https://www.homeworkping.com/,homework help,online homework help,online tutors,online tutoring,research paper help,do my homework,

1. Get
Homework/Assignm
ent Done
Homeworkping.
com
Homework Help
https://www.homeworkping.com/
Research Paper help
https://www.homeworkping.com/
Online Tutoring
https://www.homeworkping.com/
click here for freelancing tutoring
sites
A.C. No. 1359 October17,1991
GENEROSA BUTED and BENITO BOLISAY, petitioners, vs.
ATTY. HAROLD M. HERNANDO, respondent.
Jorge A. Dolorfinofor petitioners.
R E S O L U T I O N
PER CURIAM:
On 22 August 1974,spouses GenerosaButed and BenitoBolisay filedan
administrative complaintfor malpractice against respondentAtty. HaroldM.
Hernando,charging the latter withhaving wantonly abused professional
secrets or informationobtainedby him as their counsel.
After respondent Hernandofiled his Answer on25June 1974, the Court,in a
resolutiondated 4 October 1974 referredthe complaint tothe Solicitor-
General for investigation, reportand recommendation.
On 10 February 1975,complainants presented a JointAffidavit of
Desistance. 1
On 24 October 1975, the Solicitor-General conducted a hearingwhere
respondent took the witness stand onhis own behalf.
The record ofthe case shows the following background facts:
In an action for partition institutedby Generosa as compulsory heirofthe
deceased Teofilo Buted, respondentwas counsel for LucianaAbadillaanda
certain Angela Buted.Involved insaidpartitioncase was a parcel ofland
Identified as Lot9439-B. Respondentultimately succeeded indefending
LucianaAbadilla's claimofexclusive ownership over Lot9439-B. When
Lucianadied, respondentwithdrew his appearance fromthat partition case.
It appears that Luciana Abadilla sold the lotto Benito Bolisay and a new
Transfer Certificate ofTitle over the lotwas issuedin the name of
complainantspouses.
When an actionfor specificperformance was lodged by acouple named Luis
Sy and Elena Sy against BenitoBolisayas one ofthe defendants,2 the latter
retained the services ofrespondent Atty. Hernandohowever claims thathe
rendered his services toBenito Bolisay free ofcharge. Subject ofthis case was
a contract oflease executedby Benito's co-defendant therein, Enrique Buted,
over a house standingona portionofLotNo. 9439-B. Itappears thatthe Sy's
were claiming thatthe lease extended tothe aforementioned lot.Benito was
then asserting ownership overthe realtyby virtue ofa Deed ofSale executed
by LucianaAbadilla inhis favor.Eventually,the Sy's were ordered tovacate
the house subjectofthe lease. Respondentavers thatthe relationship
between himselfandBenitoBolisayas regards this case was terminated on4
December 1969. 3
On 23 February 1974,respondent Hernando, without the consentofthe heirs
ofLucianaAbadillaandcomplainant spouses, fileda petitiononbehalfofthe
heirs ofCarlos, Dionisia and Francisco allsurnamed Abadilla, seeking the
cancellationofthe Transfer Certificate ofTitle (TCT) ofcomplainant spouses
over the lot. Carlos, Dionisia and Francisco were Luciana's registered co-
owners in the original certificate oftitle covering Lot No. 9439-B. 4 At the
hearing, respondentHernandotestified that ifthe petitionfor cancellation of
TCTwas granted, Lot 9439-B wouldnolongerbe owned by complainant
spouses but would be ownedin commonby allthe heirs ofLucianaAbadilla. 5
Complainantspouses, upon learning ofrespondent's appearance against
them in the cadastralproceeding,manifestedtheir disapproval thereofina
letter dated 30July 1974.6 Respondent however, pursuedthe case untilit
was eventuallydismissed bythe trial court on2 September1974on the
ground ofprescription. 7
At the hearing before the Office ofthe Solicitor Generalandinhis Answer,
respondent Hernandoadmittedhis involvementin the cadastral case as
counsel for the Abadillas but deniedhavingseen or taken holdofthe
controversialTransfer Certificate ofTitle, and havingavailed himselfofany
confidentialinformation relating toLot9439-B.
In its Report andRecommendation dated29 March1990, the Solicitor
General recommends that respondentbe suspendedfrom the practice oflaw
for three (3) months for violation ofthe Canons ofProfessional Ethics by
representing clients withconflicting interests, and filedbefore this Court the
corresponding Complaint 8 dated 30March 1990.
The issue raised in this proceedingis: whether or notrespondent Hernando
had a conflictofinterests under the circumstances described above.

2. The Canons of ProfessionalEthics,the thenprevailingparameters ofbehavior
ofmembers of the bar, defines a conflictofinterests situation in the following
manner:
6. Adverse influence andconflicting interests.—
xxx xxx xxx
It is unprofessionalto representconflicting interests, except by
express consent ofallconcernedgivenafter afull disclosure ofthe
facts. Within the meaning ofthis canon, alawyer represents
conflictinginterests when,in behalfofone client, itis his dutyto
contend for thatwhichduty toanother clientrequires himto
oppose.
The obligationtorepresentthe client withundivided fidelity and
not to divulge his secrets orconfidence forbids also the
subsequent acceptance ofretainers or employmentfrom others in
matters adverselyaffectinganyinterest ofthe client withrespect
to which confidence has been reposed.(Emphasis supplied)
Though as regards the first andsecond cases handled byrespondent, no
conflict of interest existed, the same cannotbe saidwith respect tothe action
for specific performance andthe cadastral proceeding. By respondent's own
admission,he defendedthe right ofownershipover Lot 9439-B of
complainantBenito Bolisay in the action for specific performance.He assailed
this same rightof ownership when he subsequently fileda petitionfor
cancellationof complainants'Transfer Certificate ofTitle over thatsame lot.
Respondent Hernandowas ina conflictofinterest situation.
It is clear from the above-quotedportionofthe Canons of ProfessionalEthics
that in cases where a conflictofinterests mayexist,fulldisclosure ofthe facts
and express consentof allthe parties concernedare necessary. 9The present
Code ofProfessional Responsibility is stricter on this matterconsidering that
consent of the parties is now required tobe inwrittenform. 10In the case at
bar, such consentwas wanting.
Respondent persistently argues that contrary tothe claims ofcomplainant
spouses, he had never seen nortakenhold ofthe Transfer Certificate ofTitle
covering Lot No.9439-B norobtainedany confidentialinformation in
handling the action for specific performance.11 The contention of
respondent is, ineffect, thatbecause complainant has notclearly shown that
respondent had obtained any confidential informationfromBenito Bolisay
while representingthe latter inthe actionfor specificperformance,
respondent cannotbe penalized for representing conflictinginterests. That is
not the rule in this jurisdiction.The rule here is, rather,that the mere factthat
respondent had actedas counselfor Benito Bolisay in the action for specific
performance should have precluded respondentfrom acting orappearing as
counsel for the other side in the subsequentpetitionfor cancellation ofthe
Transfer Certificate of Title ofthe spouses Generosa andBenitoBolisay. There
is no necessity for proving the actual transmission ofconfidential information
to an attorney inthe course ofhis employment by his first client in order that
he may be precluded fromacceptingemploymentby the second or
subsequent clientwhere there are conflictinginterests between the first and
the subsequent clients. The reason for this rule was set out bythe Court
in Hiladov. David12 in the followingterms:
Communications betweenattorney and client are, ina great
number of litigations, a complicated affair, consistingofentangled
relevant andirrelevant,secret and well known facts. In the
complexity of what is said in the course ofthe dealings between
an attorney anda client, inquiry ofthe nature suggestedwould
lead to the revelation, in advance ofthe trial, ofothermatters
that might only further prejudice the complainant's cause. Andthe
theory wouldbe productive ofother unsalutary results. To make
the passing of confidentialcommunication aconditionprecedent;
i.e., to make the employment conditioned onthe scope and
characterof the knowledge acquired by an attorney in
determining his rightto change sides, wouldnot enhance the
freedom of litigants, which is tobe sedulously fostered, toconsult
with lawyers uponwhat they believe are theirrights in
litigation. The condition wouldofnecessity callfor an investigation
ofwhat information the attorney has receivedandinwhat way it
is or it is not in conflict withhis new position.Litigants would be in
consequence be wary ingoing toan attorney, lest by an
unfortunate turn ofthe proceeding, ifaninvestigationbe held, the
court should accept the attorney's inaccurate version ofthe facts
that came tohim.
Hence the necessity ofsettingdown the existence ofthe bare
relationshipofattorney and client as the yardstick fortesting
incompatibilityofinterests. This sternrule is designednotalone to
prevent the dishonest practitioner fromfraudulent conduct,butas
well to protect the honest lawyer from unfounded suspicion of
unprofessional practice.(Strongvs. Int.Bldg.,etc.;Ass'n. 183 III.,
97; 47 L.R.A., 792) It is foundedon principles ofpublic policy, on
good taste. As has been said anothercase, the question is not
necessarily one ofthe rights ofthe parties, butas to whetherthe
attorney has adhered toproper professional standard. Withthese
thoughts inmind, itbehooves attorneys, like Caesar's wife, not
only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also toavoidthe
appearance oftreachery and double-dealing. Only thus can
litigants be encouraged toentrust theirsecrets totheir attorneys
which is ofparamount importance inthe administration of
justice. 13 (Emphasis supplied)
This Court went furtherin San Jose v. Cruz, 14 where the lawyer was charged
with malpractice for having representeda new client whose interestwas
opposed to those ofhis former clients inanother case:
The record shows that the respondent offered his services to the
Matienzo spouses knowing thatthe petitionerhadobtaineda
favorable judgmentin the civilcase No. 5480andthat his efforts
in the subsequentcivilcase No.5952wouldfrustrate said
judgment andrenderit ineffectual, as has really beenthe result
upon his obtainingthe writ ofinjunction above-mentioned.
Obviously his conductis unbecomingto an attorneyandcannot be
sanctionedby the courts. An attorney owes loyalty to his client not
only in the case in which he has represented him but also after the
relation ofattorney andclienthas terminatedandit is not a good
practice topermithimafterwards todefend inanother case other
persons against his former clientunder the pretextthat the case is
distinct from, andindependent ofthe former case. 15(Emphasis
supplied)
The appropriate rule has been expressed by Justice Malcolminthe following
manner:
An attorney is notpermitted, inserving a newclientas against a
former one, to do anythingwhichwill injuriouslyaffect the former
client in any manner inwhichthe attorneyformerly represented
him, thoughthe relationofattorney and client has terminated,
and the new employmentis in a differentcase; nor can the
attorney use against his formerclientanyknowledge or
informationgainedthroughtheir former connection.16 (Emphasis
supplied)
The absence ofmonetary considerationdoes not exemptthe lawyer from
complyingwiththe prohibition against pursuing cases where a conflictof
interest exists. The prohibitionattaches fromthe moment the attorney-client
relationshipis established andextends beyond the duration ofthe
professional relationship.
The Court therefore agrees with the Solicitor-General thatrespondent
Hernando is guiltyofviolation ofthe Canons of Professional Ethics by
representing clients withconflicting interests. We believe, however, thata
heavier penalty is appropriate.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to SUSPENDAtty. HaroldM. Hernando
from the practice oflaw fora periodoffive (5) months,witha WARNING that

