The Hungarian Revolution began on October 23rd, 1956 as students in Budapest protested the communist regime. Over the next two weeks, protests grew into a nationwide uprising against Soviet domination. On November 4th, the Soviet Union launched a military intervention, sending tanks into the streets of Budapest to crush the revolution. Despite lasting just 13 days, the Hungarian Revolution marked the first major uprising against Soviet control in Eastern Europe and inspired future dissident movements across the Eastern Bloc.

1. David You
Hungarian Revolution 1956
The Seed of Revolution
On October 10th, 1956, the events of the Hungarian Revolution kickstarted as students
across Budapest protested the regime. By 3 pm, more than 10,000 students from
universities nationwide paid tribute to the statue of Hungarian revolution poet Petőfi and
the monument of Polish general Jozef Bem. People across the nation joined and had
amassed thousands of protestors by the end of the day. The crowd chanted independence
slogans, calling for Rakoski to be toppled and Nagy to take power. Things soon turned
violent as the demonstrators gained control of the radio control. On the afternoon of the
24th, the Soviets rushed into Hungary and staged an intervention codename ‘Operation
Wave.’ As the Soviet tanks roamed the streets to qualm the unrest, the Hungarian people
took arms. The uprising lasted 13 days.
The end of World War II marked a decisive end to a significant chapter in our history, which
amassed over 60 million casualties on both sides. Fascist leaders of European nations were
defeated as the Allies achieved victory in both the Pacific and European theatre.
Unfortunately, the world did not enter a phase of international peace. Two global, rival
superpowers emerged, and the entire world became a background of the ideological battle
between either communism against capitalism or more befittingly authoritarianism against
democracy.
Following the Yalta Conference, the leaders of three states represented by Roosevelt,
Churchill, and General Stalin shaped a post-war Europe that represented not only collective
security but also the self-determination of the liberated people of Europe. Stalin demanded
that a Soviet Sphere of Influence in Eastern and Central Europe be essential to the Soviet’s
national security concerns. As it turned out, the main battleground of ideology all occurred
within the former Axis powers. Berlin was to be the centre of the power struggle, which was
partitioned between the West and East. In the same vein, Vienna, Austria was also to be
partitioned.
The situation in Hungary, however, was different. Hungarians would be solely subject to a
Soviet Puppet government, with no Western oversight of Budapest’s control. Despite the
practically non-existent support of Soviet impingement, the Soviets deemed it necessary in
their grand scheme for defence against outside NATO. From the perspective of the Kremlin,
any revolutionary aspirations became not merely a struggle over one nation’s freedom, but
rather, an opening for the West to gain an upper hand in its security operations in Europe,
something that Moscow will never allow to come to fruition. Hence, this forced Moscow to
make the difficult and drastic decision; either to allow the independent-seeking revolution
to take place and risk losing a satellite state in a strategically valuable location, or to order
the Red Army to crush the opposition in Budapest. Alas, the free world watched as Moscow
embarked on the latter.
Acknowledging geopolitical tensions and Russia’s history in its previous 150 years is
apropos. Hungary, in 1956, was already an established communist nation under Soviet
dominance for nearly a decade. However, there emerged a less publicised but important
conception of the communist system. Politicians, writers, and intellectuals were certain that
the Soviet Union was indestructible from the interior, but only exterior pressure would

2. David You
threaten Soviet hegemony. The Hungarian revolution, despite failing, would test this theory.
For Khrushchev, this became a zero-sum game. To fail in Hungary would make other Bloc
states recognise that internal uprisings would collapse Soviet imperialism.
A non-partisan assessment could show that the USSR was just as disaffected by the US. The
Soviet Union ultimately was the primary European power, and the bloc states were
strategically important areas. Hence, it became unambiguous that once the mutual threat of
fascism was eliminated, the USSR and the US would no longer cooperate as allies. Moscow
had a justified, logical, substantiated fear of the new NATO alliance, as it saw its border
satellite states as potential targets for the US and its allies to engage the threat of
communism. In 1948, it became clear to Moscow that the Marshall Plan directly threatened
the wall of communism for which the Red Army had fought. It is logical to suggest that
without the US presence, the Soviets would have been more open to negotiation or political
freedom, instead of brutal suppression.
