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Keshab Giri, Master of Research in International Relations,
The University of Essex, UK.
PhD Candidate, The University of Sydney, Australia
A Lecture for 1st Semester MIRD, TU, Nepal
1
Outline for Today
 Today’s Lecture: A Map for Study of IR
 Grand Theory: Realism
 Grand Theory: Liberalism
 Beyond ‘Isms’- Recent Trends in IR:
1. Theories of International Conflict
2. Theories of International Cooperation
2
What is International Relation?
3
Indo-Nepal Relations Proxy War in Syria Eurozone Crisis
United Nations Crisis in Korean Peninsula Brexit
What are Theories of International Relations?
4
What are Theories of International
Relations?
 Apart from those key events grabbing headlines in national/international
media, there are so many other developments in international politics around
the world, how do we understand and explain them?
 Do We Know Them? Can We Explain Them? Why Do They occur? Do They Have
Any Pattern?
 We need Theories to simplify reality and draw a pattern of
events to develop our understanding of real international phenomena.
 Realism, Liberalism, and other Alternative Theories of IR come
handy in explaining Events/Developments/Trends in International Relations.
5
Realism: Classical Realism
 Classical Realism: Human Nature: rational, objective, ego-centric,
and driven by self-interest and power. Primacy of interest over
ideology.
 Thomas Hobbs, 1651, ‘Leviathan’
1. human beings are rational and smart,
2. resources are finite but desires are infinite,
3.‘war of all against all’,
4. government is delegated power and consent to pursue interest of
their citizens- peace inside-war outside
 Niccolo Machiavelli, Thucidydes, E.H. Carr, Hans J. Morgenthau,
etc.
6
Realism: Offensive Realism
 John H. Mearsheimer (2001) ‘Tragedy of Great Power Politics’
Core Assumptions:
1. There is no world government.
2. Every state is capable of using military force against some other
states.
3. There is always the possibility that the a state is attacked by another.
4. States want to preserve their territorial integrity and autonomy.
5. States are rational actors.
Predictions: 1.Regional Hegemony is the most secure situation 2.When
two states are equally powerful, neither attacks.
7
Realism: ‘Security Dilemma’, ‘Existential
Uncertainty’, and ‘Certainty of Uncertainty’
 John Hertz, 1950, ‘Security Dilemma’
 Mitzen, 2006, ‘Existential Uncertainty’
 Booth and Wheeler, 2008, ‘Certainty of Uncertainty’
8Missile Test by North Korea Iranian Nuclear Program NATO Missile Shield Europe
Realism: Neo-Realism/Structural Realism
 Key Assumptions of Neo-Realism:
1. States as the most important actors
2. States are unitary, rational actors
3. States operate under anarchy
4. States care about their own survival
 Prediction for Neo-Realism
1.States pursue power, and conflict is inevitable (security dilemma)
2. States will be engaged in balancing behaviour
9
Realism: Neo-Realism/Structural Realism
 Neo-Realism/Structural Realism:
Systemic Level Analysis
Anarchy in International System
 Kenneth N. Waltz: The founder of Neo-Realism/Structural Realism,
advocate of scientific approach in IR, ‘Man, State, and War: A
Theoretical Analysis’, (1959), Three Images:
1. First Image: Classical Realism- human nature,
2. Second Image: Political structure in a state makes some state
more war-prone. For example, dictatorship, capitalist countries are
more war-prone. Why?
3. Third Image: Most important of all images. Anarchy!
10
Logical Inconsistency in Realism
 Mearsheimer (2001): Being a preponderant power or hegemon is the
most secure condition for a security of a state
11
Logical Inconsistency in Realism
 Waltz (1964): Bipolarity is the most stable system.
12
Liberalism
 Human Nature is Dynamic and it can be Progressive!
