This document summarizes key events and developments in global politics during the early Cold War period from 1949-1953. It discusses the Soviet Union's acquisition of nuclear weapons and the American response of increasing defense spending. It also describes efforts to establish a unified European military force through the proposed European Defense Community, as well as early economic integration through the European Coal and Steel Community. Finally, it notes that the first phase of the Cold War came to an end with the departures of Joseph Stalin and Harry Truman from power in 1953, leaving uncertainty about whether East-West relations might thaw under new leadership on both sides.

1. The Cold War Part 3
Global Crisis & The Thaw

2.  World Crisis and Responses
 Nuclear Anxiety
 Cold War to Hot
 The French Plan
 European Economic Integration
 New Leadership
 The Thaw
 Strategy Under Eisenhower
 Demise of the EDC Ideal
 Issues in European Integration
 East-West Relations After Stalin

3. As the U.S. committed itself to the defence of
Western Europe, communist aggression saw
the Cold War turn hot in East Asia, and it
became evident that mere rhetoric wouldn't
protect the West from the Soviet juggernaut.
This in turn led to plans for Western
rearmament in the face of communist
aggression, and the closing of the first stage of
the Cold War.

4. While the American entry into NATO had gone a long
way to allaying European fears, serious issues still
challenged any sense of Western security.

5. It was widely believed that
the Soviet Union and its
client states had a
considerable advantage in
military manpower. Given
the time it would take to
deploy a U.S. army across
the Atlantic to Europe in
the event of war, military
officials estimated that the
Red Army would already
be at the Rhine, if not the
English Channel.

6. The U.S. was almost entirely reliant on its nuclear
arsenal (on which it had a monopoly) to keep the Soviet
Union at bay.

7. When the Soviets tested
an atomic bomb in
August 1949, the U.S.
was both shocked (there
had been no prior
warning) and horrified
(the Soviets now
possessed nuclear
weapons, in addition to
their vast armies).

8. To cope with this, desperate action was needed:
National Security Council Memorandum 68 (NSC-68)

9. Among other ideas, it proposed to counter what it
viewed as the dire Soviet threat with the development of
advanced hydrogen bombs.

10. It also recommended a large increase in U.S. land, sea,
and air forces.

11. Finally, the expansion of American defence industries,
and a 300% increase in the United States defence budget
were advised.

12. While a few inside the inner circles of power opposed
this (including George Kennan, who though it grossly
exaggerated Soviet geopolitical ambitions), most
supported a harder line with the Soviets.

13. While President Truman was impressed by their arguments,
he was loathe to force such an onerous burden on the
American people in a time of peace.

14. While initially promising
not to deploy American
forces in Europe during
peacetime, the outbreak
of the Korean War in late
1950 led President
Truman to base 4 U.S.
infantry divisions in West
Germany.

15. Likewise, NATO was transformed from a loose-knit
coalition to an integrated force under centralized
command, with its first Supreme Commander being war
hero General Dwight D. Eisenhower.

16. Meanwhile the U.S.
underwent a massive
expansion of both
nuclear and conventional
forces while increasing
its defence budget three-
fold. In 1952 Greece and
Turkey joined NATO,
while Spain (an
international pariah for
its Pro-Axis stance in the
Second World War)
received American
economic aid in
exchange for military
basing rights.

17. Essentially, the U.S. strategy for the defence of
Europe was twofold: the U.S. forces in
Germany would serve as a proverbial tripwire,
engaging Soviet forces as soon as they invaded.
This reassured the European leaders of NATO
that the U.S. would respond with maximum
force, as no American President could justify
not launching a nuclear assault on the USSR if
American GIs were dying in combat with
Soviet forces.

18. As well, the ground forces would serve as a 'Shield' with
other NATO troops to block the Soviet attacks into
Western Europe, while the 'Sword' of U.S. long-range
nuclear bombers prepared to attack the Soviet Union.

19. While no one doubted the power of America's nuclear
'sword', the ground force 'shield' was simply too weak to
hold out for long against the Soviet Army. Severe action
would be required to maintain the credibility of NATO's
defences.

20. To offset the shortage
of military manpower,
the U.S. proposed that
West Germany be
allowed to rearm itself
to contribute to the
defence of Western
Europe.

21. Many Europeans were
uncomfortable with this
idea, only 5 years after the
defeat of Nazi Germany,
and a French proposal
known as the Pleven Plan
called for the creation of a
Pan-European army, with
German divisions existing
under multinational
European command.
René Pleven

22. This seemed to offer advantages to all parties: the
Europeans didn't have to worry about a new full-blown
German army, the Americans got the additional
manpower they wanted, and the Germans were able to
parlay their contribution of troops into regaining full
sovereignty from the occupying powers.

23. In the end the 6 nations of
what came to be called
'Inner Europe' (France,
Germany, Italy, Belgium,
the Netherlands, and
Luxembourg) signed on,
and in May 1952 the
European Defence
Community (EDC) treaty
was signed.

