SlideShare a Scribd company logo
Security for Internet-
connected devices
John Lyle, University of Oxford
Welcome!
 John Lyle
 ResearchAssistant at the University of Oxford
 Member of the webinos project
 Email: me@johnlyle.com
 Twitter: @jplyle
What I’m
going to say
1. Internet ofThings security is hard!
2. There are some good reasons for this.
3. There are new (ish) threats.
4. There are some new technologies to play with.
The Insecurity
ofThings
What I’m not
going to say
1. Security is really important.
2. This is how to exploit [ insert popular technology product ]
3. I have the following silver bullets…
4. Anything about privacy
Why is IOT security
difficult?
And is there anything we can do about it?
Because…
1. Wireless communication
2. Physical insecurity
3. Constrained devices
4. Potentially sensitive data
5. Lack of standards
6. Heterogeneity: weakest link problem
7. A systems, not software problem
8. Classic web / internet threats
9. Identity management & dynamism
10. Inconvenience and cost
But really…
It’s because we don’t know how to do it.
Yet.
Threats to IOT systems
Adapted from "Security Considerations in the IP-based Internet of
Things“ - Garcia-Morchon et al.
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-garcia-core-security-05
The physical
devices
 Can be stolen
 Can be modified
 Can be replaced
 Can be cloned
The software
 Can be modified (firmware / OS / middleware)
 Can be decompiled to extract credentials
 Can be exhausted (denial of service)
The network
 Eavesdropping
 Man-in-the-middle attacks
 Rerouting traffic
 Theft of bandwidth
Securing the
whole
lifecycle
 Design
 Production
 Bootstrapping
 Monitoring
 Reconfiguration and recovery
 Decommission
Who are the attackers?
And what do they want?
We don’t
know, but…
 Make assumptions to make progress
 Use Attacker Personas for consistency
 Realistic attacker models
 Organised crime?
 Curious end users? Modders?
 Service providers?
The state of the art
Some of it, at least.
The webinos
approach
 TLS and a device PKI
 Attribute-based access control
 Web identity and authentication
 “Personal zone” model
Protocols and
identifiers for
constrained
devices
 CoAP:The ConstrainedApplication Protocol
 DTLS: DatagramTransport Layer Security
 IPsec
 Sizzle – SSL with EllipticCurve Cryptography[1]
 HIPS: Host Identity Protocol
 HIPS-DEX
 ucode
[1]Gupta,V.; Millard, M.; Fung, S.; Zhu,Yu; Gura, N.; Eberle, H.; Shantz, S.C.
"Sizzle: a standards-based end-to-end security architecture for the embedded Internet,"
Third IEEE International Conference on PervasiveComputing andCommunications. pp.247,256, 8-12 March 2005
Thoughts to
leave you with.
 Many new technologies and protocols are being developed
 IOT requires systems security
Share your results!
Any questions?
John Lyle / me@johnlyle.com

More Related Content

What's hot

CSCAMP2015 - Mobile Security in the age of APTs
CSCAMP2015 - Mobile Security in the age of APTsCSCAMP2015 - Mobile Security in the age of APTs
CSCAMP2015 - Mobile Security in the age of APTs
Anwar Mohamed
 
Security and privacy for journalists
Security and privacy for journalistsSecurity and privacy for journalists
Security and privacy for journalists
Jillian York
 
Ian Powers Resume
Ian Powers ResumeIan Powers Resume
Ian Powers Resume
Ian Powers
 

What's hot (20)

BRIDGING THE KNOWLEDGE GAP: From Higher Institution Theory to Real Life Pract...
BRIDGING THE KNOWLEDGE GAP: From Higher Institution Theory to Real Life Pract...BRIDGING THE KNOWLEDGE GAP: From Higher Institution Theory to Real Life Pract...
BRIDGING THE KNOWLEDGE GAP: From Higher Institution Theory to Real Life Pract...
 
Towards an Analysis of Security Issues, Challenges, and Open Problems in the ...
Towards an Analysis of Security Issues, Challenges, and Open Problems in the ...Towards an Analysis of Security Issues, Challenges, and Open Problems in the ...
Towards an Analysis of Security Issues, Challenges, and Open Problems in the ...
 