13
Liberalism
 Comparisons: Classical Realism and Classical Liberalism
14
Classical Realism
1 States are the most important
actors
2 States are unitary actors
3 States are rational actors
4 National security is the most
important concern in IR
5 Human nature is bad
6 Laws / institutions won’t matter
Classical Liberalism
1 States are important actors but not
only one actor
2 States are not unitary actors
3 States are not always rational actors
4 There are other important concerns
in IR as well
5 Human nature is not necessarily bad
6 Laws / institutions play crucial role
in fostering cooperation
Neo-Liberal Institutionalism
 Recap Key Assumptions of Neo-Realism:
1. States as the most important actors
2. States are unitary, rational actors
3. States operate under anarchy
4. States care about their own survival
 Prediction for Neo-Realism
1.States pursue power, and conflict is inevitable (security dilemma)
2. States will be engaged in balancing behaviour
15
Neo-Liberal Institutionalism
 Key Assumptions of Neo-Liberalism?
16
Neo-Liberal Institutionalism
 Key Assumption of Neo-Liberalism?
 Same!
1. States as the most important actors
2. States are unitary, rational actors
3. States operate under anarchy
4. States cares about their own survival
 Prediction for Neo-Liberalism?
17
Neo-Liberal Institutionalism
 Key Assumption of Neo-Liberalism?
 Same!
1. States as the most important actors
2. States are unitary, rational actors
3. States operate under anarchy
4. States cares about their own survival
 Prediction for Neo-Liberalism?
 1. Cooperation is possible
 2. States can pursue mutual gains
under some conditions 18
Neo-Liberal Institutionalism
 ‘Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma’ and Robert Axelord, 1980, ‘Effective Choice
in Prisoner’s Dilemma’
1. ‘Single-Shot Prisoner’s Dilemma’ is inadequate to explain interactions
among states
2. Simulated Repeated Computer Game Experiment with ‘experts’ in Game
Theory
3. Evolutionary Game Theory: Pragmatically Optimistic, being nice, and
forgiving strategy reaps more benefits
19
Neo-Liberal Institutionalism
 Robert O. Keohane,1984, ‘After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in
World Political Economy‘
1. Inspired by ‘Evolutionary Theory of Cooperation’ and ‘Repeated Prisoner’s
Dilemma’ by Axelord.
2. Conditions for States to Cooperate:
a. States should expect that they will engage in same issue for long time
with other states/ Long Shadow of Future
b. States should be able to monitor other state’s behaviour/ Monitoring
c. State should be willing and able to punish those who renege/ Ease of
Punishment.
3. International Institutions/Regimes enable those condition to hold
20
Alternative Theories of International
Relations
 Beyond ‘Isms’: Theory of International Conflicts-
1. Bargaining Theory of War (Rationalist Explanation of War),
2. Alliance and War,
3. Diversionary Theory of War.
4. Democratic Peace Theory
 Theory of International Cooperation-
1. Hegemonic Stability Theory
2. Rational Design Project
3. Regime Type and Cooperation
21
Bargaining Theory of War (Rationalist
Explanation of War)
 War is mutually corrosive and costly. Why states pursue war instead of
non-violent bargaining process?
 James D. Fearon (1995) offers three rationalist explanation of war:
1. Issue Indivisibility: If issue of contention is not dividable, states may
not reach agreement and thus might result in war.
2. Information Problem: private information, incentive to misrepresent
the Information, and uncertainty about action and outcome.
-Risky Return Trade-Off, costly signal,
3. Commitment Problem: Shifting balance of power (Preventive War),
First strike advantage (Pre-emptive War), Bargain over object that
provides power. 22
Bargaining Theory of War (Rationalist
Explanation of War)
 Robert Powell (1999): War is more likely when there is disparity
between ‘status quo’ and ‘distribution of power’.
1. Greater difference between ‘status quo’ and ‘distribution of
power’: war more likely
1. Lesser difference between ‘status quo’ and ‘distribution of
power’: war less likely
 Very different from Realists’ explanation of war: such as
‘preponderance of power’ school and ‘balance of power’ school.
23
Alliance and War
 An alliance is a formal agreement among independent states to
cooperate militarily in the event of military conflict.
 Obligations in Alliance: Defence, Offence, Consultation, and
Neutrality.
 Those are conditional on: adversary, location, and issue.
 The utility of Alliance:
1. alliances must influence members’ war intervention decisions
2. members’ war intervention decisions must influence outside states
 Leeds (2003) and Johnson & Leeds (2011) find that Alliances with
defence obligations seem to deter international conflict.
