldbe, as theyare hereby, set aside. 26 Second. Petitioners take us to task withtheir vigorous contention that respondent appellate court's act of nullifying NTCMemorandum Circular No. 1-1-93 issued bythen Commissioner MarianoBenedicto, Jr. andNTCMemorandumCircular No. 3-1-93 issuedalso bythen Commissioner Benedicto onJanuary6, 1993, was a collateralattackagainst the aforecited circulars andan unnecessaryandabusive exercise ofthe court's power to nullifyadministrative regulations. It must be rememberedbypetitioners, however, that administrative regulations derive their validityfrom the statute that theywere, in the first place, intendedto implement. Memorandum Circulars 1-1-93 and 3-1-93 are ontheir face null andvoid ab initio for being unabashedlycontrary to law. Theywere nullifiedbyrespondent Court ofAppeals because theyare absolutelyillegal and, as such, are without anyforce andeffect. The fact that implementation ofthese illegal regulations has resulted inthe institutionalization ofthe one-manrule in the NTC, is not andcannever be a ratificationof suchanillegal practice. At the least, these illegalregulations are anerroneous interpretationof E.O. No. 546 andinthe context of andits predecessor laws. At the most, these illegalregulations are attempts to validate the one-man rule inthe NTCas executedbypersons with the selfishinterest of maintainingtheir illusoryhold ofpower. Since the questionedmemorandum circulars are inherentlyandpatentlynull andvoid for being totallyviolative of the spirit andletter of E.O. No. 546 that constitutes the NTCas a collegial body, no court mayshirk fromits dutyof striking downsuchillegal regulations. Third. Inits certiorari actionbefore the respondent Court of Appeals, private respondent BellTel was proceeding against the NTCandCommissioner Kintanar for the former's adherence and defense of its one-manrule as enforcedbythe latter. Thus, onlythe NTCandCommissioner Kintanar maybe consideredas indispensable parties. After all, it is theywhom private respondent BellTel seekto be chastised andcorrected bythe court for having actedingrave abuse oftheir discretionamounting to lack or excess ofjurisdiction. The oppositors in NTCCase No. 94-229 are not absolutelynecessaryfor the final determinationof the issue of grave abuse ofdiscretionon the part ofthe NTCandof Commissioner Kintanar inhis capacityas chairman ofNTCbecause the task ofdefendingthem primarilyliesinthe Office of the Solicitor General. Furthermore, were the court to findthat certiorari lies against the NTCand Commissioner Kintanar, the oppositors' cause couldnot be significantlyaffectedbysuch ruling because the issue of grave abuse of discretiongoes not intothe merits of the case in which the oppositors are interested but intothe issue of collegialitythat requires, regardlessof the merits of a case, that the same be decidedonthe basisof a majorityvote ofat least twomembers of the commission. The issue inthis case is, it bears repeating, not the merits of the application ofprivate respondent BellTel for a provisionalauthorityto operate what promises to be the most technologically advancedtelephone service inthe country. This court is not inanywayconcerned withwhether or not private respondent BellTel's project proposal is technicallyfeasible or financiallyviable, and this court shouldnot, infact, delve intothese matters which are patentlyoutside of its review jurisdiction. All that respondent Court of Appeals passeduponwas the questionof whether or not the NTCand Commissioner Kintanar committedgrave abuse of discretion, andsowe must review and ascertain the correctness of the findings ofthe respondent appellate court on thisscore, and this score alone. Thus, the claim of petitioners that there is here a case ofnon-joinder of indispensable parties in the persons ofall of the oppositors inNTCCase No. 94-229, is untenable. Fourth. Petitioners, inapparent paranoia, argue that what the respondent appellate court has actuallyordered, was that the NTCsit andmeet en banc and forthwithgrant private respondent BellTel's application for a provisionalauthority. Petitioners, however, have obviouslyover-read the second part of the dispositive portionof the hereinassaileddecisionrenderedbyrespondent Court of Appeals. There is no dispute that jurisprudence is settledas to the proprietyof mandamus in causing a quasi-judicial agencyto exercise its discretionin a case alreadyripe for adjudicationandlong- awaiting the proper disposition. As to how thisdiscretion is to be exercised, however, is a realm outside the office ofthe specialcivil action ofmandamus. It is elementarylegalknowledge, after all, that mandamus doesnot lie to control discretion. When the respondent Court of Appeals directedCommissioners Kintanar, Dumlao andPerez to meet en banc and to consider andact on the working draft ofthe order grantingprovisional authorityto BellTel, said court was simplyordering the NTCto sit andmeet en banc as a collegial body, andthe subject of the deliberationof the three-man commissionwouldbe the said working draft which embodiesone course of action that maybe takenonprivate respondent BellTel's applicationfor a provisional authority. The respondent Court of Appeals, however, didnot order the NTCto forthwithgrant saidapplication. This is understandable since everycommissioner of the three-man NTChas a vote each to cast indisposingof private respondent BellTel's application and the respondent appellate court wouldnot pre-empt the exercise bythe members ofthe commissionof their individual discretioninprivate respondent BellTel's case. Respondent appellate court intends, however, for the NTCto promptlyproceedwiththe consideration of private respondent BellTel's applicationfor provisionalauthority, for the same has beenripe for decision since December, 1994. With the markedpropensityof Commissioner Kintanar to delayactionon the saidapplication and hisinsistent arrogationof sole power to promulgate anyandall NTCdecisions, respondent Court of Appeals'order for the NTCto sit and meet en banc to consider private respondent BellTel's application for a provisional authority, attains deep significance. Fifth. The accusationof petitioners that the working draft of the order granting provisional authorityto private respondent BellTel, wasobtainedbythe latter through illegal means, is a serious charge. However, not a single piece ofevidence hasbeen profferedbypetitioners to prove this charge. Private respondent BellTel makes nosecret of the source of the saidworking draft. In private respondent BellTel's Urgent Ex-Parte Motionto Resolve ApplicationandFor Issuance of ProvisionalAuthority, it is allegedthat saidworking draft waspreparedbyAtty. BasilioBolante of
- 45. 45 the Legal Departmentof the NTC. 27 Said working draft was initialedbythe CCAD Head, Engr. EdgardoCabarios andbyDeputyCommissioners DumlaoandPerez. 28 The workingdraft is attachedto the records ofNTCCase No. 94-229 whichmaybe borrowed byanyperson for any stated purpose. 29 Significantly, no one among the aforementionedpersons has renouncedthe working draft or declaredit to be spurious. More importantly, petitioners have utterlyfailedto offer proof ofany illegalityinthe preparationor procurement of saidworking draft. The more critical point that matters most, however, is that we cannot be divertedfrom the principal issue inthis case concerning the collegialityof the NTC. In the ultimate, the issue of the procurement of the working draft is more apropos for a criminalor administrative investigation than inthe instant proceedings largelyaddressedto the resolution ofa purelylegal question. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant consolidated petitions are herebyDISMISSEDfor lack of merit. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 112099 February 21, 1995 ACHILLES C. BERCES, SR., petitioner, vs. HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARYTEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., CHIEF PRESIDENTIAL LEGAL COUNSEL ANTONIO CARPIO and MAYOR NAOMI C. CORRAL OF TIWI, ALBAY, respondents. QUIASON, J.: This is a petitionfor certiorari andprohibitionunder Rule 65 of the RevisedRules of Court with prayer for mandatorypreliminaryinjunction, assailingthe Orders of the Office of the President as havingbeenissuedwithgrave abusesof discretion. SaidOrders directed the stayof execution of the decisionof the Sangguniang Panlalawigan suspending the Mayor of Tiwi, Albayfrom office. I Petitioner filed two administrative casesagainst respondent Naomi C. Corral, the incumbent Mayor of Tiwi, Albaywith the SangguniangPanlalawiganof Albay, to wit: (1) Administrative Case No. 02-92 for abuse of authorityand/or oppression for non-payment of accruedleave benefits due the petitioner amounting to P36,779.02. (2) Administrative Case No. 05-92 for dishonestyandabuse of authorityfor installing a water pipeline whichis being operated, maintained and paid for by the municipalityto service respondent's private residence andmedicalclinic. On July1, 1993, the Sangguniang Panlalawigandisposedthe two Administrative cases in the following manner: (1) Administrative Case No. 02-92 ACCORDINGLY, respondent Mayor Naomi C. Corral of Tiwi, Albay, is hereby orderedto payAchilles CostoBerces, Sr. the sum of THIRTY-SIXTHOUSAND AND SEVEN HUNDREDSEVENTY-NINE PESOSand TWO CENTAVOS (P36,779.02) per Voucher No. 352, plus legal interest due thereonfromthe time it was approvedin audit up to final payment, it beinglegally due the Complainant representingthe moneyvalue ofhis leave credits accruing for services rendered inthe municipalityfrom 1988 to 1992 as a dulyelected MunicipalCouncilor. IN ADDITION, respondent Mayor NAOMI C. CORRAL is herebyorderedSUSPENDEDfrom office as Municipal Mayor of Tiwi, Albay, for a periodof two (2) months, effective uponreceipt hereof for her blatant abuse of authoritycoupled withoppression as a public example to deter others similarlyinclined fromusing public office as a tool for personal vengeance, vindictivenessand oppressionat the expense of the Taxpayer (Rollo, p. 14). (2) Administrative Case No. 05-92 WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Mayor NAOMI C. CORRAL of Tiwi, Albay, is herebysentencedto suffer the penalty of SUSPENSION from office as Municipal Mayor thereoffor a periodof THREE(3) MONTHS beginning after her service of the first penaltyof suspensionorderedin Administrative Case No. 02-92. She is likewise orderedto reimburse the Municipalityof Tiwi One-half of the amount the latter have paidfor electric and water bills from Julyto December 1992, inclusive (Rollo, p. 16). Consequently, respondent Mayor appealedto the Office of the President questioningthe decision and at the same time prayedfor the stayof executionthereofinaccordance withSection 67(b)of the Local Government Code, which provides: Administrative Appeals. — Decision inadministrative casesmay, withinthirty (30) days from receipt thereof, be appealedto the following: xxx xxx xxx (b) The Office of the President, inthe case of decisions of the sangguniangpanlalawiganandthe sangguniang panglungsodof highlyurbanizedcitiesandindependent component cities.
- 46. 46 Acting on theprayer to stayexecutionduringthe pendencyof the appeal, the Office ofthe President issuedan Order onJuly28, 1993, the pertinent portions ofwhichreadas follows: xxx xxx xxx The stayof the executionis governedbySection68 of R.A. No. 7160 and Section6 of Administrative Order No. 18 dated 12 February1987, quoted below: Sec. 68. ExecutionPendingAppeal. — An appeal shall not prevent a decision from becomingfinalor executory. The respondent shall be consideredas havingbeenplacedunder preventive suspensionduring the pendencyof an appeal in the events he wins suchappeal. In the event the appeal results in an exoneration, he shall be paidhissalaryand such other emoluments during the pendencyof the appeal (R.A. No. 7160). Sec. 6 Except as otherwise provided byspecial laws, the executionof the decision/resolution/order appealedfromis stayed uponfiling of the appeal within the periodprescribed herein. However, inallcases, at anytime during the pendencyof the appeal, the Office of the President maydirect or staythe executionof the decision/resolution/order appealedfrom uponsuchterms and conditions as it maydeem just andreasonable (Adm. Order No. 18). xxx xxx xxx After due consideration, and inthe light ofthe Petitionfor Reviewfiledbefore this Office, we find that a stayof executionpendingappeal would be just and reasonable to prevent undue prejudice to public interest. WHEREFORE, premises considered, thisOffice herebyorders the suspension/stayof executionof: a) the Decisionof the Sangguniang Panlalawiganof Albay in Administrative Case No. 02-92 dated1 July1993 suspendingMayor Naomi C. Corral from office for a period of two (2) months, and b) the Resolution ofthe Sangguniang Panlalawiganof AlbayinAdministrative Case. No. 05-92 dated5 July1993 suspendingMayor Naomi C. Corral from office for a period of three (3) months (Rollo, pp. 55-56). Petitioner thenfileda Motionfor Reconsiderationquestioningthe aforesaidOrder ofthe Office of the President. On September 13, 1990, the Motionfor Reconsiderationwas denied. Hence, thispetition. II Petitioner claims that the governing law in the instant case is R.A. No. 7160, whichcontains a mandatoryprovisionthat anappeal "shallnot prevent a decisionfrom becomingfinal and executory." He argues that administrative Order No. 18 dated February12, 1987, (entitle "Prescribing the Rules andRegulations Governing Appealsto Office the President") authorizing the President to staythe execution ofthe appealeddecisionat anytime duringthe pendencyof the appeal, was repealed byR.A. No. 7160, which took effect onJanuary1, 1991 (Rollo, pp. 5-6). The petitionis devoidof merit. Petitioner invokes the repealing clause of Section530 (f), R.A. No. 7160, which provides: All general andspecial laws, acts, citycharters, decrees, executive orders, administrative regulations, part or parts thereof, which are incosistent with anyof the provisions ofthis Code, are herebyrepealedor modified accordingly. The aforementionedclause is not anexpress repealof Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18 because it failedto identifyor designate the laws or executive orders that are intended to be repealed(cf. I Sutherland, StatutoryConstruction467 [1943]). If there is anyrepeal of Administrative Order No. 18 byR.A. No. 7160, it is throughimplication though suchkind ofrepeal is not favored(The Philippine American Management Co., Inc. v. The Philippine American Management Employees Association, 49 SCRA 194 [1973]). There is even a presumption against implied repeal. An impliedrepeal predicates the intended repeal uponthe conditionthat a substantialconflict must be foundbetweenthe new and prior laws. Inthe absence ofanexpress repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing a prior law unlessanirreconcible inconsistencyand repugnancyexists inthe terms of the new and oldlaws (Iloilo PalayandCorn Planters Association, Inc. v. Feliciano, 13 SCRA 377 [1965]). The two laws must be absolutelyincompatible (Compania General de Tabacos v. Collector ofCustoms, 46 Phil. 8 [1924]). There must be sucha repugnancy betweenthe laws that theycannot be made to stand together (Crawford, Constructionof Statutes 631 [1940]). We findthat the provisions ofSection68 of R.A. No. 7160 and Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18 are not irreconcillablyinconsistent andrepugnant and the twolaws must infact be read together. The first sentence of Section 68 merelyprovides that an"appeal shall not prevent a decisionfrom becoming final or executory." As worded, there is roomto construe saidprovisionas giving discretionto the reviewing officials to staythe executionof the appealeddecision. There is nothing to infer therefromthat the reviewingofficials are deprivedof the authorityto order a stay
- 47. 47 of the appealedorder.If the intentionof Congress was to repeal Section6 of Administrative Order No. 18, it couldhave usedmore direct language expressive ofsuch intention. The execution of decisions pendingappeal is procedural andinthe absence ofa clear l egislative intent to remove fromthe reviewingofficials the authorityto order a stayof execution, such authoritycanprovidedinthe rules and regulations governing the appeals of elective officialsin administrative cases. The term "shall" maybe read either as mandatoryor directorydepending upona considerationof the entire provisions in whichit is found, its object andthe consequences that would follow from construing it one wayor the other (cf. De Mesa v. Mencias, 18 SCRA 533 [1966]). In the case at bench, there is no basis to justifythe constructionof the wordas mandatory. The Office of the President made a finding that the execution ofthe decisionof the Sagguniang Panlalawigansuspendingrespondent Mayor from office might be prejudicial to the public interest. Thus, inorder not to disrupt the renditionof service bythe mayor to the public, a stayof the executionof the decision is in order. WHEREFORE, the petitionis DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. FIRST DIVISION [G. R. No. 126496. April 30, 1997] GMCR, INC.; SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC.; INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS CORP.; ISLA COMMUNICATIONS CO., INC., petitioners, vs. BELL TELECOMMUNICATION PHILIPPINES, INC.; THE NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION and HON. SIMEON L. KINTANAR in his official capacity as Commissioner of the National Telecommunications, respondents. [G. R. No. 126526. April 30, 1997] COMMISSIONER SIMEON L. KINTANAR, NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, petitioner, vs.BELL TELECOMMUNICATION PHILIPPINES, INC., respondent. D E C I S I O N HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.: Before us are consolidatedpetitions seeking the reviewandreversal of the decision[1] of the respondent Court of Appeals[2] declaring the National Telecommunications Commission (hereafter, NTC) to be a collegial bodyunder Executive Order No. 546[3] and ordering the NTC to heretofore sit andact en banc, i.e., with the concurrence of at least two commissioners, for a valid dispensation of its quasi-judicial functions. Established by evidence are the following facts: On October 19, 1993, private respondent Bell Telecommunication Philippines, Inc. (hereafter, BellTel) filed withthe NTCan Application for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessityto Procure, Install, Operate andMaintainNationwide IntegratedTelecommunications Services and to Charge RatesTherefor and withFurther Request for the Issuance of Provisional Authority. Thisapplicationwas docketedas NTCCase No. 93-481. At the time ofthe filing of this application, private respondent BellTel had not beengranteda legislative franchise to engage in the business of telecommunications service. Since private respondent BellTel was, at that time, an unenfranchised applicant, it was excluded in the deliberations for service area a ssignments for local exchange carrier service[4]. Thus, onlypetitioners GMCR, Inc., Smart Communications, Inc., Isla Communications Co., Inc. and International Communications Corporation, among others, were beneficiaries of formal awards of service area assignments in April and May, 1994. On March 25, 1994, Republic Act No. 7692 was enacted granting private respondent BellTel a congressionalfranchise whichgave private respondent BellTel the right, privilege and authority to “carryon the businessof providing telecommunications services in and betweenprovinces, cities, and municipalities in the Philippines and for this purpose, to establish, operate, manage, lease, maintainandpurchase telecommunications systems, including mobile, cellular and wiredor wireless telecommunications systems, fiber optics, satellite transmit andreceive systems, and other telecommunications systems andtheir value-addedservices such as, but not limited to, transmissionof voice, data, facsimile, control signals, audio and video, informationservice bureau, and allother telecommunications systems technologies as are at present available or be made available throughtechnical advances or innovations inthe future, or construct, acquire, lease and operate or manage transmittingandreceivingstations and switchingstations, bothfor local and international services, lines, cables or systems, as is, or are convenient or essentialto efficiently carryout the purposes ofthis franchise.”[5] On July 12, 1994, private respondent BellTel filed with the NTC a second Application[6] prayingfor the issuance ofa Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity for the installation, operationandmaintenance of a combined nationwide local toll (domestic and international) andtandem telephone exchanges andfacilities using wire, wireless, microwave radio, satellitesand fiber optic cable withPublic Calling Offices (PCOs) and very small aperture antennas (VSATs) under an integratedsystem. Thissecond application wasdocketed as NTCCase No. 94-229. In this second application, BellTel proposedto install 2,600,000 telephone lines in ten
- 48. 48 (10) years usingthe most modernandlatest state-of-the-art facilities and equipment and to provide a 100% digital local exchange tel ephone network. Private respondent BellTel movedto withdrawits earlier application docketed as NTC Case No. 93-481. In an Order datedJuly11, 1994, this earlier application was ordered withdrawn, without prejudice. The second applicationof private respondent BellTel whichwas docketed as NTC Case No. 94-229 was assigned to a Hearing Officer for reception of private respondent BellTel’s evidence. Writtenoppositionandother pertinent pleadings were filedbypetitioners GMCR, Inc., Smart Communications, Inc., Isla Communications Co., Inc. and International Communications Corporationas oppositors. Other oppositors to private respondent BellTel’s application were Capitol Wireless, Inc., EasternMisamis Oriental Telephone Cooperative, Liberty Broadcastin g Network, Inc., MidsayapCommunication, Northern Telephone, PAPTELCO, Pilipino Telephone Corporation, Philippine Global Communications, Inc., Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Corporation, Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. and Extelcom and Telecommunications Office. On December 20, 1994, private respondent BellTel completed the presentation of its evidence-in-chief. In the course of the proceedings, the witnesses ofBellTel were cross-examined bythe aforementioned oppositors. On December 21, 1994, BellTel filed its Formal Offer of Evidence together with all the technical, financial and legal documents in support of its application. Pursuant to its rules, the application was referred to the Common Carriers Authorization Department (CCAD) for study and recommendation. On February 6, 1995, the CCAD, through Engr. Marle Rabena, submitted to Deputy Commissioner Fidelo Q. Dumlao, a Memorandum dated February 6, 1995[7] manifesting his findings and recommendingthat “basedontechnical documents submitted, BellTel’s proposal is technically feasible.”[8] Subsequently, Mr. RaulitoSuarez, the chief of the Ratesand Regulatory Division of CCAD, conducted a financial evaluationof the project proposal ofprivate respondent BellTel. On March 29, 1995, Mr. Suarez made the findingthat BellTel has the financial capability to support its proposed project at least for the initial two (2) years. Agreeingwith the findings andrecommendations of the CCAD, NTCDeputyCommissioners Fidelo Dumlaoand ConsueloPerez adopted the same and expressly signified their approval thereto bymakingthe followingnotationonthe aforestated Memorandum of the CCAD dated February 6, 1995: “With the finding of financial capability and technical feasibility, the application merits due/favorable consideration.”[9] Belowthis notation, DeputyCommissioners Fidelo Dumlao and Consuelo Perez affixed their signatures and the date, “4/6/95.” In view ofthese favorable recommendations bythe CCAD andtwo members of the NTC, the Legal Department thereof prepareda working draft[10] of the order grantingprovisional authority to private respondent BellTel. The said working draft was initialed by Deputy Commissioners Fidelo Q. DumlaoandConsueloPerez but was not signed by Commissioner Simeon Kintanar. While ordinarily, a decisionthat is concurred in bytwo ofthe three members composing a quasi-judicial bodyis entitledto promulgation, petitioners claim that pursuant to the prevailing policyand the corresponding procedure andpractice inthe NTC, the exclusive authority to sign, validate andpromulgate anyand all orders, resolutions anddecisions of the NTCis lodged in the Chairman, inthiscase, Commissioner Simeon Kintanar, and, thus, since only Commissioner SimeonKintanar is recognized bythe NTCSecretariat as the sole authority to sign any and all orders, resolutions anddecisions of the NTC, onlyhis vote counts;DeputyCommissioners Dumlao and Perez have allegedlyno voting power andboth their concurrence whichactually constitutes the majority is inutile without the assent of Commissioner Kintanar. Anxious over the inactionof the NTCinthe matter ofits petition praying for the issuance of a provisional authority, private respondent BellTelfiled onMay5, 1995 an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Resolve Application andfor the Issuance of a Provisional Authority[11]. Reference was explicitly made to the findings of the CCAD and recommendations of DeputyCommissioners Dumlao and Perez that were allfavorable to private respondent BellTel. Mention was also made of the aforementionedworkingdraft of the order granting a provisional authorityto BellTel, which draft was made bythe Legal Department of the NTCandinitialed bythe said deputy commissioners. No actionwas takenby the NTCon the aforecitedmotion. Thus, on May 12, 1995, private respondent BellTel filed a Second Urgent Ex-Parte Motion[12] reiterating its earlier prayer. Petitioners-oppositors filedan Opposition[13] to the aforestated two motions of private respondent BellTel. In an Order datedMay16, 1995, signedsolelybyCommissioner Simeon Kintanar, the NTC, insteadof resolvingthe two pendingmotions of private respondent BellTel, set the said motions for a hearingon May 29, 1995. On May 29, 1995, however, no hearing was conducted as the same was reset on June 13, 1995. On June 13, 1995, the dayof the hearing, private respondent BellTel filed a Motion to Promulgate (Amending the Motion to Resolve)[14] In saidmotion, private respondent prayed for the promulgationof the working draft ofthe order granting a provisional authority to private respondent BellTel, onthe groundthat the saidworking draft had alreadybeensignedor initialed byDeputyCommissioners Dumlao andPerez who, together, constitute a majorityout of the three commissioners composing the NTC. To support its prayer, private respondent BellTel asserted that the NTCwas a collegial bodyand that as such, twofavorable votes out of a maximum three votes bythe members of the commission, are enough to validly promulgate an NTC decision. On June 23, 1995, petitioners-oppositors filedtheir Joint Opposition[15] to the aforecited motion. On July4, 1995, the NTCdeniedthe saidmotion inanOrder solelysignedbyCommissioner Simeon Kintanar. On July17, 1995, private respondent BellTel filedwith this court a Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus andProhibitionseeking the nullificationof the aforestated Order dated July 4, 1995 denying the Motion to Promulgate. On July26, 1995, we issueda Resolutionreferring saidpetitionto the respondent Court of Appeals for proper determination and resolution pursuant to Section 9, par. 1 of B.P. Blg. 129.
