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"In Larger Freedom": Decision Time at the UN
Author(s): Kofi Annan
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 3 (May - Jun., 2005), pp.
63-74
Published by: Council on Foreign Relations
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n Larger Freec omn
Decision Time at the UN
Kofi Annan
OUR SHARED VULNERABILITY
As K A New York investment banker who walks past Ground
Zero
every day on her way to work what today's biggest threat is.
Then ask
an illiterate 12-year-old orphan in Malawi who lost his parents
to
AIDS. You Will get two very different answers. Invite an
Indonesian
fisherman mourning the loss of his entire family and the
destruction
of his village from the recent, devastating tsunami to tell you
what he
fears most. Then ask a villager in Darfiur, stalked by murderous
militias
and fearftil of bombing raids. Their answers, too, are likely to
diverge.
Different perceptions of what is a threat are often the biggest
obstacles to international cooperation. But I believe that in the

twenty
first century they should not be allowed to lead the world's
governments
to pursue very different priorities or to work at cross-purposes.
Today's
threats are deeply interconnected, and they feed off of one
another. The
misery of people caught in unresolved civil conflicts or of
populations
mired in extreme poverty, for example, may increase their
attraction
to terrorism. The mass rape of women that occurs too often in
today's
conflicts makes the spread of HIV and AIDS all the more likely.
In fact, all of us are vulnerable to what we think of as dangers
that
threaten only other people. Millions more of sub-Saharan
Africa's
inhabitants would plunge below the poverty line if a nuclear
terrorist
attack against a financial center in the United States caused a
massive
downturn in the global economy. By the same token, millions
ofAmer
icans could quickly become infected if, naturally or through
malicious
KOFI ANNAN is Secretary-General of the United Nations.
[63]
Kofi Annan

intent, a new disease were to break out in a country with poor
health
care and be carried across the world by unwitting air travelers
before
it was identified.
No nation can defend itself against these threats entirely on its
own.
Dealing with today's challenges-from ensuring that deadly
weapons
do not fall into dangerous hands to combating global climate
change,
from preventing the trafficking of sex slaves by organized
criminal
gangs to holding war criminals to account before competent
courts
requires broad, deep, and sustained global cooperation. States
working
together can achieve things that are beyond what even the most
powerful state can accomplish by itself.
Those who drew up the charter of the United Nations in 1945
saw
these realities very clearly. In the aftermath of World War II,
which
claimed the lives of 50 million people, they established at the
San
Francisco conference in 1945 an organization (in the words of
the
charter) to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of
war."
Their purpose was not to usurp the role of sovereign states but
to enable
states to serve their peoples better by working together. The
UN'S

founders knew that this enterprise could not be narrowly
conceived
because security, development, and human rights are
inextricably
linked. Thus they endowed the new world organization with
broad
ambitions: to ensure respect for fuindamental human rights, to
establish
conditions under which justice and the rule of law can be
maintained,
and, as the charter says, "to promote social progress and better
standards
of life in larger freedom."
When the UN Charter speaks of "larger freedom," it includes
the
basic political freedoms to which all human beings are entitled.
But
it also goes beyond them, encompassing what President Franklin
Roosevelt called "freedom from want" and "freedom from fear."
Both
our security and our principles have long demanded that we
push
forward all these frontiers of freedom, conscious that progress
on one
depends on and reinforces progress on the others. In the last 6o
years,
rapid technological advances, increasing economic
interdependence,
globalization, and dramatic geopolitical change have made this
imperative only more urgent. And since the attacks of
September n,
2001, people everywhere have come to realize this. A new
insecurity
has entered every mind, regardless of wealth or status. More

clearly
[64] FOREIGN AFFAIRS Vo/ume84No.3
"In Larger Freedom". Decision Time at the UN
than ever before, we understand that our safety, our prosperity
indeed, our freedom-is indivisible.
A NEW SAN FRANCISCO MOMENT
YET PRECISELY when these challenges have become so stark,
and
when collective action has become so plainly required, we see
deep
discord among states. Such dissonance discredits our global
institutions.
It allows the gap between the haves and the have-nots, the
strong and
the weak, to grow. It sows the seeds of a backlash against the
very
principles that the UN was set up to advance. And by inviting
states
to pursue their own solutions, it calls into question some of the
fun
damental principles that have, however imperfectly, buttressed
the
international order since 1945.
Future generations will not forgive us if we continue down this
path.
We cannot just muddle along and make do with incremental
responses

in an era when organized crime syndicates seek to smuggle both
sex
slaves and nuclear materials across borders; when whole
societies are
being laid waste by AIDS; when rapid advances in
biotechnology make
it all too feasible to create "designer bugs" immune to current
vaccines;
and when terrorists, whose ambitions are very plain, find ready
recruits
among young men in societies with little hope, even less justice,
and
narrowly sectarian schools. It is urgent that our world unite to
master
today's threats and not allow them to divide us and thus master
us.
In recent months, I have received two wide-ranging reviews of
our global challenges: one from the 16-member High-Level
Panel
on Threats, Challenges, and Change, which I had asked to make
proposals to strengthen our collective security system; the other
from
250 experts who undertook the UN Millennium Project and
devised a
plan to cut global poverty in half within the next ten years. Both
reports are remarkable as much for their hardheaded realism as
for
their bold vision. Having carefully studied them, and
extensively
consulted UN member states, I have just placed before the
world's
governments my own blueprint for a new era of global
cooperation
and collective action.

My report, entitled "In Larger Freedom," calls on states to use
the
summit of world leaders that will be held at UN headquarters in
FOREIGN AFFAIRS May/June 2005 [65]
KofiAnnan
September to strengthen our collective security, lay down a
truly
global strategy for development, advance the cause of human
rights
and democracy in all nations, and put in place new mechanisms
to
ensure that these commitments are translated into action.
Account
ability-of states to their citizens, of states to one another, of
inter
national institutions to their members, and of this present
generation
to future ones-is essential for our success. With that in mind,
the UN
must undergo the most sweeping overhaul of its 6o-year history.
World leaders must recapture the spirit of San Francisco and
forge a
new world compact to advance the cause of larger freedom.
FREEDOM FROM FEAR
THE STARTING POINT for a new consensus should be a broad
view
of today's threats. These dangers include not just international
wars

but also civil violence, organized crime, terrorism, and weapons
of
mass destruction. They also include poverty, infectious disease,
and
environmental degradation, since these ills can also have
catastrophic
consequences and wreak tremendous damage. All of these can
under
mine states as the basic units of the international system.
All states-strong and weak, rich and poor-share an interest in
having a collective security system that commits them to act
cooper
atively against a broad array of threats. The basis of such a
system
must be a new commitment to preventing latent threats from
becoming
imminent and imminent threats from becoming actual, as well as
an
agreement on when and how force should be used if preventive
strategies fail.
Action is required on many fronts, but three of them stand out
as
particularly urgent. First, we must ensure that catastrophic
terrorism
never becomes a reality. In that cause, we must make use of the
unique
normative strength, global reach, and convening power of the
UN. To
start, a comprehensive convention against terrorism should be
devel
oped. The UN has been central in helping states negotiate and
adopt

12 international antiterrorism conventions, but a comprehensive
convention outlawing terrorism in all its forms has so far eluded
us because of debates on "state terrorism" and the right to resist
occupation. It is time to put these debates aside. The use of
force by
AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS
states is already thoroughly regulated under international law.
And
the right to resist occupation must be understood in its true
meaning:
it cannot include the right deliberately to kill or maim civilians.
World leaders should unite behind a definition of terrorism that
makes clear beyond any question that the targeting of civilians
or
noncombatants is never acceptable. And they must work to
strengthen
the capacity of states to meet the binding antiterrorism
obligations
imposed on them by the Security Council.
Equally urgent is the need to breathe new life into our
multilateral
frameworks for the management of biological, chemical, and
especially
nuclear weapons; we must prevent the proliferation of these
weapons
and keep them out of the most dangerous hands. For 35 years,
the Non
proliferation Treaty (NPT), signed by all but three nations in

the world,
has gready reduced the danger of nuclear weapons' being used
by placing
strict but voluntarily accepted limits on their possession. But
recently,
for the first time, a party (North Korea) has withdrawn from the
treaty,
and strains on its verification and enforcement measures have
led to a
crisis of confidence.
To prevent a cascade of proliferation, we must find ways to
mitigate
the tensions caused by the fact that technology required for
civilian
FOREIGN AFFAIRS *May/June200s [67]
KofiAnnan
uses of nuclear power can also be used to develop nuclear
weapons.
The verification role of the International Atomic Energy Agency
should be strengthened through universal acceptance of the
Model
Additional Protocol (which toughens the NPT's reporting
requirements
and inspection regime), and incentives should be developed to
help
states forgo the development of sensitive fuel-cycle activities
while
guaranteeing them the fuel they need for peaceful purposes. We
should

also welcome other initiatives, such as Security Council
Resolution
1540, which aims to prevent nonstate actors from gaining access
to
hazardous weapons, technology, and materials, and the
voluntary
Proliferation Security Initiative, through which an increasing
number
of states are cooperating to prevent ilicit trafficking in nuclear,
chemical,
and biological weapons and materials.
A third priority is to make sure that we succeed when we take
on
the task of building lasting peace in war-torn lands. So far, our
success
in winning the peace has been decidedly mixed. Half of all civil
wars
that appear to have been resolved by peace agreements
tragically slide
States working
together can achieve
more than what even
the most powerful state
can accomplish
by itself.
back into conflict within five years. This slip
can have catastrophic consequences: millions
perished, for example, in Angola and Rwanda
in the mid-9ggos after peace agreements col
lapsed in both countries. Although over the
last decade the international community has
come to a much deeper appreciation of what