24
Alliance and War
25
Diversionary Theory of War
 Rejects Unitary Actor Assumption of Realism. Recall one of the key
assumptions of Realism: States are unitary actors with coherent preferences.
 Importance of Domestic Politics in formulating Foreign Policy of the state.
 Main Assumptions:
1. Leaders want to remain in power.
2. Public prefer a ‘capable’ leader in power.
3. Incompetent leaders pretend to be competent leaders.
 Prediction:
1. A leader has incentive to divert attention away from bad policy outcomes
by pursuing aggressive foreign policy which can lead to war.
26
Diversionary Theory of War
 Morgan and Bickers (1992) analysing US politics, find that the
probability of US presidential use of force increases as partisan
support decreases.
 A Leader will lose support if he is directly or mainly responsible for
failures at domestic front
 Johnson and Barnes (2011) looking at economic situation of 155
countries from 1950 to 1998, find that economic problems only
increase conflict when the economy is closed, why?
 When the economy is open the leader will be less likely to be seen as
responsible for the economy.
27
Diversionary Theory of War
 When the economy is open the leader will be less likely to be seen as
responsible for the economy and therefore has less diversionary
incentives.
28
Democratic Peace
29
 It is not a ‘Causal Theory’ per se. It’s just an empirical observation.
 Tons of research on the relationship between regime type and war.
Considered one of the strongest relationship in international conflict
research.
Source: COW data 1816-2008 on inter-state wars.
 Perspectives:
1. Culture and Norm: Peaceful conflict resolution
2. Institutional Constraints: Leaders are constrained, people can punish
them easily
3. Information: Transparent, credible threats.
Fighting States Frequency Percent
Autocracy vs Autocracy 55 57.89 %
Democracy vs Autocracy 39 41.05 %
Democracy vs Democracy 1 1.05 %
Total 95 100 %
Democratic Peace
 Example: Maoz & Russett (1993) who compare norm-based theory
with institutional constraints theory.
 Maoz & Russett (1993) find that levels of democracy in a dyad are
negatively related to the likelihood that the dyad experiences war,
militarised dispute (i.e., crisis bargaining), and dispute escalation,
controlling for potentially confounding factors.
 There are other prominent studies as well pertaining to Democratic
Peace:
- Audience Costs (Information Perspective) (Fearon, 1994)
- Informational Perspective and Institutional Perspective Schultz
(1999)
30
Theory of International Cooperation:
Hegemonic Stability Theory
 Two Problems in International Cooperation:
1. Distribution Problem (Neo-Realists: Waltz 1979 & Mearsheimer
2001)
2. Enforcement Problem (Neo-Liberalist: Keohane 1984)
 What is the prescription of Hegemonic Stability Theory to overcome
those problems?
1. Hegemon provides ‘Public Good’ resolving Distribution Problems
2. Using its preponderance, it can solve Enforcement Problems
31
Theory of International Cooperation:
Hegemonic Stability Theory
 Kindleberger (1978) claims that presence of Britain as hegemon in
1920s stabilised world economy but decline of Britain in 1930s and
reluctance of US to act as hegemon contributed towards instability.
 Keohane (1984), among others, criticise HST saying that the presence
of a hegemon is neither necessary nor sufficient.
32
Regime Type and International Cooperation
 This Theory also refutes one of the key assumption of Realists and
Neo-Liberalists, what is it?
33
Regime Type and International Cooperation
 This Theory also refutes one of the key assumption of Realists and Neo-
Liberalists, what is it?
 States are unitary actors. It doesn’t matter what type of regime states have
and their domestic politics.
34
Regime Type and International Cooperation
 How does domestic politics might influence international cooperation?
 Two-Level Game and Distributional Problem, Putnam (1988)
1. Level-I: International Negotiation, Level-II: Domestic Ratification
2. Win-Sets: Larger the Win-Sets in Level-I, easier to reach
agreement; Larger Win-Sets in Level-II, easier to ratify them.
 Two-Level Game and Enforcement Problem, Leeds (1999) and Leeds,
et al, (2009)
1. Pairs of Democracies and pairs of Autocracies are more likely to
cooperate than mixed Pairs
2. Regime change can change policy but leadership change does not
necessarily change policy and thus doesn’t always affect international
cooperation
35
Rational Design Project
 International Institutions facilitate cooperation through reciprocity,
who claim this?
