This document provides an analysis of the concepts of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and Protection of Civilians (PoC), examining their origins, evolution, differences, and commonalities. It argues that while R2P and PoC share a concern for protecting civilians from violence, they have distinct scopes and applications. R2P focuses on preventing mass atrocities regardless of conflict, while PoC specifically addresses the protection of civilians during armed conflict. The document uses the international response to the crisis in Libya, including UN Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973, as a case study for how R2P and PoC can reinforce each other in critical situations where civilians face deadly threats.
The document discusses the tension between state sovereignty and international governance in matters of international security. It provides an overview of different approaches to humanitarian intervention, democracy and good governance promotion, and international criminal tribunals that have challenged the traditional concept of absolute state sovereignty. While globalization has increased calls for intervention, implementation remains inconsistent and challenges include lack of political will, selective application depending on strategic interests, and tension between universal values and local contexts.
Human vs National Security in the International arenaGabriel Orozco
This document discusses security studies and different perspectives on international order. It analyzes three trends in security studies since the Cold War: 1) Those who argue the international system has not fundamentally changed; 2) The Copenhagen School's securitization theory which examines how issues become security issues; 3) Rational choice theory which views security as affecting states' use of force based on calculations. The document concludes that security studies provides a framework for interpreting phenomena and there are challenges in balancing human and national security perspectives.
The Responsibility to Protect Doctrine Expectations and Realityijtsrd
Protection of citizens from violence and aggression is one of the basic responsibilities of a sovereign country. But sometimes states fail to comply with this responsibility. The Responsibility to Protect R2P is a commitment which was adopted by the members of United Nations UN in 2005. This doctrine aims at addressing four types of crimes genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity. The R2P was adopted with a lot of expectations but the performance of the R2P has faced criticisms over the years. Mahfujur Rahman | Md. Saifullah Akon "The Responsibility to Protect Doctrine: Expectations and Reality" Published in International Journal of Trend in Scientific Research and Development (ijtsrd), ISSN: 2456-6470, Volume-4 | Issue-3 , April 2020, URL: https://www.ijtsrd.com/papers/ijtsrd30314.pdf Paper Url :https://www.ijtsrd.com/humanities-and-the-arts/political-science/30314/the-responsibility-to-protect-doctrine-expectations-and-reality/mahfujur-rahman
Historically, international humanitarian law (IHL) through the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols of 1977 has required the protection of civilian populations in armed conflict. The Geneva Conventions provide guidance with regard to the obligations of states and parties to a conflict to apply the principle of distinction and to ensure precaution in attack as they pursue their military objectives. This was the first international legal framework to provide for the protection of civilians and forms the foundation of the ‘Protection of Civilians’ concept.
Throughout the 1990s, devastating failures to protect civilians from violence and atrocities shaped thinking at the United Nations (UN) and gave rise to a more expansive concept of Protection of Civilians, incorporating international human rights law, international refugee law, and including best practices in peacekeeping operations and humanitarian response. This is reflected in the adoption of Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict as a thematic concern of the UN Security Council, and the development of policy and guidance relating to civilian protection since 1999, at the United Nations and elsewhere. The term ‘Protection of Civilians’ has expanded from a set of legal obligations in IHL to a conceptual and operational framework used by multiple ‘protection actors’ and practitioners—military and civilian, political and humanitarian.
The concept of Protection of Civilians has developed in response to conflicts and crises as they emerged and as a result has developed unevenly. Combined with the fact that there is no operational definition of Protection of Civilians, there is a perception among protection practitioners that different actors involved in providing protection to people caught up in crisis understand and implement the concept differently. This perception raised questions among the researchers as to whether different understandings actually exist, and if so what the implications for the implementation of civilian protection might be. This gave rise to a research project titled In Search of Common Ground – Understanding Civilian Protection Language and Practice for Civil and Military Practitioners.
The applicability of the Doctrine of Responsibility (R2P) in Syria in perspec...Sabita Amin
This document provides a summary of the legal framework surrounding the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, humanitarian intervention, and terrorism. It defines R2P and discusses its sources in international law, distinguishing it from humanitarian intervention. It also examines sovereignty and terrorism in international law. The chapter aims to clarify these concepts to analyze their application to the conflict in Syria.
International responses to conflict and complex humanitarian emergencies are diverse and multifaceted. Different actors – among them non-government organisations (NGOs), the United Nations (UN) protection mandated organisations, UN peacekeeping forces, both military and police – all have a role to play to mitigate the impact of armed conflict on civilian populations.
Over the last 13 years a significant amount of work has been done to improve the international community’s response in relation to the protection of civilians (POC). This has been led by different actors – the UN Security Council, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the humanitarian community made up of UN humanitarian agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and NGOs – all working in the same complex humanitarian contexts.
Despite the development of POC, there is a perceived ‘disconnect’ between the understanding of different forms of protection, the different disciplines practising or working on the POC, and the different guidance and legal regimes imposing obligations on both state and non-state actors in the area of protection.
This paper is the first contribution to a broader research project that aims to determine whether the perceived disconnect between actors involved in protection work is real or anecdotal. By exploring the evolution of protection language and policy through the UN Security Council, DPKO and the humanitarian community, it is possible to develop an improved understanding of some of the reasons for distinct protection policies and definitions that exist between different actors. Some initial variations in the interpretation of POC are quick to emerge, giving rise to additional questions about how the distinctions can be better understood.
Free to Fly représente plus de 2000 professionnels canadiens du transport aérienGuy Boulianne
This group of aviation professionals believes strongly in personal freedom and autonomy, including the right to travel freely without restrictions like vaccination status. They argue that top-down restrictions tend to be destructive and unstable because they require forfeiting individual liberties. Additionally, they believe individuals should make their own medical decisions based on personal circumstances, and that restricting travel in the name of COVID-19 can no longer be legally or morally justified.
This document presents a strategic framework for mass atrocity prevention. It begins by noting that while conflict prevention has received significant attention, comparatively less focus has been placed on preventing the specific crimes related to the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. The framework is designed to develop a more specific strategic approach for preventing mass atrocity crimes. It involves clarifying what crimes are being prevented, identifying stages of regression towards atrocities, systematizing policy tools that could mitigate risk factors or change escalatory dynamics, and assessing what is needed for tools to be effective. The framework draws on deductive and inductive reasoning, moving between conceptual assumptions and empirical observations
The document discusses the tension between state sovereignty and international governance in matters of international security. It provides an overview of different approaches to humanitarian intervention, democracy and good governance promotion, and international criminal tribunals that have challenged the traditional concept of absolute state sovereignty. While globalization has increased calls for intervention, implementation remains inconsistent and challenges include lack of political will, selective application depending on strategic interests, and tension between universal values and local contexts.
Human vs National Security in the International arenaGabriel Orozco
This document discusses security studies and different perspectives on international order. It analyzes three trends in security studies since the Cold War: 1) Those who argue the international system has not fundamentally changed; 2) The Copenhagen School's securitization theory which examines how issues become security issues; 3) Rational choice theory which views security as affecting states' use of force based on calculations. The document concludes that security studies provides a framework for interpreting phenomena and there are challenges in balancing human and national security perspectives.
The Responsibility to Protect Doctrine Expectations and Realityijtsrd
Protection of citizens from violence and aggression is one of the basic responsibilities of a sovereign country. But sometimes states fail to comply with this responsibility. The Responsibility to Protect R2P is a commitment which was adopted by the members of United Nations UN in 2005. This doctrine aims at addressing four types of crimes genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity. The R2P was adopted with a lot of expectations but the performance of the R2P has faced criticisms over the years. Mahfujur Rahman | Md. Saifullah Akon "The Responsibility to Protect Doctrine: Expectations and Reality" Published in International Journal of Trend in Scientific Research and Development (ijtsrd), ISSN: 2456-6470, Volume-4 | Issue-3 , April 2020, URL: https://www.ijtsrd.com/papers/ijtsrd30314.pdf Paper Url :https://www.ijtsrd.com/humanities-and-the-arts/political-science/30314/the-responsibility-to-protect-doctrine-expectations-and-reality/mahfujur-rahman
Historically, international humanitarian law (IHL) through the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols of 1977 has required the protection of civilian populations in armed conflict. The Geneva Conventions provide guidance with regard to the obligations of states and parties to a conflict to apply the principle of distinction and to ensure precaution in attack as they pursue their military objectives. This was the first international legal framework to provide for the protection of civilians and forms the foundation of the ‘Protection of Civilians’ concept.
Throughout the 1990s, devastating failures to protect civilians from violence and atrocities shaped thinking at the United Nations (UN) and gave rise to a more expansive concept of Protection of Civilians, incorporating international human rights law, international refugee law, and including best practices in peacekeeping operations and humanitarian response. This is reflected in the adoption of Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict as a thematic concern of the UN Security Council, and the development of policy and guidance relating to civilian protection since 1999, at the United Nations and elsewhere. The term ‘Protection of Civilians’ has expanded from a set of legal obligations in IHL to a conceptual and operational framework used by multiple ‘protection actors’ and practitioners—military and civilian, political and humanitarian.
The concept of Protection of Civilians has developed in response to conflicts and crises as they emerged and as a result has developed unevenly. Combined with the fact that there is no operational definition of Protection of Civilians, there is a perception among protection practitioners that different actors involved in providing protection to people caught up in crisis understand and implement the concept differently. This perception raised questions among the researchers as to whether different understandings actually exist, and if so what the implications for the implementation of civilian protection might be. This gave rise to a research project titled In Search of Common Ground – Understanding Civilian Protection Language and Practice for Civil and Military Practitioners.
The applicability of the Doctrine of Responsibility (R2P) in Syria in perspec...Sabita Amin
This document provides a summary of the legal framework surrounding the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, humanitarian intervention, and terrorism. It defines R2P and discusses its sources in international law, distinguishing it from humanitarian intervention. It also examines sovereignty and terrorism in international law. The chapter aims to clarify these concepts to analyze their application to the conflict in Syria.
International responses to conflict and complex humanitarian emergencies are diverse and multifaceted. Different actors – among them non-government organisations (NGOs), the United Nations (UN) protection mandated organisations, UN peacekeeping forces, both military and police – all have a role to play to mitigate the impact of armed conflict on civilian populations.
Over the last 13 years a significant amount of work has been done to improve the international community’s response in relation to the protection of civilians (POC). This has been led by different actors – the UN Security Council, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the humanitarian community made up of UN humanitarian agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and NGOs – all working in the same complex humanitarian contexts.
Despite the development of POC, there is a perceived ‘disconnect’ between the understanding of different forms of protection, the different disciplines practising or working on the POC, and the different guidance and legal regimes imposing obligations on both state and non-state actors in the area of protection.
This paper is the first contribution to a broader research project that aims to determine whether the perceived disconnect between actors involved in protection work is real or anecdotal. By exploring the evolution of protection language and policy through the UN Security Council, DPKO and the humanitarian community, it is possible to develop an improved understanding of some of the reasons for distinct protection policies and definitions that exist between different actors. Some initial variations in the interpretation of POC are quick to emerge, giving rise to additional questions about how the distinctions can be better understood.
Free to Fly représente plus de 2000 professionnels canadiens du transport aérienGuy Boulianne
This group of aviation professionals believes strongly in personal freedom and autonomy, including the right to travel freely without restrictions like vaccination status. They argue that top-down restrictions tend to be destructive and unstable because they require forfeiting individual liberties. Additionally, they believe individuals should make their own medical decisions based on personal circumstances, and that restricting travel in the name of COVID-19 can no longer be legally or morally justified.
This document presents a strategic framework for mass atrocity prevention. It begins by noting that while conflict prevention has received significant attention, comparatively less focus has been placed on preventing the specific crimes related to the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. The framework is designed to develop a more specific strategic approach for preventing mass atrocity crimes. It involves clarifying what crimes are being prevented, identifying stages of regression towards atrocities, systematizing policy tools that could mitigate risk factors or change escalatory dynamics, and assessing what is needed for tools to be effective. The framework draws on deductive and inductive reasoning, moving between conceptual assumptions and empirical observations
The author examines the nexus between international law and the concept
of human security that emerged in the 1990s. The article proceeds in three parts. Part
one outlines the concept of human security, its genesis and contents. Part two examines the nexus between human security and international law and briefly considers the
most representative aspects of international law, including international jurisprudence,
that, in the author’s opinion, reflect human security imperatives. Finally, conclusions
provide answers to the questions posed and indicate the increased value of the human
security concept. The questions read as follows: How can human security strengthen
international actions (actions based on international law)? Where in international law
is human security reflected? In other words, what aspects of international law reflect
a human security-centered approach? What is the role of international law in human
security? Taking all this into account, what is the added value of adopting the concept
of human security? This article is inevitably interdisciplinary, as it combines the perspectives of international law and international relations.
This document provides an introductory overview of conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence for non-specialists. It examines dominant patterns of such violence, including widespread violence against women and girls as well as male victims. It explores a range of causes beyond strategic warfare, like gender inequality. It also identifies gaps in preventing and responding to violence, such as lack of support services and data. The overview aims to improve understanding and support for preventing and addressing this complex issue.
strategic studies and international relationsTallat Satti
This document discusses the history and development of security studies as a sub-discipline of international relations. It covers the key assumptions and paradigms of security studies, including the realist, rationalist, and revolutionary traditions. The document then outlines the periodization of security studies, covering developments from the inter-war period through post-Cold War debates around conceptualizing security. Key topics discussed include the rise of nuclear weapons and deterrence theory, declines in security studies during détente, and expanding notions of security to include human and environmental dimensions.
Collective security aims to deter aggression by having all nations commit to jointly opposing any act of aggression. It emerged as an idea after WWI and was a core principle of the League of Nations and UN. However, collective security has proven difficult to implement in practice due to nations prioritizing their own interests over collective action, and the failure to adequately develop collective security mechanisms within international organizations. While the concept of collective opposition to aggression remains valid, the assumptions required for its effective functioning have generally not been met.
Slideshows about nonviolence and nonviolent resolution of conflicts, economic alternatives, ecology, social change, spirituality : www.irnc.org , Slideshows in english
Research in Europe and the USA
Non-collobaration principle applied to defence
What risks, what adversaries today ?
Making society uncontrolable
Making our will inflexible
Following whitout being exploited
Stategy of nonviolent action
I. strategic stadies and international relationsrizkiar
Venezuela's security policy focuses on defending against perceived U.S. intervention and threats to the regime. The U.S. security policy emphasizes military strength and alliances to protect national interests and global stability. Russia's security policy aims to assert itself as a world power and counter Western influence near its borders. China's security policy works to build military capabilities to deter threats and assert sovereignty claims while maintaining economic and political rise.
The document discusses the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, which holds that sovereign states have a primary responsibility to protect civilians from mass atrocities, but this responsibility shifts to the international community if the state is unable or unwilling to protect its population. It provides examples of conflicts in Burma, Darfur, and Palestine where R2P applies but has not been fully implemented. It calls on individuals and churches to raise awareness of R2P and put political pressure on governments to uphold their responsibility to protect civilians in armed conflicts.
Abstract
Immediately after the Cold war, there was a general optimism of an international system that would
enable the component nation-states to pursue economic growth and greater independence. Despite
the various strategies by the component nation states in the international system to attain self-
sufficiency in economic terms and thus reduce dependence on other nation states for their needs
and survival thereby weakening bilateral relations, the contemporary realities of the international
system in the face of global security challenges pose a compelling sustained cooperation and
collaboration among the nation states in the international system. Global security includes military
and diplomatic measures that nations and international organizations such as the United Nations
(UN) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) take to ensure mutual safety and security.
It also includes the regional and sub-regional collaborative strategies at combating security
challenges. Diplomacy and global security are among the most pressing issues facing the world
today. Success or failure can have huge implications for the international community and society
as a whole. This paper submits that global security will remain a compelling factor in diplomatic
relations in the twenty-first century.
Isis phenomena and collective security ziad jaserZiad Jaser
The document analyzes collective security and the threat posed by ISIS. It discusses how collective security is based on the principle that an attack on one is an attack on all. It examines theories like liberalism, constructivism and realism regarding collective security. It also looks at collective security systems like the UN and NATO. The document summarizes the US role in collective security and its policies in the Middle East. It discusses the UN's role in collective security and combating terrorism. Experts recommend addressing root causes of problems in the Middle East rather than just military responses.
Abstract:
The Responsibility to Protect (R2P or RtoP) is a global political commitment which was endorsed by all member states of the United Nations at the 2005 World Summit to prevent genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity The principle of the Responsibility to Protect is based upon the underlying premise that sovereignty entails a responsibility to protect all populations from mass atrocity crimes and human rights violations. The principle is based on a respect for the norms and principles of international law, especially the underlying principles of law relating to sovereignty, peace and security, human rights, and armed conflict. The Responsibility to Protect provides a framework for employing measures that already exist (i.e., mediation, early warning mechanisms, economic sanctions, and chapter VII powers) to prevent atrocity crimes and to protect civilians from their occurrence. The authority to employ the use of force under the framework of the Responsibility to Protect rests solely with United Nations Security Council and is considered a measure of last resort. The United Nations Secretary-General has published annual reports on the Responsibility to Protect since 2009 that expand on the measures available to governments, intergovernmental organizations, and civil society, as well as the private sector, to prevent atrocity crimes. The Responsibility to Protect has been the subject of considerable debate, particularly regarding the implementation of the principle by various actors in the context of country-specific situations, such as Libya, Syria, Sudan and Kenya, for example. It has also been argued that commensurate with the responsibility to protect, international law should also recognize a right for populations to offer militarily organized resistance to protect themselves against genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes on a massive scale.
http://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/about-responsibility-to-protect.html
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsibility_to_protect
Responsibility to protect
http://www.globalr2p.org/about_r2p
About R2P
http://www.globalr2p.org/media/files/r2p-backgrounder.pdf
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brookings-now/2013/07/24/what-is-the-responsibility-to-protect/
WHAT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/responsibility-to-protect-a-short-history/
Research Interests: Responsibility to Protect and The principle of the Responsibility to Protect
1. The document defines nonviolent civil defence (NVCD) as a way to defend against attempts to destabilize or control society through organized nonviolent collective actions.