3. repetitionof the same orsimilar offense willwarrant a more severe penalty.
A copy of this Resolution shallbe furnishedto all courts and tothe Office of
the Bar Confidantandspread onthe personal record ofrespondent.
Fernan, C.J.,Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano,BidinandDavide,Jr., JJ., concur
CBD CASENo. 251 July 11, 1995
ADELINA T. VILLANUEVA, complainant, vs.
ATTY. TERESITA STA. ANA, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
ComplainantAdelina T. Villanueva has sought thedisbarment ofrespondent
Attorney Teresita Sta.Ana.
From the Report andRecommendation oftheCommission onBarDiscipline
and the records of the case, itwouldappearthat complainantfirst met
respondentlawyer some timeinApril1992when the formerbroughtcertain
documents tothelatter for notarization. Respondent laterlearned that
complainanthad planned toborrow a substantialsum froma bank or lending
institution.Respondent represented that shecould facilitatethe loan if
complainantcouldput upa land collateral andprovide a "guaranty deposit"
ofP150,000.00. Evidentlyconvinced thatrespondent could help,
complainanthandedoverand entrusted to respondenttheamount of
P144,000.00, as well as various documents, e.g., a specialpower ofattorney,
deed of sale,tax declarationandlandtitle(in the name ofcomplainant's
father), requiredfor theloanapplication. Respondentlater toldcomplainant
that an additionalamountofP109,000.00was needed for withholding and
documentary stamptaxes,plus surcharges. Complainantthereupon decided
to forego the loanapplication. She demanded fromrespondent thereturn of
her money; however, the latter notonly failed toheed therequestbutalso
then beganto avoid complainant.
Complainantfinally sought assistance fromtheofficeof theVice-Presidentof
the Philippines, which referredthematter to theNationalBureau of
Investigation ("NBI"). Respondentwas subpoenaedtwiceby theagent-on-
case butshefailedin both instances toappear. Theinvestigation,
nonetheless,went through; thereafter, theNBI recommendedthat
respondentbecriminally chargedwith estafa under Article 315, paragraph
1(b), ofthe RevisedPenal Codeand thatdisbarmentproceedings betaken
against her. In a letter-referral, dated 03 May 1993, thenNBI Director
Epimaco A. Velasco transmitted totheCommissionon Bar Discipline
("Commission") of the Integrated Bar ofthePhilippines ("IBP") theBureau's
evaluation.
The Commissionrequiredrespondent torespondto thecharges but
respondentneither complied nor appeared at any ofthehearings scheduled
by it.
In the course of its proceedings,theCommission noted severalcriminal
charges filed againstrespondent; viz:
(1) CriminalCaseNo. 92-8849 for Falsification ofPrivate
Document, pending beforethe Regional Trial Court ofAntipolo,
Branch 73;
(2) CriminalCaseNo. 93-9289 for Estafa under Article315, par.
1(b) of the Revised PenalCode,pending beforetheRegional Trial
Court of Antipolo, Branch72;
(3) CriminalCaseNo. 93-118159 for Estafa through Falsification of
Public Document filedwith theRegional TrialCourt ofManila,
Branch 15,whichresulted inher conviction. The dispositive
portion of thedecision,dated 24March 1994,read:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds theaccused GUILTYbeyond
reasonabledoubtofthe complex crime ofEstafa thru falsification
ofpublic documentand hereby imposes upon said accused an
indeterminatepenalty of2 years 4 months of prision
correccional as minimumto 20years of reclusiontemporalas
maximumand indemnify theoffended party thesum of
P136,000.00and topaythecost.1
(4) CriminalCases Nos. 8015and 8019 for ViolationofSection
3(c), Republic ActNo. 3019, pending before the Second Divisionof
the Sandiganbayan;
(5) CriminalCases Nos. 7351and 7354 also for Violation ofSection
3(c), Republic ActNo. 3019, pending before the Second Divisionof
the Sandiganbayan;
(6) CriminalCaseNo. 7036 for Violation ofSection 3(c), Republic
Act No. 3019, pending beforetheSecondDivision ofthe
Sandiganbayan; and
(7) CriminalCaseNo. 6731 for Violation ofSection 3(c), Republic
Act No. 3019, pending beforetheSecondDivision ofthe
Sandiganbayan.
In the Commission's Report and Recommendation, dated 25 July 1994,
Investigating Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez recommended that "the
respondentbedisbarredfor being totally unfit tobe a memberofthe legal
profession." 2 In its ResolutionNo. XI-94-219, dated14 January 1995,the
Board ofGovernors oftheIntegrated Bar ofthePhilippines ("IBP") resolved
to adopt and approvethereport oftheInvestigating Commissioner.
We also agree.
Well-settled is therulethat good moral characteris not only a condition
precedent toanadmissionto thelegal profession but itmust alsoremain
extant inorder tomaintainone's good standing in thatexclusiveand
honored fraternity.3 The CodeofProfessionalResponsibility mandates:
CANON 1 — . . . .
Rule 1.01— Alawyer shall not engageinunlawful, dishonest,
immoralor deceitful conduct.
CANON 16 — Alawyer shallhold intrust all moneys and
properties ofhis clientthat may comeinto his possession.
Rule 16.01 — Alawyer shallaccountfor all money or property
collectedor received for orfrom the client.
Despitealltheopportunities accorded to her,respondent has failed to
presentherdefenseand to refutethe charges or, atthevery least, toexplain
herself. TheCourt is thus left with hardly anychoiceother thanto acceptthe
findings and recommendations oftheIntegrated Bar ofthePhilippines and
the Commission onBarDiscipline.
WHEREFORE, respondent Teresita Sta. Ana is DISBARRED.The ClerkofCourt
is directedto strikeouther namefrom theRoll ofAttorneys.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 2597 March 12, 1998
GLORITOV. MATURAN, petitioner,vs.
ATTY. CONRADOS. GONZALES, respondent.
R E S O L U TI O N
ROMERO, J.:

4. A complaint for disbarmentwas filed with this Court onOctober 25, 1983, by
Glorito V. Maturan againsthis counsel, Atty.Conrado S. Gonzales, charging
him with immoral, unethical, and anomalous acts. Therespondent filed his
comment thereto onFebruary 6,1984. On November11, 1997, or after
thirteen(13) years, theBoardofGovernors ofthe IntegratedBar ofthe
Philippines submitted their reportand recommendationon theinstantcase.
The facts, as culled fromtherecords, are as follows:
Spouses AntonioandGloria Casquejo institutedtheirson-in-law,Glorito V.
Maturan (herein petitioner), as their attorney-in-fact,througha Special
Power of Attorney (SPA) dated November6, 1981.Said SPAauthorized
Maturan tofileejectment cases againstsquatters occupying Lot 1350-A, Psd-
50375, locatedin GeneralSantos City,as wellas criminalcases against the
latter for violation of P.D. 772,again in connectionwith said lot. Respondent,
Atty. ConradoGonzales, prepared and notarizedsaid Special Power of
Attorney.
Subsequently,Glorito Maturanengaged theservices ofrespondentin
ejecting several squatters occupying Lot1350-A, Psd-50735. While said lot
was registered in thenameofCelestino Yokingco, Antonio Casquejo had,
however, instituted a casefor reconveyance ofpropertyanddeclaration of
nullity againsttheformer, docketedas CivilCaseNo. 2067.
As a consequenceof his engagementby petitioner,respondent Gonzales
filed CivilCaseNo. 1783-11 for Forcible Entry and Damages against several
individuals. On February18,1983, a judgment was rendered in favor of
petitioner. Petitioner, throughrespondent, filed a motionfor issuance ofa
writ ofexecution onMarch 10, 1983.
In the interim, theparties to CivilCase No.2067enteredinto a compromise
agreement, whichwas judicially approved ina judgmentdated March28,
1983.
On June 22, 1983, whilethemotionfor issuance ofa writofexecution was
pending, and withoutwithdrawing as counselfor petitioner, respondent
filed, on behalf of Celestino Yokingco, etal., Civil Case No.2746, an actionto
annul thejudgment renderedin Civil Case No. 2067. Theaction was
predicated onthelack of authority onthepartofpetitionerto represent
Antonio andGloria Casquejo, as no suchauthorization was shownto beon
record in CivilCaseNo. 2067.On August 24, 1983, respondent, onbehalfof
CelestinoYokingco,etal., also filed Special CivilCase No.161for injunction
with a prayerfor preliminary injunction,with damages, againstpetitioner.
Aggrieved by respondent's acceptanceofprofessional employment from
their adversaryin CivilCaseNo. 2067,and alleging thatprivilegedmatters
relating to the land inquestion had been transmittedby petitioner to
respondentin Civil Case 1783-11,petitioner filed an administrative complaint
against theformer for immoral, unethical,and anomalous acts and askedfor
his disbarment.
Respondent, ina comment dated January25,1984, deniedhaving
committed any malicious, unethical, unbecoming, immoral,or anomalousact
against his client. Respondentdeclaredthat hewas ofthe beliefthat filing a
motion for issuance of a writofexecution was thelast andfinal actin the
lawyer-clientrelationshipbetween himselfand petitioner,and thathis
formal withdrawalas counselfor theCasquejos was unnecessary in order to
sever thelawyer-client relationship between them. Furthermore, healleged
that his acceptanceof employmentfrom Yokingco was for him, an
opportunity tohonestly earna littlemore for his children's sustenance.
The investigating commissioner oftheIntegrated Bar ofthePhilippines, in his
report datedAugust 21, 1997,foundrespondent guiltyofrepresenting
conflicting interests andrecommendedthathe besuspended for three(3)
years. TheBoard of Governors oftheIBPadoptedand approved the report
and recommendation of theinvestigating commissioner but recommended
that the suspension bereduced fromthree(3) years to one(1) year.
This Court adopts thefindings ofthe investigating commissioner finding
respondentguiltyofrepresenting conflicting interests. It is improper for a
lawyer to appear as counsel for oneparty against the adverseparty who is
his client in a related suit, as a lawyer is prohibited fromrepresenting
conflicting interests or discharging inconsistent duties. Hemay not, without
being guiltyofprofessionalmisconduct,act as counselfor a personwhose
interest conflicts with thatofhis present or formerclient. 1 That the
representation ofconflicting interest is ingoodfaith and withhonest
intention onthepart ofthelawyerdoes not maketheprohibition
inoperative.
The reason for theprohibition is found intherelation ofattorney andclient,
which is one oftrustand confidenceofthehighestdegree. Alawyer
becomes familiar withall the facts connected withhis client's case. Helearns
from his clienttheweak points oftheactionas wellas the strong ones. Such
knowledgemust beconsideredsacredand guardedwith care. No
opportunity mustbegiven himto takeadvantage oftheclient's secrets. A
lawyer musthave the fullest confidenceofhis client. For ifthe confidence is
abused, theprofession willsuffer by theloss thereof. 2
This Court finds respondent's actuations violativeofCanon 6 oftheCanons
ofProfessionalEthics whichprovideinpart:
It is unprofessionalto representconflicting interests, exceptby
express consent ofallconcerned givenafter a fulldisclosureof
the facts.Within the meaning ofthis canon, a lawyer represents
conflicting interests when, in behalfofoneclient, itis his duty to
contend for thatwhichdutyto another clientrequires him to
oppose.
Moreover, respondent's justificationfor his actions reveal a patentignorance
ofthe fiduciary obligations which a lawyer owes to his client.Alawyer-client
relationship is not terminatedby thefiling ofa motionfor a writ of
execution.His acceptance ofa caseimplies that hewillprosecutethecase to
its conclusion.He may not bepermittedto unilaterally terminate the sameto
the prejudice ofhis client.
As to the recommendationthat the termofsuspensionbereduced from
three years to one year, wefindthesametobe unwarranted.In similarcases
decidedby theSupreme Court, the penalty oftwoor three years suspension
has beenimposed whererespondentwas found guilty ofrepresenting
conflicting interests. In Vda. De Alisbo vs.Jalandoon, Sr.,3 the respondent,
who appeared for complainantin a case for revival ofjudgment, even though
he had been the counsel ofthe adversepartyin the casesoughtto be
revived, was suspendedfor a period oftwoyears. In Bautista vs.Barrios, 4 a
suspensionoftwo years was imposedon respondent Barrios,who had
drafted a deed ofpartitionfor petitioner, but whoappeared for theother
party therein,when thesame was sought tobe enforcedby petitioner.
In PNB vs. Cedo, 5 theCourt even suspended therespondentthereinfor three
years, but only becauserespondent not only representedconflicting
interests, but also deliberately intendedto attractclients with interests
adverseto his former employer.Finally,in Natanvs.Capule,6 respondent was
suspended for twoyears after he acceptedprofessionalemployment inthe
very casein which his former clientwas the adverseparty.
ACCORDINGLY, this Courtresolves to MODIFYtheIBPrecommendation to
suspend respondent for one year and modifies it to SUSPENSION fromthe
practice oflaw for TWO (2) YEARS, effective immediately.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 76232 January 18, 1991
VILL TRANSPORTSERVICE, INC., petitioner, vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THEENERGY CORPORATION, and the DEPUTY
SHERIFF of the Regional Trial Court, Makati,Metro Manila, respondents.
RomualdoM. Jubayfor petitioner.
Castillo,Laman, Tan& Pantaleonfor private respondent.
FERNAN, C.J.:p