36
Rational Design Project
 International Institutions facilitate cooperation through reciprocity,
who claim
this?
 Neo-Liberal Institutionalists, such as Keohane (1984)
 But Neo-Liberals Institutionalists do not come clear on design of the
International Institutions/Regimes.
37
Rational Design Project
 Different Institutions matter differently: Different institutional design
features address different problems of cooperation.
 Read Mitchell (1994), Koremenos et al. (2001), Rosendorff & Milner
(2001), Mitchell & Keilbach (2001), Abbott & Snidal (1998), etc.
Steps of international cooperation:
1 Need of cooperation (e.g., public goods provision)
2 Form a cooperative agreement with other states
3 Design institutions to cope with the problem of enforcement
4 When member states comply with the agreement, they achieve
cooperation
38
Recap
 What is a theory of International Relations?
 Realism: Classical, Offensive, Neo-Realism/Structural Realism
 Liberalism: Classical, Neo-Liberal Institutionalism
 Beyond ‘Isms’- Recent Trends in IR:
1. Theories of International Conflict: Bargaining Theory of War
(Rationalist Explanation of War), Alliance and War, Diversionary Theory of
War, Democratic Peace
39
Recap
 Beyond ‘Isms’- Recent Trends in IR:
1. Theories of International Cooperation: Hegemonic Stability Theory,
Regime Type, Rational Design Project.
40
Recap: Which Theory/ies Might Explain
the Following Events?
41
Indo-Nepal Relations Proxy War in Syria Eurozone Crisis
United Nations Crisis in Korean Peninsula Brexit
Recap: Which Theory/ies Might Explain
the Following Events?
42
Realism (Classical) Realism (Structural) Rational Design Project
Liberalism
(Neoliberalism)
Realism (Offensive) Realism/ Institutional Design
Any Questions?
 Please introduce yourself before
presenting your question.
43
Thank You
HAPPY NEW YEAR 2073: May this year
spark in you intellectual inquisitiveness
and philosophical wisdom.
Thank you for being patient!
44

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Theories of International Relations-Introduction

  • 1. Keshab Giri, Master of Research in International Relations, The University of Essex, UK. PhD Candidate, The University of Sydney, Australia A Lecture for 1st Semester MIRD, TU, Nepal 1
  • 2. Outline for Today  Today’s Lecture: A Map for Study of IR  Grand Theory: Realism  Grand Theory: Liberalism  Beyond ‘Isms’- Recent Trends in IR: 1. Theories of International Conflict 2. Theories of International Cooperation 2
  • 3. What is International Relation? 3 Indo-Nepal Relations Proxy War in Syria Eurozone Crisis United Nations Crisis in Korean Peninsula Brexit
  • 4. What are Theories of International Relations? 4
  • 5. What are Theories of International Relations?  Apart from those key events grabbing headlines in national/international media, there are so many other developments in international politics around the world, how do we understand and explain them?  Do We Know Them? Can We Explain Them? Why Do They occur? Do They Have Any Pattern?  We need Theories to simplify reality and draw a pattern of events to develop our understanding of real international phenomena.  Realism, Liberalism, and other Alternative Theories of IR come handy in explaining Events/Developments/Trends in International Relations. 5
  • 6. Realism: Classical Realism  Classical Realism: Human Nature: rational, objective, ego-centric, and driven by self-interest and power. Primacy of interest over ideology.  Thomas Hobbs, 1651, ‘Leviathan’ 1. human beings are rational and smart, 2. resources are finite but desires are infinite, 3.‘war of all against all’, 4. government is delegated power and consent to pursue interest of their citizens- peace inside-war outside  Niccolo Machiavelli, Thucidydes, E.H. Carr, Hans J. Morgenthau, etc. 6
  • 7. Realism: Offensive Realism  John H. Mearsheimer (2001) ‘Tragedy of Great Power Politics’ Core Assumptions: 1. There is no world government. 2. Every state is capable of using military force against some other states. 3. There is always the possibility that the a state is attacked by another. 4. States want to preserve their territorial integrity and autonomy. 5. States are rational actors. Predictions: 1.Regional Hegemony is the most secure situation 2.When two states are equally powerful, neither attacks. 7