- 49. 49 In the interim,the Solicitor General filed with the respondent appellate court a Manifestation In Lieuof Comment[16] in which the Solicitor General took a legal position adverse to that of the NTC. The Solicitor General, after a close examination ofthe laws creating the NTC and its predecessors and a studious analysis of certain Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) orders, NTCcirculars, andDepartment of Justice (DOJ) legal opinions pertinent to the issue of collegiality of the NTC, made the following recommendations: “WHEREFORE, the Solicitor General respectfullyprays that thisHonorable Court: (a) declare respondent National Telecommunications Commissionas a collegialbody; (b) restrainrespondent Commissioner Simeon Kintanar fromarrogating untohimself alone the powers of the saidagency; (c) order NTC, acting as a collegial body, to resolve petitioner BellTelecom’s applicationunder NTC-94-229; (d) declare NTCMemorandumCirculars 1-1-93 and 3-1-93 as void; [and] (e) upholdthe legalityof DOTCDepartment Order 92-614.”[17] On September 23, 1996, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated the herein assailed decision the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is herebyrenderedas follows: 1. Petitioner’s petition for a writ of Certiorari and Prohibition is hereby granted. Accordingly, NTCMemorandum Circular No. 1-1-93, Annex ‘J’ of the Petition, Memorandum Circular No. 3-1-93, Annex ‘K’ of the Petition and the Order of Kintanar, Annex ‘L’ of the Petition, are herebySET ASIDE for being contrary to law. The Respondents and all those acting for and in their behalf are hereby enjoined and prohibited from implementing or enforcing the same; [and] 2. Petitioner’s petitionfor mandamus is hereby GRANTED in that the Respondent NTC, composed of Kintanar and deputy commissioners Perez and Dumlao, are hereby directed to meet enbanc andto consider and act on the draft Order, Annex ‘B’ of the Petition, within fifteen (15) days from the finality of this Decision. Without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.”[18] The hereinassailed decision being unacceptable to petitioner Simeon Kintanar and petitioners GMCR, Inc., Smart Communications, Inc., Isla Communications Co., Inc. and InternationalCommunications Corporationas oppositors in the application ofprivate respondent BellTel for a provisional authority, they filed with this court separate petitions for review. Commissioner Kintanar’s petition, docketed as G.R. No. 126526, ascribes to the respondent appellate court the following assignment of errors: “1. The Court of Appeals, insetting aside NTCMC1-1-93 and MC3-1-93 and the Order of the Commissiondated July4, 1995, made a collateralattackona law whichwas nowhere calledfor in the pleadings ofthe parties nor is authorized bythe Rules of Court. 2. The Court of Appeals erredinassumingandimposing that the Commission is a collegial body simplybyreasonof the fact that other bodieswhichwere a spin off from the defunct Public Service Commissionwere created as a collegial body. The lawthat createdEO 546 erasedthe collegial character of the proceedings before the NTC. 3. The Court of Appeals’ decision contains serious contradiction;worse, it consideredevidence not formallyoffered or incorporatedintothe records ofthe case; yet failedto consider evidence submittedbypetitioner-appellant nor onthe prejudicial issue on non-joinder of indispensable parties- 3.1 CA erred in assumingthat the NTCis collegial bythe fact that Charters of other regulatory agencies expresslymade them collegial while this express provision wasabsent inNTC’s charter. 3.2 CA contradicts itself byholding that DOTCMC92-614 prevails and[requires] collegiality. 3.3 The decisions byUndersecretaryLichaucosigned byher and her 2 deputies are innoway indicative of collegialityand shouldnot be consideredas having anypersuasive effect xxx. 3.4 The Court of Appeals erredin applying the Board ofCommunications Rules of Practice and Procedures. 4. The Court of Appeals erredwhenit grantedmandamus, directingandineffect controlling Commissioner Kintanar and deputyCommissioners Dumlao and Perez, to meet enbanc to consider and act on a ‘draft Order’ onlywhichthe Court itself recognizednolonger hadthe approval of two(2) Commissioners while inthe same token the Court of Appeals hadset aside a dulypromulgated Order of July4, 1995 allegedlybecauseit didnot carrythe approval of 2 commissioners.”[19] On the other hand, petitioners-oppositors, in their petition docketed as G.R. No. 126496, assail the decision of respondent appellate court on the following grounds: 1. The Court of Appeals erredinnot dismissingthe instant Petitionoutright for its failure to impleadindispensable parties, inviolationof Section 5, Rule 65 and Sec. 3, Rule 7 of the Revised Rules of Court; 2. The Court of Appeals seriouslyerredin takingcognizance of andpassing upon BellTel’s Petition, whichonits face is premature since the Order of July4, 1996 assailedwas not a final decision of the Commission;
- 50. 50 3. Even assumingarguendothat the Court of Appeals cantake cognizance of the Petition, the dispositioninDecisionthereinwhichnullifies NTC Memorandum Circulars 1-1-93 and 3-1-93 itselfconstitutesa collateral attack onthe said laws, the validity of which were never put inissue byanyof the parties, contrary to the clear legal requirement that the validityof laws canbe attackedonlyindirect proceedings instituted for that purpose; 4. It was infact improper for the Court of Appeals to pass onthe validityof NTCCircular No. 1-1-93 and Memorandum Circular No. 3-1-93 since the same was absolutely unnecessary for the resolution of the Petition; 5. Even assuming that the Court of Appeals correctlydefinedthe prime issues as being that of collegiality, nonetheless the Court ofAppeals committed a serious error of law in declaring the NTCas a collegial bodydespite the clear intent of E.O. No. 546 and the provisions ofDOTCMC95-640, and the obvious implications ofpending bills in Congress on the reorganization of the NTC; 6. The Decision, inmandating that the NTCCommissioner and DeputyCommissioners sit to consider the draft-andonlythe draft-inrendering its Decisionin BellTel’s application constitutesanunwarranted, unauthorizedandunlawful interference in and canalization of the discretionary functions of the Commission as a quasi -judicial entity; and 7. The Decision condones the illegal andunethical act of BellTelof surreptitiouslysecuringa draft decision, andencourages andplacespremium onfuture similar illegal acts-all in violationof the ruling andthe mandate of the Supreme Court in In Re Jurado: Adm. Matter No. 90-5-383 (July 12, 1990).[20] On December 16, 1996, private respondent BellTel filedanOmnibus Motion[21] praying for, among others, the consolidation of G.R. Nos. 126496 and 126526. On December 18, 1996, respondent BellTel filedits Comment.[22] On the same day, the NTC and Commissioner Kintanar filed a Manifestation/Motion[23] echoing the prayer for the consolidation of the G.R. Nos. 126496 and 126526. On December 19, 1996, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation/Motion[24] reiterating that its legal stance inthis case is adverse to that of the NTC and praying that it be excluded from filing any comment in behalf of the NTC. In a Resolution dated February5, 1997, we resolved, among others, to excuse the Solicitor General from filing anycomment inbehalf ofthe NTC, require the NTCto file its owncomment in G.R. No. 126496 and to consolidate G.R. Nos. 126496 and 126526. On March 6, 1997, the NTC and Commissioner Kintanar filed a Manifestation/Motion[25] prayingthat the latter’s petition inG.R. No. 126526 be adoptedas their comment in the consolidated cases . Upon the joinder of issues inthese consolidatedcases, we perceive the fundamental issue to be that of the collegiality of the NTC as a quasi -judicial agency. We find the consolidated petitions wanting of merit. First. We herebydeclare that the NTCis a collegial bodyrequiring a majorityvote out of the three members of the commission in order to validly decide a case or any incident therein. Corollarily, the vote alone of the chairmanof the commission, as in this case, the vote of Commissioner Kintanar, absent the required concurring vote coming from the rest of the membership ofthe commissionto at least arrive at a majoritydecision, is not sufficient to legally render an NTC order, resolution or decision. Simplyput, Commissioner Kintanar is not the National Telecommunications Commission. He alone does not speakfor andinbehalf ofthe NTC. The NTCacts througha three-man body, and the three members ofthe commissioneachhasone vote to cast ineverydeliberationconcerning a case or anyincident thereinthat is subject to the jurisdictionof the NTC. Whenwe consider the historical milieuinwhichthe NTCevolved into the quasi-judicial agencyit is now under Executive Order No. 146 which organizedthe NTCas a three-man commission and expose the illegalityof all memorandum circulars negating the collegial nature of the NTC under Executive Order No. 146, we are left with onlyone logicalconclusion: the NTCis a collegial bodyandwas a collegial body even during the time when it was acting as a one-man regime. We thus quote with approval the encompassinglegal ruminations ofthe respondent Court of Appeals in disposing of the issue of the collegiality of the NTC: “In resolving the issue, We recall that, onNovember 17, 1936, the NationalAssemblypassed CommonwealthAct No. 146 whichcreatedthe Public Service Commission(PSC). While providing that the PSCshall consist ofa Public Service Commissioner anda DeputyCommissioner, the law made it clear that the PSCwas not a collegialbodybystating that the DeputyCommissioner could act onlyon matters delegatedto him bythe Public Service Commissioner. As amendedbyRA 2677, the Public Service Commissionwas transformed intoandemergedas a collegialbody, composed ofone Public Service Commissioner and five (5) Associate Commissioners. The amendment providedthat contestedcasesandallcasesinvolving the fixing ofrates shall be decided bythe Commissionenbanc. On September 24, 1972, then President FerdinandE. Marcos signed, into law, Presidential Decree No. 1 adopting andapproving the IntegratedReorganizationPlan which, inturn, created the Board of Communications (BOC) inplace of the PSC. This time, the newregulatoryboardwas composed ofthree (3) officers exercising quasi-judicial functions: ‘x x x The Boardof Communications shall be composedof a full time Chairman whoshallbe of unquestioned integrityandrecognized prominence inprevious public and/or private employment; two full-time members whoshall be competent on all aspects of communications, preferablyone of whom shall be a lawyer andthe other an economist x x x’ On January25, 1978, the BOCpromulgatedits ‘Rules of Procedure andPractice’ in connection with applications andproceedings before it. On July23, 1979, President Marcos issuedExecutive Order No. 546, creating the Ministries of Public Works, and ofTransportation andCommunications, mergedthe defunct Boardof Communications andthe Telecommunications Control Bureauintoa single entity, the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC). The saidlawwas issuedbythenPresident Marcos inthe exercise of his legislative powers. Sec. 16 of E.O. 546 provides that --
- 51. 51 ‘x x xThe Commissionshall be composedof a Commissioner andtwo DeputyCommissioners, preferablyone of whomshall be a lawyer andanother aneconomist. x x x’ The aforementionedExecutive Order took effect onSeptember 24, 1979 x x x. However, the NTC did not promulgate anyRules ofProcedure and Practice. Consequently, the thenexistingRulesof Procedure and Practice promulgatedbythe BOCwas appliedto proceedings inthe NTC. In the meantime, the Decisions ofthe NTCwere signedbythe Chairmanalone of the NTCwhich renderedthe two (2) deputyCommissioners ‘non-participative’ inthe task of decision- making. This prompted the thenMinister of TransportationandCommunicationJose P. Dans, Jr. to seekthe legal opinion ofthe then Minister of Justice RicardoC. Puno, as to whether the NTC was a collegial bodyor not. On January11, 1984, Minister Punosent a letter-opinion x x x to the effect that the NTCwas not a collegial bodybut a single entityandthus the thenpractice of only the Chairmanof the NTCsigningthe Decisions of the NTCwas authorized bylaw. x x x Admittedly, the opinionof the Secretaryof Justice is entitled to great weight x x x. However, the same is not controlling or conclusive on the courts x x x. We find and declare, inthe present recourse, that the PunoOpinionis not correct. Admittedly, EO 546 does not specificallystate that the NTCwas a collegial body. Neither doesit provide that the NTCshould meet En Banc in deciding a case or inexercising its adjudicatoryor quasi-judicial functions. But the absence of such provisions does not militate against the collegial nature of the NTCunder the context of Section16 of EO 546 and under the Rulesof Procedure andPractice appliedbythe NTCinits proceedings. Under [Rule 15] of saidRules, the BOC(nowthe NTC) sits En Banc: ‘x x x In everycase heardbythe Board en banc, the orders, rulings, decisions andresolutions disposing of the merits of the matter withinits jurisdictionshall be reachedwith the concurrence of at least two regular members after deliberationandconsultation and thereafter assignedto a member for the writing ofthe opinion. Anymember dissenting fromthe order, ruling, decision or resolution shall state in writing the reason for his dissent. In all other cases, a dulyassigned Member shall issue all orders, rulings, decisions andresolutions pertinent to the case assignedto him. Copyof the decisiononthe merit ofthe case soassigned shallbe furnishedthe Chairmanof the Board. x x x’ Inscrutably, a case before the BOCmaybe assigned to and heardbyonlya member thereof whois taskedto prepare and promulgate his Decisionthereon, or heard, En Banc, bythe full membership of the BOCin whichcase the concurrence of at least two (2) ofthe membershipof the BOCis necessaryfor a validDecisionx x x. While it maybe true that the aforesaidRules of Procedure was promulgatedbefore the effectivityof Executive Order No. 546, however, the Rules of Procedure ofBOCgoverned the rulesof practice andprocedure before the NTCwhenit was established under Executive Order No. 546. This wasenunciated bythe Supreme Court in the case of ‘Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. versus NationalTelecommunications Commission, 131 SCRA 200’ when it declared that: ‘The Rules of Practice and Procedure promulgated onJanuary25, 1978 by the Board of Communications, the immediate predecessor of respondent NTCx x x govern the rules ofpractice and procedure before the BOCthen, now respondent NTC.’ x x x In the case of‘Philippine LongDistance Telephone Companyversus National Telecommunications, et al., 190 SCRA 717’, the Supreme Court applied and cited Rule 15 of the Rules of Procedure and Practice of BOCx x x. Hence, under its Rules ofProcedure and Practice, the Respondent NTC, as its predecessor, the BOC, had consistentlybeen andremains a collegialbody. Respondents Kintanar’s andNTC’s pose that Respondent Kintanar, alone, is vestedwithauthority to signand promulgate a Decision ofthe NTCis antitheticalto the nature ofa commission as envisagedin Executive Order No. 546. It must be borne inmindthat a Commission is defined as: ‘[a] bodycomposed ofseveral persons actingunder lawful authorityto performsome public service.’ (Cityof Louisville Municipal HousingCommissionversus Public Housing Administration, 261 SouthwesternReporter, 2nd, page 286). A Commissionis also defined as a board or committee of officials appointed and empowered to perform certainacts or exercise certainjurisdictionof a public nature or service x x x (Black, Law Dictionary, page 246). There is persuasive authoritythat a ‘commission’ is synonymous with ‘board’ (State Ex. Rel. Johnsonversus Independent School District No. 810, WabashCounty, 109 NorthwesternReporter 2nd, page 596). Indeed, as canbe easilydiscernedfrom the context of Section16 of Executive Order No. 546, the Commissionis composed ofa Commissioner andtwo (2) deputycommissioners x x x not the commissioner, alone, as pontificatedbyKintanar. The conjunctive word ‘and’ is not without anylegal significance. It is not, byanychance, a surplusage in the law. It means ‘inadditionto’ (McCaull Webster Elevator Companyversus Adams, 167 NorthwesternReporter, 330, page 332). The word‘and’, whether it is usedto connect words, phrases or fullsentence[s], must be acceptedas bindingtogether andas relating to one another x x x. In interpretinga statute, everypart thereofshould be given effect onthe theorythat it was enactedas anintegratedlaw andnot as a combinationof dissonant provisions. As the aphorism goes, ‘that the thingmayrather have effect thanbe destroyed’ x x x. If it was the intention of President Marcos to constitute merelya single entity, a ‘one-man’ governmental body, instead of a commission or a three-man collegialbody, he wouldnot have constituteda commission and wouldnot have specificallydecreedthat the Commissionis composed of, not the commissioner alone, but of the commissioner andthe two (2) deputycommissioners. Irrefragably, then, the NTC is a commission composednot onlyof Kintanar, but Perez andDumlao as well, acting together in the performance of their adjudicatoryor quasi-judicial functions, conformablywiththe Rules of Procedure and Practice promulgatedbythe BOCandapplicable to the NTC. The barefacedfact that x x x of Executive Order 546 usedthe word‘deputy’ to designate the two (2) other members of the Commissiondoes not militate against the collegialityof the NTC. x x x The collegialityof the NTCcannot be disparagedbythe mere nominaldesignationof the membership thereof. Indeed, We are convincedthat suchnominal designations are without
- 52. 52 functionalimplications andare designedmerelyforthe purpose of administrative structure or hierarchyof the personnelof the NTC. x x x In hindsight, even SecretaryGarcia was in accordwith the collegialityof the NTCwhen he promulgatedandissued Department Order No. 92-614 x x x. Even then Commissioner Mariano Benedictoopenlyexpressedhis vehement opposition to the Department Order of Secretary Garcia andoptedto seek refuge inthe opinion ofthe thenMinister of Justice Punox x x. It was onlywhen Commissioner Benedictoresigned and Respondent Kintanar was designatedto replace Commissioner Benedicto that SecretaryGarcia flip-flapped[sic], and suddenlyfoundit expedient to recall his Department Order No. 92-614 andauthorize Kintanar to decide, all byhimself, all cases pending withthe NTCinfrontal violationof the Rules of Procedure andPractice before the NTC, more specificallyRule 15 thereof x x x. x x x The Respondents cannot find solace in House Bill No. 10558 to buttress their argument x x x because under the House Bill, the NTCis transformed into a collegial body. Indeed, We find Respondents’ pose tenuous. For, it canlikewise be argued, withjustification, that House Bill No. 10558 indeed confirms the existingcollegial nature of the NTCbyso expresslyreaffirming the same. x x x In sum, then, We findandsodeclare that NTCCircular No. 1-1-93 x x x Memorandum Circular No. 3-1-93 x x x and the Order of Kintanar x x x declaring the NTCas a single entityor non-collegial entity, are contraryto law andthus null andvoid and shouldbe, as theyare hereby, set aside.”[26] Second. Petitioners take us to task withtheir vigorous contentionthat respondent appellate court’s act of nullifyingNTCMemorandum Circular No. 1-1-93 issued by then Commissioner Mariano Benedicto, Jr. and NTC Memorandum Circular No. 3-1-93 issued also by then Commissioner Benedicto on January 6, 1993, was a collateral attack against the aforecited circulars andan unnecessaryandabusive exercise ofthe court’s power to nullify administrative regulations. It must be rememberedby petitioners, however, that administrative regulations derive their validity from the statute that they were, in the first place, intended to implement. MemorandumCirculars 1-1-93 and 3-1-93 are ontheir face null andvoid ab initio for being unabashedlycontraryto law. Theywere nullifiedbyrespondent Court ofAppeals because they are absolutely illegal and, as such, are without any force and effect. The fact that implementationof these illegal regulations has resulted in the institutionalization ofthe one-man rule inthe NTC, is not andcannever be a ratificationof suchanillegal practice. At the least, these illegalregulations are anerroneous interpretationof E.O. No. 546 and in the context of and its predecessor laws. At the most, these illegal regulations are attempts to validate the one-man rule inthe NTCas executedbypersons withthe selfishinterest ofmaintaining their illusoryholdof power. Since the questionedmemorandum circulars are inherentlyandpatently null and void for being totallyviolative ofthe spirit andletter of E.O. No. 546 that constitutesthe NTCas a collegial body, no court may shirk from its duty of striking down such illegal regulations. Third. Inits certiorari actionbefore the respondent Court of Appeals, private respondent BellTel wasproceeding against the NTCandCommissioner Kintanar for the former’s adherence and defense of its one-man rule as enforcedbythe latter. Thus, onlythe NTCandCommissioner Kintanar maybe consideredas indispensable parties. After all, it is theywhomprivate respondent BellTel seekto be chastised andcorrected bythe court for having acted in grave abuse of their discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The oppositors in NTC Case No. 94-229 are not absolutely necessary for the final determination of the issue of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NTC and of Commissioner Kintanar inhis capacityas chairmanof NTC because the task of defending them primarilylies inthe Office of the Solicitor General. Furthermore, were the court to find that certiorari lies against the NTCand Commissioner Kintanar, the oppositors’ cause could not be significantlyaffectedbysuch rulingbecause the issue of grave abuse of discretion goes not into the merits of the case inwhich the oppositors are interestedbut intothe issue ofcollegiality that requires, regardlessof the merits of a case, that the same be decidedonthe basis of a majority vote of at least two members of the commission. The issue inthis case is, it bears repeating, not the merits of the application of private respondent BellTel for a provisional authority to operate what promises to be the most technologicallyadvancedtelephone service inthe country. This court is not in anywayconcerned with whether or not private respondent BellTel’s project proposal is technically feasible or financiallyviable, andthis court should not, in fact, delve intothese matters which are patently outside of its review jurisdiction. All that respondent Court of Appeals passed upon was the question ofwhether or not the NTC and Commissioner Kintanar committed grave abuse of discretion, andsowe must reviewand ascertain the correctness of the findings of the respondent appellate court on this score, and this score alone. Thus, the claim of petitioners that there is here a case of non-joinder of indispensable parties in the persons of all of the oppositors in NTC Case No. 94-229, is untenable. Fourth. Petitioners, inapparent paranoia, argue that what the respondent appellate court has actually ordered, was that the NTC sit and meet en banc and forthwith grant private respondent BellTel’s applicationfor a provisional authority. Petitioners, however, have obviously over-read the secondpart of the dispositive portion ofthe herein assailed decision rendered by respondent Court of Appeals. There is no dispute that jurisprudence is settledas to the proprietyof mandamus in causing a quasi-judicial agencyto exercise its discretionina case alreadyripe for adjudication and long- awaiting the proper disposition. As to how this discretionis to be exercised, however, is a realm outside the office ofthe specialcivil action ofmandamus. It is elementarylegalknowledge, after all, that mandamus does not lie to control discretion. When the respondent Court of Appeals directedCommissioners Kintanar, Dumlao andPerez to meet en banc and to consider andact onthe working draft of the order granting provisional authorityto BellTel, said court was simplyordering the NTCto sit andmeet en banc as a collegial body, andthe subject of the deliberationof the three-man commissionwouldbe the said working draft which embodiesone course of action that maybe taken on private respondent BellTel’s
- 53. 53 applicationfor a provisionalauthority. The respondent Court of Appeals, however, did not order the NTCto forthwithgrant saidapplication. This is understandable since every commissioner of the three-man NTChas a vote each to cast indisposingof private respondent BellTel’s application and the respondent appellate court would not pre-empt the exercise by the members of the commission of their individual discretion in private respondent BellTel’s case. Respondent appellate court intends, however, for the NTC to promptly proceed with the consideration of private respondent BellTel’s application for provisional authority, for the same has beenripe for decision since December, 1994. With the markedpropensityof Commissioner Kintanar to delayactionon the saidapplication and his insistent arrogation of sole power to promulgate anyandall NTCdecisions, respondent Court of Appeals’ order for the NTC to sit and meet en banc to consider private respondent BellTel’s application for a provisional authority, attains deep significance. Fifth. The accusation ofpetitioners that the workingdraft of the order granting provisional authorityto private respondent BellTel, wasobtainedbythe latter through illegal means, is a serious charge. However, not a single piece of evidence has been proffered by petitioners to prove this charge. Private respondent BellTel makes no secret of the source of the said working draft. In private respondent BellTel’s Urgent Ex-Parte Motionto Resolve Application and For Issuance of ProvisionalAuthority, it is allegedthat saidworking draft waspreparedbyAtty. BasilioBolante of the Legal Department of the NTC.[27] Saidworking draft was initialed by the CCAD Head, Engr. EdgardoCabarios and by Deputy Commissioners Dumlao and Perez.[28] The working draft is attachedto the records ofNTCCase No. 94-229 whichmay be borrowed by any person for any stated purpose.[29] Significantly, no one among the aforementionedpersons has renounced the working draft or declared it to be spurious. More importantly, petitioners have utterly failed to offer proof of any illegality in the preparation or procurement of said working draft. The more critical point that matters most, however, is that we cannot be diverted from the principal issue inthis case concerning the collegialityof the NTC. Inthe ultimate, the issue of the procurement of the working draft is more apropos for a criminal or administrative investigation than inthe instant proceedings largelyaddressedto the resolution of a purely legal question. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant consolidated petitions are herebyDISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED. Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI) v.Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC), et al., G.R.No. 171101, November 22, 2011 VELASCO, JR., J.: I. THE FACTS On July5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously(11-0) to DISMISS/DENY the petitionfiled byHLI andAFFIRMwithMODIFICATIONS the resolutions of the PARC revoking HLI’s StockDistributionPlan (SDP) and placing the subject lands in Hacienda Luisita under compulsorycoverage of the Comprehensive AgrarianReform Program (CARP) ofthe government. The Court however did not order outright landdistribution. Voting 6-5, the Court noted that there are operative facts that occurredin the interim and which the Court cannot validly ignore. Thus, the Court declared that the revocation of the SDP must, by application of the operative fact principle, give way to the right of the original 6,296 qualified farmworkers - beneficiaries (FWBs) to choose whether theywant to remainas HLI stockholders or [choose actual landdistribution]. It thus ordered the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to “immediately schedule meetings with the said 6,296 FWBs and explain to them the effects, consequences and legal or practical implications of their choice, after which the FWBs will be asked to manifest, in secret voting, their choices in the ballot, signing their signatures or placing their thumbmarks, as the case may be, over their printed names.” The parties thereafter filedtheir respective motions for reconsiderationof the Court decision. II. THE ISSUES (1) Is the operative fact doctrine availa ble in this case? (2) Is Sec. 31 of RA 6657 unconstitutional? (3) Can’t the Court order that DAR’s compulsoryacquisition of Hacienda Lusita cover the full 6,443 hectares allegedlycoveredbyRA 6657 and previouslyheld byTarlac Development Corporation (Tadeco), and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by HLI’s SDP? (4) Is the date of the “taking” (for purposes ofdetermining the just compensation payable to HLI) November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLI’s SDP? (5) Has the 10-year periodprohibition on the transfer of awardedlands under RA 6657 lapsed on May 10, 1999 (since Hacienda Luisita were placedunder CARPcoverage throughthe SDOA scheme on May11, 1989), and thus the qualifiedFWBs shouldnow be allowedto sell their land interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties, whether they have fully paid for the lands or not? (6) THE CRUCIAL ISSUE: Shouldthe ruling in the July5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI be reconsidered? III. THE RULING [The Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the motions for reconsideration of respondents PARC, et al. with respect to the option granted to the original farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs)of Hacienda Luisita to remain with petitioner HLI, which option the Court thereby RECALLED and SET ASIDE. It reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI, and UNANIMOUSLY directed immediate land distribution to the qualified FWBs.]