5. The issuein this petition for reviewon certiorariis whetheror notnoticeofa
decision served upon counsel ina casewhodid not leavea forwarding
address after hehadmovedfrom his address ofrecord, is a valid service
thereby making thedecision finaland executory after thelapseoftheperiod
to appeal.
The facts as found by the CourtofAppeals areas follows:
In Civil CaseNo. 45167before theRegionalTrial CourtofMakati, Branch
CXLI, defendantVillTransport Service, Inc. (VillTransport for brevity) was
held liable for damages for breachofcontractin favor oftheplaintiffEnergy
Corporation. Vill Transport was orderedto pay Energy Corporation
US$25,524.75or P191,435.62 as damages,P40,000for charter fees,
P33,931.65 for rental and maintenancecosts and P63,750 for servicefees,
with all of theseamounts being subjectto 12% interest perannumfrom June
16, 1980,plus attorney's fees ofP8,866.60.
On June 7, 1985 a copy of thedecisionwas sent by registeredmailto Atty.
Amante Pimentel, counsel ofrecord ofVillTransport, at his address at 563
Tanglaw Street, Mandaluyong,MetroManila. However,it was returned to
the court with the notationthattheaddresseehad moved outofhis given
address withoutleaving a forwarding address.
On September 14, 1985, Energy Corporationmoved for execution ofthe
decision andon September19,1985, thecourtfavorably acted onthe
motion. On September24,1985, a writ ofexecutionwas thereforeissued.
A month later, Vill Transportfiled an urgentmotion for reconsideration of
the order of September19,1985andserved noticeofits intentionto appeal.
It contendedthat the decision had not as yet becomefinalbecauseit came
to know of the decision only onOctober 21, 1985. Italsoclaimed that the
writ ofexecution was void as nocopy ofthemotionfor executionwas served
on it.
Energy Corporationfiled an opposition tosaidurgentmotionpointing out
that the decision had becomefinaland executory sincea copyofthe decision
was servedon Vill transport through its counselathis address ofrecordand
no appeal was perfected within thereglementary period ofappeal. Itadded
that a motionfor executionofa finalandexecutory judgment did nothaveto
be with noticeto defendant.
Before the motion for reconsideration could beresolved bythecourt,Vill
Transportfiled a motionfor newtrial based on newly-discoveredevidence.
Again, without waiting for the resolutionofsaidmotion, itfiled withthe
Court ofAppeals a petitionfor certiorari and mandamus withpreliminary
injunction aimed atthesetting asideoftheorder ofexecutionand the
issuanceof anorder for a newtrial.
On September 30, 1986, theCourtofAppeals 1 rendered a decision
dismissing the petitionfor lack ofmerit.2 It heldthat petitioner's counselwas
duty-bound to notify thetrial courtofany changeofaddress andhis failure
to do so couldnot beexcused. It addedthat the trialcourt had every reason
to consider the serviceof its decisioncompletedupon theexpirationoffive
days from notice tocounselin theabsenceofpriornoticeby the latter ofany
change of address.It opined that "to holdthat Rule13,Sec. 8 cannotapply
here becauseAtty.Pimenteldidnot get thenotice, wouldbe toencourage
litigants or theirattorneys to evadetheserviceofjudgments andorders by
simply leaving theiraddresses withoutnoticeoftheirwhereabouts." 3
Its motionfor thereconsideration ofsaid decisionhaving beendenied,Vill
Transportinterposed the instantpetition for reviewon certiorari.
Petitioner admits thenegligenceofits counsel in notleaving a forwarding
address but contends that its counsel was notactually notified ofthe
registeredletter containing a copy ofthetrialcourt's decision for hehad
moved from his address of record. Hence, servicethereofcouldnot have
taken effectafterthelapseofthe five-day periodmentionedin Rule 13,
Section 8 of theRules of Court.It invokes dueprocess complaining thatit
was deprived ofits rightto appeal fromthedecisionofthelower courton
account ofits failure toreceivea copy ofthedecision.
On the other hand, privaterespondentavers thatthepetition was
prosecuted manifestly todelay executionofthedecisionofthe lower court
which had long becomefinaland executory.It stresses thefact that, being
designated by Section 2, Rule13ofthe Rules ofCourtto receive copies ofall
court processes, petitioner's counsel was duty-boundto informthecourt of
any changes in his address ofrecord andtherefore, shouldhe failto do so,
serviceofsuch processes inhis address ofrecordshould beconsidered
completeand binding uponhis client.
We find for the privaterespondent.
Section 8,Rule13oftheRules ofCourtprovides that"(s)ervice byregistered
mail is completeupon actual receiptby theaddressee; but ifhefails to claim
his mailfrom the post officewithin five(5) days from the date offirst notice
ofthe postmaster,serviceshalltakeeffect attheexpiration ofsuchtime."
In Barramedavs. Castillo, 4 the Courtheld that sincetheexceptionin service
by registered mailrefers to constructiveservice, not to actualreceiptofthe
mail, it is but fair and just thattherebeconclusiveproofthata first notice
was sent by the postmaster totheaddressee. Whilein the morerecent case
ofDe la Cruz vs. De la Cruz, 5 the Courtappears to haveadoptedthemore
stringent rule ofrequiring not only thatthenotice ofthe registeredmailbe
sent but thatit should also bedeliveredto and received by the addressee,
We find thatthis rulecannot beappliedin this case wherein the elementof
negligence is present.
Petitioner herein disputes that a first noticewas eversentto its counselof
record because "the postofficejustreturnedtheregistered letter and put
the stampmark . . . 'Moved'"thereon. 6 To our mind, petitioner's contention
is sufficientproofthat indeed a firstnotice was sentto its counselofrecord.
Its non-receiptby theaddressee, however, was dueentirely tohis neglectin
informing thecourt ofthefact that hehad movedand had a newaddress. To
cater to petitioner's rhetorical argumentwould put a premium onnegligence
and encourage thenon-termination ofcases byreasonthereof.
In Antonio vs. Court ofAppeals, 7 theCourt categorically stated that the
requirement ofconclusive proofofreceipt oftheregistrynotice
"presupposes thatthenoticeis sent to the correct address as indicatedin the
records ofthecourt. It does not apply where, as in the caseatbar, thenotice
was sent to the lawyer's givenaddress butdid not reachhimbecausehe had
moved therefrom withoutinforming thecourtofhis newlocation.The
serviceattheoldaddress should beconsidered valid.Otherwise, no process
can be served on theclient through his lawyer ifthelatterhas simply
disappeared withoutleaving a forwarding address. Thereis no needto stress
that service onthelawyer,ifvalid, is also valid serviceon the clienthe
represents.The rulein fact is that itis on thelawyerandnottheclient that
the serviceshould firstbe made."
Losing a caseon account ofone's counsel's negligenceis a bitterpill to
swallow for thelitigant.But then, theCourtis duty-bound toobserveits rules
and procedures. And, in theobservance thereoffor theorderly
administration ofjustice, it cannot countenancethe negligence and
ineptitudeoflawyers whowantonly jeopardizetheinterests oftheir
clients. 8 On his part,a lawyershall observe therules of procedureand shall
not misusethem to defeattheends ofjustice. 9
Thus, a lawyershould so arrangematters that officialand judicial
communications sent by mail willreach him promptly and shouldhe failto
do so, not only he but his client as well,must suffertheconsequenceofhis
negligence.10 Failureto claim registeredmailofwhich noticehad been duly
given by the postmaster is not excusablenegligencethatwould warrant the
reopening ofa decided case. 11 The sameruleapplies incases like the instant
one where thecounsel, through his negligence,caused thenondelivery ofa
judicial notice.
WHEREFORE, the instantpetition is hereby deniedfor lack ofmerit.This
decision is immediately executory. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

6. A.C. No. 4103 September 7, 1995
VERONICA S. SANTIAGO, BENJAMIN Q. HONTIVEROS, MR.SOCORROF.
MANAS, and TRINIDAD NORDISTA, complainants, vs.
ATTY. AMADOR. FOJAS, respondent.
DAVIDEJR., J.:
In their letter of 8 September 1993, the complainants,former clients ofthe
respondent, praythat the latter bedisbarred for "malpractice, neglectand
other offenses whichmay bediscovered during theactualinvestigationof
this complaint."They attached thereto an AffidavitofMeritwhereinthey
specifically allege:
1. That we areDefendants-Appellates [sic]in theCourtofAppeals
Case No. CA-G.N.CV No. 38153 ofwhichto our surpriselost
unnecessarily the aforesaid Petition [sic]. Acloseperusalofthe
case reveals theserious misconductofour attorney onrecord,
Atty. Amado Fojas tantamountto malpracticeand negligencein
the performanceofhis duty obligationto us, todefendus in the
aforesaidcase. Thatthesaidattorney withoutinforming us the
reason why and riding highon the trust andconfidence werepose
on him either abandoned, failedto act accordingly,or seriously
neglected toanswerthecivilcomplaintagainst us inthesala of
Judge Teresita Capulong CaseNo. 3526-V-91Val. Metro Manila so
that we were deduced [sic]in default.
2. That underfalsepretenses Atty.Fojas assuredus that
everything was in order. That hehadalready answered the
complaintso that inspiteoftheincessantdemandfor himto give
us a copy he continued to deny sametous.Only todiscloselater
that he neveransweredit after all because according to him he
was a very busy man. Please refer toCourt ofAppeals decision
dated August 17, 1993.
3. That becauseofAtty. Amado Foja's neglectandmalpracticeof
law we lost the JudgeCapulong case andour appealto theCourt
of Appeals.So that itis only proper thatAtty. Fojas be disciplined
and disbarred in thepractice ofhis profession.
In his Comment, the respondentadmits his "mistake"infailing to file the
complainants'answer inCivilCaseNo. 3526-V-91, but healleges that itwas
cured by his filing of a motion for reconsideration, whichwas unfortunately
denied by the court. Heasserts thatCivilCaseNo. 3526-V-91was a "losing
cause"for thecomplainants because itwas based ontheexpulsionofthe
plaintifftherein fromtheFarEasternUniversity Faculty Association (FEUFA)
which was declaredunlawfulin the finaldecisionin NCR-OD-M-90-10-050.
Thus, "[t]he unfavorable judgment intheRegionalTrialCourt is not
imputableto [his]mistakebut rather imputable to themerits ofthe
case, i.e., the decision intheExpulsion casewherein defendants
(complainants herein) illegally removed fromtheunion(FEUFA) membership
Mr. PaulinoSalvador. . . ."He further claims that the complainants filed this
case to harass himbecauseherefused toshare his attorney's fees in the
main labor casehehadhandled for them. The respondentthen prays for the
dismissalof this complaint for utter lack ofmerit, sincehis failureto filethe
answer was cured and,even granting for thesakeofargumentthat such
failure amountedto negligence, it cannotwarranthis disbarmentor
suspensionfrom the practiceofthelaw profession.
The complainants fileda Reply to therespondent's Comment.
Issues having beenjoined, werequired the parties to informus whether they
were willing to submitthis casefor decisionon thebasis ofthepleadings
they have filed. Intheir separatecompliance, bothmanifested inthe
affirmative.
The facts in this casearenotdisputed.
Complainants Veronica Santiago, BenjaminHontiveros, Ma. SocorroManas,
and TrinidadNordista werethePresident, Vice-President, Treasurer, and
Auditor, respectively, ofthe FEUFA. They allegedly expelledfrom the union
PaulinoSalvador. Thelatter then commenced with the Department ofLabor
and Employment (DOLE) a complaint (NCR-OD-M-90-10-050) todeclare
illegalhis expulsion fromtheunion.
In his resolutionof22 November1990, Med-ArbiterTomas Falconitin
declared illegalSalvador's expulsionanddirected the union and allits officers
to reinstateSalvador's name intheroll ofunionmembers with alltherights
and privileges appurtenant thereto. This resolutionwas affirmed intoto by
the Secretary ofLabor and Employment.
Subsequently,Paulino Salvador filedwith the Regional TrialCourt (RTC) of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch172, a complaint against thecomplainants
herein for actual,moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's fees, under
Articles 19,20, and 21oftheCivil Code. Thecasewas docketedas CivilCase
No. 3526-V-91.
As the complainants'counsel, the respondentfiled a motion to dismiss the
said caseon grounds of(1) res judicataby virtueofthefinaldecision ofthe
Med-Arbiter inNCR-OD-M-90-10-050and (2) lackofjurisdiction, since what
was involved was anintra-union issue cognizableby the DOLE. Later,he filed
a supplemental motion todismiss.
The trial court, per JudgeTeresita Dizon-Capulong, granted themotionand
ordered the dismissalofthe case. Upon Salvador's motion for
reconsideration, however,it reconsidered theorderofdismissal, reinstated
the case, andrequiredthecomplainants hereinto file their answer within a
nonextendible periodoffifteen days from notice.
Instead offiling ananswer, the respondentfiled a motion for reconsideration
and dismissal ofthecase.This motion having beendenied,therespondent
filed with this Court a petition for certiorari, which was later referredto the
Court ofAppeals and docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP No. 25834.
Although that petition andhis subsequent motion for reconsideration were
both denied,therespondent stilldidnot file thecomplainants'answer in
Civil Case No. 3526-V-91.Hence, upon plaintiffSalvador's motion, the
complainants were declared indefault,and Salvador was authorizedto
presenthis evidence ex-parte.
The respondent thenfiled a motion to setasidetheorderofdefaultand to
stop the ex-parte reception ofevidencebefore the Clerk ofCourt, but tono
avail.
Thereafter, the trialcourt rendereda decisionordering the complainants
herein to pay,jointly andseverally, plaintiffSalvador the amounts of
P200,000.00as moral damages; P50,000.00as exemplary damages or
corrective damages; andP65,000.00 as attorney's fees; plus costofsuit.
The complainants, stillassisted by the respondent, elevated thecaseto the
Court ofAppeals, which, however, affirmed intoto thedecision ofthe trial
court.
The respondent asserts that hewas aboutto appealthesaid decisionto this
Court, but his services as counselfor thecomplainants andfor theunion
were illegally and unilaterally terminated by complainantVeronica Santiago.
The core issuethatpresents itselfis whether the respondentcommitted
culpable negligence,as wouldwarrantdisciplinary action, in failing tofilefor
the complainants ananswerin CivilCase No.3526-V-91 for whichreason the
latter weredeclaredin default and judgment was rendered againstthem on
the basis ofthe plaintiff's evidence,which was received ex-parte.
It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged toact either as adviser oradvocate
for every personwho may wish to becomehis client.He has theright to
declineemployment,1 subject, however, to Canon 14oftheCodeof

