The document details a resolution regarding the petition against Simeon Barranco Jr., who was denied admission to the legal profession due to claims of immorality related to his relationship with Patricia Figueroa, with whom he had an illegitimate child. The court ultimately dismissed the complaint, determining that his actions did not amount to gross immorality justifying permanent exclusion from the bar, and allowed him to take his oath as a lawyer. Additionally, the document mentions other cases involving allegations of immorality against members of the legal profession, emphasizing the importance of maintaining good moral character within the bar.

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[SBC Case No. 519. July 31, 1997]
PATRICIA FIGUEROA, complainant, vs. SIMEON BARRANCO, JR.,
respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
ROMERO, J.:
In a complaint made way back in 1971, Patricia Figueroa petitioned
that respondent Simeon Barranco, Jr. be denied admission to the
legal profession. Respondent had passed the 1970 bar examinations
on the fourth attempt, after unsuccessful attempts in 1966, 1967
and 1968. Before he could take his oath, however, complainant filed
the instant petition averring that respondent and she had been
sweethearts, that a child out of wedlock was born to them and that
respondent did not fulfill his repeated promises to marry her.
The facts were manifested in hearings held before Investigator
Victor F. Sevilla in June and July 1971. Respondent and complainant
were townmates in Janiuay, Iloilo. Since 1953, when they were both
in their teens, they were steadies. Respondent even acted as escort
to complainant when she reigned as Queen at the 1953 town fiesta.
Complainant first acceded to sexual congress with respondent
sometime in 1960. Their intimacy yielded a son, Rafael Barranco,
born on December 11, 1964.i
[1] It was after the child was born,
complainant alleged, that respondent first promised he would
marry her after he passes the bar examinations. Their relationship
continued and respondent allegedly made more than twenty or
thirty promises of marriage. He gave only P10.00 for the child on
the latter’s birthdays. Her trust in him and their relationship ended
in 1971, when she learned that respondent married another woman.
Hence, this petition.
Upon complainant’s motion, the Court authorized the taking of
testimonies of witnesses by deposition in 1972. On February 18,
1974, respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss the
case citing complainant’s failure to comment on the motion of Judge
Cuello seeking to be relieved from the duty to take aforesaid
testimonies by deposition. Complainant filed her comment stating
that she had justifiable reasons in failing to file the earlier comment
required and that she remains interested in the resolution of the
present case. On June 18, 1974, the Court denied respondent’s
motion to dismiss.
On October 2, 1980, the Court once again denied a motion to
dismiss on the ground of abandonment filed by respondent on
September 17, 1979.ii
[2] Respondent’s third motion to dismiss was
noted in the Court’s Resolution dated September 15, 1982.iii
[3] In
1988, respondent repeated his request, citing his election as a
member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Janiuay, Iloilo from 1980-
1986, his active participation in civic organizations and good
standing in the community as well as the length of time this case has
been pending as reasons to allow him to take his oath as a lawyer.iv
[4]
On September 29, 1988, the Court resolved to dismiss the complaint
for failure of complainant to prosecute the case for an unreasonable
period of time and to allow Simeon Barranco, Jr. to take the lawyer’s
oath upon payment of the required fees.v
[5]
Respondent’s hopes were again dashed on November 17, 1988
when the Court, in response to complainant’s opposition, resolved
to cancel his scheduled oath-taking. On June 1, 1993, the Court
referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.
The IBP’s report dated May 17, 1997 recommended the dismissal of
the case and that respondent be allowed to take the lawyer’s oath.
We agree.

2. Respondent was prevented from taking the lawyer’s oath in 1971
because of the charges of gross immorality made by complainant.
To recapitulate, respondent bore an illegitimate child with his
sweetheart, Patricia Figueroa, who also claims that he did not fulfill
his promise to marry her after he passes the bar examinations.
We find that these facts do not constitute gross immorality
warranting the permanent exclusion of respondent from the legal
profession. His engaging in premarital sexual relations with
complainant and promises to marry suggests a doubtful moral
character on his part but the same does not constitute grossly
immoral conduct. The Court has held that to justify suspension or
disbarment the act complained of must not only be immoral, but
grossly immoral. “A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and
false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful
as to be reprehensible to a high degree.”vi
[6] It is a willful, flagrant,
or shameless act which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of
respectable members of the community.vii
[7]
We find the ruling in Arciga v. Maniwangviii
[8] quite relevant because
mere intimacy between a man and a woman, both of whom possess
no impediment to marry, voluntarily carried on and devoid of any
deceit on the part of respondent, is neither so corrupt nor so
unprincipled as to warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction
against him, even if as a result of such relationship a child was born
out of wedlock.ix
[9]
Respondent and complainant were sweethearts whose sexual
relations were evidently consensual. We do not find complainant’s
assertions that she had been forced into sexual intercourse,
credible. She continued to see and be respondent’s girlfriend even
after she had given birth to a son in 1964 and until 1971. All those
years of amicable and intimate relations refute her allegations that
she was forced to have sexual congress with him. Complainant was
then an adult who voluntarily and actively pursued their relationship
and was not an innocent young girl who could be easily led astray.
Unfortunately, respondent chose to marry and settle permanently
with another woman. We cannot castigate a man for seeking out
the partner of his dreams, for marriage is a sacred and perpetual
bond which should be entered into because of love, not for any
other reason.
We cannot help viewing the instant complaint as an act of revenge
of a woman scorned, bitter and unforgiving to the end. It is also
intended to make respondent suffer severely and it seems,
perpetually, sacrificing the profession he worked very hard to be
admitted into. Even assuming that his past indiscretions are ignoble,
the twenty-six years that respondent has been prevented from
being a lawyer constitute sufficient punishment therefor. During
this time there appears to be no other indiscretion attributed to
him.x
[10] Respondent, who is now sixty-two years of age, should
thus be allowed, albeit belatedly, to take the lawyer’s oath.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Respondent
Simeon Barranco, Jr. is ALLOWED to take his oath as a lawyer upon
payment of the proper fees.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza, Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., Hermosisima, Jr., and Torres, Jr., JJ., on leave
November 29, 1989
A.M. No. 3249 SALVACION DELIZO CORDOVA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. LAURENCE D. CORDOVA, respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
, J.:
In an unsworn letter-complaint dated 14 April 1988 addressed to
then Mr. Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee, complainant Salvacion
Delizo charged her husband, Atty. Laurence D. Cordova, with
immorality and acts unbecoming a member of the Bar. The letter-
complaint was forwarded by the Court to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline ("Commission"), for
investigation, report and recommendation.
The Commission, before acting on the complaint, required
complainant to submit a verified complaint within ten (10) days
from notice. Complainant complied and submitted to the
Commission on 27 September 1988 a revised and verified version of
her long and detailed complaint against her husband charging him
with immorality and acts unbecoming a member of the Bar.
In an Order of the Commission dated 1 December 1988, respondent
was declared in default for failure to file an answer to the complaint
within fifteen (15) days from notice. The same Order required
complainant to submit before the Commission her evidence ex
parte, on 16 December 1988. Upon the telegraphic request of
complainant for the resetting of the 16 December 1988 hearing, the
Commission scheduled another hearing on 25 January 1989. The
hearing scheduled for 25 January 1989 was rescheduled two (2)
more times-first, for 25 February 1989 and second, for 10 and 11
April 1989. The hearings never took place as complainant failed to
appear. Respondent Cordova never moved to set aside the order of
default, even though notices of the hearings scheduled were sent to
him.
In a telegraphic message dated 6 April 1989, complainant informed
the Commission that she and her husband had already "reconciled".
In an order dated 17 April 1989, the Commission required the
parties (respondent and complainant) to appear before it for
confirmation and explanation of the telegraphic message and
required them to file a formal motion to dismiss the complaint
within fifteen (15) days from notice. Neither party responded and
nothing was heard from either party since then.
Complainant having failed to submit her evidence ex parte before
the Commission, the IBP Board of Governors submitted to this Court
its report reprimanding respondent for his acts, admonishing him
that any further acts of immorality in the future will be dealt with
more severely, and ordering him to support his legitimate family as a
responsible parent should.
The findings of the IBP Board of Governors may be summed up as
follows:
Complainant and respondent Cordova were married on 6 June 1976
and out of this marriage, two (2) children were born. In 1985, the

3. couple lived somewhere in Quirino Province. In that year,
respondent Cordova left his family as well as his job as Branch Clerk
of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Cabarroguis, Quirino Province,
and went to Mangagoy, Bislig, Surigao del Sur with one Fely G.
Holgado. Fely G. Holgado was herself married and left her own
husband and children to stay with respondent. Respondent Cordova
and Fely G. Holgado lived together in Bislig as husband and wife,
with respondent Cordova introducing Fely to the public as his wife,
and Fely Holgado using the name Fely Cordova. Respondent Cordova
gave Fely Holgado funds with which to establish a sari-sari store in
the public market at Bislig, while at the same time failing to support
his legitimate family.
On 6 April 1986, respondent Cordova and his complainant wife had
an apparent reconciliation. Respondent promised that he would
separate from Fely Holgado and brought his legitimate family to
Bislig, Surigao del Sur. Respondent would, however, frequently come
home from beerhouses or cabarets, drunk, and continued to neglect
the support of his legitimate family. In February 1987, complainant
found, upon returning from a trip to Manila necessitated by
hospitalization of her daughter Loraine, that respondent Cordova
was no longer living with her (complainant's) children in their
conjugal home; that respondent Cordova was living with another
mistress, one Luisita Magallanes, and had taken his younger
daughter Melanie along with him. Respondent and his new mistress
hid Melanie from the complinant, compelling complainant to go to
court and to take back her daughter by habeas corpus. The Regional
Trial Court, Bislig, gave her custody of their children.
Notwithstanding respondent's promises to reform, he continued to
live with Luisita Magallanes as her husband and continued to fail to
give support to his legitimate family.
Finally the Commission received a telegram message apparently
from complainant, stating that complainant and respondent had
been reconciled with each other.
After a review of the record, we agree with the findings of fact of the
IBP Board. We also agree that the most recent reconciliation
between complainant and respondent, assuming the same to be
real, does not excuse and wipe away the misconduct and immoral
behavior of the respondent carried out in public, and necessarily
adversely reflecting upon him as a member of the Bar and upon the
Philippine Bar itself. An applicant for admission to membership in
the bar is required to show that he is possessed of good moral
character. That requirement is not exhausted and dispensed with
upon admission to membership of the bar. On the contrary, that
requirement persists as a continuing condition for membership in
the Bar in good standing.
In Mortel v. Aspiras, 1 this Court, following the rule in the United
States, held that "the continued possession ... of a good moral
character is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the
practice of the law ... and its loss requires suspension or disbarment,
even though the statutes do not specify that as a ground for
disbarment. " 2 It is important to note that the lack of moral
character that we here refer to as essential is not limited to good
moral character relating to the discharge of the duties and
responsibilities of an attorney at law. The moral delinquency that
affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such
includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral
standards of the community, conduct for instance, which makes "a
mockery of the inviolable social institution or marriage." 3 In Mortel,
the respondent being already married, wooed and won the heart of
a single, 21-year old teacher who subsequently cohabited with him
and bore him a son. Because respondent's conduct in Mortel was
particularly morally repulsive, involving the marrying of his mistress
to his own son and thereafter cohabiting with the wife of his own
son after the marriage he had himself arranged, respondent was
disbarred.
In Royong v. Oblena, 4 the respondent was declared unfit to
continue as a member of the bar by reason of his immoral conduct
and accordingly disbarred. He was found to have engaged in sexual
relations with the complainant who consequently bore him a son;
and to have maintained for a number of years an adulterous
relationship with another woman.
In the instant case, respondent Cordova maintained for about two
(2) years an adulterous relationship with a married woman not his
wife, in full view of the general public, to the humiliation and
detriment of his legitimate family which he, rubbing salt on the
wound, failed or refused to support. After a brief period of "reform"
respondent took up again with another woman not his wife,
cohabiting with her and bringing along his young daughter to live
with them. Clearly, respondent flaunted his disregard of the
fundamental institution of marriage and its elementary obligations
before his own daughter and the community at large.
WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the
practice of law indefinitely and until farther orders from this Court.
The Court will consider lifting his suspension when respondent
Cordova submits proof satisfactory to the Commission and this
Court that he has and continues to provide for the support of his
legitimate family and that he has given up the immoral course of
conduct that he has clung to.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco,
Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Gri
A.M. No. 3049 December 4, 1989
PERLA Y. LAGUITAN, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. SALVADOR F. TINIO, respondent.
Joanes G. Caacbay for respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
PER CURIAM:
In the instant Petition for Disbarment dated 21 May 1987, petitioner
Perla Y. Laguitan charged Atty. Salvador F. Tinio with immorality and
acts unbecoming a member of the Bar.
After answer was filed on 27 October 1987, the Court, in its
Resolution dated 16 November 1987, referred the Petition to the
Solicitor General for Investigation, Report and Recommendation.
During the initial hearing of this case by the Solicitor General on 17
February 1988, only respondent and his counsel appeared; it turned
out that complainant had not been duly served with notice of the

4. hearing. The hearing scheduled for 24 March 1988 was likewise
reset to 27 April 1988 upon motion of respondent and upon failure
of complainant to appear before the Office of the Solicitor General.
This case was eventually transmitted by the Solicitor General to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline
(Commission) for investigation and proper action. Thus, in an order
dated 18 August 1988, the Commission set the case for hearing on 9
September 1988 and required both complainant and respondent to
submit additional copies of their pleadings within ten (10) days from
notice.
The initial hearing set by the Commission for 9 September 1988 was
reset to 20 September 1988 because only complainant appeared,
respondent having failed to present himself despite due notice to
him. The hearing of 20 September 1988 was again reset to 20
October 1988 because neither complainant nor her counsel
appeared. The hearing for 20 October 1988 was once again reset to
14 November 1988 as only complainant appeared, Finally, the
hearing for 14 November 1988 was rescheduled two (2) more times,
first to 15 December 1988 and second to 17 January 1989.
In its Order dated 27 January 1989, the Commission, upon the
unexplained failure of respondent to appear at the hearing on 17
January 1989, required petitioner to make a formal offer of evidence
ex parte, and thereafter submit the case for resolution. The Order
was duly received by respondent's counsel on 31 January 1989.
On 9 February 1989, petitioner formally offered her exhibits as
follows:
1. Exh. 'A' — Certificate of Live Birth of Sheila
Laguitan Tinio.
Purpose: To show and prove the filiation of the
child as shown on the document;
2. Exh. 'B' —Certificate of Live Birth of Benedict
Laguitan.
Purpose: To show and prove likewise the filiation
of the child as shown on the document:
3. Exh. 'C' to 'C-6' — Receipts issued by the Mt.
Carmel Maternity and Children's Hospital.
Purpose: To prove that petitioner herein gave
birth to a baby girl at the Mt. Carmel Maternity
and Children's Hospital and for which
respondent paid the bills for the hospitalization,
medicines and professional fees of doctors;
4. Exh. 'D' to 'D-2' — Receipts issued by the
Paulino Medical Clinic.
Purpose: To show and prove that petitioner again gave birth to a
baby boy at said clinic and for which respondent paid the bill for
hospitalization, medicines and professional fees of doctors;
5. Exh. 'E' to 'E-l' — Baptismal certificates of
Sheila L. Tinio and Benedict L. Tinio, respectively
Purpose: To show and prove that respondent admits his paternity of
the children:
6. Exh. 'F' to 'F-4' — The family pictures showing
respondent either singly or with the rest of the
family during happier times.
Purpose: To show and prove that petitioner and respondent really
lived together as husband and wife and begot two children and the
respondent admits these through the pictures:
7. Exh. 'G' to 'G-3' — The school records of Sheila
L. Tinio at the St. Mary's Academy.
Purpose: To show and prove that respondent was supporting the
schooling of the children as he himself signed the correspondence
and was marked as Exh. 'G-2-A'. 1
Based on the aforequoted exhibits, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Board of Governors submitted to us its findings and
recommendation, which may be summed up as follows:
Sometime in June 1974, complainant and respondent Tinio met each
other and in time became lovers. Beginning in 1976, the parties lived
together as husband and wife. As a result, complainant bore
respondent two (2) children: Sheila, now about ten (10) years old
and Benedict, now approximately nine (9) years old. In the course of
this relationship, petitioner discovered that respondent Tinio, before
meeting her, had contracted marriage with someone else and that
the prior marriage was subsisting. Nonetheless, complainant
continued living in with respondent until eventually, ten (10) years
later, she and her children by respondent Tinio were abandoned by
the latter in November 1986. Feeling helpless and aggrieved, she
sought the help of respondent's parents in supporting her children
who were then already in school. Respondent's parents gave her
P400.00 and advised her not to see them again.
After examination of the record of this case and noting that
respondent Tinio appeared before the IBP Investigating
Commissioner and candidly admitted his illicit relationship with
complainant and his having begotten two (2) children by her, and
promised the Commissioner that he would support his illegitimate
children but had not lived to his promise, we agree with the findings
of fact of the IBP Board. The IBP Board recommends that respondent
Tinio be suspended from the practice of law "not for having
cohabited with the complainant, but for refusal to support his
illegitimate children," the suspension to remain in effect until
respondent Tinio complies with his obligation of support.
The Court agrees that respondent Tinio deserves to be suspended
from the practice of law but not merely because he has failed in his
obligation to support the children complainant bore him but also
because for a prolonged period of time, he lived in concubinage with
complainant, a course of conduct inconsistent with the requirement
of good moral character that is required for the continued right to
practice law as a member of the Philippine Bar, 2
Concubinage
imports moral turpitude and entails a public assault upon the basic
social institution of marriage.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent Salvador
F. Tinio from the practice of law until further orders from this Court.
The Court will consider lifting the suspension upon evidence
satisfactory to the Commission and to this Court that respondent is