- 54. 54 1. YES, theoperative fact doctrine is applicable in this case. [The Court maintained its stance that the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case since, contrary to the suggestion of the minority, the doctrine is not limited only to invalid or unconstitutional laws but also applies to decisions made by the President or the administrative agencies that have the force and effect of laws. Prior to the nullification or recall of said decisions, they may have produced acts and consequences that must be respected. It is on this score that the operative fact doctrine should be applied to acts and consequences that resulted from the implementation of the PARC Resolution approving the SDP of HLI. The majority stressed that the application of the operative fact doctrine by the Court in its July 5, 2011 decision was in fact favorable to the FWBs because not only were they allowed to retain the benefits and homelots they received under the stock distribution scheme, they were also given the option to choose for themselves whether they want to remain as stockholders of HLI or not.] 2. NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 NOT unconstitutional. [The Court maintained that the Court is NOT compelled to rule on the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, reiterating that it was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the resolution thereof is not the lis mota of the case. Moreover, the issue has been rendered moot and academic since SDO is no longer one of the modes of acquisition under RA 9700. The majority clarified that in its July 5, 2011 decision, it made no ruling in favor of the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, but found nonetheless that there was no apparent grave violation of the Constitution that may justify the resolution of the issue of constitutionality.] 3. NO, the Court CANNOT order that DAR’s compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita cover the full 6,443 hectares and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by HLI’s SDP. [Since what is put in issue before the Court is the propriety of the revocation of the SDP, which only involves 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land and not 6,443 has., then the Court is constrained to rule only as regards the 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land.Nonetheless, this should not prevent the DAR, under its mandate under the agrarian reform law, from subsequently subjecting to agrarian reform other agricultural lands originallyheld by Tadeco that were allegedly not transferred to HLI but were supposedly covered by RA 6657. However since the area to be awarded to each FWB in the July 5, 2011 Decision appears too restrictive – considering that there are roads, irrigation canals, and other portions of the land that are considered commonly-owned by farmworkers, and these may necessarily result in the decrease of the area size that may be awarded per FWB – the Court reconsiders its Decision and resolves to give the DAR leeway in adjusting the area that may be awarded per FWB in case the number of actual qualified FWBs decreases. In order to ensure the proper distribution of the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita per qualified FWB, and considering that matters involving strictlythe administrative implementation and enforcement of agrarian reform laws are within the jurisdiction of the DAR, it is the latter which shall determine the area with which each qualified FWB will be awarded. On the other hand, the majority likewise reiterated its holding that the 500-hectare portion of Hacienda Luisita that have been validly converted to industrial use and have been acquired by intervenors Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) and Luisita Industrial Park Corporation (LIPCO), as well as the separate 80.51-hectare SCTEX lot acquired by the government, should be excluded from the coverage of the assailed PARC resolution. The Court however ordered that the unused balance of the proceeds of the sale of the 500-hectare converted land and of the 80.51-hectare land used for the SCTEX be distributed to the FWBs.] 4. YES, the date of “taking” is November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLI’s SDP. [For the purpose of determining just compensation, the date of “taking” is November 21, 1989 (the date when PARC approved HLI’s SDP) since this is the time that the FWBs were considered to own and possess the agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita. To be precise, these lands became subject of the agrarian reform coverage through the stock distribution scheme only upon the approval of the SDP, that is, on November 21, 1989. Such approval is akin to a notice of coverage ordinarily issued under compulsory acquisition. On the contention of the minority (Justice Sereno) that the date of the notice of coverage [after PARC’s revocation of the SDP], that is, January 2, 2006, is determinative of the just compensation that HLI is entitled to receive, the Court majority noted that none of the cases cited to justify this position involved the stock distribution scheme. Thus, said cases do not squarely apply to the instant case. The foregoing notwithstanding, it bears stressing that the DAR's land valuation is only preliminary and is not, by any means, final and conclusive upon the landowner. The landowner can file an original action with the RTC acting as a special agrarian court to determine just compensation. The court has the right to review with finality the determination in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function.] 5. NO, the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657 has NOT lapsed on May 10, 1999; thus, the qualified FWBs should NOT yet be allowed to sell their land interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties. [Under RA 6657 and DAO 1, the awarded lands may only be transferred or conveyed after 10 years from the issuance and registration of the emancipation patent (EP) or certificate of land ownership award (CLOA). Considering that the EPs or CLOAs have not yet been issued to the qualified FWBs in the instant case, the 10-year prohibitive period has not even started. Significantly, the reckoning point is the issuance of the EP or CLOA, and not the placing of the agricultural lands under CARP coverage. Moreover, should the FWBs be immediately allowed the option to sell or convey their interest in the subject lands, then all efforts at agrarian reform would be rendered nugatory, since, at the end of the day, these lands will just be transferred to persons not entitled to land distribution under CARP.]
- 55. 55 6. YES, theruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI should be reconsidered. [The Court reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI, inasmuch as these qualified FWBs will never gain control [over the subject lands] given the present proportion of shareholdings in HLI. The Court noted that the share of the FWBs in the HLI capital stock is [just] 33.296%. Thus, even if all the holders of this 33.296% unanimously vote to remain as HLI stockholders, which is unlikely, control will never be in the hands of the FWBs. Control means the majority of [sic] 50% plus at least one share of the common shares and other voting shares. Applying the formula to the HLI stockholdings, the number of shares that will constitute the majority is 295,112,101 shares (590,554,220 total HLI capital shares divided by 2 plus one [1] HLI share). The 118,391,976.85 shares subject to the SDP approved by PARC substantially fall short of the 295,112,101 shares needed by the FWBs to acquire control over HLI.] Gonzales vs COMELEC G.R. No. L-28196 21 SCRA 774 November 9, 1967 Petitioner: Ramon A. Gonzalez / Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA) Respondent: Commission on Elections (COMELEC) FACTS: This case is composed of consolidatedcases filedseparately by Petitioner Gonzalez and PHILCONSA assailing for the declaration of nullity of RA. No. 4913 and R.B.H. No. 1 and 3. On March 16, 1967, the Senate andthe House of Representatives passedthe following resolutions (Resolution of Both Houses/R.B.H.): 1. R.B.HNo. 1: Proposes that Sec 5, Art VI of Constitution be amended so as to increase the membership ofthe House of Representatives from a maximum of 120 in accordance with the present Constitution, to a maximumof 180, to be apportionedamong severalprovinces and that each province shall have at least one (1) member. 2. R.B.H. No. 2: Calls for a conventionto propose amendments to the Constitution, which will be composed oftwo (2) elective delegates from each representative district, to be "elected in the general elections to be held on the second Tuesday of November 1971. 3. R.B.H. No. 3: Proposes that Sec 16, Art VI of the Constitution be amended so as to authorize Senators and Members of the House of Representatives to become delegates to the aforementionedconstitutional convention, without the need to forfeit their respective seats in Congress. Subsequently, Congress passeda bill, which became RA No. 4913, providing that the amendments to the Constitutionproposedinthe aforementionedResolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval bythe people at the generalelections onNovember 14, 1967. This act fixes the date and manner of elevtion for the proposed amendments to be voted upon by the people , and appropriates funds for said election. Petitioners assail the validity/constitutionality of RA No. 4913 and for the prohibition with preliminaryinjunction to restrainCOMELECfrom implementing or complying with the said law. PHILCONSA also assails R.B.H No. 1 and 3. ISSUE: 1.) Whether or not RA No. 4913 is unconstitutional. 2.) Whether or not the issue involves a political question. HELD: 1.) Pursuant to Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, SCheldthat there is nothingin this provision that states that the election referred to is special, different from the general election. The Congress deemedit best to submit the amendments for ratification in accordance with the provisions ofthe Constitution. It doesnot negate its authorityto submit proposed amendments for ratification in general elections. Petition is therefore DENIED. 2.) SC also notedthat the issue is a political question because it attacks the wisdom of the action taken byCongress andnot the authorityto take it. A political questionis not subject to review by the Court. Constitutional Law 1: CH 2: Constitution; Political vs Justiciable Question (Textbook: Cruz, Professor: Atty. Usita)
- 56. 56 G.R. No. L-51201May 29, 1980 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME OF MARIA ESTRELLA VERONICA PRIMITIVA DUTERTE, ESTRELLAS. ALFON, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. ABAD SANTOS, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1 This is a petitionfiled pursuant to Republic Act No. 5440 to reviewanOrder of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, BranchXXIII, datedDecember 29, 1978, which partiallydeniedpetitioner's prayer for a change of name. Onlya questionof law is involved andthere is no controversyover the facts whichare well-statedin the questionedOrder as follows: têñ.£îhqw⣠This is verified petition filedonApril 28, 1978 bypetitioner Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte through her counsel, Atty. RosauroAlvarez, praying that her name be changed fromMaria EstrellaVeronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella S. Alfon. The notice settingthe petition for hearingon December 14, 1978 at 8:30 o'clock inthe morningwas publishedinthe Times Journal inits issues of July 28, August 5 and 11, 1978 and a copythereoftogether with a copyof the petitionwas furnishedthe Office of the Solicitor General (Exhibits C, C-1, C-2 and C-3). At the hearing ofthe petition onDecember 14, 1978, Atty. Rosauro Alvarez appeared for the petitioner andFiscal DonatoSor. Suyat, Jr. representedthe office of the Solicitor General, Uponmotionof counsel for the petitioner, without objectiononthe part of FiscalSuyat, the DeputyClerk ofCourt was appointedcommissioner to receive the evidence andto submit the same for resolution ofthe Court. From the testimonialanddocument evidence presented, it appears that petitioner Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte was bornonMay15, 1952 at the U.S.T. Hospital(Exhibit A). She was registeredat the local Civil Registrar's Office as MariaEstrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte On June 15, 1952, she was baptized as Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte at the St. Anthonyde Padua Church Singalong, Manila (Exhibit B). Her parents are Filomeno Duterte andEstrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte has beentaken cared of byMr. and Mrs. Hector Alfon. Petitioner andher uncle, Hector Alfon, have been residing at 728 J.R. Yulo Street corner IdealStreet, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila for twenty-three (23) years. Whenpetitioner startedschooling, she usedthe name Estrella S. Alfon. She attendedher first grade up to fourth year highschool at StellaMaris College using the name Estrella S. Alfon (Exhibits E, E-1, E-2 andE-3). After graduating fromhighschool she enrolledat the ArellanoUniversityandfinished Bachelor of Science inNursing(Exhibit E- 4). Her scholastic records fromelementaryto college show that she was registered bythe name ofEstrella S. Alfon. Petitioner has exercised her right of suffrage under the same name (Exhibit D). She has not committedanyfelony or misdemeanor (Exhibits G, G-1, G-2, G-3 andG-4). Petitioner has advanced the followingreasons for filing the petition: 1. She has beenusing the name Estrella Alfon since her childhood; 2. She has beenenrolled inthe grade school andincollege using the same name; 3. She has continuouslyusedthe name Estrella S. Alfonsince her infancyand all her friends andacquaintances knowher bythis name; 4. She has exercisedher right ofsuffrage under the same name. Section5, Rule 103 of the Rules ofCourt provides: Upon satisfactoryproofin open court on the date fixedinthe order that such order has been publishedas directed and that the allegations of the petition are true, the court shall if proper andreasonable cause appears for changing the name ofthe petitioner adjudge that such name be changedin accordance with the prayer of the petition. The evidence submittedshows that the change of name from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella Alfonis not proper andreasonable with respect to the surname. The fact that petitioner has beenusinga different surname andhasbecome knownwithsuch surname does not constitute proper andreasonable cause to legallyauthorize and change her surname to Alfon. The birthcertificate clearlyshows that the father of petitioner is Filomeno Duterte. Petitioner likewise admitted this fact inher testimony. To allowpetitioner to change her surname from Duterte to Alfonis equivalent to allowing her to use her mother's surname. Article 364 of the Civil Code provides: Legitimate and legitimatedchildrenshall principallyuse the surname ofthe father. If another purpose of the petitioner is to carrythe surname of Alfon because her uncle who reared her since childhood has the surname "Alfon" thenthe remedyis not a petition for change of name.
- 57. 57 WHEREFORE, the petitioninsofaras the first name is grantedbut deniedwith respect to the surname. Petitioner is authorized to change her name from Maria EstrellaVeronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella Alfon Duterte. Let copyof this order be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig, Metro Manila pursuant to Section3, Rule 103 of the Rules ofCourt. The lower court should have fullygrantedthe petition. The onlyreason whythe lower court deniedthe petitioner's prayer to change her surname is that as legitimate childof FilomenoDuterte andEstrella Alfonshe should principallyuse the surname of her father invokingArt. 364 of the Civil Code. But the word"principally" as usedinthe codal provisionis not equivalent to "exclusively" sothat there is nolegal obstacle ifa legitimate or legitimated childshouldchoose to use the surname ofits mother to whichit is equallyentitled. Moreover, this Court inHawLiongvs. Republic, G.R. No. L-21194. April 29, 1966, 16 SCRA 677, 679, said: têñ.£îhqw⣠The following maybe considered, amongothers, as proper or reasonable causes that maywarrant the grant of a petitioner for change of name; (1) when the name is ridiculous, tainted withdishonor, or is extremelydifficult to write or pronounce; (2) when the request for change is a consequence of a change of'status, such as when a natural childis acknowledgedor legitimated; and (3) whenthe change is necessaryto avoidconfusionTolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1953 ed., Vol. 1, p. 660). In the case at bar, it has beenshownthat petitioner has, since childhood, borne the name Estrella S. Alfon althoughher birth records andbaptismal certificate show otherwise; she was enrolledin the schoolsfrom the grades upto college under the name EstrellaS. Alfon;all her friends callher bythis name; she finishedher course inNursing incollege and wasgraduatedandgivena diploma under this name; andshe exercised the right of suffrage likewise under this name. There is therefore ample justification to grant fullyher petitionwhichis not whimsical but onthe contrary is basedon a solid and reasonable ground, i.e. to avoidconfusion. WHEREFORE, the Order appealedfrom is herebymodifiedinthat, the petitioner is allowed to change not onlyher first name but alsoher surname so as to be known as ESTRELLA S. ALFON. No costs. SO ORDERED. Barredo (Chairman), Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., and De Castro, JJ., concur.1äwphï1.ñët G.R. No. L-51201 May 29, 1980 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME OF MARIA ESTRELLAVERONICA PRIMITIVA DUTERTE, ESTRELLAS. ALFON, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. ABAD SANTOS, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1 This is a petitionfiled pursuant to Republic Act No. 5440 to reviewanOrder of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, BranchXXIII, datedDecember 29, 1978, which partiallydeniedpetitioner's prayer for a change of name. Onlya questionof law is involved andthere is no controversyover the facts whichare well-statedin the questionedOrder as follows:têñ.£îhqw⣠This is verified petition filedonApril 28, 1978 bypetitioner Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte through her counsel, Atty. RosauroAlvarez, praying that her name be changed fromMaria EstrellaVeronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella S. Alfon. The notice settingthe petition for hearingon December 14, 1978 at 8:30 o'clock inthe morningwas publishedinthe Times Journal inits issues of July 28, August 5 and 11, 1978 and a copythereoftogether with a copyof the petitionwas furnishedthe Office of the Solicitor General (Exhibits C, C-1, C-2 and C-3). At the hearing ofthe petition onDecember 14, 1978, Atty. Rosauro Alvarez appeared for the petitioner andFiscal DonatoSor. Suyat, Jr. representedthe office of the Solicitor General, Uponmotionof counsel for the petitioner, without objectiononthe part of FiscalSuyat, the DeputyClerk ofCourt was appointedcommissioner to receive the evidence andto submit the same for resolution ofthe Court. From the testimonialanddocument evidence presented, it appears that petitioner Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte was bornonMay15, 1952 at the U.S.T. Hospital(Exhibit A). She was registeredat the local Civil Registrar's Office as MariaEstrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte On June 15, 1952, she was baptized as Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte at the St. Anthonyde Padua Church Singalong, Manila (Exhibit B). Her parents are Filomeno Duterte andEstrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte has beentaken cared of byMr. and Mrs. Hector Alfon. Petitioner andher uncle, Hector Alfon, have been residing at 728 J.R. Yulo Street corner IdealStreet, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila for twenty-three (23) years. Whenpetitioner startedschooling, she usedthe name Estrella S. Alfon. She attended her first grade upto fourth year highschool at StellaMaris College using the name Estrella S. Alfon (Exhibits E, E-1, E-2 andE-3). After graduating fromhighschool she enrolledat the ArellanoUniversityandfinished Bachelor of Science inNursing(Exhibit E- 4). Her scholastic records fromelementaryto college show that she was registered bythe name ofEstrella S. Alfon. Petitioner has exercised her right of
- 58. 58 suffrage under thesame name (Exhibit D). She has not committedanyfelony or misdemeanor (Exhibits G, G-1, G-2, G-3 andG-4). Petitioner has advanced the followingreasons for filing the petition: 1. She has beenusing the name Estrella Alfon since her childhood; 2. She has beenenrolled inthe grade school andincollege using the same name; 3. She has continuouslyusedthe name Estrella S. Alfonsince her infancyand all her friends andacquaintances knowher bythis name; 4. She has exercisedher right ofsuffrage under the same name. Section5, Rule 103 of the Rules ofCourt provides: Upon satisfactoryproofinopen court on the date fixedinthe order that such order has been publishedas directed and that the allegations of the petition are true, the court shall if proper andreasonable cause appears for changing the name ofthe petitioner adjudge that such name be changedin accordance with the prayer of the petition. The evidence submittedshows that the change of name from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella Alfonis not proper andreasonable with respect to the surname. The fact that petitioner has beenusinga different surname andhasbecome knownwithsuch surname does not constitute proper andreasonable cause to legallyauthorize and change her surname to Alfon. The birthcertificate clearlyshows that the father of petitioner is Filomeno Duterte. Petitioner likewise admitted this fact inher testimony. To allowpetitioner to change her surname from Duterte to Alfonis equivalent to allowing her to use her mother's surname. Article 364 of the Civil Code provides: Legitimate and legitimatedchildrenshall principallyuse the surname ofthe father. If another purpose of the petitioner is to carrythe surname of Alfon because her uncle who reared her since childhood has the surname "Alfon" thenthe remedyis not a petition for change of name. WHEREFORE, the petitioninsofar as the first name is grantedbut deniedwith respect to the surname. Petitioner is authorized to change her name from Maria EstrellaVeronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella Alfon Duterte. Let copyof this order be furnishedthe Local Civil Registrar of Pasig, Metro Manila pursuant to Section3, Rule 103 of the Rules ofCourt. The lower court should have fullygrantedthe petition. The onlyreason whythe lower court deniedthe petitioner's prayer to change her surname is that as legitimate childof FilomenoDuterte andEstrella Alfonshe should principallyuse the surname of her father invokingArt. 364 of the Civil Code. But the word"principally" as usedinthe codal provisionis not equivalent to "exclusively" sothat there is nolegal obstacle ifa legitimate or legitimated childshouldchoose to use the surname ofits mother to whichit is equallyentitled. Moreover, this Court inHawLiongvs. Republic, G.R. No. L-21194. April 29, 1966, 16 SCRA 677, 679, said: têñ.£îhqw⣠The following maybe considered, amongothers, as proper or reasonable causes that maywarrant the grant of a petitioner for change of name; (1) when the name is ridiculous, tainted withdishonor, or is extremelydifficult to write or pronounce; (2) when the request for change is a consequence of a change of'status, such as when a natural childis acknowledgedor legitimated; and (3) whenthe change is necessaryto avoidconfusionTolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1953 ed., Vol. 1, p. 660). In the case at bar, it has beenshownthat petitioner has, since childhood, borne the name Estrella S. Alfon althoughher birth records andbaptismal certificate show otherwise; she was enrolledin the schoolsfrom the grades upto college under the name EstrellaS. Alfon;all her friends callher bythis name; she finishedher course inNursing incollege and wasgraduatedandgivena diploma under this name; andshe exercised the right of suffrage likewise under this name. There is therefore ample justification to grant fullyher petitionwhichis not whimsical but onthe contrary is basedon a solid and reasonable ground, i.e. to avoidconfusion. WHEREFORE, the Order appealedfrom is herebymodifiedinthat, the petitioner is allowed to change not onlyher first name but alsoher surname so as to be known as ESTRELLA S. ALFON. No costs. SO ORDERED. Barredo (Chairman), Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., and De Castro, JJ., concur.1äwphï1.ñët Floresca vs. Phillex Mining Floresca et al are the heirs of the deceasedemployees ofPhilex Mining Corporation (hereinafter referredto as Philex), who, while workingat its copper mines underground operations at Tuba, Benguet onJune 28, 1967, diedas a result of the cave-inthat buried them in the tunnels of the mine. Specifically, the complaint alleges that Philex, in violation of government rules and