7. ProfessionalResponsibility.Onceheagrees totakeup thecauseofa client,
the lawyer owes fidelityto suchcause andmust always be mindfulofthe
trust andconfidence reposedin him.2 He mustservethe client with
competenceand diligence,3 and champion thelatter's causewith
wholehearted fidelity, care, anddevotion. 4 Elsewisestated,he owes entire
devotion totheinterestof theclient,warm zealin the maintenanceand
defense of his client's rights, and the exertionofhis utmost learning and
abilityto theend thatnothing betakenor withheld fromhis client, save by
the rules of law, legally applied. 5 This simply means that his client is entitled
to the benefit of any and every remedy anddefensethat is authorized by the
law ofthe land andhe may expect his lawyer to assert everysuch remedy or
defense.6 If muchis demandedfrom an attorney,it is becausetheentrusted
privilegeto practicelaw carries with itthecorrelativeduties notonly to the
client butalso tothecourt, tothebar, andto the public. Alawyer who
performs his duty withdiligenceandcandor not only protects theinterestof
his client;he also serves theends ofjustice, does honor tothebar, andhelps
maintaintherespect of thecommunity tothelegalprofession. 7
The respondent admits that itwas his duty to file an answer inCivil CaseNo.
3526-V-91. Hejustifies his failureto doso in this wise:
[I]n his overzealousness to questiontheDenial Order
of the trial court, 8 [he]instead,thruhonestmistake
and excusableneglect,filed a PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI with the Honorable Court, docketed
as G.R. No. 100983. . . .
And, when the CourtofAppeals, to which G.R. No. 100983 was
referred, dismissedthepetition, heagain "inadvertently"failedto
file an answer "[d]ueto honestmistake andbecauseofhis
overzealousness as stated earlier. . . . "
In their Reply,thecomplainants allegethathis failureto filean answer was
not an honestmistake but was "deliberate, malicious and calculated toplace
them on the legaldisadvantage, to their damage andprejudice"for,as
admitted by him in his motion toset aside the order ofdefault,his failureto
do so was "dueto volumeand pressureoflegalwork." 9 In short, the
complainants want toimpress upon this Courtthat the respondenthas given
inconsistent reasons tojustify his failureto file an answer.
We agree withthecomplainants. Inhis motion for reconsideration ofthe
default order, therespondentexplained his non-filing ofthe requiredanswer
by impliedly invoking forgetfulness occasioned by a largevolumeand
pressure of legal work, whilein his Comment inthis caseheattributes it to
honest mistakeand excusableneglectdueto his overzealousness to question
the denialorder of thetrial court.
Certainly,"overzealousness"on theonehandand"volumeand pressureof
legal work"on theother aretwodistinct and separatecauses or grounds.
The first presupposes therespondent's fulland continuing awareness ofhis
duty to file ananswer which, nevertheless, hesubordinatedto his conviction
that the trialcourt had committed a reversible error or graveabuse of
discretion in issuing an order reconsidering its previous order ofdismissalof
Salvador's complaint andin denying the motion toreconsider the saidorder.
The secondground is purely basedon forgetfulness becauseofhis other
commitments.
Whether it bethefirst or the second ground, thefact remains thatthe
respondentdidnotcomplywith his duty tofileananswerin CivilCase No.
3526-V-91. His lack of diligencewas compounded byhis erroneous belief
that the trialcourt committed sucherror or graveabuseofdiscretion and by
his continued refusal tofileananswer even after hereceived the Courtof
Appeals'decision inthe certiorari case. Thereis no showing whatsoever that
he further assailed thesaid decision beforethis Court ina petitionfor review
under Rule45 of theRules ofCourt toprove his claim ofoverzealousness to
challengethetrialcourt's order. Neitherwas itshownthathe allegedin his
motion to lift theorderof defaultthatthecomplainants had a meritorious
defense.10 And, inhis appeal fromthejudgmentby default, hedid not even
raise as oneof the errors ofthe trialcourt either theimpropriety oftheorder
ofdefault or thecourt's graveabuseofdiscretionin denying his motion to lift
that order.
Pressure andlargevolumeoflegalwork provideno excusefor the
respondent's inability toexerciseduediligencein theperformanceofhis
duty to file ananswer. Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention,
diligence,skill, and competence, regardless ofits importanceand whether he
accepts itfor a feeor for free.
All told, therespondent committed a breach ofCanon18ofthe Codeof
ProfessionalResponsibility which requires himto servehis clients,the
complainants herein,withdiligenceand, morespecifically,Rule18.03
thereofwhich provides: "Alawyer shall not neglecta legalmatter entrusted
to him, and his negligencein connection therewith shallrender him liable."
The respondent's negligenceis notexcused by his claim thatCivil CaseNo.
3526-V-91 was in fact a "losing cause"for the complainants sincethe claims
therein for damages werebasedon thefinaldecisionofthe Med-Arbiter
declaring the complainants'actofexpelling Salvador fromtheunionto be
illegal. This claimis a mereafterthoughtwhichhardly persuades us. Ifindeed
the respondent was so convinced ofthefutility ofany defensetherein, he
should haveseasonably informedthecomplainants thereof. Rule15.05,
Canon 15 oftheCode ofProfessionalResponsibility expressly provides:
A lawyer,when advising his client, shallgivea candid
and honest opinion on the merits andprobableresults
ofthe client's case, neither overstating nor
understanding theprospects ofthecase.
Then too, ifhe wereunconvincedofanydefense, weareunable
to understand why hetookall the troubleoffiling a motionto
dismiss onthegrounds of res judicata and lack ofjurisdiction and
ofquestioning theadverse ruling thereoninitially with this Court
and then with theCourt ofAppeals, unless,ofcourse, hemeant
all ofthese tosimply delaythedispositionofthecivilcase. Finally,
the complainants were not entirely without any valid or justifiable
defense.They could provethat the plaintiffwas notentitled toall
the damages sought by him orthat ifhewere so,they couldask
for a reduction ofthe amounts thereof.
We do not therefore hesitateto rulethattherespondent is notfreefrom any
blame for thesadfateofthecomplainants. Heis liable for inexcusable
negligence.
WHEREFORE, ATTY. AMADO R. FOJAS is hereby REPRIMANDED and
ADMONISHED to be, henceforth, morecareful in theperformance ofhis duty
to his clients.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 3923. March 30, 1993.
CONCORDIAB. GARCIA, complainant, vs.ATTY. CRISANTO L. FRANCISCO,
respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. LEGAL ETHICS; MISCONDUCTOF COUNSEL; VIOLATION OF OATH NOT
DELAYANY MAN OR MONEY OR MALICE; SUSPENSION FOR ONEYEAR FROM
PRACTICEOF LAW FOR GROSS ABUSEOF RIGHTOF RECOURSETO THE
COURTS BY ARGUING ACAUSE THAT IS OBVIOUSLYWITHOUTMERIT. — The
cause oftherespondent's clientis obviously withoutmerit. The respondent
was awareofthis fact whenhewilfully resortedto thegambits summarized
above, continuously seeking reliefthat was consistently denied, as heshould
have expected. . . By grossly abusing his rightofrecourseto the courts for
the purpose ofarguing a causethat hadbeen repeatedly rebuffed, hewas
disdaining theobligation ofthelawyer tomaintain only suchactions or
proceedings as appear tohimto bejustandsuchdefenses only as he
believes to behonestly debatableunderthelaw. By violating his oath notto
delay any man for money or malice,he has besmirchedthenameofan