5. supporting or has made provision for the support of his illegitimate
children and that he has given up his immoral course of conduct.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco,
Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and
Regalado, JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera, J., is on Leave.
A.M. No. 2697 April 19, 1991
ATTY. JOSE S. SANTOS, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. CIPRIANO A. TAN, respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
PER CURIAM:p
Complainant Atty. Jose S. Santos instituted on November 20, 1984
these disbarment proceedings against respondent Atty. Cipriano A.
Tan for alleged gross misconduct.
Specifically, the complainant who was then Acting Director of the
Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance under the Ministry (now
Department) of Agrarian Reform, charged the respondent with
having committed acts of immorality, falsification, and bigamy.
In the said complaint, Atty. Santos stated that the respondent, while
employed as Trial Attorney IV, with the Judicial Cases Division under
the aforesaid Department, maintained amorous relationship with a
married clerk, a certain Norma O. Pihid (nee Olea), who was then
directly under him. Eventually, the respondent got married to
Norma O. Pihid on April 27, 1981 before the Municipal Mayor of
Meycauayan, Bulacan, purportedly in an attempt to cover up their
illicit relations. 1
The complainant, moreover, alleged that the respondent falsified his
marriage contract with Norma O. Pihid by deliberately
misrepresenting himself as single, thus, deceiving the said mayor
into solemnizing the said marriage. 2
In the information sheet,
however, prepared and filed by the respondent prior to his
employment, he clearly stated therein that he was married to one
Emilia Benito Tan and had begotten eight (8) children with the latter.
3
Consequently, the complainant likewise charged the respondent
with bigamy since it appears from the records of the Local Civil
Registrar that he had previously contracted marriage with the said
Emilia A. Benito on January 6, 1941. The complainant asserted that
the said marriage continued to be valid and binding between the
said contracting parties when the respondent entered into a
subsequent manage with Norma O. Pihid on April 27, 1981. 4
Finally, the complainant averred that the respondent's second wife,
Norma O. Pihid, gave birth to a child by the respondent on
November 21, 1981 at the Children's Medical Center in Quezon City,
as evidenced by the birth certificate of the said child indicating his
name to be Noel Olea Tan. 5
On January 9, 1985, the Court acting on the said complaint for
disbarment required the respondent to submit his Answer.
The respondent in an Answer dated February 28, 1985, denied
having married Norma O. Pihid on April 27, 1981 and having
fathered a child by the name of Noel Olea Tan, although he admitted
being married to Emilia A. Benito. 6
As regards the charges of bigamy and falsification of official
documents, the respondent argued that the same were issues that
were properly the subject of a criminal case filed by the complainant
against him which was pending before the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos, Bulacan, Branch VI, and therefore raised a prejudicial
question in the present controversy. 7
Anent the charge of maintaining amorous relationship with Norma
O. Pihid, the respondent contended that the same charge had been
previously resolved in an Order dated October 1, 1982 issued by the
Minister (now Secretary) of the Ministry (now Department) of
Agrarian Reform. In the said order, the allegation of immorality
which was originally the content of an anonymous letter-complaint
was dismissed for being devoid of merit.
The respondent, in turn, suggested that the real and actual motive
behind the said complaint was traceable to the strong resentment
harbored by the complainant against the former whose services as
Chief Trial Attorney of the said Ministry (now Department) was
extended even beyond his retirement age at the request of the then
Minister (now Secretary) Conrado F. Estrella. The respondent
contended that he and the complainant did not see eye to eye with
respect to the handling and prosecution of agrarian cases. 8
By way of a counter-complaint, the respondent charged the
complainant with acts unbecoming of a lawyer and a member of the
Philippine Bar such as obtaining and utilizing confidential documents
without the necessary authorization, introducing a falsified
document as evidence in a court proceeding, and executing an
affidavit-complaint containing false statements. The respondent
further assailed the complainant for filing the said complaint based
on inadmissible and unfounded charges. 9
On March 25, 1985, the Court resolved to refer the said complaint to
the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation.
The Report and Recommendation submitted by the Solicitor General
on February 23, 1990, in part, states:
xxx xxx xxx
A thorough review of the record of the case duly
heard before the Office of the Solicitor General
in several protracted hearings, reveals the
existence of a ground for disbarment against
respondent.
Aside from claiming that the documents
presented by complainant were allegedly
unauthenticated, hearsay, self-serving, and his
defense of alibi at the time of the marriage on

6. April 27, 1981, respondent has miserably failed
in refuting the same and at the same time
presenting strong evidence to convince the
Solicitor General of the falsity of the charges
against him.
On April 27, 1981 respondent claims that he was
attending a government case at the then CFI of
Caloocan City (Exh. 9-A, rec.) while his alleged
second wife was at the Court of Appeals on
official business (Exhs. 6 & 11 A, rec.).
There are serious doubts in entertaining the
aforesaid defense.
A glance at the daily time records (Exhs. 9-A and
11-A, rec.) reveals that both entries of
respondent and Norma Olea were indicated on
the line covering April 26, 1981; secondly,
penmanship of the alleged entries for April 27,
1981 are the same; thirdly, the indicated time
in's of respondent and Norma Olea were the
same, i.e., 8:01 a.m.; fourthly, probability that
they were together is high because they were
both out of the office.
Assuming, arguendo, respondent's alibi that they
were married in Meycauayan, Bulacan, it was
highly probable and possible for both to proceed
to Meycauayan, Bulacan on April 27, 1981 since
the places where they were allegedly then is [sic]
not impossibly far from Meycauayan Bulacan.
Respondent even failed to specify the alleged
government case he was attending at the CFI of
Caloocan either by mentioning the title of the
case or by presenting other evidence aside from
his self-serving testimony.
With respect to the Birth Certificate (Exh. A) of
respondent's alleged son, the former has not
made a categorical denial that Noel Olea Tan is
NOT his son. He only argues that the birth
certificate is not authentic. Evidence for
complainant, however, shows that Exhibit A-5
was presented to show the authenticity of the
Birth Certificate contrary to respondent's claim
(pls. see Certification dated July 24, 1985 found
at the back of the Birth Certificate). Likewise,
respondent has not made any categorical denial
of his amorous relationship with Norma Olea
despite the existence of his first marriage with
Emilia Benito Tan.
For immorality to be a ground for disbarment, it
must be so gross, e.g., it is so corrupt and false
as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled
or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high
degree (Reyes v. Wong, 63 SCRA 667 [1975]).
The circumstances of the case definitely has put
respondent's moral character in doubt despite
non-conviction of the criminal case for bigamy
against respondent. The reputation of a lawyer
must be such that he be of good moral character
during the continuance of his practice and the
exercise of the privilege.
The findings are clear and convincing that
respondent entered into a second marriage
despite the existence of his first marriage and
that he begot a child with the second woman.
Definitely, such factual findings have put serious
doubt on respondent's moral character.
Respondent's main defense of alibi is rather too
weak a reason that he did not engage in an
immoral act. As earlier said, respondent has
neither categorically denied that Norma Olea is
his wife nor Noel Olea Tan is his son with Norma.
It appears, however, that respondent has retired
from government service on March 27, 1983. He
was sixty-five (65) years old on September 16,
1982 (Exh. 13, rec.), and therefore, e. the time of
the rendition of this report, respondent is now
seventy two (72) years old.
Considering that respondent has retired and is in
the twilight of his life, disbarment would be too
harsh a penalty to impose on respondent.
Suspension from the practice of law would be
proper for humanitarian reasons if respondent is
still actively engaged in practice.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS,
it is respectfully recommended that respondent
be adjudged guilty of immoral conduct,
unbecoming of a lawyer, and accordingly impose
the penalty of one (1) year suspension from the
active practice of law. 10
We agree with the said findings of the Solicitor General including his
favorable and compassionate consideration of the advanced age of
the respondent. Specifically, Rule 1.01 of Canon I of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that "a lawyer shall not engage
in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
Whatever the alleged motives of the complainant are, the
respondent has failed to controvert and refute the charges made by
the former. Even granting arguendo that the complainant was not
well-motivated in instituting these disbarment proceedings, the
same does not exculpate him from any liability resulting from his
grossly immoral conduct.
As regards the respondent's counter-complaint, the Solicitor General
in compliance with the Court's Resolution dated October 1, 1990,
submitted his Supplemental Report and Recommendation on
November 22, 1990, and found that the charges against the
complainant for acts unbecoming a member of the Philippine Bar
were all unsubstantiated. We agree with his findings and
recommendation on this regard which state:
No misconduct has been committed by Atty.
Santos contrary to Atty. Tan's accusations which
will warrant disciplinary action. If at all, Atty.
Tan's charges were merely in defense of the

7. charges against him (immorality) which the
Solicitor General has found to be supported by
the evidence. (cf.: Report and Recommendation
dated February 23, 1990, pp. 46-52, Records-
Adm. Cases)
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS,
it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Tan's
counter-complaint against Atty. Santos be
DISMISSED for being unsubstantiated. 11
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Cipriano A. Tan guilty of
immoral conduct in disregard of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the active practice of
law for a period of one (1) year. The counter-complaint against
complainant Atty. Jose S. Santos is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
Let this Decision be spread upon the personal records of the
respondent and copies thereof furnished to all courts.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras,
Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Grino-Aquino,
Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
A.M. No. 2349 July 3, 1992
DOROTHY B. TERRE, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JORDAN TERRE, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
In a sworn complaint filed with this Court on 24 December 1981,
complainant Dorothy B. Terre charged respondent Jordan Terre, a
member of the Philippine Bar with "grossly immoral conduct,"
consisting of contracting a second marriage and living with another
woman other than complainant, while his prior marriage with
complainant remained subsisting.
The Court resolved to require respondent to answer the complaint. 1
Respondent successfully evaded five (5) attempts to serve a copy of
the Court's Resolution and of the complaint by moving from one
place to another, such that he could not be found nor reached in his
alleged place of employment or residence. 2
On 24 April 1985, that is
after three (3) years and a half, with still no answer from the
respondent, the Court noted respondent's success in evading service
of the complaint and the Court's Resolution and thereupon resolved
to "suspend respondent Atty. Jordan Terre from the practice of law
until after he appears and/or files his answer to the complaint
against him" in the instant
case. 3
On 28 September 1985, respondent finally filed an Answer with a
Motion to Set Aside and/or Lift Suspension Order. In his Answer,
Atty. Terre averred that he had contracted marriage with
complainant Dorothy Terre on 14 June 1977 upon her
representation that she was single; that he subsequently learned
that Dorothy was married to a certain Merlito A. Bercenilla
sometime in 1968; that when he confronted Dorothy about her prior
marriage, Dorothy drove him out of their conjugal residence; that
Dorothy had mockingly told him of her private meetings with
Merlito A. Bercenilla and that the child she was then carrying (i.e.,
Jason Terre) was the son of Bercenilla; that believing in good faith
that his marriage to complainant was null and void ab initio, he
contracted marriage with Helina Malicdem at Dasol, Pangasinan. 4
In her Reply, complainant Dorothy denied that Jason Terre was the
child of Merlito A. Bercenilla and insisted that Jason was the child of
respondent Jordan Terre, as evidenced by Jason's Birth Certificate
and physical resemblance to respondent. Dorothy further explained
that while she had given birth to Jason Terre at the PAFGH
registered as a dependent of Merlito Bercenilla, she had done so out
of extreme necessity and to avoid risk of death or injury to the fetus
which happened to be in a difficult breech position. According to
Dorothy, she had then already been abandoned by respondent
Jordan Terre, leaving her penniless and without means to pay for the
medical and hospital bills arising by reason of her pregnancy.
The Court denied respondent's Motion to Set Aside or Lift the
Suspension Order and instead referred; by a Resolution dated 6
January 1986, the complaint to the Office of the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation. 5
Then Solicitor Pio C. Guerrero was appointed investigator by the
Office of the Solicitor General. He set the case for hearing on 7 July
1986 with notice to both parties. On 7 July 1986, complainant
Dorothy appeared and presented her evidence ex parte, since
respondent did not so appear. 6
The Investigating Solicitor scheduled
and held another hearing on 19 August 1986, where he put
clarificatory questions to the complainant; respondent once again
did not appear despite notice to do so. Complainant finally offered
her evidence and rested her case. The Solicitor set still another
hearing for 2 October 1986, notifying respondent to present his
evidence with a warning that should he fail once more to appear,
the case would be deemed submitted for resolution. Respondent did
not appear on 2 October 1986. The Investigating Solicitor
accordingly considered respondent to have waived his right to
present evidence and declared the case submitted for resolution.
The parties were given time to submit their respective memoranda.
Complainant Dorothy did so on 8 December 1986. Respondent Terre
did not file his memorandum.
On 26 February 1990, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted
its "Report and Recommendation" to this Court. The Report
summarized the testimony of the complainant in the following
manner:
Complainant Dorothy Terre took the witness
stand and testified substantially as follows: she
and respondent met for the first time in 1979 as
fourth year high school classmates in Cadiz City