it takes to win the peace, it still lacks a strategic
focus for its work. I therefore propose the
creation of a new intergovernmental organ
in the UN: a Peacebuilding Commission. The commission would
be a
forum in which representatives from donor countries, troop
contribu
tors, and the country being helped would sit together with
leaders
from other member states, international financial institutions,
and
regional organizations to agree on strategy, provide policy
guidance,
mobilize resources, and coordinate the efforts of all involved.
When prevention fails, and all other means have been
exhausted, we
must be able to rely on the use of force. However, we need to
find com
mon ground on when and how. Article 51 of the UN Charter
preserves
the right of all states to act in self-defense against an armed
attack.
[68] FOREIGN AFFAIRS* Volume84 No.3
"In Larger Freedom" Decision Time at the UN
Most lawyers recognize that the provision includes the right to
take pre
emptive action against an imminent threat; it needs no
reinterpretation

or rewriting. Yet today we also face dangers that are not
imminent but
that could materialize with little or no warning and might
culminate in
nightmare scenarios if left unaddressed. The Security Council is
fully
empowered by the UN Charter to deal with such threats, and it
must be
ready to do so.
We must also remember that state sovereignty carries
responsibilities
as well as rights, including the responsibility to protect citizens
from
genocide or other mass atrocities. When states fail to live up to
this
responsibility, it passes to the international community, which,
if
necessary, should stand ready to take enforcement action
authorized
by the Security Council.
The decision to use force is never easy. To help forge consensus
over when and how resort to force is appropriate, the Security
Council should consider the seriousness of the threat, whether
the
proposed action addresses the threat, the proportionality of that
pro
posed action, whether force is being contemplated as a last
resort, and
whether the benefits of using force would outweigh the costs of
not
using it. Balancing such considerations will not produce made-
to
measure answers but should help produce decisions that are
grounded

in principle and therefore command broad respect.
LIVING IN DIGNITY
ACCEPTING OUR solemn responsibility to protect civilians
against
massive violations of human rights is part of a larger need: to
take
human rights and the rule of law seriously in the conduct of
interna
tional affairs. We need long-term, sustained engagement to
integrate
human rights and the rule of law into all the work of the UN.
This
commitment is as critical to conflict prevention as it is to
poverty
reduction, particularly in states struggling to shed a legacy of
violence.
The UN, as the vehicle through which the Universal Declaration
of
Human Rights and two international human rights covenants
have been
promulgated, has made an enormous contribution to human
rights. But
the international machinery in place today is not sufficient to
ensure
that those rights are upheld in practice. The Office of the UN
High
FO RE I GN AF FA I RS May/June 2005 [ 6 9]
KofiAnnan

Commissioner for Human Rights operates on a shoestring
budget, with
insufficient capacity to monitor the field. The high
commissioner's office
needs more support, both political and financial. The Security
Council
and in time, I hope, the proposed Peacebuilding Commission-
should
involve the high commissioner much more actively in its
deliberations.
The Commission on Human Rights has been discredited in the
eyes
of many. Too often states seek membership to insulate
themselves from
criticism or to criticize others, rather than to assist in the body's
true task,
which is to monitor and encourage the compliance of all states
with
their human rights obligations. The time has come for real
reform. The
commission should be transformed into a new Human Rights
Council.
The members of this council should be elected directly by the
General
Assembly and pledge to abide by the highest human rights
standards.
No human rights agenda can ignore the right of all people to
govern
themselves through democratic institutions.The principles of
democracy
are enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
which,
ever since it was adopted in 1948, has inspired constitutions in

every
corner of the globe. Democracy is more widely accepted and
practiced
today than ever before. By setting norms and leading efforts to
end
colonialism and ensure self-determination, the UN has helped
nations
freely choose their destiny. The UN has also given concrete
support for
elections in more and more countries: in the last year alone, it
has
done so in more than 20 areas and countries, including
Afghanistan,
Palestine, Iraq, and Burundi. Since democracy is about far more
than
elections, the organization's work to improve governance
throughout
the developing world and to rebuild the rule of law and state
institutions
in war-torn countries is also of vital importance. Member states
of the
UN should now build on this record, as President George W.
Bush
suggested to the UN General Assembly in September 2004, by
sup
porting a fund to help countries establish or strengthen
democracy.
Of course, at the UN, democratic states sometimes have to work
with nondemocratic ones. But today's threats do not stop neatly
at the
borders of democratic states, and just as no democratic nation
restricts
its bilateral relations to democracies, no multilateral
organization
designed to achieve global objectives can restrict its

membership to
them. I look forward to the day when every member state of the
General Assembly is democratically governed. The UN'S
universal
"In Larger Freedom"1- Decision Time at the UN
membership is a precious asset in advancing that goal. The very
fact
that nondemocratic states often sign on to the UN'S agenda
opens an
avenue through which other states, as well as civil society
around the
world, can press them to align their behavior with their
commitments.
FREEDOM FROM WANT
SUPPORT FOR human rights and democracy must go hand in
hand
with serious action to promote development. A world in which
every year i1 million children die before their fifth birthday,
almost
all from preventable causes, and 3 million people of all ages die
of
AIDS is not a world of larger freedom. It is a world that
desperately
needs a practical strategy to implement the Millennium
Declaration
on which all states solemnly agreed five years ago. The eight

Millen
nium Development Goals that are to be achieved by 2015
include
halving the proportion of people in the world who live in
extreme
poverty and hunger, ensuring that all children receive primary
education, and turning the tide against HIV/AIDS, malaria, and
other
major diseases.
The urgency of taking more effective action to achieve these
goals
can hardly be overstated. Although the deadline is still a decade
away,
we risk missing it if we do not drastically accelerate and scale
up our
action this year. Development gains cannot be achieved
overnight. It
takes time to train teachers, nurses, and engineers; to build
roads,
schools, and hospitals; and to grow the small and large
businesses that
create jobs and generate income for the poor.
The UN summit in September must be the time when all nations
sign up not just for a declaration but also for a detailed plan of
attack
on deadly poverty by which all can be judged. That summit will
be a
moment for deeds rather than words-a moment to implement the
commitments that have been made and to move from the realm
of
aspirations to that of operations.

At the core of this plan must be the global partnership between
rich and poor countries, the terms of which were set out three
years
ago at the International Conference on Financing for Develop
ment in Monterrey, Mexico. That historic compact was firmly
grounded in the principles of mutual responsibility and mutual
ac
FORE IGN AFFAI RS May/June 2005 [71]
KofiAnnan
countability. It reaffirmed the responsibility of each country for
its
own development and elicited concrete commitments from
wealthy
nations to support poorer ones.
In September, all developing countries should undertake to put
forward, by 2006, practical national strategies to meet the
Millennium
Goals. Each country should map the key dimensions and
underlying
causes of extreme poverty, use that map to assess its needs and
identify
necessary public investments, and convert that assessment into a
ten-year framework for action, elaborating three-to-five-year
poverty
reduction strategies for the meantime.
Donors must also ensure that developing countries that put such

strategies in place really do get the support they need, in the
form of
market access, debt relief, and official development assistance
(ODA).
For too long, ODA has been inadequate, unpredictable, and
driven by
supply rather than demand. Although such aid has been
increasing
since the Monterrey summit, already with noticeable results,
many
donors still give far less than the target of 0.7 percent of gross
national
income. All of them should now draw up their own ten-year
strategies
to meet the 0.7 percent target by 2015 and ensure that they
reach o.5 per
cent by 2009.
We need action on other fronts, too. On global climate change,
for
example, the time has come to agree on an international
framework
that draws in all major emitters of greenhouse gases in a
common
effort to combat global warming beyond the year 2012, when
the
Kyoto Protocol is due to expire. We need both a commitment to
a new
regulatory framework and far more innovative use of new
technologies
and market mechanisms in carbon trading. We must also learn
the
lesson of December's devastating tsunami, by putting in place a
worldwide capability to give early warning of all natural

hazards
not just tsunamis and storms, but floods, droughts, landslides,
heat
waves, and volcanic eruptions.
A RENEWED UN
IF THE UN is to be a vehicle through which states can meet the
challenges of today and tomorrow, it needs major reforms to
strengthen
its relevance, effectiveness, and accountability. In September,
decisions
[72] FOREIGN AFFAIRS Volume 84:1No.3
"In Larger Freedom": Decision Time at the UN
should be reached to make the General Assembly and the Eco
nomic and Social Council more strategic in their work. Just as
we
contemplate creating new institutions such as a Peacebuilding
Com
mission, we should abolish those that are no longer needed,
such
as the Trusteeship Council.
No reform of the UN would be complete, however, without
Security
Council reform. The council's present makeup reflects the world
of
1945, not that of the twenty-first century. It must be reformed
to
include states that contribute most to the organization,

financially,
militarily, and diplomatically, and to represent broadly the
current
membership of the UN. Two models for expanding the council
from
15to 24 members are now on the table: one creates six new
permanent
seats and three new nonpermanent ones; the other creates nine
new
nonpermanent seats. Neither model expands the veto power
currently
enjoyed by the five permanent members. I believe the time has
come
to tackle this issue head on. Member states should make up their
minds and reach a decision before the September summit.
Equally important is reform of the UN Secretariat and the wider
network of agencies, funds, and programs that make up the UN
system.
Since 1997, there has been a quiet revolution at the UN,
rendering the
system more coherent and efficient. But I am deeply conscious
that
more needs to be done to make the organization more
transparent
and accountable, not just to member states, but to the public on
whose confidence it relies and whose interests it ultimately
must
serve. Recent failures have only underlined this imperative.
I am already taking a series of measures to make the UN
Secretariat's