- 59. 59 regulations, negligentlyanddeliberatelyfailedto takethe required precautions for the protection of the lives of its menworking underground. Floresca et al movedto claim their benefits pursuant to the Workmen’s Compensation Act before the Workmen’s CompensationCommission. Theyalso petitioned before the regular courts andsue Philex for additional damages. Philex invoked that theycan no longer be suedbecause the petitioners have alreadyclaimed benefits under the WCA. ISSUE: Whether or not Floresca et al can claim benefits and at the same time sue. HELD:Under the law, Floresca et al couldonlydo either one. Iftheyfiled for benefits under the WCA then theywillbe estoppedfrom proceeding with a civil case before the regular courts. Conversely, if theysuedbefore the civil courts thentheywouldalsobe estopped from claiming benefits under the WCA. The SChowever ruled that Floresca et al are excusedfrom this deficiency due to ignorance ofthe fact. Hadtheybeen aware ofsuchthen theymayhave not availed ofsuch a remedy. However, if in case they’ll wininthe lower court whatever awardmay be granted, the amount givento them under the WCA should be deducted. The SCemphasizedthat ifthey would go strictlybythe bookinthis case then the purpose of the law may be defeated. Idolatrous reverence for the letter of the lawsacrifices the humanbeing. The spirit of the law insures man’s survival andennobles him. As Shakespeare said, the letter of the law killeth but its spirit giveth life. Justice Gutierrez dissenting No civil suit shouldprosper after claiming benefits under the WCA. If employers are alreadyliable to paybenefits under the WCA they shouldnot be compelled to bear the cost of damage suits or get insurance for that purpose. The exclusionprovided bythe WCA can onlybe properlyremoved by the legislature NOT the SC. Case Digest:Chavez v. National Housing Authority G.R. No. 164527 15 August 2007 Ponente: VELASCO, JR., J. FACTS: On August 5, 2004, former Solicitor General FranciscoChavez, filedan instant petitionraising constitutionalissueson the JVA enteredbyNational HousingAuthorityandR-II Builders, Inc. On March 1, 1988, then-President CoryAquino issuedMemorandumorder No. (MO) 161 approving anddirecting implementationof the Comprehensive and Integrated Metropolitan Manila Waste Management Plan. During this time, SmokeyMountain, a wastelandinTondo, Manila, are being made residence of manyFilipinos living in a subhuman state. As presentedinMO 161, NHA preparedfeasibilitystudiesto turn the dumpsite into low-cost housingproject, thus, SmokeyMountain Development andReclamationProject (SMDRP), came into place. RA 6957 (Build-Operate-Transfer Law) was passedonJuly1990 declaring the importance of private sectors as contractors ingovernment projects. Thereafter, Aquino proclaimedMO 415 applying RA 6957 to SMDRP, amongothers. The same MO alsoestablished EXECOM and TECHCOMin the executionandevaluationof the plan, respectively, to be assisted bythe Public Estates Authority(PEA). Notices ofpublic bidding to become NHA’s venture partner for SMDRPwere publishedin newspapers in 1992, from which R-II Builders, Inc. (RBI)wonthe biddingprocess. Then-President Ramos authorizedNHA to enter into a Joint Venture Agreement withRBI. Under the JVA, the project involves the clearing of SmokeyMountainfor eventualdevelopment into a lowcost housingcomplex andindustrial/commercialsite. RBI is expectedto fullyfinance the development of SmokeyMountainand reclaim40 hectares of the landat the ManilaBay Area. The latter together withthe commercial area to be built onSmokeyMountain will be owned byRBI as enablingcomponents. Ifthe project is revokedor terminatedbythe Government through nofault of RBI or bymutual agreement, the Government shall compensate RBI for its actual expensesincurredinthe Project plus a reasonable rate of returnnot exceeding that stated inthe feasibilitystudyand inthe contract as of the date of suchrevocation, cancellation, or termination ona schedule to be agreeduponbybothparties. To summarize, the SMDRPshall consist ofPhase I andPhaseII. Phase I of the project involves clearing, levelling-off the dumpsite, and construction oftemporaryhousing units for the current residents onthe clearedandlevelled site. Phase II involves the construction ofa fenced incineration area for the on-site disposal ofthe garbage at the dumpsite. Due to the recommendations done bythe DENR after evaluations done, the JVA was amended and restated(now ARJVA) to accommodate the designchangesand additionalwork to be done to successfullyimplement the project. The original 3,500 units oftemporaryhousing were decreasedto 2,992. The reclaimedlandas enabling component was increasedfrom40 hectares to 79 hectares, which wassupported bythe issuance of Proclamation No. 465 by President Ramos. The revision alsoprovidedfor the 119-hectare landas an enablingcomponent for Phase II of the project. Subsequently, the CleanAir Act was passedbythe legislature whichmade the establishment of an incinerator illegal, making the off-site dumpsite at SmokeyMountainnecessary. On August 1, 1998, the project was suspended, to be later reconstitutedbyPresident Estrada inMO No. 33. On August 27, 2003, the NHA andRBI executeda Memorandum of Agreement wherebyboth parties agreedto terminate the JVA andsubsequent agreements. During this time, NHA reportedthat 34 temporaryhousing structures and21 permanent housing structures hadbeen turned over byRBI. ISSUES: Whether respondents NHA andRBI have beengrantedthe power and authorityto reclaimlands of the public domainas this power is vestedexclusivelyinPEA as claimed bypetitioner Whether respondents NHA andRBI were giventhe power andauthoritybyDENR to reclaim foreshore and submergedlands Whether respondent RBI canacquire reclaimedforeshore andsubmerged lands considered as alienable andoutside the commerce of man Whether respondent RBI canacquire reclaimedlands when there was nodeclarationthat said lands are no longer neededfor public use Whether there is a law authorizing sale ofreclaimed lands Whether the transfer of reclaimed lands to RBI was done bypublic bidding Whether RBI, being a private corporation, is barredbythe Constitutionto acquire lands ofpublic domain Whether respondents canbe compelled to disclose all informationrelated to the SMDRP Whether the operative fact doctrine applies to the instant position
- 60. 60 HELD: Executive Order 525reads that the PEA shall be primarilyresponsiblefor integrating, directing, and coordinating all reclamationprojects for andon behalf of the National Government. This does not meanthat it shallbe responsible for all. The requisites for a validandlegal reclamation project are approval bythe President (whichwere provided for byMOs), favourable recommendation ofPEA (whichwere seenas a part of its recommendations to the EXECOM), and undertaken either byPEA or entityunder contract of PEA or bythe National Government Agency(NHA is a government agencywhose authorityto reclaimlands under consultationwith PEA is derivedunder PD 727 and RA 7279). Notwithstanding the needfor DENR permission, the DENR is deemed to have granted the authorityto reclaim in the SmokeyMountain Project for the DENRis one ofthe members of the EXECOM which provides reviews for the project. ECCs and SpecialPatent Orders were given by the DENR whichare exercises of its power of supervisionover the project. Furthermore, it was the President via the abovementionedMOs that originallyauthorizedthe reclamation. It must be notedthat the reclamationof lands of public domainis reposed first inthe Philippine President. The reclaimedlands were classifiedalienable anddisposable via MO 415 issuedbyPresident AquinoandProclamationNos. 39 and465 byPresident Ramos. Despite not havinganexplicit declaration, the lands have been deemedto be nolonger needed for public use as stated in ProclamationNo. 39 that these are to be “disposedto qualified beneficiaries.” Furthermore, these lands have alreadybeen necessarilyreclassifiedas alienable and disposable lands under the BOT law. Letter I of Sec. 6 of PD 757 clearlystatesthat the NHA canacquire propertyrights and interests and encumber or otherwise dispose of them as it maydeemappropriate. There is no doubt that respondent NHA conducteda public bidding of the right to become its joint venture partner inthe SmokeyMountainProject. It was notedthat notices were published in national newspapers. The bidding proper was done bythe Bids andAwards Committee on May18, 1992. RA 6957 as amended byRA 7718 explicitlystates that a contractor canbe paid“a portionas percentage of the reclaimedland” subject to the constitutional requirement that onlyFilipino citizens or corporationwithat least 60% Filipinoequity can acquire the same. Inaddition, when the lands were transferredto the NHA, these were consideredPatrimonial lands ofthe state,by which it has the power to sell the same to anyqualifiedperson. This relief must be granted. It is the right of the Filipinopeopleto informationon matters of public concerned as statedinArticle II, Sec. 28, and Article III, Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution. When the petitioner filed the case, the JVA hadalreadybeen terminatedbyvirtue of MOA betweenRBI andNHA. The properties andrights inquestion after the passage of around10 years from the start of the project’s implementationcannot be disturbedor questioned. The petitioner, beingthe Solicitor General at the time SMDRPwas formulated, had ample opportunityto question the saidproject, but didnot do so. The moment to challenge has passed. Aparri vs CA GR L-30057 Facts: On January15, 1960, private respondent approvedthe following resolution# 13, hereby appointingMr. Bruno Aparri, as generalmanager of NARRA, with all the rights, prerogatives and compensations to take effect on January116, 1960. On March 15, 1962, the boardof directors approvedresolution # 24 whichstating thereat that the incumbent general manager shall perform hisdutyupto the close of office hour onMarch 31, 1962. In accordance withthe provisions ofsection8, sub-section2 of RA 1160. It herebyfixes the term of office ofthe incumbent general manager until march31, 1962. Petitioner file a mandamus with preliminaryinjunctionwith the first instance court. The petitionprayfor the annulment of the resolutionof NARRA board. Issue: Whether or not board resolutionNo. 24 was a removal or dismissal ofpetitioner without cause. Held: It was affirmedthat the term ofoffice ofpetitioner expiredonMarch 31, 1962. It is necessaryin each case to interpret the word "Term" withthe purview ofthe statutessoas to effectuate the statutoryscheme pertaining to the office under examination. Inthe case at bar, the term of office is not fixed bylaw. However, the power to fix the term is rested inthe boardof directors subject to the recommendation ofthe office of economic coordination and the approval of the president ofthe philippines. ResolutionNo. 24 speaks of noremoval but anexpirationof the term of office ofthe petitioner. The statute is undeniablyclear. "It is the rule instatutory constructionthat ifthe words andphrases of a statute are not obscure or ambiguous. Its meaningandintentionof the legislative must be determinedfrom the language employedand where there is no ambiguityin words, there is noroomfor construction. The petitioner inthis case was not removed before the expirationof histerm rather, hisright to hold office ceasedbythe expirationon March 31, 1962, of his termto holdsuchoffice. G.R. No. L-64313 January 17, 1985 NATIONAL HOUSING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. BENJAMIN JUCO AND THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, respondents. Government Corporate Counsel for petitioner. Amante A. Pimentel for respondents. GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: Are employees of the National Housing Corporation (NHC) coveredbythe Labor Code or by laws and regulations governing the civil service? The background facts of this case are stated in the respondent-appellee's brief as follows:
- 61. 61 The records revealthatprivate respondent (BenjaminC. Juco) was a project engineer of the National Housing Corporation (NHC) from November 16, 1970 to May14, 1975. For havingbeen implicated ina crime of theft and/or malversation of public funds involving 214 pieces of scrap G.I. pipes owned by the corporation which was allegedly committed on March 5, 1975. Juco's services were terminatedby(NHC) effective as of the close of working hours on May14, 1975. On March 25, 1977 he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner (NHC) with Regional Office No. 4, Department of Labor (now Ministry of Labor and Employment) docketedas R04-3-3309-77 (Annex A, Petition). The said complaint was certifiedbyRegional Branch No. IV of the NLRC for compulsory arbitrationwhere it wasdocketed as Case No. RB-IV-12038-77 and assignedto Labor Arbiter Ernilo V. Peñalosa. The latter conducted the hearing. Byagreement of the parties, the case was submitted for resolution upon submission of their respective position papers. Private respondent (Juco) submitted his position paper on July 15, 1977. He professedinnocence of the criminal acts imputed against him contending"that he was dismissedbasedon purely fabricated charges purposelyto harass himbecause he stood as a witness in the theft case filedagainst certainhigh officials ofthe respondent's establishment" (NHC) and prayedfor 'hisimmediate reinstatement to his former position inthe (NHC) without loss of seniority rights and the consequent payment of his will back wages plus all the benefits appertainingthereto. On July28, 1977, the NHCalso filed its position paper alleging that the Regional Office Branch IV, Manila, NLRC, "is without authority to entertain the case for lack of jurisdiction, consideringthat the NHCis a government owned and controlledcorporation;that even assumingthat this case falls within the jurisdiction of this Office, respondent firm (now petitioner) maintains that respondent (Juco), now private respondent, was separatedfromthe service for validandjustified reasons, i.e., for havingsoldcompanyproperties consistingof 214 piecesof scrapG.I. pipes at a junk shopin Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, and thereafter appropriatingthe proceeds thereof to his own benefit." The pertinent portion ofthe decisionof respondent NationalLabor Relations Commission (NLRC) reads: The fact that inthe earlycase of Fernandez v. Cedro (NLRC Case No. 201165-74, May19, 1975) the Commission, (SecondDivision) ruled that the respondent NationalHousing Corporationis a government- owned or controlledcorporation does not preclude us from later taking a contrarystandifbydoing so the ends ofjustice couldbetter be served. For although adherence to precedents (stare decisis) is a sum formula for achieving uniformity of action and conducive to the smoothoperationof anoffice, Idolatrous reverence for precedents which have outlived their validityand usefulness retards progress and should therefore be avoided. In fact, even courts do reverse themselves for reasons of justice andequity. This Commissionas an Administrative body performing quasi judicial function is no exception. WHEREFORE, inthe light of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby, set aside. In view, however, of the fact that the Labor Arbiter didnot resolve the issue of illegal dismissal we have opted to remandthis case to the Labor Arbiter a quo for resolution of the aforementioned issue. The NHC is a one hundred percent (100%) government-owned corporation organized in accordance withExecutive Order No. 399, the Uniform Charter of Government Corporations, datedJanuary5, 1951. Its shares of stockare ownedbythe Government Service Insurance System the Social SecuritySystem, the Development Bank ofthe Philippines, the NationalInvestment and Development Corporation, and the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation. Pursuant to Letter of Instruction No. 118, the capital stock of NHCwas increased from P100 million to P250 millionwith the five government institutions above mentionedsubscribing in equalproportion to the increasedcapital stock. The NHChas never hadanyprivate stockholders. The government has been the only stockholder from its creation to the present. There should nolonger be anyquestion at this time that employees of government-owned or controlled corporations are governed by the civil service law and civil service rules and regulations. Section 1, Article XII-B of the Constitution specifically provides: The Civil Service embraces everybranch, agency, subdivision, and instrumentalityof the Government, including every government- owned or controlled corporation. ... The 1935 Constitution had a similar provision in its Section 1, Article XI I which stated: A Civil Service embracing all branches and subdivisions of the Government shall be provided by law. The inclusionof "government-ownedor controlledcorporations" within the embrace of the civil service shows a deliberate effort of the framers to plug an earli er loophole which allowed government-owned or controlled corporations to avoid the full consequences of the an encompassingcoverage ofthe civil service system. The same explicit intent is shown by the addition of"agency" and"instrumentality" to branchesand subdivisions of the Government. All offices and firms of the government are covered.
- 62. 62 The amendments introducedin1973 are not Idle exercises or a meaninglessgestures. They carry the strongmessage that t civil service coverage is broadandan-embracing insofar as employment in the government in any of its governmental or corporate arms is concerned. The constitutionalprovisionhas beenimplemented by statute. Presidential Decree No. 807 is unequivocalthat personnel ofgovernment-ownedor controlledcorporations belong to the civil service and are subject to civil service requirements. It provides: SEC. 56. Government-owned or Controlled Corporations Personnel. — All permanent personnel of government-owned or controlled corporations whose positions are nowembracedinthe civil service shallcontinue inthe service until theyhave beengiven a chance to qualifyin an appropriate examination, but in the meantime, those who do not possess the appropriate civil service eligibility shag not be promoted until they qualify in an appropriate civil service examination. Services of temporarypersonnel may be terminated any time. The veryLabor Code, P. D. No. 442 as amended, which the respondent NLRCwants to apply in its entirety to the private respondent provides: ART. 277. Government employees. — The terms and conditions of employment of all government employees, including employees of government-ownedandcontrolled corporations shall be governed bythe Civil Service Law, rules andregulations. Their salaries shall be standardizedbythe National Assemblyas provided for in the New Constitution. However, there shall be reduction of existing wages, benefits and other terms and conditions of employment being enjoyed by them at the time of the adoption of the Code. Our decision in Alliance of Government Workers, et al v. Honorable Minister of Labor and Employment et all. (124 SCRA 1) gives the background of the amendment which includes government-owned or controlled corporations in the embrace of the civil service. We stated: Records of the 1971 Constitutional Convention show that in the deliberationheldrelative to what is now Section 1(1), Article XII - B, supra, the issue of the inclusion of government-owned or controlled corporations figured prominently. The late delegate Roberto S. Oca, a recognized labor leader, vehemently objected to the inclusion of government-owned or controlledcorporations in the Civil Service. He argued that such inclusionwouldput asunder the right of workers in government corporations, recognized in jurisprudence under the 1935 Constitution, to form andjoinlabor unions for purposes ofcollective bargainingwith their employers in the same manner as inthe private section (see: records of 1971 Constitutional Convention). In contrast, other labor experts and delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention enlightened the members of the Committee on Labor on the divergent situation of government workers under the 1935 Constitution, andcalled for its rectification. Thus, ina Position Paper dated November 22, 197 1, submitted to the Committee on Labor, 1971 Constitutional Convention, then Acting Commissioner of Civil Service Epi ReyPangramuyen declared: It is the stand, therefore, of this Commission that byreason ofthe nature ofthe public employer and the peculiar character of the public service, it must necessaryregard the right to strike given to unions in private industry as not applying to public employeesandcivil service employees. It has been stated that the Government, in contrast to the private employer, protects the interests ofallpeople inthe public service, and that accordingly, such conflicting interests as are present inprivate labor relations couldnot exist in the relations betweengovernment and those whom they employ. Moreover, determination of employment conditions as well as supervision of the management of the public service is in the hands of legislative bodies. It is further emphasized that government agencies inthe performance oftheir duties have a right to demand undivided allegiance fromtheir workers and must always maintaina pronounced esprit de corps or firm discipline among their staff members. It would be highlyincompatible withthese requirements of the public service, if personnel took orders from union leaders or put solidarity with members of the working class above solidarity with the Government. Thiswouldbe inimical to the public interest. Moreover, it is asserted that public employeesby joining labor unions may be compelled to support objectives whichare political in nature and thus jeopardize the fundamental principle
- 63. 63 that the governmentalmachinery must be impartial andnon-political in the sense of party politics. (See: Records of 1971 Constitutional Convention). Similar, Delegate LeandroP. Garcia, expressingfor the inclusion of government-ownedor controlledcorporations in the Civil Service, argued: It is meretricious to contend that because Government-ownedor controlled corporations yieldprofits, their employees are entitled to better wages andfringe benefits than employees of Government other thanGovernment-owned and controlled corporations which are not making profits. There is no gainsaying the fact that the capital theyuse is the people's money. (see: Records of the 1971 Constitutional Convention). Summarizing the deliberations of the 1971 Constitutional Conventionon the inclusion of Government-owned or controlled corporation Dean JoaquinG. Bernas, SJ., of the Ateneo de Manila UniversityProfessional School of Law, stated that government- owned corporations came under attackas g cows of a privilegedfew enjoying salaries far higher thantheir counterparts in the various branches ofgovernment, while the capital of these corporations belongs to the Government and government moneyis pumped into them whenever on the brinkof disaster, andtheyshould therefore come under the strict surveillance of the Civil Service System. (Bernas, The 1973 Philippine Constitution, Notes and Cases, 1974 ed., p. 524). Applyingthe pertinent provisions ofthe Constitution, the Labor Code as amended, and the Civil Service Decree as amendedandthe precedent inthe Alliance of Government Workers decision, it is clear that the petitioner National HousingCorporationcomesunder the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission, not the Ministry of Labor and Employment. This becomes more apparent if we consider the fact that the NHC performs governmental functions and not proprietary ones. The NHCwas organized for the governmental objectives stated i n its amended articles of incorporation as follows: SECOND:That the purpose for whichthe corporation is organized is to assist and carryout the coordinated massive housing program of the government, principallybut not limitedto low-cost housing with the integrationcooperation and assistance of all governmental agencies concerned, through the carrying on of any or all the following activities: l) The acquisition, development or reclamation of lands for the purpose of constructionandbuilding therein preferably low-cost housing so as to provide decent and durable dwelling for the greatest number of inhabitants in the country; 2) The promotionand development of physical social andeconomic communitygrowththroughthe establishment of general physical plans for urban, suburban and metropolitan areas to be characterized by efficient land use patterns; 3) The coordination and implementation of all projects of the government for the establishment ofnationwide and massive low cost housing; 4) The undertakingandconductingof research andtechnical studies of the development and promotion ofconstruction of houses and buildings of soundstandards of design liability, durability, safety, comfort and size for improvement of the architectural and engineering designs andutility of houses and buildings with the utilization ofnew and/or native materials economics in materialand construction, distribution, assembly and construction and of applying advanced housing and building technology. 5) Constructionandinstallationinthese projects of low-cost housing privatelyor cooperatively owned water and sewerage system or waste disposal facilities, and the formulations of a unified or officiallycoordinatedurban transportation system as a part of a comprehensive development plan in these areas. The petitioner points out that it was established as an instrumentality of the government to accomplish governmental policies andobjectives andextend essentialservices to the people. It wouldbe incongruous ifemployees discharging essentially governmental functions are not covered bythe same lawandrules which governthose performing other governmental functions. If government corporations dischargingproprietaryfunctions now belong to the civil service with more reason shouldthose performinggovernmental functions be governed by civil service law. The respondent NLRCcites a 1976 opinionof the Secretaryof Justice which holds that the phrase "government-owned or controlled corporations" in Section 1, Article XII-B of the Constitution contemplates onlythose government-ownedor controlled corporations created by special law. The opinionstates that since the Constitution provides for the organization or regulation of private corporations onlyby"general law", expressly excluding government-owned or controlled corporations, it follows that whenever the Constitution mentions government-owned or controlledcorporations, it must refer to those created byspecial law. P.D. No. 868 which repeals