8. High School (tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 9); she was then
married to Merlito Bercenilla, while respondent
was single (id.); respondent was aware of her
marital status (ibid, p. 14); it was then that
respondent started courting her but nothing
happened of the courtship (ibid, p. 10); they
[complainant and respondent] moved to Manila
were they respectively pursued their education,
respondent as a law student at the Lyceum
University (tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 12, 15-16);
respondent continued courting her, this time
with more persistence (ibid, p. 11); she decided
nothing would come of it since she was married
but he [respondent] explained to her that their
marriage was void ab initio since she and her
first husband were first cousins (ibid, p. 12);
convinced by his explanation and having secured
favorable advice from her mother and
ex-in-laws, she agreed to marry him
[respondent] (ibid, 12-13, 16); in their marriage
license, despite her [complainant's] objection, he
[respondent] wrote "single" as her status
explaining that since her marriage was void ab
initio, there was no need to go to court to
declare it as such (ibid, 14-15); they were
married before Judge Priscilla Mijares of the City
Court of Manila on June 14, 1977 (Exhibit A; tsn,
July 7, 1986, pp. 16-17); Jason Terre was born of
their union on June 25, 1981 (Exhibit B, tsn, July
7, 1986, p. 18); all through their married state up
to the time he [respondent] disappeared in
1981, complainant supported respondent, in
addition to the allowance the latter was getting
from his parents (ibid, pp. 19-20); she was
unaware of the reason for his disappearance
until she found out later that respondent
married a certain Vilma [sic] Malicdem (Exhibit C,
tsn, July 7, 1986, pp. 21-22); she then filed a case
for abandonment of minor with the City Fiscal of
Pasay City (ibid, p. 23) which was subsequently
filed before Branch II of the City Court of Pasay
City as Criminal Case No. 816159 (Exhibit D; tsn,
July 7, 1986, p. 24); she likewise filed a case for
bigamy against respondent and Helina Malicdem
with the office of the Provincial Fiscal of
Pangasinan, where a prima facie case was found
to exist (Exhibit E; tsn, July 7, pp. 25-26);
additionally, complainant filed an administrative
case against respondent with the Commission on
Audit where he was employed, which case
however was considered closed for being moot
and academic when respondent was considered
automatically separated from the service for
having gone on absence without official leave
(Exhibit F; tsn, July 7, 1986, pp. 28-29). 7
There is no dispute over the fact that complainant Dorothy Terre
and respondent Jordan Terre contracted marriage on 14 July 1977
before Judge Priscilla Mijares. There is further no dispute over the
fact that on 3 May 1981, respondent Jordan Terre married Helina
Malicdem in Dasol, Pangasinan. When the second marriage was
entered into, respondent's prior marriage with complainant was
subsisting, no judicial action having been initiated or any judicial
declaration obtained as to the nullity of such prior marriage of
respondent with complainant.
Respondent Jordan Terre sought to defend himself by claiming that
he had believed in good faith that his prior marriage with
complainant Dorothy Terre was null and void ab initio and that no
action for a judicial declaration of nullity was necessary.
The Court considers this claim on the part of respondent Jordan
Terre as a spurious defense. In the first place, respondent has not
rebutted complainant's evidence as to the basic facts which
underscores the bad faith of respondent Terre. In the second place,
that pretended defense is the same argument by which he had
inveigled complainant into believing that her prior marriage to
Merlito A. Bercenilla being incestuous and void ab initio (Dorothy
and Merlito being allegedly first cousins to each other), she was free
to contract a second marriage with the respondent. Respondent
Jordan Terre, being a lawyer, knew or should have known that such
an argument ran counter to the prevailing case law of this Court
which holds that for purposes of determining whether a person is
legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that
the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential. 8 Even if we
were to assume, arguendo merely, that Jordan Terre held that
mistaken belief in good faith, the same result will follow. For if we
are to hold Jordan Terre to his own argument, his first marriage to
complainant Dorothy Terre must be deemed valid, with the result
that his second marriage to Helina Malicdem must be regarded as
bigamous and criminal in character.
That the moral character of respondent Jordan Terre was deeply
flawed is shown by other circumstances. As noted, he convinced the
complainant that her prior marriage to Bercenilla was null and void
ab initio, that she was still legally single and free to marry him. When
complainant and respondent had contracted their marriage,
respondent went through law school while being supported by
complainant, with some assistance from respondent's parents. After
respondent had finished his law course and gotten complainant
pregnant, respondent abandoned the complainant without support
and without the wherewithal for delivering his own child safely in a
hospital.
Thus, we agree with the Solicitor General that respondent Jordan
Terre, by his actions, "eloquently displayed, not only his unfitness to
remain as a member of the Bar, but likewise his inadequacy to
uphold the purpose and responsibility of his gender" because
marriage is a basic social institution. 9
In Pomperada v. Jochico, 10
the Court, in rejecting a petition to be
allowed to take the oath as a member of the Bar and to sign the Roll
of Attorneys, said through Mme. Justice Melencio-Herrera:
It is evident that respondent fails to meet the
standard of moral fitness for membership in the
legal profession. Whether the marriage was a
joke as respondent claims, or a trick played on
her as claimed by complainant, it does not speak
well of respondent's moral values. Respondent
had made a mockery of marriage, a basic social
institution which public policy cherishes and
protects (Article 216, Civil Code). 11
In Bolivar v. Simbol, 12
the Court found the respondent there guilty of
"grossly immoral conduct" because he made a dupe of complainant,
living on her bounty and allowing her to spend for his schooling and
other personal necessities while dangling before her the mirage of a
marriage, marrying another girl as soon as he had finished his

9. studies, keeping his marriage a secret while continuing to demand
money from complainant. . . . ." The Court held such acts "indicative
of a character not worthy of a member of the Bar." 13
We believe and so hold that the conduct of respondent Jordan Terre
in inveigling complainant Dorothy Terre to contract a second
marriage with him; in abandoning complainant Dorothy Terre after
she had cared for him and supported him through law school,
leaving her without means for the safe delivery of his own child; in
contracting a second marriage with Helina Malicdem while his first
marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre was subsisting,
constituted "grossly immoral conduct" under Section 27 of Rule 138
of the Rules of Court, affording more than sufficient basis for
disbarment of respondent Jordan Terre. He was unworthy of
admission to the Bar in the first place. The Court will correct this
error forthwith.
WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DISBAR respondent Jordan Terre
and to STRIKE OUT his name from the Roll of Attorneys. A copy of
this decision shall be spread on the personal record of respondent
Jordan Terre in the Bar Confidant's Office. A copy of this resolution
shall also be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
shall be circularized to all the courts of the land.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin,
Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon and
Bellosillo, JJ., concur.
[A.C. No. 4148. July 30, 1998]
REMEDIOS RAMIREZ TAPUCAR, complainant, vs. ATTY. LAURO L.
TAPUCAR, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PER CURIAM:
In a letter-complaint dated November 22, 1993, complainant
Remedios Ramirez Tapucar sought the disbarment of her husband,
Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar, on the ground of continuing grossly immoral
conduct for cohabiting with a certain Elena (Helen) Peña under
scandalous circumstances.[1]
Prior to this complaint, respondent was already administratively
charged four times for conduct unbecoming an officer of the court.
in Administrative Matter No. 1740, resolved on April 11, 1980,
respondent, at that time the Judge of Butuan City, was meted the
penalty of six months suspension without pay,[2] while in
Administrative Matter Nos. 1720, 1911 and 2300-CFI, which were
consolidated,[3] this Court on January 31, 1981 ordered the
separation from service of respondent.[4]
Now he faces disbarment.
The records reveal the following facts:
From the Report and Recommendation of the Commission on Bar
Discipline, it appears that complainant and respondent were
married on October 29, 1953 at the Sacred Heart Roman Catholic
Church in Quezon City. They established their residence in Antipolo,
Rizal, were eight of their eleven children were born. In 1962
respondent relocated his family to Dadiangas, Cotabato (Now
General Santos City), where his last three children were born and
where he practiced his profession until his appointment as a CFI
Judge in Butuan City on January 30, 1976.
In August, 1976, shortly after being appointed as CFI Judge,
respondent began cohabiting with a certain Elena (Helen) Peña, in
Nasipit, Agusan Del Norte. On December 28, 1977 Elena gave birth
to their first child, named Ofelia Sembrano Peña.
In view of this cohabitation, a certain Atty. Tranquilino Calo filed an
administrative complaint against respondent for immorality. After
investigation, the penalty of suspension from office for a period of
six months without pay was meted by this Court upon respondent.
[5]
Despite this penalty, respondent still continued to cohabit with
Elena, giving rise to another charge of immorality and other
administrative cases, such as conduct unbecoming an officer of the
court, and grossly immoral conduct. These cases were consolidated
and after investigation, this Court ordered his dismissal and
separation from the service.[6]
But his dismissal as a judge did not impel respondent to mend his
ways. He continued living with Elena, which resulted in the birth on
September 20, 1989, of their second child named Laella Peña
Tapucar. Moreover, he completely abandoned complainant and his
children by her.
Respondent later moved from Nasipit, Agusan del Norte back to
Antipolo, Rizal, bringing along Elena and their two children. And on
March 5, 1992, respondent contracted marriage with Elena in a
ceremony solemnized by Metropolitan Trial Court Judge Isagani A.
Geronimo of Antipolo, Rizal. This was done while the respondent’s
marriage to complainant subsists, as nothing on record shows the
dissolution thereof.
Complainant, in the meanwhile, had migrated to United States of
America upon her retirement from the government service in 1990.
However, her children, who remained in Antipolo, kept her posted
of the misery they allegedly suffered because of their father’s acts,
including deception and intrigues against them. Thus, despite
having previously withdrawn a similar case which she filed in 1976,
complainant was forced to file the present petition for disbarment
under the compulsion of the material impulse to shield and protect
her children from the despotic and cruel acts of their own father.
Complainant secured the assistance of her eldest daughter, Atty.
Ma. Susana Tapucar-Baua, to represent her in this case.
Consistent with Section 20, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, the
matter was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline of the

10. Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation. After conducting a thorough investigation, the
Commission through Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez
recommended that respondent be disbarred, and his name be
stricken off the roll of attorneys. Mainly, this was premised on the
ground that, notwithstanding sanctions previously imposed upon
him by the Honorable Supreme Court, respondent continued the
illicit liaison with Elena.[7]
In his report Commissioner Fernandez noted that, instead of
contradicting the charges against him, respondent displayed
arrogance, and even made a mockery of the law and the Court, as
when he said:
“I have been ordered suspended by Supreme Court for two months
without pay in 1980 for having a mistress, the same girl Ms. Elena
(Helen) Peña, now my wife. Being ordered separated in later
administrative case constitute double jeopardy. If now disbarred for
marrying Ms. Elena Peña will constitute triple jeopardy. If that’s the
law so be it.”[8]
Based on said report, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, passed on May 17, 1997, a Resolution adopting
the Commissioner’s recommendation, as follows:
“RESOLUTION NO. XII-97-97
Adm. Case No. 4148
Remedios Ramirez Tapucar vs. Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-titled case, herein made part of the
Resolution/Decision as Annex “A”; and, finding the recommendation
therein to be fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, Respondent Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar is
hereby DISBARRED and that his name be stricken off the roll of
attorneys.”
We find the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner
Fernandez, as approved and adopted by the Board of Governors of
IBP, more than sufficient to justify and support the foregoing
Resolution, herein considered as the recommendation to this Court
by said Board pursuant to Rule 139-B, Sec. 12(b), of the Rules of
Court.* We are in agreement that respondent’s actuations merit the
penalty of disbarment.
Well settled is the rule that good moral character is not only a
condition precedent for admission to the legal profession, but it
must also remain intact in order to maintain one’s good standing in
that exclusive and honored fraternity.[9] There is perhaps no
profession after that of the sacred ministry in which a high-toned
morality is more imperative than that of law.[10] The Code of
Professional Responsibility mandates that:
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in
public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit
of the legal profession.*
As this Court often reminds members of the Bar, they must live up
to the standards and norms expected of the legal profession, by
upholding the ideals and tenets embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility always. Lawyers must maintain a high
standards of legal proficiency, as well as morality including honesty,
integrity and fair dealing. For they are at all times subject to the
scrutinizing eye of public opinion and community approbation.
Needless to state, those whose conduct – both public and private –
fails this scrutiny would have to be disciplined and, after appropriate
proceedings, penalized accordingly.
Moreover, it should be recalled that respondent here was once a
member of the judiciary, a fact that aggravates this professional
infractions. For having occupied that place of honor in the Bench, he
knew a judge’s actuations ought to be free from any appearance of
impropriety.[11] For a judge is the visible representation of the law,
more importantly, of justice. Ordinary citizens consider him as a
source of strength that fortifies their will to obey the law.[12]
Indeed, a judge should avoid the slightest infraction of the law in all
of his actuations, lest it be a demoralizing example to others.[13]
Surely, respondent could not have forgotten the Code of Judicial
Conduct entirely as to lose its moral imperatives.[14]
Like a judge who is held to a high standard of integrity and ethical
conduct,[15] an attorney-at-law is also invested with public trust.
Judges and lawyers serve in the administration of justice.
Admittedly, as officers of the court, lawyers must ensure the faith
and confidence of the public that justice is administered with dignity
and civility. A high degree or moral integrity is expected of a lawyer
in the community where he resides. He must maintain due regard
for public decency in an orderly society.
A lawyer is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity
of the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society,
to the bar, to the courts and to his clients.[16] Exacted from him, as
a member of the profession charged with the responsibility to stand
as a shield in the defense of what is right, are such positive qualities
of decency, truthfulness and responsibility that have been
compendiously described as “moral character.” To achieve such end,
every lawyer needs to strive at all times to honor and maintain the
dignity of his profession, and thus improve not only the public
regard for the Bar but also the administration of justice.
On these considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend a lawyer
for misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity,
which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty,
probity, and good demeanor, thus proving unworthy to continue as
an officer of the court.[17]

11. The power to disbar, however, is one to be exercised with great
caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct which seriously
affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the
Court of and member of the bar.[18] For disbarment proceedings
are intended to afford the parties thereto full opportunity to
vindicate their cause before disciplinary action is taken, to assure
the general public that those who are tasked with the duty of
administering justice are competent, honorable, trustworthy men
and women in whom the Courts and the clients may repose full
confidence.
In the case of Obusan vs. Obusan, Jr.,[19] a complaint for disbarment
was filed against a member of the bar by his wife. She was able to
prove that he had abandoned his wife and their son; and that he had
adulterous relations with a married but separated woman.
Respondent was not able to overcome the evidence presented by
his wife that he was guilty of grossly immoral conduct. In another
case,[20] a lawyer was disbarred when he abandoned his lawful wife
and cohabited with another woman who had borne him a child. The
Court held that respondent failed to maintain the highest degree of
morality expected and required of a member of a bar.
In the present case, the record shows that despite previous
sanctions imposed upon by this Court, respondent continued his
illicit liaison with a woman other than lawfully-wedded wife. The
report of the Commissioner assigned to investigate thoroughly the
complaint found respondent far from contrite; on the contrary, he
exhibited a cavalier attitude, even arrogance; in the face of charges
against him. The IBP Board of Governors, tasked to determine
whether he still merited the privileges extended to a member of the
legal profession, resolved the matter against him. For indeed,
evidence of grossly immoral conduct abounds against him and could
not be explained away. Keeping a mistress, entering into another
marriage while a prior one still subsists, as well as abandoning
and/or mistreating complainant and their children, show his
disregard of family obligations, morality and decency, the law and
the lawyer’s oath. Such gross misbehavior over a long period of
time clearly shows a serious flaw in respondent’s character, his
moral indifference to scandal in the community, and his outright
defiance of established norms. All these could not but put the legal
profession in disrepute and place the integrity of the administration
of justice in peril, hence the need for strict but appropriate
disciplinary action.
IN VIEW THEREOF, respondent Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar is hereby
DISBARRED. The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out his name
from the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Melo, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Martinez, and Quisumbing, JJ.,
concur.
Bellosillo, no part due to personal relationships.
Purisima, J., no part.
[A.C. No. 5333. October 18, 2000]
ROSA YAP PARAS, complainant, vs. ATTY. JUSTO DE JESUS PARAS,
respondent.
DECISION
MELO, J:
This has reference to a case for disbarment initiated by complainant
Rosa Yap Paras against her husband, Atty. Justo de Jesus Paras. The
parties exchanged tirades and barbs in their copious pleadings,
hurling invectives, cutting remarks and insults at each other.
Reduced to its essentials, Rosa Paras charged her husband with
dishonesty and falsification of public documents, harassment and
intimidation, and immorality for siring a child with another woman.
Respondent denied the allegations, contending that his wife, in
cahoots with her family, is out to destroy and strip him of his share
in their multi-million conjugal assets.
The parties come from wealthy families in Negros Oriental. They
were married on May 21, 1964 and have two grown-up children.
They have vast sugarlands and other businesses. Respondent was a
Municipal Judge for 14 years and served as Mayor in their town for 2
terms during the administration of President Aquino. Complainant is
a businesswoman. Sometime in 1988, their marriage fell apart when
due to "marital strain that has developed through the years,"
respondent left his wife and children to live with his mother and
sister in Dumaguete City and thence started his law practice.
Complainant, in the meantime, filed a case for the dissolution of
their marriage, which case is still pending in court.
The complaint charged:
DISHONESTY, FALSIFICATION and FRAUD
… respondent obtained loans from certain banks in the name
of complainant by counterfeiting complainant's signature,
falsely making it appear that complainant was the applicant
for said loans. Thereafter, he carted away and
misappropriated the proceeds of the loans.
. . . to guarantee the above loans, respondent mortgaged
some personal properties belonging to the conjugal partnership
without the consent of complainant.
GROSSLY IMMORAL CONDUCT AND CONCUBINAGE
Respondent is . . . engaged in the immoral and criminal act of
concubinage as he maintained an illicit relationship with one Ms.
Jocelyn A. Ching, siring an illegitimate child with her while married to
complainant.
UNETHICAL AND UNPROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Respondent abused courts of justice and misused his legal skills to
frighten, harass and intimidate all those who take a position
diametrically adverse to his sinister plans by unethically filing
complaints and other pleadings against them. He utilized strategies
to obstruct justice.

12. OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE
(Respondent) utilized strategies to obstruct justice. In the criminal
actions initiated against him, respondent used his legal skills not to
prove his innocence but to derail all the proceedings.
(Complaint, Rollo, p. 2)
In his Answer, respondent interposed the following defenses:
(1) On the Charge of Falsification of Public Documents:
That during the sugarboom in the 1970's, his wife executed in his
favor a Special Power of Attorney to negotiate for an agricultural or
crop loan authorizing him "to borrow money and apply for and
secure any agricultural or crop loan for sugar cane from the Bais
Rural Bank, Bais City . . ." (Rollo, Annex "3", p. 262)
(2) On the Charge of Forgery:
That the Report of the National Bureau of Investigation which found
that "the questioned signatures (referring to the alleged forged
signatures of complainant) and the standard sample signatures
JUSTO J. PARAS were written by one and the same person…"(Annex
"B" of the Complaint, Rollo, p. 26) was doctored, and that his wife
filed against him a string of cases for falsification of public
documents because he intends to disinherit his children and
bequeath his inchoate share in the conjugal properties to his own
mother.
(3) On the Charge of Grossly Immoral Conduct and
Concubinage:
That this is a malicious accusation fabricated by his brother-in-law,
Atty. Francisco D. Yap to disqualify him from getting any share in the
conjugal assets. He cites the dismissal of the complaint for
concubinage filed against him by his wife before the City Prosecutor
of Negros Oriental as proof of his innocence.
Respondent, however, admits that he, his mother and sister, are
solicitous and hospitable to his alleged concubine, Ms. Jocelyn Ching
and her daughter, Cyndee Rose (named after his own deceased
daughter), by allowing them to stay in their house and giving them
some financial assistance, because they pity Ms. Ching, a secretary
in his law office, who was deserted by her boyfriend after getting
her pregnant.
(4) On the Charge of Obstruction of Justice:
That "the legal remedies pursued by (him) in defense and offense
are legitimate courses of action done by an embattled lawyer."
The Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines investigated the complaint against respondent
summarizing the causes of action as follows:
(1) Falsification of complainant's signature and misuse of
conjugal assets; and
(2) Immorality and criminal acts of concubinage with one Ms.
Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching (for) siring an illegitimate child with her while
married to complainant, and, abandonment of his own family.
(Rollo, Report of the IBP, p. 34)
No actual hearing was conducted as the parties agreed to merely
submit their respective memoranda, depositions, and other pieces
of evidence attached to their pleadings.
Thereafter, the CBD found respondent guilty as charged and
recommended:
(1) Respondent's suspension from the practice of law for
three (3) months on the first charge; and
(2) Respondent's indefinite suspension from the practice of
law on the second charge.
(ibid., p. 57)
The CBD held that the dismissal of the criminal cases against
respondent for falsification and use of falsified documents (Criminal
Case No. 11768) and for concubinage (I.S. No. 93-578) will not bar
the filing of an administrative case for disbarment against him. In a
criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is required for
conviction, while in an administrative complaint, only a
preponderance of evidence is necessary.
The CBD gave credence to the NBI Report that "the questioned
signatures (referring to the signatures appearing in the loan
agreements, contracts of mortgage, etc.) and the standard sample
signatures of respondent were written by one and the same
person." This affirms the allegation of complainant Rosa Yap Paras
that her husband forged her signatures in those instruments.
Respondent denies this but his denial was unsubstantiated and is,
therefore, self-serving.
In finding respondent liable for Immorality, the CBD relied heavily on
the uncontroverted sworn affidavit-statements of respondent's
children and three other eyewitnesses to respondent's illicit affair
with Ms. Jocelyn Ching. For a better appreciation of their
statements, their affidavits are hereby reproduced in full. Thusly,
"I, DAHLIA Y. PARAS, of legal age, single, resident of Bindoy, Negros
Oriental, but presently living in Dumaguete City, after being duly
sworn hereby depose and say:
1. I am a nurse by profession. I finished my BSN degree at the
College of Nursing, Silliman University.
2. My mother is Rosa Yap Paras and my father Justo J. Paras.
My father has left the family home in Bindoy and now lives at his
mother's house at San Jose Ext., Dumaguete City.
3. My father has a "kabit" or concubine by the name of Ma.
Jocelyn Ching. They have a child named Cyndee Rose, who was
delivered at the Silliman University Hospital Medical Center on July
19, 1990.

13. 4. Jocelyn used to be the secretary of my father and Atty.
Melchor Arboleda when they practice law together in 1988 to 1989.
Their relationship started in 1989. When she became pregnant, my
father rented an apartment for her at the Amigo Subdivision,
Dumaguete City.
5. Following delivery of the baby, my father built a house for
Jocelyn in Maayong Tubig, Dauin, Negros Oriental. My father spend
time there often with Jocelyn and their child.
6. I used to visit my father at San Jose Extension these past
years, and almost every time I was there, I would see Jocelyn, sitting,
watching TV, serving coffee in my father's law office, and one time,
she was washing my father's clothes.
7. I first saw their child Cyndee Rose in 1992, about early
May, at San Jose Extension. I was there to ask for my allowance. He
was there at the time, and when I looked at Cyndee Rose closely, I
became convinced that she was my father's daughter with Jocelyn.
8. Incidentally, I had an elder sister also named Cindy Rose
(now deceased).
9. In September 1992 when I went to visit my father, I saw
toys and child's clothes in my father's room.
10. Whenever, I saw Jocelyn at San Jose Extension, I wanted to
talk to her or be alone with her, but she would deliberately avoid
me. I could see that she was hiding something from me." p. 109,
Records.
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT
x x x x x x x x x
1. . . . sometime during the period of April-September, 1992,
I made several visits to my father at his mother's house in San Jose
Extension, Dumaguete City, where he had moved after he left our
home in Bindoy;
2. That these visits were made on different times and
different days of the week;
3. That most of my visits, I would meet a woman who was
also living at my father's place. This woman is now known to me to
be Ma. Jocelyn Ching;
4. That my basis for observing that Ms. Ching was living in my
father's house is that during my visits, whether during office hours
or after office hours, I would meet her at my father's place, not his
office; she was wearing house clothes and slippers, such as skimpy
clothes, shorts and T-shirt, not street or office clothes; she was
generally unkempt, not made up for work or going out; on one
occasion, I even saw her, washing my father's clothes as well as a
small child's clothing; and she conducted herself around the house
in the manner of someone who lived there;
5. That on one of my visits, I confirmed that Ms. Ching was
living with my father from Josie Vailoces, who was then a working
student living at my father's place;
6. Ms. Vailoces subsequently confirmed under oath the fact
that my father and Ms. Jocelyn Ching were living together as
husband and wife at my father's place in a deposition taken in
connection with Civil Case No. 10613, RTC-Dumaguete City, Branch
30, the Honorable Enrique C. Garovillo, presiding. A copy of the
transcript of the deposition of Ms. Vailoces is already part of the
record of this case. For emphasis, photocopies of the pertinent
portion of the written deposition of Josie Vailoces is hereto attached
as Annexes "A"and "A-1." p. 111, Records
Respondent's son has this to say:
"I, RHOUEL Y. PARAS, 15 years old, single, resident of Bindoy, Negros
Oriental, but presently living in Dumaguete City, after being duly
sworn according to law, depose and say:
1. I am a high school student at the Holy Cross High School,
Dumaguete City.
2. My mother is Rosa Yap Paras, and my father Justo J. Paras,
a lawyer.
3. My father has left our home in Bindoy, and now lives at his
mother's house in San Jose Extension, Dumaguete City. He is not
giving us support any more.
4. However, from October 1991 to December 1992, I was
getting my allowance of P50.00 a week. I would go to their house at
San Jose Extension and personally ask him for it.
5. In October 1992, between 11:30 AM and 1:00 PM, I went
to San Jose Extension for my weekly allowance. I asked Josephus, an
adopted son of my father's sister, if my father was around. Josephus
said my father was in his room.
6. So I went direct to his room and because the door was not
locked, I entered the room without knocking. There I saw my father
lying in bed side by side with a woman. He was only wearing a brief.
The woman was wearing shorts and T-shirt.
7. They both appeared scared upon seeing me. My father
hurriedly gave me P100.00 and I left immediately because I felt bad
and embarrassed.
8. Before that incident, I used to see the woman at my
father's house in San Jose Extension. Every time I went to see my
father, she was also there.
9. I later came to know that she was Ms. Jocelyn Ching, and
that she was my father's "kabit" or concubine.
10. I am no longer getting my weekly allowance from my
father." p. 112, Records
Added to the foregoing sworn statements of respondent's children is
the damaging statement under oath of Virgilio Kabrisante who was
respondent's secretary when respondent was a mayor of Bindoy,
Negros Oriental which reads as follows:

14. "I, VIRGILIO V. KABRISANTE, of legal age, married, Filipino, a resident
of Malaga, Bindoy, Negros Oriental, after having been sworn in
accordance with law, do hereby depose and state that:
1. I personally know Justo J. Paras, having been his secretary
during his incumbency as Mayor of Bindoy, Negros Oriental. In fact,
through the latter's recommendation and intercession, I was later
on appointed as OIC Mayor of the same town from December 1986
to January 1987.
2. When Justo J. Paras decided to practice law in Dumaguete
City, I became his personal aide and performed various chores for
the same. As his personal aide, I stayed in the same house and room
with the latter.
3. Sometime in January 1989, Justo J. Paras confided to me
that he felt attracted to my lady friend named Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching.
He then requested me to invite the latter to a dinner date at Chin
Loong Restaurant.
4. Conveying the invitation which was accepted by Ma.
Jocelyn Ching, the latter, Justo J. Paras and myself then had dinner
at the above-mentioned restaurant.
5. At the behest of Justo J. Paras, I invited Ma. Jocelyn A.
Ching, on several occasions, always to a picnic at a beach in Dauin,
Negros Oriental. Said invitations were always accepted by the latter.
6. At each of the above-mentioned picnics, I observed that
Justo J. Paras and Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching had become more and more
intimate with each other.
7. Sometime in March 1989, at around 7:00 o'clock in the
evening on a Friday, I accompanied Justo J. Paras to the area in front
of the Silliman University Medical Center, where he said he was
going to meet someone.
8. After waiting for a few minutes, Ma. Jocelyn Ching arrived
and immediately boarded at the back seat of the Sakbayan vehicle I
was driving for Justo J. Paras. The latter then requested me to drive
both of them (Justo Paras and Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching) to Honeybee
Motel somewhere in Sibulan, Negros Oriental.
9. When we arrived there, Justo J. Paras asked me to wait for
them outside the room, while he and Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching entered
the said room.
10. I waited outside the room for about two (2) hours after
which the two of them emerged from the room. We then proceeded
to Chin Loong to eat supper.
11. After eating supper, we dropped Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching off
in front of the Dumaguete City Cockpit.
12. This meeting was repeated two more times, at the same
place and always on a Friday.
13. On April 3, 1988, I went home to Bindoy and stopped
working for Justo Paras." pp. 56-57, Records.
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT
x x x x x x x x x
1. Sometime in May 1989, I returned to Dumaguete City to
look for a job, having been jobless since I left Dumaguete City to go
home to Bindoy, Negros Oriental.
2. While looking for a job, I stayed at the house where my
friend, Bernard Dejillo was staying at Mangnao, Dumaguete City. My
friend Bernard Dejillo was occupying a room at the second floor of
the said house which he shared with me.
3. Sometime in the last week of May 1989, in the course of
my job hunting, I met Justo J. Paras. Having not seen each other for
some time, we talked for a while, discussing matters about the
barangay elections in Bindoy, Negros Oriental.
4. When our discussion was finished, Justo J. Paras asked me
where I was staying, to which I answered that I was staying at the
aforementioned house. He then requested me to find out if there
was an available room at the said house which he could rent with
Ma. Jocelyn A. Ching. I told him that I would have to ask my friend
Bernard Dejillo about the matter.
5. When I arrived at the house that evening, I asked my
friend Bernard Dejillo about the matter, to which the latter signified
his approval. He told me that a room at the first floor of the same
house was available for rental to Justo Paras and Ma. Jocelyn A.
Ching.
6. The next day, I immediately informed Justo J. Paras of
Bernard Dejillo's approval of his request.
7. Sometime in the first week of June 1989, Ma. Jocelyn
Ching moved in to the room she had rented at the first floor of the
house I was also staying at.
8. Almost every night thereafter, Justo J. Paras would come
to the house and stay overnight. When he came at night Justo J.
Paras and I would converse and while conversing, drink a bottle of
Tanduay Rum. Oftentimes, Ma. Jocelyn Ching would join in our
conversation.
9. After we finish drinking and talking, Justo J. Paras and Ma.
Jocelyn Ching would enter the room rented and sleep there, while I
would also go upstairs to my room.
10. The next morning I could always observe Justo J. Paras
came out of said room and depart from the house.
11. The coming of Justo J. Paras to the house I was staying
ceased after about one (1) month when they transferred to another
house.
12. I myself left the house and returned to Bindoy, Negros
Oriental some time in June 1989.
13. Sometime in January 1993, on a Saturday at about
noontime, I went to the house of Justo J. Paras to consult him about
a Kabataang Barangay matter involving my son. When I arrived at his
house, I noticed that the same was closed and there was no one
there.