8. honorable profession andhas proved himselfunworthy ofthe trust reposed
in him by law as anofficer oftheCourt . . . For this serious transgression of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, hedeserves to besanctioned, not
only as a punishmentfor his misconductbut alsoas a warning to other
lawyers who maybe influenced by his example.Accordingly, heis hereby
SUSPENDED for ONEYEAR from the practice oflaw andfrom the enjoyment
ofall the rights and privileges appurtenantto membershipofthe Philippine
bar.
R E S O L U T I O N
PER CURIAM, p:
In a sworn complaint filedwith theCourt onOctober 6, 1992,Concordia B.
Garcia seeks the disbarment ofAtty.Crisanto L.Francisco.
On March 9, 1964,Concordia B. Garcia andherhusbandGodofredo,the
Dionisio spouses, andFelisa and Magdalena Baetiong leashed a parcelofland
to Sotero Baluyot Leefor a period of25years beginning May 1, 1964.Despite
repeated verbaland written demands, Lee refused to vacateafter the
expiration of thelease. Leeclaimed that hehad anoption to extend thelease
for another 5years and the rightofpre-emption over theproperty.
In this disbarment case, the complainantclaims thatLee's counsel,
respondentFrancisco, commenced various suits beforedifferent courts to
thwart Garcia's right toregain her property and thatall these proceedings
were decided againstLee.The proceedings stemmed fromthesaid lease
contractand involved thesame issues and parties, thus violating the
proscription againstforum-shopping.
Respondent, inhis comment, says that heinsertedin defense ofhis client's
right only such remedies as were authorized by law.
The tangle of recourses employedby Francisco is narratedas follows:
1. On March 29, 1989,Lee,through Francisco,filed a complaintagainst
Garcia andtheother lessors for specificperformanceand reconveyancewith
damages intheRegionalTrialCourt ofQuezonCity. This was docketed as
Civil Case No. Q-89-2118.On June9,1989, Garcia filed a motion to dismiss
the complainton thegrounds offailureto statea cause ofaction, laches and
prescription. The casewas dismissedby Judge Felimon Mendoza onAugust
10, 1989.
2. On May 29, 1989,Garcia and theother lessors filed a complaintfor
unlawful detainer againstLee intheMetropolitanTrial CourtofQuezon City.
This was docketed as Civil CaseNo. 1455. ThroughFrancisco, Lee filed an
answer alleging as specialand affirmativedefensethe pendency ofCivilCase
no. Q-89-2118 in theRegional TrialCourt ofQuezon City. On September 5,
1989, Judge Marcelino Bautista issued a resolution rejecting this allegation
on the ground that theissues beforethetwo courts were separateand
different.
3. On October 24, 1989, Lee, through Francisco, filedwith the Regional Trial
Court ofQuezon Citya petition for certiorariand prohibition withpreliminary
injunction against JudgeBautista, Garcia and the other lessors. This was
docketedas civilCaseNo. Q-89-3833. Infiling this petition, Francisco knewor
should haveknown thatit violatedtheRule onSummary Procedure
prohibiting the filing of petitions for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition
against any interlocutory orderissuedby thecourt.
Francisco claims that what heappealed totheRegionalTrialCourt inCivil
Case No. Q-89-3833was the denial ofhis prayerfor dismissal ofCivilCase
No. 1455. This is not true.Civil CaseQ-89-3833was clearly a special civil
action and not an appeal.
On November 13, 1989,JudgeAbrahamVera issuedan order enjoining Judge
Bautista from proceeding with the trialofthe unlawful detainer case. Upon
motion ofthe complainant, however, theinjunction was set aside andCivil
Case No. Q-89-3833was dismissed onJanuary 9, 1990.Leedid notappeal.
4. On April 6, 1990,Lee through Francisco, filed a petitionfor certiorari and
prohibitionwith prayer for preliminary injunction with the CourtofAppeals
against JudgeVera, JudgeSingzon, Garcia andtheother lessors.Docketed as
CAG.R. Sp No. 20476, the petitionassailedtheJanuary 9,1990order of
Judge Vera dismissing Civil Case No.Q-89-3833.On May 31, 1989, the
petitionwas denied.
5. On June 14,1990, JudgeSingzondecidedCivilCaseno.1455 in favor of
complainantGarcia and theother lessors. Leedidnot appeal. Instead, on,
June 21, 1990, through Francisco again, hefiled a petition against Judge
Singzon and theotherlessors for certiorariand annulment ofthe decision in
Civil Case No. 1455and damages with prayer for issuanceofpreliminary
injunction.This was docketedas Civilcase No.90-5852 in theRegional Trial
Court ofQuezon City, Branch 98, presided by JudgeCesar C.Paralejo.
In Francisco's comment beforeus, healleges that CivilCaseNo.Q-90-5852is
an appealfrom the unlawful detainer case.Again, helies.Civil CaseNo. Q-90-
5852 was a specified civil action and not an appeal.
On July 2, 1990, Garcia's groupfiled an Omnibus Motion toDismiss CivilCase
No. 90-5852. On July 13, 1990,Judge Paralejo issuedanorder enjoining
Judge Singzon fromenforcing the decision inthat case. Garcia attacked this
order in a petition for certiorariand prohibition withprayer for preliminary
injunction docketedas CASp. No. 22392. Thepetition was granted bythe
Court ofAppeals on September19,1991, on theground thatthejudgmentin
the unlawful detainer casehad comefinal andexecutory as June30, 1990.
6. On September24,1991, Garcia filed a motion for execution inthe
unlawful detainer case. On September27,1991, Lee,throughFrancisco, filed
a motion to inhibit JudgeSingzon and todefer the hearing ofthemotion. A
writ ofexecution was nonetheless issued by JudgeSingzon on October8,
1991.
7. Two days later,Lee, through Francisco,filed with theSupremeCourta
petitionfor certiorari withpreliminary injunction andtemporary restraining
order againsttheCourt ofAppeals, JudgeSingzon, Garcia andtheother
lessors.This Court denied thepetition onJanuary 27, 1992, and
reconsiderationon April 8,1992.
8. Finally, Lee, still through Francisco, filed a petitionfor certiorari with
preliminary injunction againstJudge Singzon, Garcia and theother lessors in
the RegionalTrial CourtofQuezon Cityto set aside anddeclare the writs of
execution in CivilCaseNo. 1455.This was dismissedon August 4,1992, and
Lee, through Francisco, fileda motionfor reconsideration. According to
Francisco,he was relievedas counsel while this motion was pending.
A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause ofhis client butnotat theexpense of
truth and the administration ofjustice.
The causeoftherespondent's client inobviously withoutmerit. The
respondentwas aware ofthis factwhen hewilfully resorted to the gambits
summarizedabove, continuously seeking reliefthatwas consistently denied,
as he should haveexpected.He thereby added tothealready clogged
dockets ofthecourts andwasted their valuabletime. Healso caused much
inconvenience andexpensetothecomplainant, who was obliged todefend
herselfagainsthis everymove.
By grossly abusing his rightofrecourseto the courts for thepurposeof
arguing a causethathadbeenrepeatedly rebuffed,he was disdaining the
obligation ofthe lawyer to maintain only such actions or proceedings as
appearto himto bejustand suchdefenseonly as hebelieves to behonestly
debatable under thelaw. By violating his oath not to delay any man for
money or malice, he has besmirched thenameofanhonorableprofession
and has proved himselfunworthy oftrust reposed inhimby law as anofficer
ofthe Court.

9. Atty. Crisantol. Francisco took his oath as a lawyer onMarch 2,1956.
Considering his age and experience inthe practiceofthelaws, heshould
have known better thanto triflewith itand to useit as aninstrument for
harassment of thecomplainant andthemisuseofjudicialprocesses. For this
serious transgression of theCode ofProfessionalResponsibility, hedeserves
to be sanctioned,notonlyas punishment for his misconduct but also as a
warning to other lawyers who may beinfluencedby his example.
Accordingly,he is herebySUSPENDEDfor ONEYEAR from the practiceoflaw
and from the enjoymentof all the rights andprivileges appurtenant to
membership inthePhilippine bar.
Let a copy of this Resolution beserved immediately on therespondentand
circularized toall courts and theIntegrated Bar ofthePhilippines.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 98149 September 26, 1994
JOSEV. DEL ROSARIO, petitioner, vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and DEDIOS MARIKINA TRANSPORTATION CO.,
INC., respondents.
Ponce Enrile,Cayetano,Reyes & Manalastas for petitioner.
Orlando B. Bragafor private respondent.
VITUG, J.:
Petitioner suffered physical injuries, requiring two (2) majoroperations,
when he fellfrom, andthen was dragged along theasphalted road by, a
passenger bus operatedby privaterespondent transportation company. The
incidentoccurredwhen the bus driverbolted forwardathighspeed while
petitionerwas stillclinging onthebus door's handle barthat causedthe
latter tolosehis gripand balance. Therefusalofprivate respondentto
settled petitioner's claim for damages constrained petitionerto file,on 26
June 1985, a complaint for damages against private respondent.
After the reception of evidence,thetrialcourt, on 11December1989,
renderedits decision, the dispositiveportion reading thusly:
WHEREFORE, judgmentis hereby rendered dismissing defendant
De Dios Marikina Transportation Co., Inc.'s counterclaim for lack
of merit and ordering said defendantto pay plaintiffJoseV. Del
Rosario:(a) thesum ofP76,944.41, as actual andcompensatory
damages; (b) thesum ofP15,000.00, as moralandexemplary
damages; and(c) the sumofP33,641.50, as attorney's fees, a s
well as topay thecosts ofsuit; and,as regards thethird-party
complaintherein, ordering third-party defendant FirstQuezon
City InsuranceCo.,Inc.to indemnify third-partyplaintiff
De Dios Marikina Transportation Co., Inc. in thesumof
P12,000.00,with interestthereonatthelegalratefrom dateof
filing of the third-party complaint onAugust 20, 1985, until full
payment thereof. Further, there being no satisfactory warrant,
therefor, the Courthereby dismisses therest oftheclaims in the
complaintandthird-party complaint herein.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
On appealto it, theCourt ofAppeals affirmed in totothefindings offact of
the trialcourt,as wellas thegrantto petitioner ofdamages, but itreduced
the award for attorney's fees fromP33,641.50 toP5,000.00. Petitioner's
motion for reconsiderationquestioning the reduction ofattorney's fees was
denied by the appellate court. Hence,this petition raising this soleissue.
We see merit inthepetition.
There is no questionthata courtmay, whenever itdeems it justand
equitable, allowtherecovery bytheprevailing party ofattorneys fees. 1 In
determining thereasonableness ofsuchfees, this Courtin a number of
cases 2 has provided various criteria which, for convenientguidance, we
might collate thusly:
a) the quantity and characterofthe services rendered;
b) the labor,time andtrouble involved;
c) the natureand importanceofthelitigation;
d) the amountofmoney or thevalueoftheproperty affectedby
the controversy;
e) the novelty and difficulty ofquestions involved;
f) the responsibility imposed oncounsel;
g) the skill and experiencecalled for intheperformanceofthe
service;
h) the professionalcharacter and socialstanding ofthelawyer;
i) the customary charges ofthe bar for similar services;
j) the characterofemployment, whether casual orfor
establishmentclient;
k) whether thefeeis absoluteor contingent(it being therulethat
an attorneymayproperly charge a higher feewhen itis
contingent thanwhen itis absolute); and
1) the results secured.
In this instance, thecomplaint for damages was instituted by petitioner in
June 1985, following therefusalofprivaterespondent to settlepetitioner's
claim, andthedecision thereon was promulgated bythecourt a quo onlyin
December 1989 or about fouryears and sixmonths later. Severalpleadings
were filedandno less than twenty appearances were made bypetitioner's
counsel, notcounting thevarious other pleadings ultimately filedwith the
Court ofAppeals and nowbefore this Court. Giventhenature ofthecase, the
amount ofdamages involved,andtheevidenteffortexertedby petitioner's
counsel, thetrial court's awardofattorney's fees for P33,641.50 would
appearto us to bejust andreasonable.
WHEREFORE, the instantpetition is hereby GRANTED,andthedecisionofthe
Court ofAppeals is MODIFIED byREINSTATING thetrial court's awardof
attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED
G.R. No. L-29184 January 30, 1989
BENEDICTO LEVISTE, petitioner, vs.
THE COURTOF APPEALS, HON. JUDGELUIS B. REYES, COURTOF FIRST
INSTANCEOF MANILA, ROSA DEL ROSARIO, RITA BANU, CARMEN DE
GUZMAN-MARQUEZ, JESUS R. DEGUZMAN, RAMON R. DEGUZMAN,
JACINTOR. DEGUZMAN and ANTONIOR. DE GUZMAN, respondents.
Benedicto Leviste for and in his ownbehalf.
Gatchalian, Ignacio &Associates for respondents de Guzman.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
The issuein this caseis whether ornot an attorney who was engaged ona
contingent feebasis may, inorder tocollect his fees, prosecute an appeal
despitehis client's refusal toappeal the decision ofthetrial court.
On September 7,1963, thepetitioner,a practicing attorney,enteredinto a
written agreement withtheprivaterespondent Rosa del Rosario toappearas
her counselin a petition for probateoftheholographic willofthelate
Maxima C. Reselva. Underthewill,a pieceofreal property atSales Street,
Quiapo, Manila,was bequeathed toDel Rosario. Itwas agreed that
petitioner's contigentfee would bethirty-five per cent(35%) ofthe property
that Rosa may receive upon theprobateofthe will(Annex "A", p. 59,Rollo).
In accordancewith their agreement, Levisteperformedthefollowing services
as Del Rosario's counsel:
(1) Thoroughly researchedandstudied the lawon probateand
succession;
(2) Looked for and interviewed witnesses,and took their
affidavits;
(3) Filed the petition for.probateis SpecialProceeding No. 58325;