24. Relations in Europe were transforming, and not simply in a
military sense. Germany and France, bitter enemies for
centuries, had decided to end their long and ultimately
pointless rivalry.

25. The first big breakthrough
was a proposal known as
the Schuman Plan to jointly
coordinate the coal and steel
industries of France and
Germany, the logic being
that these industries were
complementary between the
two (as opposed to
competitive), and that a
prosperous Europe was
inconceivable without a
prosperous Germany. Robert Schuman

26. In this way, France hoped that just as it sought to utilize
Germany's manpower in the EDC, it could utilize its
economic recovery to allow Europe to prosper.

27. A conference between the six
EDC countries resulted in
the signing in April 1951 of a
treaty to merge their coal,
iron, and steel industries
under a supranational entity
known as the European Coal
and Steel Community
(ECSC).

28. In fact, both the Pleven and
Schumann Plans that led to the
EDC and ECSC had been
created by a French bureaucrat
by the name of Jean Monnet: a
political and economic genius
who worked tirelessly his
entire life for European unity
and who many consider today
to be the Father of a United
Europe.
Jean Monnet

29. Monnet realized from observing both World Wars first hand
that steel was central to war making capability, and that if
the German steel industry were highly integrated into the
larger European one, it would render war making both
harder and less desirable, contributing to a peaceful and
prosperous Europe.

30. While Chancellor Adenauer
realized by joining the
ECSC he would render
reunification with East
Germany impossible, he felt
it was justified, as a
stronger, more
economically powerful
West Germany allied to the
U.S. would be in a better
position to eventually
agitate for reunification:
and in the long term, he was
correct.

31. In early 1953 the first stage of the Cold War came to an
end with the departure of the two leaders who had
overseen this era. In January President Harry Truman
handed over power to the newly elected President
Dwight D. Eisenhower, and only 6 weeks later Soviet
Dictator Joseph Stalin died of a stroke.

32. In his later years, Stalin had become increasingly paranoid,
with deadly results for many communist party members in
the satellite states and at home in the USSR. After his death,
the USSR was ruled for the next two years by consensus
among top officials as opposed to the diktat of a single
leader.

33. The legacy of Stalin in the
postwar period is undeniably
impressive (albeit not morally),
as despite the USSR's
incredibly massive strategic
inferiority in both nuclear
weapons and naval forces, it
managed to create a satellite
empire in Eastern Europe,
while in East Asia China and
North Korea became
communist states and the
Vietnamese communist party
battled the French for
independence.

34. Truman however was also
an accomplished leader: the
spread of communist power
had been contained by the
rebuilding of Western
Europe, the repulsing of
Soviet moves towards
Turkey and Iran, and the
defence of South Korea and
the Nationalist Chinese on
Taiwan along with a
security agreement with old
wartime opponent Japan.

35. Ultimately, both these
nations had survived the
Second World War to
become the only two
nations capable of
pursuing not merely
regional, but global
interests: they had become
Superpowers in a Bipolar
International System. The
question on everyone's
mind now was whether
the Cold War would go
on, or would a peaceful,
diplomatic solution be
found?

36. While the attempts to form a Pan-European
army began to run into trouble, it may yet have
proved unnecessary as relations with the USSR
begin to warm slightly. This was a result of
complex interactions between the policies of
the new Eisenhower administration, the
ongoing process of European integration, and
the consequences of Stalin's death on the Soviet
Union.

37. The election of the
Republican presidential
candidate Eisenhower
served as an indication of
dissatisfaction with the
Democrat's policy of
containment. Republicans
decried it as an immoral
abandonment of millions to
communist slavery, and
called for a 'rolling back' of
the iron curtain.

38. However, American military forces were insufficient to
even defend Western Europe, never mind liberating
Eastern Europe, and the Republicans were committed to
lower government expenditures. A way was needed to
limit spending, yet still project great military power, but
how?

39. The answer came in 1954 when the 'new look' in
American defence policy was announced: NATO would
rely on America's nuclear forces to keep the Soviets in
check.

40. This would both allow costly conventional
forces to be kept modestly sized, while
ensuring American willingness to utilize
military power (as the Soviets despite having
tested nuclear weapons, had no functional ones
and no means of delivering them, rendering
America invulnerable) in the defence of
Europe.

41. In order for the new
American defence policy
to work, a rearmed West
Germany was needed to
compensate for the lack of
American forces in Europe
(despite nuclear
superiority, a decently
sized army was still
needed in Europe).

42. While the EDC seemed to be the answer to this problem, and
was ratified in 5 of the 6 constituent states, it was ultimately
defeated in the French National Assembly. To overcome this
setback, the British proposed a novel solution: the old
Brussels Treaty (made largely superfluous by NATO) would
be expanded to include West Germany and Italy, and
renamed the Western European Union.