CSCAMP2015 - Mobile Security in the age of APTs
CSCAMP2015 - Mobile Security in the age of APTsCSCAMP2015 - Mobile Security in the age of APTs
CSCAMP2015 - Mobile Security in the age of APTs
 
Technical Challenges in Cyber Forensics
Technical Challenges in Cyber ForensicsTechnical Challenges in Cyber Forensics
Technical Challenges in Cyber Forensics
 
Introduction Network security
Introduction Network securityIntroduction Network security
Introduction Network security
 
Application Security: What do we need to know?
Application Security: What do we need to know?Application Security: What do we need to know?
Application Security: What do we need to know?
 
Refugees on Rails Berlin - #2 Tech Talk on Security
Refugees on Rails Berlin - #2 Tech Talk on SecurityRefugees on Rails Berlin - #2 Tech Talk on Security
Refugees on Rails Berlin - #2 Tech Talk on Security
 
review on Internet Of Things
review on Internet Of Thingsreview on Internet Of Things
review on Internet Of Things
 
Wi fi quiz
Wi fi quizWi fi quiz
Wi fi quiz
 
Network Security Goals
Network Security GoalsNetwork Security Goals
Network Security Goals
 
Network security
Network security Network security
Network security
 
Security and privacy for journalists
Security and privacy for journalistsSecurity and privacy for journalists
Security and privacy for journalists
 
Ian Powers Resume
Ian Powers ResumeIan Powers Resume
Ian Powers Resume
 
PhD-Guidance-in-Security
PhD-Guidance-in-SecurityPhD-Guidance-in-Security
PhD-Guidance-in-Security
 
Summers@Mizzou 2017 Hacker Tracker Talk
Summers@Mizzou 2017 Hacker Tracker TalkSummers@Mizzou 2017 Hacker Tracker Talk
Summers@Mizzou 2017 Hacker Tracker Talk
 
Network Security Fundamentals
Network Security FundamentalsNetwork Security Fundamentals
Network Security Fundamentals
 
Cybersaftey (1)
Cybersaftey (1)Cybersaftey (1)
Cybersaftey (1)
 
Smart Defense: Strategic Approach to fight contemporary Security, Privacy & A...
Smart Defense: Strategic Approach to fight contemporary Security, Privacy & A...Smart Defense: Strategic Approach to fight contemporary Security, Privacy & A...
Smart Defense: Strategic Approach to fight contemporary Security, Privacy & A...
 
Hacking
HackingHacking
Hacking
 
Network Security
Network SecurityNetwork Security
Network Security
 

Viewers also liked

IOT based smart security and monitoring devices for agriculture
IOT based smart security and monitoring devices for agriculture IOT based smart security and monitoring devices for agriculture
IOT based smart security and monitoring devices for agriculture
sneha daise paulson
 

Viewers also liked (8)

STSAFE-A: certified security for IoT devices and services
STSAFE-A: certified security for IoT devices and servicesSTSAFE-A: certified security for IoT devices and services
STSAFE-A: certified security for IoT devices and services
 
Practical Security Assessments of IoT Devices and Systems
Practical Security Assessments of IoT Devices and Systems Practical Security Assessments of IoT Devices and Systems
Practical Security Assessments of IoT Devices and Systems
 
IoT and physical security of medical devices
IoT and physical security of medical devicesIoT and physical security of medical devices
IoT and physical security of medical devices
 
IOT based smart security and monitoring devices for agriculture
IOT based smart security and monitoring devices for agriculture IOT based smart security and monitoring devices for agriculture
IOT based smart security and monitoring devices for agriculture
 
IoT Devices Expanding Your Digital Footprint
IoT Devices Expanding Your Digital FootprintIoT Devices Expanding Your Digital Footprint
IoT Devices Expanding Your Digital Footprint
 
Overview of IoT and Security issues
Overview of IoT and Security issuesOverview of IoT and Security issues
Overview of IoT and Security issues
 