15. 14. Needing to consult him about the above-mentioned
matter, I proceeded to the resthouse of Justo J. Paras located at
Maayong Tubig, Dauin, Negros Oriental.
15. When I arrived at the said resthouse, Justo J. Paras was not
there but the person in charge of the said resthouse informed me
that Justo J. Paras was at his house at Barangay Maayong Tubig,
Dauin, Negros Oriental. The same person also gave me directions so
that I could locate the house of Justo J. Paras he referred to earlier.
16. With the help of the directions given by said person, I was
able to locate the house of Justo J. Paras.
17. At the doorway of the said house, I called out if anybody
was home while knocking on the door.
18. After a few seconds, Ma. Jocelyn Ching opened the door.
Upon seeing the latter, I asked her if Justo J. Paras was home. She
then let me in the house and told me to sit down and wait for a
while. She then proceeded to a room.
19. A few minutes later, Justo J. Paras came out of the same
room and sat down near me. I noticed that the latter had just woke
up from a nap.
20. We then started to talk about the matter involving my son
and sometime later, Ma. Jocelyn Ching served us coffee.
21. While we were talking and drinking coffee I saw a little girl,
about three (3) years old, walking around the sala, whom I later
came to know as Cyndee Rose, the daughter of Justo J. Paras and
Ma. Jocelyn Ching.
22. After our conversation was finished, Justo J. Paras told me
to see him at this office at San Jose Extension, Dumaguete City, the
following Monday to discuss the matter some more.
23. I then bid them goodbye and went home to Bindoy,
Negros Oriental.
24. I am executing this affidavit as a supplement to my
affidavit dated 22 July 1993." pp. 58-60, Records
(ibid., pp. 44-52)
The CBD likewise gave credence to the sworn affidavits and the
deposition of two other witnesses, namely, Salvador de Jesus, a
former repairman of the Paras' household, and, Josie Vailoces, a
working student and former ward of the Paras' family, who both
gave personal accounts of the illicit relationship between
respondent and Jocelyn Ching, which led to the birth of Cyndee
Rose. De Jesus swore that while doing repair works in the Paras'
household he observed Ms. Ching and Cyndee Rose practically living
in the Paras' house (p. 85, Rollo, Annex "H"). Vailoces, on the other
hand, deposed that she was asked by respondent Paras to deliver
money to Ms. Ching for the payment of the hospital bill after she
gave birth to Cyndee Rose. Vailoces was also asked by respondent to
procure Cyndee Rose Paras' baptismal certificate after the latter was
baptized in the house of respondent; she further testified that in
said baptismal certificate, respondent appears as the father of
Cyndee Rose which explains why the latter is using the surname
"Paras." (p. 87, Annex "I", Rollo)
The findings and the recommendations of the CBD are substantiated
by the evidentiary record.
ON THE CHARGE OF FALSIFICATION OF COMPLAINANT'S SIGNATURE
The handwriting examination conducted by the National Bureau of
Investigation on the signatures of complainant Rosa Yap Paras and
respondent Justo de Jesus Paras vis-à-vis the questioned signature
"Rosa Y. Paras" appearing in the questioned bank loan documents,
contracts of mortgage and other related instrument, yielded the
following results:
CONCLUSION:
1. The questioned and the standard sample signatures JUSTO
J. PARAS were written by one and the same person.
2. The questioned and the standard sample signatures ROSA
YAP PARAS were not written by one and the same person.
(Annex "B", Rollo, p. 26, emphasis ours;)
The NBI did not make a categorical statement that respondent
forged the signatures of complainant. However, an analysis of the
above findings lead to no other conclusion than that the questioned
or falsified signatures of complainant Rosa Y. Paras were authored
by respondent as said falsified signatures were the same as the
sample signatures of respondent.
To explain this anomaly, respondent presented a Special Power of
Attorney (SPA) executed in his favor by complainant to negotiate for
an agricultural or crop loan from the Bais Rural Bank of Bais City.
Instead of exculpating respondent, the presence of the SPA places
him in hot water. For if he was so authorized to obtain loans from
the banks, then why did he have to falsify his wife's signatures in the
bank loan documents? The purpose of an SPA is to especially
authorize the attorney-in-fact to sign for and on behalf of the
principal using his own name.
ON THE CHARGE OF IMMORALITY AND CONCUBINAGE
The evidence against respondent is overwhelming. The affidavit-
statements of his children and three other persons who used to
work with him and have witnessed the acts indicative of his infidelity
more than satisfy this Court that respondent has strayed from the
marital path. The baptismal certificate of Cyndee Rose Paras where
respondent was named as the father of the child (Annex "J", Rollo, p.
108); his naming the child after his deceased first-born daughter
Cyndee Rose; and his allowing Jocelyn Ching and the child to live in
their house in Dumaguete City bolster the allegation that
respondent is carrying on an illicit affair with Ms. Ching, the mother
of his illegitimate child.
It is a time-honored rule that good moral character is not only a
condition precedent to admission to the practice of law. Its
continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice
of law (People vs. Tunda, 181 SCRA 692 [1990]; Leda vs. Tabang, 206
SCRA 395 [1992]). In the case at hand, respondent has fallen below

16. the moral bar when he forged his wife's signature in the bank loan
documents, and, sired a daughter with a woman other than his wife.
However, the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution,
and only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the
standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and
as a member of the bar (Tapucar vs. Tapucar, Adm. Case No. 4148,
July 30, 1998). Disbarment should never be decreed where any
lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, could accomplish the
end desired (Resurrecion vs. Sayson, 300 SCRA 129 [1998]).
In the light of the foregoing, respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS on the charge of falsifying his
wife's signature in bank documents and other related loan
instruments; and for ONE (1) YEAR from the practice of law on the
charges of immorality and abandonment of his own family, the
penalties to be served simultaneously. Let notice of this decision be
spread in respondent's record as an attorney, and notice of the
same served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the
Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts
concerned.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Panganiban, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
[A.C. No. 4881. October 8, 2003.]
RAU SHENG MAO, Complainant, v. ATTY. ANGELES A. VELASCO,
Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Complainant is a Taiwanese national. He came to the Philippines to
invest in a beach resort for leisure and recreation. He engaged the
services of respondent as legal consultant and retained counsel.
Complainant now seeks his disbarment for gross misconduct and
immorality. 1chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Complainant Rau Sheng Mao narrates that sometime in 1993 he
hired respondent Atty. Angeles A. Velasco as his legal consultant and
counsel for his company, the Foreign Investors Consultancy and
Management Inc. (FICMI). As he was new in the country, he trusted
the business judgment of respondent who crowed about his being
president of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Virac,
Catanduanes Chapter.
A year later, complainant, in his capacity as President of FICMI,
entered into a Management Agreement with Haru Gen Beach Resort
and Hotel Corporation ("Haru Gen") for the operation and
management of Twin Rock Beach Resort in Virac, Catanduanes. Haru
Gen was represented in this transaction by respondent as director
and stockholder. After concluding the management agreement,
respondent sold complainant his ten thousand shares of stock with
Haru Gen for P1,000,000.00. Complainant alleges that although he
had fully paid for the shares, as evidenced by receipts acknowledged
by respondent, the latter failed and refused to deliver the
certificates for the purchased shares.
Complainant also alleges that respondent persuaded him to buy
three (3) parcels of land belonging to the latter for P3,660,800.00.
Although he paid respondent P3,300,000.00, the latter reneged on
his obligation to deliver the certificates of title covering the
purchased properties.
To further complicate his woes, in the course of FICMI’s
management of Twin Rock Beach Resort, several complaints were
filed against him by former employees of the beach resort.
Respondent acted as his counsel and in the course of their
professional relationship respondent asked for several sums of
money purportedly to be given to the judges hearing his cases. In
one of his letters to complainant, respondent wrote — "the judge
(whom he did not identify) was not contented of the P6,000.00
claiming that he dismissed two (2) cases. I suggest that you give
additional P5,000.00 . . ." 2 In another letter he reported to
complainant that "Judge Barsaga has already rendered the decision
in my case regarding the three (3) parcels of land . . . He is asking —
‘Christmas gift’ . . ." 3
Complainant also claims that respondent represented him in the
special proceedings involving the settlement of the estate of the
deceased Miharu Matsuzawa where he (complainant) was
appointed administrator. Thereafter however their relationship
turned sour and respondent did not only sever their professional
relationship but went further and moved for the revocation of
complainant’s appointment as administrator.chanrob1es virtua1
1aw 1ibrary
Lastly, complainant charges respondent with immorality for
flaunting his illicit relationship with a certain Ludy Matienzo despite
his being legally married to one Rosita Velasco. Complainant
declares that the affaire d’ amour, which was common knowledge in
the place, produced three (3) children, namely, Jesebeth, Jenny and
Jenneth, all of whom were acknowledged by respondent as his own.
Respondent denies the allegations and insists that he could not have
deceived complainant in their business dealings inasmuch as the
latter was represented in all their transactions by Atty. Ricardo B.
Purog, Jr. Insofar as the charge of non-delivery of the purchased
shares of stock is concerned, he asserts that complainant very well
knew that he had not paid for his shares hence his failure to
immediately deliver the certificates corresponding to the shares
sold. As for the non-delivery of the certificates of title covering the
three (3) parcels of land, respondent avers that he had told
complainant that the purchased properties were still under
litigation.
Without disclaiming authorship of any of the letters presented by
complainant where respondent bragged about his influence over
judges, respondent avers that in all his thirty-five (35) years of
practice he had never asked favors from judges nor privately sought
an audience with them. He likewise denies having had any
relationship with Ludy Matienzo and in support thereof he
presented the affidavit of Ludy Matienzo refuting the imputed
relationship between them as well as the affidavit of his wife Rosita
attesting to his fidelity. 4
In retort to respondent’s denial of fathering any of Ludy Matienzo’s
daughters, complainant presented in evidence the baptismal
certificate of Jenny M. Velasco which listed respondent Angeles
Velasco as her father and Ludy Matienzo as her mother. 5 He
likewise presented affidavits of several persons residing within the
municipality, including a lawyer, a court employee and a neighbor of
the Matienzos, confirming respondent’s intimate relationship with

17. Ludy Matienzo. 6
Consistent with Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, the matter was
referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation.
After conducting a thorough investigation, the Commission
recommended that respondent Atty. Angeles A. Velasco be
"suspended for a period of at least two (2) years." Mainly, the
recommendation was premised on the ground that notwithstanding
complainant’s failure to support his allegation that respondent
duped him in their business transactions, the evidence on record
supports the charge of immorality against Respondent. Also,
respondent by writing letters to complainant boasting about being
able to influence judges undermined the integrity of the
judiciary.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Upon a review of the records, we are convinced that respondent’s
conduct leaves much to be desired. We however agree with the
findings of the Investigating Commissioner that complainant was as
not as gullible in his business dealings with respondent as he
presented himself to be. The Commission found it unlikely for
complainant to have been deceived by respondent inasmuch as the
former was represented by his own counsel Atty. Purog, Jr. in all his
business transactions with the latter. Thus, complainant could not
have been misled by respondent with respect to the import of their
contracts regarding the sale of the shares of stock with Haru Gen as
well as the sale of the three (3) parcels of land. Nonetheless,
respondent must still be chastised for his grossly immoral conduct.
Respondent Atty. Angeles A. Velasco has been living an adulterous
life with Ludy Matienzo with whom he has three (3) children. The
children bear respondent’s surname; their school records even refer
to their mother Ludy Matienzo as "Ludy M. Velasco." By flaunting his
relationship with a woman not his wife respondent has transgressed
the high moral standard required for membership in the bar.
Under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. It may be difficult to specify the degree of moral
delinquency that may qualify an act as immoral, yet, for purposes of
disciplining a lawyer, immoral conduct has been defined as that
"conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a
moral indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the
community." 7 Thus, in several cases, the Court did not hesitate to
discipline a lawyer for keeping a mistress in defiance of the mores
and sense of morality of the community. 8
As keepers of the public faith, lawyers are burdened with the highest
degree of social responsibility and thus must handle their personal
affairs with the greatest caution. They are expected at all times to
maintain due regard for public decency in the community where
they live. Their exalted positions as officers of the court demand no
less than the highest degree of morality. Indeed, those who have
taken the oath to assist in the dispensation of justice should be more
possessed of the consciousness and the will to overcome the
weakness of the flesh.
What is more, respondent has violated another basic tenet of legal
ethics — he has given complainant the impression that he was in a
position to influence the court. 9 Thus, in a series of letters
presented by complainant, which respondent meekly claimed were
private communications between them, respondent trumpeted his
connection with judges and their supposed demand for money. A
lawyer is duty bound to avoid improprieties which give the
appearance of influencing the court. Respondent’s actions could not
but place the integrity of the administration of justice in peril, hence
the need for strict disciplinary action.chanrob1es virtual law library
On these considerations, we feel strongly the impulse to purge
respondent from the ranks of our noble profession. However,
considering that he is in the declining years of his life 10 and has
rendered years of service to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines as
President of the Virac, Catanduanes Chapter, we feel that
disbarment would be too harsh a penalty for him. Hence, a
suspension of two (2) years, as recommended by the Commission on
Bar Discipline, would suffice as a punitive but compassionate
disciplinary measure.
Indeed, no profession offers greater opportunity for public service
than that of a lawyer. For the privilege conferred upon him, a lawyer
is tasked with the equally great responsibility of upholding the ethics
and ideals established by the learned lawyers of ancient times. Into
his hands are entrusted the life, liberty and property of a trusting
man. The only guarantee that this trust will be carried with honor
is;the character of the lawyer. Such character, on the other hand,
can only be observed through one’s reputation and conduct. Thus,
when a lawyer so deports himself that confidence can no longer be
rested in him without fear, his usefulness to the court and to the
society ceases.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Angeles A. Velasco is SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for two (2) years from notice, with warning
that a repetition of the acts charged will be dealt with more
severely. Respondent is further ordered to notify this Court of his
receipt of this Decision.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts in the land, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant,
and let it be spread in respondent’s personal record.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-
Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio
Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Corona, J., is on leave.
A.M. No. 1334 November 28, 1989
ROSARIO DELOS REYES, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOSE B. AZNAR, respondent.
Federico A. Blay for complainant.
Luciano Babiera for respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
This is a complaint for disbarment filed against respondent on the
ground of gross immorality.

18. Complainant, a second year medical student of the Southwestern
University (Cebu), alleged in her verified complaint that respondent
Atty. Jose B. Aznar, then chairman of said university, had carnal
knowledge of her for several times under threat that she would fail
in her Pathology subject if she would not submit to respondent's
lustful desires. Complainant further alleged that when she became
pregnant, respondent, through a certain Dr. Gil Ramas, had her
undergo forced abortion.
In compliance with the Resolution of the Court dated July 9, 1974,
respondent filed his Answer denying any personal knowledge of
complainant as well as all the allegations contained in the complaint
and by way of special defense, averred that complainant is a woman
of loose morality.
On September 2, 1974, the Court Resolved to refer the case to the
Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation.
The findings of the Solicitor General is summarized as follows:
EVIDENCE FOR THE COMPLAINANT
Complainant Rosario delos Reyes testified that:
1) she was a second year medical student of the Southwestern
University, the Chairman of the Board of which was respondent Jose
B. Aznar (pp. 11, 15, tsn, June 6, 1975);
2) she however failed in her Pathology subject which
prompted her to approach respondent in the latter's
house who assured her that she would pass the said
subject (pp. 15,16, 26, 33, tsn, June 6, 1975);
3) despite this assurance, however, she failed (p. 33, tsn,
June 6, 1975);
4) sometime in February, 1973, respondent told her that
she should go with him to Manila, otherwise, she would
flunk in all her subjects (pp. 42, 50, tsn, June 6,
1975); ... ... ... ;
5) on February 12, 1973, both respondent and
complainant boarded the same plane (Exh. "A") for
Manila; from the Manila Domestic Airport, they proceeded
to Room 905, 9th Floor of the Ambassador Hotel where
they stayed for three days (Exhs. "K", "K-1" to "K-6"; p. 55,
tsn, June 6, 1 975);
6) after arriving at the Ambassador Hotel, they dined at a
Spanish restaurant at San Marcelino, Malate, Manila for
around three hours (pp 56-57, tsn, June 6, 1975);
7) they returned to the hotel at around twelve o'clock
midnight, where respondent had carnal knowledge of her
twice and then thrice the next morning (p. 59, tsn, June 6,
1975; pp. 154, 155 & 157, tsn, July 18, 1975);
8) complainant consented to the sexual desires of
respondent because for her, she would sacrifice her
personal honor rather than fail in her subjects (p.6l, tsn,
June 6, 1975); ... ... ...;
9) sometime in March, 1973, complainant told respondent
that she was suspecting pregnancy because she missed her
menstruation (p. 76, tsn, July 17, 1975); ... ... ...;
10) later, she was informed by Dr. Monsanto (an instructor
in the college of medicine) that respondent wanted that
an abortion be performed upon her (p.82, tsn, July l7,
1975); ... ... ... ;
11) thereafter, Ruben Cruz, a confidant of respondent, and
Dr. Monsato fetched her at her boarding house on the
pretext that she would be examined by Dr. Gil Ramas (pp.
87-88, tsn, July 17, 1975);
12) upon reaching the clinic of Dr. Ramas she was given an
injection and an inhalation mask was placed on her mouth
and nose (pp. 88-90, tsn, July 17, 1 975);
13) as a result, she lost consciousness and when she woke
up, an abortion had already been performed upon her and
she was weak, bleeding and felt pain all over her body (pp.
90-91, tsn, July 17, 1975); ... ... ... (Rollo, pp. 38-40)
Monica Gutierrez Tan testified that she met
complainant and a man whom complainant
introduced as Atty. Aznar in front of the
Ambassador Hotel (pp. 183-184, tsn, Sept. 10,
1975; Rollo, p. 41).
Dr. Rebecca Gucor and Dr. Artemio Ingco, witnesses for the
complainant, testified that abdominal examinations and x-ray
examination of the lumbro-sacral region of complainant showed no
signs of abnormality (Rollo, p. 42).
The evidence for the respondent as reported by the Solicitor General
is summarized as follows:
Edilberto Caban testified that:
1. In December, 1972, respondent Atty. Aznar stayed at
Ambassador Hotel with his wife and children; respondent
never came to Manila except in December, 1972; (pp. 8-9,.
tsn, Nov. 24, 1977);
2. He usually slept with respondent everytime the latter
comes to Manila (p. 13, tsn, Nov. 24, 1977; Rollo, pp. 42-
43).
Oscar Salangsang, another witness for the respondent stated that:
1. In February, 1973, he went to Ambassador Hotel to
meet respondent; the latter had male companions at the
hotel but he did not see any woman companion of
respondent Aznar;
2. He usually slept with respondent at the Ambassador
Hotel and ate with him outside the hotel together with
Caban (pp. 8-9, 13-15, tsn, Jan. 13, 1978; Rollo, p. 43).