2. NVCD aims to make society uncontrollable politically, ideologically resistant to submission, and economically unexploitable in order to dissuade aggressors.
3. NVCD acts on political institutions, local powers, and social forces to strengthen resistance and prevent an adversary from achieving their goals through nonviolent means like noncooperation and civil disobedience.
This document provides an overview of international relations theory, including concepts of security in the international arena. It discusses traditional security approaches focused on the state and military concerns, as well as more modern human security approaches. It also outlines several theoretical perspectives in international relations like realism, liberalism, constructivism, and compares realism and liberalism. Key concepts covered include the multi-sum security principle, women in international security, and the UNDP human security proposal.
The document discusses various topics related to humanitarian intervention and sovereignty including:
1. The responsibility to protect principle holds that states have a primary responsibility to protect civilians, and the international community has a secondary responsibility to assist or intervene if the state is unwilling or unable to protect its population from mass atrocities.
2. There is debate around when and how humanitarian intervention should take place, with questions around the role of the UN Security Council and criteria for determining just cause.
3. While humanitarian intervention has become more accepted, it remains a highly political issue and requires balancing concerns of sovereignty and preventing mass atrocities or genocide. Global consensus and prevention should be the ultimate goals.
This lecture provides with an overview over the position of radicalization within International Relations. How can we approach the issue of radicalization from the perspectives of the international system?
This document summarizes a consultation held in Abuja, Nigeria to discuss the report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) titled "The Responsibility to Protect". The consultation was organized by the Centre for Democracy & Development and brought together civil society organizations from West Africa. Key discussions focused on examining the conceptual basis of the responsibility to protect, its relevance in the regional context of West Africa, and how its principles could be operationalized in the region. Regional perspectives on applying the report's flexible view of sovereignty were presented.
This document provides an overview of the development of counterterrorism at the United Nations from its founding to post-9/11. It discusses how terrorism was initially not addressed in the UN Charter and was seen as a domestic issue rather than an international threat. The General Assembly first addressed terrorism in 1972 but its resolutions were non-binding. The Security Council's first resolution on terrorism was in 1989 in response to the Lockerbie bombing. Post-9/11, resolutions like 1368 and 1373 established binding counterterrorism mandates and committees in response to the 9/11 attacks. The document analyzes key Security Council counterterrorism resolutions from 1989 to post-9/11 to understand how the UN's approach to and
The document discusses the evolution of the concept of security from a traditional state-centric view to a broader human security perspective. It outlines how human security emerged after World War II to consider all aspects of individual and community life, in contrast to the prior focus only on state sovereignty and military threats. The document then compares the traditional and human security paradigms, examining differences in their referents, threats, and means of ensuring security.
This document discusses the concept of human security. It provides background on how human security became part of international discourse in 1994. It then outlines three conceptions of human security and debates around defining and applying the concept. Key risks to human security are also examined, such as state failure, organized violence, relative poverty, and threats from pandemics, environmental degradation, and terrorism.
The document discusses the concept of human security as an alternative to traditional notions of state security. It defines human security as protecting individuals from threats like poverty, disease, and human rights abuses rather than just protecting a state from military aggression. It explains that human security encompasses economic, food, health, environmental, and personal dimensions. It also argues that human security is best achieved by improving conditions at the local level and promoting development.
Preventive War and Humanitarian InterventionJude Metoyer
The document discusses Michael Doyle's proposal for developing a legal framework for preventive war and humanitarian intervention. It summarizes Doyle's three-part proposal: 1) Develop a multilateral framework for sanctioning preventive war, 2) Develop case law and jurisprudence around preventive use of force, and 3) Apply the same legal standards for unilateral intervention that exist for multilateral interventions. The document agrees with the first two parts but argues that Harold Koh makes a stronger case for banning unilateral preventive action, as unilateral action lacks legitimacy and there are better alternatives through multilateral cooperation.
This document summarizes a report on delivering human security through multi-level governance. It discusses conceptualizing human security, assessing human security at the local level, the role of regional governance in promoting human security using the EU as a case study, and other regional experiences. The key conclusions are that human security encompasses freedom from fear and want, shifts the focus from states to individuals, and is context-specific. It requires actors at all levels of governance from local to global. Regional organizations like the EU and AU play an important role in aspects of human security within their regions. Local assessment of human security indicators can empower communities and improve governance.
The author examines the nexus between international law and the concept
of human security that emerged in the 1990s. The article proceeds in three parts. Part
one outlines the concept of human security, its genesis and contents. Part two examines the nexus between human security and international law and briefly considers the
most representative aspects of international law, including international jurisprudence,
that, in the author’s opinion, reflect human security imperatives. Finally, conclusions
provide answers to the questions posed and indicate the increased value of the human
security concept. The questions read as follows: How can human security strengthen
international actions (actions based on international law)? Where in international law
is human security reflected? In other words, what aspects of international law reflect
a human security-centered approach? What is the role of international law in human
security? Taking all this into account, what is the added value of adopting the concept
of human security? This article is inevitably interdisciplinary, as it combines the perspectives of international law and international relations.
This document provides an introductory overview of conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence for non-specialists. It examines dominant patterns of such violence, including widespread violence against women and girls as well as male victims. It explores a range of causes beyond strategic warfare, like gender inequality. It also identifies gaps in preventing and responding to violence, such as lack of support services and data. The overview aims to improve understanding and support for preventing and addressing this complex issue.
strategic studies and international relationsTallat Satti
This document discusses the history and development of security studies as a sub-discipline of international relations. It covers the key assumptions and paradigms of security studies, including the realist, rationalist, and revolutionary traditions. The document then outlines the periodization of security studies, covering developments from the inter-war period through post-Cold War debates around conceptualizing security. Key topics discussed include the rise of nuclear weapons and deterrence theory, declines in security studies during détente, and expanding notions of security to include human and environmental dimensions.
Collective security aims to deter aggression by having all nations commit to jointly opposing any act of aggression. It emerged as an idea after WWI and was a core principle of the League of Nations and UN. However, collective security has proven difficult to implement in practice due to nations prioritizing their own interests over collective action, and the failure to adequately develop collective security mechanisms within international organizations. While the concept of collective opposition to aggression remains valid, the assumptions required for its effective functioning have generally not been met.
Slideshows about nonviolence and nonviolent resolution of conflicts, economic alternatives, ecology, social change, spirituality : www.irnc.org , Slideshows in english
Research in Europe and the USA
Non-collobaration principle applied to defence
What risks, what adversaries today ?
Making society uncontrolable
Making our will inflexible
Following whitout being exploited
Stategy of nonviolent action
I. strategic stadies and international relationsrizkiar
Venezuela's security policy focuses on defending against perceived U.S. intervention and threats to the regime. The U.S. security policy emphasizes military strength and alliances to protect national interests and global stability. Russia's security policy aims to assert itself as a world power and counter Western influence near its borders. China's security policy works to build military capabilities to deter threats and assert sovereignty claims while maintaining economic and political rise.
The document discusses the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, which holds that sovereign states have a primary responsibility to protect civilians from mass atrocities, but this responsibility shifts to the international community if the state is unable or unwilling to protect its population. It provides examples of conflicts in Burma, Darfur, and Palestine where R2P applies but has not been fully implemented. It calls on individuals and churches to raise awareness of R2P and put political pressure on governments to uphold their responsibility to protect civilians in armed conflicts.
Abstract
Immediately after the Cold war, there was a general optimism of an international system that would
enable the component nation-states to pursue economic growth and greater independence. Despite
the various strategies by the component nation states in the international system to attain self-
sufficiency in economic terms and thus reduce dependence on other nation states for their needs
and survival thereby weakening bilateral relations, the contemporary realities of the international
system in the face of global security challenges pose a compelling sustained cooperation and
collaboration among the nation states in the international system. Global security includes military
and diplomatic measures that nations and international organizations such as the United Nations
(UN) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) take to ensure mutual safety and security.
It also includes the regional and sub-regional collaborative strategies at combating security
challenges. Diplomacy and global security are among the most pressing issues facing the world
today. Success or failure can have huge implications for the international community and society
as a whole. This paper submits that global security will remain a compelling factor in diplomatic
relations in the twenty-first century.
Isis phenomena and collective security ziad jaserZiad Jaser
The document analyzes collective security and the threat posed by ISIS. It discusses how collective security is based on the principle that an attack on one is an attack on all. It examines theories like liberalism, constructivism and realism regarding collective security. It also looks at collective security systems like the UN and NATO. The document summarizes the US role in collective security and its policies in the Middle East. It discusses the UN's role in collective security and combating terrorism. Experts recommend addressing root causes of problems in the Middle East rather than just military responses.
Abstract:
The Responsibility to Protect (R2P or RtoP) is a global political commitment which was endorsed by all member states of the United Nations at the 2005 World Summit to prevent genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity The principle of the Responsibility to Protect is based upon the underlying premise that sovereignty entails a responsibility to protect all populations from mass atrocity crimes and human rights violations. The principle is based on a respect for the norms and principles of international law, especially the underlying principles of law relating to sovereignty, peace and security, human rights, and armed conflict. The Responsibility to Protect provides a framework for employing measures that already exist (i.e., mediation, early warning mechanisms, economic sanctions, and chapter VII powers) to prevent atrocity crimes and to protect civilians from their occurrence. The authority to employ the use of force under the framework of the Responsibility to Protect rests solely with United Nations Security Council and is considered a measure of last resort. The United Nations Secretary-General has published annual reports on the Responsibility to Protect since 2009 that expand on the measures available to governments, intergovernmental organizations, and civil society, as well as the private sector, to prevent atrocity crimes. The Responsibility to Protect has been the subject of considerable debate, particularly regarding the implementation of the principle by various actors in the context of country-specific situations, such as Libya, Syria, Sudan and Kenya, for example. It has also been argued that commensurate with the responsibility to protect, international law should also recognize a right for populations to offer militarily organized resistance to protect themselves against genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes on a massive scale.
http://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/about-responsibility-to-protect.html
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsibility_to_protect
Responsibility to protect
http://www.globalr2p.org/about_r2p
About R2P
http://www.globalr2p.org/media/files/r2p-backgrounder.pdf
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brookings-now/2013/07/24/what-is-the-responsibility-to-protect/
WHAT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/responsibility-to-protect-a-short-history/
Research Interests: Responsibility to Protect and The principle of the Responsibility to Protect
1. The document defines nonviolent civil defence (NVCD) as a way to defend against attempts to destabilize or control society through organized nonviolent collective actions.
2. NVCD aims to make society uncontrollable politically, ideologically resistant to submission, and economically unexploitable in order to dissuade aggressors.
3. NVCD acts on political institutions, local powers, and social forces to strengthen resistance and prevent an adversary from achieving their goals through nonviolent means like noncooperation and civil disobedience.
This document provides an overview of international relations theory, including concepts of security in the international arena. It discusses traditional security approaches focused on the state and military concerns, as well as more modern human security approaches. It also outlines several theoretical perspectives in international relations like realism, liberalism, constructivism, and compares realism and liberalism. Key concepts covered include the multi-sum security principle, women in international security, and the UNDP human security proposal.
The document discusses various topics related to humanitarian intervention and sovereignty including:
1. The responsibility to protect principle holds that states have a primary responsibility to protect civilians, and the international community has a secondary responsibility to assist or intervene if the state is unwilling or unable to protect its population from mass atrocities.
2. There is debate around when and how humanitarian intervention should take place, with questions around the role of the UN Security Council and criteria for determining just cause.
3. While humanitarian intervention has become more accepted, it remains a highly political issue and requires balancing concerns of sovereignty and preventing mass atrocities or genocide. Global consensus and prevention should be the ultimate goals.
This lecture provides with an overview over the position of radicalization within International Relations. How can we approach the issue of radicalization from the perspectives of the international system?
This document summarizes a consultation held in Abuja, Nigeria to discuss the report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) titled "The Responsibility to Protect". The consultation was organized by the Centre for Democracy & Development and brought together civil society organizations from West Africa. Key discussions focused on examining the conceptual basis of the responsibility to protect, its relevance in the regional context of West Africa, and how its principles could be operationalized in the region. Regional perspectives on applying the report's flexible view of sovereignty were presented.
This document provides an overview of the development of counterterrorism at the United Nations from its founding to post-9/11. It discusses how terrorism was initially not addressed in the UN Charter and was seen as a domestic issue rather than an international threat. The General Assembly first addressed terrorism in 1972 but its resolutions were non-binding. The Security Council's first resolution on terrorism was in 1989 in response to the Lockerbie bombing. Post-9/11, resolutions like 1368 and 1373 established binding counterterrorism mandates and committees in response to the 9/11 attacks. The document analyzes key Security Council counterterrorism resolutions from 1989 to post-9/11 to understand how the UN's approach to and
The document discusses the evolution of the concept of security from a traditional state-centric view to a broader human security perspective. It outlines how human security emerged after World War II to consider all aspects of individual and community life, in contrast to the prior focus only on state sovereignty and military threats. The document then compares the traditional and human security paradigms, examining differences in their referents, threats, and means of ensuring security.
This document discusses the concept of human security. It provides background on how human security became part of international discourse in 1994. It then outlines three conceptions of human security and debates around defining and applying the concept. Key risks to human security are also examined, such as state failure, organized violence, relative poverty, and threats from pandemics, environmental degradation, and terrorism.
The document discusses the concept of human security as an alternative to traditional notions of state security. It defines human security as protecting individuals from threats like poverty, disease, and human rights abuses rather than just protecting a state from military aggression. It explains that human security encompasses economic, food, health, environmental, and personal dimensions. It also argues that human security is best achieved by improving conditions at the local level and promoting development.
Preventive War and Humanitarian InterventionJude Metoyer
The document discusses Michael Doyle's proposal for developing a legal framework for preventive war and humanitarian intervention. It summarizes Doyle's three-part proposal: 1) Develop a multilateral framework for sanctioning preventive war, 2) Develop case law and jurisprudence around preventive use of force, and 3) Apply the same legal standards for unilateral intervention that exist for multilateral interventions. The document agrees with the first two parts but argues that Harold Koh makes a stronger case for banning unilateral preventive action, as unilateral action lacks legitimacy and there are better alternatives through multilateral cooperation.
This document summarizes a report on delivering human security through multi-level governance. It discusses conceptualizing human security, assessing human security at the local level, the role of regional governance in promoting human security using the EU as a case study, and other regional experiences. The key conclusions are that human security encompasses freedom from fear and want, shifts the focus from states to individuals, and is context-specific. It requires actors at all levels of governance from local to global. Regional organizations like the EU and AU play an important role in aspects of human security within their regions. Local assessment of human security indicators can empower communities and improve governance.
International intellectual property law and human securitySpringer
This document discusses the evolving concept of security from focusing solely on state security to encompassing individual/human security and human rights. It examines different approaches to conceptualizing human security, including as a development and rights-based framework. Key aspects of human security discussed include protecting fundamental freedoms and dignity, addressing both rights violations and deprivations, and taking an integrated approach to reducing threats beyond any single issue. The document also analyzes debates around defining human security and balancing expansiveness with policy usefulness.
Dialectical Relationship Between Terrorism and Human Security: A Sociological...Rula alsawalqa
This article analyzes the dialectical relationship between terrorism and human security to reveal its dimensions and their role in counterterrorism and to understand what motivates individuals to join terrorist groups. Adopting a qualitative methodological design, data were analyzed through deductive reasoning from the sociological perspective. The findings revealed that terrorist threats to human security could not be addressed through traditional mechanisms alone. They require a new consensus that recognizes the linkages and interdependencies between development, human rights, and national security through a comprehensive approach that uses a wide range of new opportunities.
The document summarizes the key discussions and outcomes from a 2011 conference on enhancing protection of civilians in peacekeeping operations. Some of the main points covered in the summary include:
- There have been efforts by the UN and AU to strengthen protection of civilians in peace operations over the last 10 years, but challenges remain as conflicts persist.
- The conference brought together 200 experts to discuss implementing recent policy reforms to better protect civilians.
- Issues discussed included defining protection of civilians, developing guidance for comprehensive protection strategies, challenges in translating policy to practice in the field, and improving training, coordination, and accountability.
- Key themes that emerged were the need for a holistic approach to protection that addresses all needs, and acknowledging more
the manual takes a developmental approach to peace education, offering methods and materials suitable to all grade levels, that we also advocate for disarmament education.
The Global Campaign for Peace Education
This document discusses the evolving concept of peacebuilding within the UN and its relationship to peacekeeping. It argues that conceptual clarity is important for developing effective strategies but that peacebuilding remains an ambiguous term. The UN has attempted to clarify peacebuilding over time, most recently defining it as the organizing principle for UN intervention across all stages of conflict to support larger peace processes, with peacekeeping as one tool. However, this paradigm has operational and institutional implications that remain unacknowledged, contributing to conceptual confusion. The document examines how peacebuilding has broadened in scope and emphasizes national ownership over time.