IoT security (Internet of Things)
IoT security (Internet of Things)IoT security (Internet of Things)
IoT security (Internet of Things)
 
Internet of Things - Privacy and Security issues
Internet of Things - Privacy and Security issuesInternet of Things - Privacy and Security issues
Internet of Things - Privacy and Security issues
 

Similar to IoT Mashup - Security for internet connected devices - Lyle

Addressing security and privacy in io t ecosystem v0.4
Addressing security and privacy in io t ecosystem v0.4Addressing security and privacy in io t ecosystem v0.4
Addressing security and privacy in io t ecosystem v0.4
Somasundaram Jambunathan
 
IT Security for the Physical Security Professional
IT Security for the Physical Security ProfessionalIT Security for the Physical Security Professional
IT Security for the Physical Security Professional
ciso_insights
 
Security challenges for internet of things
Security challenges for internet of thingsSecurity challenges for internet of things
Security challenges for internet of things
Monika Keerthi
 
509286-Aki_Koivu-Review
509286-Aki_Koivu-Review509286-Aki_Koivu-Review
509286-Aki_Koivu-Review
Aki Koivu
 
E-Commerce Privacy and Security System
E-Commerce Privacy and Security SystemE-Commerce Privacy and Security System
E-Commerce Privacy and Security System
IJERA Editor
 
E-Commerce Privacy and Security System
E-Commerce Privacy and Security SystemE-Commerce Privacy and Security System
E-Commerce Privacy and Security System
IJERA Editor
 

Similar to IoT Mashup - Security for internet connected devices - Lyle (20)

Io t security defense in depth charles li v1 20180425c
Io t security defense in depth charles li v1 20180425cIo t security defense in depth charles li v1 20180425c
Io t security defense in depth charles li v1 20180425c
 
Addressing security and privacy in io t ecosystem v0.4
Addressing security and privacy in io t ecosystem v0.4Addressing security and privacy in io t ecosystem v0.4
Addressing security and privacy in io t ecosystem v0.4
 
IT Security for the Physical Security Professional
IT Security for the Physical Security ProfessionalIT Security for the Physical Security Professional
IT Security for the Physical Security Professional
 
Security and Privacy considerations in Internet of Things
Security and Privacy considerations in Internet of ThingsSecurity and Privacy considerations in Internet of Things
Security and Privacy considerations in Internet of Things
 
Asegurarme de la Seguridad?, Un Vistazo al Penetration Testing
Asegurarme de la Seguridad?, Un Vistazo al Penetration TestingAsegurarme de la Seguridad?, Un Vistazo al Penetration Testing
Asegurarme de la Seguridad?, Un Vistazo al Penetration Testing
 
IS THERE A TROJAN! : LITERATURE SURVEY AND CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE LATEST ...
IS THERE A TROJAN! : LITERATURE SURVEY AND CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE LATEST ...IS THERE A TROJAN! : LITERATURE SURVEY AND CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE LATEST ...
IS THERE A TROJAN! : LITERATURE SURVEY AND CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE LATEST ...
 
Security challenges for internet of things
Security challenges for internet of thingsSecurity challenges for internet of things
Security challenges for internet of things
 
Presentation on iot- Internet of Things
Presentation on iot- Internet of ThingsPresentation on iot- Internet of Things
Presentation on iot- Internet of Things
 
IoT Security, Threats and Challenges By V.P.Prabhakaran
IoT Security, Threats and Challenges By V.P.PrabhakaranIoT Security, Threats and Challenges By V.P.Prabhakaran
IoT Security, Threats and Challenges By V.P.Prabhakaran
 
Fundamentals of Network security
Fundamentals of Network securityFundamentals of Network security
Fundamentals of Network security
 
Cyber Security: A Hands on review
Cyber Security: A Hands on reviewCyber Security: A Hands on review
Cyber Security: A Hands on review
 
