The Post-War World Part 1

The Cold War Part 1
The Soviet Empire Emerges

 Europe’s New Master
 The Second World War Ends
 Formation of the Soviet Empire
 Czechoslovakia Caught Between The East and West
 Yugoslavia – The Anomaly
 The Cold War Begins
 Early Concerns About Soviet Expansion
 Confrontation on the Periphery
 British Withdrawal & the Truman Doctrine

With the end of the Second World War, the
nations of Europe were divided into two
separate groups: those liberated by the forces
of the Western Allies, and those 'liberated' by
the armies of the Soviet Union. This resulted in
the transformation of Eastern Europe from
liberated territories to members of the Soviet
'Satellite Empire'.

As Hitler's Empire collapsed around him, the power
vacuum in Europe was rapidly being filled by the two
powers who had done the most to defeat Nazi tyranny.

From the west the
armies of the Anglo-
American
democracies pushed
into Germany, while
from the east the
Soviet juggernaut
smashed through the
last, desperate
German resistance.

While the fate of postwar Europe had been
much discussed, in the end the various nations
of the continent would adopt the political and
economic systems of the occupying armies.
Those liberated by the Western Allies would
establish or re-establish democratic rule and
capitalism, while those overrun by the Red
Army would become communist states allied
to the Soviet Union.

While it seems there
was no master plan to
establish a communist
empire in Eastern
Europe, the Soviet
leader Joseph Stalin
did wish to establish a
buffer zone to
forestall future
aggression from
Central Europe.

His main area of concern focused on three countries:
Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria.

The fate of Poland was particularly sad, for even though
Britain and its allies had gone to war in 1939 to defend
Polish independence, they were powerless to prevent
the occupying Soviets from imposing their own political
system there.

While the prewar Polish government had managed to escape
to London early in the war, and later established relations
with Britain's erstwhile ally the Soviet Union, the revelation
of the Katyn Massacre caused relations to be broken off
between the two.

Moreover, the destruction of the London government's
military forces in Poland (the Home Army) meant that
they had effectively no influence on Polish soil.

While Stalin pledged
to allow free elections
in Poland, he never
intended to allow an
unfriendly regime to
assume power, and
widespread electoral
fraud ensured a
communist victory.
Polish Constitution (in Russian)

Romania and Bulgaria shared a similar fate, as these
two nations were seen as essential to Soviet national
interests.

Romania like Poland had prewar border disputes with
the USSR

Likewise, Bulgaria lay
along the Russian
route to the
strategically vital
Turkish Straits.

Both saw communist parties assume power while at the
same time neutralizing other parties or absorbing
ideologically sympathetic ones.

Czechoslovakia represented something of an
anomaly, as both communists and non-
communists shared political power in a spirit
of cooperation.

The country's President
Edvard Beneš had
maintained cordial relations
with the Soviets in the
prewar years, and
maintained something of an
informal agreement with
Stalin: if the country was left
alone to conduct its political
and economic affairs, it
would not oppose Soviet
foreign policies.
Edvard Beneš

In this way Czechoslovakia
was to be something of a
Central European Finland,
which enjoyed a similar
arrangement with its old
Soviet foe. However, even
though all Soviet forces
withdrew from
Czechoslovakia by the end
of 1945, they were not done
meddling in Czech affairs.

When East-West relations began to degrade in 1948, the
Soviets criticised the Czech communists for not having
seized power, and let it be known that they would be
willing to lend military aid to accomplish this.

The Czech communist
party leader Klement
Gottwald then began
placing communist
supporters in places of state
power, and eventually
managed to usurp power
when President Benes
resigned in June 1948. In
this way Czechoslovakia
went from multiparty
democracy to one-party
state.
Klement Gottwald

Unlike every other state
in Eastern Europe during
the Second World War,
Yugoslavia had largely
liberated itself via the
indigenous partisan
movement, led by the
dedicated communist
Josip Broz (popularly
known as Tito).

Likewise, Tito had regional ambitions for Yugoslavia,
envisioning a pan-Balkan federation dominated by his
country and including Albania, Bulgaria, and parts of
northern Greece.

While Stalin at first supported Tito, with Tito loyally
following Stalin's lead, the Soviet leader eventually grew
wary of Tito's increasingly independent regime. The Soviets
proceeded to put pressure on Yugoslavia due to that nation's
perceived lack of deference, but this ultimately backfired.

Tito was an orthodox
communist in domestic
matters, but turned to the
West for economic support
in response to Soviet
pressure, which the West
was more than happy to
provide. In this way,
Yugoslavia left the Soviet
Bloc, and pursued its own
policies as an independent
communist nation not
beholden to anyone.

Yugoslavia's impact on the international scene was relatively
modest, one result of its actions was to increase Stalin's
paranoia regarding other possible political defections by the
Soviet satellites, leading to a campaign to uproot suspected
'Titos' who likewise might pursue an independent path to
socialism.

As the influence of the Soviet Union increased
in the nations surrounding it, the Western
democracies began to consider an appropriate
reaction. This era saw continuing attempts by
the Soviet Union to expand its sphere of
influence, as well as the beginning of the U.S.
and its allies perception and reactions to Soviet
policies.

While the Allies had tacitly accepted the idea of a series
of buffer states in Eastern Europe, the U.S. at this time
began to view this not so much as a defensive measure,
but as a staging ground for the expansion of Soviet
control into Western Europe.

This was prompted in
part by a speech given by
Stalin in early 1946
where references to
wartime allies were
replaced by ominous
warnings of the coming
clash between
communism and
capitalism.

As well, the Soviet Union refused to take part in the new
international financial organizations created for the
postwar world, denouncing them an tools of American
economic imperialism.