This document provides an analysis of challenges faced by MONUC/MONUSCO, the United Nations peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), in protecting civilians. Through interviews with Congolese civil society and MONUC staff, it identifies several protection challenges, including:
1) Organizational and operational constraints due to MONUC's complex mandate in a difficult conflict environment, illustrating the capability gap faced by modern UN peacekeeping.
2) Difficulty communicating with civilians to prevent threats, which remains one of MONUC's biggest challenges.
3) Ethical and political constraints in collaborating with the Congolese army (FARDC) on joint military operations against armed groups.
Ethical and Regulatory Challenges to Science and Research Policy at the Globa...Emilio Mordini
This document discusses new security technologies and the tension with privacy that arises from their use. It begins by reviewing theories of security and how the concept has evolved from national to human security. This has broadened the types of threats considered security issues. Emerging security technologies encompass a wide range including biometrics, sensors, surveillance systems, and data collection and analysis tools. However, attempts to create taxonomies of these technologies have resulted in very long lists that suggest almost anything could be classified as a security technology. This broad conception of security risks losing focus on the core meaning and value of the concept. The document analyzes these issues in terms of privacy, function creep, ineffectiveness, lack of oversight, and unequal effects on
Security of the young Roma women and men in KrusevacRomaniCikna
This document summarizes a study on the security of young Roma women and men in Krusevac, Serbia. It begins by introducing the concept of security and defining it in terms of both national security and individual human security. It then describes Serbia's security sector and legal framework regarding international agreements and national laws related to human rights and security. The study findings are presented regarding the participants' understanding of security concepts and their perspectives on threats to their personal and collective security.
American Society of International Law is collaborating with .docxShiraPrater50
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The Responsibility to Protect: Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention
Author(s): Gareth Evans
Source: Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law), Vol. 98 (
MARCH 31-APRIL 3, 2004), pp. 78-89
Published by: American Society of International Law
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78 ASIL Proceedings, 2004
Pentagon and is presently an adviser to the Kerry campaign. Mr. Feinstein is also cochair with
Anne-Marie Slaughter of the ASIL-Council on Foreign Relations Project on Old Rules, New
Threats and published with Dean Slaughter the article in the January/February issue of Foreign
Affairs that introduced the concept of "a duty to prevent."3
The Responsibility to Protect: Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention
by Gareth Evans*
The Policy Challenge
Until terrorism overwhelmed international attention after 9/11, the really big issue in inter
national relations?the one that must have launched a thousand Ph.Ds?was the "right of
humanitarian intervention," the question of when, if ever, it is appropriate for states to take
coercive action, in particular coercive military action, against another state in order to protect
people at risk in that other state. Man-made internal catastrophe, and what the international
community should do about it, is what more than anything else preoccupied international rela
tions practitioners, commentators, and scholars in the decade after the Cold War.
The cases on which the debate centered are all burnished in our memory. They are cases both
when intervention happened and when it did not:
The debacle of the international intervention in Somalia in 1993;
The pathetically inadequate response to genocide in Rwanda in 1994;
The utter inability of the UN presence to prevent murderous ethnic cleansing in Srebrenica
in ...
PLSI 120/.DS_Store
__MACOSX/PLSI 120/._.DS_Store
PLSI 120/articles/Annan In Larger Freedom FA 2005.pdf
"In Larger Freedom": Decision Time at the UN
Author(s): Kofi Annan
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 3 (May - Jun., 2005), pp. 63-74
Published by: Council on Foreign Relations
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20034350 .
Accessed: 16/08/2012 01:53
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of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]
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Council on Foreign Relations is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Foreign
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n Larger Freec omn
Decision Time at the UN
Kofi Annan
OUR SHARED VULNERABILITY
As K A New York investment banker who walks past Ground Zero
every day on her way to work what today's biggest threat is. Then ask
an illiterate 12-year-old orphan in Malawi who lost his parents to
AIDS. You Will get two very different answers. Invite an Indonesian
fisherman mourning the loss of his entire family and the destruction
of his village from the recent, devastating tsunami to tell you what he
fears most. Then ask a villager in Darfiur, stalked by murderous militias
and fearftil of bombing raids. Their answers, too, are likely to diverge.
Different perceptions of what is a threat are often the biggest
obstacles to international cooperation. But I believe that in the twenty
first century they should not be allowed to lead the world's governments
to pursue very different priorities or to work at cross-purposes. Today's
threats are deeply interconnected, and they feed off of one another. The
misery of people caught in unresolved civil conflicts or of populations
mired in extreme poverty, for example, may increase their attraction
to terrorism. The mass rape of women that occurs too often in today's
conflicts makes the spread of HIV and AIDS all the more likely.
In fact, all of us are vulnerable to what we think of as dangers that
threaten only other people. Millions more of sub-Saharan Africa's
inhabitants would plunge below the poverty line if a nuclear terrorist
attack against a financial center in the United States caused a massive
downturn in the global economy. By the same token, millions ofAmer
icans could quickly become infected if, naturally or through malicious
KOFI ANNAN is Secretary-General of the United Nations.
[63]
Kofi Ann.
The document discusses the concept of human security. It defines human security as protecting individuals rather than states from threats, and focuses on protection, provision, and empowerment. The UNDP's 1994 Human Development Report originated the concept and defined seven areas of human security: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political security. There are two schools of thought on human security - freedom from want, which takes a holistic development approach, and freedom from fear, which focuses on protecting individuals from violence. The document also discusses critiques of human security, promoting human security through organizations and policies, and the relationship between human security and gender.
This document summarizes a conference held by the International Peace Academy, United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, and Center on International Organization on the topic of human rights, the United Nations, and the struggle against terrorism. The conference brought together experts on terrorism, security, human rights, and international policy to discuss the complex relationship between counterterrorism efforts and upholding human rights standards. Key issues discussed included balancing security concerns with human rights protections, and ensuring independent review of government threat assessments to prevent overreach and unwarranted restrictions of human rights.
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE STATUS AND APPLICATION OF THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PR...Kayla Jones
The document provides a critical analysis of the status and application of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine in international law. It discusses the debate around whether R2P qualifies as an emerging norm or customary international law. While some scholars view it as such, others argue it is merely a political principle and not legally binding. The document aims to analyze R2P's legal framework and whether it has developed into customary international law. It contends that R2P has not reached that level and is not a novel concept, but rather reaffirms existing principles of international law.
This document provides guidance for preparing a human development report that focuses on human security. It defines human security and distinguishes it from human development. There are four common types of human security reports: 1) comprehensive reports that map threats to various freedoms, 2) state-building reports focused on state failure as a threat, 3) citizen security reports on personal safety, and 4) challenge-driven reports on specific threats like food insecurity. The document advises selecting objectives, themes, and the type of report based on the country context. It also outlines the process for conducting research, analysis, and stakeholder engagement to develop an effective human security report.
The document discusses the 2011 military intervention in Libya that was conducted under the principle of the responsibility to protect (R2P). It explores whether the failure was due to flaws in the operationalization of the intervention or problems with the R2P doctrine itself. The intervention began with the goal of protecting civilians but shifted to a regime change operation, ignoring responsibilities to rebuild. The paper will analyze what went wrong in the operation, consider alternatives, and discuss whether intervention failure was inevitable given structural problems with R2P as a principle.
This document summarizes national civilian capacity arrangements for conflict management. It discusses the increasing focus on deploying civilian expertise to support countries recovering from conflict. Peace and stabilization missions have become more civilianized in response to the predominance of complex intrastate conflicts. However, civilian vacancy rates remain high. In response, some countries have developed rapidly deployable civilian capacity arrangements over the past decade to support missions, though challenges remain regarding coordination and building local capacity. The field continues to evolve as new arrangements are developed and existing ones improved.
Similar to Security Challenges Volume 7 Number 4 (Summer 2011) (20)
This paper explores the relationship between security and development, with a focus on how different types of violence inhibit development in fragile and conflict-affected states.
This paper is based upon a comprehensive literature review of separate pieces of research including academic studies, datasets and policy analysis. It explores statistics and figures that illustrate the barriers that insecurity poses to achieving development outcomes in fragile and conflict-afflicted states. It also examines these dynamics in detail in four countries: Afghanistan, Solomon Islands, South Sudan and Timor-Leste.
The assignment was not to come up with policy recommendations per se; rather it was to present a comprehensive synopsis of how different types of violence shackles and inhibits development in fragile and conflict-affected states. The research team believes that the material presented will be of use to inform policy debate and development, including in the field of security sector reform.
The analysis is contextualised by focusing on three types of violence: political, criminal and interpersonal. The barriers these different types of violence pose to development is presented throughout the report, and embedded in the country case studies.
The statistics uncovered in the course of the project are stark and unnerving. These statistics, among others, are used to highlight the barriers that different types of violence pose to development. It is not only the financial cost, but also the broader institutional and social costs that generate a series of barriers for meaningful development. Through synthesising these statistics, this paper contributes to the understandings of the links between security and development, paving way for policy recommendations and lines of action for Australia and development practitioners.
Armed conflicts and natural disasters are inherently gendered crises; they can affect women, men, girls and boys in profoundly different ways. It is increasingly accepted that understanding these differences—or adopting a gender perspective—improves the effectiveness of responses to these crises, as well as the efforts of policy-making, advocacy, research and training institutions that focus on them. A gender perspective is more frequently recognised as a core requirement for all personnel involved in these efforts. However, there are many who are expected to engage with gender issues, yet remain unfamiliar with them. For this audience, there is a dearth of literature that provides an introductory overview of gender issues in crisis environments.
This paper is intended to be an educational and awareness-raising resource for those who are beginning to engage with gender issues in crisis environments, whether they are civilian, military or police. It examines gender dimensions commonly observed in conflict and disaster environments, such as differences in casualty trends, risks, threats, vulnerabilities, needs, opportunities and stresses. It provides examples of the operational benefits of a gender perspective and the harmful consequences resulting from the absence of a gender perspective.
The document discusses the challenges of developing civilian policing in Afghanistan. It outlines two main models of policing - the community policing model and the gendarmerie or paramilitary model. Efforts to establish an Afghan National Police since 2001 have relied too heavily on the militarized gendarmerie model and faced challenges including high casualty rates, desertion, and lack of focus on core policing skills in training. For civilian policing to be effective in Afghanistan, it will require moving away from militarization and prioritizing policing approaches accepted by local communities.
This document discusses guidelines for interaction between civilian police and military personnel during international peace and stability operations. It recommends that before deployments, governments develop strategic frameworks and policies to facilitate cooperation. It also recommends pre-deployment training that allows police and military to learn about each other's roles and capabilities. During operations, conducting thorough risk assessments is important to determine the appropriate roles for police and military given the security environment. The roles and capabilities of each force should be considered to ensure they are suited to the tasks required.
The document provides a summary report from the 2011 Civil-Military Interaction Seminar. The following are the key points from the document:
1. The seminar brought together 125 experts from 21 countries to discuss current trends in civil-military practice and future needs. Five broad themes were examined: local-level processes, new and non-traditional players, the importance of information, prevention/preparedness, and civil-military guidelines.
2. Current global trends shaping civil-military engagement include the fragile economic realities in post-conflict states, fluidity in humanitarianism, and increasing natural disasters in complex environments. Integrated economic reconstruction is needed to support transitions from war to peace.
3. Three clear
This document summarizes analysis conducted by the Military Operations Analysis Team using extensive databases on military engagements, intelligence, villages, economic activity, and social development in Phuoc Tuy province during Australia's involvement in the Vietnam War from 1966 to 1971. The analysis applies statistical, spatial, and temporal techniques to understand factors like changes in insurgent and government control over time, who initiated military contacts, and the impact of various counterinsurgency programs.
1) RAMSI has been transitioning its civilian development, policing, and military components in Solomon Islands over the past decade as the security situation has improved.
2) The civilian development programs will transition to long-term bilateral and multilateral development partners, while the military component will withdraw in mid-2013 and policing will continue being supported for the foreseeable future.
3) While some of the factors that contributed to the past tensions have been addressed, such as rebuilding government institutions and removing weapons, unfinished issues remain like unequal economic development and potential for civil unrest, requiring an ongoing capable local police force.
The document summarizes Operation Sumatra Assist, the Australian Defense Force's (ADF) response to the 2004 Boxing Day tsunami in Indonesia. It discusses [1] the initial ADF deployment of medical personnel, engineers, and aircraft to provide relief; [2] the establishment of facilities like a field hospital and water purification plants to aid survivors; and [3] the challenges of coordinating relief efforts with other countries' militaries and aid organizations. The ADF response was praised for its speed, cultural sensitivity when working with Indonesian communities, and professionalism under difficult conditions in providing emergency relief.
The document is an aide-memoire created by the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) to capture best practices from their support of domestic disaster relief efforts in 2011, including Operations PIKE, CHRISTCHURCH QUAKE, and RENA. The aide-memoire aims to assist NZDF planning and operations, as well as inform other agencies involved in disaster response. It contains lessons learned from the 2011 events and is intended to complement NZDF doctrine. The document provides guidance to the military and other agencies in planning for and coordinating disaster relief operations.
The document summarizes an international conference on building security capacity held from September 6-8, 2011 in Washington DC. The conference was co-sponsored by the Australian Civil-Military Centre and the US Center for Complex Operations. Key topics discussed included lessons learned from security sector capacity building efforts, disarmament and demobilization programs, and the importance of civil-military cooperation in peace and stabilization operations. Presenters emphasized the need for context-specific approaches, long-term capacity building led by the host country, and maintaining security gains through political and economic development.
1) Natural disasters have significantly increased over the last few decades, affecting over 2 billion people and causing over $910 billion in damages globally. This trend is expected to continue with climate change.
2) Future natural disasters will likely have even greater impacts due to population growth, increasing urbanization, effects of climate change like sea level rise and extreme weather events. Developing countries are most vulnerable but developed countries face major economic impacts.
3) Effective response to increase in frequency and scale of natural disasters will challenge existing humanitarian system and require improved coordination between numerous responding entities.
The document discusses the challenges of rebuilding war-torn states and achieving sustainable peace through economic reconstruction. It outlines the difficult transition these countries must make from an economy of war to an economy of peace and then eventual normal development. However, the record of success is poor, with about half of countries relapsing back into conflict. Key challenges include balancing security and economic priorities, integrating military and civilian strategies, and effectively using large amounts of aid to support the transition without creating dependency or distortions. An effective strategy must make peace irreversible by addressing the root causes of conflict and transforming the political and security situation.
1) The document discusses the evolution of the humanitarian enterprise over the past 10 years, lessons learned from civil-military interaction during crises in Haiti, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, and what to expect for humanitarian action between now and 2020.
2) It notes major quantitative and qualitative changes to the humanitarian field, including more funding, workers, and media attention, but also greater politicization and the blending of humanitarian and political/military agendas.
3) The response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake showed the importance of military logistics support but also coordination challenges when the military takes a leading role, while the response to Pakistan floods demonstrated more positive civil-military cooperation.
This document discusses conflict prevention in theory and practice. It begins by noting the broad agreement on the importance of preventive action but the gap between rhetoric and reality. It then discusses the development of conflict prevention frameworks and mechanisms over time at the UN and other organizations. However, capacity for preventive action remains limited. The challenges of translating early warnings into timely responses and of addressing the underlying causes of conflicts are also discussed. Effective prevention requires tailored strategies and leadership to coordinate multi-faceted prevention efforts.
The document summarizes lessons learned from Christchurch, New Zealand's response to major earthquakes in 2010 and 2011. It discusses:
1) The earthquakes caused widespread damage across Christchurch, destroying infrastructure and claiming 182 lives. A state of emergency was declared.
2) Restoring critical infrastructure like roads, water, and sewage systems was a top priority. This was achieved through a large coordinated effort involving the city, military, and contractors.
3) The military played a key role, providing logistical support, security, and humanitarian aid. However, coordinating their command-and-control style with the city's more collaborative approach required adjustment.
This document summarizes a conference and workshop on emerging law relating to the detention of non-state actors engaged in hostilities. The conference explored legal gaps and questions around detaining powers, applicable legal regimes, and standards. Speakers discussed increasing convergence between international humanitarian law and international human rights law. The workshop involved closed discussions of national detention practices and transferring detainees. Overall, the document examines complex legal issues and practical challenges surrounding the detention of non-state actors in non-international armed conflicts.
Here are the key points about the UN Cluster Approach:
- The Cluster Approach was established by the UN to improve coordination and response in sectors or areas of activity during humanitarian emergencies.
- Clusters are groups of humanitarian organizations, both UN and non-UN, in each of the main sectors of humanitarian action such as water, health and logistics.
- The clusters provide a clear point of contact and leadership in each sector. A designated agency called the 'cluster lead' facilitates cluster coordination and planning.
- The goal is to ensure a more coherent sector-wide response by filling gaps and reducing duplication of effort.
- Clusters operate at both the national and sub-national levels. At the national
Australia’s peacekeeping and peacebuilding
experiences in the Autonomous Region of
Bougainville in Papua New Guinea, and in
Solomon Islands and Timor-Leste.
The Civil-Military Affairs Conference 2012 focused on learning lessons from past peace and stabilization operations to improve future missions. Over two days, the conference explored successes and challenges, factors for effective operations, and initiatives to strengthen civilian capacity, civil-military collaboration, local ownership, and the role of women in building peace. Speakers included government and military officials from Australia, the UN, and other countries working to advance practical solutions.
This document provides a primer on strategic planning for multiagency peace and stabilization operations. It was produced by Noetic Group for the APCMCOE and acknowledges Noetic's work in developing the content, which is published under a Creative Commons license allowing reproduction and transmission without written permission.