Iot Security
Iot SecurityIot Security
Iot Security
 
509286-Aki_Koivu-Review
509286-Aki_Koivu-Review509286-Aki_Koivu-Review
509286-Aki_Koivu-Review
 
itmsday2.pptx
itmsday2.pptxitmsday2.pptx
itmsday2.pptx
 
Touring the Dark Side of Internet: A Journey through IOT, TOR & Docker
Touring the Dark Side of Internet: A Journey through IOT, TOR & DockerTouring the Dark Side of Internet: A Journey through IOT, TOR & Docker
Touring the Dark Side of Internet: A Journey through IOT, TOR & Docker
 
xDEFENSE: An Extended DEFENSE for mitigating Next Generation Intrusions
xDEFENSE: An Extended DEFENSE for mitigating Next Generation IntrusionsxDEFENSE: An Extended DEFENSE for mitigating Next Generation Intrusions
xDEFENSE: An Extended DEFENSE for mitigating Next Generation Intrusions
 
E-Commerce Privacy and Security System
E-Commerce Privacy and Security SystemE-Commerce Privacy and Security System
E-Commerce Privacy and Security System
 
E-Commerce Privacy and Security System
E-Commerce Privacy and Security SystemE-Commerce Privacy and Security System
E-Commerce Privacy and Security System
 
The Sharp Increase in Unmasking of Obtrusion into Internet of Things (IoT) IP...
The Sharp Increase in Unmasking of Obtrusion into Internet of Things (IoT) IP...The Sharp Increase in Unmasking of Obtrusion into Internet of Things (IoT) IP...
The Sharp Increase in Unmasking of Obtrusion into Internet of Things (IoT) IP...
 
Iot(security)
Iot(security)Iot(security)
Iot(security)
 

More from webinos project

IoT Mashup - Webinos iot-2013-07-23 Raggett
IoT Mashup - Webinos iot-2013-07-23 RaggettIoT Mashup - Webinos iot-2013-07-23 Raggett
IoT Mashup - Webinos iot-2013-07-23 Raggett
webinos project
 
IoT Mashup - webinos APIs - Nilsson
IoT Mashup - webinos APIs - NilssonIoT Mashup - webinos APIs - Nilsson
IoT Mashup - webinos APIs - Nilsson
webinos project
 
IoT Mashup - webinos iot and m2m - Allott
IoT Mashup - webinos iot and m2m - AllottIoT Mashup - webinos iot and m2m - Allott
IoT Mashup - webinos iot and m2m - Allott
webinos project
 
IoT Mashup - Webinos architecture 101 - Baldwin
IoT Mashup - Webinos architecture 101 - BaldwinIoT Mashup - Webinos architecture 101 - Baldwin
IoT Mashup - Webinos architecture 101 - Baldwin
webinos project
 
iotmaship - Webinos iot and m2m - allott
iotmaship - Webinos iot and m2m - allottiotmaship - Webinos iot and m2m - allott
iotmaship - Webinos iot and m2m - allott
webinos project
 
iotmashup - intro - allott
iotmashup - intro - allottiotmashup - intro - allott
iotmashup - intro - allott
webinos project
 
iotmashup - Webinos architecture 101 - baldwin
iotmashup - Webinos architecture 101 - baldwiniotmashup - Webinos architecture 101 - baldwin
iotmashup - Webinos architecture 101 - baldwin
webinos project
 
webinos project overview
webinos project overviewwebinos project overview
webinos project overview
webinos project
 

More from webinos project (20)

IoT Mashup - Welcome
IoT Mashup - WelcomeIoT Mashup - Welcome
IoT Mashup - Welcome
 
IoT Mashup - Webinos iot-2013-07-23 Raggett
IoT Mashup - Webinos iot-2013-07-23 RaggettIoT Mashup - Webinos iot-2013-07-23 Raggett
IoT Mashup - Webinos iot-2013-07-23 Raggett
 
IoT Mashup - webinos APIs - Nilsson
IoT Mashup - webinos APIs - NilssonIoT Mashup - webinos APIs - Nilsson
IoT Mashup - webinos APIs - Nilsson
 
IoT Mashup - webinos iot and m2m - Allott
IoT Mashup - webinos iot and m2m - AllottIoT Mashup - webinos iot and m2m - Allott
IoT Mashup - webinos iot and m2m - Allott
 