  • 8. Realism: ‘Security Dilemma’, ‘Existential Uncertainty’, and ‘Certainty of Uncertainty’  John Hertz, 1950, ‘Security Dilemma’  Mitzen, 2006, ‘Existential Uncertainty’  Booth and Wheeler, 2008, ‘Certainty of Uncertainty’ 8Missile Test by North Korea Iranian Nuclear Program NATO Missile Shield Europe
  • 9. Realism: Neo-Realism/Structural Realism  Key Assumptions of Neo-Realism: 1. States as the most important actors 2. States are unitary, rational actors 3. States operate under anarchy 4. States care about their own survival  Prediction for Neo-Realism 1.States pursue power, and conflict is inevitable (security dilemma) 2. States will be engaged in balancing behaviour 9
  • 10. Realism: Neo-Realism/Structural Realism  Neo-Realism/Structural Realism: Systemic Level Analysis Anarchy in International System  Kenneth N. Waltz: The founder of Neo-Realism/Structural Realism, advocate of scientific approach in IR, ‘Man, State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis’, (1959), Three Images: 1. First Image: Classical Realism- human nature, 2. Second Image: Political structure in a state makes some state more war-prone. For example, dictatorship, capitalist countries are more war-prone. Why? 3. Third Image: Most important of all images. Anarchy! 10
  • 11. Logical Inconsistency in Realism  Mearsheimer (2001): Being a preponderant power or hegemon is the most secure condition for a security of a state 11
  • 12. Logical Inconsistency in Realism  Waltz (1964): Bipolarity is the most stable system. 12
  • 13. Liberalism  Human Nature is Dynamic and it can be Progressive! 13
  • 14. Liberalism  Comparisons: Classical Realism and Classical Liberalism 14 Classical Realism 1 States are the most important actors 2 States are unitary actors 3 States are rational actors 4 National security is the most important concern in IR 5 Human nature is bad 6 Laws / institutions won’t matter Classical Liberalism 1 States are important actors but not only one actor 2 States are not unitary actors 3 States are not always rational actors 4 There are other important concerns in IR as well 5 Human nature is not necessarily bad 6 Laws / institutions play crucial role in fostering cooperation
  • 15. Neo-Liberal Institutionalism  Recap Key Assumptions of Neo-Realism: 1. States as the most important actors 2. States are unitary, rational actors 3. States operate under anarchy 4. States care about their own survival  Prediction for Neo-Realism 1.States pursue power, and conflict is inevitable (security dilemma) 2. States will be engaged in balancing behaviour 15
  • 16. Neo-Liberal Institutionalism  Key Assumptions of Neo-Liberalism? 16
  • 17. Neo-Liberal Institutionalism  Key Assumption of Neo-Liberalism?  Same! 1. States as the most important actors 2. States are unitary, rational actors 3. States operate under anarchy 4. States cares about their own survival  Prediction for Neo-Liberalism? 17
  • 18. Neo-Liberal Institutionalism  Key Assumption of Neo-Liberalism?  Same! 1. States as the most important actors 2. States are unitary, rational actors 3. States operate under anarchy 4. States cares about their own survival  Prediction for Neo-Liberalism?  1. Cooperation is possible  2. States can pursue mutual gains under some conditions 18
  • 19. Neo-Liberal Institutionalism  ‘Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma’ and Robert Axelord, 1980, ‘Effective Choice in Prisoner’s Dilemma’ 1. ‘Single-Shot Prisoner’s Dilemma’ is inadequate to explain interactions among states 2. Simulated Repeated Computer Game Experiment with ‘experts’ in Game Theory 3. Evolutionary Game Theory: Pragmatically Optimistic, being nice, and forgiving strategy reaps more benefits 19
  • 20. Neo-Liberal Institutionalism  Robert O. Keohane,1984, ‘After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in World Political Economy‘ 1. Inspired by ‘Evolutionary Theory of Cooperation’ and ‘Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma’ by Axelord. 2. Conditions for States to Cooperate: a. States should expect that they will engage in same issue for long time with other states/ Long Shadow of Future b. States should be able to monitor other state’s behaviour/ Monitoring c. State should be willing and able to punish those who renege/ Ease of Punishment. 3. International Institutions/Regimes enable those condition to hold 20