How to Interpret Trends in the Kalyan Rajdhani Mix Chart.pdfChart Kalyan
A Mix Chart displays historical data of numbers in a graphical or tabular form. The Kalyan Rajdhani Mix Chart specifically shows the results of a sequence of numbers over different periods.
Monitoring and Managing Anomaly Detection on OpenShift.pdfTosin Akinosho
Monitoring and Managing Anomaly Detection on OpenShift
Overview
Dive into the world of anomaly detection on edge devices with our comprehensive hands-on tutorial. This SlideShare presentation will guide you through the entire process, from data collection and model training to edge deployment and real-time monitoring. Perfect for those looking to implement robust anomaly detection systems on resource-constrained IoT/edge devices.
Key Topics Covered
1. Introduction to Anomaly Detection
- Understand the fundamentals of anomaly detection and its importance in identifying unusual behavior or failures in systems.
2. Understanding Edge (IoT)
- Learn about edge computing and IoT, and how they enable real-time data processing and decision-making at the source.
3. What is ArgoCD?
- Discover ArgoCD, a declarative, GitOps continuous delivery tool for Kubernetes, and its role in deploying applications on edge devices.
4. Deployment Using ArgoCD for Edge Devices
- Step-by-step guide on deploying anomaly detection models on edge devices using ArgoCD.
5. Introduction to Apache Kafka and S3
- Explore Apache Kafka for real-time data streaming and Amazon S3 for scalable storage solutions.
6. Viewing Kafka Messages in the Data Lake
- Learn how to view and analyze Kafka messages stored in a data lake for better insights.
7. What is Prometheus?
- Get to know Prometheus, an open-source monitoring and alerting toolkit, and its application in monitoring edge devices.
8. Monitoring Application Metrics with Prometheus
- Detailed instructions on setting up Prometheus to monitor the performance and health of your anomaly detection system.
9. What is Camel K?
- Introduction to Camel K, a lightweight integration framework built on Apache Camel, designed for Kubernetes.
10. Configuring Camel K Integrations for Data Pipelines
- Learn how to configure Camel K for seamless data pipeline integrations in your anomaly detection workflow.
11. What is a Jupyter Notebook?
- Overview of Jupyter Notebooks, an open-source web application for creating and sharing documents with live code, equations, visualizations, and narrative text.
12. Jupyter Notebooks with Code Examples
- Hands-on examples and code snippets in Jupyter Notebooks to help you implement and test anomaly detection models.
5th LF Energy Power Grid Model Meet-up SlidesDanBrown980551
5th Power Grid Model Meet-up
It is with great pleasure that we extend to you an invitation to the 5th Power Grid Model Meet-up, scheduled for 6th June 2024. This event will adopt a hybrid format, allowing participants to join us either through an online Mircosoft Teams session or in person at TU/e located at Den Dolech 2, Eindhoven, Netherlands. The meet-up will be hosted by Eindhoven University of Technology (TU/e), a research university specializing in engineering science & technology.
Power Grid Model
The global energy transition is placing new and unprecedented demands on Distribution System Operators (DSOs). Alongside upgrades to grid capacity, processes such as digitization, capacity optimization, and congestion management are becoming vital for delivering reliable services.
Power Grid Model is an open source project from Linux Foundation Energy and provides a calculation engine that is increasingly essential for DSOs. It offers a standards-based foundation enabling real-time power systems analysis, simulations of electrical power grids, and sophisticated what-if analysis. In addition, it enables in-depth studies and analysis of the electrical power grid’s behavior and performance. This comprehensive model incorporates essential factors such as power generation capacity, electrical losses, voltage levels, power flows, and system stability.
Power Grid Model is currently being applied in a wide variety of use cases, including grid planning, expansion, reliability, and congestion studies. It can also help in analyzing the impact of renewable energy integration, assessing the effects of disturbances or faults, and developing strategies for grid control and optimization.
What to expect
For the upcoming meetup we are organizing, we have an exciting lineup of activities planned:
-Insightful presentations covering two practical applications of the Power Grid Model.
-An update on the latest advancements in Power Grid -Model technology during the first and second quarters of 2024.
-An interactive brainstorming session to discuss and propose new feature requests.
-An opportunity to connect with fellow Power Grid Model enthusiasts and users.
Ivanti’s Patch Tuesday breakdown goes beyond patching your applications and brings you the intelligence and guidance needed to prioritize where to focus your attention first. Catch early analysis on our Ivanti blog, then join industry expert Chris Goettl for the Patch Tuesday Webinar Event. There we’ll do a deep dive into each of the bulletins and give guidance on the risks associated with the newly-identified vulnerabilities.
Your One-Stop Shop for Python Success: Top 10 US Python Development Providersakankshawande
Simplify your search for a reliable Python development partner! This list presents the top 10 trusted US providers offering comprehensive Python development services, ensuring your project's success from conception to completion.
"Frontline Battles with DDoS: Best practices and Lessons Learned", Igor IvaniukFwdays
At this talk we will discuss DDoS protection tools and best practices, discuss network architectures and what AWS has to offer. Also, we will look into one of the largest DDoS attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure that happened in February 2022. We'll see, what techniques helped to keep the web resources available for Ukrainians and how AWS improved DDoS protection for all customers based on Ukraine experience
"Choosing proper type of scaling", Olena SyrotaFwdays
Imagine an IoT processing system that is already quite mature and production-ready and for which client coverage is growing and scaling and performance aspects are life and death questions. The system has Redis, MongoDB, and stream processing based on ksqldb. In this talk, firstly, we will analyze scaling approaches and then select the proper ones for our system.
The Microsoft 365 Migration Tutorial For Beginner.pptxoperationspcvita
This presentation will help you understand the power of Microsoft 365. However, we have mentioned every productivity app included in Office 365. Additionally, we have suggested the migration situation related to Office 365 and how we can help you.
You can also read: https://www.systoolsgroup.com/updates/office-365-tenant-to-tenant-migration-step-by-step-complete-guide/
Have you ever been confused by the myriad of choices offered by AWS for hosting a website or an API?
Lambda, Elastic Beanstalk, Lightsail, Amplify, S3 (and more!) can each host websites + APIs. But which one should we choose?
Which one is cheapest? Which one is fastest? Which one will scale to meet our needs?
Join me in this session as we dive into each AWS hosting service to determine which one is best for your scenario and explain why!
Main news related to the CCS TSI 2023 (2023/1695)Jakub Marek
An English 🇬🇧 translation of a presentation to the speech I gave about the main changes brought by CCS TSI 2023 at the biggest Czech conference on Communications and signalling systems on Railways, which was held in Clarion Hotel Olomouc from 7th to 9th November 2023 (konferenceszt.cz). Attended by around 500 participants and 200 on-line followers.
The original Czech 🇨🇿 version of the presentation can be found here: https://www.slideshare.net/slideshow/hlavni-novinky-souvisejici-s-ccs-tsi-2023-2023-1695/269688092 .
The videorecording (in Czech) from the presentation is available here: https://youtu.be/WzjJWm4IyPk?si=SImb06tuXGb30BEH .
zkStudyClub - LatticeFold: A Lattice-based Folding Scheme and its Application...Alex Pruden
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Generating privacy-protected synthetic data using Secludy and MilvusZilliz
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Skybuffer SAM4U tool for SAP license adoptionTatiana Kojar
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3. RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS
Vesselin Popovski
The Concepts of Responsibility to Protect and Protection of Civilians:
‘Sisters, but not Twins’ ......................................................................................... 1
Ramesh Thakur
Libya and the Responsibility to Protect:
Between Opportunistic Humanitarianism and Value-Free Pragmatism................ 13
Michael G. Smith, Jeni Whalan and Peter Thomson
The Protection of Civilians in UN Peacekeeping Operations:
Recent Developments.......................................................................................... 27
Hugh Breakey and Angus Francis
Points of Convergence and Divergence:
Normative, Institutional and Operational Relationships between R2P and PoC... 39
Charles Sampford
A Feuerbachian Inversion:
From Sovereign Rights and Subjects Duties to Citizen Rights and State Duties 51
MYANMAR
John Blaxland
Myanmar: Time for Australian Defence Cooperation .......................................... 61
Christopher B. Roberts
Changing Myanmar:
International Diplomacy and the Futility of Isolation ............................................. 77
ARTICLE
Vandra Harris and Aaron P. Jackson
Learning Each Other’s Language:
Doctrine and AFP-ADF Interoperability ................................................................ 103
4.
5. Editors’ Note
Welcome to the Summer 2011 edition of Security Challenges. The recent
Libya intervention has put the future of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P)
back on the international agenda. In this edition, Ramesh Thakur and other
prominent authors discuss this concept and its practical implications from
different angles. Moreover, Myanmar seems to have embarked on a
process of significant political change in recent months. In this context, John
Blaxland writes about the potential for defence engagement between
Australia and Myanmar, while Christopher Roberts argues for ending
international sanctions against the regime. Finally, the edition features an
article by Aaron Jackson and Vandra Harris on the crucial issue of how to
promote interoperability between the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and
the Australian Defence Force (ADF).
Stephan Frühling
Benjamin Schreer
Managing Editors
December 2011
The Kokoda Foundation
and the
Security Challenges Editorial Team
wish to acknowledge the generous support of
The Australian Department of Defence
and
Jacobs Australia
for the production and printing of the journal.
6.
7. Security Challenges, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Summer 2011), pp. 1-12. - 1 -
The Concepts of Responsibility to
Protect and Protection of Civilians:
‘Sisters, but not Twins’
Vesselin Popovski
This article examines the differences and commonalities between the concepts ‘Protection of
Civilians’ (PoC) and ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) in terms of their origins, evolution and
applicability to various situations. Such comparative analysis is necessary as to avoid confusion
and misinterpretation. The main argument is that the two can be regarded as ‘sister’ concepts,
reinforcing each other, particularly when it comes to critical situations, the most recent example
being the international responses to the deadly threats to civilians in Libya in February-March
2011 and the measures imposed by the UN Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973. The
article also assesses whether the responses to the crisis in Libya represent a triumph or a
failure of the ’sister’ concepts.
With the failures of the international community and warring parties to protect
civilians in major armed conflicts in the last two decades—including Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Liberia, Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi, Timor Leste, Democratic
Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, Kosovo, Darfur and elsewhere—two
related, but distinct concepts have risen on the international agenda: the
duty for Protection of Civilians (PoC) in armed conflict and the Responsibility
to Protect (R2P) people from mass atrocities. There is a close relationship
between R2P and PoC. They share the same concern—civilian suffering
from mass human-induced violence—and both have underpinned
international policy and calls for interventions. But there are also important
differences in their scope and the situations and ways in which they can be
applied. One can argue that they are ‘sister’ concepts: it is important to keep
in mind their differences, as to avoid confusion and gaps in responsibilities;
but also it is important to exploit the commonalities between the two as to
bring mutual reinforcement and co-operation among actors. The two
concepts have co-existed for more than a decade, but there has hardly been
any in-depth comparative analysis nor a clear differentiation so far, apart
from a short anonymous brief written for the Global Centre for R2P.
1
The
UN Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973 on Libya utilised both
concepts and have provided us with an opportunity to undertake a more
detailed comparison.
1
‘The Relationship between the Responsibility to Protect and the Protection of Civilians in
Armed Conflict’, Policy Brief, Global Centre for the Policy to Protect, 9 May 2011,
<http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/The%20Relationship%20Between%20POC%20and%20R2P-
%20Updated.pdf> [Accessed 3 December 2011].
8. Vesselin Popovski
- 2 -
Protection of Civilians
The origins of PoC in armed conflict can be traced in the history of the
development of the norms of war, prescribed in early religious texts and
developed by many scholars of politics and ethics over many centuries.
2
The need to protect the life of civilians and other non-combatants in armed
conflicts has been gradually accepted in international humanitarian law,
universalised and codified in the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention. The
Fourth Geneva Convention—‘Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War’
3
—coined the term PoC, and grounded its international legal
establishment. PoC, therefore, emerged as relevant to situations of armed
conflict only—if there is no armed conflict, where civilians are defined as the
opposite of combatants, PoC transforms itself into protection of citizens (that
can confusingly also be abbreviated as PoC) in times of peace, which is
covered by the well-developed and comprehensive body of human rights.
PoC is more limited than the peace-time protection of citizens and more
limited than the protection of all non-combatants in times of war—it would
not, for example, include the protection of wounded or captured soldiers,
which are dealt within the First, Second and Third Geneva Conventions.
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), some UN agencies
with protection mandates, such as OCHA (Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs), UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees), and some humanitarian NGOs interpret the concept of PoC as
one of their core activities and apply it in a broader sense, covering not only
the period of armed conflict, but also protecting civilians in post-conflict
situations, too. PoC has been under regular consideration by the UN
Security Council since 1999, when it received the first report of the
Secretary-General on the subject.
4
Responsibility to Protect
In parallel with the increased attention to PoC, another concept, R2P, has
emerged out of a similar concern—the failure to protect people from
systematic mass atrocities.
5
In 1996, the then Representative of the UN
2
See V. Popovski, G. Reichberg and N. Turner (eds.), World Religions and Norms of War
(Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2009).
3
‘Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Geneva, 12
August 1949’, International Humanitarian Law—Treaties & Documents, International Committee
of the Red Cross, 2005, <http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/380?OpenDocument> [Accessed
November 2011].
4
S/1999/957, 8 September 1999. For a full list of all UN Security Council resolutions and
Secretary General Reports on PoC, see <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/
c.glKWLeMTIsG/b.4012213/k.481A/Protection_of_Civilians_in_Armed_ConflictbrUN_Document
s.htm> [Accessed 19 November 2011].
5
Ramesh Thakur, The Responsibility to Protect: Norms, Laws and the Use of Force in
International Politics (London: Routledge, 2011); Gareth Evans, The Responsibility to Protect:
Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and for All (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 2008);
Alex J. Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect: The Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities (Cambridge:
Polity, 2009).
9. The Concepts of Responsibility to Protect and Protection of Civilians
- 3 -
Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons, Francis Deng, with his
team at Brookings published the seminal work Sovereignty as
Responsibility,
6
arguing that sovereignty can no longer be seen as a licence
for states to ignore people, but rather as states’ responsibility for the
humanitarian consequences of conflict. After yet another failure to protect
civilian population—Kosovo Albanians from the Milosevic regime’s
repressions in 1998-99—and the controversial un-authorised military
intervention by NATO, an International Commission on Intervention and
State Sovereignty (ICISS) was formed from the initiative and sponsorship of
the Canadian Government, that coined the phrase R2P in its 2001 Report.
7
R2P has become a worldwide shared concept, when in September 2005
almost 150 world leaders—the largest ever gathering in history of Heads of
States—adopted the document ‘World Summit Outcome’
8
at the opening of
the UN General Assembly 60
th
Session in New York, spelling out the newly
emerging norm in paragraphs 138-140 of the document. The UN General
Assembly continued debating R2P in several of its sessions as is evident
from the Reports of the UN Secretary-General in 2009, 2010 and 2011,
9
always enjoying a huge support, and with very few countries, still reluctant to
accept it.
R2P thus applies to serious situations of mass atrocities, but it does not
cover all violations of human rights, nor suffering from natural disasters—as
horrific as these might be. One test of the R2P limitations was the 2008
Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar, when some of the initial founders of the
concept—Bernard Kouchner and Lloyd Axworthy—attempted to speak about
Myanmar’s reckless ignorance of the human suffering as a failure to exercise
R2P.
10
This could have been possible under the original scope of the ICISS
2001 Report, but not under what was agreed upon by the UN General
Assembly in the 2005 World Summit Outcome document. One may argue
that if the Myanmar regime’s deliberate impediments to humanitarian
assistance had continued and the misery and starvation of people could
amount to a policy of extermination, a crime against humanity, then such
deliberate inflicting of additional human suffering (not the victimisation from
the natural disaster per se) could have triggered the applicability of R2P.
However, if evidence does not support such a finding of a crime against
6
D. Rothchild, Fr. Deng, I. W. Zartman, S. Kimaro, T. Lyons, Sovereignty as Responsibility:
Conflict Management in Africa Brookings (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1996).
7
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), The Responsibility to
Protect, Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (Ottawa:
International Development Research Centre, December 2001).
8
‘2005 World Summit Outcome’, Fact Sheet, UN Department of Public Information, September
2005, <http://www.un.org/summit2005/presskit/fact_sheet.pdf> [Accessed 3 December 2011].
9
2009 UN SG Report: Implementing the Responsibility to Protect; 2010 UN SG Report: Early
Warning, Assessment, and the Responsibility to Protect; 2011 UN SG Report: The Role of
Regional and Sub-regional arrangements in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect.
10
For analysis, see ‘Cyclone Nargis and the Responsibility to Protect’, Myanmar/Burma Briefing
No. 2 by the Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect,
<http://www.r2pasiapacific.org/documents/Burma_Brief2.pdf> [Accessed 3 December 2011].
10. Vesselin Popovski
- 4 -
humanity, an R2P framework cannot be activated, and in such a case other
mechanisms—human rights machinery, humanitarian assistance—could be
applied instead.
In the case of R2P, the threshold between what falls in and what falls out of
the concept lies in the determination of the four atrocity crimes and
accordingly, it should not be equated to the general duty to protect citizens
from various disasters, nor should its mechanisms be equated with general
conflict prevention or conflict resolution; these can be regarded as a much
larger and historically more developed agenda. Although prevention of
conflicts in general can be a useful contribution in avoiding the occurrence of
potential mass atrocities during these conflicts, the focus of the R2P
preventive mechanisms should be specified to address particular atrocity
crimes. R2P, although narrowed in scope, should have a deep resource:
from the domestic, bilateral, regional and international mechanisms, starting
from power-sharing agreements (Kenya)
11
to the use of military force as a
last resort (Libya) can form its arsenal.