procedures and management more open to scrutiny. But if
reform is
to be truly successful, the secretary-general, as chief
administrative
officer of the organization, must be empowered to manage it
with
autonomy and flexibility, so that he or she can drive through the
nec
essary changes. The secretary-general must be able to align the
organization's work program behind the kind of agenda I have
outlined,
once it is endorsed by member states, and not be hamstrung by
old
mandates and a fragmented decision-making structure that
jeopardize
setting a central strategic direction. When member states grant
the post
this autonomy and flexibility, they will have both the right and
the
responsibility to demand even greater transparency and
accountability.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS May/June 2005 [73]
KofiAnnan
DECISION TIME
IN CALLING ON member states to make the most far-reaching
reform
in the organization's history and to come together on a range of
issues
where collective action is required, I do not claim that success

through
multilateral means is guaranteed. But I can almost guarantee
that
unilateral approaches will, over time, fail. I believe states have
no
reasonable alternative to working together, even if collaboration
means taking the priorities of your partners seriously to ensure
that
they will take seriously your own in return-even if, as President
HarryTruman said in San Francisco 6o years ago, "We all have
to rec
ognize, no matter how great our strength, that we must deny
ourselves
the license to do always as we please."
The urgency of global cooperation is now more apparent than
ever.
A world warned of its vulnerability cannot stand divided while
old
problems continue to claim the lives of millions and new
problems
threaten to do the same. A world of interdependence cannot be
safe
or just unless people everywhere are freed from want and fear
and are
able to live in dignity. Today, as never before, the rights of the
poor
are as fundamental as those of the rich, and a broad
understanding of
them is as important to the security of the developed world as it
is to
that of the developing world.
Ralph Bunche, a great American and the first UN official to

receive
the Nobel Peace Prize, once said that the UN exists "not merely
to
preserve the peace but also to make change-even radical change
possible without violent upheaval. The UN has no vested
interest in
the status quo."Today, these words take on new significance.
The UN'S
mission of peace must bring closer the day when all states
exercise
their sovereignty responsibly, deal with internal dangers before
these
threaten their citizens and those of other states, enable and
empower
their citizens to choose the kind of lives they would like to live,
and
act with other states to meet global threats and challenges. In
short,
the UN must steer all of the world's peoples toward "better
standards
of life in larger freedom." The UN summit in September is the
chance
for all of us to set out on that path.0
[74] FOREIGN AFFAIRS Volume84No.3
Article Contentsp. 63p. 64p. 65p. 66p. 67p. 68p. 69p. 70p. 71p.
72p. 73p. 74Issue Table of ContentsForeign Affairs, Vol. 84,
No. 3 (May - Jun., 2005), pp. 1-158Front MatterCommentsA
Global Answer to Global Problems: The Case for a New
Leaders' Forum [pp. 2-6]Pitch Imperfect: The Trouble at the
Voice of America [pp. 7-13]In Memoriam: George F. Kennan,
1904-2005 [p. 11-11]ReflectionLessons from German History
[pp. 14-18]EssaysThe Autumn of the Autocrats [pp. 20-
35]Freedom and Justice in the Modern Middle East [pp. 36-
51]Gaza: Moving Forward by Pulling Back [pp. 52-62]"In

Larger Freedom": Decision Time at the UN [pp. 63-74]Saving
the World Bank [pp. 75-85]What If the British Vote No? [pp.
86-97]How the Street Gangs Took Central America [pp. 98-
110]Down to the Wire [pp. 111-124]Reviews &
ResponsesReview EssayReview: Sisyphus as Social Democrat:
The Life and Legacy of John Kenneth Galbraith [pp. 126-
130]Recent Books on International RelationsPolitical and
LegalReview: untitled [p. 131-131]Review: untitled [pp. 131-
132]Review: untitled [p. 132-132]Review: untitled [pp. 132-
133]Review: untitled [p. 133-133]Review: untitled [p. 133-
133]Economic, Social, and EnvironmentalReview: untitled [pp.
133-134]Review: untitled [p. 134-134]Review: untitled [pp.
134-135]Review: untitled [p. 135-135]Review: untitled [p. 135-
135]Military, Scientific, and TechnologicalReview: untitled [p.
137-138]Review: untitled [p. 138-138]The United
StatesReview: untitled [p. 138-138]Review: untitled [p. 139-
140]Review: untitled [p. 140-140]Western EuropeReview:
untitled [pp. 140-141]Review: untitled [p. 141-141]Review:
untitled [p. 141-141]Review: untitled [pp. 141-142]Review:
untitled [p. 142-142]Western HemisphereReview: untitled [pp.
144]Eastern Europe and Former Soviet RepublicsReview:
untitled [p. 145-145]Review: untitled [p. 145-145]Review:
untitled [p. 146-146]Review: untitled [pp. 146-147]Middle
EastReview: untitled [p. 147-147]Review: untitled [pp. 147-
148]Review: untitled [pp. 148-149]Asia and PacificReview:
untitled [p. 149-149]Review: untitled [pp. 149-150]Review:
untitled [pp. 150-151]AfricaReview: untitled [pp. 151-

153]Review: untitled [p. 153-153]Letters to the EditorNew
Balance [pp. 154-155]Shades of Black [pp. 155-156]Snowball
Effect [p. 156-156]Waste Not [pp. 156-157]Happy Thoughts [p.
158-158]Back Matter
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2005.pdf
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2009.pdf
A World Without Power | Foreign Policy
http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/27/a-world-without-power/
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PLSI 120/articles/Global Battle on AIDS NY Times 010508.doc
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/05/washington/05aids.html?_r
=1&th&emc=th&oref=slogin
NY Times
January 5, 2008
In Global Battle on AIDS, Bush Creates Legacy
By SHERYL GAY STOLBERG
WASHINGTON — Dr. Jean W. Pape did not know what to
expect in early January 2003, when he slipped away from his
work treating AIDS patients in Haiti and flew to Washington for
a secret meeting with President Bush.
Mr. Bush was considering devoting billions to combat global
AIDS, a public health initiative unparalleled in size and scope.
The deliberations had been tightly carried out; even the health
secretary was left out early on. If President Bush was going to
shock the world — and skeptical Republicans — with a huge
expenditure of American cash to send expensive drugs overseas,
he wanted it to be well spent.
“He said, ‘I will hold you accountable, because this is a big

move, this is an important thing that I’ve been thinking about
for a long time,’” recalled Dr. Pape, one of several international
AIDS experts Mr. Bush consulted. “We indicated to him that
our arms are totally broken as physicians, knowing that there
are things we could do if we had the drugs.”
Nearly five years later, the President’s Emergency Plan for
AIDS Relief — Pepfar, for short — may be the most lasting
bipartisan accomplishment of the Bush presidency.
With a year left in office, Mr. Bush confronts an America
bitterly split over the war in Iraq. His domestic achievements,
the tax cuts and education reform, are not fully embraced by
Democrats, and his second-term legislative agenda —
revamping Social Security and immigration policy — lies in
ruins.
The global AIDS program is a rare exception. So far, roughly
1.4 million AIDS patients have received lifesaving medicine
paid for with American dollars, up from 50,000 before the
initiative. Even Mr. Bush’s most ardent foes, among them
Senator John Kerry of Massachusetts, his 2004 Democratic
challenger, find it difficult to argue with the numbers.
“It’s a good thing that he wanted to spend the money,” said Mr.
Kerry, an early proponent of legislation similar to the plan Mr.
Bush adopted. “I think it represents a tremendous
accomplishment for the country.”
Announced in the 2003 State of the Union address, the plan
called for $15 billion for AIDS prevention, treatment and care,
concentrating on 15 hard-hit nations in Africa and the
Caribbean. An enthusiastic Congress has already approved $19
billion.
Mr. Bush is pressing for a new five-year commitment of $30

billion. He will travel to Africa in February to make his case —
and, the White House hopes, burnish the compassionate
conservative side of his legacy.
Despite the effort, there are still 33 million people living with
H.I.V., and the United Nations estimates that there were 1.7
million new infections in 2007 in sub-Saharan Africa alone.
Critics, including Mr. Kerry, are particularly incensed by the
requirement that one-third of the prevention funds be spent
teaching abstinence, despite a lack of scientific consensus that
such programs reduce the spread of H.I.V.
When a Ugandan AIDS activist, Beatrice Were, denounced the
abstinence-only approach at an international AIDS conference
last year, she received a standing ovation. Paul Zeitz, executive
director of the Global AIDS Alliance, an advocacy group here
in Washington, says the Bush program has been hamstrung by
“ideologically driven policies.”
That assessment was echoed, in more diplomatic terms, by the
independent Institute of Medicine, which evaluated the program
in March. It called on Congress to abandon the abstinence
requirement and to lift the ban on paying for clean needles for
drug addicts, among other changes.
Yet the institute concluded that, over all, the program had made
“a promising start.” And when they step back, even critics like
Mr. Zeitz concede that Mr. Bush spawned a philosophical
revolution. In one striking step, he put to rest the notion that
because patients were poor or uneducated they did not deserve,
or could not be taught to use, medicine that could mean the
difference between life and death.
In Haiti, about 13,000 patients are now receiving anti-retroviral
drugs. That is only half the estimated 26,000 who need them,
but far more than the 100 being treated five years ago. “A huge