  • 21. Alternative Theories of International Relations  Beyond ‘Isms’: Theory of International Conflicts- 1. Bargaining Theory of War (Rationalist Explanation of War), 2. Alliance and War, 3. Diversionary Theory of War. 4. Democratic Peace Theory  Theory of International Cooperation- 1. Hegemonic Stability Theory 2. Rational Design Project 3. Regime Type and Cooperation 21
  • 22. Bargaining Theory of War (Rationalist Explanation of War)  War is mutually corrosive and costly. Why states pursue war instead of non-violent bargaining process?  James D. Fearon (1995) offers three rationalist explanation of war: 1. Issue Indivisibility: If issue of contention is not dividable, states may not reach agreement and thus might result in war. 2. Information Problem: private information, incentive to misrepresent the Information, and uncertainty about action and outcome. -Risky Return Trade-Off, costly signal, 3. Commitment Problem: Shifting balance of power (Preventive War), First strike advantage (Pre-emptive War), Bargain over object that provides power. 22
  • 23. Bargaining Theory of War (Rationalist Explanation of War)  Robert Powell (1999): War is more likely when there is disparity between ‘status quo’ and ‘distribution of power’. 1. Greater difference between ‘status quo’ and ‘distribution of power’: war more likely 1. Lesser difference between ‘status quo’ and ‘distribution of power’: war less likely  Very different from Realists’ explanation of war: such as ‘preponderance of power’ school and ‘balance of power’ school. 23
  • 24. Alliance and War  An alliance is a formal agreement among independent states to cooperate militarily in the event of military conflict.  Obligations in Alliance: Defence, Offence, Consultation, and Neutrality.  Those are conditional on: adversary, location, and issue.  The utility of Alliance: 1. alliances must influence members’ war intervention decisions 2. members’ war intervention decisions must influence outside states  Leeds (2003) and Johnson & Leeds (2011) find that Alliances with defence obligations seem to deter international conflict. 24
  • 26. Diversionary Theory of War  Rejects Unitary Actor Assumption of Realism. Recall one of the key assumptions of Realism: States are unitary actors with coherent preferences.  Importance of Domestic Politics in formulating Foreign Policy of the state.  Main Assumptions: 1. Leaders want to remain in power. 2. Public prefer a ‘capable’ leader in power. 3. Incompetent leaders pretend to be competent leaders.  Prediction: 1. A leader has incentive to divert attention away from bad policy outcomes by pursuing aggressive foreign policy which can lead to war. 26
  • 27. Diversionary Theory of War  Morgan and Bickers (1992) analysing US politics, find that the probability of US presidential use of force increases as partisan support decreases.  A Leader will lose support if he is directly or mainly responsible for failures at domestic front  Johnson and Barnes (2011) looking at economic situation of 155 countries from 1950 to 1998, find that economic problems only increase conflict when the economy is closed, why?  When the economy is open the leader will be less likely to be seen as responsible for the economy. 27
  • 28. Diversionary Theory of War  When the economy is open the leader will be less likely to be seen as responsible for the economy and therefore has less diversionary incentives. 28
  • 29. Democratic Peace 29  It is not a ‘Causal Theory’ per se. It’s just an empirical observation.  Tons of research on the relationship between regime type and war. Considered one of the strongest relationship in international conflict research. Source: COW data 1816-2008 on inter-state wars.  Perspectives: 1. Culture and Norm: Peaceful conflict resolution 2. Institutional Constraints: Leaders are constrained, people can punish them easily 3. Information: Transparent, credible threats. Fighting States Frequency Percent Autocracy vs Autocracy 55 57.89 % Democracy vs Autocracy 39 41.05 % Democracy vs Democracy 1 1.05 % Total 95 100 %
  • 30. Democratic Peace  Example: Maoz & Russett (1993) who compare norm-based theory with institutional constraints theory.  Maoz & Russett (1993) find that levels of democracy in a dyad are negatively related to the likelihood that the dyad experiences war, militarised dispute (i.e., crisis bargaining), and dispute escalation, controlling for potentially confounding factors.  There are other prominent studies as well pertaining to Democratic Peace: - Audience Costs (Information Perspective) (Fearon, 1994) - Informational Perspective and Institutional Perspective Schultz (1999) 30