Differentiating R2P and PoC
The two concepts have a similar origin, they share the same initial
humanitarian impulse, but they have different scope and applicability. Not all
war crimes would fall under PoC, because some of them are not committed
against civilians, for example, mistreatment of prisoners of war. But all war
crimes would fall under R2P, as they represent one of the four atrocity
crimes. War crimes against civilians, as well as crimes against humanity
committed during armed conflict, would fall under both R2P and PoC and in
these situations the two circles of R2P and PoC would overlap.
A situation that would fall under PoC, but not R2P, for example, would be the
protection of civilians threatened from escalating armed conflict, if mass
atrocities are not planned and committed as part of such armed conflict. A
situation that would fall under R2P, but not PoC, would be, for example,
ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity without nexus to an armed
conflict. On one hand, PoC is narrower than R2P—if all war crimes trigger
R2P, not all war crimes would fall under PoC—some are not committed
against civilians. On the other hand, R2P is narrower than PoC; it would not
apply in every armed conflict, but only in those in which mass atrocities have
been systematically planned and committed.
Interestingly, a situation that originally was not an armed conflict, can
escalate into an armed conflict and engage the PoC. The first UN Security
11
Mark Schneider, ‘Implementing the R2P in Kenya and Beyond’,
<http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/speeches/2010/implementing-the-responsibility-
to-protect-in-kenya-and-beyond.aspx> [Accessed 2 December 2011]; also ‘Kenya in Crisis’,
Africa report No. 137, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/horn-of-africa/kenya/137-
kenya-in-crisis.aspx> [Accessed 2 December 2011].
11. The Concepts of Responsibility to Protect and Protection of Civilians
- 5 -
Council Resolution 1970 (26 February 2011) on Libya describes atrocities
against peaceful demonstrators—not yet an armed conflict—and activates
R2P (crimes against humanity), but is technically not yet a PoC situation.
The second UN Security Council Resolution 1973 (17 March 2011) already
describes the situation in Libya as a civil war, not simply protests and riots,
and the PoC comes to life (in parallel with R2P) as it applies in non-
international armed conflict. Another interesting element, emphasised in
Resolution 1973, is that PoC is an obligation of all parties in conflict,
therefore it urges not only the Gaddafi regime, but the rebels, as well, to
protect civilians. If R2P is a matter for states only, PoC can be an obligation
for non-state actors.
The comparison between the legal sources of R2P and PoC can be
illustrated as follows:
Table 1: Comparison of Legal Sources for R2P and PoC
R2P Legal Sources PoC Legal Sources
1948 Genocide Convention (genocide) 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention (PoC),
International Humanitarian Law (IHL), jus in bello
traditions
1949 four Geneva Conventions and their
Additional Protocols (war crimes)
UN Security Council Resolutions: thematic (Res.
1894) and country-specific mandates to PoC
1998 Rome Statute for ICC (crimes against
humanity, forceful deportation)
Refugee Laws (1951 Convention, 2009 African
Union Convention on Internally Displaced
Persons)
Domestic Law Ottawa protocol banning landmines
Bilateral, Regional Law 2010 Convention on Cluster Munitions
UN Charter, Chapter VI, VII, VIII measures Relevant Human Rights Laws—prohibition of
recruitment of children in armed forces
Relevant Human Rights Laws—non-
discrimination of ethnic minorities
Table 1 (though not exhaustive), demonstrates well both similarities and
differences: if all four Geneva Conventions are relevant to R2P, only the last
(fourth) Geneva Convention is relevant to PoC. The whole volume of human
rights laws would be too large for both R2P and PoC, and only parts of it will
be relevant; for example, the non-discrimination of minorities would be
relevant to R2P, if minorities rights are gradually abused, this can escalate
into ethnic cleansing or genocidal policies. In another example, children’s
rights may be relevant to PoC in the case of a serious impact of armed
conflicts on children. The legal sources for PoC would also include refugee
laws, some disarmament treaties, and prohibiting certain weapons like
chemical weapons, landmines or cluster munitions that cause excessive
civilian suffering.
12. Vesselin Popovski
- 6 -
Table 2 (being, as Table 1, also not exhaustive) indicates the similarities and
differences between R2P and PoC in terms of the actors engaged in the
various types of protection:
Table 2: Comparison of Actors Engaged with R2P and PoC
R2P Actors PoC Actors
UN Secretary General Special Advisors Armed Forces
Police, law enforcement institutions (Pillar 1)
Peace Operations, UN Security Council,
Department of Peace-Keeping Operations
(DPKO)
Regional actors: African Union, European
Union, League of Arab States, others
UN Agencies:
UNHCR, OCHA
DPKO, UNHCR, High-Commissioner for
Human Rights, Peacebuilding Commission,
UNICEF, Special Rapporteur on Children; Aid
donors, capacity builders, NGOs (Pillar 2)
ICRC
Mediators, fact-finding missions, Secretary-
General (non-coercive measures); UN Security
Council (coercive measures, Pillar 3)
Humanitarian NGOs
International Criminal Tribunals
Some actors would engage in both R2P and PoC, but others will have
specific mandate in just one type of protection. Although R2P may have the
ambition to engage almost everyone, illustrated in the formula ‘narrow, but
deep response’, some actors—PKO, UNHCR, ICRC, OCHA—that are very
willing to apply PoC, are reluctant to engage with R2P, considering it a
potential jeopardy for their mandates.
R2P and PoC concepts are ‘sisters, but not twins.’ They are close in
relationship and share similar humanitarian concerns; yet, their specificity is
important and should not be confused. Agencies that acknowledge and
engage in PoC have been reluctant to attach their mandate to R2P, seeing
the concept as too interventionist. In fact, one needs to be reminded that
R2P contains very little interventionism—even within the Pillar Three
12
machinery, military intervention forms only a last option. Adding that R2P
has a very large preventative agenda, there is not much to worry about; R2P
came into existence as a counter-point to intervention, it is about helping
potential victims of atrocities. Although technically not a firm international
legal obligation, it has reached global acceptance and every General
Assembly debate proves this. R2P, as the ‘younger sister’, does not
undermine action, rather it catalyses it; it can mobilise political will and serve
12
The 2009 UN SG Report: ‘Implementing the Responsibility to Protect’ divided R2P into three
pillars: first pillar—states domestic responsibility to protect; second pillar—states and
international organizations assist other states to protect; and third pillar—when states manifestly
fail to protect, the international community through the UN Security Council adopt timely and
decisive measures, including coercion, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
13. The Concepts of Responsibility to Protect and Protection of Civilians
- 7 -
the PoC agenda well. The ‘sister’ concepts, R2P and PoC, can reinforce
each other, but also can compete with each other.
R2P and PoC: Libya 2011
One may argue that R2P and PoC merge closer when it comes to very
critical situations such as in February-March 2011 in Libya, where R2P
rapidly developed from Pillar One to the whole scope of Pillar Three, ‘timely
and decisive response’, when Libya manifestly failed to protect. The
categorisation of the situation as civil war brought PoC language into
Resolution 1973 and it became a textbook resolution for a parallel
application of both PoC and R2P.
Libya 2011 is not the first time when R2P was referred to by the UN Security
Council—previous Security Council resolutions on Sudan (Darfur) and Côte
d’Ivoire also used R2P language.
13
Also, Libya is not the first time when the
Security Council has authorised use of force to protect civilians—the
bombing of Bosnian Serb military targets around Sarajevo in 1995 was
aimed mostly to protect the Bosnian Muslim civilian population and was
under the solid authorisation by the Security Council. I would even question
that Resolution 1973 is the first time the Security Council has authorised the
use of force for human protection against the wishes of a functioning state,
and that the closest the Council came to doing so in the past, was in Security
Council Resolution 794 (1992) in Somalia and Resolution 929 (1994) in
Rwanda.
14
Let us not forget Security Council Resolution 688 (1991) in the
aftermath of the first Gulf War that established a no-fly zone to protect the
Kurdish minority in Northern Iraq, certainly against the wishes of a
functioning state (Iraq) and in a very similar situation to that in Libya—
Saddam Hussein was threatening a huge part of the Iraqi (Kurdish)
population with massacre. Although Resolution 688 did not use the
language ‘all necessary means’, the no-fly zone in Northern Iraq was not a
paper-tiger—it was supported with limited air strikes several times in the
1990s, with the intervening states referring to Resolution 688 as a
justification for their military actions. Resolution 688 was adopted when the
R2P did not exist yet as a defined concept, and when PoC was simply a
legal requirement from the Fourth Geneva Convention, therefore one can
regard the two Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973 on Libya as the
first real test of utilising the two ‘sister’ concepts, R2P and PoC, to stop a
potential mass slaughter of a civilian population.
13
See for example text from Resolution 1962 (2010) on Côte d’Ivoire: “recalling that the Ivorian
leaders bear primary responsibility for ensuring peace and protecting the civilian population in
Côte d’Ivoire and demanding that all stakeholders and parties to conflict act with maximum
restraint to prevent a recurrence of violence and ensure the protection of civilians”.
14
Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, ‘The New Politics of Protection?’, International Affairs,
vol. 87, issue 4 (2011); also A. Bellamy, ‘Libya and the Responsibility to Protect: The Exception
and the Norm’, Ethics & International Affairs, vol. 25, no. 3 (2011).
14. Vesselin Popovski
- 8 -
Resolution 1970
The Security Council invoked R2P immediately when on 26 February 2011 it
considered the deadly risk and the urgent need to protect the Libyan
population from atrocities, and adopted Resolution 1970, condemning the
use of force against civilians, deploring the gross systematic violations of
human rights, expressing deep concerns at the deaths of civilians and the
incitement to hostility by the Libyan Government. The Council considered
that the widespread and systematic attacks against the civilian population
may amount to crimes against humanity, referring to one of the four atrocity
crimes and triggering the applicability of R2P. In explicit text and in a
separate paragraph, Resolution 1970 recalled the Libyan authorities’
responsibility to protect (emphasis added) its population.
Resolution 1970 demanded an immediate end to violence, urged Libya to act
with utmost restraint, to respect human rights, to ensure safety of all foreign
nationals, to allow safe passage of humanitarian and medical supplies, and
lift media restrictions; and referred the situation to the International Criminal
Court (ICC)—an additional signal that R2P crimes might have been
committed. It also imposed Chapter VII sanctions on Libya, namely an arms
embargo, strengthened with a call upon States to inspect all cargo, that may,
upon reasonable ground to believe, contain prohibited items; a travel ban
against 16 Libyan officials, listed in Annex I of the Resolution, among them
Gaddafi himself, some of his family members and military leaders, involved
in violence; and an asset freeze against six designated individuals, listed in
Annex II of the Resolution—Gaddafi, four of his sons and one daughter.
There was no positive reaction, rather the opposite; Gaddafi not only ignored
Resolution 1970, but committed clear breaches of it, refusing to permit
humanitarian aid convoys into the besieged Misrata and Ajdabiya, a clear
failure by Libya to exercise R2P. The search for a peaceful solution through
the UN Special Envoy and the African Union High-Level Committee
continued, but gradually most governments and regional organisations
realised that the use of diplomatic efforts only would not protect the Libyan
people in lethal danger. Acknowledging Gaddafi regime’s manifest failure to
protect people, the international community shifted to enforcement
measures: on 12 March 2011 the League of Arab States (LAS) called on the
Security Council to impose immediately a no-fly zone on the Libyan Air
Force and to establish safe areas as precautionary measures to protect the
civilian population.
Resolution 1973
This demand for a no-fly zone by the LAS proved to be crucial.
15
The United
Kingdom, France and Lebanon (the latter representing LAS) introduced a
15
Bellamy and Williams, ‘The New Politics of Protection?’.
15. The Concepts of Responsibility to Protect and Protection of Civilians
- 9 -
new resolution, Security Council Resolution 1973 (17 March 2011) which
urged the parties involved in armed conflict to “bear the primary
responsibility to take all feasible steps to ensure protection of civilians
(emphasis added)”. In Resolution 1973, PoC came to life, as the situation
moved from a riot—which does not qualify as ‘armed conflict’—to a civil war,
or a non-international armed conflict, in the language of the Geneva
Conventions. This was an important development, as the Security Council
could now strengthen its decisions based on obligations under international
humanitarian laws, applicable only in time of (civil) war and add war crimes
jurisdiction into what has already been established as R2P obligations in
Resolution 1970 on the basis of potential crimes against humanity. In
Resolution 1973, all the force of PoC (applicable to armed conflict) is added
to the force of R2P, previously already activated in Resolution 1970. The
‘sister’ concepts R2P and PoC in Resolution 1973 were synergised, their
legal and political forces merged to urge the Security Council to utilise all its
overwhelming power under Chapter VII, including the use of force—to
protect the civilian population and civilian-populated areas. This timely and
determined decision of the Security Council, a body often accused of being
obsolete, can be regarded as a triumph of both PoC and R2P.
Paragraph 4 of Resolution 1973 under the sub-title ‘Protection of Civilians’
contained the authorisation of the use of force in the well-known formula ‘to
take all necessary measures’. Paragraph 5 added into the authorisation of
the use of force, the establishment of a no-fly zone. Another new measure
imposed by Resolution 1973 is a ban on flights where states shall deny
permission to Libyan aircraft to take off from, or land in, or overfly their
territory. Resolution 1973 in its two Annexes added additional designations
of individuals, to whom the travel ban or the asset freeze will apply.
Resolution 1973 also strengthened other measures already adopted in
Resolution 1970: Paragraph 13 of Resolution 1973, enforcement of the arms
embargo, replaced Paragraph 11 of the previous resolution, adding an
additional authorisation to use force—after calling upon all vessels and
aircraft of flag States to co-operate with the inspections of the arms
embargo; the Security Council also authorised UN Member States‚ to use
“all necessary measures commensurate with the specific circumstances to
carry out such inspections”. Similar precedents can be found in the history
of the enforcement of sanctions in Southern Rhodesia in 1966 (Security
Council Resolution 221), Iraq-Kuwait in 1990 (Security Council Resolution
665) and others. This additional and limited authorisation to use of force in
Resolution 1973 does not, curiously, target Libya only; it can be applied
against any other state (including its vessels and aircraft) that may violate
the arms embargo.
Here comes probably the most controversial—legally and politically—issue
in my analysis: Resolutions 1970 and 1973 not only prohibited the supply of
any weapons to Libya, but also authorised limited use of force to intercept
such supplies. Therefore, when in late June 2011 the French parachuted
16. Vesselin Popovski
- 10 -
machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades and munitions to the Libyan
rebels, could, hypothetically, Russia, officially protesting this as a violation of
Resolution 1970,
16
use force against the French aircraft delivering such
weapons to rebels in contravention of the Resolutions? Ironically, such
hypothetical use of force by Russia to prevent the French supplies of
weapons to Libyan rebels, would have been in compliance with Paragraph
13 of Resolution 1973.
Resolution 1973 was adopted with ten votes in favour and five abstentions:
Brazil, China, Germany, India and Russia. These five countries—two
permanent members and three strong candidates for permanent
membership—voiced their preference to seek a peaceful solution when
abstaining from the vote. Interestingly, Resolution 1973 does not eliminate
efforts for a peaceful solution; in fact it repeats and extends them. In its
statement, Russia recalled its own earlier draft resolution, calling for a
ceasefire and dialogue, but it is doubtful whether such a mild resolution
would have been instrumental. Calls for a ceasefire were never in shortage.
Many were made by UN officials and regional organisations, but in vain. On
the contrary, announcement of a ceasefire came from Gaddafi immediately
after the adoption of Resolution 1973 and this demonstrated how important
for the concept R2P is, if the international community is able to utilise the
R2P machinery to its deepest scope—threat and use of military measures
under Chapter VII.
R2P and PoC after Libya
I share views expressed by various scholars
17
that Security Council
Resolutions 1970 and 1973 represent a triumph of R2P and PoC. It would
have been a defeat of R2P and PoC, if Resolutions 1970 and 1973 were not
adopted and Gaddafi could massacre the citizens of Benghazi. The
Resolutions are a triumph of R2P, because for the first time since the
concept emerged 10 years ago, the full and deepest scope of its
implementation was utilised. The Pillar One domestic responsibility to
protect was referred to in Resolution 1970, and when this responsibility was
manifestly flouted and the regime threatened its own population with
massacre, the responsibility shifted to the international community; and, both
the UN and regional organisations engaged in the full scope of Pillar Three
measures: negotiations, diplomatic pressure, sanctions and, when all these
proved to be ineffective, the authorisation for the use of force came from the
only legal authority—the Security Council.
16
Statement by Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov, ‘Russia Criticizes France over Arming Libyan
Rebels’, RT, 30 June 2011, <http://rt.com/news/france-supplying-rebels-country/> [Accessed 19
November 2011].
17
See Gareth Evans, ‘Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes: The R2P Balance Sheet After Libya’, the
Second Renate Kamener Oration, Leo Baeck Centre, Melbourne, 31 July 2011; Alex Bellamy,
Tom Weiss, Jennifer Welsh and other authors in the Roundtable: Libya, RToP, and
Humanitarian Intervention, Ethics & International Affairs, vol. 25, no. 3 (2011).