10. (4) Made the properpublications;
(5) Presentedat thetrialthefollowing witnesses:
a) Eleuterio deJesus
b) Lucita deJesus
c) Purita L. Llanes
d) Rita Banu
e) Jesus Lulod.
On August 20, 1965, Levistereceived a letter fromMs. DelRosario, informing
him that shewas terminating his services as hercounseldueto "conflicting
interest."This consisted, according to the letter, inpetitioner's moral
obligation toprotecttheinterest ofhis brother-in-law,GaudencioM. Llanes,
whom Del Rosario and the other parties in the probate proceeding intended
to eject as lessee of theproperty which was bequeathed to DelRosario
under the will(Annex "B", p. 60, Rollo).
On September 20, 1965, petitioner filed a "Motion to IntervenetoProtect
His Rights to Fees for ProfessionalServices."(Annex "B", p. 60, Rollo.)
In an order datedNovember 12, 1965 the trialcourt denied his motionon
the ground thathe had"not fileda claimfor attorney's fees nor recordedhis
attorney's lien."(p. 3, Rollo.)
On November 23, 1965,petitioner filed a "FormalStatementofClaim for
Attorney's Fees and Recording ofAttorney's Lien,'which was notedin the
court's order of December 20,1965(Annexes "D"and"E", pp. 63 &64,
Rollo).
Although the order denying his motionto intervenehad becomefinal,
petitionercontinued toreceivecopies ofthe court's orders, as wellthe
pleadings of the other parties in the case. Healso continuedto file pleadings.
The case was submitted for decision withouttherespondents'evidence.
On November 23, 1966,DelRosarioand Rita Banu,thespecialadministratrix-
legatee, fileda "MotionTo WithdrawPetition for Probate"alleging thatDel
Rosario waived her rights tothedevisein her favor and agreedthattheDe
Guzman brothers andsisters who opposed her petitionfor probate, shall
inherit alltheproperties left bythedecedent.(Annex"F", p. 65,Rollo.)
In an order of April 13, 1967 the trialcourt deniedthemotion to withdraw
the petition for being contrary topublic policy (Annex "G", pp.66-67,Rollo).
Nonetheless, onAugust 28, 1967, thecourt disallowed the will, holding that
the legalrequirements for its validity werenot satisfied as only two
witnesses testified that the willand the testatrix's signature werein the
handwriting of Maxima Reselva.
The petitioner filedanappealbond, noticeofappeal, andrecordon appeal.
The privaterespondents fileda motion todismiss theappeal ontheground
that petitioner was not a party ininterest.
The petitioner opposed the motionto dismiss his appeal, claiming that he
has a direct and materialinterest in thedecision soughtto bereviewed.He
also asked thathebe substitutedas party-petitioner, in lieuofhis former
client, Ms. Del Rosario.
On March 28, 1968, the trialjudgedismissed the appealand denied
petitioner's motion for substitution.
The petitioner filedin the CourtofAppeals a petition for mandamus (CA-G.R.
No. 41248) praying that thetrial court beordered togiveduecourse tohis
appealand to grant his motionfor substitution.
On May 22, 1968, the CourtofAppeals dismissedthepetition for being
insufficientin formand substanceas the petitionerdidnot appear tobethe
proper party toappealthedecisionin SpecialProceeding No. 58325 (Annex
1, p. 77, Rollo).
Upon the denial ofhis motionfor reconsideration, petitionerappealed by
certiorarito this Court,assigning thefollowing errors against theCourtof
Appeals'resolution:
1. The Court ofAppeals erredin finding that the petitioner
appears not tobe the proper party to appealthedecisionin Sp.
Proc. No. 58325oftheCourt ofFirst Instance ofManila.
2. Assuming thepetitioner's rightofappealis doubtful,theCourt
ofAppeals erred indismissing his petition for mandamus; and
3. The Court ofAppeals erredin notreversing the decision inSp.
Proc. No. 58325denying theprobate oftheholographic willofthe
late Maxima C. Reselva, saiddecision being patentlyerroneous.
Under his firstassignmentoferror, petitionerargues that by virtue ofhis
contractofservices with Del Rosario,he is a creditorofthelatter,and that
under Article1052 ofthe CivilCode which provides:
ART. 1052. Ifthe heirrepudiates theinheritancetotheprejudice
ofhis own creditors, thelatter may petitionthecourtto authorize
them to accept itin thenameofthe heir.
The acceptance shall benefitthecreditors onlyto anextent
sufficientto cover theamount oftheir credits.The excess, should
there be any,shall inno casepertainto the renouncer, but shall
be adjudicatedto thepersons towhom, in accordancewith the
rules established in this Code, itmaybelong.
he has a right toacceptfor his clientDel Rosario totheextent of35% thereof
the devise in her favor (whichsheineffectrepudiated) to protect his
contigentattorney's fees.
The argument is devoid ofmerit. Article1052 ofthe CivilCode does not apply
to this case. That legalprovision protects thecreditor ofa repudiating heir.
Petitioner is nota creditor ofRosa delRosario. Thepaymentofhis fees is
contingent and dependent uponthesuccessful probate ofthe holographic
will. Sincethe petitionfor probatewas dismissed bythelowercourt, the
contingency did not occur. Attorney Levisteis not entitled to his fee.
Furthermore,Article1052presupposes that theobligoris an heir. Rosa del
Rosario is not a legalheir ofthe late Maxima C. Reselva. Upon thedismissal
ofher petition for probate ofthe decedent's will, shelostherrightto inherit
any part ofthelatter's estate. There is nothing for thepetitioner to accept in
her name.
This Court had ruled inthecase of Recto vs. Harden, 100Phil. 1427,that "the
contract(for contingent attorney's fees) neither gives, nor purports to give,
to the appellee (lawyer) any rightwhatsoever,personalor real, inand to her
(Mrs. Harden's) aforesaid sharein the conjugal partnership. The amount
thereofis simply a basis for thecomputation ofsaid fees."
The Court ofAppeals did noterrin dismissing the petitionfor mandamus, for
while it is true that,as contendedby thepetitioner,publicpolicy favors the
probate ofa will,it does notnecessarily follow that everywill thatis
presentedfor probate, shouldbe allowed. The law lays down procedures
which shouldbe observedand requisites that shouldbe satisfiedbefore a
will may beprobated.Those procedures andrequirements werenot
followed inthis caseresulting in thedisallowanceofthe will. Therebeing no
valid will,themotionto withdraw theprobatepetition was inconsequential.
Petitioner was not a partyto theprobateproceeding in the lower court. He
had no direct interest intheprobateofthewill.His only interest in theestate
is an indirectinterest as former counsel for a prospectiveheir.In Paras vs.
Narciso, 35Phil. 244, Wehad occassion to rulethatonewho is only indirectly
interested in a willmay notinterfere inits probate. Thus:

11. ... the reason for theruleexcluding strangers fromcontesting the
will, is not thatthereby thecourt maybe prevented from learning
facts which wouldjustify or necessitatea denial ofprobate, but
rather thatthecourts and the litigants should not bemolestedby
the intervention in theproceedings ofpersons with no interest in
the estatewhichwould entitlethem tobe heardwith relation
thereto.(Paras vs. Narciso,35 Phil. 244, 246.)
Similary, in Morente vs. Firmalino,40 O.G.21stSupp. 1, We held:
We are of the opinion thatthelowercourt did not err in holding
that noticeof an attorney's liendidnot entitletheattorney-
appellant tosubrogate himselfinlieuofhis client.It only gives
him the rightto collect a certain amountfor his services incase
his client is awarded a certainsum bythe court.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is deniedfor lack ofmerit. Costs
against thepetitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 117438June8, 1995
RAUL SESBREÑO, petitioner, vs.
HON, COURT OF APPEALS, and PATRICIA GIAN, SOTEROBRANZUELA,
ANDRES C. YPIL, SANTIAGOBACAYO, BRIGIDOCOHITMINGAO, VICTORINO
DINOY, GUILLERMOMONTEJOand EMILIORETUBADO,respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
Of interestto alllaw practitioners is theissueat bench, namely, whether the
Court ofAppeals had theauthority toreduce the amount ofattorney's fees
awarded to petitionerAtty. RaulH. Sesbreño, notwithstanding the contract
for professionalservices signed byprivaterespondents.
The antecedent facts of thecasefollow.
Fifty-two employees sued the Province ofCebu andthen GovernorRene
Espina for reinstatementandbackwages. 1 Herein petitioner,Raul H.
Sesbreño, replaced theemployees'formercounselAtty.CatalinoPacquiao.
Thirty-two of the fifty-two employees signed two documents whereby the
former agreed topay petitioner 30% as attorney's fees and 20% as expenses
to be takenfrom their back salaries.
On September 12, 1974, thetrialcourt rendereda decision ordering the
Province of Cebuto reinstatethepetitioning employees andpay them back
salaries.Said decision became final and executory after it was affirmedin
toto by the Courtof Appeals andthepetition to reviewtheappellate
decision,denied by this Courtin 1978. 2
A compromise agreement was entered intoby theparties below in April
1979 whereby theformer employees waivedtheir rightto reinstatement
among others. Likewise, pursuantto said compromiseagreement, the
Province of Cebureleased P2,300,000.00 tothepetitioning employees
through petitioneras "Partial SatisfactionofJudgment."Theamount
representedback salaries,terminalleavepay and gratuity pay due tothe
employees.
SometimeNovemberandDecember1979,ten employees,herein private
respondents, 3 filedmanifestations beforethetrialcourt asserting thatthey
agreed to pay petitioner40%to betaken only fromtheir back salaries.
The lower court issuedtwo orders, with which petitionercomplied, requiring
him to releaseP10,000.00to each oftheten private respondents andto
retain 40% of theback salaries pertaining to the latter out ofthe
P2,300,000.00released tohim.
On March 28, 1980, the trialcourt fixed petitioner's attorney's fees at 40%of
back salaries, terminal leave, gratuity pay and retirement benefits and 20%
as expenses,or a total of60% ofallmonies paid totheemployees.
Privaterespondents'motionfor reconsiderationwas granted and onJune 10,
1980, thetrial courtmodified the awardafter noting thatpetitioner's
attorney's lienwas inadvertently placed as 60%when itshould havebeen
only 50%. The dispositiveportion oftheorderreads:
WHEREFORE, in view ofall the foregoing the order of
this Courtfixing 60% as attorney's fee[s]ofAtty.
Sesbreñoshould be50% ofall monies which the
petitioners (Suico, etal.) may receive fromthe
ProvincialGovernment.
Obviously not satisfiedwith theattorney's fees fixedby thetrial court,
petitionerappealed totheCourt ofAppeals claiming additional fees for legal
services before the SupremeCourt,reimbursementfor expenses anda clear
statement that thefeebe likewise takenfrom retirement payawarded to his
clients. Unfortunately, therespondentappellatecourt did notagreewith him
as the generous award was further reduced. 4
The appellatecourt noted that inthis jurisdiction, attorney 's fees are always
subjectto judicialcontrol anddeemedtheaward of20% oftheback salaries
awarded to private respondents as a fair,equitable andreasonableamount
ofattorney's fee. The decretal portionofthe decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the questionedorder is MODIFIED. Theattorney's
fees due Atty.Raul Sesbreñois fixed atanamount equivalent to
20% ofall back salaries which the Province ofCebu has awarded
to herein 10 petitioners.5
Hence this petitionfor review whereheclaims thatattorney's fees
amounting to 50% ofallmonies awarded to his clients as contingent fees
should beupheld for being consistentwithprevailing case lawand the
contractofprofessionalservices between the parties. Headds thatsince
private respondents didnot appeal, they arenotentitled toaffirmativerelief
other thanthatgranted intheregional trial court.
We find no reversibleerror in thedecision oftheCourt ofAppeals and vote
to deny the petition.
Respondentcourt found that thecontract ofprofessionalservices entered
into by the parties 6 authorizedpetitioner to takea totalof 50%from the
employees'back salaries only. Thetrialcourt, however,fixed the lawyer's fee
on the basis ofall monies to beawardedto privaterespondents.
Fifty per centofallmonies which private respondents may receivefrom the
provincialgovernment, according to the CourtofAppeals, is excessiveand
unconscionable,not tosay, contrary tothecontract ofprofessional
services. 7 Afterconsidering thefacts and thenatureofthecase,as wellas
the lengthoftimeand effort exerted by petitioner, respondent court
reduced the amount ofattorney's fees duehim.
It is a settledrule that whata lawyermay chargeand receive as attorney's
fees is always subject tojudicialcontrol.8 Alawyer is primarily anofficer of
the court chargedwith theduty ofassisting thecourt inadministering
impartialjustice betweentheparties.When hetakes his oath, hesubmits
himselftothe authority ofthecourtandsubjects his professionalfees to
judicial control. 9
As statedby theCourt in thecaseof Sumaong v. Judge:10
A lawyer is not merelythedefenderofhis client's causeanda
trusteeofhis client in respect oftheclient's cause ofactionand
assets;he is also,and first andforemost, anofficer ofthecourt
and participates inthefundamentalfunctionofadministering
justicein society.It follows that a lawyer's compensationfor