Furthermore, Hungary’s political and geopolitical feat became indispensable to the Soviet
security networks. In the previous 150 years, Russia has been engulfed in a European war
three times, and the invasions of the motherland have always come through Eastern and
Central Europe. For Moscow, it became imperative to prevent NATO expansion at any cost.
Amidst the current conflict in Ukraine, this geographical feat is still relevant. The former
territories of the Soviet Union provided a buffer against any military incursion from NATO.
From the Netherlands in the West to the Ural Mountains in the East, this region of Europe is
dominated by a geographic feature called the North European Plain. It encompasses a
narrow width in Northern Germany, but with a mouth that opens increasingly wider as it
approaches the Ural Mountains. Thus, it became increasingly difficult to defend across the
east, and therefore it became imperative for Moscow to expand control westward to
narrow the gap.
History, culture, and heritage have been compelling factors in nationalist struggles. The
Hungarian Revolution was ultimately a nationalistic rebellion. Hungary does not share the
cultural heritage that Romania, Poland, or even Yugoslavia share with Russia. Its cultural
history is a critical reason the Hungarians were unwilling to submit to the Slavs. Hungary
was the outlier in the Soviet Bloc, both culturally and socially.
Hungary’s post-war government eagerly participated in Stalinism, which consisted of all
parts of life—Stalin’s vision and declaration of the perfect communist society - through
dedication to the Bolshevik Party. Stalinism penetrated every aspect of life, and the
economy was centrally planned with dedication to heavy industry. The best explanation of
Stalinism is that ‘the party controlled the state, the state-controlled society, and these two,
together with the now transformed social institutions, controlled the individual.’
Conceivably, the government had a considerable distrust of the intelligentsia.
Matyas Rakosi, a dedicated Stalinist, was to superintend Hungary. Described himself as
‘Stalin’s most apt pupil,’ he was responsible for the largest and bloodiest purges ever in the
Eastern Bloc states. Rakosi was willing to push Stalin’s political reforms into Hungary, with
the message, ‘If the powerful officials of the communist dictatorship can vanish from one
day to another, how much more defenceless a simple citizen must be.’ The purges began
with the party, but the impacts were soon felt in all elements of society. Starting in 1949,
Rakosi began what he termed, ‘salami tactics.’ In the two years from 1950, he eagerly
proved himself as a staunch henchman of Stalin, as over 100,000 middle-class Hungarians
were deported or placed in internment camps.

3. David You
The death of Stalin from a stroke in 1953 was perhaps the most influential leading up to the
revolution. His death opened a power vacuum, and the future of the USSR seemed
uncertain at the time. His death marked the end of Stalinism. However, the damages
inflicted by the Stalinist economy seemed irreversible. The collectivisation of industry has
plunged the industrial structure and cost of living. This resulting economic decline, along
with the insistence on nationalisation, hit the intelligentsia the hardest.
Under Khrushchev, however, Russia embarked on a very different course. Khrushchev in the
mid-1950s had to defend socialism inside the USSR against the newly built NATO alliance. To
allow a free Hungary would send a message to the world, and the already discontented
communist states, most notably Poland. Despite Khrushchev not proclaiming to be a
Stalinist, he was a product of the Soviet system and was confined in the very structure.
Khrushchev was not a liberal by any means. His record inside the communist party proved
him capable of violence. He had been ruthless in the Great Purge and demonstrated Stalin-
like political violence in reclaiming West Ukraine in the Great Patriotic War. However, he
understood the necessity to alter the position of the Soviet Union. The war exposed Soviet
citizens to the West, and complete isolation was no longer viable.