17. The Concepts of Responsibility to Protect and Protection of Civilians
- 11 -
The removal of Gaddafi from power was nowhere stated as an aim in the
Resolutions; Gaddafi was mentioned but in terms of referral to the ICC, the
freezing of his assets and the ban on travel. Also, the military action was
only one part of the whole coercive regime established by the Resolutions.
A common mistake is to see R2P simply as a military intervention. In fact,
the international community has a lot of options before it comes to military
intervention: Chapter VI dialogue and mediation, non-military sanctions
(Article 41), and only if these fail, military intervention (Article 42). What the
responses to the crisis in Libya show, is that the Chapter VI and the Article
41 measures could be shortened to move faster towards a ‘timely and
decisive’ military response. Libya also showed that consensus can often be
difficult, particularly when it comes to the last resort. It was the extraordinary
coincidence of many factors in Libya
18
that allowed the triumph of R2P and
PoC.
If Libya demonstrated the fullest opportunity and the triumph of R2P and
PoC, Syria showed the opposite—the limits of the ‘sister’ concepts. The
difficult question from Kosovo in 1999 (that triggered the debates that gave
birth to R2P), ‘How to save people from mass atrocities, when a state
manifestly fails to protect them and the UN Security Council is paralysed?’, is
back on the table. The biggest R2P triumph so far, in Libya, could be
followed by probably the biggest R2P failure so far—to protect people in
Syria and elsewhere. If the UN and regional organisations do not act with
the same determination as they did in Libya, the danger of selectivity in the
application of R2P and PoC will continue to cloud international law. In the
words of Dr. Simon Adams, Executive Director of the Global Centre for the
R2P: “While tanks, troops and even warships have been unleashed against
ordinary Syrians, the Security Council has so far failed in its responsibility to
protect civilians. Syria has become a stain upon the conscience of the
world.”
19
Conclusion
The concepts R2P and PoC originated from a similar concern, potential
human suffering and innocent victimhood from wars or mass atrocities, and
developed in parallel over the last decade. I presented in the comparative
analysis above the commonalities and differences between the two concepts
and emphasised that they can reinforce each other, but they can also enter
into competing agendas. Although collaboration is always preferable,
ignorance of the differences between the two concepts may create confusion
and counter-productivity.
18
Bellamy, ‘Libya and the Responsibility to Protect’.
19
Global Centre for R2P Media release ‘Syria at the Crossroads: UN General Assembly Must
Uphold their Responsibility to Protect’, <www.globalr2p.org/media/pdf/Syria_Press_Release_
21_November_2011.pdf> [Accessed 3 December 2011].
18. Vesselin Popovski
- 12 -
Professor Ed Luck, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General
on R2P, called the two concepts ‘cousins, but not sisters’; but this was
before Resolutions 1970 and 1973 on Libya. After Libya, which
demonstrated the important of progress in the development of awareness,
adoption and implementation of both R2P and PoC concepts, I would not
hesitate to define R2P and PoC as ‘sisters, but not twins’. The two concepts
may exist separately in normal circumstances, but when the lives of people
are gravely threatened in critical situations, as occurred in Libya in February-
March 2011, they should reinforce each other and merge closer as to avoid
gaps in order to protect the innocent people at risk.
Vesselin Popovski is Senior Academic Programme Officer at the Institute for Sustainability and
Peace, United Nations University in Tokyo. He develops research, teaches and publishes in
peace and security, international law, human rights and global governance. He co-edited the
books: International Criminal Accountability and the Rights of Children (2006); World Religions
and Norms of War (2009); Democracy in the South (2010); Human Rights Regimes in the
Americas (2010); Blood and Borders (2011). He has completed a trilogy on modern trends and
innovations in governance, co-editing Engaging Civil Society (2010), Building Trust in
Government (2010) and Cross-Border Governance (2011). Another major book Legality and
Legitimacy in Global Affairs is forthcoming with Oxford University Press. He took part in two
major international initiatives: the International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty, that produced the concept ‘Responsibility to Protect’, and the Princeton Principles
of Universal Jurisdiction. popovski@unu.edu.
21. Security Challenges, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Summer 2011), pp. 13-25. - 13 -
Libya and the Responsibility to Protect:
Between Opportunistic
Humanitarianism and Value-Free
Pragmatism
Ramesh Thakur
Since the Treaty of Westphalia, sovereignty has been backed by the norm of nonintervention.
By contrast, the responsibility to protect (R2P) strikes a balance between unauthorised
unilateral interventions and institutionalised indifference. With a rapidly deteriorating
humanitarian situation in Libya in early 2011, the United Nations (UN) authorised the use of
force to protect an imminent slaughter of civilians but prohibited taking sides in the internal civil
war, intervening with ground troops, or effecting forcible regime change. The record of NATO
actions in Libya marks a triumph for R2P but also raises questions about how to prevent the
abuse of UN authority to use international force for purposes beyond human protection.
Military action by international forces in Libya in 2011 marks the first instance
of the implementation of the sharp edge of the new norm of the responsibility
to protect (R2P). It was a successful example, if also a controversial one.
Until the twentieth century, state sovereignty included the right to go to war
and an unchallengeable monopoly on the lawful use of force domestically.
Gradually by the time of the creation of the United Nations (UN) in 1945 and
more rapidly thereafter, the right to use force internationally was restricted to
self-defence against armed attack or under UN authorisation. Historically,
the norm of nonintervention notwithstanding, individual states had also
intervened inside sovereign jurisdictions to stop the slaughter of kith and kin
or co-religionists.
1
Under the impact of the Holocaust and starting with the
Genocide Convention in 1948, the international community asserted the
collective right to stop states killing large numbers of civilians inside their
borders.
Even so, for 350 years—from the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 until 1998—
sovereignty functioned as institutionalised indifference. International
interventions in Kosovo and East Timor in 1999 broke that mould and were
the backdrop to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s search for a new norm.
His genius lay in channelling historic ideational transformations into new
1
For a study of the relevance of R2P to the problem of states with ethnic ties spread across
national borders, see Walter Kemp, Vesselin Popovski and Ramesh Thakur (eds.), Blood and
Borders: The Responsibility to Protect and the Problem of the Kin-State (Tokyo: United Nations
University Press, 2011).
22. Ramesh Thakur
- 14 -
institutional linkages. Instead of collective gnashing and wailing during
atrocities followed by a traumatic repeat afterwards, yet again, of promises of
‘Never Again’, he pushed for a new doctrine to take timely and effective
action. With Canada’s help, an international commission formulated the
innovative principle of the responsibility to protect.
2
The UN was neither designed nor expected to be a pacifist organisation. On
the contrary, its origins lie in the anti-Nazi wartime military alliance among
Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union. Its primary purpose is the
maintenance of international peace and security. The chief responsibility for
doing this is vested in the all-powerful UN Security Council as the world’s
sole and duly sworn in sheriff for enforcing international law and order.
The system of collective security against interstate aggression never
materialised. In the decades after World War II the nature of armed conflict
was transformed.
3
Interstate warfare between uniformed armies gave way
to irregular conflict between rival armed groups. The nature of the state too
changed from its idealised European version. Many communist and some
newly-decolonised countries were internal security states whose regimes
ruled through terror. Increasingly, the principal victims of both types of
violence were civilians. Advances in telecommunications brought the full
horror of their plight into the world’s living rooms. R2P spoke eloquently to
the need to change the UN’s normative framework in line with the changed
reality of threats and victims.
4
In the meantime, the goals of promoting human rights and democratic
governance, protecting civilian victims of humanitarian atrocities and
punishing governmental perpetrators of mass crimes became more
important. Our understanding and appreciation of human rights and
commitment to their promotion and protection have deepened and
broadened.
5
The chief impulse to human rights is the recognition that every
human being is deserving of equal moral consideration. It is an acceptance
2
The Responsibility to Protect, Report of the International Commission on Intervention and
State Sovereignty (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre for ICISS, 2001). The
Report is available on the website at <www.iciss.gc.ca>. See also Gareth Evans, The
Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and for All (Washington: Brookings
Institution, 2008); Ramesh Thakur, The Responsibility to Protect: Norms, Laws and the Use of
Force in International Politics (London: Routledge, 2011) and The People vs. the State:
Reflections on UN Authority, US Power and the Responsibility to Protect (Tokyo: United Nations
University Press, 2011); Thomas G. Weiss, Humanitarian Intervention (London: Polity, 2007);
Alex J. Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect: The Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities (Cambridge:
Polity, 2009).
3
See Andrew Mack et al., Human Security Report 2005 (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2005).
4
For an account of the UN’s transformation since 1945, see Ramesh Thakur, The United
Nations, Peace and Security: From Collective Security to the Responsibility to Protect
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
5
See Roger Normand and Sarah Zaidi, Human Rights at the UN: The Political History of
Universal Justice (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008).
23. Libya and the Responsibility to Protect
- 15 -
of a duty of care by those living in safety towards those trapped in zones of
danger. The UN’s normative mandates on security, development and
human rights alike embody this powerful intuition.
6
Failure to act in the 1994 Rwanda genocide
7
and non-UN-authorised
humanitarian intervention in Kosovo in 1999 set off angry and deeply divisive
recriminations around the world for acts of omission and commission.
8
In
the wake of that controversy, the 2001 report of the International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) argued that the
essential nature of sovereignty had changed from state privileges and
immunities to the responsibility to protect people from atrocity crimes.
Where the state defaulted on its solemn responsibility owing to lack of will or
capacity, or because it was itself complicit in the commission of the
atrocities, the responsibility to protect tripped upwards to the international
community acting through the authenticated structures and procedures of
the UN.
The importance of sovereignty as the key organising principle of the modern
world order needed and received a strong affirmation in the ICISS report.
The Commission took pains to emphasise that a cohesive and peaceful
international system is more likely to be achieved through the cooperation of
effective and legitimate states than in an environment of fragile, collapsed,
fragmenting or generally chaotic states.
9
Reconceptualising sovereignty as responsibility
10
was not a radical departure
from established precept and practice. Nowhere is the authority of the state
absolute. Internally, it is constrained and regulated by constitutional power-
sharing arrangements and shared between different levels of government:
local, provincial and national. It is also distributed among different sectors of
public authorities at any one given level, such as the legislature, executive,
judiciary and bureaucracy. Internationally, too, in human rights covenants,
UN practice and state practice itself, sovereignty is understood as embracing
responsibility. The UN Charter is itself an example of an international
obligation voluntarily accepted by member states.
6
This is most powerfully articulated in Kofi A. Annan, In Larger Freedom: Towards
Development, Security and Human Rights For All, Report of the Secretary-General, document
A/59/2005 (New York: United Nations, 21 March 2005).
7
See Kingsley Moghalu, Rwanda’s Genocide: The Politics of Global Justice (Houndmills:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).
8
See Albrecht Schnabel and Ramesh Thakur (eds.), Kosovo and the Challenge of
Humanitarian Intervention: Selective Indignation, Collective Action, and International Citizenship
(Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2000).
9
This was the assumption behind a joint project between the Carr Center of Harvard University,
the International Peace Academy and the United Nations University: Simon Chesterman,
Michael Ignatieff and Ramesh Thakur (eds.), Making States Work (Tokyo: United Nations
University Press, 2005).
10
For further elaboration, see Trudy Jacobsen, Charles Sampford and Ramesh Thakur (eds.),
Re-envisioning Sovereignty: The End of Westphalia? (London: Ashgate, 2008).
24. Ramesh Thakur
- 16 -
There is no transfer or dilution of the status of state sovereignty. But there is
a necessary change in the exercise of sovereignty: from sovereignty as
control to sovereignty as responsibility in both internal functions and external
duties. Anne Orford argues that contrary to claims that the requirement is to
put the R2P principle into practice, ICISS in fact put evolving practice of
contingent and softening sovereignty, and of increasing international
intrusions, into a new concept: the justificatory principle followed practice,
words followed deeds. R2P is an attempt to integrate existing and evolving
but dispersed practices of protection into a conceptually coherent account of
international authority.
11
The unanimous endorsement of R2P by the largest ever collection of world
leaders at the UN summit in 2005 was historic, for it spoke to the
fundamental purposes of the UN and responded to a critical challenge of the
21st century. Some 150 world leaders tightened the application of R2P to
four atrocity crimes: war crimes, genocide, ethnic cleansing, and crimes
against humanity. They affirmed that states have the primary responsibility
to protect all people within their territorial jurisdiction but that if they
manifestly failed to do so, owing to incapacity, unwillingness or complicity in
the crimes, then the international community, acting through the UN Security
Council, would take timely and decisive action to implement the international
responsibility to protect.
12
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon then refined the
principle further in the language of three pillars: Pillar One as the state’s own
responsibility; Pillar Two as international assistance to strengthen state
capacity to implement R2P obligations; and Pillar Three as coercive
international action, including measures not involving the use of force under
Article 41 of the United Nations Charter (for example economic sanctions,
arms embargoes, and asset freezes) and, ultimately, military force under
Article 42.
13
R2P captures and channels the convergence of some significant trends in
world affairs. Its preventive and rebuilding pillars involve strengthening a
state’s capacity to handle its own law and order problems. But its hard edge
requires the international community, acting through the UN, to take up the
slack when any state defaults on its sovereign responsibility to protect all
people inside its borders.
By its very nature, including unpredictability, unintended consequences and
the risk to innocent civilians caught in the crossfire, warfare is inherently
brutal: there is nothing humanitarian about the means. Still, the fact is that
our ability and tools to act beyond our borders have increased tremendously.
11
Anne Orford, International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2011).
12
2005 World Summit Outcome, adopted by UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/60/1, 24
October 2005, paras. 138-40.
13
Ban Ki-moon, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Report of the Secretary-General
(New York: United Nations, Doc. A/63/677, 12 January 2009).
25. Libya and the Responsibility to Protect
- 17 -
This greatly increases demands and expectations ‘to do something’ and the
fundamental question cannot be avoided: under what circumstances is the
use of force necessary, justified and required to provide effective
international humanitarian protection to at-risk populations without the
consent of their own government? Absent R2P, the intervention is more
likely to be ad hoc, unilateral, self-interested and deeply divisive. With the
R2P norm and guiding principles agreed to in advance, military action is
more likely to be rules-based, multilateral, disinterested and consensual.
Not a Western Implant
The R2P debate is emphatically not a West versus The Rest narrative.
Instead the theory and practice of state sovereignty is itself decidedly
European. Developing countries, not Western ones, are the likely targets of
international military interventions. If their people are the principal
beneficiaries and their states the main victims when R2P is put into practice,
their scholars, think tank analysts, public intellectuals and journalists should
be the lead debaters. Asia has its own rich traditions that vest sovereigns
with responsibility for the lives and welfare of subjects while circumscribing
the exercise of power with the majesty of law that stands above the agents
of the state. In India Ashoka, the great Mauryan emperor (269–232 BC),
inscribed the following message on a rock edict: “this is my rule: government
by the law, administration according to the law, gratification of my subjects
under the law, and protection through the law”.
14
The debate is also wrongly framed on substance. In the real world, we know
that there will be more atrocities, victims and perpetrators—and therefore
more interventions. They were common before R2P; they are not
guaranteed with R2P. The real choice is not if interventions will take place,
but when, why, how, by whom and under whose authority. Unilateral and ad
hoc interventions will sow and nourish the seeds of international discord.
Multilateral and rules-based interventions will speak powerfully to the world’s
determination never again to return to institutionalised indifference to mass
atrocities.
R2P attempts to strike a balance between unilateral interference and
institutionalised indifference. It will help the world to be better prepared—
normatively, organisationally and operationally—to meet the recurrent
challenge of external military intervention wherever and whenever it arises
again, as assuredly it will. To interveners, R2P offers the prospect of
international legitimacy, reduced compliance and transaction costs and more
effective results. To potential targets of intervention, R2P offers the
reassurance of a rules-based system. Absent an agreed new set of rules,
14
Quoted in Stanley Wolpert, A New History of India (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977),
pp. 66–7.
26. Ramesh Thakur
- 18 -
there will be nothing to stop the powerful from intervening ‘anywhere and
everywhere’.
Gaddafi in the Crosshairs of a Changing Normative Order
R2P is narrow—it applies only to the four crimes of ethnic cleansing,
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. But it is deep: there are
no limits to what can be done in responding to these atrocity crimes. In a
matching symmetry, support for R2P has been broad but shallow.
15
Libya in
2011 provided an opportunity to convert the noble sentiments and solemn
promise of R2P into meaningful action whose import will resonate long and
far. In poignant testament to its tragic origins and normative power, R2P
was the discourse of choice in debating how best to respond to the crisis.
R2P is not solely about military intervention. The world’s comfort level is
greater with action under Pillars One (building state capacity) and Two
(international assistance to build state capacity) than Pillar Three (coercive
international action with the final option being military intervention to protect
at-risk populations from atrocity crimes). But, to be meaningful, the R2P
spectrum of action must include military force as the option of last resort.
Three sets of issues were involved in framing the most appropriate and
effective response to the Libyan crisis: military capacity, legal authority, and
political legitimacy. Analysts were divided on the scale, complexity and
feasibility of a no-fly zone. Only the West has the requisite assets and
operational capability for military action in the Libyan theatre. But NATO
would have been ill-advised to take any military action on its own authority.
Political commentators warned of mission creep. But that would arise only if
ownership of the uprising was appropriated from the Libyans. No one asked
for foreign boots on the ground. UN legal authorisation could be restricted to
four military tasks: surveillance and monitoring, humanitarian assistance,
enforcement of the arms embargo, and enforcement of a no-fly zone.