success story,” Dr. Pape says, “beyond my imagination.”
In Uganda, a country already far along on its own AIDS
initiative when Mr. Bush began his, 110,000 people are under
treatment, and 2 million have H.I.V. tests each year, up from
10,000 treated and 400,000 tested before, according to Dr. Alex
Coutinho, a top AIDS expert there. The money comes mostly
from Pepfar, but also from a United Nations fund to which the
United States contributes.
Dr. Coutinho said Ugandans were terrified that when Mr. Bush
left office, “the Bush fund,” as they call it, would go with him.
“When I’ve traveled in the U.S., I’m amazed at how little
people know about what Pepfar stands for,” he said. “Just
because it has been done under Bush, it is not something the
country should not be proud of.”
The story of how a conservative Republican president became a
crusader against global AIDS is an unlikely one. Mr. Bush ran
for the White House in 2000 with what Joshua B. Bolten, his
chief of staff, calls “a Republican’s skepticism about the
efficacy of foreign aid.” He talked of letting “Africa solve
Africa’s problems.” But a variety of forces conspired to put the
international AIDS epidemic on the new president’s agenda.
Colin L. Powell, then the new secretary of state, was deeply
troubled by demographics showing that in some African nations,
AIDS threatened to wipe out the entire child-bearing population
— a condition that could create instability, and a climate ripe
for terrorism. Just weeks into his new job, he called Tommy G.
Thompson, the new administration’s health and human services
secretary.
“I said, ‘Tommy, this is not just a health matter, this is a
national security matter,’” Mr. Powell recalled. They vowed to
work together, and the president, Mr. Powell said, “bought into

it immediately.” Yet, little was done at first, infuriating
advocates like Mr. Zeitz.
By 2002, though, Christian conservatives, a core component of
Mr. Bush’s political base, began adopting the cause. Jesse
Helms, the conservative Republican senator from North
Carolina, declared himself ashamed that he had not done more.
Bill Frist, a physician who was then a Republican senator from
Tennessee, was badgering Mr. Bush about the epidemic. So was
Bono, the rock star. Generic drugs were slashing the costs for
treatment.
In the spring of that year, Mr. Bush sent Mr. Thompson and the
government’s top AIDS expert, Dr. Anthony S. Fauci, to Africa
“to try to scope out anything we could do in a humanitarian
way,” Dr. Fauci said.
They came back and proposed $500 million to prevent mother-
to-child transmission of the disease. The president approved,
Dr. Fauci said, but told them to think bigger.
“He wanted to do something game-changing,” Mr. Bolten said.
“Something that, instead of at the margins assuaging
everybody’s conscience, might actually change the trajectory of
this disease which, from the reports we were getting, was
headed to destroy a whole continent.”
Mr. Bolten, Dr. Fauci and a handful of others spent eight
months quietly planning. Inside the White House, Condoleezza
Rice, then the national security adviser, favored the program.
But there was resistance from those who thought it “problematic
to be announcing a lot of money for foreigners,” said Michael J.
Gerson, Mr. Bush’s former speechwriter. Opponents waged an
11th-hour attempt to strip the announcement from the State of
the Union address. Mr. Bush overruled them.

With the United States about to invade Iraq, some theorized that
Mr. Bush was trying to soften the nation’s image. Not so, says
Mr. Gerson, who calls the initiative “foreign policy moralism.”
But he does see a link: “It fit a broader conception of his view
of America’s purpose in the world, which included not just the
liberation of other people, but their treatment for disease.”
The goals were ambitious: to treat 2 million people, prevent 7
million new infections and provide care for 10 million,
including orphans and other children considered at risk, over
five years, beginning in 2004 when the money became
available.
The prevention targets will not be measured until 2010. But Dr.
Mark Dybul, Mr. Bush’s global AIDS coordinator, says the
program is on track to meet its goals. In addition to drugs for
1.4 million, the government says it has provided care for nearly
6.7 million people affected by the disease, including 2.7 million
orphans and other children. Drugs provided to pregnant women
have spared an estimated 152,000 infants from infection, the
government says.
Some AIDS experts say the money could be spent more
efficiently. Yet the fight is not over whether to reauthorize the
program, but how. Much of the money has been channeled
through American religious-based organizations, drawing
criticism from people like Dr. Coutinho of Uganda, who say
local control would cut costs.
Citing the current infection rate, advocates say $50 billion is
needed, not $30 billion as Mr. Bush has proposed. Senator
Joseph R. Biden Jr. of Delaware, the Democratic chairman of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, is also calling for $50
billion, as is Dr. Coutinho.

“Unless Pepfar is reauthorized at a much higher level,” Dr.
Coutinho said, “we are going to be in the business of playing
God.”
At the White House, AIDS advocacy has become a family affair.
Laura Bush made her third trip to Africa last year, and the
president’s daughter Jenna chronicled the life of a young
H.I.V.-positive woman in a new book.
Mr. Bush announced his trip to Africa in conjunction with
World AIDS Day in November, quoting from Deuteronomy: “I
have set before you life and death ... Therefore, choose life.”
On that day, the North Portico of the White House was
festooned with a huge red ribbon, the symbol of the fight
against the epidemic. Even Mr. Zeitz took it as a promising
sign.
__MACOSX/PLSI 120/articles/._Global Battle on AIDS NY
Times 010508.doc
PLSI 120/articles/Globalization still hurting poor nations
0108.pdf
www.AfricaEconomicAnalysis.org
Globalization still hurting poor nations
By Dr. Ravinder Rena
Eritrea Institute of Technology
Globalization is a buzzword gaining increasing importance all
over the world. Today,

the world appears radically altered. A very significant feature of
the global economy is
the integration of the emerging economies in world markets and
the expansion of
economic activities across state borders. Other dimensions
include the international
movement of ideas, information, legal systems, organizations,
people, popular
globetrotting cuisine, cultural exchanges, and so forth.
However, the movement of people, even in this post-1970s era
of globalization, is restricted
and strictly regulated in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. More
countries are now integrated
into a global economic system in which trade and capital flow
across borders with
unprecedented energy. Nonetheless, globalization has become
painful, rather than
controversial, to the developing world. It has produced
increasing global economic
interdependence through the growing volume and variety of
cross-border flows of finance,
investment, goods, and services, and the rapid and widespread
diffusion of technology.
A World Bank study: "Global Economic Prospects: Managing

the Next Wave of
Globalization," succinctly discusses the advantages of
globalization. Driven by 1974-onward
globalization, exports have doubled, as a proportion of world
economic output, to over 25
percent, and, based on existing trends, will rise to 34 percent by
2030.
World income has doubled since 1980, and almost half-a-billion
people have climbed out of
poverty since 1990. According to current trends, the number of
people living on less than
1-purchasing power-dollar-a-day, will halve from today's 1
billion by 2030. This will take
place as a result of growth in Southeast Asia, whose share of the
poor will halve from 60
percent, while Africa's will rise from 30 percent to 55 percent.
The scale, benefits, and criticism of globalization are often
exaggerated. On the contrary,
compared to the immediate post-war period, the average rate of
growth has steadily slowed
during the age of globalization, from 3.5 percent per annum in
the 1960s, to 2.1 percent, 1.3
percent, and 1.0 percent in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s
respectively.

The growing economic interdependence is highly asymmetrical.
The benefits of linking and
the costs of de-linking are not equally distributed.
Industrialized countries - the European
Union, Japan, and the United States - are genuinely and highly
interdependent in their
relations with one another. The developing countries, on the
other hand, are largely
independent from one another in terms of economic relations,
while being highly dependent
on industrialized countries. Indeed, globalization creates losers
as well as winners, and
entails risks as well as opportunities. An International Labor
Organization blue-ribbon panel
noted in 2005 that the problems lie not in globalization per se
but in the deficiencies in its
governance.
Some globalization nay-sayers have vouched that there has been
a growing divergence, not
convergence, in income levels, both between countries and
peoples. Inequality among, and
within, nations, has widened. Assets and incomes are more
concentrated. Wage shares have

fallen while profit shares have risen. Capital mobility alongside
labor immobility has
reduced the bargaining power of organized labor. The rise in
unemployment and the
accompanying "casualization" of the workforce, with more and
more people working in the
informal sector, have generated an excess supply of labor and
depressed real wages.
Globalization has spurred inequality - both in the wealthiest
countries as well as the
developing world. China and India compete globally, yet only a
fraction of their citizens
prosper. Increasing inequality between rural and urban
populations, and between coastal and
inland areas in China, could have disastrous consequences in
the event of political transition.
Forty of the poorest nations, many in Africa, have had zero
growth during the past 20 years.
Their governments followed advice from wealthy nations and
World Bank consultants on
issues ranging from privatization to development, but millions
of people suffer from poverty.
Ironically, the wealthiest people benefit from the source of
cheap labor. Western policies