In an attempt to explain
this radical change in
Soviet behaviour, the
U.S. sought assessments
from experts on the
subject. One respondent
was a middle-aged
American diplomat who
had been based for
many years in the U.S.
embassy in Moscow,
George F. Kennan.
George F. Kennan

In his famous 'Long Telegram' (over 8,000
words!) he explained the situation in a lucid
and compelling way: essentially, that
throughout history Russian leaders had needed
external enemies to rally their diverse peoples
and to justify their iron rule. With Germany
and Japan vanquished, the only remaining
rivals (the U.S. and U.K.) had to be converted
from allies into potential enemies in order to
justify the Soviet state's harsh rule.

Kennan's analysis had a powerful effect on the American
government, and while it was kept secret for the time
being, the basic themes were very publically exposed in
a speech delivered by former Prime Minister Winston
Churchill.

In his 'Sinews of Peace'
address, Churchill claimed
an Iron Curtain was
descending across the
continent, decrying Soviet
actions and calling for
Anglo-American alliance
against this threat.

Although not speaking in
an official manner, his
prestige lent an air of
authority to this address,
and even before he spoke
tensions between the
Superpowers were on the
rise.

One of the first places where East-West tensions flared
up was in Iran.

A traditional zone of
rivalry between the old
Russian and British
Empires, Iran had been
occupied by the Soviets
and British after the
German invasion of the
Soviet Union, in order to
allow allied supplies to
reach the hard pressed
USSR.

However, while the British
were content to turn
power over to the new
pro-western Shah of Iran,
the Soviets began to
encourage dissension in
the northern provinces of
Iran which it had
occupied.
Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi
Emperor of Iran

Specifically targeted were the Azeri peoples who had long
struggled against the dominance of Iran's Persian majority,
and among whom the Soviets attempted to create the
framework for a puppet state (utilizing the links between
these Iranian Azeris and the many Azeris in the Soviet
Union).

By April of 1946 the Soviets
managed to wring two
concessions from Iran in
exchange for withdrawing its
occupation forces after the
war: autonomy for the
Iranian's Azeri province, and
the right to exploit the
petroleum reserves in the
north of the country.

However, shortly after the Soviets withdrew, the Iranians
repudiated both agreements and reasserted control over
their northern province. The Soviets had cautiously tested
Western tolerance for their adventurism, and been badly
stung: after Iran repudiated the agreements it aligned itself
with the U.S., and remained a solid American ally for the
next 3 decades.

Following this humiliating incident, the Soviets began to
exert pressure on Turkey to allow for joint control of the
Turkish Straits separating the Soviet dominated Black Sea
from the Mediterranean Sea.

As well the Soviets demanded the annexation of Turkish
provinces on the Soviet border.

When the Turks
(naturally) rejected these
demands, the Soviets
massed forces on the
Turkish border and began
a menacing press
campaign to intimidate
the Turks. And while the
allies had previously been
sympathetic to the Soviet
interests in the straits,
they now saw it as an
intolerable geostrategic
threat to Western Europe.

In the summer of 1946 President Truman dispatched the
most powerful aircraft carrier in the U.S. navy to bolster
existing forces in the region and lend confidence to the
Turks. While the war of words would continue, Turkey
refused to budge on the issue of compromising its national
sovereignty.

The final area of immediate postwar confrontation
between the two wartime allies was across the Aegean
from Turkey, in Greece.

There communists and non-communists clashed openly
in the Greek Civil War.

While Stalin was
ambivalent about this
conflict, he tacitly allowed
Yugoslavia to provide
support to the communist
rebels there. Personally,
he doubted the Greek
communists could win
the war, and was
distrustful of any
communist movement
that he could not directly
control.

Great Britain had served
as the traditional
guardian of Greek
independence, but was
itself suffering heavily
as its postwar economy
remained stagnant and
seemingly endless
imperial engagements
drained away its
remaining strength and
funds.

In early 1947 they declared
the end of all economic and
military assistance to Greece
and Turkey, and appealed to
Washington to step into the
void by aiding those two
countries. By appealing to the
patriotic sentiments of the
American congress, the
President pitched the relief of
Greece and Turkey as the
beginning of a new phase of
American foreign policy and
the defence of American
national interests.

In March of 1947 the President delivered a stirring speech to
congress, in which he outlined what would come to be
known as the 'Truman Doctrine': essentially, that the U.S.
would unconditionally support any country in the world
threatened by external Soviet aggression or by indigenous
communist insurgents.

The response of
congress was swift:
400 million dollars in
aid was given to
Turkey and Greece,
and American
advisors and
equipment began to
flow into the Royal
Greek Army, which
crushed the
communist insurgents
and won the civil war.

With this new policy in
mind, the U.S. government
felt it needed to justify its
stance against the Soviet
Union, and did so with the
release of an article titled
'The Sources of Soviet
Conduct' by a mysterious
'Mr. X' (in fact the newly
promoted George Kennan).

Published in the popular and respected journal Foreign
Affairs, the article spelled out how historical Russian
paranoia and the messianic ideology of Marxism-
Leninism would see the Soviets probing and testing the
nations bordering the USSR for weaknesses, and
attempting to subvert them to the communist cause and
Soviet control.

To respond to this, the U.S. would have to extend economic,
political, and military assistance to the countries in danger:
when faced by a ring of strong, prosperous, stable states, the
Soviet Union would be forced to accept the limits of its own
power. The strategy spelled out here became known as
'Containment', and would face its greatest test in the
economically devastated nations of Western Europe.

The Post-War World Part 1

Recommended

Recommended

More Related Content

What's hot

What's hot (20)

Viewers also liked

Viewers also liked (10)

Similar to The Post-War World Part 1

Similar to The Post-War World Part 1 (20)

More from KyleWHough

More from KyleWHough (18)

Recently uploaded

Recently uploaded (20)

The Post-War World Part 1