The UN Security Council, Human Rights Council and Secretary-General Ban
Ki-moon called on Libya to respect its R2P, human rights and international
humanitarian law obligations.
16
When their appeals were ignored, on 26
February, the Security Council demanded an end to the violence in Libya,
which “may amount to crimes against humanity”; imposed sanctions;
affirmed Libya’s R2P obligations; and referred Gaddafi to the International
15
See Ramesh Thakur, ‘The Responsibility to Protect and the North–South Divide’, in Sanford
R. Silverburg, ed., International Law: Contemporary Issues and Future Developments (Boulder:
Westview, 2011), pp. 32–47.
16
See ‘Security Council Press Statement on Libya’, United Nations document SC/10180
AFR/2120, 22 February 2011, <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10180.doc.htm>
[Accessed 5 September 2011]; ‘Ban Strongly Condemns Qadhafi’s Actions Against Protesters,
Calls for Punishment’, <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=37599> [Accessed 5
September 2011].
27. Libya and the Responsibility to Protect
- 19 -
Criminal Court (Resolution 1970).
17
On 4 March, both the Global Centre and
International Coalition for R2P published an open letter to the Security
Council pointing out that Resolution 1970 had failed to halt attacks taking
place at the moment and calling for additional protective measures.
18
Although Britain and France took the lead in trying to mobilise diplomatic
support for some military action to help the Libyan rebels, the critical turning
point was US backing. The key decision was made by President Barack
Obama at a meeting with top officials on 15 March. R2P gave him the
necessary intellectual and normative tool to act. He decided to side with pro-
interventionist advisers in favour of a definition of the Libyan crisis that was
closer to his instincts and consistent with the narrative that won him the
White House.
19
The game-changer was the juxtaposition of R2P as a
powerful new galvanising norm; the defection of Libyan diplomats who joined
the chorus of calls from the rebels for immediate action to protect civilians;
and Arab, French and British participation that provided political cover and
international legitimacy. In Iraq in 2003, Washington was the ardent suitor
for military intervention. In Libya in 2011, Washington was the reluctant
follower.
Adopted on 17 March by a 10-0-5 (China, Russia, Brazil, Germany, India)
vote, UN Security Council Resolution 1973 authorised the use of “all
necessary measures … to protect civilians and civilian-populated areas”: the
first UN-sanctioned combat operations since the 1991 Gulf War.
20
In the
Balkans, it took NATO almost the full decade to intervene with air power in
Kosovo in 1999. In Libya, it took just one month to mobilise a broad
coalition, secure a UN mandate to protect civilians, establish and enforce no-
fly and no-drive zones, stop Gaddafi’s advancing army and prevent a
massacre of the innocents in Benghazi.
Carefully crafted both to authorise and delimit the scope of intervention,
Resolution 1973 specified the purpose of military action as humanitarian
protection and limited the means to that goal. At a time when the recapture
of Benghazi by Gaddafi loyalists seemed imminent, Resolution 1973
authorised military action to prevent such civilian slaughter but not intervene
in the civil war (any state has the right to use force to suppress armed
uprisings), nor effect regime change. Occupying or dismembering Libya was
17
United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1970 (2011), 26 February 2011.
18
International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect and the Global Centre for the
Responsibility to Protect, ‘Open Letter to the Security Council on the Situation in Libya’, 4 March
2011, <http://globalr2p.org/advocacy/index.php> [Accessed 5 September 2011].
19
See Helene Cooper and Steven Lee Myers, ‘Obama Takes Hard Line with Libya after Shift by
Clinton’, New York Times, 18 March 2011.
20
United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1973 (2011), 17 March 2011. Previous
operations, such as in Bosnia, East Timor, Somalia or Congo, were or are peace operations
authorised to use force if challenged and not conceived as combat operations from the outset.
28. Ramesh Thakur
- 20 -
prohibited. Gaddafi was not to be directly targeted. To the extent that he
was so targeted, NATO exceeded UN authority in breach of the Charter law.
Obama’s insistence that the United States would not be deploying ground
troops aligned military means to the limited ambitions and objectives:
humanitarian protection, not regime change.
21
In contrast to the Bush
doctrine, under Obama the United States will act in concert with others, not
alone; coax, persuade and heed, not impose its will; and set clear limits on
goals and means. This did not please some shadow warriors. Referring to
the role of Hillary Clinton, Susan Rice, and Samantha Power in the decision
to join the intervention against the inclinations of Defense Secretary Robert
Gates, National Security Adviser Thomas Donilon and Chief of
Counterterrorism John Brennan, Jacob Heibrunn derided Obama for
effectively having been henpecked into interventionism by “these Valkyries
of foreign affairs”.
22
Not to be outdone on misogyny, Mark Krikorian
commented caustically that “our commander-in-chief is an effete vacillator
who is pushed around by his female subordinates”.
23
Norm Consolidation or Abuse
As the collection of articles in this special issue makes clear, there is a close
normative and operational link between R2P and the protection of civilians
(PoC). The jury is still out on whether international military action in Libya
and Côte d’Ivoire will promote consolidation or softening of the twin norms.
There were inconsistencies in the muted response to protests and uprisings
in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia where vital Western geopolitical and oil
interests are directly engaged, and with the lack of equally forceful military
action in Syria and Yemen. Western failures to defend the dignity and rights
of Palestinians under Israeli occupation have been especially damaging to
their claims to promote human rights and oppose humanitarian atrocities
universally instead of selectively.
Despite the doubts, the alternative of standing idly on the sidelines yet again
would have added to the shamefully long list of rejecting the collective
responsibility to protect. Gaddafi would have prevailed and we have no
reason to doubt his threat to embark on a methodical killing spree of rebel
21
The commendable initial clarity was soon muddied, and policy benchmarks made needlessly
tougher, when Obama joined the British and French leaders in writing that although the goal of
military action was “not to remove Qaddafi by force”, “it is impossible to imagine a future for
Libya with Qaddafi in power”. Barack Obama, David Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy, ‘Libya’s
Pathway to Peace’, International Herald Tribune, 14 April 2011.
22
Jacob Heibrunn, ‘America's Foreign Policy Valkyries: Hillary Clinton, Samantha Power, and
Susan Rice’, National Interest, 21 March 2011, <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/jacob-
heilbrunn/americas-foreign-policy-valkyries-hillary-clinton-samantha-p-5047> [Accessed 5
September 2011].
23
Mark Krikorian, ‘They Know Who Wears the Pants in This Country’, National Review Online,
21 March 2011, <http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/262607/they-know-who-wears-pants-
country-mark-krikorian> [Accessed 5 September 2011].
29. Libya and the Responsibility to Protect
- 21 -
leaders, cities and regions alley by alley, house by house, room by room.
Had the world shirked its responsibility, Libya could have been the graveyard
of the new R2P norm and the UN might as well have sounded the last post
for it.
Libya marks the first time the Security Council has authorised an
international R2P operation. Côte d’Ivoire is the first time it has authorised
the use of military force by outside powers solely for PoC. Between them,
Resolutions 1973 and 1975 show that including R2P language in the
preamble might provide the normative justification for PoC demands in the
operational paragraphs of the UN mandates.
Many PoC champions fear the more overtly politicised agenda of R2P. This
ignores the reality of how they come together when atrocity crimes are being
committed. PoC advocates are nervous about being cross-contaminated by
R2P because they tend to focus on the soft side of the subject, such as
programs to train peacekeepers, rather than the sharp end of robust military
action. In justifying the authorisation of all necessary measures by the UN
peace operation in Côte d’Ivoire, UN Security Council Resolution 1975
reaffirmed “the primary responsibility of each State to protect civilians” and,
in the same sentence, reiterated that “parties to armed conflict bear the
primary responsibility to take all feasible steps to ensure the protection of
civilians”.
24
Seamus Milne, convinced that the Arab revolution had been hijacked by the
imperialist West in Libya, argued that “If stopping the killing had been the
real aim, Nato states would have backed a ceasefire and a negotiated
settlement, rather than repeatedly vetoing both”.
25
Terry Macalister, the
Guardian’s energy editor, believes that “The Libyan conflict has been a war
about oil if not ‘for’ oil”. The British and French governments have worked
“hand in glove” with the big energy companies in the war to rid Libya of
Gaddafi and secure access to future energy supplies, he argues. He asks
whether their cooperation is “a potent symbol that western politics and oil are
so closely intermeshed that the agendas of both are indistinguishable”?
26
In his speech to the General Assembly, India’s Prime Minister Manmohan
Singh made a thinly-veiled attack on the expansive interpretation by NATO
of Resolution 1973: “Actions taken under the authority of the United Nations
must respect the unity, territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of
24
United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1975 (2011), 17 March 2011.
25
Seamus Milne, ‘Libya’s Imperial Hijacking Is a Threat to the Arab Revolution’, Guardian, 24
August 2011, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/aug/24/libyas-imperial-hijacking-
threat-arab-revolution> [Accessed 5 September 2011].
26
Terry Macalister, ‘So, Was this a War for Oil?’ Guardian, Friday 2 September 2011,
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/sep/02/next-war-libya-one-for-oil> [Accessed 5
September 2011].
30. Ramesh Thakur
- 22 -
individual states”.
27
Russia and China led the chorus of dismay at the UN
appearing to take sides in the internal conflicts in Libya and Côte d’Ivoire.
28
They may be less willing in future to permit sweeping endorsements for
tough action, either by a coalition (Libya) or by UN peacekeepers (Côte
d’Ivoire).
Value-free pragmatism is no more an answer to the challenge of reconciling
realism and idealism than opportunistic humanitarianism. Brazil, China,
Germany, India, and Russia joined the African Union (AU) in positioning
themselves on the wrong side of the war—as witnessed in the triumphal visit
of British Prime Minister David Cameron and French President Nicolas
Sarkozy to Libya in September—and on the wrong side of history insofar as
the emerging normative architecture is concerned. The AU moved to
recognise the rebel Transitional National Council on 20 September, only
after they had captured Tripoli. Among others, one risk for the AU is that the
new regime will highlight its Arab over its African heritage and identity.
29
The
reason this matters is that, following the Libya precedent, regional
organisations may well acquire a critical ‘gatekeeping role’ in the global
authorisation of R2P-type operations.
30
As long as the rising new powers
remain more concerned with consolidating their national power aspirations
than developing the norms and institutions of global governance,
31
they will
remain incomplete powers, limited by their own narrow ambitions, with their
material grasp being longer than their normative reach.
The Libyan people’s euphoria and NATO’s relief over the successful military
campaign is likely to temper criticisms of the manner in which NATO rode
roughshod over UN authorisation to protect civilians. For NATO had indeed
intervened on behalf of one side in a civil war and pursued regime change.
That said, we should not retreat into naivety on what may be required in
particular circumstances. Already in 2003, replying to criticisms of the ICISS
report by Adam Roberts, I had noted that “the primary motivation behind
intervention—the cause rather than the necessary condition—must not be
defeating an enemy state”. But “If defeat of a non-compliant state or regime
27
‘Manmohan Slams West for Using Force to Change Regimes’, Times of India, 25 September
2011, <http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-09-25/india/30200524_1_libya-
sovereignty-countries> [Accessed 26 September 2011].
28
See Patrick Worsnip, ‘ANALYSIS-U.N. Protection of Civilians at Issue after Libya’, Reuters,
13 May 2011 <http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/analysis-un-protection-of-civilians-at-issue-
after-libya> [Accessed 5 September 2011].
29
See Knox Chitiyo, ‘Has Africa Lost Libya?’, Guardian, 19 September 2011,
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/sep/18/africa-libya-not-lost> [Accessed 19
September 2011].
30
See Alex J Bellamy and Paul D Williams, ‘The New Politics of Protection? Côte d’Ivoire, Libya
and the Responsibility to Protect’, International Affairs, vol. 87, no. 4 (2011), pp. 825-50.
31
See Amitav Acharya, ‘Can Asia Lead? Power Ambitions and Global Governance in the
Twenty-first Century’, International Affairs, vol. 87, no. 4 (2011), pp. 851-69.
31. Libya and the Responsibility to Protect
- 23 -
is the only way to achieve the human protection goals, then so be it”.
32
In
Libya, the West’s strategic interests coincided with UN values. This does not
mean that the latter was subordinated to the former. It does mean, as with
Australia vis-à-vis East Timor in 1999, that there was a better prospect of
sustained NATO engagement than if Western interests were not affected.
Paris, London and Washington—and Ban—did not waver in their resolve,
despite critics from the left pushing for diplomacy, not war and critics from
the right calling for boots on the ground. The protracted wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan notwithstanding, too many expected or demanded instant
military gratification. In fact six months to overthrow an entrenched and
determined dictator is not excessively long. Moreover, it is also true that had
all the restrictions of Resolution 1973 been scrupulously observed, the war
would have been more protracted and messier, and coalition unity of
purpose and action would have been even more strained.
The outcome is a triumph first and foremost for the citizen soldiers who
refused to let fear of Gaddafi’s thugs determine their destiny any longer. It is
triumph secondly for R2P. It is possible for the international community,
working through the authenticated, UN-centred structures and procedures of
organised multilateralism, to deploy international force to neutralise the
military might of a thug and intervene between him and his victims with
reduced civilian casualties and little risk of military casualties. NATO military
muscle deployed on behalf of UN political will help to level the killing field
between citizens and a tyrant.
But the ruins of Libya’s political infrastructure and parlous state of its coffers
mean that the third component in the ICISS formulation R2P—the
international responsibility to rebuild and reconstruct
33
—will also be called
on. This will require the international community to stay engaged with state
building in Libya for some time. Fortunately, Libya’s physical infrastructure
remains mainly intact as there was no Iraq-style shock-and-awe bombing
campaign. The willingness, nature and duration of outside help will also help
to shape the judgment of history on whether Western motivations were
primarily self-interested geopolitical and commercial, or the disinterested
desire to protect civilians from a murderous rampage. As with the war itself,
however, the lead role will have to be assumed by Libyans themselves, while
the international community can assist without assuming ownership of the
process or responsibility for the outcome.
The price of that in turn may require the international community to accept
and live with the political choices made by the Libyans. The Transitional
32
Ramesh Thakur, ‘In Defence of The Responsibility to Protect’, International Journal of Human
Rights, vol. 7, no. 3 (Autumn 2003), p. 163.
33
The substance of this is incorporated within Pillar Two (international assistance) in the
subsequent reformulation of R2P by Secretary-General Ban.
32. Ramesh Thakur
- 24 -
National Council’s immediate priorities are to establish security, law and
order; prevent lootings and reprisals and avoid attacks on black Africans by
lighter-skinned Arabs as the new normal; defeat remaining pockets of
resistance by Gaddafi loyalists and prevent them from turning into a
protracted low-level insurgency, and establish control over the whole
country; restore infrastructure and public services; and ameliorate the
humanitarian situation. National reconciliation based on the politics of
concessions, compromises and power-sharing accommodation,
reconstruction and continuing regional and international support will be the
next order of business after immediate humanitarian needs have been met.
Conclusion
In both Libya and Côte d’Ivoire, regimes that had lost all domestic and
international legitimacy declared war on their own people. In both, global
political responses were shaped by universal values as well as strategic
interests, so that UN member states moved closer to mirroring traditional UN
policy and perspectives. Because the UN is taking the lead in redefining
sovereignty by aligning state prerogatives with the will and consent of the
people, the ruling class of any country must now fear the risk and threat of
international economic, criminal justice and military action if they violate
global standards of conduct and cross UN red lines of behaviour.
34
The two operations in Libya and Côte d’Ivoire therefore mark a pivotal
rebalancing of interests and values. In the old world order, international
politics, like all politics, was a struggle for power.
35
The new international
politics will be about the struggle for the ascendancy of competing normative
architectures based on a combination of power, understood as the
disciplined application of force, and values and ideas.
At the time of writing, the rebels had captured Tripoli but not Gaddafi. Hard
questions, unasked so as not to complicate the push for victory, will now
come to the fore. Who are the rebels? What do they stand for? For whom
do they speak? How much popular support do they command? Albeit
qualified and incomplete, therefore, Libya nevertheless does mark an
important milestone on the journey to tame atrocities on their own people by
tyrants.
In the words of former Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld, the UN was
“not created in order to bring us to heaven, but to save us from hell”.
36
34
For the intimate relationship between the twin normative agendas of R2P and international
criminal justice, see Ramesh Thakur and Vesselin Popovski, ‘The Responsibility to Protect and
Prosecute: The Parallel Erosion of Sovereignty and Impunity’, in Giuliana Ziccardi Capaldo
(ed.), The Global Community: Yearbook of International Law and Jurisprudence 2007, vol. 1
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 39-61.
35
This was most famously formulated in Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The
Struggle for Power and Peace, 4th
ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967).
36
Quoted in Brian Urquhart, Hammarskjold (New York: W. W. Norton, 1994), p. 4.
33. Libya and the Responsibility to Protect
- 25 -
Failures in Africa and the Balkans in the 1990s reflected structural, political
and operational deficiencies that accounted for the UN’s inability to save
people from a life of hell on earth. R2P responds to the idealised UN as the
symbol of an imagined and constructed community of strangers: We are our
brothers’ and sisters’ keepers.