Africa Economic Analysis - Globalization still hurting poor
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reinforce the growing divide between rich and poor.
Nearly three-quarters of Africa's population live in rural areas
in contrast with less-than-
10-percent in the developed world. Globalization has driven a
wedge between social classes
in the rich countries, while among the world's poor, the main
divide is between countries -
those that adapted well to globalization and, in many areas,
prospered, and those that
maladjusted and, in many cases, collapsed.
As the Second World collapsed and globalization took off, the
latter rationale evaporated and
a few countries, notably India and China, accelerated their
growth rates significantly,
enjoying the fruits of freer trade and larger capital flows.
Although the two countries adapted
well to globalization, there is little doubt that their newfound
relative prosperity opened

many new fissure lines. Inequality between coastal and inland
provinces, as well as between
urban and rural areas, skyrocketed in China.
Another large group of Third World countries in Latin America,
Africa, and former
Communist countries, experienced a quarter-century of decline,
or stagnation, punctuated by
civil wars, international conflicts, and the onslaught of AIDS.
While rich countries grew on
average by almost 2 percent per capita annually from 1980 to
2002, the world's poorest 40
countries had a combined growth rate of zero. For large swaths
of Africa, the income level
today is less than 1-dollar-per-day.
For these latter countries, the promised benefits of globalization
never arrived. Social
services were often taken over by foreigners. Western experts
and technocrats arrived on
their jets, stayed in luxury hotels, and hailed the obvious
worsening of economic and social
conditions as a step toward better lives and international
integration.
Indeed, for many people in Latin America and Africa,

globalization was merely a new, more
attractive label, for the old imperialism, or worse - for a form of
re-colonization. The
left-wing reaction sweeping Latin America, from Mexico to
Argentina, is a direct
consequence of the fault lines opened by policies designed to
benefit Wall Street, not the
people in the streets of Asmara or Kampala.
The rapid growth of global markets has not seen the parallel
development of social and
economic institutions to ensure their smooth and efficient
functioning, labor rights have been
less diligently protected than capital and property rights, and
the global rules on trade and
finance are unfair to the extent that they produce asymmetric
effects on rich and poor
countries.
The deepening of poverty and inequality has implications for
the social and political
stability, among and within, nations. It is in this context that the
plight and hopes of
developing countries have to be understood in the Doha Round
of trade talks. Having

commenced in 2001, the Doha Round was supposed to be about
the trade-led and trade-
facilitated development of the world's poor countries. After five
years of negotiations, the
talks collapsed because of unbridgeable differences among the
EU, the US, and developing
countries led by India , Brazil , and China.
From the developing world's perspective, the problem is that the
rich countries want access
to poor countries' resources, markets, and labor forces at the
lowest possible price. Some rich
countries were open to implementing deep cuts in agricultural
subsidies, but resisted opening
their markets, others wanted the reverse. Developing countries
like India, China, and Eritrea,
among other things, are determined to protect the livelihood of
their farmers. In countries
like India, farmer suicide has been a terrible human cost and a
political problem for India's
state and central governments for some time, as well as a threat
to rural development.
Protecting farmers' needs, therefore, is essential for social
stability as well as the political
survival of governments in the developing world.

The rich countries' pledges of flexibility failed to translate into
concrete proposals during the
Doha negotiations. Instead, they effectively protected the
interests of tiny agricultural
minorities. By contrast, in developing countries, farming
accounts for 30 to 60 percent of the
Gross Domestic Product and up to 70 percent of the labor force.
This is why labor rights
protection is at least as critical for developing countries as
intellectual property rights
protection is for the rich.
Developing countries were promised a new regime that would
allow them to sell their goods
and trade their way out of poverty through undistorted market
openness. This required
generous market access by the rich for the products of the poor,
and also reduction-
cum-elimination of market-distorting producer and export
subsidies, with the resulting
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dumping of the rich world's produce on world markets.
Thus Europe launched its "Everything but Arms" initiative
whereby it would open its
markets to the world's poorest countries. The initiative
foundered on too many non-tariff
barriers, for example in the technical rules of origin. The US
seemed to offer so-called EBP -
Everything But what they produce. Under its proposals,
developing countries would have
been free to export jet engines and super-computers to the US,
but not textiles, agricultural
products, or processed foods.
Elimination of rich country production and export subsidies,
and the opening of markets,
while necessary, would not be sufficient for developing
countries to trade their way out of
underdevelopment. They also have a desperate need to institute
market-friendly incentives
and regulatory regimes and increase their farmers' productivity,
and may require technical
assistance from international donors to achieve this through
investment in training,

infrastructure, and research.
The failure of the Doha Round is also, finally, symptomatic of a
much bigger malaise,
namely the crisis of multilateral governance in security and
environmental matters, as well as
in trade. In agriculture, as in other sectors, problems-without-
passports require solutions-
without-borders.
To convince Africans about the benefits of globalization, we
must take a more enlightened
view of liberalizing trade, services, and labor intensive
manufacturing in which African
countries are competitive. Trade is not only a means to
prosperity, but also a means of peace-
building. We need to devise an enlightened approach in
negotiations over the reduction of
harmful gas emissions, intellectual property rights, life saving
drugs, and the transfer of
technologies toward combating poverty. Ultimately,
globalization broadens the gap between
rich and poor. It also creates distortions in the global economy.
Therefore, it is not a panacea
for world economic development.

_____________
Ravinder Rena currently working as Associate Professor of
Economics at the Eritrea
Institute of Technology. His most recent books published by the
New Africa Press in
December 2006 are:
1] A Handbook on the Eritrean Economy: Problems and
Prospects for Development;
2] Financial Institutions in Eritrea .
___________
Date Uploaded 1/23/2008
Copyright Africa Economic Analysis 2005
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__MACOSX/PLSI 120/articles/._Globalization still hurting poor
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PLSI 120/articles/Iraq & the Democratic Peace.pdf

Iraq and the Democratic Peace: Who Says Democracies Don't
Fight?
Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War by
Edward D. Mansfield; Jack
Snyder
Review by: John M. Owen IV
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 6 (Nov. - Dec., 2005), pp. 122-
127
Published by: Council on Foreign Relations
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20031781 .
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Review Essay
Iraq and the Democratic Peace
Who Says Democracies Don't Fight?
fobn M. Owen IV
Electing to Fight: Why Emerging
Democracies Go to War. BY EDWARD D.
MANSFIELD AND JACK SNYDER.
MIT Press, 2005, 288 pp. $32.95.
Seldom if ever has the hostility between
academics and the U.S. president been
so pronounced. Of course, political sci
entists always seem to complain about
the occupant of the White House, and
Republicans fare worse than Democrats:
Herbert Hoover was called callous, Dwight
Eisenhower a dunce, Richard Nixon evil,
Ronald Reagan dangerous, and George
H.W. Bush out of touch. But professors
have consigned George W. Bush to a
special circle of their presidential hell.
And the White House seems to return
the sentiment.
According to the academics, Bush's
chief transgressions have had to do with
foreign policy, especially the Iraq war-a

mess that could have been avoided if only
the president and his advisers had paid
more attention to those who devote their
lives to studying international relations.
The irony of this argument is that few
other presidents-certainly none since
Woodrow Wilson, a former president of
the American Political Science Association,
scribbled away in the Oval Office-have
tied their foreign policies more explicitly
to the work of social science. The defining
act of Bush's presidency was grounded in
a theory that the political scientist Jack
Levy once declared was "as close as any
thing we have to an empirical law in
international relations," namely, that
democracies do not fight one another.
The theory, which originated in the
work of the eighteenth-century philoso
pher Immanuel Kant and was refined in
JOHN M. OWEN IV is Associate Professor of Politics at the
University of
Virginia and the author of Liberal Peace, Liberal War:
American Politics and
International Security.
[122]

the 1970S and 1980s by several researchers
working independently, has, since the
1990S, been one of the hottest research
areas in international relations. Although
some skeptics remain and no one agrees
about why exactly it works, most academics
now share the belief that democracies
have indeed made a separate peace. What
is more, much research suggests that
they are also unusually likely to sign and
honor international agreements and to
become economically interdependent.
The administrations of Presidents
George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton made
frequent appeals to the theory in public,
and it seems to have informed their
support for democratization in former
communist lands and in Haiti. The cur
rent Bush administration, however, has
gone much further in its faith in the idea,
betting the farm that the theory holds and
will help Washington achieve a peaceful,
stable, and prosperous Muslim world as,
over time, Iraq's neighbors, following
Iraq's example, democratize. The United
States' real motives for attacking Iraq may
have been complex, but "regime change"
the replacement of Saddam Hussein's
gruesome tyranny with a democracy
was central to Washington's rhetoric by
the time it began bombing Baghdad in
March 2003.
Why has a president who set his

defining policy around one of political
science's crown jewels come in for so much
venom from the same academics who
endorse the idea? After all, a host of peer
reviewed journal articles have implicitly
supported the president's claim that a
democratic Iraq would not threaten the
United States or Israel, develop weapons
of mass destruction, or sponsor terrorism.
Are professors simply perpetual critics
who refuse to take responsibility for the
consequences of their ideas? Or does
Bush hatred trump social science?
The Bush administration's desire to
break with its predecessors and alter the
authoritarian status quo in the Middle
East was admirable. But the White House
got its science wrong, or at least not com
pletely right: the democratic peace theory
does not dictate that the United States can
or should remake Iraq into a democracy.
In Electing to Fight. Why Emerging
Democracies Go to War, the veteran political
scientists Edward Mansfield and Jack
Snyder make two critical points. Not only
is turning authoritarian countries into
democracies extremely difficult, much
more so than the administration seems to
have anticipated. The Middle East could
also become a much more dangerous place
if Washington and the rest of the world
settle for a merely semidemocratic regime
in Baghdad. Such an Iraq, Mansfield and