- 64. 64 all charters, laws,decrees, rules, andprovisions exempting any branch, agency, subdivision, or instrumentalityof the government, including government- ownedor controlledcorporations from the civil service lawandrules is also cited to show that corporations not governed by special charters or laws are not to be brought within civil service coverage. The discussions in the Constitutional Convention are also mentioned. It appears that at the time the Convention discussedgovernment-ownedor controlledcorporations, allsuch corporations were organized only under special laws or charters. The fact that "private" corporations ownedor controlledbythe government may be created by specialcharter does not meanthat suchcorporations not created byspecial law are not covered bythe civil service. Nor does the decree repealing all charters and special laws granting exemption from the civil service law implythat government corporations not created by special law are exempt from civil service coverage. These charters andstatutes are the only laws granting such exemptionand, therefore, theyare the onlyones whichcould be repealed. There was no similar exempting provision inthe general law which called for repeal. And finally, the fact that the Constitutional Convention discussedonlycorporations created byspecial law or charter cannot be an argument to exclude petitioner NHCfrom civil service coverage. As statedinthe cited speech delivered during the conventionsessions of March9, 1972, all government corporations then in existence were organizedunder special laws or charters. The convention delegates could not possiblydiscuss government-ownedor controlledcorporations whichwere still non-existent or about whose existence they were unaware. SectionI ofArticle XII-B, Constitutionusesthe word "every" to modify the phrase "government- owned or controlled corporation." "Every" means eachone ofa group, without exception It means allpossible and all taken one by one. Of course, our decision inthis case refers to a corporation created as a government-ownedor controlledentity. It does not cover cases involvingprivate firms takenover bythe government in foreclosure or similar proceedings. We reserve judgment on these latter cases when the appropriate controversy is brought to this Court. The infirmityof the respondents' position lies inits permitting a circumventionor emasculation of Section 1, Article XII-B of the Constitution It would be possible for a regular ministry of government to create a host of subsidiarycorporations under the Corporation Code funded by a willing legislature. A government-ownedcorporation couldcreate severalsubsidiarycorporations. These subsidiarycorporations would enjoythe best of twoworlds. Their officials and employees wouldbe privileged individuals, free from the strict accountability required by the Civil Service Decree and the regulations of the CommissiononAudit. Their incomes would not be subject to the competitive restraints ofthe openmarket nor to the terms and conditions of civil service employment. Conceivably,all government-ownedor controlledcorporations couldbe created, no longer byspecial charters, but through incorporationunder the general law. The constitutional amendment including such corporations in the embrace of the civil service would cease to have application. Certainly, such a situation cannot be allowed to exist. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned decision of the respondent NationalLabor Relations Commission is SET ASIDE. The decisionof the Labor Arbiter dismissingthe case before it for lack of jurisdiction is REINSTATED. SO ORDERED. Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente and Cuevas, JJ., concur. Separate Opinions ABAD SANTOS, J., dissenting: It was I, as Secretaryof Justice, who issuedOpinionNo. 62, series of 1976, for the Commissioner of Civil Service whowantedto knowthe scope ofthe constitutionalprovisions onthe Civil Service in respect of government-ownedor controlledcorporations. Inresponse I opined, for the reasons stated therein, that only those corporations created by special law are contemplated. In the case at bar the National Housing Corporation was not created by special law; it was organizedpursuant to the CorpotationLaw — Act No. 1459 entitled, AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE FORMATION AND ORGANIZATION OF CORPORATIONS, DEFINING THEIR POWERS, FIXING THE DUTIES OF DIRECTORSAND OTHEROFFICERSTHEREOF, DECLARINGTHE RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF SHAREHOLDERS AND MEMBERS, PRESCRIBING THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH SUCH CORPORATIONS MAY TRANSACT BUSINESS. [Act No. 1459 has beenreplacedbyBatas Pambansa Blg. 68 known as The New CorporationCode.] In the fight of myopinion, the National Housing Corporationis not coveredbythe Civil Service provisions of the Constitution. Hence I dissent. Is the National Housing Corporation covered bythe Labor Code? I am not prepared to answer this question at this time. I dowishto emphasize that whether or not a corporation is "government- owned or controlled" depends upon the purpose of the inquiry. A corporation may be "government-owned or controlled" for one purpose but not for another. Inother words, it is not possible to broadly categorize a corporation as government-owned or controlled." It maybe asked, if the National Housing Corporation is not coveredbythe Civil Service should it not be covered insteadbythe Labor Code?Myanswer is, not necessarily. For it may well be that the National Housing Corporation is in limbo. The following corporations (the list is not exhaustive) appear to be "government-owned or controlled" not by virtue of foreclosure or similar proceedings: Human Settlements Development Corporation Nayon Filipino Foundation, Inc. Philippine Aero Space Development Corporation Philippine Associated Smelting and Refining Corporation Petrophil Corporation Petron TBA Corporation
- 65. 65 Philippine National OilCo. Food Terminal Inc. Republic Planters Bank QUARE:Is this Court readyto holdthat each and everyone of the above-named corporation is government-owned or controlled for Civil Service purposes? Separate Opinions ABAD SANTOS, J., dissenting: It was I, as Secretaryof Justice, who issuedOpinionNo. 62, series of 1976, for the Commissioner of Civil Service whowantedto knowthe scope ofthe constitutionalprovisions onthe Civil Service in respect of government-ownedor controlledcorporations. Inresponse I opined, for the reasons stated therein, that only those corporations created by special la w are contemplated. In the case at bar the National Housing Corporation was not created by special law; it was organizedpursuant to the CorpotationLaw — Act No. 1459 entitled, AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE FORMATION AND ORGANIZATION OF CORPORATIONS, DEFINING THEIR POWERS, FIXING THE DUTIES OF DIRECTORSAND OTHEROFFICERSTHEREOF, DECLARINGTHE RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF SHAREHOLDERS AND MEMBERS, PRESCRIBING THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH SUCH CORPORATIONS MAY TRANSACT BUSINESS. [Act No. 1459 has beenreplacedbyBa tas Pambansa Blg. 68 known as The New CorporationCode.] In the fight of myopinion, the National Housing Corporationis not coveredbythe Civil Service provisions of the Constitution. Hence I dissent. Is the National Housing Corporation covered bythe Labor Code? I am not prepared to answer this question at this time. I dowishto emphasize that whether or not a corporation is "government- owned or controlled" depends upon the purpose of the inquiry. A corporation may be "government-owned or controlled" for one purpose but not for another. Inother words, it is not possible to broadly categorize a corporation as government-owned or controlled." It maybe asked, if the National Housing Corporation is not coveredbythe Civil Service should it not be covered insteadbythe Labor Code?Myanswer is, not necessarily. For it may well be that the National Housing Corporation is in limbo. The following corporations (the list is not exhaustive) appear to be "government-owned or controlled" not by virtue of foreclosure or similar proceedings: Human Settlements Development Corporation Nayon Filipino Foundation, Inc. Philippine Aero Space Development Corporation Philippine Associated Smelting and Refining Corporation Petrophil Corporation Petron TBA Corporation Philippine National Oil Co. Food Terminal Inc. Republic Planters Bank QUARE:Is this Court readyto holdthat each and everyone of the above-named corporation is government-owned or controlled for Civil Service purposes? THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. VICTOR SANTO NIÑO, Defendant-Appellee. D E C I S I O N WILLARD, J.: Act No. 1780 is entitled as follows: chanrobles virtualawlibrary “An Act to regulate the importation, acquisition, possession, use, andtransfer of firearms, andto prohibit the possession of same except in compliance with the provisions of this Act. ” Section 26 of this Act is in part as follows: chanrobles virtualawlibrary “It shall be unlawful for anypersonto carryconcealedabout hispersonanybowie knife, dirk, dagger, kris, or other deadlyweapon: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary Provided, That this prohibitionshall not applyto firearms inpossessionof persons whohave secured a license therefor or whoare entitled to carry same under the provisions of this Act. ” The amended complaint in this case is as follows: chanrobles virtualawlibrary “The undersigned accuses Victor SantoNinoof the violationof Act No. 1780, committed as follows: chanrobles virtualawlibrary “That on or about the 16th dayof August, 1908, in the cityof Manila, Philippine Islands, the said Victor SantoNino, voluntarily, unlawfully, andcriminally, hadinhispossession and concealed about his person a deadly weapon, to wit: chanrobles virtualawlibraryOne (1) ironbar, about 15 inchesinlength providedwith aniron ball on one endanda string onthe other to tie to the wrist, whichweaponhadbeen designed and made for use in fighting, and as a deadly weapon. “With violation of the provisions of section 26 of Act No. 1780 of the Philippine Commission. ” A demurrer to this complaint wassustainedin the court below the Government has appealed. The basis for the holding of the court below was that —
- 66. 66 “The words orother deadlyweapon’ onlysignifya kindof weaponincluded within the preceding classification. In other words, the rule of ejusdemgenerismust be applied in the interpretationof this law, which rule is as follows: chanrobles virtualawlibrary “‘The most frequent application of this rule is found where specific and generic terms of the same nature are employedinthe same act, the latter following the former. While inthe abstract, general terms are to be given their natural and full signification, yet where theyfollow specific words of a like nature they take their meaningfrom the latter, andare presumedto embrace only things or persons of the kind designated by them. ’“ In short, the court below heldthat the carrying of a revolver concealedabout the person would not be a violationof thisAct. The rule of constructionabove referred to is resortedto only for the purpose of determiningwhat the intent of the legislature was in enacting the law. If that intent clearlyappears fromother parts of the law, andsuchintent thus clearlymanifested is contrary to the result which would reachedbyapplicationof the rule of ejusdem generis, the latter must give way. In this case the provisoof the Act clearlyindicates that in the view of the legislature the carrying of anunlicensedrevolver wouldbe a violation ofthe Act. Bythe proviso it manifested its intention to include inthe prohibitionweapons other thanthe armas blancas therein specified. The judgment of the court below is reversed,and the case is remanded for further proceedings. No costs will be allowed to either party in this court. SO ORDERED. Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Johnson and Carson, JJ., concur. ALU-TUCP vs. NLRC and NSC [G.R. No. 109902. August 02, 1994] FACTS: Petitioners, as employees of private respondent National Steel Corporation (NSC), filed separate complaints for unfair labor practice, regularization and monetarybenefits with the NLRC, Sub-Regional ArbitrationBranchXII, IliganCity. The complaints were consolidatedandafter hearing, the Labor Arbiter declaredpetitioners “regular project employeeswhoshall continue their employment as such for as longas such [project]activityexists,” but entitled to the salaryof a regular employee pursuant to the provisions inthe collective bargainingagreement. It also orderedpayment of salarydifferentials. The NLRCin its questionedresolutions modified the Labor Arbiter’s decision. It affirmedthe Labor Arbiter’s holdingthat petitioners were project employees since theywere hiredto performwork in a specific undertaking— the Five Years Expansion Program, the completionof whichhadbeen determinedat the time of their engagement and whichoperationwas not directlyrelatedto the business ofsteel manufacturing. The NLRC, however, set aside the award to petitioners ofthe same benefits enjoyedbyregular employees for lack oflegal andfactual basis. The law onthe matter is Article 280 of the Labor Code, where the petitioners argue that theyare “regular” employees ofNSCbecause:(i)their jobs are “necessary, desirable andwork-relatedto private respondent’s mainbusiness, steel-making”;and(ii) theyhave renderedservice for six (6) or more years to private respondent NSC. ISSUE:Whether or not petitioners are considered “permanent employees” as opposed to being only“project employees” of NSC. HELD:NO. Petitionfor Certiorari dismissed for lackof merit. NLRCResolutions affirmed. RATIO: Functionof the proviso. Petitioners are not considered“permanent employees”. However, contraryto petitioners’ apprehensions, the designation ofnamedemployees as “project employees” andtheir assignment to a specific project are effected and implementedin goodfaith, and not merelyas a means of evading otherwise applicable requirements oflabor laws. On the claim that petitioners’ service to NSCof more than six (6) years shouldqualifythem as “regular employees”, the Supreme Court believedthis claimis without legalbasis. The simple fact that the employment of petitioners as project employeeshadgone beyond one (1) year, does not detract from, or legallydissolve, their status as “project employees”. The secondparagraphof Article 280 of the Labor Code, quotedabove, providing that anemployee whohas servedfor at least one (1) year, shall be considereda regular employee, relatesto casualemployees, not to project employees. G.R. No. L-34024 April 5, 1978
- 67. 67 ISIDRO G. ARENAS,petitioner, vs. CITY OF SAN CARLOS (PANGASINAN), CITY COUNCIL OF SAN CARLOS CITY, JUAN C. LOMIBAO, BENJAMIN POSADAS, DOUGLAS D.SORIANO, BASILIO BULATAO, CATALINA B. CAGAMPAN, EUGENIO RAMOS, FRANCISCO CANCINO, ALFREDO VINLUAN, MARCELO LAPEÑA, LEOPOLDO C. TULAGAN and TORIBIO PAULINO, in their official capacities as City Mayor, City Vice Mayor, City Councilors and City Treasurer, respectively, and Honorable Presiding Judge, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF SAN CARLOS CITY (PANGASINAN), BRANCH X, respondents. Daniel C. Macaraeg and Alfredo P. Arenas for petitioner. Abelardo P. Fermin & Antonio Ruiz for respondents. FERNANDEZ, J.: This is a petitionfor certiorari to review the decisionof the Court of First Instance of Pangasinanat San Carlos City, Branch X, dismissingthe petition for mandamus inCivil Case No. SCC-182. 1 In January1971, Isidro G. Arenas, a CityJudge of SanCarlos City(Pangasinan), instituted against the Cityof San Carlos (Pangasinan), CityCouncil of SanCarlos Cityandthe Mayor, Vice-Mayor, City Councilors andCityTreasurer of SanCarlos City, a petitionfor mandamus inthe Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. The petitionallegedthat the petitioner, IsidroG. Arenas, is the incumbent CityJudge of SanCarlos City(Pangasinan, that the respondent Cityof San Carlos, from the time of its creationin1966 up to the present, has beenclassifiedas a thirdclass city;that Republic Act No. 5967 whichbecame effective onJune 21, 1969 provides that the basic salaries of cityjudgesof secondandthird class cities shallbe P18,000.00 per annum;that the petitioner was thenactuallyreceiving a monthly salaryof P1,000.00 of whichP350.00 was the share of the nationalgovernment andP650.00 is the share of the citygovernment, which salarywas P500.00 below the basic monthlysalaryof a City Judge of a third classcity;that under Republic Act No. 5967, the difference betweenthe salary actuallybeing receivedbya CityJudge andthe basic salaryestablishedin saidact shallbe paidby the citygovernment;that fromJune 21, 1969 up to the filingof the petitionon January21, 1971, the petitioner was entitledto a salarydifferential of P9,500.00 withthe respondent Cityof San Carlos (Pangasinan);that the petitioner hadrepeatedlyrequestedthe respondents to enact the necessarybudget andto payhimthe saiddifferential but the respondents, without any justification, whatsoever, refusedandstill refuse to do the same; that it is the clear dutyof the respondent to enact the necessarybudget providingfor the payment of the salaryof the petitioner as providedfor in Republic Act No. 5967;that petitioner has noother plain, adequate and speedyremedyexcept the present actionfor mandamus;and that because of the refusal of the respondent to complywiththeir obligation as providedinRepublic Act No. 5967, the petitioner was forced to engage the services of a lawyer to file thisactionfor which he was to pay the sum ofP2,000.00 as attorney's fees. 2 In their answer dated February10, 1971, the respondents admittedanddenied the allegations in the petitionand allegedthat Republic Act No. 5967 further provides, among other things, that the salaryof the cityjudge shall at least be one hundredpesos per monthlessthanthat of a city mayor;that the cityjudge receives an annual salaryof P12,000.00 which is P100.00 per monthless than the salarybeingreceived bythe citymayor whichis P13,200.00 yea rly;that assumingthe existence of a salarydifference, in viewof the provision ofRepublic Act No. 5967, that the payment of the salarydifference shall be subject to the implementationof the respective city government, which is discretionaryon the part of the citygovernment as to whether it would or wouldnot implement the payment ofthe salarydifference, andinview ofthe financial difficulties of the citywhich hasa big overdraft, the payment ofthe salarydifference of the cityjudge cannot be made; andthat the petitioner should payhis lawyer and shouldnot charge the attorney's fees to the respondents whohave not violated anyrights of the petitioner. 3 The Court of First Instance ofSan Carlos City(Pangasinan), BranchX, renderedits decisiondated May31, 1971 dismissingthe petition, without pronouncement as to costs. The pertinent portion ofSection7, Republic Act No. 5967 reads: Sec. 7. Unlessthe CityCharter or anyspecial lawprovides higher salary, the cityjudge incharteredcitiesshallreceive a basic salarywhichshall not be lower thanthe sums as providedthereinbelow: xxx xxx xxx (c) For second and third class cities, eighteenthousandpesos per annum; xxx xxx xxx For the cities of Baguio, Quezon, Pasayandother first class cities, the city judge shall receive one thousandpesos less thanthat fixedfor the district judge, andfor secondand third class cities, the cityjudge shallreceive one thousandfive hundredpesos less than that fixedfor the district judge, andfor other cities, the cityjudge shall receive twothousandpesos less than that fixed for the district judge: Provided, however, That the salaryof a cityjudge shallbe at least one hundredpesos per month lessthan that of the citymayor. The petitioner contends that "... if the last provisoof saidSection7 of Republic Act No. 5967 wouldbe interpretedas the controllingmeasure for fixing the salaryof the cityjudges, thenthe principal provisionof Section7 fixingthe salaries ofCityJudges at rate very much higher thanthat of a CityMayor (particularlyinthe case of secondandthird classcities) wouldbe renderedtotally useless." The petitioner submitted"that since the principal intentionof the legislature inenacting Section7 of Republic Act 5967 is to increase the salaryof the cityjudges, then the last provisoof said Section7 shouldgive wayto the provisions of saidsectionpreceding saidproviso." The record shows that whenRepublic Act No. 5967 took effect on June 21, 1969, San Carlos City (Pangasinan) was a thirdclass city;that the petitioner as cityjudge received anannualsalaryof
- 68. 68 P12,000.00; and thatthe citymayor of SanCarlos Cityreceived anannual salaryof P13,200.00 which was exactlyP100.00 a month more than the salaryof the cityjudge. During the deliberation in the Senate onHouse Bill No. 17046, which became Republic Act No. 5967, the followingdiscussiontook place: SENATOR GANZON — Because with the bill as drafted, I recall that there will be some cities where the city judges willreceive salaries higher than those of the mayors. Andinall charters, Your Honor, the cityjudge is considereda department head — theoretically, at least, under the mayor. It wouldnot be fair for the purposes ofpublic administrationthat a citydepartment head should receive a salaryhigher than that of the chief executive of the city. SENATOR LAUREL. That point is verywell taken, andI wouldlike to congratulate Your Honor. SENATOR LAUREL. No. Mr. President, I understandthe concernof the distinguishedgentlemanfromDavao. But inthis particular amendment preparedbythe distinguishedladyfromLa Union, this will not require the council to payit at P100.00 exactlyless thanthe salaryof the mayor. It is just the limit — the maximum — but theymayfix it at much less than that. That is whythe words "at least" were suggested bythe Committee. It need not be exactlyjust P100.00 less. It maybe P500.00 less. SENATOR ALMENDRAS. Your Honor, take for example the citiesof Iloilo, Cebu, Bacolodor Manila for that matter. The Mayors are receivingat least P1,500 a month. Now, under the amendment of the ladyfromLa Union, Nueva Ecija and Davao — whichhasalreadybeen accepted bythe sponsor — doesit mean that if the salaryof the citymayor is P1,500, the cityjudgeswill receive P1,400? xxx xxx xxx SENATOR ANTONINO — I wouldlike to call his attentionto lines 13 to 20. We presented thisamendment because it says here:"For the citiesof Baguio, Quezon, Pasayandother first class cities, the cityjudge shallreceive one thousandpesos less than that fixedfor the district judge". So it will happen, and myattentionwas calledbythe gentlemenfrom Iloilo — that the cityjudge win be receivingmore salarythan the citymayor. Hence the amendment, Mr. President. xxx xxx xxx I conferred withthe gentlemenfrom Iloilo and Batangas, andthiswas their objection. We have proposed this amendment to at least solve this problem, so that no cityjudge will be receiving more than the city mayor. So theywill be receiving less than what is proposedinthis Bill. (Vol. IV, No. 61, Senate Congressional Records, pages 2773-2787. (Emphasissupplied .) 4 It is clear from the deliberationof the Senate that the intention ofCongressinenacting Republic Act No. 5967 was that the salaryof a cityjudge shouldnot be higher than the salaryof the city mayor. The savingclause "Provided, however, That the salaryof a cityjudge shall be at least P100.00 per month less thanthat of the citymayor" qualifies the earlier provisionwhichfixes the salaryof cityjudges for secondandthirdclass cities at P18,000.00 per annum. The primarypurpose of a proviso is to limit the general language of a statute. When there is irreconcilable repugnancybetweenthe proviso and the bodyof the statute the former is given precedence over the latter on the groundthat it is the latest expressionof the intent ofthe legislature. Inasmuchas the citymayor of SanCarlos City(Pangasinan) was receivinganannual salaryof P13,200.00, the respondents cannot be compelledto provide for an annual salaryof P18,000.00 for the petitioner as cityjudge ofthe saidcity. WHEREFORE, the petitionfor review is herebydismissed and the decision appealedfrom is affirmed, without pronouncement as to cost. SO ORDERED. Teehankee, (Chairman) Makasiar, Muñoz Palma and Guerrero, JJ., concur. TOLENTINO VS SECRETARY Tolentino et al is questioning the constitutionalityof RA 7716 otherwise knownas the Expanded Value AddedTax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino averredthat thisrevenue bill did not exclusivelyoriginate from the House of Representatives as requiredbySection24, Article 6 of the Constitution. Even though RA 7716 originatedas HB 11197 andthat it passed the 3 readings in the HoR, the same did not complete the 3 readings inSenate for after the 1st reading it wasreferredto the Senate Ways & Means Committee thereafter Senate passed its ownversionknownas Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averredthat what Senate couldhave done is amend HB11197 by striking out its text and substituting it w/ the text of SB 1630 in that way“the bill remains a House Bill and the Senate version just becomes the text (onlythe text) ofthe HB”. Tolentino and co-petitioner Roco [however] even signedthe saidSenate Bill. ISSUE: Whether or not EVAT originated in the HoR.