  • 31. Theory of International Cooperation: Hegemonic Stability Theory  Two Problems in International Cooperation: 1. Distribution Problem (Neo-Realists: Waltz 1979 & Mearsheimer 2001) 2. Enforcement Problem (Neo-Liberalist: Keohane 1984)  What is the prescription of Hegemonic Stability Theory to overcome those problems? 1. Hegemon provides ‘Public Good’ resolving Distribution Problems 2. Using its preponderance, it can solve Enforcement Problems 31
  • 32. Theory of International Cooperation: Hegemonic Stability Theory  Kindleberger (1978) claims that presence of Britain as hegemon in 1920s stabilised world economy but decline of Britain in 1930s and reluctance of US to act as hegemon contributed towards instability.  Keohane (1984), among others, criticise HST saying that the presence of a hegemon is neither necessary nor sufficient. 32
  • 33. Regime Type and International Cooperation  This Theory also refutes one of the key assumption of Realists and Neo-Liberalists, what is it? 33
  • 34. Regime Type and International Cooperation  This Theory also refutes one of the key assumption of Realists and Neo- Liberalists, what is it?  States are unitary actors. It doesn’t matter what type of regime states have and their domestic politics. 34
  • 35. Regime Type and International Cooperation  How does domestic politics might influence international cooperation?  Two-Level Game and Distributional Problem, Putnam (1988) 1. Level-I: International Negotiation, Level-II: Domestic Ratification 2. Win-Sets: Larger the Win-Sets in Level-I, easier to reach agreement; Larger Win-Sets in Level-II, easier to ratify them.  Two-Level Game and Enforcement Problem, Leeds (1999) and Leeds, et al, (2009) 1. Pairs of Democracies and pairs of Autocracies are more likely to cooperate than mixed Pairs 2. Regime change can change policy but leadership change does not necessarily change policy and thus doesn’t always affect international cooperation 35
  • 36. Rational Design Project  International Institutions facilitate cooperation through reciprocity, who claim this? 36
  • 37. Rational Design Project  International Institutions facilitate cooperation through reciprocity, who claim this?  Neo-Liberal Institutionalists, such as Keohane (1984)  But Neo-Liberals Institutionalists do not come clear on design of the International Institutions/Regimes. 37
  • 38. Rational Design Project  Different Institutions matter differently: Different institutional design features address different problems of cooperation.  Read Mitchell (1994), Koremenos et al. (2001), Rosendorff & Milner (2001), Mitchell & Keilbach (2001), Abbott & Snidal (1998), etc. Steps of international cooperation: 1 Need of cooperation (e.g., public goods provision) 2 Form a cooperative agreement with other states 3 Design institutions to cope with the problem of enforcement 4 When member states comply with the agreement, they achieve cooperation 38
  • 39. Recap  What is a theory of International Relations?  Realism: Classical, Offensive, Neo-Realism/Structural Realism  Liberalism: Classical, Neo-Liberal Institutionalism  Beyond ‘Isms’- Recent Trends in IR: 1. Theories of International Conflict: Bargaining Theory of War (Rationalist Explanation of War), Alliance and War, Diversionary Theory of War, Democratic Peace 39
  • 40. Recap  Beyond ‘Isms’- Recent Trends in IR: 1. Theories of International Cooperation: Hegemonic Stability Theory, Regime Type, Rational Design Project. 40
  • 41. Recap: Which Theory/ies Might Explain the Following Events? 41 Indo-Nepal Relations Proxy War in Syria Eurozone Crisis United Nations Crisis in Korean Peninsula Brexit
  • 42. Recap: Which Theory/ies Might Explain the Following Events? 42 Realism (Classical) Realism (Structural) Rational Design Project Liberalism (Neoliberalism) Realism (Offensive) Realism/ Institutional Design
  • 43. Any Questions?  Please introduce yourself before presenting your question. 43
  • 44. Thank You HAPPY NEW YEAR 2073: May this year spark in you intellectual inquisitiveness and philosophical wisdom. Thank you for being patient! 44