In February 1956, Khrushchev appeared before the 20th Party Congress and delivered his
report ‘On the Cult of Personality and its Consequence.’ For Khrushchev, this became the
defining moment of his political career and a critical turning point for Russia. His methodical
censure of Stalin, including disclosures on Stalin’s breach of law in dealing with his political
rivals, proved to have devastating consequences.
For the Hungarian intelligentsia, the speech had resounding implications. For them, there
was little distinction between Stalin and Rakosi. Both men had broken Soviet legality under
Khrushchev’s interpretation, creating a cult of personality to remove political opposition.
Moreover, Khrushchev’s appraisal of the restrictions of intellectual expression by Stalin was
seen by writers and university students as a call for a free press. Khrushchev’s secret speech
had become the ultimate catalyst, and his words brought revolutionary upheaval.
Unequivocally, Khrushchev was at a crossroads when handling the revolution. His years in
power set out a series of contradictions, with a constant tension between reform and
oppression.
Imre Nagy was to be promoted to prime minister by the politburo. The reasons for his
promotion seemed unclear at the time. Perhaps, for Khrushchev, Nagy’s popularity with the
Hungarian people was rising due to the successes of his land reform as Minister of
Agriculture, or more plainly, his anti-Stalinist policies, endeared him.
Nevertheless, one thing is clear: Moscow was unhappy with the Hungarian leadership.
Rakosi’s regime was heavily criticised for its standard of living and failures in mechanising
industrialisation.
Nagy’s reformist policies became known as the ‘New Course,’ a liberal and certainly
reformist draft. Nagy was still unwaveringly advocating socialism but merely wanted to
implement a better version following its economic woes following the Second World War.
However, Moscow could not allow a liberal Hungary because the people wanted more once
concessions were made.
There were several reasons for the failures of liberal reform. Following Stalin’s death, riots
in East Germany profoundly impacted all the Bloc states, including Hungary. News does not
operate in a vacuum, and Moscow had to decide how the situation would impact other Bloc
states. For Soviet interests, East Germany could not be allowed to be a free country, as

4. David You
Khrushchev saw that allowing East Germany to be free would allow the US to gain a
foothold in Germany and possibly reunite the nation. Inevitably, Moscow sent the Red Army
to crush the revolt violently. One would assume the same logic would be applied to Hungry.
Another reason was practicality. Nagy’s freedom to govern would be limited after the
events of Berlin in 1953. In Soviet politics, the party always came before the national
government. It was impossible to imagine that Nagy would operate when the party
apparatus obeyed Rakosi and his entourage of Stalinist cliques.
The Soviets acted in its best interest in its decision to crush the Hungarian Revolution in
1956. After twelve days of bloody fighting, the Red Army entered the city with foot soldiers
and tanks. Nagy was later arrested and replaced with Kadar, willing to comply with
Moscow’s demand, ending any hopes of a free Hungary. While the Hungarian Revolution
would be the first major uprising against Soviet imperialism, it would certainly not be the
last. Certainly, Khrushchev’s decision to invade directly impacted his predecessor Brezhnev
in his decision to invade Czechoslovakia during the Prague Spring.
The events of the Hungarian Revolution remain one of the greatest tragedies of the 20th
century with more than 2000 deaths and displacement of 200,000. Hungary ultimately failed
to create a free Hungary state but did set the starting point for Soviet decline. The story of
the Hungarian Revolution remains inspiring, as one small European nation took on the
oppression of the Soviet Union.
Bibliography
(Anderson, A cold war in the Soviet Bloc)(Byrne, The 1956 Hungarian revolution) (Travel, n.d.) (JSTOR, n.d.)(Researchgate,n.d)(Cambridge,n.d)(Rev,n.d)( Molnar, A concise
History of Hungary, 2001)(Heller & Feher, The Dismantling of Stalin’s Empire, 1991)( Shopflin, ‘Hungary after the Second World War’ 1963) (Smith, ‘In Khrushchev in the
Kremlin)(Reallifelore, 2022)