19. The Court notes that throughout the period of the investigation
conducted by the Solicitor General, respondent Aznar was never
presented to refute the allegations made against him.
In his Answer, respondent Aznar alleges that he does not have any
knowledge of the allegations in the complaint. As special defense,
respondent further alleged that the charge levelled against him is in
furtherance of complainant's vow to wreck vengeance against
respondent by reason of the latter's approval of the
recommendation of the Board of Trustees barring complainant from
enrollment for the school year 1973-1974 because she failed in most
of her subjects. It is likewise contended that the defense did not
bother to present respondent in the investigation conducted by the
Solicitor General because nothing has been shown in the hearing to
prove that respondent had carnal knowledge of the complainant.
Contrary to respondent's averments, the Solicitor General made a
categorical finding to the effect that respondent had carnal
knowledge of complainant, to wit:
From the foregoing, it is clear that complainant was
compelled to go to Manila with respondent upon the
threat of respondent that if she failed to do so, she would
flunk in all her subjects and she would never become a
medical intern (pp. 42, 50, tsn, June 6, 1975). As
respondent was Chairman of the College of Medicine,
complainant had every reason to believe him.
It has been established also that complainant was brought
by respondent to Ambassador Hotel in Manila for three
days where he repeatedly had carnal knowledge of her
upon the threat that if she would not give in to his lustful
desires, she would fail in her Pathology subject (Exhs. "A",
"K", "K-1" to "K-6" pp. 51, 52, 55-59, tsn, June 6, 1975);
xxx xxx xxx
On the other hand, respondent did not bother to appear
during the hearing. It is true that he presented Edilberto
Caban and Oscar Salangsang who testified that respondent
usually slept with them every time the latter came to
Manila, but their testimony (sic) is not much of help. None
of them mentioned during the hearing that they stayed
and slept with respondent on February 12 to February 14,
1973 at Ambassador Hotel. ... ... ... Besides, Edilberto
Caban testified that respondent stayed at Ambassador
Hotel with his wife and children in December, 1972. The
dates in question, however, are February 12 to 14, 1973,
inclusive. His (Caban's) testimony, therefore, is immaterial
to the present case" (Rollo, pp. 43-44).
In effect, the Solicitor General found that the charge of immorality
against respondent Aznar has been substantiated by sufficient
evidence both testimonial and documentary; while finding
insufficient and uncorroborated the accusation of intentional
abortion. The Solicitor General then recommends the suspension of
respondent from the practice of law for a period of not less than
three (3) years.
On March 16, 1989, the Court Resolved to require the parties to
Move in the premises to determine whether any intervening event
occurred which would render the case moot and academic (Rollo, p.
69).
On April 12, 1989, the Solicitor General filed a manifestation and
motion praying that the case at bar be considered submitted for
decision on the bases of the report and recommendation previously
submitted together with the record of the case and the evidence
adduced (Rollo, p. 75).
After a thorough review of the records, the Court agrees with the
finding of the Solicitor General that respondent Aznar, under the
facts as stated in the Report of the investigation conducted in the
case, is guilty of "grossly immoral conduct" and may therefore be
removed or suspended by the Supreme Court for conduct
unbecoming a member of the Bar (Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court).
Respondent failed to adduce evidence sufficient to engender doubt
as to his culpability of the offense imputed upon him. With the
exception of the self-serving testimonies of two witnesses presented
on respondent's behalf, the records are bereft of evidence to
exonerate respondent of the act complained of, much less
contradict, on material points, the testimonies of complainant
herself.
While respondent denied having taken complainant to the
Ambassador Hotel and there had sexual intercourse with the latter,
he did not present any evidence to show where he was at that date.
While this is not a criminal proceeding, respondent would have done
more than keep his silence if he really felt unjustly traduced.
It is the duty of a lawyer, whenever his moral character is put in
issue, to satisfy this Court that he is a fit and proper person to enjoy
continued membership in the Bar. He cannot dispense with nor
downgrade the high and exacting moral standards of the law
profession (Go v. Candoy, 21 SCRA 439 [1967]). As once pronounced
by the Court:
When his integrity is challenged by evidence, it is
not enough that he denies the charges against
him; he must meet the issue and overcome the
evidence for the relator (Legal and Judicial
Ethics, by Malcolm, p. 93) and show proofs that
he still maintains the highest degree of morality
and integrity, which at all times is expected of
him. ... In the case of United States v. Tria, 17
Phil. 303, Justice Moreland, speaking for the
Court, said:
An accused person sometimes owes a duty to
himself if not to the State. If he does not perform
that duty, he may not always expect the State to
perform it for him. If he fails to meet the
obligation which he owes to himself, when to
meet it is the easiest of easy things, he is hardy
indeed if he demand and expect that same full
and wide consideration which the State
voluntarily gives to those who by reasonable
effort seek to help themselves. This is
particularly so when he not only declines to help
himself but actively conceals from the State the
very means by which it may assist him (Quingwa
SCRA 439 [1967]).
The Solicitor General recommends that since the complainant is
partly to blame for having gone with respondent to Manila knowing
fully well that respondent is a married man ,with children,

20. respondent should merely be suspended from the practice of law for
not less than three (3) years (Rollo, p. 47).
On the other hand, respondent in his manifestation and motion
dated April 18, 1989 alleges that since a period of about ten (10)
years had already elapsed from the time the Solicitor General made
his recommendation for a three (3) years suspension and
respondent is not practicing his profession as a lawyer, the court
may now consider the respondent as having been suspended during
the said period and the case dismissed for being moot and
academic.
We disagree.
Complainant filed the instant case for disbarment not because
respondent reneged on a promise to marry (Quingwa v. Puno,
supra). More importantly. complainant's knowledge of of
respondent's marital status is not at issue in the case at bar.
Complainant submitted to respondent's solicitation for sexual
intercourse not because of a desire for sexual gratification but
because of respondent's moral ascendancy over her and fear that if
she would not accede, she would flunk in her subjects. As chairman
of the college of medicine where complainant was enrolled, the
latter had every reason to believe that respondent could make good
his threats. Moreover, as counsel for respondent would deem it
"worthwhile to inform the the Court that the respondent is a scion
of a rich family and a very rich man in his own right and in fact is not
practicing his profession before the court" (Rollo, p. 70), mere
suspension for a limited period, per se, would therefore serve no
redeeming purpose. The fact that he is a rich man and does not
practice his profession as a lawyer, does not render respondent a
person of good moral character. Evidence of good moral character
precedes admission to bar (Sec.2, Rule 138, Rules of Court) and such
requirement is not dispensed with upon admission thereto. Good
moral character is a continuing qualification necessary to entitle one
to continue in the practice of law. The ancient and learned
profession of law exacts from its members the highest standard of
morality (Quingwa v. Puno, supra).
Under Section 27, Rule 138, "(a) member of the bar may be removed
or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for
any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he
is required to take before admission to practice, ... " In Arciga v.
Maniwang (106 SCRA 591, [1981]), this Court had occasion to define
the concept of immoral conduct, as follows:
A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude. A member of the bar
should have moral integrity in addition to
professional probity.
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an
inflexible standard as to what is grossly immoral
conduct or to specify the moral delinquency and
obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of
continuing as a member of the bar. The rule
implies that what appears to be unconventional
behavior to the straight-laced may not be the
immoral conduct that warrants disbarment.
Immoral conduct has been defined as 'that
which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and
which shows a moral indifference to the opinion
of the good and respectable members of the
community' (7 C.J.S. 959).
Where an unmarried female dwarf possessing
the intellect of a child became pregnant by
reason of intimacy with a married lawyer who
was the father of six children, disbarment of the
attorney on the ground of immoral conduct was
justified (In re Hicks 20 Pac. 2nd 896).
In the present case, it was highly immoral of respondent, a married
man with children, to have taken advantage of his position as
chairman of the college of medicine in asking complainant, a student
in said college, to go with him to Manila where he had carnal
knowledge of her under the threat that she would flunk in all her
subjects in case she refused.
WHEREFORE, respondent Jose B. Aznar is hereby DISBARRED and his
name is ordered stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Gancayco,
Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ.,
concur.
Fernan (C.J.), took no part.
Melencio-Herrera, J., is on leave.
A.C. No. 1512 January 29, 1993
VICTORIA BARRIENTOS, complainant,
vs.
TRANSFIGURACION DAAROL, respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
PER CURIAM:
In a sworn complaint filed with this Court on August 20, 1975,
complainant Victoria C. Barrientos seeks the disbarment of
respondent Transfiguracion Daarol, ** a member of the Philippine
Bar, on grounds of deceit and grossly immoral conduct.
After respondent filed his answer (Rollo, p. 12), the Court Resolved
to refer the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report
and recommendation (Rollo, p. 18).

21. As per recommendation of the Solicitor General and for the
convenience of the parties and their witnesses who were residing in
the province of Zamboanga del Norte, the Provincial Fiscal of said
province was authorized to conduct the investigation and to submit
a report, together with transcripts of stenographic notes and
exhibits submitted by the parties, if any (Rollo, p. 20).
On November 9, 1987, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted
its Report and Recommendation, viz.:
Evidence of the complainant:
. . . complainant Victoria Barrientos was single
and a resident of Bonifacio St., Dipolog City; that
when she was still a teenager and first year in
college she came to know respondent
Transfiguracion Daarol in 1969 as he used to go
to their house being a friend of her sister Norma;
that they also became friends, and she knew the
respondent as being single and living alone in
Galas, Dipolog City; that he was the General
Manager of Zamboanga del Norte Electric
Cooperative, Inc. (ZANECO) and subsequently
transferred his residence to the ZANECO
compound at Laguna Blvd. at Del Pilar St.,
Dipolog City (pp. 109-111, tsn, September 30,
1976).
That on June 27, 1973, respondent came to their
house and asked her to be one of the usherettes
in the Mason's convention in Sicayab, Dipolog
City, from June 28 to 30, 1973 and, she told
respondent to ask the permission of her parents,
which respondent did, and her father consented;
that for three whole days she served as
usherette in the convention and respondent
picked her up from her residence every morning
and took her home from the convention site at
the end of each day (pp. 112-114, tsn, id.).
That in the afternoon of July 1, 1973, respondent
came to complainant's house and invited her for
a joy ride with the permission of her mother who
was a former classmate of respondent; that
respondent took her to Sicayab in his jeep and
then they strolled along the beach, and in the
course of which respondent proposed his love to
her; that respondent told her that if she would
accept him, he would marry her within six (6)
months from her acceptance; complainant told
respondent that she would think it over first;
that from then on respondent used to visit her in
their house almost every night, and he kept on
courting her and pressed her to make her
decision on respondent's proposal; that on July
7, 1973, she finally accepted respondent's offer
of love and respondent continued his usual
visitations almost every night thereafter; they
agreed to get married in December 1973 (pp.
115-119, tsn, id.).
That in the morning of August 20, 1973,
respondent invited her, with the consent of her
father, to a party at the Lopez Skyroom; that at
7:00 p.m. of that day respondent fetched her
from her house and went to the Lopez Skyroom
(pp. 119-121, tsn, id); that at about 10:00 p.m. of
that evening they left the party at the Lopez
Skyroom, but before taking her home
respondent invited her for a joy ride and took
her to the airport at Sicayab, Dipolog City;
respondent parked the jeep by the beach where
there were no houses around; that in the course
of their conversation inside the jeep, respondent
reiterated his promise to marry her and then
started caressing her downward and his hand
kept on moving to her panty and down to her
private parts (pp. 121-122, tsn. id.); that she then
said: "What is this Trans?", but he answered:
"Day, do not be afraid of me. I will marry you"
and reminded her also that "anyway, December
is very near, the month we have been waiting
for" ([p], 122, tsn, id.), then he pleaded, "Day,
just give this to me, do not be afraid" (ibid), and
again reiterated his promise and assurances, at
the same time pulling down her panty; that she
told him that she was afraid because they were
not yet married, but because she loved him she
finally agreed to have sexual intercourse with
him at the back seat of the jeep; that after the
intercourse she wept and respondent again
reiterated his promises and assurances not to
worry because anyway he would marry her; and
at about 12:00 midnight they went home (pp.
122-124, tsn, id.).
After August 20, 1973, respondent continued to
invite her to eat outside usually at the
Honeycomb Restaurant in Dipolog City about
twice or three times a week, after which he
would take her to the airport where they would
have sexual intercourse; that they had this
sexual intercourse from August to October 1973
at the frequency of two or three times a week,
and she consented to all these things because
she loved him and believed in all his promises
(pp. 125-127, tsn, id.).
Sometime in the middle part of September, 1973
complainant noticed that her menstruation
which usually occurred during the second week
of each month did not come; she waited until
the end of the month and still there was no
menstruation; she submitted to a pregnancy test
and the result was positive; she informed
respondent and respondent suggested to have
the fetus aborted but she objected and
respondent did not insist; respondent then told
her not to worry because they would get
married within one month and he would talk to
her parents about their marriage (pp. 129-132,
tsn, id.).
On October 20, 1973, respondent came to
complainant's house and talked to her parents
about their marriage; it was agreed that the
marriage would be celebrated in Manila so as