43. This parallel organization saw Britain commit forces to
the continent, and forced West Germany to accept limits
on its new military forces (no army operating outside
NATO, limits on certain conventional weapons systems,
no ABC [atomic, biological, chemical] weapons).

44. This alternative to the
EDC saw West Germany
formally join NATO on
May 9 1955, ten years to
the day after the
surrender of Nazi
Germany, and finally
regain full sovereignty.

45. In response to the rearmament of West Germany, the
Soviet Union and its various satellite powers formed a
counterpart alliance known as the Warsaw Pact.

47. The expansion of NATO
in no way however
lessened the alliance's
dependence on nuclear
weapons, which took on
an increasingly
important role in alliance
planning, with the idea
being that nuclear
weapons would indeed
be considered a weapon
of first resort.

48. This strategy of a full
nuclear attack in
response to a
conventional Soviet
attack was referred to by
American Secretary of
state John Foster Dulles
as 'Massive Retaliation'.
John Foster Dulles

49. It required the U.S. to let the Soviets know that they
would strike, without actually striking, a convoluted
game of political and diplomatic manoeuvring known
as 'Brinkmanship'. The Soviets likewise began to focus
on building up their nuclear forces, and by the
beginning of the 1960's war seemed a remote possibility
(due to the fact it would almost immediately become an
all out nuclear exchange).

50. The path to European
cooperation did not die with
the EDC, far from it. The
ECSC was seen as a success,
and negotiations began to
expand the integration of
the ECSC economies. While
Jean Monnet preferred what
he called the 'functional'
approach of gradual
integration of certain
sectors, the 'comprehensive'
school of thought won out,
and in March 1957 the
European Economic
Community (EEC) was
established.

51. In addition to its stated goals of seeking to
integrate the European economies, allow a free
flow of labour, and standardize social
legislation, it also introduced various political
bodies to help manage this new community
including an executive commission, a council
of ministers, a parliamentary assembly, and a
court of justice. The second great goal of the
EEC after the harmonization of the European
economies was to establish a standardized
trading policy with the rest of the world.

52. The British, who had stayed out of the EEC so as to benefit
from their special relationship with the U.S. as well as to
maintain trading benefits with their vestigial empire, were
concerned that their extensive links to the European states of
the EEC would be threatened if they remained outside it. To
remedy this the U.K. along with Norway, Denmark, Austria,
Sweden, Switzerland, and Portugal founded the European
Free Trade Association (EFTA).

53. The EFTA was much more
loosely organized and
widespread than the EEC,
lacking the political bodies of
the later, and was the answer
of the so called 'Outer Seven'
to the EEC's 'Inner Six'. With
this, non-communist Europe
was split into two separate
economic blocs, which served
to complicate and perhaps
even threaten the future of
European economic
cooperation.

54. With Stalin's death power had passed into the
hands of a collection of high Soviet officials
working in consensus, and a new period of
improved relations began with the West,
nicknamed the 'Thaw'. Under this new
leadership, political prisoners were released,
the secret police reigned in, economic reforms
implemented, and communist organizations
and allies abroad were encouraged to parlay
with their Western opponents.

55. In 1955 a new de facto
leader emerged in the
form of the until then
obscure first secretary
of the communist
party Nikita
Khrushchev.

56. Among other ventures in the spirit of reducing global
tensions was the solution to the long simmering
'Austrian Question', as that nation had like Germany
been occupied since the end of the war.

57. In the end, Austria was reunited as a sovereign, neutral
nation, and was a signal that East-West cooperation
need not end in bitter stalemate and division.

58. On the Western side of the continent, an unlikely leader
called for face to face meetings between the two sides.
Winston Churchill, back in power after his 1945
electoral defeat and as ardent an anticommunist as any
man, greatly feared that a nuclear war would annihilate
civilization, and was desperate to avoid that possibility.

59. He proposed that the big stumbling block of East-West
relations, Germany, be reunited as a neutral state.
However, this plan was ultimately rejected by members
of both sides, as both feared a united Germany would
slip into the other's sphere of influence. Regardless, in
July 1955 the leaders of the Soviet Union, France, the
U.K., and the U.S. met in Geneva, Switzerland.

60. While nothing
substantive resulted from
these talks, the press
images of the leaders of
East and West chatting
happily led to
international media
referring to the 'Spirit of
Geneva', as both sides
seemed to be on much
better terms.

61. In February 1956 the degree of change in the Soviet Union
became clear, when Khrushchev delivered a speech behind
closed doors angrily denouncing Stalin and his many
crimes, and renouncing the dead leader's belief in the
inevitability of war between communism and capitalism,
putting forth a new policy of peaceful coexistence.

62. With this in mind he subsequently dissolved the
Cominform and vowed to relax the Soviet grip on the
satellite states. It seemed that a new age of moderation
and cooperation might be at hand.