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System safety

System safety, 2013

Slide 1
Safety
• Safety is a property of a system that
reflects the system’s ability to
operate, normally or abnormally, without
danger of causing human injury or death
and without damage to the system’s
environment.
System safety, 2013

Slide 2
Principal dependability
properties

System safety, 2013

Slide 3
Safety criticality
• Primary safety-critical systems
– Embedded software systems whose
failure can cause the associated
hardware to fail and directly threaten
people.

System safety 2013

Slide 4
System safety 2013

Slide 5
• Secondary safety-critical systems
– Systems whose failure results in faults in other
(socio-technical) systems, which can then have
safety consequences.
– For example, a medical records system is safetycritical as failure may lead to inappropriate
treatment being prescribed.
System safety 2013

Slide 6
System safety 2013

Slide 7
Safety and reliability
• Safety and reliability are related but
distinct
• For a system to be safe, it must
generally be reliable
• However, this is not enough. It must
also be safe in the event of system
failure
System safety 2013

Slide 8
• Reliability is concerned with
conformance to a given specification
and delivery of service
• Safety is concerned with ensuring
system cannot cause damage
irrespective of whether or not it
conforms to its specification
System safety 2013

Slide 9
• A reliable system can be unsafe if the
requirements are incorrect or
incomplete

System safety 2013

Slide 10
Unsafe reliable systems

The software on this plane operated ‘reliably’ yet the plane
crashed- covered in a separate video
System safety 2013

Slide 11
Unsafe reliable systems
• There may be dormant faults in a system
that are undetected for many years and
only rarely arise.
• Specification errors
– If the system specification is incorrect then
the system can behave as specified but still
cause an accident.
System safety 2013

Slide 12
• Hardware failures generating spurious inputs
– Hard to anticipate in the specification.

• Context-sensitive commands i.e. issuing the
right command at the wrong time
– Often the result of operator error.

System safety 2013

Slide 13
Accident
• An unplanned event or sequence of events
which results in human death or
injury, damage to property, or to the
environment.
• An overdose of insulin by a softwarecontrolled insulin injection system is an
example of an accident.
System safety 2013

Slide 14
Hazard
• A condition with the potential for causing or
contributing to an accident. A failure of the
sensor that measures blood glucose is an
example of a hazard.

System safety 2013

Slide 15
Damage
•

A measure of the loss resulting from a mishap.
Damage can range from many people being killed as
a result of an accident to minor injury or property
damage.

•

Damage resulting from an overdose of insulin could
be serious injury or the death of the user of the insulin
pump.

System safety 2013

Slide 16
Safety critical systems
development
• Hazard avoidance
– The system is designed so that some
classes of hazard simply cannot arise.

System safety 2013

Slide 17
• Hazard detection and removal
– The system is designed so that hazards are
detected and removed before they result in
an accident.

System safety 2013

Slide 18
• Damage limitation
– The system includes protection features
that minimise the damage that may result
from an accident.

System safety 2013

Slide 19
Summary
• Safety is a property of a system that reflects
the system’s ability to operate, normally or
abnormally, without danger of causing human
injury or death.
• Safety and reliability are related but reliable
systems may be unsafe.
System safety 2013

Slide 20
Summary
• Hazards are conditions that may (but need
not) lead to an accident
• Safety is achieved through
– Hazard avoidance

– Hazard detection and removal
– Damage limitation
System safety 2013

Slide 21

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System safety

  • 2. Safety • Safety is a property of a system that reflects the system’s ability to operate, normally or abnormally, without danger of causing human injury or death and without damage to the system’s environment. System safety, 2013 Slide 2
  • 4. Safety criticality • Primary safety-critical systems – Embedded software systems whose failure can cause the associated hardware to fail and directly threaten people. System safety 2013 Slide 4
  • 6. • Secondary safety-critical systems – Systems whose failure results in faults in other (socio-technical) systems, which can then have safety consequences. – For example, a medical records system is safetycritical as failure may lead to inappropriate treatment being prescribed. System safety 2013 Slide 6
  • 8. Safety and reliability • Safety and reliability are related but distinct • For a system to be safe, it must generally be reliable • However, this is not enough. It must also be safe in the event of system failure System safety 2013 Slide 8
  • 9. • Reliability is concerned with conformance to a given specification and delivery of service • Safety is concerned with ensuring system cannot cause damage irrespective of whether or not it conforms to its specification System safety 2013 Slide 9
  • 10. • A reliable system can be unsafe if the requirements are incorrect or incomplete System safety 2013 Slide 10
  • 11. Unsafe reliable systems The software on this plane operated ‘reliably’ yet the plane crashed- covered in a separate video System safety 2013 Slide 11
  • 12. Unsafe reliable systems • There may be dormant faults in a system that are undetected for many years and only rarely arise. • Specification errors – If the system specification is incorrect then the system can behave as specified but still cause an accident. System safety 2013 Slide 12
  • 13. • Hardware failures generating spurious inputs – Hard to anticipate in the specification. • Context-sensitive commands i.e. issuing the right command at the wrong time – Often the result of operator error. System safety 2013 Slide 13
  • 14. Accident • An unplanned event or sequence of events which results in human death or injury, damage to property, or to the environment. • An overdose of insulin by a softwarecontrolled insulin injection system is an example of an accident. System safety 2013 Slide 14
  • 15. Hazard • A condition with the potential for causing or contributing to an accident. A failure of the sensor that measures blood glucose is an example of a hazard. System safety 2013 Slide 15
  • 16. Damage • A measure of the loss resulting from a mishap. Damage can range from many people being killed as a result of an accident to minor injury or property damage. • Damage resulting from an overdose of insulin could be serious injury or the death of the user of the insulin pump. System safety 2013 Slide 16
  • 17. Safety critical systems development • Hazard avoidance – The system is designed so that some classes of hazard simply cannot arise. System safety 2013 Slide 17
  • 18. • Hazard detection and removal – The system is designed so that hazards are detected and removed before they result in an accident. System safety 2013 Slide 18
  • 19. • Damage limitation – The system includes protection features that minimise the damage that may result from an accident. System safety 2013 Slide 19
  • 20. Summary • Safety is a property of a system that reflects the system’s ability to operate, normally or abnormally, without danger of causing human injury or death. • Safety and reliability are related but reliable systems may be unsafe. System safety 2013 Slide 20
  • 21. Summary • Hazards are conditions that may (but need not) lead to an accident • Safety is achieved through – Hazard avoidance – Hazard detection and removal – Damage limitation System safety 2013 Slide 21