22. not to create a scandal as complainant was
already pregnant; complainant and her mother
left for Manila by boat on October 22, 1973
while respondent would follow by plane; and
they agreed to meet in Singalong, Manila, in the
house of complainant's sister Delia who is
married to Ernesto Serrano (pp. 132-135, tsn,
id.).
On October 26, 1973, when respondent came to
see complainant and her mother at Singalong,
Manila, respondent told them that he could not
marry complainant because he was already
married (p. 137, tsn, id.); complainant's mother
got mad and said: "Trans, so you fooled my
daughter and why did you let us come here in
Manila?" (p. 138, tsn, id.). Later on, however,
respondent reassured complainant not to worry
because respondent had been separated from
his wife for 16 years and he would work for the
annulment of his marriage and, subsequently
marry complainant (p. 139, tsn, id.); respondent
told complainant to deliver their child in Manila
and assured her of a monthly support of P250.00
(p. 140, tsn, id.); respondent returned to Dipolog
City and actually sent the promised support; he
came back to Manila in January 1974 and went
to see complainant; when asked about the
annulment of his previous marriage, he told
complainant that it would soon be approved (pp.
141-142, tsn, id.); he came back in February and
in March 1974 and told complainant the same
thing (p. 142, tsn, id.); complainant wrote her
mother to come to Manila when she delivers the
child, but her mother answered her that she
cannot come as nobody would be left in their
house in Dipolog and instead suggested that
complainant go to Cebu City which is nearer;
complainant went to Cebu City in April 1974 and,
her sister Norma took her to the Good Shepherd
Convent at Banawa Hill; she delivered a baby girl
on June 14, 1974 at the Perpetual Succor
Hospital in Cebu City; and the child was
registered as "Dureza Barrientos" (pp. 143-148,
tsn, id.).
In the last week of June 1974 complainant came
to Dipolog City and tried to contact respondent
by phone and, thru her brother, but to no avail;
as she was ashamed she just stayed in their
house; she got sick and her father sent her to
Zamboanga City for medical treatment; she
came back after two weeks but still respondent
did not come to see her (tsn. 48-150, tsn, id.);
she consulted a lawyer and filed an
administrative case against respondent with the
National Electrification Administration; the case
was referred to the Zamboanga del Norte
Electric Cooperative (ZANECO) and it was
dismissed and thus she filed the present
administrative case (pp. 150-151, tsn, id.).
Evidence for the Respondent
The evidence of the respondent consists of his
sole testimony and one exhibit, the birth
certificate of the child (Exh. 1). Respondent
declared substantially as follows: that he was
born on August 6, 1932 in Liloy, Zamboanga del
Norte; that he married Romualda Sumaylo in
Liloy in 1955; that he had a son who is now 20
years old; that because of incompatibility he had
been estranged from his wife for 16 years; that
in 1953 he was baptized as a moslem and
thereby embraced the Islam Religion (pp.
173-180 tsn, Jan. 13, 1977); that he came to
know complainant's father since 1952 because
he was his teacher; likewise he knew
complainant's mother because they were former
classmates in high school; that he became
acquainted with complainant when he used to
visit her sister, Norma, in their house; they
gradually became friends and often talked with
each other, and even talked about their personal
problems; that he mentioned to her his being
estranged from his wife; that with the consent of
her parents he invited her to be one of the
usherettes in the Masonic Convention in Sicayab,
Dipolog City held on June 28-30, 1973 (pp. 185-
192, tsn, id.); that the arrangement was for him
to fetch her from her residence and take her
home from the convention site; that it was
during this occasion that they became close to
each other and after the convention, he
proposed his love to her on July 7, 1973; that
(sic) a week of courtship, she accepted his
proposal and since then he used to invite her
(pp. 193-194, tsn, id.).
That in the evening of August 20, 1973,
respondent invited complainant to be his
partner during the Chamber of Commerce affair
at the Lopez Skyroom; that at about 10:00 p.m.
of that evening after the affair, complainant
complained to him of a headache, so he decided
to take her home but once inside the jeep, she
wanted to have a joy ride, so he drove around
the city and proceeded to the airport; that when
they were at the airport, only two of them, they
started the usual kisses and they were carried by
their passion; they forgot themselves and they
made love; that before midnight he took her
home; that thereafter they indulged in sexual
intercourse many times whenever they went on
joy riding in the evening and ended up in the
airport which was the only place they could be
alone
(p. 195, tsn, id.).
That it was sometime in the later part of October
1973 that complainant told him of her
pregnancy; that they agreed that the child be
delivered in Manila to avoid scandal and
respondent would take care of expenses; that
during respondent's talk with the parents of
complainant regarding the latter's pregnancy, he
told him he was married but estranged from his
wife; that when complainant was already in

23. Manila, she asked him if he was willing to marry
her, he answered he could not marry again,
otherwise, he would be charged with bigamy but
he promised to file an annulment of his marriage
as he had been separated from his wife for 16
years; that complainant consented to have
sexual intercourse with him because of her love
to him and he did not resort to force, trickery,
deceit or cajolery; and that the present case was
filed against him by complainant because of his
failure to give the money to support complainant
while in Cebu waiting for the delivery of the child
and, also to meet complainant's medical
expenses when she went to Zamboanga City for
medical check-up (pp. 198-207, tsn, id.).
FINDING OF FACTS
From the evidence adduced by the parties, the
following facts are not disputed:
1. That the complainant, Victoria Barrientos, is
single, a college student, and was about 20 years
and 7 months old during the time (July-October
1975) of her relationship with respondent,
having been born on December 23, 1952; while
respondent Transfiguracion Daarol is married,
General Manager of Zamboanga del Norte
Electric Cooperative, and 41 years old at the
time of the said relationship, having been born
on August 6, 1932;
2. That respondent is married to Romualda A.
Sumaylo with whom be has a son; that the
marriage ceremony was solemnized on
September 24, 1955 at Liloy, Zamboanga del
Norte by a catholic priest, Rev. Fr. Anacleto
Pellamo, Parish Priest thereat; and that said
respondent had been separated from his wife for
about 16 years at the time of his relationship
with complainant;
3. That respondent had been known by the
Barrientos family for quite sometime, having
been a former student of complainant's father in
1952 and, a former classmate of complainant's
mother at the Andres Bonifacio College in
Dipolog City; that he became acquainted with
complainant's sister, Norma in 1963 and
eventually with her other sisters, Baby and Delia
and, her brother, Boy, as he used to visit Norma
at her residence; that he also befriended
complainant and who became a close friend
when he invited her, with her parents' consent,
to be one of the usherettes during the Masonic
Convention in Sicayab, Dipolog City from June 28
to 30, 1973, and he used to fetch her at her
residence in the morning and took her home
from the convention site after each day's
activities;
4. That respondent courted complainant, and
after a week of courtship, complainant accepted
respondent's love on July 7, 1973; that in the
evening of August 20, 1973, complainant with
her parents' permission was respondent's
partner during the Chamber of Commerce affair
at the Lopez Skyroom in the Dipolog City, and at
about 10:00 o'clock that evening, they left the
place but before going home, they went to the
airport at Sicayab, Dipolog City and parked the
jeep at the beach, where there were no houses
around; that after the usual preliminaries, they
consummated the sexual act and at about
midnight they went home; that after the first
sexual act, respondent used to have joy ride with
complainant which usually ended at the airport
where they used to make love twice or three
times a week; that as a result of her intimate
relations, complainant became pregnant;
5. That after a conference among respondent,
complainant and complainant's parents, it was
agreed that complainant would deliver her child
in Manila, where she went with her mother on
October 22, 1973 by boat, arriving in Manila on
the 25th and, stayed with her brother-in-law
Ernesto Serrano in Singalong, Manila; that
respondent visited her there on the 26th, 27th
and 28th of October 1973, and again in February
and March 1974; that later on complainant
decided to deliver the child in Cebu City in order
to be nearer to Dipolog City, and she went there
in April 1974 and her sister took her to the Good
Shepherd Convent at Banawa Hill, Cebu City;
that on June 14, 1974, she delivered a baby girl
at the Perpetual Succor Hospital in Cebu City
and, named her "Dureza Barrientos"; that about
the last week of June 1974 she went home to
Dipolog City; that during her stay here in Manila
and later in Cebu City, the respondent defrayed
some of her expenses; that she filed an
administrative case against respondent with the
National Electrification Administration; which
complaint, however, was dismissed; and then
she instituted the present disbarment
proceedings against respondent.
xxx xxx xxx
In view of the foregoing, the undersigned
respectfully recommend that after hearing,
respondent Transfiguracion Daarol be disbarred
as a lawyer. (Rollo, pp. 28-51).
After a thorough review of the case, the Court finds itself in full
accord with the findings and recommendation of the Solicitor
General.
From the records, it appears indubitable that complainant was never
informed by respondent attorney of his real status as a married
individual. The fact of his previous marriage was disclosed by
respondent only after the complainant became pregnant. Even then,
respondent misrepresented himself as being eligible to re-marry for
having been estranged from his wife for 16 years and dangled a
marriage proposal on the assurance that he would work for the
annulment of his first marriage. It was a deception after all as it

24. turned out that respondent never bothered to annul said marriage.
More importantly, respondent knew all along that the mere fact of
separation alone is not a ground for annulment of marriage and
does not vest him legal capacity to contract another marriage.
Interestingly enough. respondent lived alone in Dipolog City though
his son, who was also studying in Dipolog City, lived separately from
him. He never introduced his son and went around with friends as
though he was never married much less had a child in the same
locality. This circumstance alone belies respondent's claim that
complainant and her family were aware of his previous marriage at
the very start of his courtship. The Court is therefore inclined to
believe that respondent resorted to deceit in the satisfaction of his
sexual desires at the expense of the gullible complainant. It is not in
accordance with the nature of the educated, cultured and
respectable, which complainant's family is, her father being the
Assistant Principal of the local public high school, to allow a
daughter to have an affair with a married man.
But what surprises this Court even more is the perverted sense of
respondent's moral values when he said that: "I see nothing wrong
with this relationship despite my being married." (TSN, p. 209,
January 13, 1977; Rollo, p. 47) Worse, he even suggested abortion.
Truly, respondent's moral sense is so seriously impaired that we
cannot maintain his membership in the Bar. In Pangan v. Ramos
(107 SCRA 1 [1981]), we held that:
(E)ven his act in making love to another woman
while his first wife is still alive and their marriage
still valid and existing is contrary to honesty,
justice, decency and morality. Respondent made
a mockery of marriage which is a sacred
institution demanding respect and dignity.
Finally, respondent even had the temerity to allege that he is a
Moslem convert and as such, could enter into multiple marriages
and has inquired into the possibility of marrying complainant (Rollo,
p. 15). As records indicate, however, his claim of having embraced
the Islam religion is not supported by any evidence save that of his
self-serving testimony. In this regard, we need only to quote the
finding of the Office of the Solicitor General, to wit:
When respondent was asked to marry
complainant he said he could not because he
was already married and would open him to a
charge of bigamy (p. 200, tsn, January 13, 1977).
If he were a moslem convert entitled to four (4)
wives, as he is now claiming, why did he not
marry complainant? The answer is supplied by
respondent himself. He said while he was a
moslem, but, having been married in a civil
ceremony, he could no longer validly enter into
another civil ceremony without committing
bigamy because the complainant is a christian (p.
242, tsn, January 13, 1977). Consequently, if
respondent knew, that notwithstanding his
being a moslem convert, he cannot marry
complainant, then it was grossly immoral for him
to have sexual intercourse with complainant
because he knew the existence of a legal
impediment. Respondent may not, therefore,
escape responsibility thru his dubious claim that
he has embraced the Islam religion. (Rollo,
p. 49).
By his acts of deceit and immoral tendencies to appease his sexual
desires, respondent Daarol has amply demonstrated his moral
delinquency. Hence, his removal for conduct unbecoming a member
of the Bar on the grounds of deceit and grossly immoral conduct
(Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court) is in order. Good moral character
is a condition which precedes admission to the Bar (Sec. 2, Rule 138,
Rules of Court) and is not dispensed with upon admission thereto. It
is a continuing qualification which all lawyers must possess (People
v. Tuanda, 181 SCRA 682 [1990]; Delos Reyes v. Aznar, 179 SCRA 653
[1989]), otherwise, a lawyer may either be suspended or disbarred.
As we have held in Piatt v. Abordo (58 Phil. 350 [1933], cited in Leda
v. Tabang, 206 SCRA 395 [1992]):
It cannot be overemphasized that the
requirement of good character is not only a
condition precedent to admission to the practice
of law; its continued possession is also essential
for remaining in the practice of law (People v.
Tuanda, Adm. Case No. 3360, 30 January 1990,
181 SCRA 692). As aptly put by Mr. Justice
George A. Malcolm: "As good character is an
essential qualification for admission of an
attorney to practice, when the attorney's
character is bad in such respects as to show that
he is unsafe and unfit to be entrusted with the
powers of an attorney, the court retains the
power to discipline him (Piatt v. Abordo, 58 Phil.
350 [1933]).
Only recently, another disbarment proceeding was resolved by this
Court against a lawyer who convinced a woman that her prior
marriage to another man was null and void ab initio and she was still
legally single and free to marry him (the lawyer), married her, was
supported by her in his studies, begot a child with her, abandoned
her and the child, and married another woman (Terre vs. Terre,
Adm. Case No. 2349, July 3, 1992).
Here, respondent, already a married man and about 41 years old,
proposed love and marriage to complainant, then still a 20-year-old
minor, knowing that he did not have the required legal capacity.
Respondent then succeeded in having carnal relations with
complainant by deception, made her pregnant, suggested abortion,
breached his promise to marry her, and then deserted her and the
child. Respondent is therefore guilty of deceit and grossly immoral
conduct.
The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who
measure up to the exacting standards of mental and moral fitness.
Respondent having exhibited debased morality, the Court is
constrained to impose upon him the most severe disciplinary action
— disbarment.
The ancient and learned profession of law exacts from its members
the highest standard of morality. The members are, in fact, enjoined
to aid in guarding the Bar against the admission of candidates unfit
or unqualified because deficient either moral character or education
(In re Puno, 19 SCRA 439, [1967]; Pangan vs. Ramos, 107 SCRA 1
[1981]).
As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good
moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character
and must lead a life in accordance with the highest moral standards

25. of the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and an
officer of the Court is not only required to refrain from adulterous
relationships or the keeping of mistresses but must also behave
himself in such a manner as to avoid scandalizing the public by
creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards (Tolosa
vs. Cargo, 171 SCRA 21, 26 [1989], citing Toledo vs. Toledo, 7 SCRA
757 [1963] and Royong vs. Oblena, 7 SCRA 859 [1963]).
In brief, We find respondent Daarol morally delinquent and as such,
should not be allowed continued membership in the ancient and
learned profession of law (Quingwa v. Puno, 19 SCRA 439 [1967]).
ACCORDINGLY, We find respondent Transfiguracion Daarol guilty of
grossly immoral conduct unworthy of being a member of the Bar
and is hereby ordered DISBARRED and his name stricken off from
the Roll of Attorneys. Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to all
courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of
the Bar Confidant and spread on the personal record of respondent
Daarol.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bid
[A.C. No. 2884. January 28, 1998]
IRENE RAYOS-OMBAC, complainant, vs. ATTY. ORLANDO A. RAYOS,
respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PUNO, J.:
This case stemmed from a petition for disbarment filed with this
Court by Mrs. Irene Rayos-Ombac against her nephew, Atty. Orlando
A. Rayos, a legal practitioner in Metro Manila, for "his failure to
adhere to the standards of mental and moral fitness set up for
members of the bar."xi
[1]
The records show that in January 1985, respondent induced
complainant who was then 85 years old to withdraw all her bank
deposits and entrust them to him for safekeeping. Respondent told
her that if she withdraws all her money in the bank, they will be
excluded from the estate of her deceased husband and his other
heirs will be precluded from inheriting part of it.
Acting on respondent's suggestion, complainant preterminated all
her time deposits with the Philippine National Bank on January 18,
1985. She withdrew P588,000.00.
Respondent then advised complainant to deposit the money with
Union Bank where he was working. He also urged her to deposit the
money in his name to prevent the other heirs of her husband from
tracing the same.
Complainant heeded the advice of respondent. On January 22,
1985, respondent deposited the amount of P588,000.00 with Union
Bank under the name of his wife in trust for seven beneficiaries,
including his son. The maturity date of the time deposit was May
22, 1985.
On May 21, 1985, complainant made a demand on respondent to
return the P588,000.00 plus interest. Respondent told her that he
has renewed the deposit for another month and promised to return
the whole amount including interest on June 25, 1985. Respondent,
however, failed to return the money on June 25, 1985.
On August 16, 1985, respondent informed complainant that he
could only return P400,000.00 to be paid on installment.
Complainant acceded to respondent's proposal as she was already
old and was in dire need of money.
On the same date, respondent and complainant executed a
memorandum of agreement stating:
"WHEREAS, on January 22, 1985, (complainant) entrusted for
safekeeping to (respondent) the sum of FIVE HUNDRED EIGHTY
EIGHT THOUSAND PESOS (P588,000.00) which sum of money was
withdrawn by the parties from the Philippine National Bank on said
date.
WHEREAS, the said amount was deposited by (respondent) with the
consent of (complainant) with the UNION BANK, J.P. Rizal Branch,
Makati, Metro Manila.
WHEREAS, upon mutual agreement of the parties, they have agreed
as they hereby agree on the following terms for the purpose of
disposing of the above sum, to wit:
1. Of the sum of P588,000.00 received in trust, (respondent) shall
return only the sum of P400,000.00 to (complainant) in the following
manner:
a) P100,000.00 upon execution of this agreement;
b) P200,000.00 on or before October 19, 1985, to be covered by
postdated check;
c) P100,000.00 on or before November 19, 1985, to be covered by a
postdated check.
2. (Respondent) hereby undertakes and guarantees that at the time
the aforesaid postdated checks fall due, the same should be backed
up with sufficient funds on a best efforts basis.
3. That the remaining balance of P188,000.00, (respondent) hereby
acknowledges the same as his indebtedness to (complainant) to be
paid by the former when able or at his option. (Complainant)
however assures (respondent) that she will not institute any
collection suit against (respondent) (sic), neither will she transmit
the same by way of testamentary succession to her heirs, neither
are (respondent's) heirs liable.
4. That the parties have executed this agreement with the view of
restoring their previous cordial filial relationship."xii
[2]
In accordance with the memorandum of agreement, respondent
issued to complainant the following checks:
1. UCPB Check No. 487974 dated August 19, 1985 in the
amount of P100,000.00;