12. professionalservices rendered aresubject to thesupervisionof
the court, not justto guarantee that the fees he charges and
receives remain reasonableand commensuratewith the services
rendered, but also tomaintainthedignity and integrity ofthe
legal professionto whichhebelongs.Upontaking his attorney 's
oath as an officerofthecourt, a lawyer submits himselfto the
authority of thecourts to regulatehis rightto professional fees. 11
In the case at bench, theparties entered intoa contingentfeecontract. The
Agreement provides:
WE, the undersigned petitioners in thecaseof POLICRONIO
BELACHO, ET AL., VS. RENEESPINAETAL., hereby agreeto pay
Atty. Sesbreño,our lawyer, the following to betaken fromour
back salaries:
30% as attorney's fees
20% as expenses
That we enter intoagreementin orderto bepaidour back salaries
as early as possible andso that wemay bereinstatedas early as
possible.
A stipulation ona lawyer's compensationin a writtencontract for
professionalservices ordinarily controls the amount offees that the
contracting lawyer may beallowed,unless thecourtfinds suchstipulated
amount unreasonable unconscionable. 12
A contingentfee arrangement is valid inthis jurisdiction 13 and is generally
recognizedas valid and binding but must belaiddownin an express
contract. 14 The amountof contingent fees agreed upon bytheparties is
subjectto thestipulation that counselwill bepaidfor his legal services only if
the suit orlitigationprospers.Amuchhigher compensation is allowedas
contingent fees in consideration oftheriskthat the lawyer may getnothing if
the suit fails.
Contingent feecontracts are under thesupervision and closescrutiny ofthe
court in order thatclients may beprotectedfrom unjustcharges. 15 Its
validity depends inlargemeasure onthereasonableness ofthestipulated
fees underthecircumstances ofeach case. 16
When the courts find thatthestipulated amountis excessive orthecontract
is unreasonableor unconscionable, or found tohave been marredby fraud,
mistake, undue influenceor suppression offacts on thepart oftheattorney,
public policy demands that said contractbedisregarded toprotect theclient
from unreasonable exaction. 17
Stipulatedattorney's fees are unconscionable whenevertheamount is by far
so disproportionate compared to the valueoftheservices rendered as to
amount to fraudperpetratedupontheclient. This means to say thatthe
amount of thefee contractedfor, standing aloneand unexplainedwould be
sufficientto showthat an unfair advantage hadbeen takenofthe client, or
that a legalfraud had been perpetrated onhim. 18
The decreeof unconscionability or unreasonableness ofa stipulatedamount
in a contingent feecontract,will nothowever,preclude recovery. Itmerely
justifies thecourt's fixing a reasonableamount for the lawyer's services.
Courts may always ascertain, ifthe attorney's fees arefound to beexcessive,
what is reasonableunder the circumstances. Quantum meruit, meaning "as
much as hedeserves,"is usedas the basis for determining thelawyer's
professionalfees in theabsenceofa contract. Factors such as thetimespent
and extent of services rendered;novelty and difficulty ofthequestions
involved; importanceof thesubject matter; skill demanded; probability of
losing other employmentas a result ofacceptance oftheproffered case;
customary charges for similar services; amount involvedin the controversy
and the benefits resulting to the client; certainty ofcompensation; character
ofemployment; andprofessional standing ofthe lawyer, areconsidered in
determining his fees. 19
There is nothing irregular about therespondent court's finding that the 50%
fee ofpetitioner is unconscionableAs aptly put by the court:
It effectively deprives theappellees ofa meaningfulvictory ofthe
suit they have passionately pursued. Balancing theallocation of
the monetary award,50%ofallmonies to the lawyer and the
other 50% tobe allocated among all his 52clients, is too lop-sided
in favor ofthe lawyer.The ratio makes the practiceoflawa
commercial venture, ratherthan a nobleprofession.
. . . Also, the 52 employees whoaretheplaintiffs in the
aforementioned civil casewere dismissed fromemployment, their
means oflivelihood. All52hiredclaimant-appellantas counsel so
that they could bereinstated and their sourceofincomerestored.
It would, verily be ironicifthecounselwhom they hadhiredto
help wouldappropriatefor himself50%or even60%ofthe total
amount collectible by theseemployees.Here is an instance where
the courts should intervene.20
Considering thenature ofthe case, whichis a labor case, the amount
recovered and petitioner's participation inthecase,anaward of50% ofback
salaries ofhis 52 clients indeedstrikes us as excessive. Underthe
circumstances,a feeof20%ofback salaries wouldbe a fairsettlementin this
case. In anyevent,this award pertains only tothetenprivaterespondents
herein. Petitionerhas already beencompensated intheamount of50% ofall
monies received, by the rest ofhis clients in the casebelow.
WHEREFORE, in view oftheforegoing, thepetition is DENIED and the
appealeddecisionAFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-67970 January 15, 1988
JOSEABROGAR and JUANA DESEAR, petitioners, vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATECOURT, SOCORRODESEAR and BRIGIDA
DESEAR, respondents.
SARMIENTO, J.:
This is a Petition for Reviewon certiorari ofthe Decision ofthethen
Intermediate Appellate Court, 1 nowCourt ofAppeals, affirming in toto the
decision ofthetrial courtwhichannulleda sheriffsale.
The petitioners and private respondents were judgment plaintiffs and
defendants, respectively, ina civilcase 2decided by the trialcourt and
affirmed by theappellatecourt. For failureoftheprivaterespondents to
satisfy a finalandexecutory judgment inthesaid civilcase amounting to
P2,553.00only, their twoparcels ofland with a combined marketvalueof
P75,000.00,were leviedon execution and advertised for publicsale by the
ProvincialSheriff.3 Theauctionsale was scheduled for March 27, 1971but
the samedid notpush through becausethetrial court, upon motionof
private respondentSocorroDesear, issuedanorder onMarch 26, 1971, or
one day before the date fixed, postponing theauctionsale oncondition that
the publication fees wouldbe paid by the movant. Themovantdidnotpayas
ordered. Instead ofproceeding withtheauction sale onMarch 27, 1971,
considering thattherewas novalidpostponement,thecondition thereofnot
having been compliedwith, the ProvincialSheriffofPangasinannevertheless
held the auction almost fourmonths later, on July16,1971, when thetwo
parcels oflandwere sold, for,as earlier stated, P2,553.00 only.Subsequently,
a Sheriffs Certificate ofSalewas issued. There was noshowing thatprivate
respondentSocorroDesear agreedto theJuly 16, 1971 auctionsale.
However, itis indisputablethattherewas neither new noticenor new
publication ofthe said auctionsale. 4

13. The trial courtruledthat the Sheriffs Final Sale was null andvoidfor lack of
notice and publication and awarded attorney's fees intheamount of
P2,000.00in favor of theprivaterespondents. 5
Now before us,thepetitioners assigned severalerrors oftherespondent
appellate court. Wesummarize these assignederrors into two,to wit: (1) in
ruling thattherewas no valid postponementofthe date oftheauction sale
originally setfor March 27, 1971;and(2) in awarding attorney's fees of
P2,000.00in the absence ofany prayer andlegalbases therefor. 6
As correctly pointedoutby therespondent court(andthetrial court), the
proper noticeand publication ina newspaperwas made for the saleatpublic
auctionscheduled for March 27,1971.On motion, however, ofprivate
respondents, thetrial court in an OrderdatedMarch 26,1971,directed the
sale set for March 27, 1971postponedprovidedthemovant wouldpay the
publication fees, otherwise thepublicauction wouldcontinueata date tobe
designated by the Sheriff. The movantdidnot pay the publication fees hence
there was nopostponement ofthepublic auction salesince the condition
precedent orsuspensivecondition(that ofpaying thepublicationfees) was
not compliedwith. 7 Therewas thereforeno valid postponementofthe
public auctionsale.And therewas no writtenconsentofdebtorand creditor
and neitherwas there any agreementin writing by the parties authorizing
the sheriff or theofficer making the saleto adjourn thesame "toanydate
agreed upon inwriting by theparties." 8
The public auction saleset for March 27, 1971, shouldhavebeen held
considering thatthesaid schedulecomplied withall the requirements oflaw
regarding a public sale, including noticeand publication. Theofficer may
adjourn the salefrom day today ifit is necessary to doso for lack oftimeto
completethesaleon thedatefixed in thenotice. 9 Buthe maynot adjourn to
another date unless with thewrittenconsent oftheparties. 10 This was
preciselythepoint of the appellate courtwhen itstressed the factthat there
was no written agreement between thedebtorand thecreditor topostpone
the sale, andin fact there was no saleheldon thescheduled date 11 to
warranttheapplication of Section 24,Rule39oftheRevisedRules ofCourt.
Considering, therefore,that there was no validpostponement oftheoriginal
date ofthe auction saleon March27,1971, "then the allegedpublic auction
sale on July16,1971or close tofour months after the originaldate ofsaleon
March 27, 1971withoutthepropernoticeand publication is nulland void"as
correctly pointedout by therespondent court. 12
The secondissueraisedby thepetitioners is meritorious.
There is neither anallegationnor evidenceto supporttheaward of
P2,000.00by way of attorney's fees in favor ofprivaterespondents.The
complaintdoes not prayfor attorney's fees. 13 Even thetranscript of
stenographicnotes inthetrialdoes notcontainanytestimonyto supportan
award of attorney's fees. 14 As succinctly put,theclaim for attorney's fees
was neither pleadednor proved !
The exerciseof judicialdiscretion intheaward ofattorney's fees under
Article 2208(ii) of theNewCivil Codedemands a factual, legal,andequitable
justification. Without suchjustification,theaward is a conclusion withouta
premise, its basis being improperly left to speculation and conjecture. 15
Attorney's fees arerecoverablenotas a matter ofright. 16 Itis theimport of
Article 2208that theaward ofattorney's fees is anexceptionand thatthe
decision must contain an express finding offact to bring thecasewithin the
exception andjustify thegrant ofattorney's fees."Just and equitable"under
paragraph 11, Article2208, New CivilCodeis nota matter offeelings, but
demonstration.17 The reason for the awardofattorney's fees must bestated
in the textof the court's decision,otherwise, ifitis statedonly in the
dispositiveportion of thedecision, the samemust bedisallowed onappeal. 18
In the light of alltheforegoing, theaward ofattorney's fees in favor ofthe
private respondents in the casebeforeus has no basis.Hence, attorney's
fees mustbe disallowed.
WHEREFORE, the Decision oftherespondent courtdeclaring nulland void
the publicauction saleon July 16, 1971 for lack ofnoticeand publication,is
hereby AFFIRMED. However, theawardofattorney's fees is REVERSED.Costs
against petitioners.
This Decision is IMMEDIATELYEXECUTORY.
G.R. No. 97255 August 12,1994
SOLID HOMES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, INVESTCO, INC., ANGELAPEREZ STALEY, and
ANTONIO PEREZ, respondents.
Rene A. Diokno for petitioner.
R E S O L U T I O N
VITUG, J.:
An action for collection ofsums ofmoney, damages and attorney's fees was
filed with the RegionalTrial Court(Civil Case No.40615) ofPasig by private
respondents Investco, Angela Perez Staley and Antonio Perez Jr.against
petitionerSolid Homes, Inc.
Privaterespondents averredthat,on 07September1976, they sold, under an
agreemententitled "contract toselland tobuy,"toSolid Homes six(6)
parcels oflandin Quezon City andMarikina, with an area of704,443sq.m.,
for a total selling price ofP10,211,075.00payable (inaccordancewith
paragraph 1thereof), as follows:
a) P100,000.00, PhilippineCurrency, as partdown payment upon
signing and execution ofthis contractreceiptofwhich infullis
hereby acknowledged;
b) P2,042,215.00, Philippine Currency, as downpaymentpayable
on the following dates:
1 July 22, 1977— P400,000.00
2 October 22, 1977 — 711,107.50
3 January 22, 1978— 711,107.50
It is hereby agreed that the above down payment included the
first down payment ofP199,000.00. Should the FIRSTPARTY
obtain titles to theproperties above-describedafter July22,1977,
the due dates ofthedown payment andall subsequent payments
on the balanceshallbe adjusted accordingly.
c) The balanceofP8,188,860.00shall bepayablein ten (10) semi-
annualinstallments for a periodoffive (5) years andshall earn
interest at the rateoftwelve (12%) per annum, thefirst
installment tobe due onJuly 22, 1978. Theinstallmentdue
together withtheScheduleofPayments attachedhereto as
Schedule"A"and madeanintegral partofthis contract (Exh.A). 1
The secondparagraphofExhibit "A"stipulated that shouldSolid Homes fail
to pay any oftheinstallments ontheirrespective due dates,an interest of
one percent (1%) per month on thedefaulted amountwould bepaid for up
to two months or pro-ratathereof; thereafter,should theinstallmentdue, as
well as theinterest thereon,still remain unpaid, theentirebalance ofthe
purchase price would then become immediatelydueand demandable.Such
due and demandablesum would bepayable withinthirty (30) days, counted
from the expiration ofthe 2-month period, without further need for judicial
action.
Privaterespondents asserted that SolidHomes violatedtheterms ofthe
agreementby refusing to paythebalance ofP4,800,282.91andby failing to
negotiate a settlement with the tenants and squatters oftheproperty
despiteits receipt fromInvestco ofP350,000.00 for that specific purpose.