- 69. 69 HELD: Bya 9-6 vote,the SCrejectedthe challenge, holdingthat suchconsolidation wasconsistent with the power of the Senate to propose or concur withamendments to the version originated in the HoR. What the Constitutionsimplymeans, accordingto the 9 justices, is that the initiative must come from the HoR. Note also that there were severalinstances before where Senate passed its own version rather than having the HoR version as far as revenue and other such bills are concerned. This practice of amendment by substitution has always been accepted. The propositionof Tolentinoconcerns a mere matter of form. There is noshowingthat it would make a significant difference if Senate were to adopt his over what has been done. Dra. Brigida Buenaseda et. al. vs.Sec. Juan Flavieret. al.[G.R. No. 106719. September 21, 1993 Ponente:QUIASON, J. FACTS: The petitionfor Certiorari, Prohibitionand Mandamus, with Prayer for PreliminaryInjunction or TemporaryRestrainingOrder, under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules ofCourt, seeks to nullifythe Order of the Ombudsmandirecting the preventive suspension ofpetitioners Dr. Brigida S. Buenaseda et.al. The questionedorder was issuedinconnectionwith the administrative complaint filedwiththe Ombudsman(OBM-ADM-0-91-0151) bythe private respondents against the petitioners for violationof the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The Supreme Court required respondent Secretaryto complywiththe aforestatedstatus quo order. The Solicitor General, in his comment, statedthat (a)“The authorityof the Ombudsmanis onlyto recommendsuspension and he has nodirect power to suspend;” and(b)“Assuming the Ombudsman has the power to directlysuspenda government official or employee, there are conditions required bylaw for the exercise of such powers;[and] saidconditions have not been met inthe instant case” ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to suspend government officials andemployees workinginoffices other than the Office of the Ombudsman, pending the investigationof the administrative complaints filed against said officials andemployees. HELD: YES. Petitionwas dismissed, status quo liftedand set aside. RATIO: When the constitutionvestedonthe Ombudsmanthe power “to recommendthe suspension” of a public official or employees (Sec. 13 [3]), it referredto “suspension,” as a punitive measure. All the words associatedwith the word “suspension” in saidprovision referred to penalties in administrative cases, e.g. removal, demotion, fine, censure. Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, the word “suspension” shouldbe given the same sense as the other words with which it is associated. Where a particular word is equallysusceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made specific byconsideringthe companyof terms inwhichit is foundor withwhich it is associated. Section24 of R.A. No. 6770, whichgrants the Ombudsmanthe power to preventivelysuspend public officials and employees facingadministrative charges before him, is a procedural, not a penal statute. The preventive suspension is imposedafter compliance with the requisitestherein set forth, as anaidinthe investigation ofthe administrative charges. People vs. MagallanesG.R. Nos. 118013-14 October 11, 1995FACTS: In the eveningof August 7, 1992, the SpousesDumancas, under the directionandcooperation of P/Col. Nicolas Torres whotook advantage of his positionas station commander of the PNP, with Poli ce Inspector Abeto’s cooperation, inducedother police officers, namely:Canuday, Pahayupan, Lamis, civilian agents: Fernandez,Divinagracia, Delgadoand Gargallano, to abduct kidnapanddetain, Rufino Gargar and DaniloLumangyao, with theuse ofa motor vehicle and then shot and killed the victims with evident premeditation, treacheryandnocturnity.The other accused secretlyburiedthe victims in a makeshift shallowgrave to conceal the crime of murder for a feeof P500.00 each.The cases were consolidated and the accused pleaded not guilty and filed motions for bail. Theprosecution presented Moises Grandeza, the allegedlone eyewitness and co-conspirator inthe offense. After theprosecution restedits case, the trial court receivedevidence for the accused, but the reception of evidence wassuspendedbecause of the motions for inhibition ofjudge Garvilles filedbyseveral accused. Garvilles voluntarilyinhibited himself and the case was re -raffled. However, the prosecutionmoved for the transmittal of the recors tothe Sandiganbayanbecause the offenses chargedwere committedinrelation to the office of the accused PNPofficers. The trial court ruled that the Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdictionbecause the informations donotstate that the
- 70. 70 offenseswere committedinrelation tothe office of the accused PNP officers and denied the Motionfor the Transfer of Records to Sandiganbayan. The prosecution moved to reconsider but the same was denied.The reception of evidence was resumed but the judge later inhibited himself. The cases were thenre-raffledto Branch49 of tne Regional Trial Court of Bacolod. The prosecutionfileda petitionfor certiorari,prohibitionandmandamus with a prayer for a temporary restraining order, challengingthe refusalof the judge totransfer the cases to the Sandiganbayan. The private respondents were required to comment on the petition andissued a temporary restraining order enjoiningthe respondent judge to desist from proceeding with the trial of thecase. ISSUE: Whether the offenses were committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers HELD: The jurisdiction of a court may be determined by the law in force at the time of the commencement of theaction. When the informations inthe cases were filed, the law governing the jurisdictionof the Sandiganbayan wasP.D. 1861 , which providesthat the Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over cases involving:1)violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act;2) offenses committed bypublic officers inrelationto theiroffice, where the penalty prescribed is higher thanprision correccional or imprisonment of six (6) years, or a fine of P 6,000.00.If the penaltyfor the offense charged does not exceedimprisonment of six (6) years or a fine ofP6,000.00, it shallbe triedbythe Regional Trial Court, MetropolitanTrial Court, Municipal Trial Court or theMunicipal Circuit Trial Court.Jurisdictionis also determinedbythe allegations in the complaint or informationandnot bythe result of the evidence after the trial. In the present case, the Sandiganbayan has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the cases. The allegations inthe complaint or informationof “takingadvantage of his position” is not sufficient to bringthe offenses withinthe definitionof “offenses committedin relation to public office.” It is considered merely as an aggravating circumstance.Moreover, the Sandiganbayan haspartlylost its jurisdiction over cases involving violations ofR.A. 3019, as amended inR.A. 1379 because it onlyretains jurisdiction on cases enumerated in subsection (a) when the public officers rank i s classifiedas Grade “27” or higher. In the case at bar, none of the PNPofficers involved occupy a position classified as Grade “27” or higher. Accused Torres, who is highe st in rank among the accused, only has a rank classified as Grade “18”. Lastly, the courts cannot be divested of jurisdiction which was already acquired before the subsequent enactment of R.A. 7975 which limited the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdictionto officers whose rank is Grade “27” or higher, be4cause the courts retainits jurisdictionuntilthe end oflitigation. Hence, cases already under the jurisdictionof the courts at the time of the enactment of R.A. 7975 are onlyreferred to the proper courts if trial hasnot yet begunat that time. Petition is DENIED and the challenged orders are AFFIRMED Republic vs Migrino Vera vs Cuevas People vs Echaves ExpressioUnius Est ExclusioAlterius -express mention ofone person, thing, act or consequence excludes all others San Pablo Manufacturing Co. vs Commission of Internal Revenue Noscitor a Sociis -where a particular wordis equallysusceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made specific byconsideringthe company of terms in which it i s found or with which it is associated Colgate-Palmolive Phils. Inc. vs. Hon. Gimenez [G.R. No. L-14787 January28 1961 Ponente:GUTIERREZ DAVID, J. FACTS: The petitioner Colgate-Palmolive Philippines importedfrom abroadvarious materials such as irish moss extract, sodium benzoate, sodium saccharinate precipitatedcalciumcarbonate and dicalciumphosphate, for use as stabilizers andflavoring of the dentalcream it manufactures. For everyimportationmade of these materials, the petitioner paidto the CentralBankof the Philippines the 17% special excise tax onthe foreign exchange used for the payment ofthe cost, transportationandother charges incident thereto, pursuant to Republic Act No. 601, as amended, commonlyknownas the Exchange Tax Law. The petitioner filedwith the Central Bankthree applications for refundof the 17% specialexcise tax it hadpaid. The auditor of the Central Bank,
- 71. 71 refusedto passinaudit itsclaims for refundfixedbythe Officer-in-Charge ofthe Exchange Tax Administration, onthe theorythat toothpaste stabilizers and flavors are not exempt under section 2 of the Exchange Tax Law. Petitioner appealedto the Auditor General, but the latter affirmed the rulingof the auditor of the Central Bank, maintaining that the term “stabilizer andflavors” mentioned in section2 of the Exchange Tax Law refers onlyto those used in the preparationor manufacture of foodor food products. Not satisfied, the petitioner brought the case to the Supreme Court thru the present petitionfor review. ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign exchange used bypetitioner for the importationof dental cream stabilizers and flavors is exempt from the 17% special excise tax imposedbythe Exchange Tax Law (Republic Act No. 601). HELD: YES. The decisionunder reviewwas reversed. RATIO: General and special terms. The ruling of the Auditor General that the term “stabilizer and flavors” as usedinthe law refers onlyto those materialsactuallyusedin the preparationor manufacture of food andfood products is based, apparently, onthe principle ofstatutoryconstructionthat “general terms may be restricted by specific words, with the result that the general language will be limited bythe specific language which indicates the statute’s object and purpose.” The rule, however, is applicable onlyto cases where, except for one generalterm, all the items inan enumeration belong to or fallunder one specific class (ejusdem generis). Inthe case at bar, it is true that the term “stabilizer and flavors” is precededbya number of articles that maybe classifiedas foodor food products, but it is likewise true that the other items immediately following it donot belongto the same classification. The rule of constructionthat general andunlimited terms are restrained andlimitedbyparticular recitalswhenusedinconnectionwiththem, does not require the rejectionof general terms entirely. It is intendedmerelyas an aidinascertaining the intentionof the legislature and is to be taken inconnectionwithother rules of construction. RomanCatholic Archbishop ofManila vSocial SecurityCommision RomanCatholic Archbishop ofManila vs. SocialSecurityCommission Case No. 263 G.R. No. L-15045 (January20, 1961) Chapter V, Page 221, Footnote No.175 FACTS: Petitioner filed withRespondent Commission a request that “Catholic Charities, andall religious and charitable institutions and/or organizations, whichare directlyor indirectly, whollyor partially, operatedbythe RomanArchbishopof Manila” be exemptedfromcompulsorycoverage of RA 1161, otherwise knownas the Social SecurityLaw of1954. Petitioner contends that the term “employer” as defined inthe law should— following the principle of ejusdem generis--- be limited to those who carryon “undertakings or activities which have the element ofprofit or gain, or which are pursuedfor profit or gain,” because the phrase “activityof anykind” in the definitionis precededbythe words “anytrade, business, industry, undertaking. ISSUE: W/N the rule of ejusdemgeneriscanbe appliedinthiscase. HELD: No. The rule of ejusdem generisapplies onlywhere there is uncertainty. It is not controlling where the plainpurpose and intent of the Legislature wouldtherebybe hinderedanddefeated. The definitionof the term“employer” is sufficientlycomprehensive as to include religious and charitable institutions or entities not organizedfor profit. This is made more evident bythe fact that it contains anexceptionin which said institutions or entities are not included. G.R. No. L-55130 January 17, 1983 PEDRO SANTOS TO, petitioner, vs.
- 72. 72 HON. ERNANICRUZ-PAÑO, PresidingJudge, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch XVIII, and JUAN Y. OCAMPO, respondents. Dakila F. Castro & Associates for petitioner. Abundio J. Macarañas for private respondent. DE CASTRO, J.: Petitioner was convictedbyrespondent judge ofthe Court of First Instance of Rizal (QuezonCity Branch) of the crime of estafa for having issueda bouncing checkfor P5,000.00, and sentencedto an indeterminate penaltyof fromsevenyears andeight months of prision mayor as minimum,to nine years andfour months of prision mayor, as maximum. 1 He appealedto the Court of Appeals which reducedthe penaltyto one year and one dayof prision correccional as minimum, to one year andeight months as maximum. 2 Upon the Court of Appeals'decisionbecoming final, petitioner not having appealedtherefrom, he fileda petitionfor probation 3 withrespondent judge, who, despite the favorable recommendation ofthe ProbationOffice, deniedthe petitionon July24, 1980, on the following grounds: (a) to grant probation to petitioner will depreciate the seriousness of the offense committed, and (b) petitioner is not a penitent offender. A motionfor reconsideration filed bypetitioner havingbeen deniedbythe respondent judge, the present proceeding was resortedto, petitioner averring that the respondent judge erred in denying hispetitionfor probationdespite the recommendationfor its approval bythe Probation Office. We findfor the petitioner. At the outset, it might be statedthat the Solicitor General whose comment was requiredbythis Court, recommends the grantingof probation. As he points out, petitioner is not amongthe offenders enumeratedinthe probationlaw (Presidential Decree No. 968) from availing of the benefits ofprobation. Under Section9 of saidlaw, the disqualifiedoffenders are the following: (a) those sentencedto serve a maximumterm of imprisonment of more than six years; (b) those convicted ofanyoffense against the securityof the State; (c) those whohave previouslybeen convicted byfinal judgment of anoffense punishedbyimprisonment of not less thanone month and one dayand/or a fine ofnot less than twohundred pesos; (d) those who have beenonce on probation under the provisions of the decree; and (e) those whowere alreadyservingsentence at the time the substantive provisions ofthe decree became applicable, pursuant to Section33. Under the abovequotedprovision, petitioner maynot be disqualifiedfrom being entitledto the benefits ofprobation. Some other provisions have to be sought, if any, uponwhichto deny petitioner the benefits of probation which, from a reading of the law inits entirety, shouldwith liberality, rather thanundue strictness, be extended to anyone not listedas disqualified. In expresslyenumerating offenders not qualifiedto enjoythe benefits of probation, the clear intent is to allowsaid benefits to those not includedinthe enumeration. If onlyfor the above observationas to how the lawshouldbe applied inorder that its objective could be realizedandachieved, We cannot but findrespondent judge's reasons for his denial of the petitionfor probationinsufficient to justifya deviation froma policyof liberalitywith which the lawshould be applied. The first reasongivenbythe judge is that "probationwindepreciate the seriousness of the offense committed." Accordingto him, the State has shownserious concern withthe above of checks as a commercial paper, as shownbyvarious measures takento curb the pernicious practice of issuing bouncing checks. For purpose of probation, what the law gives more importance to is the offender, not the crime. The inquiryis more onwhether probationwill helpthe offender along the lines for whichthe probationsystemhas beenestablished, such as giving the first-time offender a secondchance to maintainhis place insocietythrougha processof reformation, which is better achieved, at least as to one who has not committeda veryserious offense, whenhe is not mixedwithhardened criminals in anatmosphere not conducive to soul-searchingas within prisonwalls. The consciousnessof the State's benignityingiving him that secondchance to continue inpeaceful and cordial associationwith hisfellowmenwilladvance, rather thanretard, the process of reformationinhim. If, therefore, reformationis what the lawis more, ifnot solely, concerned with, not the prevention bymeans ofpunitive measures, of the commission ofthe offense, it is readilyseen that the respondent judge has fallen into a wrong obsession. He would, in effect, disqualifyallthose who commit estafa through bouncing cheeks fromenjoying the benefits of probation. He would therebyaddto the crimesexpresslymentioned inthe lawwhichare not subject to probation. Thus, the onlycrimes mentionedin the law basedon the nature thereof are those against national security(Section 9, paragraphb), the other crimes beingthose punishedbymore thansix years imprisonment. Respondent judge wouldthus be writingintothe lawa newgroundfor disqualifyinga first-offender from the benefits of probation, basedon the nature of the crime, not on the penaltyimposed as is the maincriterionlaid downbythe lawindeterminingwhomaybe
- 73. 73 grantedprobation. That crimewouldbe estafa onlybyissuing bouncingcheck, but not all forms of estafa, which, incidentally, is one offense the criminal liabilityfor which is generallyseparatedbya thin line frommere civil liability. For those whowouldcommit the offense a secondtime or oftener, or commit anoffense of manifest gravity, it is the long prisonterm which must be servedthat will act as deterrent to protect society. In protectingsociety, the familyof the offender which might be dependent or the latter to a greater or lesser extent for support or other necessitiesof life shouldnot be lost sight of, it beingthe basic unit ofthat society. Bythe relative lightnessof the offense, as measuredby the penaltyimposed, more thanbyits nature, as the law so ordains, the offender is not such a serious menace to societyas to be wrestedawaytherefrom, as the more dangerous type of criminals shouldbe. The second reasonof respondent judge for denying petition petitioner's bidfor probation, is that petitioner is allegedlynot a penitent offender, as shownbyhis protestation of innocence even after his convictionbythe trial court and the affirmance of his convictionbythe Court ofAppeals. We findthe respondent judge, likewise, in error inassuming that petitioner hasnot shown repentance in committingthe crime ofwhichhe has beenfound guiltybyboththe trial and appellate courts. Ifpetitioner appealed the decisionof the respondent judge to the Court of Appeals, he cannot be blamed for insistingon his versionbywhich he couldhope either to be acquitted or at least givena lighter penaltythat wouldentitle him to the benefits of probation.1äwphï1.ñët The recourse he tookhas, indeed, provedto be wellworththe effort. His penaltywas reducedonappeal which placed him withinthe benign purpose of the ProbationLaw. By the move he took bywhichto achieve this objective, acquittal not quite being withinreach, petitioner cannot be saidto be a non-penitent offender, under serving ofprobationbenefits. Once the opportunitywas laidopento him, he graspedit;for insteadof appealing further to the Supreme Court, he promptlyappliedfor probation, made possible onlybythe reducedpenalty imposedbythe Court of Appeals. The penaltyimposedbyrespondent court placedpetitioner beyond the pale of the ProbationLaw. How canhe be saidto be a non-penitent offender, as the law wouldjudge one to be so, just because he appealed, as he couldnot have them appliedfor probationeven if he wantedto? Whoknows but that if the penaltyimposedbythe trial court is that imposed bythe Court of Appealspetitioner would have applied for probation forthwith? Under the circumstances as just pointedout, We find nosufficient justificationfor respondent judge's holding petitioner to be a non-penitent offender. We find, instead, that the liberalitywith which the ProbationLaw shouldbe appliedinfavor of the applicant for its benefits affords the better means ofachieving the purpose ofthe law, as indicatedinOur decisioninthe case of Balleta Jr. vs. Hon. Leviste, G.R. No. L-49907, August 21, 1979, 92 SCRA 719, cited bythe Solicitor-General who, as earlier stated, recommends granting of the instant petitionfor probation. WHEREFORE, the order of the respondent judge denying probationis set aside, andpetitioner is herebydeclared admitted to probation, subject to the terms andconditions as are prescribedby the law, andrecommended bythe probationofficer. Makasiar (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero and Abad Santos, JJ., concur. Aquino and Escolin, JJ., concur in the result. Samson v. CA [Nov. 25, 1986] 24SEP Samsonv. Court of Appeals Fact: AO No. 3, issuedbyMayor Samsonof CaloocanCity, summarilyterminatedthe servicesof respondent Talens whoheldposition ofAsst. Sec. to the Mayor on the ground of“lackandloss of confidence” andappointing Liwag to the position. RA No. 2260 declares the positionof secretaries to citymayors non-competitive andthis was interpretedbyMayor Samsonas to include the position ofAsst. Sec. to the Mayor. Issue: Legalityof Administrative Order No. 3 Held: Secretaryto the Mayor andAsst. Secretaryto the Mayor are two separate anddistinct positions. One is of higher categoryandrank than the other. The functions strictlyattributable to a “secretary,” is not automaticallyvestedor transferredto an“assistant secretary,” because the latter simplyassists or aids the former inthe accomplishment of hisduties. CATU VS RELLOSA FACTS: Petitioner initiated a complaint against Elizabeth Catu and Antonio Pastor who were occupyingone ofthe units ina building in Malate which was owned by the former. The said complaint was filedin the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay 723, Zone 79 of the 5th District of Manila where respondent was the punong barangay. The parties, having been summoned for conciliationproceedings and failing to arrive at an amicable settlement, were issued by the respondent a certificationfor the filing ofthe appropriate actionincourt. Petitioner, thus, filed a complaint for ejectment against ElizabethandPastor inthe Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila where respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants. Because of this, petitioner filed the instant administrative complaint against the respondent onthe groundthat he
- 74. 74 committed anact ofimproprietyas a lawyer andas a public officer whenhe stoodas counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he presidedover the conciliationproceedings between the litigants as punong barangay. In hisdefense, respondent claimed that as punong barangay, he performed his task without bias andthat he accededto Elizabeth’s request to handle the case for free as she wasfinanciallydistressed. The complaint was thenreferredto the IntegratedBar of the Philippines (IBP) where after evaluation, theyfoundsufficient groundto discipline respondent. According to them, respondent violatedRule 6.03 of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility and, as anelective official, the prohibitionunder Section 7(b) (2) of RA 6713. Consequently, for the violationof the latter prohibition, respondent committeda breachof Canon1. Consequently, for the violationof the latter prohibition, respondent was thenrecommendedsuspension from the practice of law for one monthwith a stern warningthat the commissionof the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. ISSUE:Whether or not the foregoing findings regarding the transgressionof respondent as well as the recommendation on the imposable penalty of the respondent were proper. HELD:No. First, respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rul e 6.03 the Code of Professional Responsibilityas this applies onlyto a lawyer whohas left government service and in connectionto former government lawyers who are prohibited from accepting employment in connectionwithanymatter inwhich [they] had intervened while in their service. In the case at bar, respondent was anincumbent punongbarangay. Apparently, he does not fall within the purview of the said provision. Second, it is not Section90 of RA 7160 but Section7(b)(2) of RA 6713 whichgoverns the practice of professionof elective local government officials. While RA 6713 generallyapplies to all public officialsand employees, RA 7160, being a special law, constitutes an exception to RA 6713 .Moreover, while under RA 7160,certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors, provincial board members and councilors) are expressly subjected to a total or partial proscription to practice their professionor engage in any occupation, no such interdiction is made onthe punong barangayand the members of the sangguniangbarangay. Expressiounius est exclusio alterius since theyare excludedfromanyprohibition, the presumptionis that theyare allowedto practice their profession. Respondent, therefore, is not forbidden to practice his profession. Third, notwithstandingall of these, respondent stillshouldhave procured a prior permission or authorization from the headof hisDepartment, as requiredbycivil service regulations. The failure of respondent to complywith Section12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules constitutes a violationof his oath as a lawyer:to obeythe laws. Inacting as counsel for a party without first securing the required writtenpermission, respondent not only engaged in the unauthorized practice of law but alsoviolateda civil service rules whichis a breachof Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: Rule 1.01 - Alawyershall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. For not living upto his oath as well as for not complying withthe exacting ethicalstandards of the legal profession, respondent failed to comply with Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY ANDTHE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIESOF THE INTEGRATEDBAR. A lawyer whodisobeys the lawdisrespects it. Insodoing, he disregards legal ethics and disgraces the dignityof the legal profession. Everylawyer shouldact and comport himself ina manner that promotes public confidence inthe integrityof the legal profession. A member of the bar may be disbarredor suspendedfrom hisoffice as anattorneyfor violationof the lawyer's oathand/or for breach ofthe ethics of the legal professionas embodied inthe Code of Professional Responsibility. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of professional misconduct for violating hisoathas a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is thereforeSUSPENDED from the practice of law for a periodof six months effective from hisreceipt of this resolution. He is sternly WARNED that any repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. Respondent is stronglyadvisedto look upandtake to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza. G.R. No. L-32441 March 29, 1930 DOMINADOR GOMEZ, plaintiff-appellant, vs. HONORIO VENTURA, Secretary of the Interior of the Government of the Philippine Islands, and the BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, defendants-appellees. Jose Varela Calderon for appellant. Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellees. ROMUALDEZ, J.: In this cause, the plaintiff prays for judgment, as follows: 1. Annulling andsetting aside the aforementioned investigationproceedings, and particularly the decision of the Board of Medical Examiners of the Philippine Islands dated March 30, 1926, forever revokingthe plaintiff's license to practice medicine and surgery. 2. Ordering the defendants to restore the plaintiff to his status before the investigation andthe decision ofMarch 30, 1926, that is, as if there had never been an investigation and an adverse decision.