Iot mashup intro
Iot mashup introIot mashup intro
Iot mashup intro
 
IoT Mashup - Webinos architecture 101 - Baldwin
IoT Mashup - Webinos architecture 101 - BaldwinIoT Mashup - Webinos architecture 101 - Baldwin
IoT Mashup - Webinos architecture 101 - Baldwin
 
iotmaship - Webinos iot and m2m - allott
iotmaship - Webinos iot and m2m - allottiotmaship - Webinos iot and m2m - allott
iotmaship - Webinos iot and m2m - allott
 
iotmashup - intro - allott
iotmashup - intro - allottiotmashup - intro - allott
iotmashup - intro - allott
 
iotmashup - Webinos architecture 101 - baldwin
iotmashup - Webinos architecture 101 - baldwiniotmashup - Webinos architecture 101 - baldwin
iotmashup - Webinos architecture 101 - baldwin
 
webinos - Architecture and Strategy
webinos  - Architecture  and Strategywebinos  - Architecture  and Strategy
webinos - Architecture and Strategy
 
webinos and Open Ecosystems Open Governance
webinos and Open Ecosystems Open Governancewebinos and Open Ecosystems Open Governance
webinos and Open Ecosystems Open Governance
 
webinos Use Cases - Open Day
webinos Use Cases - Open Daywebinos Use Cases - Open Day
webinos Use Cases - Open Day
 
webinos APIs
webinos APIswebinos APIs
webinos APIs
 
webinos Security privacy
webinos Security privacywebinos Security privacy
webinos Security privacy
 
webinos Architecture Overview
webinos Architecture Overviewwebinos Architecture Overview
webinos Architecture Overview
 
webinos Open Day Introduction
webinos Open Day Introductionwebinos Open Day Introduction
webinos Open Day Introduction
 
Webinos Personal Zones
Webinos Personal ZonesWebinos Personal Zones
Webinos Personal Zones
 
Issues in the Web Application Landscape and webinos Architecture
Issues in the Web Application Landscape and webinos Architecture Issues in the Web Application Landscape and webinos Architecture
Issues in the Web Application Landscape and webinos Architecture
 
webinos project overview
webinos project overviewwebinos project overview
webinos project overview
 
webinos whitepaper
webinos whitepaperwebinos whitepaper
webinos whitepaper
 

Recently uploaded

Essentials of Automations: Optimizing FME Workflows with Parameters
Essentials of Automations: Optimizing FME Workflows with ParametersEssentials of Automations: Optimizing FME Workflows with Parameters
Essentials of Automations: Optimizing FME Workflows with Parameters
Safe Software
 

Recently uploaded (20)

Essentials of Automations: Optimizing FME Workflows with Parameters
Essentials of Automations: Optimizing FME Workflows with ParametersEssentials of Automations: Optimizing FME Workflows with Parameters
Essentials of Automations: Optimizing FME Workflows with Parameters
 
How world-class product teams are winning in the AI era by CEO and Founder, P...
How world-class product teams are winning in the AI era by CEO and Founder, P...How world-class product teams are winning in the AI era by CEO and Founder, P...
How world-class product teams are winning in the AI era by CEO and Founder, P...
 
Salesforce Adoption – Metrics, Methods, and Motivation, Antone Kom
Salesforce Adoption – Metrics, Methods, and Motivation, Antone KomSalesforce Adoption – Metrics, Methods, and Motivation, Antone Kom
Salesforce Adoption – Metrics, Methods, and Motivation, Antone Kom
 
Unpacking Value Delivery - Agile Oxford Meetup - May 2024.pptx
Unpacking Value Delivery - Agile Oxford Meetup - May 2024.pptxUnpacking Value Delivery - Agile Oxford Meetup - May 2024.pptx
Unpacking Value Delivery - Agile Oxford Meetup - May 2024.pptx
 
To Graph or Not to Graph Knowledge Graph Architectures and LLMs
To Graph or Not to Graph Knowledge Graph Architectures and LLMsTo Graph or Not to Graph Knowledge Graph Architectures and LLMs
To Graph or Not to Graph Knowledge Graph Architectures and LLMs
 