Snyder imply, would be uncommonly
likely to start wars-a bull in the Middle
Eastern china shop. Unfortunately, such
an Iraq may also be just what we are likely
to end up with.
ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACIES
At first glance, the realists' critique of the
Iraq war is easier to understand than that
of the democratic peace theorists. Indeed,
realism-which holds that a country's
type of government has no systematic
effects on its foreign policy-is enjoying
a revival in Washington these days, pre
cisely because of the war. According to the
realists, the best way to have dealt with
Saddam would have been not to overthrow
him but to use coercive bargaining: to have
threatened him with annihilation, for ex
ample, if he ever used nuclear weapons.
F O R E I G N A F FA I R S November/December 2005 [123 ]
John M Owen IV
Even the democratic peace theory,
however, does not necessarily prescribe
the use of force to transform despotisms
such as Iraq into democracies. Indeed, by
itself, the argument that democracies do
not fight one another does not have any
practical implications for the foreign pol
icymaker. It needs an additional or minor

premise, such as "the United States can
make Iraq into a democracy at an accept
able cost." And it is precisely this minor
premise about which the academy has been
skeptical. No scholarly consensus exists
on how countries become democratic, and
the literature is equally murky on the costs
to the United States of trying to force
them to be free.
This last part of the puzzle is even more
complicated than it first appears. Enter
Mansfield and Snyder, who have been
contributing to the democratic peace
debate for a decade. Their thesis, first
published in 1995, is that although mature
democracies do not fight one another, de
mocratizing states-those in transition
from authoritarianism to democracy
do, and are even more prone to war than
authoritarian regimes. Now, in Electing
to Fight, the authors have refined their
argument. As they outline in the book,
not only are "incomplete democratizing"
states-those that develop democratic
institutions in the wrong order-unlikely
ever to complete the transition to democ
racy; they are also especially bellicose.
According to Mansfield and Snyder,
in countries that have recently started to
hold free elections but that lack the proper
mechanisms for accountability (institutions
such as an independent judiciary, civilian
control of the military, and protections for

opposition parties and the press), politicians
have incentives to pursue policies that
make it more likely that their countries will
start wars. In such places, politicians know
they can mobilize support by demanding
territory or other spoils from foreign
countries and by nurturing grievances
against outsiders. As a result, they push
for extraordinarily belligerent policies.
Even states that develop democratic in
stitutions in the right order-adopting
the rule of law before holding elections
are very aggressive in the early years of
their transitions, although they are less
so than the first group and more likely to
eventually turn into full democracies.
Of course, politicians in mature
democracies are also often tempted to
use nationalism and xenophobic rhetoric
to buttress their domestic power. In such
cases, however, they are usually restrained
by institutionalized mechanisms of account
ability. Knowing that if they lead the
country into a military defeat or quagmire
they may be punished at the next election,
politicians in such states are less likely to
advocate a risky war. In democratizing
states, by contrast, politicians know that
they are insulated from the impact of bad
policies: if a war goes badly, for example,
they can declare a state of emergency,
suspend elections, censor the press, and
so on. Politicians in such states also tend
to fear their militaries, which often crave

foreign enemies and will overthrow civil
ian governments that do not share their
goals. Combined, these factors can
make the temptation to attack another
state irresistible.
Mansfield and Snyder present both
quantitative and case-study support for
their theory. Using rigorous statistical
methods, the authors show that since
1815, democratizing states have indeed
been more prone to start wars than either
[124] FOREIGN AFFAIRS- Volume84No.6
democracies or authoritarian regimes.
Categorizing transitions according to
whether they ended in full democracies
(as in the U.S. case) or in partial ones (as
in Germany in 1871-1918 or Pakistan
throughout its history), the authors find
that in the early years of democratic tran
sitions, partial democracies-especially
those that get their institutions in the
wrong order- are indeed significantly
more likely to initiate wars. Mansfield
and Snyder then provide several succinct
stories of democratizing states that did
in fact go to war, such as the France of
Napoleon III (1852-70), Serbia between
877 and 19i4, Ethiopia and Eritrea between

1998 and 2ooo, and Pakistan from 1947
to the present. In most of these cases, the
authors find what they expect: in these
democratizing states, domestic political
competition was intense. Politicians, vying
for power, appeased domestic hard-liners
by resorting to nationalistic appeals that
vilified foreigners, and these policies often
led to wars that were not in the countries'
strategic interests.
Although their argument would have
been strengthened by a few comparative
studies of democratizing states avoiding
war and of full democracies and authori
tarian states starting wars, Mansfield
and Snyder are persuasive. In part this is
because they carefully circumscribe their
claims. They acknowledge that some cases
are "false positives," that is, wars started
by states that have wrongly been classified
as democratizing, such as the Iran-Iraq
War, started by Iraq in 1980. They also
answer the most likely objections to their
argument. Some skeptics, for example,
might counter that Mansfield and Snyder
get the causality reversed: it is war or
the threat of it that prevents states from
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[125]
John M Owen IV
becoming mature democracies. Others
might argue that democratizing states
become involved in more wars simply
because their internal instability tempts
foreign states to attack them-in other
words, that democratizers are more sinned
against than sinning. Analyzing data
from i816 through 1992, Mansfield and
Snyder put paid to these alternative
explanations. Bad domestic institutions
usually precede wars, rather than vice
versa, and democratizing states usually
do the attacking.
Where does Electing to Fight leave
realism, the dominant theory of inter

national conflict? The quantitative data
support the realist claims that major
powers are more likely to go to war than
minor ones and that the more equal are
the great powers, the more likely are
wars among them. But democratization
makes war more likely even after one takes
these factors into account. Furthermore,
the case studies suggest that democra
tizing states very often lose more than
they gain from the wars they begin,
which implies that they do not respond
to international incentives as rationally
as realism would expect. That said, not
withstanding its preference for viewing
states from the inside, the Mansfield
Snyder theory is still "realist" in the general
sense that it assumes that politicians and
other actors are rationally self-interested.
Their self-interest simply involves build
ing and maintaining domestic power as
well as external security-and sometimes
trading some of the latter in order to
gain the former.
The authors' conclusions for foreign

policy are straightforward. The United
States and other international actors should
continue to promote democracy, but they
must strive to help democratizing states
implement reforms in the correct order. In
particular, popular elections ought not to
precede the building of institutions that will
check the baleful incentives for politicians
to call for war. Mansfield and Snyder are
unsparing toward well-intentioned organ
izations that have pressured authoritarian
governments to rush to elections in the
past-often with disastrous consequences.
As the authors show, for example, it was
organizations such as the World Bank
and the National Democratic Institute
that pushed Burundi and Rwanda to in
crease popular sovereignty in the early
1990s-pressure that, as Mansfield and
Snyder argue, helped set off a chain of
events that led to genocide. Acknowledging
their intellectual debt to writers such as
Samuel Huntington (particularly his
1968 book Political Order in Changing
Societies) and Fareed Zakaria, Mansfield
and Snyder have written a deeply conser
vative book. Sounding like Edmund Burke
on the French Revolution but substituting

statistics and measured prose for rhetorical
power, the authors counsel against abruptly
empowering people, since premature elec
tions may well usher in domestic upheavals
that thrust the state outward against
its neighbors.
BACK IN BAGHDAD
This brings the conversation back to Iraq,
and in particular the notion that the United
States can turn it into a democracy at an
acceptable cost. In effect, Mansfield and
Snyder have raised the estimate of these
costs by pointing out one other reason this
effort may fail-a reason that few seem to
have thought of. Forget for a moment the
harrowing possibility of a Sunni-Shiite
Kurdish civil war in Iraq. Set aside the
[126] FOREIGN AFFAIRS* Volume84No.6
prospect of a Shiite-dominated state
aligning itself with Iran, Syria, and
Lebanon's Hezbollah. What if, follow

ing the departure of U.S. troops, Iraq
holds together but as an incomplete
democratizer, with broad suffrage but
anemic state institutions? Such an Iraq
might well treat its own citizens better
than the Baathist regime did. Its treat
ment of its neighbors, however, might
be just as bad.
Although Saddam was an unusually
bellicose and reckless tyrant, attacking
Iran in 1980 and Kuwait in 1990 and
engaging in foolish brinkmanship with
the United States, as Mansfield and
Snyder imply, a democratic Iraq may
be no less bellicose and reckless. In the
near future, intensely competitive elites
there-secularists, leftists, moderates,
and both Shiite and Sunni Islamists
could compete for popularity by stirring
up nationalism against one or more of
Iraq's neighbors. And Iraq lives in a
dangerous neighborhood. Already, Iraqi
Shiite parties have been critical of Sunni
dominatedJordan; Iraqi Sunni parties,
of Shiite-dominated Iran; and Iraqi
Kurdish parties, of Turkey.
One hopes that the White House
contemplated this scenario prior to
March 2003. Whether it did or not,
the possibility must be considered now,
by U.S. civilian and military leaders,

academics, and U.S. allies who agree
with those academics. If Mansfield and
Snyder are correct about the bellicose
tendencies of young, incompletely de
mocratized states, the stakes of Iraq's
transition are higher than most have
supposed. They are high enough, in
fact, that those who called so loudly
in the l990S for an end to UN sanctions
because Iraqis were dying but who are
silent about the Iraqis who are dying
now ought to reconsider their proud
aloofness from the war. An aggressive
Iraq, prone to attack Kuwait, Iran, Saudi
Arabia, Syria, or Israel, is in no one's
interest. The odds may be long that Iraq
will ever turn into a mature democracy
of the sort envisaged by the Bush admin
istration. But those odds are lengthened
by the refusal of those states in Europe
and the Middle East that could make a
difference actually to do so.O
F O R E I G N A F FA I R S November/December 2005 [127]
Article Contentsp. 122p. 123p. 124p. 125p. 126p. 127Issue
Table of ContentsForeign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 6 (Nov. - Dec.,
2005), pp. 1-160Front MatterCommentsBlowback Revisited:
Today's Insurgents in Iraq Are Tomorrow's Terrorists [pp. 2-
6]Who Will Control the Internet? Washington Battles the World
[pp. 7-13]Independence for Kosovo: Yielding to Balkan Reality
[pp. 14-20]EssaysIraq: Learning the Lessons of Vietnam [pp.