- 75. 75 3. Ordering saiddefendantsto issue infavor of the plaintiff a license for the practice of medicine andsurgeryinthe Philippine Islands, such as he hadprior to the investigation and adverse decision. 4. Granting the plaintiff any proper legal remedy. (Pages 5 and 6, bill of exemptions.) The defendants answered witha general denialand prayed that the complaint be dismissed. After trial the Court of First Instance of Maniladismissed the complaint with costs against the plaintiff. Counsel for plaintiff contends that the court below erred: 1. In holdingthat Assistant Fiscal Alfonso Felix of the City of Manila was authorized to appear andinstitute administrative proceedings against Dr. Dominador Gomez before the Board of Medical Examiners of the Philippines. 2. In not holding that Assistant FiscalAlfonsoFelix, of the City of Manila, had personalitynor power to institute administrative proceedings against Dr. Dominador Gomez before the Board of Medical Examiners of the Philippines. 3. In admitting inits decision that section 9 of Act No. 2381, known as the Opium Law, is valid. 4. In not holding that section9 of Act No. 2381, known as the Opium Law, is unconstitutional, and therefore null and void. 5. In holdingthat section9 Act No. 2381, known as the Opium Law, is in force. 6. In not holding that section9 Act No. 2381 has been repealed, even on the supposition that it was valid. 7. In rendering the judgment appealed from. 8. In denying the motion for avoidance, andfor a new trial, filedbyappellant. The first two assignments of error relate to the validity of the charges against the plaintiff, preferred byAssistant Fiscal Alfonso Felix ofthe Cityof Manila, who, according to the plaintiff is not authorizedbylawto file charges with the Board of Medical Examiners, which therefore acquired no jurisdiction over the matter. According to section 780 of Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3111, the procedure to be observed in revoking a certificate of registration is the following: Proceedings for revocationof a certificate of registration s hall be begun by filing a writtencharge or charges against the accused. These charges may be preferred by any person or persons, firm or corporation, or the Board of Medical Examiners itself may direct its executive officer to prepare said charges. Said charges shall be filedwith the executive officer of the Board of Medical Examiners anda copythereof, together with written notice of the time andplace whentheywill be heared and determined, shall be served upon the accusedor his counsel, at least two weeks before the date actually fixed for said hearing. (Sec. 12, Act No. 3111.) The law does not require that the charges be preferred by a public officer or by any specified person;it evenpermits the Board of MedicalExaminers itself to require its exe cutive officer to prefer said charges. Fromthe wording of the law we infer that any person, including a public officer, mayprefer the charges referred to in the above-quoted provision. Wherefore, the fact that the chargeswere filedbyAssistant FiscalAlfonsoFelix of the Cityof Manila, does not deprive the Boardof MedicalExaminers of jurisdictionto hear saidcharges andto take the proper action according to law. The appellant contends inhis thirdandfourth assignments of error that section 9 of Act No. 2381 is nullandvoidonthe groundof unconstitutionality, since said sectionis foreignto the subject of said Act, inviolationof section 3 of the Jones Lawprohibiting the enactment of anybill embracing more thanone subject and providing that the subject be expressed in the title of the bill. Our opinionis that the matter containedin section 9 of Act No. 2381 is not foreign to the end pursuedinsaidAct, andthat in view in the provision ofsaidsectionit cannot be maintained that Act No. 2381 includes more than one subject. The penalty provided in said section for the physicianor dentist whoprescribesopiumfor a patient whose physical condition does not require the use of saiddrug, is one ofthe means employed bythe Legislature to attainthe purpose of Act No. 2381, which is, to prohibit unnecessaryuse of opium;it is one of the details subordinate to the purpose inview. Suchpunishment is not the endcontemplated in Act No. 2381, but, as we have just said, it is a means employed to regulate the use of opium. In passingsaidAct No. 2381, the Legislature merelyexercisedthe police power expressly granted bythe Act of Congress of March3, 1905, for the protectionof the health, comfort, and general welfare of the people of the Philippine Islands. ID.; ID.; POWER OF PHILIPPINE LEGISLATURE TO LEGISLATE UPON THE SUBJECT. — The Philippine Legislature is expressly authorized by the Act of Congress of March3, 1905, to adopt legislationuponthe importationandsale of opium in the Philippine Islands. The purpose of such legislation was to protect the health, comfort, and general welfare of the people of the Philippine Islands. Such legislationwas an exercise of the police power of the State. (United States vs. Wayne Shoup, 35 Phil., 56.) And, as we have stated, the provisions contained in section 9 of Act No. 2381 relative to the physicians anddentist are simplydetailes andmeans conducive to the ultimate purpose of said
- 76. 76 Act, which detailsandmeans neednot be statedin the title of the Act for the very reason that properly speaking, they are not foreign matter. The generalpurpose of these provisions is accomplishedwhen a law has but one general object, whichis fairlyindicatedbyits title. To require every end and means necessaryor convenient for the accomplishment of this general object to be providedfor bya separate act relating to that alone, would not onlybe unreasonable, but would actually render legislation impossible. (Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, pp. 296-297.) The constitutionalrequirement is addressed to the subject, not to the details of the act. The subject must be single; the provisions, to accomplished the object involved inthat subject, maybe multifarious. . . . None of the provisions of a statute will be held unconstitutional when they all relate, directly or indirectly, to the same subject, have naturalconnection, and are not foreignto the subject expressedinthe title. As veryfrequentlyexpressed by the courts, anyprovisions that are germane to the subject expressed in the title may properly be included in the act. (I Sutherland on Stat. Const., par. 118.) In order to hold that section9 of Act No. 2381 is unconstitutional on the ground alleged by the plaintiff, the violationof the constitutional provisionmust be substantial andmanifest. It is not so in the case at bar. 2. To warrant the setting aside of statutes because their subjects are not expressedinthe titles, the violationof the rule must be substantialand plain. (Posadasvs. Menzi, Decisionof the United States Supreme Court, page 388, No. 11, May 15, 1929, United States Supreme Court Advance Opinions.) At all events the validityof this Opium Law, Act No. 2381, has alreadybeenupheld by this court, not onlyinthe above citedcase, UnitedStates vs. Wayne Shoup, supra, but also inthe subsequent case of United States vs. Jao Li Sing (37 Phil., 211). Passing to the fifthandsixthassignments of error, whereincounselfor appellant contends that even granting that section 9 of Act No. 2381 is valid, it was repealedbyAct No. 2493 and later by section780 of the Administrative Code, we note, first, that there is noexpress repealof section 9 of Act No. 2381. Secondly, it cannot be heldthat it has beenimpliedly repealed, for the reason that the provisions ofsection9, Act No. 2381, are neither contraryto, nor incompatible with, the provisions ofsection780 of the Administrative Code, as amended. Upon this point, we approve and adopt the following statements made by the trial judge: Counsel contends, insupport of the above, that Act No. 2493 being complete, and "covering the field" by implication repealed all laws relating to the practice of medicine, powers of the Board ofMedical Examiners and allied matters;hence, the saidlaw, expresslyproviding the causes for revocation of medical licenses, necessarilyexcludedall others, even though embodied in prior enactments. Act No. 310 provided that the Board of medical Examiners could revoke licensesfor "unprofessional conduct," without definingthe term. Act No. 1761 (the Opium Law)provided that illegalyprescribing opium shouldbe cause for revocationof medical licenses. Clearly, the OpiumLawdid not repeal Act No. 310. Act No. 2381 — also an Opium Law — in its section 9, repeated the provisionas to doctors anddentists. The repetition didnot repeal Act No. 310. Act No. 2493, section 11 (Ad. Code, sec. 780), provided that certificates of physicians are revocable for "unprofessional conduct," without defining the phrase. Inother words, sofar as revocation oflicenses is concerned, Act No. 2493 is mere reenactment of Act No. 310. The reenactment of the saidportion of Act No. 310 did not repeal section 9 of the Opium Law. Ifsaidsection 9 has been repealed, it must be by Act No. 3111, which amends Act No. 2493 (Ad. Code, sec. 780), byan addition after the words "unprofessional conduct" of the following: "The words "unprofessional conduct, immoral, or dishonorable conduct" as usedinthis chapter shall be construed to include the following acts:(1) Procuring, aiding or abetinga criminal abortion; (2) advertising, either in his ownname or inthe name of any other person, firm, association, or corporation, in any written or printed paper, or document, of medical business in which untruthful or improbable promises are made, or being employed by, or in the service of anyperson, firm, association or corporationsoadvertising, or advertising inanyobscene manner derogatoryto good morals;(3) habitual intemperance or additionto the use of morphine, opium, cocaine or other drugs having a similar effect; (4) conviction of a crime or misdemeanor involving dishonorable conduct; and (5) willfully betraying a professional secret." It cannot be seriouslycontended that aside fromthe five examples specified there can be no other conduct of a physician deemed "unprofessional" conduct theretofore deemed grounds for revocation licenses. The maxim expressio unius est exclussio alterius shouldbe appliedonlyas a means of discoveringlegislative intent and should not be permitted to defeat the plainindicatedpurpose ofthe Legislature. It does not apply when words are mentioned by way of example, or to remove doubts. (See Cyc., 1122.) If, therefore, there exists, "unprofessional conduct" not specified in the laws, with more reasondoesthe criminaluse of opium remaina specific cause for revocation of license. (Pages 11, 12 and 13, bill of exceptions.) As to the seventhandeighthassignments of error, we find the judgment and appealed from correctly rendered, and the motion of avoidance and new trial properly denied. As the Attorney-General correctlyobserves, the powers vested in the Boardof Medical Examiners to suspend or revoke a physician's certificate of registration and the authority gra nted the Secretaryof the Interior of confirming or reversing the decision of said board of examiners, partake of a quasi-judicialcharacter, that is, involve the use of discretion. For this reason, the exercise thereof cannot be reviewedbymandamus, which is the nature of thiscause onits merits.
- 77. 77 As in thecase ofcourts and judicial officers, it is a rule of general application that mandamus will not lieto reviewor control the acts of executive officers and boards ofstate and federal governments inrespect of matters as to which theyare vestedwithdiscretion. Inother words, theycannot be compelled to act or render a decisioninanyparticular way, andthis is so, even though the exercise of this discretion requires the construction and interpretation of statutes. Where public officials exercise their discretion, it is said that their conclusions, although disputable, are impregnable to mandamus. (38 C. J., 659-660.) That this actionis reallya mandamus proceeding, appears clearlyfrom the terms of the complaint filed herein. Finding nomerit inthe assignments of error, the judgment appealedfrom is affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered. Malcolm, Ostrand, Johns and Villa-Real, JJ., concur. Villamor, J., reserves his vote. Javellana vs Tayo G.R. No. L-18919 December 29, 1962 ABELARDO JAVELLANA, TOMAS JONCO, RUDICO HABANA, EXEQUIEL GOLEZ, ALFREDO ANG, and FILIPINAS SOLEDAD, in their capacities as Councilors of the Municipal Municipality of Buenavista, Province of Iloilo, petitioners appellees, vs. SUSANO TAYO, as Mayor of the Municipal Municipality of Buenavista, Iloilo, respondent- appellant. FACTS: The petitioners are dulyelectedandqualifiedmembers of the Municipal Council of the Municipalityof Buenavista, Iloilo;andthat the respondent at the time the acts hereinbelow complainedof took place, was andstill is the duly-electedandqualified Mayor of the Municipality. The Municipal Council ofBuenavista (Council) unanimouslyapprovedResolutionNo. 5, Seriesof 1960 which set the regular sessions of the Councilandwhichresolutionwas dulyapprovedbythe respondent. At the time andplace set for the regular sessionof the Council, the Mayor, Vice- Mayor, 2 Councilors, and the Secretarywere absent. The six councilors, whoare the petitioners in this case, were present and theyproceededto elect amongthemselves a temporarypresiding officer and ActingSecretaryto take notes of the proceedings. Havingthus electeda temporary presiding officer anda secretaryof the Council, theyproceededto dobusiness. On the subsequent Council meetings, the Mayor, Vice Mayor, 2 Councilors andSecretarywere still not around. When the Minutesof the Proceeding waspresented to the Mayor, the latter refused to act uponsaid minutes, or particularlyto approve or disapprove the resolutionas approved bythe Council, the Mayor declaringthe sessions above referredto as null andvoid and not inaccordance with. ISSUE: Whether or not the sessions heldbythe Councilwere valid RULING: This Court (the trial court), after perusal of all the records of this case hasreached the conclusionthat the sessions held bythe petitioner during the absence ofthe respondent Mayor were perfectlyvalid and legal. The attendance of the Mayor is not essential to the validityof the sessionas longas there is quorum constitutedinaccordance withlaw. To declare that the proceedings ofthe petitioners were null and voidis to encourage recalcitrant public officials who wouldfrustrate valid session for political endor consideration. Public interest will immensely suffer, if a mayor whobelongs to one politicalgrouprefuses to call or attend a session, because the Council is controlledbyanother political group. (And this was upheld bythe SC.) We findsaid award proper under Article 27 of the newCivil Code, 3 considering that according to the trial court, he (Golez)was able to prove that he sufferedthe same, as a consequence of appellant's refusalto performhis officialduty, not withstanding the action takenbythe Provincial Fiscal anthe Provincial Boardupholdingthe validityof the sessionin question. DECISION: Trial Court decision affirmed. [Digest] Lopez vs. CA (1970) Lopez publisher and owner of Manila Chronicle and Gatbonton (Editor) v. Court of Appeals and Cruz (1970) Ponente: Fernando, J.
- 78.
- 79. 79 Facts: January1956 – Front-pagestoryon the ManilaChronicle Fidel Cruz, sanitaryinspector assignedto the BabuyanIslands, sent distresssignals to US Airforce planes which forwardedsuchmessage to Manila o An American Armyplane droppedemergencysustenance kits on the beach ofthe island which contained, amongother things, a twowayradio set. Using the radioset Cruz reportedto the authorities inManila that the locals were living in terror due to a series of killings committedon the island since Christmasof 1955. o Philippine defense forces (scout rangers) were immediatelydeployedto the babuyanclaro. They were ledbyMajor WilfredoEncarnacionwho discovered that Cruz onlyfabricated the storyabout the killings to get attention. Cruz merelywantedtransportationhome to Manila. o Major Encarnacionbrandedthe fiasco as a “hoax” the same word to be used bythe newspapers who coveredthe same January13, 1956 - This Week Magazine of the ManilaChronicle, editedbyGatbontondevoteda pictorial article to it. It claimedthat despite the storyof Cruz beinga hoax it brought to light the miseryof the people living inthat place, with almost everybodysick, only2 individualsable to read andwrite and foodandclothing being scarce January29, 1956 - This Week Magazine inthe "JanuaryNews Quiz" made reference to Cruz as “a healthinspector whosuddenlyfelt "lonely" inhis isolated post, cookedupa storyabout a murderer runningloose onthe island ofCalayansothat he couldbe ferriedbackto civilization.” Called it “Hoax of the year” In both issuesphotos of a FidelCruz were publishedbut both photos were ofa different personof the same name Fidel G. Cruz former mayor, business man, contractor from Santa Maria, Bulacan o January27, 1957 publishedstatements correcting their misprint andexplainedthat confusion and error happeneddue to the rushto meet the Jan13th issue’s deadline Cruz suedhereinpetitioners for libel inCFI Manila. Cruz won and wasawardedP11,000 in damages (5k actual, 5k moral, 1k attorney’s fees) CA affirmedCFI decisionhence this case Issue: WON petitioners should be held liable for their error in printing the wrong Fidel Cruz’s photo in relation to the “hoax of the year”? o WON such error is sufficient ground for an action for libel to prosper? Held: Yes they are liable but damages awarded to Cruz is reduced to P1,000.00 Ratio: 1. Mistake is no excuseto absolve publishers because libel is harmful onits face bythe fact that it exposes the injured partyto more thantrivialridicule, whether it is fact or opinionis irrelevant. Citing Lu Chu Sing v. Lu Tiong Gui libelis "malicious defamation, expressedeither inwriting, printing, or bysigns or pictures, or the like, ..., tending to blackenthe memoryof one whois dead or to impeachthe honesty, virtue, or reputation, or publish the allegedor naturaldefects of one who is alive, andthereby"pose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule," Citing standard treatise of Newell on Slander and Libel "Publicationof a person's photographin connectionwithan article libelous of a third person, is a libelon the personwhose picture is published, where the acts set out inthe article are imputedto suchperson." o In this case 3rd personwas Cruz his picture being publishedbeside the article imputes him as the purveyor of the hoax of the year 2. Libel cannot be usedto curtail press freedomhowever it also cannot claim anytalismanic immunityform constitutionallimitations State interest inpress freedom citing Justice Malcolm:Fulldiscussionof public affairs is necessary for the maintenance ofgood governance…“Public officials must not be toothin-skinned with reference to comments onofficial acts”…”of course criticism does not authorize defamation. Nevertheless, as an individual is less thanthe state, so must expected criticismbe bornfor the common good.” So long as it was done ingoodfaith, the press shouldhave the legalright to have andexpress their opinions onlegal questions. To denythemthat right would be to infringe uponfreedom ofthe press. “Last wordon the subject” Citing Quisumbingv. Lopez:Pressshould be given leewayandtolerance as to enable them to courageouslyand effectivelyperform their important role in our democracy Freedomof the press ranks high inthe hierarchyof legalvalues TEST of LIABLITY must prove there wasactual malice inpublishing the story/photo! (Note:but this was not done inthiscase) 4. Citing Concepcion, CJ. Correctionof error in publishingdoesnot wipe out the responsibility arising from the publicationof the original article Correction= Mitigatingcircumstance not a justifying circumstance! Dissent: Dizon, J. Manila Chronicle shouldbe absolved because: o No evidence ofactual malice o The article does not ascribe anything immoralor anymoral turpitude to Cruz o The negligence performed byManilaChronicle is this case should be considered“excusable negligence” G.R. No. L-10690 June 28, 1957 APOLONIO PANGILINAN, ET AL., petitioners, vs. FELISAALVENDIA, respondent. Emili P. Cortes and Pacifico L. Santiago for petitioners. Isidro T. Calma for respondent. REYES, J.B.L., J.: This is a petitionfor certiorari to review the decision ofthe Court of Industrial Relations in Case No. 215 Pampanga (later transferred to the Court of Agrarian Relations which denied reconsiderationof the Industrial Court's decision)authorizingthe ejectment of petitioners from their respective landholdings, andtheir replacement byother tenants oftheir landlord's choice. It appears that petitioners ApolonioPangilinan, Mariano Bundalian, Miguel Galang, and Valentin Santos are tenants of respondents Felisa Alvendia inbarrios San Nicolas and Sto. Cristo, Florida
- 80. 80 Blanca, Pampanga, undertenancycontracts executedon July17, 1953 (Exhibits A, B, C, and D). On July27, 1954, respondent Alvendiafileda petition in the Court of Industrial Relations for the ejectment of petitioners onthe ground that for the agricultural years 1953-54 and 1954-55, they did not personallyperform the principal work of plowing and harrowing on their respective landholdings, but entrustedsaidwork to other persons, notwithstanding repeated demands by respondent that they do the farm work themselves. Petitioners in their answer, denied respondent's claims, andallegedthat theywere the ones working the land although at times, they were helpedbytheir childrenandsons-in-law;andthat respondent filed the ejectment action against them because theyrefused to sign tenancycontracts withher onthe 45-55 sharing basis and insisted on a 70-30 sharing basis. After trial, the Industrial Court foundthat petitioners were beinghelped either bytheir sons, sons- in-law, or grandsons, ontheir landholdings;held that a contract of tenancyis personal in nature and cannot be entrustedto a son, son-in-lawor grandson, especially where there is a specific prohibitioninthe tenancycontracts against allowingthirdpersons to dothe principal phases of farming for the tenants;andauthorizedpetitioners' ejectment and replacement byother tenants. The case was later transferred to the Court of Agrarian Relations upon its creation where petitioners fileda motionfor reconsideration of the Industrial Court's judgement, which was denied. Hence, their present appeal. The lower court foundthat the "third persons" referred to by respondent Alvendia to whom petitioners allegedly entrusted the work of plowing and harrowing on their respective landholdings were either their sons-in-law or grandsons whowere not, however, dependent upon them for support and were living separately from them. The issue, therefore, is whether petitioners violatedthe lawandtheir tenancy contracts in entrusting their farm work to such relatives. Republic Act 1199, which took effect on August 30, 1954, defines "tenant" as: . . . a person who, himself andwiththe aidavailable fromwithin hisimmediate farm household, cultivates the land belonging to, or possessed by another, with the latter's consent, for purpose ofproduction, sharingthe produce with the landholder under the share tenancysystem, or payingto the landholder a price certainor ascertainable in produce or in money or both, under the leasehold tenancy system; While "immediate farm household," according to the same Act, includes: . . . the members of the family of the tenant, and such other person or persons, whether relatedto the tenant or not, whoare dependent upon him for support and who usually help him operate the farm enterprise. Under the above definitionof "tenant" givenbyRepublic Act 1199, petitioners were within their legal rights inaskingassistance in their farm work from their sons -in-law or grandsons. Such relatives fall within the phrase "the members of the familyof the tenant"; and the law does not require that these members of the tenant's family be dependent on him for support, such qualification beingapplicable only to "such other person or persons, whether related to the tenant or not", whom, as they are "dependent upon him for support" and usually help him operate the frame enterprise", the lawconsiders alsopart of the tenant's immediate household. But respondent Alvendia claims that as her contracts withpetitioners were enteredintowhen Act 4054, the oldTenancyAct, was still inforce, the definition ofthe word "tenant" given in said Act should be applied in this case, to wit: . . . a farmer or farm laborer whoundertakes to work and cultivate land for another or a personwhofurnishes the labor withthe consent ofthe landlord. Granting that Act 4054 appliesto this case, there is, however, nothingin its above definition of "tenant" to prohibit the farmer who undertakesto work andcultivate the land of another, from doingsuchwork withthe assistance ofhis family, whoare under his control and authority. The above definition is, in fact, so broadthat it evenincludes the labor of third persons hired by the farmer to work onhis farm, under the clause "or a person who furnishes the labor with the consent ofthe landlord". It is the hiringof thirdpersons to dothe farm work for the tenant that the new tenancyRepublic Act No. 1199, eliminated fromthe old concept of "tenant" under Act 4054, thus restricting the meaning of "tenant" to one "who, himself and with the aid available from withinhis immediate farm household, cultivates the land belonging to, or pos sessed by, another, withthe latter's consent . . ." Whether under the new or the oldtenancylaw, therefore, the work done bythe members ofa tenant's familyis, inlegal contemplation, includedinthe work that the tenant undertakes to perform onthe landgivento himintenancy. In the absence ofclear and categoricalimperatives, we will not construe statutes in a sense inconsistent with the traditional unity of the Filipino family. Respondent Alvendia alsocontends that her tenancycontract with petitioners, Exhibits A, B, C, and D, expresslyprohibit the latter from askingfor andaccepting helpin the cultivation of their landholdings from their sons-in-law andgrandsons, under the provision in said contracts that: (a) The TENANT is the one to plow, harrow andprepare the landto be planted, and likewise, he is the one to plant and fence the seedbed. With respect to this work, the LANDLORD shall not spendfor anything, but she has the power to tell or order the TENANT whento plow, harrow, or what to do pertaining, the tenant's work. The above provisioncontains no prohibitionfor the tenant to accept assistance from the members of his familyinthe plowing, harrowing, preparing, planting, or fencingof his landholding. It simply enumerates the exact dutiesexpectedof the tenant byhis landlord;andthe tenant is referred to as "the one"to performthese duties, only, to distinguish his obligations from those of his landlord. We see nothing in farmingtasks that requires individual specializedskill. Besides, it is a fact that petitioners Galang andSantos were already74 and 64, respectively, when respondent signed the tenancycontracts withthemin1953. Respondent's having acceptedpetitioners Galang and Santos as her tenants in spite of their advancedage not onlydisproves her claim that theyare alreadytoo old to perform their dutiesas tenants, but proves that she hadimpliedly agreed that these petitioners wouldbe helpedbytheir familiesin their farm work, since respondent must have realized that at their advancedage, these petitioners could not bythemselves alone perform all the farm work without family assistance.