Optimizing NoSQL Performance Through Observability
Optimizing NoSQL Performance Through ObservabilityOptimizing NoSQL Performance Through Observability
Optimizing NoSQL Performance Through Observability
 
Measures in SQL (a talk at SF Distributed Systems meetup, 2024-05-22)
Measures in SQL (a talk at SF Distributed Systems meetup, 2024-05-22)Measures in SQL (a talk at SF Distributed Systems meetup, 2024-05-22)
Measures in SQL (a talk at SF Distributed Systems meetup, 2024-05-22)
 
Exploring UiPath Orchestrator API: updates and limits in 2024 🚀
Exploring UiPath Orchestrator API: updates and limits in 2024 🚀Exploring UiPath Orchestrator API: updates and limits in 2024 🚀
Exploring UiPath Orchestrator API: updates and limits in 2024 🚀
 
Demystifying gRPC in .Net by John Staveley
Demystifying gRPC in .Net by John StaveleyDemystifying gRPC in .Net by John Staveley
Demystifying gRPC in .Net by John Staveley
 
PLAI - Acceleration Program for Generative A.I. Startups
PLAI - Acceleration Program for Generative A.I. StartupsPLAI - Acceleration Program for Generative A.I. Startups
PLAI - Acceleration Program for Generative A.I. Startups
 
Designing Great Products: The Power of Design and Leadership by Chief Designe...
Designing Great Products: The Power of Design and Leadership by Chief Designe...Designing Great Products: The Power of Design and Leadership by Chief Designe...
Designing Great Products: The Power of Design and Leadership by Chief Designe...
 
"Impact of front-end architecture on development cost", Viktor Turskyi
"Impact of front-end architecture on development cost", Viktor Turskyi"Impact of front-end architecture on development cost", Viktor Turskyi
"Impact of front-end architecture on development cost", Viktor Turskyi
 
Behind the Scenes From the Manager's Chair: Decoding the Secrets of Successfu...
Behind the Scenes From the Manager's Chair: Decoding the Secrets of Successfu...Behind the Scenes From the Manager's Chair: Decoding the Secrets of Successfu...
Behind the Scenes From the Manager's Chair: Decoding the Secrets of Successfu...
 
Speed Wins: From Kafka to APIs in Minutes
Speed Wins: From Kafka to APIs in MinutesSpeed Wins: From Kafka to APIs in Minutes
Speed Wins: From Kafka to APIs in Minutes
 
What's New in Teams Calling, Meetings and Devices April 2024
What's New in Teams Calling, Meetings and Devices April 2024What's New in Teams Calling, Meetings and Devices April 2024
What's New in Teams Calling, Meetings and Devices April 2024
 
From Daily Decisions to Bottom Line: Connecting Product Work to Revenue by VP...
From Daily Decisions to Bottom Line: Connecting Product Work to Revenue by VP...From Daily Decisions to Bottom Line: Connecting Product Work to Revenue by VP...
From Daily Decisions to Bottom Line: Connecting Product Work to Revenue by VP...
 
Slack (or Teams) Automation for Bonterra Impact Management (fka Social Soluti...
Slack (or Teams) Automation for Bonterra Impact Management (fka Social Soluti...Slack (or Teams) Automation for Bonterra Impact Management (fka Social Soluti...
Slack (or Teams) Automation for Bonterra Impact Management (fka Social Soluti...
 
Agentic RAG What it is its types applications and implementation.pdf
Agentic RAG What it is its types applications and implementation.pdfAgentic RAG What it is its types applications and implementation.pdf
Agentic RAG What it is its types applications and implementation.pdf
 
Bits & Pixels using AI for Good.........
Bits & Pixels using AI for Good.........Bits & Pixels using AI for Good.........
Bits & Pixels using AI for Good.........
 