14. The trial courtrendered judgmenton 14February 1985; thedispositive
portion read:
WHEREFORE, judgmentis hereby rendered ordering the
defendant to pay theplaintiffs:
1) The amount ofP4,800,282.91 withinterestthereofattherate
of one percent per monthfrom February 23, 1981, until fully paid;
2) The amount ofP99,559.00representing costofscience and
transfertaxes which defendantcredited toits account with
interest at the legalrate fromthefiling ofthecomplaint;
3) The amount ofP250,000.00to cover attorney's fees and
litigationexpenses. 2
On appeal, theCourtof Appeals (CA-G.R.CV No. 13400),modified the trial
court's judgment and renderedits own decision, dated21 January1991,
resolving thusly:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the judgmentofthetrialcourt is hereby
modified by ordering defendant-appellant topay plaintiffthe
amount of P4,800,282.91with interest thereon at therateofone
percent per month from March 22, 1982. Theamount of
attorney's fees is hereby reducedfrom P250,000.00to
P50,000.00.The decision is AFFIRMED inall other aspects. 3
In the instant petitionfor review, petitionerSolid Homes argues (a) thatthe
Court ofAppeals should not haveawarded attorney's fees, therebeing an
absence of any special finding offactto justify suchaward, and(b) that it
erred in declaring dueand demandable the entireunpaidbalancestillowing
to privaterespondents.
The Second Division of this Court required respondents to comment on the
petitionin its Resolution of 22April1991. Meanwhile, Atty. Alejandro Barin
withdrew as counsel for respondents Investco, Inc., Angela Perez Staley and
Antonio Perez, Jr. 4 Werequired private respondents tosubmitthenameand
address of their new counsel; tothis day, no compliancehas yetbeenmade.
In our resolution, dated 01 December 1993, werequired the parties to move
in the premises andto advisethe Courtwhether "supervening events may
have renderedthis casemoot and academic." 5
Petitioner submitted its compliance andmanifested thusly:
In the meantime, onApril15, 1985beforejudgment was
renderedby theRTC in Civil CaseNo. 40615 Investco, Inc.
(respondentherein) soldthevery sameparcels ofland involved in
said case, in favor ofArmed Forces ofthePhilippines Mutual
Benefit Association, Inc. (AFPMBAI)
Solid Homes,Inc.(herein petitioner) filedCivil CaseNo. Q-46570
RTC Quezon City entitled 'Solid Homes, Inc., plaintiffversus
AFPMBAI, Investco,Inc.and theRegister ofDeeds ofQuezon City
covering titles registered in Quezon City and CivilCase No.52999
Solid Homes,Inc., plaintiffversus AFPMBAI, Investco,Inc., and
Registerof Deeds for Pasig covering titles registered inPasig,
Metro Manila,bothfor nullification ofthesaid second deedof
sale over thesameproperties involved intheinstant case.
Quezon City RTC Civil Case No.46570 was decided infavor of
plaintiffs, Solid Homes,Inc.; on appeal, theCourt ofAppeals (CA
G.R. No. 22365) reversed the decision; samewas elevatedto the
Supreme Court where it is pending inSC G.R. No. 100437.
Pasig RTC, CivilCaseNo. 52999was decidedin favor ofplaintiff
Solid Homes,Inc.; defendants appealedto the CourtofAppeals
(CA G.R. No. 27398),which affirmedtheRTC Decision; on the
main causeofactionPetition for Review by this tothis Honorable
Court is pending under G.R.No. 104769.
Under the circumstances, hereinpetitioner, in compliancewith
the Resolutiondated December 1, 1993,hereby manifests that
supervening events sincethePetitionherein was filed has not
renderedthis caseas mootandacademic,considering thatthe
issue involved is the amountto bepaidin SOLID HOMES, INC.as
balance ontheconsideration oftheoriginalsale byInvestco, Inc.
to it and theconcomitanttransferoftitles tothelatterupon
payment thereof, whereas in G.R. No. 100437 andG.R. No.
104769, theissueis whetherthesecond buyer AFPMBAI had
actualor constructivenotice ofthe priorsale by Investco, Inc. to
herein Petitioner,Solid Homes, Inc. 6
As ofthis late date,theCourt has yetto hear from private respondents.
Given the premises,and inorder topermit this case tobe finally resolved
and terminated,therequired comment on thepetition for review should
now be, as it is hereby,dispensed with.
Article 2208oftheCivil Codeallows attorney's fees to beawardedby a court
when its claimant is compelledto litigatewith thirdpersons or toincur
expenses to protect his interest by reason ofan unjustified actor omissionof
the party fromwhomit is sought.Whilejudicialdiscretion is hereextant, an
award thereofdemands, nevertheless,a factual, legalor equitable
justification. Themattercannot and should notbe left tospeculation and
conjecture(Mirasol vs. Dela Cruz, 84 SCRA337; StrongholdInsurance
Company Inc. vs. Court ofAppeals,173SCRA 619).
In the case at bench, therecords donotshow enough basis for sustaining the
award for attorney's fees and toadjudge its paymentby petitioner.On the
contrary,theappellatecourt itselfhas found that petitioner's act of
withholding payment could not besaidto beallthat unjustified. The
disagreement oftheparties on thedemandabilityofthe amountstill due and
the accrual dateofinteresthas persisted largely becauseofsupervening
circumstances and theperceivedinexplicitness ofthecontract itself. The
decision oftheappellatecourt, has, infact, reversedthat ofthetrial court on
the imposition ofinterestfrom 23February1981, thus upholding, which we
similarly findto bein order, thepositionofpetitionerthat the accrualdated
should insteadstart only on28 March1982.
Relativetothedemandability oftheentire unpaid balance, weagreewith,
and so adoptas our own thatofrespondent court; viz:
The amount actually paid onaccountofthe contractto buyand
sell (Exh. Aor 1) is not an area ofcontroversy inthefirst causeof
action. Thesum ofP2,042,215.00 corresponding tothedown
payment,as wellas P4,084,430.00 withrespect tothefirst four
semi-annualinstallments anda portion ofthe fifthinstallment,
had been received making a totalofP6,126,645.00. It is conceded
that a balance ofP4,800,282.91is leftunpaid. Thedisputeis with
respectto the periodwhen defendanthaddefaultedand,
consequently, whenpaymentofinterest shallbegin. The plaintiffs
claim thatsaid period shouldstart on February 23, 1981; while
the defendant contends that the periodmust beadjusted should
the titles be obtained by theplaintiffcorporation after July 22,
1977, as providedin Par. 1(b) ofthecontract toselland to buy.
Considering that titles wereactually transferredto Investco,Inc.
betweenMarch 21to March28, 1979, the defendantavers that
the originalscheduleofpayment must notbefollowed and the
5th installment shallonly bedueon March22,1982.
xxx xxx xxx
It is undisputed thatappellantSolid Homes hadmadea total
payment ofP6,126,645.00leaving a balanceofP4,800,282.91,
which refers tothe6thto the 10thinstallments.Ofthe 5th
installment due onJuly 22, 1980, the following payments were
made by appellant:

15. Oct. 30, 1980 toNov. 10, 1980 P150,000.00
Nov. 18, 1980to Dec. 10, 1980270,000.00
Dec. 18, 1980to Jan. 14, 1981 101,853.12
Jan. 20 to Feb. 12,1981 95,000.00
Feb. 16 to Feb.19,1981115,000.00
—————
P731,853.12
Thereafter, nofurther payment was madeby appellant
contending thatundertheprovisions ofparagraph1(b) ofthe
contract, the payment schedule shouldbe adjusted.The said
provisions states as follows:
Par. 1, sub-par. (b)
Should the FIRSTPARTY(plaintiffInvestco) obtain titles
to the properties above-described afterJuly 22, 1977,
the due dates ofthedownpaymentand the
subsequent payments onthebalanceshall beadjusted
accordingly.'
Admittedly, the subjecttitles were obtained during theperiodof
March 21, to March 28, 1979, orafter July 22,1977(Exhs.D to 1
and Exhs. 2 to10). Thus,implementing par. 1(b) ofthe Contract,
the due dates ofpayments should havebeen adjusted as follows:
Due Dates
Per ContractInstallment Adjusted
ScheduleA Number DueDates
Downpayment
July 22, 1977March 28, 1979
October 22,1977June 08, 1979
January22,1978September 28, 1979
Balance
July 22, 1978No. 1 March08, 1980
January22,1979No. 2 September 28, 1980
July 22, 1979No. 3 March28, 1981
January22,1981No. 4 September 28, 1981
July 22, 1980No. 5 March28, 1982
January22,1981No. 6 September 28, 1982
July 22, 1981No. 7 March28, 1983
January22,1982No. 8 September 28, 1983
July 22, 1982No. 9 March28, 1984
January22,1983No. 10September28,1984
In view of the adjustmentofduedates in accordancewith par.
1(b) of the Contract payments made shouldcorrespond to the
adjusted dates.Thus, thepayment on the 4th installment which is
supposed tohave been made onJanuary 22, 1980, shouldbe
credited on September 28, 1981, andthenext payment onthe
5th installment which should have been madeon July22,1981
under the contractwould haveto becreditedon March 28,1981,
the adjustedduedate. 7
It is but proper,therefore, toindeed declare28March 1982 tobe the due
date for the payment of the 5th installment. Thetotal amountof
P731,853.12, representing payments for the 5th installment madeby
petitioner, shouldrightlybe creditedon 28March 1982, theadjusteddue
date. Sinceno paymentappears to havebeenmadeafter 1981,petitioner
should therebybe likewise heldin default inthepaymentofthe 6th tothe
10th installments. Under the terms ofthecontract, hereinbeforerecited,
petitioner's defaulthas effectively activatedtheacceleration clause ofthe
contract, and weseeno erroron thepartofthe appellatecourt inordering
petitionerto pay the entireunpaidbalance ofP4,800,282.91 withinterest
thereon at the rateof1% per month to be computed from22 March 1982.
WHEREFORE, excepton theawardofattorney's fees which is hereby
DELETED, the decisionoftheCourt ofAppeals is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-41862 February 7,1992
B. R. SEBASTIAN ENTERPRISES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, EULOGIOB. REYES, NICANOR G. SALAYSAY, inhis
capacity asProvincial SheriffofRizal, and ANTONIOMARINAS, in his
capacity asDeputy Sheriff, respondents.
Benito P. Fabie for petitioner.
Ildefonso de Guzman-Mendiolafor private respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This is a petition for prohibitionand mandamus, withprayer for preliminary
injunction,to review theResolution dated 10November 1975ofrespondent
Court ofAppeals in C.A.-G.R. No.53546-R denying petitioner's motion to
reinstateits appeal, earlier dismissed for failureto filetheAppellant's Brief.
The material operative facts ofthis case,as gathered fromthepleadings of
the parties, arenotdisputed.
Eulogio B. Reyes,now deceased, filedanaction for damages with thethen
Court ofFirst Instance (nowRegionalTrialCourt) ofRizal, Pasay City Branch,
against theDirector ofPublic Works, the RepublicofthePhilippines and
petitionerherein,B. R. SebastianEnterprises,Inc.The casewas docketedas
Civil Case No. 757-R. 1
On 7 May 1973, the trialcourt rendereda decision finding petitioner liable
for damages butabsolving theother defendants. 2
Petitioner, thru its counsel, the lawfirm ofBaizas, Alberto andAssociates,
timely appealed the adversedecisionto the respondentCourt ofAppeals,
which docketed the caseas C.A.-G.R. No.53546-R.3
During the pendency oftheappeal, theplaintiff-appellee therein,Eulogio B.
Reyes, died. Uponprior leaveoftherespondent Court,he was substituted by
his heirs — EnriqueN. Reyes,Felicisima R. Natividad, Donna Marie N. Reyes
and RenneMarieN. Ryes — whoarenowtheprivaterespondents inthis
presentpetition.
On 19 February 1974, petitioner, thru its thencounsel ofrecord, received
notice to file Appellant's Briefwithin 45days from receipt thereof. It had,
therefore, until5 April 1974 within which tocomply.
Counselfor petitioner failed tofiletheBrief; thus, on 9July 1974, respondent
Court issued a Resolutionrequiring said counselto show cause why the
appealshould not bedismissedfor failureto filetheAppellant's Briefwithin
the reglementaryperiod. 4 Acopy ofthis Resolutionwas receivedby counsel
for petitioneron 17July 1974. 5
As the latterfailed to comply withtheabove Resolution,respondent Court,
on 9 September1974, issued another Resolutionthis timedismissing
petitioner's appeal:
It appearing that counselfor defendant-appellant failedto show
cause why theappeal shouldnotbe dismissed (for failureto file
the appellant's briefwithin the reglementary periodwhich
expired onApril5, 1974) within theperiodof10 days fixed in the