- 81. 81 The decisionappealedfromis, therefore,reversed, andthe ejectment actionfiledbyrespondent against petitioners dismissed, with costs against respondent Felisa Alvendia. So ordered. Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur. Florentino v. PNB G.R. No. L-8782. April 28, 1956 FACTS: The petitioners and appellants filed a petitionfor mandamus against Philippine National Bank to compel it to accept the backpay certificate of petitioner Marcelino B. Florentino to pay an indebtedness inthe sum of P6,800 secured by real estate mortgage plus interest. The de bt incurredonJanuary2, 1953, which is due onJanuary2, 1954. Petitioner is a holder of Backpay Acknowledgment No. 1721 dated October 6, 1954, in the amount of P22,896.33 by virtue of Republic Act No. 897 approvedonJune 20, 1953. Petitioners offered to pay their loan with the respondent bank withtheir backpaycertificate, but the respondent bank, onDecember 29, 1953, refused to accept the latter's backpay certificate. Under section 2 of Republic Act No. 879, respondent-appellee contends that the qualifying clause refers to all the antecedents, whereas the appellant's contention is that it refers only to the last antecedent. ISSUE: Whether or not the clause “whomaybe willing to accept the same for settlement” refers to all antecedents mentioned in the last sentence of section 2 of Republic Act No. 879. HELD: No. Grammatically, the qualifyingclause refers onlyto the last antecedent;that is, "anycitizen of the Philippines or anyassociation or corporationorganizedunder the laws of the Philippine s." It should be notedthat there is a comma before the words "or to anycitizen, etc.," whichseparates said phrase from the precedingones. But even disregarding the grammatical construction, to make the acceptance of the backpaycertificates obligatory upon any citizen, association, or corporation, whichare not government entities or ownedor controlledbythe government, would render section2 of Republic Act No. 897 unconstitutionalfor it would amount to an impairment of the obligationof contracts bycompelling private creditors to accept a sort of promissory note payable within ten years withinterest at a rate verymuch lower thanthe current or eventhe legal one. It was alsofoundout inthe Congressional Record that the amendatory bill to Sec. 2 was made whichpermits the use of backpaycertificatesas payment for obligations andindebtedness in favor of the government. Another reasonis that it is matter of general knowledge that many officialsand employeesof the Philippine Government, who had served during the Japanese Occupation, have alreadyreceivedtheir backpaycertificates andused them for the payment of the obligations to the Government and its entities for debts incurred before the approval of Republic Act No. 304. Florentinoincurredhis debt to the PNB on January2, 1953. Hence, the obligationwas subsisting when the AmendatoryAct No. 897 was approved. Consequently, the present case falls squarely under the provisions of section 2 of the Amendatory Act No. 897. People v. Tamani G.R. Nos: L-22160 & L-22161 Facts: On February 14, 1963, the lower court found Tamani guilty of consummated and attempted murder. On February25, 1963, Tamani’s counsel received a copyof the decision and consequently filed for a motion for reconsiderationonMarch 1, 1963. It was denied. On July 13, 1963, the lower court sent a denial order to the counsel through his wife via registeredmail. On September 10, 1963, the said counsel appealed
- 82. 82 the lower court’sdecision. Then, the appellees argued that the appeal shouldbe dismissedcontending that the appeal should have been made upto July24, 1963 which is the 15 dayperiodof appealfrom the date of notice and not fromthe date of promulgation. Thus, the appellees claimed that the appeal was filed 47 days late. 2 Issue: Whether the 15-dayperiodshouldcommence from the date ofpromulgation or from the date of notice of the decision. Held: Appeal wasdismissed. The 15-dayperiodshould commence from the date of promulgation. Ratio: Rule 122 of the Rule s of Court provides: SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken . — an appealmust be takenwithinfifteen(15) days from promulgationor notice of the judgment or order appealedfrom. This periodfor perfecting an appeal shall be interrupted from the time a motionfor new trial is fileduntil notice of the order overrulingthe motionshallhave beenserved upon the defendant or his attorney. 3 The assumptionthat the fifteen-dayperiodshouldbe counted from February 25, 1963, when a copyof the decision was allegedlyservedonappellant's counselbyregistered mail, is not well- taken. The word "promulgation" insection 6 shouldbe construedas referring to "judgment" while the word "notice" should be construed as referringto "order". That construction is sanctioned by the rule of reddendo singula singulis : "referring eachto each;referring eachphrase or expression to its appropriate object", or "let each be put inits proper place, that is, the words shouldbe takendistributively". Therefore, when the order denyingappellant's motionfor reconsiderationwas served by registered mail on July 13th on appellant's counsel, he hadonly1 daywithinwhich to file hisnotice of appeal and not 11 days. Appellant Tamani's notice of appeal, filed on September 10, 1963, was 58 days late. Mapa v.Arroyo and Labrador Development Corporation Case Digest Jose Antonio Mapa v. Hon. Joker Arroyo and Labrador Development Corporation G.R. No. 78585 (July 5, 1989) FACTS: Mapa bought lots from Labrador Development Corporation whichare payable intenyears. Mapa defaultedto paythe installment dues and continued to do so despite constant reminders byLabrador. The latter informedMapa that the contracts to sell the lots were cancelled, but Mapa invoked Clause 20 of the four contracts. Said clause obligates Labrador to complete the development of the lots, except those requiring the services of a public utility company or the government, within 3 years from the date of the contract. Petitioner contends that P.D. 957 requires Labrador to provide the “facilities, improvements, and infrastructures for the lots, and other forms of development” if offeredand indicated in the approved subdivision plans. ISSUE: W/N Clause 20 of the said contracts include andincorporate P.D. 957 through the doctrine of last antecedent, making the cancellation of the contracts of sale incorrect. HELD: No. Labrador has everyright to cancel the contracts of sale, pursuant to Clause 7 of the said contract for the reason ofthe lapse offive years ofdefault payment fromMapa. P.D. 957 does not applybecause it was enacted longafter the executionof the contracts involved, and, other than those provided inClause 20, no further writtencommitment was made by the developer. The words “which are offeredandindicatedinthe subdivision or condominiumplans” refer not only to “other forms of development” but also to “facilities, improvements, and infrastructures”. The word“and” is not meant to separate words, but is a conjunction used to denote a joinder or a union. Chua v.CSC (Civil Service Commission) Case Digest Chua v. Civil Service Commission G.R. No. 88979 (February 7, 1992) FACTS: RA 6683 provided benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation as well as for involuntaryseparationdue to reorganization. Section2 covers those who are qualified: Sec. 2. Coverage. – This Act shall cover all appointive officials and employees of the National Government. The benefits authorized under this Act shall applyto allregular, temporary, casual and emergencyemployees, regardless of age, who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years ofgovernment service as of the date of separation…” Petitioner Lydia Chua, believing that she is qualifiedto avail of the benefits of the program, filed an application on January 30, 1989 with Respondent Administration, which, however, denied the same. Recourse by the petitioner to Respondent Commission yielded the same result. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner’s status as a co-terminus employee is excluded from the benefits of RA 6683 (Early Retirement Law). HELD: The petitionis granted. The EarlyRetirement Lawwouldviolate the equal protection clause of the constitution if the Supreme Court were to sustainRespondent’s submission that the benefits of saidlaw are to be denieda class of government employees whoare similarlysituated as thosecoveredbythe saidlaw. The court applied the doctrine of necessary implication in deciding this case. G.R. No. L-5127 May 27, 1953 PEDRO BATUNGBAKAL, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY and MANUEL AGREGADO, as Auditor General of the Philippines,defendants-appellants. Government Corporate Counsel Pompeyo Diaz, Assistant Attorney Leovigildo Monasterial and Juan T. Alano for appellant. Jose M. Casal for appellee.
- 83. 83 MONTEMAYOR, J.: This isan appeal bythe National Development Company(NDC) andManuel Agregado as Auditor General ofthe Philippines from a decisionof the Court of First Instance of Manila ordering the appellants to reinstate the plaintiff-appellee Pedro Batungbakalinhis former positionas property examiner in the Comptroller's office in the NDC, with a salary of P2,040 per annum, the compensationhe was receiving when he was suspended on December 31, 1946, and further ordering that he be paidhis backsalary at the rate of P2,040 per annum from the date of his suspensionup to the date ofhis reinstatement, deductingtherefrom whatever amount he still owed the NDC. The appeal having beentakendirect to this court, onlyquestions of law may be raised and the findingof facts made by the trial court are binding on the parties and on this tribunal. The facts as found by the lower court may be briefly stated as follows. On February14, 1939, plaintiffPedro Batungbakalwas appointed bythe Auditor General as cash and propertyexaminer inthe office of the Comptroller of the NDC. Shortlybefore the Pacific was the position ofcash andpropertyexaminer was divided into two, namely, cash examiner and propertyexaminer, Batungbakal retaining the positionof propertyexaminer. Around October of 1944 he went on leave. When the NDCwas reopenedinMarch, 1945, Batungbakal and some other employees in the Comptroller's office were recalled to duty. The Comptoller was under the supervision of the Auditor General but his salary and those of his personnel were paid by the NDC. Since the reorganizationof the NDCit became the practice that onlythe Comptroller wasappointed by the Auditor General withthe approval of the Board ofDirectors ofthe Companywhile the personnel in his office were appointed by the company itself. On August 24, 1945, Batungbakal was appointed bythe Chairmanof the Board of Directors and Acting General Manager of the NDCas propertyexaminer insaid companywith a salary of P100 a month;he was promotedinsalaryto P2,040 a year effective April 1, 1946, in the same position of propertyexaminer byappointment datedMarch30, 1946, signed bythe Acting General Manager of the NDC. On December 31, 1946, Batungbakal wassuspended from office as property examiner by the Investigating Committee created by Administrative Order No. 39 of the President of the Philippines, andon April 17, 1947, he received from the officer incharge of the NDCnotice of his dismissal. Said notice reads as follows: Pursuant to the instruction of the Chief of the Executive Office, I have the honor to inform you that according to the report of the Investigation Committee which was created under Administrative Order No. 39 of His Excellency, the President ofthe Philippines to investigate the business affairs and operations ofthe National Development Company, you have been found to have committedgross negligence inthe performance of your duties to the detriment of this Company. The said Committee likewise found that irregularities committedbyyou constitute acts and ommission which made possible the ommission ofirregularities in the disposal of yarns either in the names of fictitious buyers or through dummies, contraryto the policy of this Company. On May28, 1947, Batumbakalfileda petitionfor reconsideration withthe Office of the President; the matter was referredto Hon. Sixto de la Costa as Chairman of the Investigating Committee. On December 4, 1948, the Investigating Committee of the NDC under the Cha irmanship of Honorable e la Costa submittee to the President of the Philippinesthroughthe Secretaryof Justice its report of the investigation which ends thus: In view ofthe foregoing, the committee reconsiders its previous findings, declaring that Batungbakal andde la Cruz have not committed negligence in the discharge oftheir duties, andtherefore recommends their reinstatement to the service of the National Development Company. On August 17, 1949, the Secretary of Justice forwarded the said report together with other pertinent papers to the Office of the President with the following recommendation: In view ofthe foregoing, the undersigned recommends that: (1) Mr. Pedro Batungbakal be reinstatedwith the warning that, as representative of the Comptroller, which includedthe auditing department, he was bound by the rules, regulations andinstructions issuedbythe Management of the National Development Companyandhisfailure hereafter to comply with these rules, regulations andinstructions will be more severelydealt with; . . . "t" (Exhibit A). On September 5, 1949, the Office of the President of the Philippines referred the matter to the General Manager of the NDC through the Chairman of the Control Committee, Government Enterprise Council (GEC) for appropriate action. On October 14, 1949, the Executive Vice-Chairman of the Control Committee of the GEC forwarded the papers to the General Manager of the NDC with the following statements: The Control Committee, GEC, herebyconcurs in the view of the Secretary of Justice statedinthe preceding second endorsement exonerating Messrs. Pedro BatungbakalandSisenandode la Cruz of the charge of gross negligence in the performance of their duties since the evidence gathered by the InvestigatingCommittee headedbyJudge de la Costa shows that theydid not know of the existence of the instructions contained inthe memorandum order of the Management datedJune 13, 1946 and the goods sold by the National Development Companywere delivered to an authorize representative of the party to whom the goods were sold. (See Exhibit 2-A of the respondent Auditor General.) On October 27, 1949, the TechnicalAssistant (Legal Credit and Collection) of the NDC wrote a letter to the Auditor General through the Auditor of the NDC, wherein after giving a brief
- 84. 84 statement of thecase of Batungbakal including the findings and recommendation of the Investigation Committee and the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice for the reinstatement ofBatungbakal, he requestedthe opinion of the Auditor Generalas to whether or not Batungbakal was entitled to his backpayfrom the date of his suspension to the date of his reisntatement. The Auditor ofthe NDCinhis first indorsement to the Auditor General among other things said: Obviously, the reinstatement of Mr. Batungbakalinthe Office of the Auditor of the NationalDevelopment Companyis no longer feasible, because there is no vacancyfor the position of "property examiner" formerly held by him. . . . x x x x x x x x x However, in viewof the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice in this case, this Office believes that no objection may interposed to the reinstatement ofMr. Batungbakal in the National Development provided that the same is not made to anypositionunder the jurisdiction of the General Auditing Office. x x x x x x x x x Accordingly, it is believed that Mr. Batungbakal is not entitled to any salary from the time of his suspensionor dismissal to the date of his resinstatement or appointment to a position different from that held by him when he was suspended and later dismissed from office. On February15, 1960, the Auditor Generalreturnedthe papers of Batungbakal of the NDC with the following statement: In view ofthe foregoing circumstances surroundings the case of Mr. Pedro Batungbakal and the fact that hisreinstatement to the position formerly held byhim in that office is nolonger feasible, thisOffice recommends that anew position be created inthe NationalDevelopment Companyto which he maybe reinstated, provided it will not be in the Auditing Department. With reference to hisclaim for salary, this Office will offer no objection to the payment thereof from the ate ofhis suspension onDecember 31, 1946, to the date of his dismissal on April 17, 1957 (Exhibit 1-AG). On April 15, 1950, the Secretary of the Board of Directors of the NDC wrote to Batungbakal informing him that the Board of Directors of the NDC in its meeting of April 12, 1950, has authorized the payment of his salaryduring the periodof hissuspensionfrom December 31, 1946 to the date of hisdismissal onApril 17, 1947, as recommendedbythe Auditor General, and that the Boardlikewise authorizedhis reappointment to anysuitable positionin the NDC. His ba ckpay from December 31, 1946 up to April 17, 1947 amounting to P689 was applied to the sum of P1,392.42 (should be P1,394.42), leaving an unpaid balance of P705.42. On August 15, 1950, the ActingSecretaryof Economic Coordinationreplyingto a letter of counsel for Batungbakalsaid that he approved the action taken by the Board of Directors of the NDC reiterating its previous resolutionthat it hadno objectionto the re-employment of Batungbakal to anysuitable positionin the NDCbut statinghowever that it was not possible to re-employ him at that time because hisformer itemwas alreadyoccupied bysomeone else, andthat there were no vacant item to which he could be appointed. On October 2, 1950, Batungbakal wrote to the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the NDC, requestinghis resinstatement inthe service of the company and the payment to him of all his salaryup to the date ofhis resinstatement. Actinguponthis request the Board of Directors of the NDCin its meetingheld October 8, 1950 authorizedhis reinstatement as previously approved by said Boardon April12, 1950 provided that "he renounce his right to claimfor the payment of his back salary, andauthorizedthe Acting General Manager to lookfor a suitable position for him in the National Shipyard & Graving Dock Department." On November 4, 1950, Batungbakal throughcounsel informedthe General Manager of the NDC that he declined to accept any position other than the one formerly occupied by him and requested that his back salary be paid to him as soon as possible. In its meeting ofNovember 8, 1950, the Boardof Directors of the NDC approved Batungbakal's request for the payment of his salary amounting to P 7,820 as of October 31, 1950, and appropriatedthe necessary sum therefore, s ubject to the final approval of the GEC and the Auditor General providedBatungbakal relinquishedhis right to reinstatement inthe service of the NDC. On November 17, 1950, the Acting General Manager of the NDC wrote to the Secretary of Economic Coordinationtransmitting excerpts fromthe minutes ofthe meetingof the NDCheldon November 8, 1950, for his final approval at the same time informing Batugbakal's counsel of his action. In a memorandumto the Auditor GeneraldatedDecember 29, 1950, the Chief Law Officer, after discussingthe fact of the case of Batungbakalstatedhisopinion that the action of the Board of Directors ofthe NDCauthorizingthe payment ofback salaries to Batungbakal was legallyjustified for the reasonthat Batungbakalhadnot beensuspended and dismissedfor cause, and that as an employee of the NDc which is an agencyof the Government he couldnot be removed except for cause. The Senior Attorneyof the same office inanother memorandum to the Auditor General on the same matter said that he hadaninterview withcounselof Batungbakalregarding the latter's claim for backsalary, andmade reference to efforts of the Auditor's office towards a compromise and statedhis belief that the full back salary of Batungbakal could legally be paid by the Government becauseit covereda periodof onlythree years, andthat there was a precedent to support it, namely, that of Severo Yap, former Superintendent of the ofabout of Prisons who was paidhis back salaryfor a periodof about five years during hissuspension, and he expressed his belief that the office may not insist on further compromise.
- 85. 85 On February7, 1951,the Auditor Generalbyhis 2nd indorsement returned to the Administrator of Economic Coordinationthe resolutionadoptedbythe Boardof Directors of the NDCon November 8, 1950, authorizing the payment to Batungbakal of the sum of P7,820 as back salary from December 31, 1946 to October 31, 1950 with the following comment and recommendation: This office finds no specific provision of law under which payment to Mr. Batungbakal of the aforesaid amount of P7,820 may be authorized. The provisions ofsection260 of the RevisedAdministrative Code whichauthorizes payment to a suspended employee of his full salary corresponding to the whole period ofhis suspension upon hisexoneration or reinstatement may not be applied inthe instant case because, as will be noted from the facts stated in the withinletter of Mr. Batungbakal, datedOctober 2, 1950, he was not merely suspended from office but also dismissed from the service. In the case, however, of employees whowere dismissed from the service by the Commissioner of Civil Service but subsequentlyexonerated upon appeal to the Civil Service Board ofAppeals, it was ruledbythe President as a matter of policythat payment oftheir salaryfor the periodtheywere out of the service shallbe discretionaryon the part of the Department Head concerned. This ruling, it is believed, may be followed in the instant case. In view ofthe precarious financial condition of the National Development Company, the undersigned, pursuant to the aforesaid ruling, hereby authorizes the payment to Mr. Batungbakal ofhis salarycorrespondingonlyto the period from the date of his suspension on December 31, 1946 to December 31, 1947. On April 12, 1950, the Administrator of Economic Coordination inhis 3rd indorsement, returned said resolutionto the General Manager of the NDC informing him that in view of the reasons stated in the preceding indorsement, hisoffice had noobjection to the payment of the salary of Batungbakal from December 31, 1946 to December 31, 1947. On the basis of the facts above recited, Batungbakal apparentlydissatisfiedifnot disgusted with the treatment accorded him, filedthis case in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the NDC and Manuel Agregado as Auditor General with the following prayer: Wherefore plaintiff prays this Honorable court: (a) In the first cause of action, to order the officer-in-charge of the defendant NDC to reinstate the plaintiff into the service without any condition or qualification whatsoever; (b) In the secondcause of action, to order the Auditor General to approve the claim of the plaintifffor his back salaryfrom the time he was suspended on December 31, 1946 up to the time that he would be reinstated, and also to order the officer-in-charge ofthe NDCto paythe backsalaries of plaintiff for the above-stated period at the rate of P2,040 per annum; (c) To order the defendants to paythe plaintiff the sumof five thousandpesos (P5,000) representing damages and attorney's fees and also to order the defendants to pay the costs of this suit; and (d) To grant the plaintiff all other just and equitable relief. The defendants eachfiledananswer. Hearing was had on the preliminary issue raised by the Auditor General inhisanswer to the effect that the court hadno jurisdiction to entertain plaintiff's cause of actionagainst the Auditor General whose decisions are appealable onlyto the President of the Philippines or to Supreme Court defending onwhether the aggrievedpartyis a government officer or a private person, citingArticle XI, section 3, of the Constitution, Commonwealth Act 327, and Rule 45 of the Rulesof Court. The Auditor General further claimedthat his right and duty to appoint personnelandto approve accounts was discretionaryon his part andcouldnot be limited or compelled by mandamus. Ruling, that the court hadjurisdiction, it orderedthe case to be tried onits merits. After trial the lower court presided byJudge Fidel Ibañez rendered the decision now appealedfrom as related at the beginning of this opinion. To determine the right ofplaintiff Batungbakal to reinstatement and to back salaries, it is necessary to ascertain his status as an employee. Altho his salary was paid by the NDC, nevertheless, he was appointed by the Auditor General who under section 548 of the Administrative Code, is ex officio auditor of corporations like the NDCwherein the Government of the Philippines owns the majority stock. As such ex officio auditor, the Auditor General is authorized to appoint his representative in the saidcorporationas well as to appoint and fix the salaryand the number of personnelto assist saidrepresentative insaid work. Batungbakal was such employee inthe office of the comptroller or auditor of the NDC, under the control of the Auditor General. Althoughafter the reorganization ofthe NDCit became the practice for the NDC itself to appoint personnel in the office of the comptroller or companyauditor, nevertheless, the practice cannot override or supplant the legal provisions of the law, much lees affect the status of such personnel. In an opinionrenderedbythe Secretaryof Justice in his second indorsement of July 27, 1949, requested bythe Auditor General, the saidSecretary said that the auditor General controlled corporations referring to the Cebu PortlandCement Co. (whichhas the same status as the NDCas well as their subordinates are not corporate employees but agents of the Government and therefore theyare embraced inthe civil service. According to the Secretary of Justice this view was shared by the Commissioner of Civil Service himself. Article XII, section 4, of the Constitutionprovides that "no officer or employee inthe civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law." Section 694 of the Administrative Code has a similar provision. Interpreting these two laws, basis and statutory, we have held inthe case ofLacson vs. Romero,1 G.R. No. L-3081, 47 Off. Gaz., 1778 and De los Santos vs. Mallari2 G.R. No. L-3881, August 31, 1952, that a civil service official maynot be removed from office except for cause. We have here a case ofa civil service employee, suspended and later dismissed without case as shownbythe fact that after a reinvestigationhe was exonerated and found guiltlessof the chargesof grossnegligence filed against him, and was even recommended
- 86. 86 for reinstatement bytheGovernment Committee that investigated him. In other words, his suspensionandremoval were illegal and in violation not onlyof the Administrative Code but of the Constitutionitself. To remedythe evil and wrongcommitted, the least that couldbe done is to restore to him the office andpost of which he had beenillegallydeprived, and to include in that remedyor redresspayment ofthe salarywhichhe should have received during this period of illegal suspension and dismissal is far from unreasonable and unjust. But the Auditor General contends that under the law which gives him right to appoint the personnel in the office of the Comptroller of the NDC, he has full discretion to appoint or not to appoint anyperson inthat office; that as Auditor Generalvestedbythe Constitution and section 584 of the Administrative Code withjurisdictionover the accounts of the Government including claims against it, he alsohasfull discretion to grant or withhold backsalariescorresponding to the periodof suspension or dismissal ofanemployee appointed by him. I t is also claimed that to reinstate Batungbakal to his former position would mean the removal without cause of the present incumbent. We cannot agree withAuditor General. His theoryandcontentionifaccepted and followed would leadto anunfortunate and intolerable situation, incongruous with basic principles of justice and the constitutional protection of civil service employees against Government abuse and unjustifiedsuspension or removal. Without reference to the present Auditor General, let us imagine in the future an arbitrary and wrong-minded Auditor General dismissinganemployee from his office or inanoffice under hiscontrol, without cause, and later appointinganother person to the same position. Such dismissedemployee may establish to the satisfactionof the Government andthe courts that he was innocent andwas dismissed without reasonor cause, andyet under the theoryafore-mentioned, suchdismissed employee is utterly helplessand without redressbecause his reinstatement andthe payment of his back salary are whollywithin the Auditor General's discretionwhich maynot be controlledbymandamus to say nothing ofthe fact that having already filed the position, there is no vacancy to which the dismissed employee maybe re-appointed. The unreasonables and fallacy of the theory and contentionabove-mentionedis patentlyrevealed and brought home bythe case just imagined. When a citizenafter due hearingestablishes hisright incourt, said right is paramount andmust be given force and effect. The way must be cleared for its enforcement, and technicalities in procedure, judicial as well as administrative, must give away. Havingproven that he (the plaintiff)hadbeen suspendedanddismissedwithout cause, contrary to the express provisionof the Constitution, his reinstatement becomes a plainministerialduty of the Auditor General, a duty whose performance may be controlled and enjoined bymandamus.3 There is no room for discretion. The Auditor General is not being directed to perform anact whichhe mayor maynot execute accordingto his discretion. He is being asked and enjoinedto redress a grievance, to right a wrong done. Andthe payment of the back salary is merelyincidental to and follows reinstatement, this, aside from the parallel a nd analogy which maybe foundinsection260, paragraph1, RevisedAdministrative Code which provides for the payment of back salary upon reinstatement. It is further arguedthat Batungbakal not having appealed fromthe decisionof the Auditor General denying hisclaim to reisntatement andpayment of backsalary, as providedbyArticle XI, section 3, of the Constitution, the Jones Law, section 255, RevisedAdministrative Code, Commonwealth Act No. 327, section 2 thereof, and Rule 45, of the Rules ofCourt, saiddecisionhas become final and conclusive upon the executive branches of the Government, and he may not resort to the courts. This same questionwas raisedanddecided in the case of Ynchausti & Co. vs. Wright, 47 Phil., 866, where it was heldthat the failure to appeal fromthe Auditor's decisiondoes not affect claimant's right of redressinthe Courts, and that although the Organic Act provides that the "decision of the Auditor shall be final and conclusive upon the executive branches of the Government,"said Organic ACt does not provide that said decision shall be final and conclusive upon either the Legislature or the Judiciary. As for the contention that for the Auditor General to reinstate the plaintiffwouldbe tantamount to compelling him to dismisswithout cause the present incumbent who was appointed after plaintiff's dismissal, suffice it to saythat in sodoing, neither injustice nor violationof lawwouldbe committed. Inasmuchas Batungbakal was illegallysuspended and dismissed, legallyspeaking, his position never became vacant, hence there was novacancyto whichthe present incumbent could be permanentlyappointed. Inother words, the present incumbent's occupancy of or tenure in said post is temporary and precarios and does not come within the contemplation of the constitutionalprohibition. But, assuming for the moment that the incumbent's tenure were permanent andthat said tenure fell under the protection ofthe Constitution, still, his beingmade to leave the post to give wayto the plaintiff's superior right, mayyet be considered as removalfor cause, not unlike a case of quowarrantowhere a respondent incumbent is ousted by court order to give way to the successful party or petitioner. The decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs. Paras, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Bautista Angelo and Labrador, JJ., concur. Jugo, J., concurs in the result.