26. 2. UCPB Check No. 487975 dated October 19, 1985 in the
amount of P200,000;
3. UCPB Check No. 487976 dated November 19, 1985 in the
amount of P100,000.00.
Complainant was not able to encash UCPB Check No. 487974 as it
was dishonored due to insufficient funds.
Respondent, nonetheless, asserted that he was not duty-bound to
fund the check because under paragraph 2 of the memorandum of
agreement, he only guaranteed that the checks shall be "backed up
with sufficient funds on a best efforts basis." This prompted the
other relatives of respondent and complainant to intervene in the
brewing dispute between the two. They begged respondent to pay
his obligation to complainant. Heeding their plea, respondent
replaced UCPB Check No. 487974 with two new checks, one for
P64,800.00 and another for P35,200.00. Complainant was able to
encash the first check but not the second because it was dishonored
by the drawee bank. The remaining checks, UCPB Check No. 487975
and UCPB Check No. 487976, were likewise dishonored by the
drawee bank for lack of funds.
On November 15, 1985, complainant filed a complaint for estafa
against respondent and a corresponding information was filed
against him by the provincial fiscal.
Respondent thereafter made a proposal to complainant for an
amicable settlement. To pay his debt, respondent offered to
complainant two second hand cars and cash amounting to
P40,000.00. Complainant refused the offer because she needed
cash to provide for her daily needs.
The records also show that respondent filed several suits against
complainant.
First, in February 1985, respondent filed a criminal case for estafa
against complainant. It appears that respondent has previously told
the tenants of a parcel of land owned by complainant that she had
promised to sell them the land and that she had authorized him to
negotiate with them. He obtained from the tenants advance
payment for the lots they were occupying. Respondent then
prepared a special power of attorneyxiii
[3] authorizing him to sell the
land and asked complainant to sign it. Complainant, however,
refused to sign because she did not intend to make respondent her
attorney-in-fact. Hence, the tenants sued respondent for estafa.
Respondent, in turn, sued complainant for estafa for allegedly
reneging on her promise to sell the land.
Then, on April 5, 1986, respondent filed a pleading entitled "Motion
to Review Acts of Administratrix as a Prelude for Formal Motion to
(sic) her Discharge" in Special Proceedings No. 5544 for the
settlement of the estate of complainant's husband, pending before
the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan.xiv
[4] Respondent
filed the pleading although he was not a party to the case.
Finally, on May 19, 1986, respondent indicted complainant for
"falsification by private individuals and use of falsified documents
under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code" for allegedly making
untruthful statements in her petition for appointment as
administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband.xv
[5]
Thus, in June 1986, complainant filed with this Court a complaint to
disbar respondent on two grounds: (1) that respondent employed
clever scheme to defraud complainant, and (2) that respondent filed
frivolous cases against complainant to harass her.
Respondent subsequently filed a complaint for disbarment against
complainant's counsel, Atty. Abelardo Viray. The complaint cited
four causes of action: (1) assisting client to commit tax fraud; (2) use
of unorthodox collection method; (3) ignorance of the law; and (4)
subornation of perjury.xvi
[6]
Both disbarment cases were consolidated and referred to the Office
of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation.
The cases were transferred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation and disposition pursuant to Section 20 Rule
139-B which took effect on June 1, 1988.
After investigation, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP
recommended the suspension of respondent from the practice of
law for two years. It also recommended the dismissal of the
complaint to disbar Atty. Viray for lack of merit.xvii
[7]
On January 27, 1996, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed
Resolution No. XII-96-22 stating:
"RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED
and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above entitled case,
hereinmade part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A";
and, finding the recommendation therein to be supported by
the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,
Respondent Atty. Orlando A. Rayos is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for two (2) years and the complaint
against Atty. Abelardo V. Viray is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit."xviii
[8]
On June 6, 1996, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with
regard to Administrative Case No. 2884.xix
[9] The Board of Governors
of the IBP, however, denied the motion in Resolution No. XII-96-
193.xx
[10]
On September 15, 1997, respondent filed with this Court a Motion
to Lift Suspension for Two Years, alleging that complainant has
executed an affidavit withdrawing the complaint for disbarment.xxi
[11]
We deny the motion of respondent.
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:
"A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct."
Rule 1.03 of the same Code, on the other hand, provides:
"A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest,
encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man's cause."

27. Respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well
as his oath as an attorney when he deceived his 85-year old aunt
into entrusting to him all her money, and later refused to return the
same despite demand. Respondent's wicked deed was aggravated
by the series of unfounded suits he filed against complainant to
compel her to withdraw the disbarment case she filed against him.
Indeed, respondent's deceitful conduct makes him unworthy of
membership in the legal profession. The nature of the office of a
lawyer requires that he shall be of good moral character. This
qualification is not only a condition precedent to admission to the
legal profession, but its continued possession is essential to maintain
one's good standing in the profession.xxii
[12]
Considering the depravity of respondent's offense, we find the
penalty recommended by the IBP to be too mild. Such offense calls
for the severance of respondent's privilege to practice law not only
for two years, but for life.
The affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case allegedly
executed by complainant does not, in any way, exonerate the
respondent. A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed
regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What
matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the
record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been
duly proven.xxiii
[13] This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary
proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in
any sense a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the
respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve
no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They
are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They
are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from
the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The
attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer
of the court. The complainant or the person who called the
attention of the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no
sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except
as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of
justice.xxiv
[14] Hence, if the evidence on record warrants, the
respondent may be suspended or disbarred despite the desistance
of complainant or his withdrawal of the charges. In the instant case,
it has been sufficiently proved that respondent has engaged in
deceitful conduct, in violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent is hereby DISBARRED. Let a copy of
this decision be attached to respondent's record in the Bar
Confidant's Office and furnished the IBP and all our courts.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Panganiban, and Martinez, JJ, concur.
[A C. No. 3919. January 28, 1998]
SOCORRO T. CO, complainant, vs. ATTY. GODOFREDO N.
BERNARDINO, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
BELLOSILLO, J.
This is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by
complainant Socorro T. Co, a businesswoman, against Atty.
Godofredo N. Bernardino charging him with unprofessional and
unethical conduct indicating moral deficiency and unfitness to stay
in the profession of law.
Socorro T. Co alleged that in October 1989, as she was following up
the documents for her shipment at the Bureau of Customs, she was
approached by respondent, Atty. Godofredo N. Bernardino,
introducing himself as someone holding various positions in the
Bureau of Customs such as Executive Assistant at the NAIA, Hearing
Officer at the Law Division, and OIC of the Security Warehouse.
Respondent offered to help complainant and promised to give her
some business at the Bureau. In no time, they became friends and a
month after, or in November of the same year, respondent
succeeded in borrowing from complainant P120,000.00 with the
promise to pay the amount in full the following month, broadly
hinting that he could use his influence at the Bureau of Customs to
assist her. To ensure payment of his obligation, respondent issued
to complainant several postdated Boston Bank checks: No. 092601
dated 1 December 1989 for P21,950.00, No. 092602 dated 4
December 1989 for P6,750.00, No. 092615 dated 15 January 1990
for P65,000.00 and No. 092622 dated 15 January 1990 for
P10,000.00 (Exhs. "A-3," "B," "C," "D," respectively). Respondent
also issued a postdated Urban Development Bank check No. 051946
dated 9 January 1990 for P5,500.00 (Exh. "E"). However, the checks
covering the total amount of P109,200.00 were dishonored for
insufficiency of funds and closure of account.
Pressed to make good his obligation, respondent told complainant
that he would be able to pay her if she would lend him an additional
amount of P75,000.00 to be paid a month after to be secured by a
chattel mortgage on his Datsun car. [1] As complainant agreed
respondent handed her three (3) copies of a deed of chattel
mortgage which he himself drafted and six (6) copies of the deed of
sale of his car with the assurance that he would turn over its
registration certificate and official receipt. The agreement was not
consummated as respondent later sold the same car to another.
Despite several chances given him to settle his obligation
respondent chose to evade complainant altogether so that she was
constrained to write him a final demand letter dated 22
September 1992 [2] preceding the filing of several criminal
complaints against him for violation of BP Blg. 22. [3] Complainant
also filed a letter-complaint dated 5 October 1992 with the Office of
the Ombudsman. [4]
It may be worth mentioning that a certain Emelinda Ortiz also filed
several criminal and civil cases against respondent similarly involving
money transactions. [5] Ms. Ortiz claimed that respondent had
volunteered to sell to her a 20-footer container van filled with
imported cotton fabric shirting raw materials from the Bureau of
Customs warehouse for P600,000.00 in time for the holidays.
However, despite her successive payments to respondent totalling
P410,000.00, the latter failed to deliver the goods as promised.
Worse, respondent's personal check for P410,000.00 representing

28. reimbursement of the amount he received from Ms. Ortiz was
returned dishonored for insufficiency of funds.
By way of defense, respondent averred that he gave the checks to
complainant Co by way of rediscounting and that these were fully
paid when he delivered five cellular phones to her. He brushed
aside the allegations of complainant and Ms. Ortiz as ill-motivated,
vague, confusing, misleading and full of biases and prejudices.
Although he is married he insinuated a special relationship with the
two (2) women which caused him to be careless in his dealings with
them.
On 3 March 1993 the Court referred this administrative case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation.
On 17 May 1997 the IBP issued a resolution recommending the
suspension of respondent from the practice of law for six (6) months
based on the following findings -
1. No receipt has been produced by respondent showing that the
face value of the subject checks has been paid or that the alleged
five (5) units of cellular phones have been delivered to the
complainant;
2. The Decision in the criminal cases that were filed vis-a-vis the
subject bouncing checks and wherein he was acquitted clearly shows
that his acquittal was not due to payment of the obligation but
rather that 'private complainant knew at the time the accused
issued the checks that the latter did not have sufficient funds in the
bank to cover the same. No violation of BP Blg. 22 is committed
where complainant was told by the drawer that he does not have
sufficient funds in the bank; and
3. Respondent subsequently paid the complainant as shown by a
receipt dated 26 August 1995 x x x and the release of real estate
mortgage x x x x If it is true that he had already paid his obligation
with five (5) cellular phones, why pay again?
The general rule is that a lawyer may not be suspended or disbarred,
and the court may not ordinarily assume jurisdiction to discipline
him for misconduct in his non-professional or private capacity (In Re
Pelaez, 44 Phil. 5569 [1923]). Where, however, the misconduct
outside of the lawyer's professional dealings is so gross a character
as to show him morally unfit for the office and unworthy of the
privilege which his licenses and the law confer on him, the court may
be justified in suspending or removing him from the office of
attorney (In Re Sotto, 38 Phil. 569 [1923]).
The evidence on record clearly shows respondent's propensity to
issue bad checks. This gross misconduct on his part, though not
related to his professional duties as a member of the bar, puts his
moral character in serious doubt. The Commission, however, does
not find him a hopeless case in the light of the fact that he
eventually paid his obligation to the complainant, albeit very much
delayed. [6]
While it is true that there was no attorney-client relationship
between complainant and respondent as the transaction between
them did not require the professional legal services of respondent,
nevertheless respondent's abject conduct merits condemnation
from this Court. Thus we held in Lizaso v. Amante [7] where Atty.
Amante enticed complainant to invest in the casino business with
the proposition that her investment would yield her an interest of
10% profit daily, and Atty. Amante not only failed to deliver the
promised return on the investment but also the principal thereof
(P5,000.00) despite complainant's repeated demands -
As early as 1923, however, the Court laid down in In Re Vicente
Pelaez [44 Phil.567 (1923)] the principle that it can exercise its
power to discipline lawyers for causes which do not involve the
relationship of an attorney and client x x x x In disciplining the
respondent, Mr. Justice Malcolm said: x x x x As a general rule, a
court will not assume jurisdiction to discipline one of its officers for
misconduct alleged to have been committed in his private capacity.
But this is a general rule with many exceptions x x x x The nature of
the office, the trust relation which exists between attorney and
client, as well as between court and attorney, and the statutory
rules prescribing the qualifications of attorneys, uniformly require
that an attorney shall be a person of good moral character. If that
qualification is a condition precedent to a license or privilege to
enter upon the practice of the law, it would seem to be equally
essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of
the privilege. So it is held that an attorney will be removed not only
for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross
misconduct not connected with his professional duties, which shows
him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which
his license and the law confer upon him x x x x [8]
Ten years later, in Piatt v. Abordo [9] where the erring lawyer was
suspended for one year from the practice of law for attempting to
engage in an opium deal, Justice Malcolm reiterated that an
attorney may be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in
his profession, but also for gross misconduct not related to his
professional duties which show him to be an unfit and unworthy
lawyer. "The courts are not curators of the morals of the bar. At the
same time the profession is not compelled to harbor all persons
whatever their character, who are fortunate enough to keep out of
prison. As good character is an essential qualification for admission
of an attorney to practice, when the attorney's character is bad in
such respects as to show that he is unsafe and unfit to be entrusted
with the powers of an attorney, the courts retain the power to
discipline him x x x x Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is
most sacredly bound to uphold the law x x x and to that doctrine we
give our unqualified support." [10]
Finally, reference is made to Rule 1.01, Chapter 1, entitled The
Lawyer and Society of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
requires that "a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct." "Conduct," as used in this Rule, is
not limited to conduct exhibited in connection with the performance
of professional duties.

29. In the case at bar, it is glaringly clear that the procurement of
personal loans through insinuations of his power as an influence
peddler in the Bureau of Customs, the issuance of a series of bad
checks and the taking undue advantage of his position in the
aforesaid government office constitute conduct in gross violation of
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The recommended suspension of respondent for six (6) months is
less than what he justly deserves. His propinquity for employing
deceit and misrepresentations as well as his cavalier attitude
towards incurring debts without the least intention of repaying them
is reprehensible. This disturbing behavior cannot be tolerated most
especially in a lawyer who is an officer of the court.
WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. GODOFREDO N. BERNARDINO is
SUSPENDED FOR ONE (1) YEAR from the practice of law with
warning that repetition of the same or similar acts will merit a more
severe penalty. Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts in
the land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar
Confidant and spread in respondent's personal records.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., (Chairman), Vitug, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

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