Powerful Start- the Key to Project Success, Barbara Laskowska
Powerful Start- the Key to Project Success, Barbara LaskowskaPowerful Start- the Key to Project Success, Barbara Laskowska
Powerful Start- the Key to Project Success, Barbara Laskowska
 

IoT Mashup - Security for internet connected devices - Lyle

  • 1. Security for Internet- connected devices John Lyle, University of Oxford
  • 2. Welcome!  John Lyle  ResearchAssistant at the University of Oxford  Member of the webinos project  Email: me@johnlyle.com  Twitter: @jplyle
  • 3. What I’m going to say 1. Internet ofThings security is hard! 2. There are some good reasons for this. 3. There are new (ish) threats. 4. There are some new technologies to play with.
  • 5. What I’m not going to say 1. Security is really important. 2. This is how to exploit [ insert popular technology product ] 3. I have the following silver bullets… 4. Anything about privacy
  • 6. Why is IOT security difficult? And is there anything we can do about it?
  • 7. Because… 1. Wireless communication 2. Physical insecurity 3. Constrained devices 4. Potentially sensitive data 5. Lack of standards 6. Heterogeneity: weakest link problem 7. A systems, not software problem 8. Classic web / internet threats 9. Identity management & dynamism 10. Inconvenience and cost
  • 8. But really… It’s because we don’t know how to do it. Yet.
  • 9. Threats to IOT systems Adapted from "Security Considerations in the IP-based Internet of Things“ - Garcia-Morchon et al. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-garcia-core-security-05
  • 10. The physical devices  Can be stolen  Can be modified  Can be replaced  Can be cloned
  • 11. The software  Can be modified (firmware / OS / middleware)  Can be decompiled to extract credentials  Can be exhausted (denial of service)
  • 12. The network  Eavesdropping  Man-in-the-middle attacks  Rerouting traffic  Theft of bandwidth
  • 13. Securing the whole lifecycle  Design  Production  Bootstrapping  Monitoring  Reconfiguration and recovery  Decommission
  • 14. Who are the attackers? And what do they want?
  • 15. We don’t know, but…  Make assumptions to make progress  Use Attacker Personas for consistency  Realistic attacker models  Organised crime?  Curious end users? Modders?  Service providers?
  • 16. The state of the art Some of it, at least.
  • 17. The webinos approach  TLS and a device PKI  Attribute-based access control  Web identity and authentication  “Personal zone” model
  • 18. Protocols and identifiers for constrained devices  CoAP:The ConstrainedApplication Protocol  DTLS: DatagramTransport Layer Security  IPsec  Sizzle – SSL with EllipticCurve Cryptography[1]  HIPS: Host Identity Protocol  HIPS-DEX  ucode [1]Gupta,V.; Millard, M.; Fung, S.; Zhu,Yu; Gura, N.; Eberle, H.; Shantz, S.C. "Sizzle: a standards-based end-to-end security architecture for the embedded Internet," Third IEEE International Conference on PervasiveComputing andCommunications. pp.247,256, 8-12 March 2005
  • 19. Thoughts to leave you with.  Many new technologies and protocols are being developed  IOT requires systems security Share your results!
  • 20. Any questions? John Lyle / me@johnlyle.com