Ramesh Thakur is Professor of International Relations in the ANU’s Asia–Pacific College of
Diplomacy, and Adjunct Professor in the Institute of Ethics, Governance and Law at Griffith
University. He was Vice Rector and Senior Vice Rector of the United Nations University (and
Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations) from 1998–2007. He was a Commissioner
and one of the principal authors of The Responsibility to Protect, and Senior Adviser on
Reforms and Principal Writer of Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s second reform report. His
related books include The United Nations, Peace and Security: From Collective Security to the
Responsibility to Protect (Cambridge University Press, 2006); Global Governance and the UN:
An Unfinished Journey, co-written with Thomas G. Weiss (Indiana University Press, 2010); The
Responsibility to Protect: Norms, Laws and the Use of Force in International Politics (Routledge,
2011); Blood and Borders: The Responsibility to Protect and the Problem of the Kin-State, co-
edited with Walter Kemp and Vesselin Popovski (UN University Press, 2011); and The People
vs. the State: Reflections on UN Authority, US Power and the Responsibility to Protect (UN
University Press, 2011). His next major project is The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy
co-edited with Andrew F. Cooper and Jorge Heine (Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
ramesh.thakur@anu.edu.au.
35. Security Challenges, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Summer 2011), pp. 27-38. - 27 -
The Protection of Civilians in UN
Peacekeeping Operations:
Recent Developments
Michael G. Smith, Jeni Whalan and Peter Thomson
The frequency with which peacekeeping operations have proved inadequate to protect civilians
has prompted substantial reform of peacekeeping mandates and practice. But it has also led to
significant normative developments within the wider UN system—not just in peacekeeping
mandates and practice. This article charts the normative, institutional and operations contours
of the protection of civilians in armed conflict within the UN, highlighting the particular
contributions of the Australian government to that agenda. It concludes by identifying four
pathways through which efforts to protect civilians can be improved. 1
In his report that coincided with Remembrance Day 2010, the Secretary-
General of the United Nations (UN), Ban Ki-Moon, reinforced the central
importance of the ‘protection of civilians’ (PoC) to UN peacekeeping, thereby
confirming protection as a key measure of UN effectiveness and credibility:
we must focus our efforts on enhancing protection where and for whom it
matters most—on the ground, in the midst of conflict and for the hundreds of
thousands of civilians who are, on a daily basis, at risk of, or fall victim to,
serious violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law.2
Armed conflict has tragic consequences for civilians. Too often in recent
conflicts, armed groups have intentionally targeted civilians as a tool of
war—including many in which UN peacekeepers were deployed. In Rwanda
in 1994, the United Nations system and its hopelessly inadequate
peacekeeping force were “almost paralysed in the face of a wave of some of
the worst brutality humankind has seen in [that] century”.
3
In 1995,
peacekeepers in the tragically named UN Protection Force oversaw the
establishment of ‘safe areas’ which were anything but for up to 20,000
civilians killed in and around Srebrenica, Sarajevo, Bihać, Goražde, Žepa,
and Tuzla.
4
And in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Major General
Patrick Cammaert reflected on the abhorrent prevalence of rape, noting that
1
The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors alone; they do not necessarily
reflect the position of the Australian government.
2
United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Protection of Civilians
in Armed Conflict, S/2010/579, 11 November 2010.
3
United Nations Security Council, Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the
United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, S/1999/1257, 16 December 1999.
4
United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to General
Assembly Resolution 53/35: The Fall of Srebrenica, A/54/549, 15 November 1999.
36. Michael G. Smith, Jeni Whalan and Peter Thomson
- 28 -
“[i]t has probably become more dangerous to be a woman than a soldier in
armed conflict”.
5
The frequency with which peacekeeping operations have over the past two
decades proved inadequate to protect civilians has prompted substantial
reform of peacekeeping mandates and practice. But it has also led to
significant normative developments within the wider UN system—not just in
peacekeeping mandates and practice. An emerging priority for field
operations, PoC is also becoming a focal point within the UN security
system: an embryonic coordinating raison d’être among the UN’s central
organs—the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Secretariat—
and its member states and agencies.
In official statements, policy discourse and scholarly contributions, the
credibility of the UN is increasingly argued to hinge on its ability to protect
civilians. In his remarks at the 2010 UN Security Council open debate on the
protection of civilians in armed conflict, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon
stated that “saving and protecting people from the horrors of armed conflict”
is a central component of the UN’s ‘cardinal mission’. The UN’s New
Horizon agenda notes that consensus on policy and requirements for civilian
protection is “central to the success of current and future UN peacekeeping
operations”.
6
Paul Williams goes even further, arguing that PoC is critical to
the “legitimacy and success of individual peacekeeping operations but also
to the credibility of the entire UN system”.
7
Indeed, the protection of civilians is a core component of the UN’s
contemporary efforts to save generations form the scourge of war, echoed in
regional organisations and by national governments around the world.
Nowhere is this more evident than within the multidimensional peace
operations that today integrate protection as a cross-cutting issue to be
addressed by military, civilian and policing components acting in concert—
not by any one component alone. Yet the protection agenda within the UN
system is far outpacing the development of practical, operational methods
for actually fulfilling protection obligations in the field.
8
As Dennis McNamara
noted in 2009, while the last decade saw “major—and even quite radical”
5
Patrick Cammaert quoted in United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights, ‘Rape: Weapon of War’, <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/
RapeWeaponWar.aspx> [Accessed 9 September 2011].
6
UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, A New
Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping (New York: United Nations,
July 2009), p. v.
7
Paul D. Williams, Enhancing Civilian Protection in Peace Operations: Insights from Africa,
Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Research Paper No. 1, (Washington DC: National Defense
University Press, September 2010), p.11.
8
On the history of civilian protection, see Siobhán Wills, Protecting Civilians: The Obligations of
Peacekeepers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
37. The Protection of Civilians in UN Peacekeeping Operations: Recent Developments
- 29 -
progress at the institutional level, “this has not led to more effective
protection in the field for most civilians caught-up in today’s wars”.
9
The Normative and Practical Contours of PoC
A task increasingly assigned to peacekeeping operations by the Security
Council, PoC is, at its roots, based on international humanitarian law, human
rights law and refugee law. The moral imperative to protect civilians is
grounded in inherent principles of humanity and codified in international
law.
10
For humanitarian actors, the touchstone definition of humanitarian
protection is that developed by the International Committee of the Red Cross
and endorsed by the Interagency Standing Committee:
all activities aimed at ensuring full respect for the rights of the individual in
accordance with the letter and the spirit of the relevant bodies of law, i.e.
human rights law, international humanitarian law, and refugee law. Human
rights and humanitarian organisations must conduct these activities in an
impartial manner (not on the basis of race, national or ethnic origin,
language or gender).11
The norm that civilians are not legitimate targets in war and should be
protected from the consequences of violent conflict is subject to little
contestation. As an operational objective and a practical task, however,
protecting civilians is a more challenging endeavour. The operational
implementation of civilian protection can and does mean different things to
different actors. In this way, conceptual debates regarding the ‘protection’
resemble those of other contested terms such as ‘security’—which may refer
to practices across a wide span of traditional national defence, international
collective security or broad human security, entailing distinctive policy
instruments and desired outcomes. Civilian protection can and does exist
outside of peacekeeping operations, which adds to the confusion. Further,
actions to ‘protect’ are not immune from unintended consequences.
9
Dennis McNamara, ‘The Politics of Protection’, keynote address to the conference ‘Protecting
People in Conflict and Crisis: Responding to the Challenges of a Changing World’, Oxford,
September 2009, available <http://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/pdfs/keynotepapermcnamara.pdf>
[Accessed 23 September 2011].
10
See Charles Sampford, this volume. These normative foundations of PoC are shared with
the related norm of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), endorsed by UN member states at the
2005 World Summit. However, where R2P is limited in application to preventing civilians from
four specific mass atrocity crimes—genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic
cleansing—PoC has much broader application: to protect civilians from conflict-related grave
harms, which may include the R2P atrocity crimes, but which also extend to serious human
rights violations and the broader human costs of armed conflict. For more on the relationship
between PoC and R2P, see Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, ‘The Relationship
between the Responsibility to Protect and the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict’, Policy
Brief, 9 May 2011, <http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/The%20Relationship%20Between%
20POC%20and%20R2P-%20Updated.pdf> [accessed 23 September 2011].
11
See International Committee of the Red Cross, Professional Standards for Protection Work,
(Geneva: ICRC, October 2009), p. 8.
38. Michael G. Smith, Jeni Whalan and Peter Thomson
- 30 -
As it exists in debates before the Security Council, and as it will be
considered here, the PoC agenda focuses primarily on the implementation of
protection through the mandates of UN peace operations. At the heart of
contemporary PoC debates is a difficult practical challenge: how should
protection mandates be operationalised? How can protection be
implemented in practice?
In this context, civilian protection is now broadly understood to be an
inherent objective of contemporary peacekeeping. For the authors of the
independent study commissioned by the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping
Operations (DPKO) and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs (OCHA), PoC is intrinsic to peacekeeping and “[m]issions are
presumed to deploy to protect civilians, which is an enduring, implicit goal of
operations”.
12
Importantly, where UN peacekeepers are deployed with protection
mandates, current guidance prescribes the adoption of multidimensional
strategies: just as peacekeeping is no longer the sole domain of soldiers,
protection can only be achieved through the concerted efforts of integrated
civil, military and police components within the peace operation, working in
collaboration with the UN Country Team when deployed, and with the host
state that retains ultimate responsibility for the protection of their citizens.
PoC straddles the traditional ‘3D’ divisions between diplomacy, defence and
development. It requires a fundamentally integrated approach, for which the
security forces and civilian structures of contributing states are often ill-
suited. It stands to reason that if multidimensional UN peacekeeping
missions are effectively to implement PoC, then countries contributing
troops, police and civilian personnel must also develop their own integrated
national approaches; it is unrealistic to expect that the United Nations can
implement PoC when its member states lack the necessary capabilities.
New approaches and ad hoc coordination mechanisms within contributing
member states are required to breakdown and re-link traditional silos of
effort, including for the development of national PoC doctrine.
The Evolution of PoC in UN Peacekeeping
The personnel of today’s peace operations face more difficult PoC
challenges than did ‘traditional’ peacekeepers. Developed during the Cold
War, traditional peacekeeping operations were deployed primarily to address
inter-state conflicts. Designed to implement agreed conflict settlements,
12
Victoria Holt and Glyn Taylor, with Max Kelly, Protecting Civilians in the Context of UN
Peacekeeping Operations: Successes, Setbacks and Remaining Challenges, independent
study jointly commissioned by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the UN
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 17 November 2009, p. 210. Similarly, Paul
Williams views civilian protection as the ‘very essence’ of peacekeeping (Enhancing Civilian
Protection in Peace Operations, p. 7).
39. The Protection of Civilians in UN Peacekeeping Operations: Recent Developments
- 31 -
these operations were charged with monitoring ceasefires and buffer zones,
in largely consensual environments populated by state-controlled militaries.
To the extent that traditional peacekeeping missions helped to manage or
end conflict, they coincidentally may have contributed to protecting civilians.
However, PoC was neither the core concern nor the explicit mandate of
these earlier operations. Some earlier precedent can be found in the
wording of a leaflet, signed by Special Representative of the Secretary-
General Ralph Bunche and Force Commander General Carl Van Horn,
distributed to troops of the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC),
deployed in 1960:
You serve as members of an international force. It is a peace force, not a
fighting force … Your task is to help in restoring order and calm in this
country which has been so troubled recently … Protection against acts of
violence is to be given to all the people, white and black. You carry arms,
but they are to be used only in self-defence. You are in the Congo to help
everyone, to harm no one.13
Deployed within a state and authorised to use force if necessary, ONUC
stands out from the UN’s other early peacekeeping endeavours, not least for
its demonstration of the fundamental tensions between sovereignty, consent,
impartiality, human rights and the broader maintenance of peace and
security.
These tensions continue to plague contemporary peacekeeping, with the
political, analytical and practical challenges of civilian protection at their core.
There is nothing ‘new’ about the human cost of conflict, nor anything
distinctly modern about the deliberate targeting of civilians as a tactic of
warfare. But for the UN, and for its constantly evolving instrument of
peacekeeping, the challenge of confronting these wrongs remains a
relatively new demand on the organisation. In Cambodia, Rwanda, Bosnia,
Haiti, East Timor, and in a host of African states, UN peacekeepers have
been deployed in settings where civilians have tragically been targeted in
deliberate attacks by armed parties. Mechanisms such as ceasefire
monitoring and interposition forces are no longer sufficient to address the
conditions of insecurity into which peace operations are deployed, where
often fragmented armed groups wage conflict across invisible ‘frontlines’ that
can too easily be concealed within communities. Peacekeepers are now
more often authorised to use all necessary means, including deadly force, in
the pursuit of their mandates.
Notably, there is no explicit mention of civilian protection in Boutros-Ghali’s
landmark An Agenda for Peace, which in 1992 laid out a new manifesto for
the post-Cold War United Nations, nor its 1995 Supplement, released after
13
Quoted in Herbert Nicholas, ‘UN Peace Forces and the Changing Globe: The Lessons of
Suez and Congo’, International Organization, vol. 17, no. 2 (Spring 1963), fn. 14, pp. 329-30.
40. Michael G. Smith, Jeni Whalan and Peter Thomson
- 32 -
the tragedy of Rwanda. In October 1995, DPKO released its ‘General
Guidelines for Peacekeeping’, which mentions civilian protection only once,
to question the feasibility and desirability of ‘safe areas’ that damage the
impartiality of peacekeepers.
14
By 1998, however, the demand for peacekeeping reform had seized UN
headquarters. In that year, the Secretary-General Kofi Annan marked an
important step in the UN’s emerging protection agenda by identifying PoC as
a ‘humanitarian imperative’. Outlining his justification for prioritising civilian
protection on the Security Council’s agenda, Annan characterised the
significance of PoC in a manner that continues to shape its debates today:
In recent decades, there has been a dramatic and unacceptable
deterioration in the level of adherence to humanitarian norms in crisis
situations … In the past, civilian populations were chiefly indirect victims of
fighting between hostile armies. Today, they are often the main targets,
with women suffering in disproportionate numbers while often also being
subjected to atrocities that include organised rape and sexual exploitation …
Adherence to international humanitarian and human rights norms by all
parties to a conflict must be insisted upon, and I intend to make this a
priority in the work of the United Nations.15
In the years that followed, the United Nations progressively embedded PoC
as a peacekeeping objective. In 1999, the Security Council established the
United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMISIL), authorising
it “within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to afford protection to
civilians under imminent threat of physical violence”.
16
The Security Council
has now authorised twelve UN peace operations with PoC mandates, eight
of which remain active at the time of writing in 2011: UNOCI in Cote d’Ivoire;
MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of Congo; MINUSTAH in Haiti;
UNIFIL in Lebanon; UNMIL in Liberia; UNMISS in South Sudan; UNISFA in
Abyei; and UNAMID in Darfur.
17
The release in 2000 of The Report of the Panel on United Nations
Peacekeeping Operations, known as the Brahimi Report, catalysed
significant shifts in the UN’s approach to peace operations, including with
regard to PoC. The report identified numerous problems in UN
peacekeeping; among its many recommendations was the call for “robust
doctrine and realistic mandates”. The Brahimi Report observed that the UN
had often been unable to respond effectively to challenges on the ground
14
United Nations Department of Peace-keeping Operations, General Guidelines for Peace-
Keeping Operations (New York: United Nations, 1995); see also Williams, Enhancing Civilian
Protection in Peace Operations, p. 13.
15
United Nations, The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable
Development in Africa, Report of the Secretary-General, A/52/871—S/1998/318, 13 April 1998,
paras 49-50.
16
United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1270 (1999), 22 October 1999.
17
The UN mission in Sudan (UNMIS) completed its operations in July 2011; its successor
mission, the UN mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) also has a PoC mandate.
41. The Protection of Civilians in UN Peacekeeping Operations: Recent Developments
- 33 -
and it stressed the need for peacekeepers, once deployed, to carry out their
mandates “professionally and successfully”. Moreover, UN peacekeepers,
whether troops or police, who witness violence against civilians “should be
presumed to be authorised to stop it, within their means, in support of basic
UN principles”.
18
As PoC gained prominence within UN peacekeeping debates, in 2002 UN
OCHA submitted to the Security Council an Aide Memoire, intended as a
practical diagnostic tool for the Security Council’s consideration of PoC
issues during deliberations on peacekeeping mandates. The Aide Memoire
is regularly updated; its fourth edition, published in 2011, identifies seven
general areas of protection concern:
1. Parties’ responsibilities to protect and assist the conflict-affected
population;
2. The protection of refugees and internally displaced persons;
3. Humanitarian access and safety and security of humanitarian
workers;
4. The conduct of hostilities;
5. Small arms and light weapons, mines and explosive remnants of
war;
6. Compliance, accountability and the rule of law; and
7. Media and information, inc. protection of journalists, countering
occurrences of speech used to incite violence, and promoting and
supporting accurate management of information on the conflict.
19
The Aide Memoire also details protection concerns related to two specific
conflict-affected populations: women and children. Finally, it includes an
appendix of protection language used in Security Council resolutions to
address the spectrum of issues listed above.
Two cross-cutting protection themes have emerged in Security Council
debates over the past decade: the protection of women and children in
conflict. In 2000 the Security Council specifically linked women’s experience
of conflict to the maintenance of international peace and security.
20
In 2008,
18
United Nations, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, A/55/305—
S/2000/809, 21 August 2000.
19
UN OCHA, ‘Aide Memoire: For the Consideration of Issues Pertaining to the Protection of
Civilians in Armed Conflict’, Policy and Studies Series, vol. 1, no. 4 (2011). The Aide Memoires
have been adopted through Presidential Statements in the Security Council; the most recent
was adopted in S/PRST/2011/25.
20
United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1325 (2000), 31 October 2000.