22-43]The Iraq Syndrome [pp. 44-54]The End of Europe? [pp.
55-67]Fighting the War of Ideas [pp. 68-78]Base Politics [pp.
79-92]Mbeki's South Africa [pp. 93-105]The Limits of
Intelligence Reform [pp. 106-120]Reviews & ResponsesReview
EssayReview: Iraq and the Democratic Peace: Who Says
Democracies Don't Fight? [pp. 122-127]Review: The Ethical
Economist: Growth May Be Everything, but It's Not the Only
Thing [pp. 128-134]Recent Books on International
RelationsPolitical and LegalReview: untitled [p. 135-
135]Review: untitled [pp. 135-136]Review: untitled [p. 136-
136]Review: untitled [pp. 136-137]Review: untitled [p. 137-
137]Review: untitled [p. 137-137]Economic, Social, and
EnvironmentalReview: untitled [pp. 137-138]Review: untitled
[p. 138-138]Review: untitled [pp. 138-139]Review: untitled [p.
139-139]Review: untitled [pp. 139-140]Military, Scientific, and
TechnologicalReview: untitled [p. 140-140]Review: untitled [p.
141]The United StatesReview: untitled [p. 142-142]Review:
untitled [p. 143-143]Review: untitled [pp. 143-144]Western
EuropeReview: untitled [p. 144-144]Review: untitled [pp. 144-
146]Review: untitled [p. 146-146]Western HemisphereReview:
untitled [pp. 148-149]Eastern Europe and Former Soviet
RepublicsReview: untitled [p. 149-149]Review: untitled [p.
149-149]Review: untitled [pp. 149-150]Review: untitled [p.
150-151]Review: untitled [p. 151-151]Middle EastReview:
untitled [p. 153-153]Asia and PacificReview: untitled [pp. 153-
155]AfricaReview: untitled [p. 156-156]Review: untitled [p.

156-156]Review: untitled [pp. 156-158]For the Record [p. 158-
158]Back Matter
__MACOSX/PLSI 120/articles/._Iraq & the Democratic
Peace.pdf
PLSI 120/articles/Mearsheimer Don't Arm Ukraine 0215.docx
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/09/opinion/dont-arm-
ukraine.html?smid=fb-share&_r=0
The Opinion Pages | Op-Ed Contributor Don't Arm Ukraine By
JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER, FEB. 8, 2015
Ukrainian Army soldiers at a weapons training exercise in
western Ukraine last week. Pavlo Palamarchuk/Associated Press
The Ukraine crisis is almost a year old and Russia is winning.
The separatists in eastern Ukraine are gaining ground and
Russia’s president, Vladimir V. Putin, shows no signs of
backing down in the face of Western economic sanctions.
Unsurprisingly, a growing chorus of voices in the United States
is calling for arming Ukraine. A recent report from three
leading American think tanks endorses sending Kiev advanced
weaponry, and the White House’s nominee for secretary of
defense, Ashton B. Carter, said last week to the Senate armed
services committee, “I very much incline in that direction.”
They are wrong. Going down that road would be a huge mistake
for the United States, NATO and Ukraine itself. Sending
weapons to Ukraine will not rescue its army and will instead
lead to an escalation in the fighting. Such a step is especially
dangerous because Russia has thousands of nuclear weapons and
is seeking to defend a vital strategic interest.
There is no question that Ukraine’s military is badly outgunned
by the separatists, who have Russian troops and weapons on
their side. Because the balance of power decisively favors
Moscow, Washington would have to send large amounts of
equipment for Ukraine’s army to have a fighting chance.
But the conflict will not end there. Russia would counter-

escalate, taking away any temporary benefit Kiev might get
from American arms. The authors of the think tank study
concede this, noting that “even with enormous support from the
West, the Ukrainian Army will not be able to defeat a
determined attack by the Russian military.” In short, the United
States cannot win an arms race with Russia over Ukraine and
thereby ensure Russia’s defeat on the battlefield.
Proponents of arming Ukraine have a second line of argument.
The key to success, they maintain, is not to defeat Russia
militarily, but to raise the costs of fighting to the point where
Mr. Putin will cave. The pain will supposedly compel Moscow
to withdraw its troops from Ukraine and allow it to join the
European Union and NATO and become an ally of the West.
This coercive strategy is also unlikely to work, no matter how
much punishment the West inflicts. What advocates of arming
Ukraine fail to understand is that Russian leaders believe their
country’s core strategic interests are at stake in Ukraine; they
are unlikely to give ground, even if it means absorbing huge
costs.
Great powers react harshly when distant rivals project military
power into their neighborhood, much less attempt to make a
country on their border an ally. This is why the United States
has the Monroe Doctrine, and today no American leader would
ever tolerate Canada or Mexico joining a military alliance
headed by another great power.
Russia is no exception in this regard. Thus Mr. Putin has not
budged in the face of sanctions and is unlikely to make
meaningful concessions if the costs of the fighting in Ukraine
increase.
Upping the ante in Ukraine also risks unwanted escalation. Not
only would the fighting in eastern Ukraine be sure to intensify,
but it could also spread to other areas. The consequences for
Ukraine, which already faces profound economic and social
problems, would be disastrous.
The possibility that Mr. Putin might end up making nuclear
threats may seem remote, but if the goal of arming Ukraine is to

drive up the costs of Russian interference and eventually put
Moscow in an acute situation, it cannot be ruled out. If Western
pressure succeeded and Mr. Putin felt desperate, he would have
a powerful incentive to try to rescue the situation by rattling the
nuclear saber.
Our understanding of the mechanisms of escalation in crises and
war is limited at best, although we know the risks are
considerable. Pushing a nuclear-armed Russia into a corner
would be playing with fire.
Advocates of arming Ukraine recognize the escalation problem,
which is why they stress giving Kiev “defensive,” not
“offensive,” weapons. Unfortunately, there is no useful
distinction between these categories: All weapons can be used
for attacking and defending. The West can be sure, though, that
Moscow will not see those American weapons as “defensive,”
given that Washington is determined to reverse the status quo in
eastern Ukraine.
The only way to solve the Ukraine crisis is diplomatically, not
militarily. Germany’s chancellor, Angela Merkel, seems to
recognize that fact, as she has said Germany will not ship arms
to Kiev. Her problem, however, is that she does not know how
to bring the crisis to an end.
She and other European leaders still labor under the delusion
that Ukraine can be pulled out of Russia’s orbit and
incorporated into the West, and that Russian leaders must
accept that outcome. They will not.
To save Ukraine and eventually restore a working relationship
with Moscow, the West should seek to make Ukraine a neutral
buffer state between Russia and NATO. It should look like
Austria during the Cold War. Toward that end, the West should
explicitly take European Union and NATO expansion off the
table, and emphasize that its goal is a nonaligned Ukraine that
does not threaten Russia. The United States and its allies should
also work with Mr. Putin to rescue Ukraine’s economy, a goal
that is clearly in everyone’s interest.
It is essential that Russia help end the fighting in eastern

Ukraine and that Kiev regain control over that region. Still, the
provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk should be given substantial
autonomy, and protection for Russian language rights should be
a top priority.
Crimea, a casualty of the West’s attempt to march NATO and
the European Union up to Russia’s doorstep, is surely lost for
good. It is time to end that imprudent policy before more
damage is done — to Ukraine and to relations between Russia
and the West.
John J. Mearsheimer, a professor of political science at the
University of Chicago, is the author of “The Tragedy of Great
Power Politics.”
A version of this op-ed appears in print on February 9, 2015, in
The International New York Times.
__MACOSX/PLSI 120/articles/._Mearsheimer Don't Arm
Ukraine 0215.docx
PLSI 120/articles/Rice Promise of Democratic Peace.doc
LexisNexis™ Academic
Copyright 2005 The Washington Post
The Washington Post
December 11, 2005 Sunday
Final Edition
SECTION: Editorial; B07
LENGTH: 1713 words
HEADLINE: The Promise of Democratic Peace;
Why Promoting Freedom Is the Only Realistic Path to Security
BYLINE: Condoleezza RiceBODY:

Soon after arriving at the State Department earlier this year, I
hung a portrait of Dean Acheson in my office. Over half a
century ago, as America sought to create the world anew in the
aftermath of World War II, Acheson sat in the office that I now
occupy. And I hung his picture where I did for a reason.
Like Acheson and his contemporaries, we live in an
extraordinary time -- one in which the terrain of international
politics is shifting beneath our feet and the pace of historical
change outstrips even the most vivid imagination. My
predecessor's portrait is a reminder that in times of
unprecedented change, the traditional diplomacy of crisis
management is insufficient. Instead, we must transcend the
doctrines and debates of the past and transform volatile status
quos that no longer serve our interests. What is needed is a
realistic statecraft for a transformed world.
President Bush outlined the vision for it in his second inaugural
address: "It is the policy of the United States to seek and
support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in
every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending
tyranny in our world." This is admittedly a bold course of
action, but it is consistent with the proud tradition of American
foreign policy, especially such recent presidents as Harry
Truman and Ronald Reagan. Most important: Like the ambitious
policies of Truman and Reagan, our statecraft will succeed not
simply because it is optimistic and idealistic but also because it
is premised on sound strategic logic and a proper understanding
of the new realities we face.
Our statecraft today recognizes that centuries of international
practice and precedent have been overturned in the past 15
years. Consider one example: For the first time since the Peace
of Westphalia in 1648, the prospect of violent conflict between
great powers is becoming ever more unthinkable. Major states

are increasingly competing in peace, not preparing for war. To
advance this remarkable trend, the United States is transforming
our partnerships with nations such as Japan and Russia, with the
European Union, and especially with China and India. Together
we are building a more lasting and durable form of global
stability: a balance of power that favors freedom.
This unprecedented change has supported others. Since its
creation more than 350 years ago, the modern state system has
always rested on the concept of sovereignty. It was assumed
that states were the primary international actors and that every
state was able and willing to address the threats emerging from
its territory. Today, however, we have seen that these
assumptions no longer hold, and as a result the greatest threats
to our security are defined more by the dynamics within weak
and failing states than by the borders between strong and
aggressive ones.
The phenomenon of weak and failing states is not new, but the
danger they now pose is unparalleled. When people, goods and
information traverse the globe as fast as they do today,
transnational threats such as disease or terrorism can inflict
damage comparable to the standing armies of nation-states.
Absent responsible state authority, threats that would and
should be contained within a country's borders can now melt
into the world and wreak untold havoc. Weak and failing states
serve as global pathways that facilitate the spread of pandemics,
the movement of criminals and terrorists, and the proliferation
of the world's most dangerous weapons.
Our experience of this new world leads us to conclude that the
fundamental character of regimes matters more today than the
international distribution of power. Insisting otherwise is
imprudent and impractical. The goal of our statecraft is to help
create a world of democratic, well-governed states that can meet
the needs of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly

in the international system. Attempting to draw neat, clean lines
between our security interests and our democratic ideals does
not reflect the reality of today's world. Supporting the growth of
democratic institutions in all nations is not some moralistic
flight of fancy; it is the only realistic response to our present
challenges.
In one region of the world, however, the problems emerging
from the character of regimes are more urgent than in any other.
The "freedom deficit" in the broader Middle East provides
fertile ground for the growth of an ideology of hatred so vicious
and virulent that it leads people to strap suicide bombs to their
bodies and fly airplanes into buildings. When the citizens of
this region cannot advance their interests and redress their
grievances through an open political process, they retreat
hopelessly into the shadows to be preyed upon by evil men with
violent designs. In these societies, it is illusory to encourage
economic reform by itself and hope that the freedom deficit will
work itself out over time.
Though the broader Middle East has no history of democracy,
this is not an excuse for doing nothing. If every action required
a precedent, there would be no firsts. We are confident that
democracy will succeed in this region not simply because we
have faith in our principles but because the basic human longing
for liberty and democratic rights has transformed our world.
Dogmatic cynics and cultural determinists were once certain
that "Asian values," or Latin culture, or Slavic despotism, or
African tribalism would each render democracy impossible. But
they were wrong, and our statecraft must now be guided by the
undeniable truth that democracy is the only assurance of lasting
peace and security between states, because it is the only
guarantee of freedom and justice within states.
Implicit within the goals of our statecraft are the limits of our
power and the reasons for our humility. Unlike tyranny,

democracy by its very nature is never imposed. Citizens of
conviction must choose it -- and not just in one election. The
work of democracy is a daily process to build the institutions of
democracy: the rule of law, an independent judiciary, free
media and property rights, among others. The United States
cannot manufacture these outcomes, but we can and must create
opportunities for individuals to assume ownership of their own
lives and nations. Our power gains its greatest legitimacy when
we support the natural right of all people, even those who
disagree with us, to govern themselves in liberty.
The statecraft that America is called to practice in today's world
is ambitious, even revolutionary, but it is not imprudent. A
conservative temperament will rightly be skeptical of any policy
that embraces change and rejects the status quo, but that is not
an argument against the merits of such a policy. As Truman
once said, "The world is not static, and the status quo is not
sacred." In times of extraordinary change such as ours, when the
costs of inaction outweigh the risks of action, doing nothing is
not an option. If the school of thought called "realism" is to be
truly realistic, it must recognize that stability without
democracy will prove to be false stability, and that fear of
change is not a positive prescription for policy.
After all, who truly believes, after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001,
that the status quo in the Middle East was stable, beneficial and
worth defending? How could it have been prudent to preserve
the state of affairs in a region that was incubating and exporting
terrorism; where the proliferation of deadly weapons was
getting worse, not better; where authoritarian regimes were
projecting their failures onto innocent nations and peoples;
where Lebanon suffered under the boot heel of Syrian
occupation; where a corrupt Palestinian Authority cared more
for its own preservation than for its people's aspirations; and
where a tyrant such as Saddam Hussein was free to slaughter his
citizens, destabilize his neighbors and undermine the hope of

peace between Israelis and Palestinians? It is sheer fantasy to
assume that the Middle East was just peachy before America
disrupted its alleged stability.
Had we believed this, and had we done nothing, consider all
that we would have missed in just the past year: A Lebanon that
is free of foreign occupation and advancing democratic reform.
A Palestinian Authority run by an elected leader who openly
calls for peace with Israel. An Egypt that has amended its
constitution to hold multiparty elections. A Kuwait where
women are now full citizens. And, of course, an Iraq that in the
face of a horrific insurgency has held historic elections, drafted
and ratified a new national charter, and will go to the polls
again in coming days to elect a new constitutional government.
At this time last year, such unprecedented progress seemed
impossible. One day it will all seem to have been inevitable.
This is the nature of extraordinary times, which Acheson
understood well and described perfectly in his memoirs. "The
significance of events," he wrote, "was shrouded in ambiguity.
We groped after interpretations of them, sometimes reversed
lines of action based on earlier views, and hesitated long before
grasping what now seems obvious." When Acheson left office in
1953, he could not know the fate of the policies he helped to
create. He certainly could never have predicted that nearly four
decades later, war between Europe's major powers would be
unthinkable, or that America and the world would be harvesting
the fruits of his good decisions and managing the collapse of
communism. But because leaders such as Acheson steered
American statecraft with our principles when precedents for
action were lacking, because they dealt with their world as it
was but never believed they were powerless to change it for the
better, the promise of democratic peace is now a reality in all of
Europe and in much of Asia.
When I walk past Acheson's portrait upon departing my office

for the last time, no one will be able to know the full scope of
what our statecraft has achieved. But I have an abiding
confidence that we will have laid a firm foundation of principle
-- a foundation on which future generations will realize our
nation's vision of a fully free, democratic and peaceful world.
The writer is secretary of state.
LOAD-DATE: December 11, 2005
__MACOSX/PLSI 120/articles/._Rice Promise of Democratic
Peace.doc
PLSI 120/articles/the clash of civilizations.pdf
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further
reproduction prohibited without permission.
The clash of civilizations?
Huntington, Samuel P
Foreign Affairs; Summer 1993; 72, 3; ABI/INFORM Global
pg. 22

__MACOSX/PLSI 120/articles/._the clash of civilizations.pdf
PLSI 120/ONLINE JOURNALS.docxONLINE JOURNALS
Due Tues. before class on each week you choose (4 weeks)
Through course Blackboard page (Journal tab), submit a written
journal entry of approximately 300 words each for four class
weeks of your choice from weeks 2 to 15 (except test weeks 7 &
12) that includes the following:
1. Comments on at leasttwo of the assigned readings for that
week, including (for each):
a) a statement of the main argument (or main issues if your
textbook)
b) your reaction to the argument
c) some point(s) you found interesting.
Be sure to indicate which readings you are commenting on;
authors (and page numbers if relevant) will suffice. Assigned
reading from your textbook may be one of the two readings you
comment on. In addition to assigned reading, you may include

comments on or reactions to other course materials that week if
you wish.
2. Two or more numbered questions you have based on what
you read. These may be any of the following:
- informational questions (for example regarding points or terms
that were unclear or not fully explained)
- philosophical/discussion questions
- questions you might want to explore in the future
- questions or statements applying or connecting a concept or
point raised in readings to a recent government policy, action,
or international event.
Be sure these are your own questions, not those stated in your
chapter summaries or elsewhere. Indicate which reading (and
page number if applicable) inspired each question. You are also
encouraged to raise your questions in class.
Your journals will be shared only with your instructor. Your
grade for this assignment will be based primarily on your
fulfillment of the requirements above and your demonstrated
effort to learn and critically think about the material. In order
to receive credit for a week, your entries must be completed
before Tuesday’s class when the assigned readings will begin to
be discussed. Before submitting posts, carefully read over your
work to check for errors and clarity. Although your journal will
be graded primarily on content, credit will be lost for sloppy
work (e.g. typos) or unclearly written statements that make it
difficult to evaluate the content. Posts that cannot be
understood will not receive credit. Review the “Writing
refresher” PowerPoint posted on the course Blackboard
Assignment page for tips on writing clearly and fixing common
grammatical errors.
The purpose of this assignment is to both facilitate and
demonstrate your understanding of the course material and its
application through reflection, critical thinking, and writing.

PLSI 120.DS_Store__MACOSXPLSI 120._.DS_StorePLSI 120.docx

PLSI 120.DS_Store__MACOSXPLSI 120._.DS_StorePLSI 120.docx

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PLSI 120.DS_Store__MACOSXPLSI 120._.DS_StorePLSI 120.docx