Editor's Notes

  1. Good morning everyone.Thanks for being here.I wanted to talk about security of internet-disconnected devices, but apparently that wouldn’t be interesting.
  2. My nameMy affiliation – webinos and OxfordI’ve been part of the team working on the security and privacy architecture in webinosBefore that, I completed a doctorate in trusted computing and web servicesI’m leaving, so here’s a slightly more useful set of contact detailsDo email me, talk to me on Twitter
  3. I’m going to start by telling you what you probably already know. But lets be honest about it: IoT security is a really hard problem. Give yourselves a pat on the back if you’re working on this stuff, I reckon there are some fundamentally difficult issues surrounding it.Indeed, I’m going to start by talking about challengesThen I’m going to talk about specific IoT threats and attacks. Then I’m going to drop into a few technologies. Probably a frustrating number, that definitely wont cover the things you are interested in.
  4. To highlight the fun that can be had in this subject, I want to show you what happens when the Internet of Things happens by mistake.This is *old* now – but essentially this website searches for IP cameras in places like car parks, offices, and so on.
  5. With a presentation about security, it’s very easy to fall into some classic traps.So here’s what I’m not going to say. If you catch me saying any of these points, please throw something at me…
  6. 1) Wireless communication – lots of wifi devices in IOT, all broadcasting all communication.2) Physical insecurity – In many scenarios, the devices are placed in areas where the owner isn’t in physical control or possession. E.g., sensors places in public locations, or in buildings with lots of people nearby.3) Constrained devices – the “internet connected devices” may be too constrained to enforce security controls or do heavy-weight cryptography. Constrained in terms of power, bandwidth, memory…4) Healthcare, cameras, etc.5) No clear standards, so no defence in using a “best practice” solution. Everything is adhoc. Can’t stand on the shoulder of any giants.6) The fact that you have lots of different devices, means that you have a ‘weakest link’ problem. The weakest device may be an attack surface to compromise the rest of the system7) IOT involves people, hardware, software, systems, businesses, and more. It isn’t a software problem, and doesn’t have just software solutions.8) Chances are, your IOT system is also a Web system. At least for control. You’ve therefore got all the classic web threats to deal with – XSS, CSRF, content injection, etc. You’ve also got attackers from across the world.9) Security would be easier if we could identify all security principles, all the things, ahead of time. But in IOT we can’t.10) Adding security functionality costs more, and is inconvenient. Buying sensors and constrained devices with encryption coprocessors is expensive and hard. The most secure way is not the default.
  7. We’re going to find out a lot of ways *not* to do it.We’re going to need to share experiences, experiment, and feed back information. If security isn’t going to be your big selling point, then you need to make it a collective task. That’s a good argument for openness.We could argue that this is like the 90s, or the dot-com bubble. Lots of great technology, huge potential, but also all the same naivety and lack of security thinkingWe needs to apply our current security and privacy attitudes to IOT, not the ones we had 10-20 years ago.
  8. Having talked about why it’s hard, lets think about the threats we’ll have to deal withThese are threats specifically around IOT, largely take from the IETF core working group, and a document written by Garcia-Morchon et al.
  9. Anyone could steal or modify a thingAnyone could replace a particular thing with an alternative modelA manufacturer could “clone the physical characteristics, firmware/software, or security configuration of the thing”.
  10. An attacker with physical or remote access could plausibly update or modify firmware - there’s a proof-of-concept exploit for routers through web browsers for thisThe software you deploy to the device could be decompiled to obtain any keys or credentials it holds.The software is likely to be vulnerable to Denial of Service attacks. These might be used to make it malfunction.
  11. Rerouting traffic – exploit the network protocol to make the connection via your node look more favourable, thus gathering traffic from all sources. A useful attack if you only control a small part of the network.
  12. There are security challenges at all of the following stages…
  13. Don’t let uncertainty behind attackers stop you from making progressIn webinos, we came up with a set of personas – descriptions of archetypal people – describing potential attackers (script kiddies, etc)Realism: the ‘global passive adversary’ model is not appropriate. How much of your network might any one attacker gain access to?Don’t push people towards modders – the mobile industry and car industry has taught us that removing simlocks helps fund more serious fraud.
  14. Web-friendly notions of sharingInternet-based access point for each personal zone User-as-owner modelPolicy-driven access controlLimitations - Not really suited to constrained devices! We think it actually might work well, but this wasn’t the original design - One device has one owner. Only.
  15. CoAP – a protocol designed to be easy to integrate with the web, but suitable for constrained devicesDTLS – TLS but for UDP not just TCPIpsecSizzle – work in 2005 to have constrained devices use SSL. Works with ECC and Identity Based EncryptionHIPS – new global namespace, layer of abstraction between the transport and IP layer. Identify endpoints by their host identifiers (HIs), a public key. HIP Diet EXchange (DEX) - fewer cryptographic primitivesUcode - 128-bit fixed length identifier used to identify objects
  16. Capabilities?
  17. It should be obvious that IOT is current a voyage into the unknownThere’s way too much uncertainty and new technology floating aroundGeneric solutions wont help that much – it’s a systems problemThe only way progress will be made is through sharing results, making data and reports open, and collaboration. Please take this opportunity.