Working Paper 03/2012 Civil-military interaction and the future of humanitarian action

Civil-military interaction and
the future of humanitarian action

Antonio Donini Senior Researcher, Feinstein International Centre, Tufts University

> Paper 03/2012

‘That’s the reason they’re called lessons,’ the Gryphon
remarked: ‘because they lessen from day to day.’
—Alice in Wonderland

The following discussion is structured into three parts:
>> a brief update on the evolution of the
humanitarian enterprise in the past 10 years
network power. The enterprise has also become much more
>> lessons from civil–military interaction
professionalised: for many humanitarian aid workers—and
in three recent crises
there are an estimated 300 000—working in emergencies
>> what we can expect in the years to 2020. has become a career rather than a voluntary mission.
‘Oligopolisation’ has also continued apace. Northern
Evolution of the humanitarian federations of major non-government organisations and UN
humanitarian agencies define how the enterprise works,
enterprise, 2000 to 2010 what constitutes a crisis and how it should be tackled.
In the years from 2000 to 2010 there were major Barriers to entry for groups from the South have become
quantitative and qualitative changes in the nature of the higher; the isomorphism has increased—‘you’ can join ‘us’
humanitarian enterprise. but only on ‘our’ terms.

Quantitative changes We are more technically proficient and do more evaluations
(and have more conferences) but are we better? Are we
Never has there been so much money, so many aid workers more effective at saving lives?
and so much media attention devoted to humanitarian
matters. The humanitarian enterprise now accounts for Qualitative changes
more than US$14 billion a year.1 Afghanistan, Iraq, Darfur, Somalia, Sri Lanka and Haiti stand
Institutionalisation of the enterprise has exploded, in terms as setbacks for humanitarianism. The ‘instrumentalisation’
of standards, norms, guidelines, clusters, accountability and of humanitarian action in support of political and military

1 ACMC Paper 3/2012 > Conflict prevention in practice: from rhetoric to reality

agendas has resulted in unprecedented levels of co‑option,
blurring of lines, and the subordination of humanitarianism
Lessons from civil-military
to politics. The Global War on Terror has accelerated interaction: three crises
this process, and in extreme cases the result is the
Haiti and Pakistan constitute examples from which much can
criminalisation of humanitarian action (for example, in the
be learnt about civil–military responses; Afghanistan teach
cases of Somalia and Palestine). As a consequence, aid
us lessons about ‘stabilisation’ and the future of civil–military
agencies are becoming more risk averse.
interaction.
Humanitarianism is also being affected by the current
wave of interventionism, which is fuelled in part by the Haiti
International Criminal Court and responsibility to protect An extremely strong—magnitude 7.0 on the Richter
agendas. Increasingly, the North’s human rights agenda Scale—earthquake hit Haiti on 12 January 2010. The
clashes with the humanitarian agenda. And the humanitarian resultant devastation triggered a massive humanitarian
enterprise has itself become much more interventionist. response, in which the US military, the UN peace mission
We are perhaps witnessing the merger of humanitarianism and 27 other military contingents played a crucial role.
and empire: non-government organisations are ‘the Civil‑military interaction was widely seen to be helpful in
mendicant orders of empire’, ‘the capillary vessels of terms of logistics, but the dominance of the US military
globalization’.2 Even those who do not see themselves as presence gave rise to many questions.
‘force multipliers’ of Northern world-ordering agendas or
of stabilisation operations3 are affected by association. In Important factors
Afghanistan, Iraq and Darfur we have paid a high price for This was natural disaster in an unnatural setting. It occurred
being seen to take sides. in a densely populated urban area in what is a very poor
country and a weak state that was mostly sidelined in the
The collapse of the asylum and protection regime is aftermath of the quake. A dense population in an urban
another area of concern. From refugees to IDPs (internally environment characterised by shanty housing posed new
displaced persons) to ISPs (internally stuck persons), challenges for humanitarian organisations. There was poor
dealing with protection has become more difficult. On overall interaction with Haitian civil society and groups. The
the plus side, though, those who deliberately cause harm long history of US hegemony and economic interests, which
to civilians are increasingly questioned by civil society— had resulted in decades of weakening of the state, affected
witness the Arab Spring. the quality of the response.
Finally, the humanitarian field is more crowded than Coordination
ever, with the emergence of new traditions (Islamic non- The immediate post-quake period was a time of huge
government organisations and donors), a diversification of logistical effort accompanied by a serious coordination
donors (Gulf states, Brazil, Cuba–Venezuela, and private deficit. The absence of humanitarian leadership
donors and foundations) and new types of ‘humanitarian’ compounded by slow needs assessment undermined the
action (for-profit organisations and private security humanitarians’ efforts to influence the overall direction
companies), including military–aid hybrids. and shape of the operation. The humanitarians’ directing
In summary, the politicisation and manipulation of military contingents was poor, so US Central Command
of humanitarian action have reached new heights: took the strategic lead in Florida. US control of the airport
humanitarian action is now inseparable from western foreign in Port‑au-Prince was resented, although the US did do vital
policy.4 At the same time, humanitarian action has itself work in rehabilitating the air link and the seaport area.
crossed the threshold of power—from a powerful discourse The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
to a discourse of power. At its heart this is power that moves and the UN–NGO aid community were unclear about the
unprecedented amounts of funds and influences public civil‑military relationship in a non-war setting; and there was
opinion and governance, but it also a biopolitical power that much uncertainty about how to interact with US and other
expresses itself at its most extreme in triage—who is ‘saved’, military participants. The Joint Operations Tasking Centre
who is ‘damned’, and who remains in a transient or, more functioned well, however, as a single point of tasking and
often than not, permanent state of purgatory. What we have communication.
is a kind of primordial form of instrumentalisation that is
consubstantial with the humanitarian relationship.


Mobilisation of military logistic assets was vital on occasions, so the relationship was harmonious and led to the
but there were persistent concerns about the militarisation establishment of a new disaster management infrastructure.
of relief. The history of military interventions in Haiti fuelled
The role of the military
unease about the military’s motivations, and a widespread
International military forces—there were 19 different
perception in Haiti that the US military presence was linked
contingents—played an important role in the early
to hegemonic interests and a desire to curb migration to the
post‑quake stage, and the contribution of the national
United States.
Pakistani military5 was significant from the start. Helicopters
Cuba provided a contrary example to the US behemoth— played a central role because of the mountainous terrain and
‘gauze not guns’. A total of 1500 Cuban doctors were collapsed roads. The Pakistani military has a larger stock of
deployed (some remain there); they treated 70 000 patients helicopters than anyone else.
in contrast to the US medical ship treating only 8600.
There are three general lessons to be learnt in relation to the
The lesson here concerns the need for a better appreciation military role in 2005:
that disaster relief goes way beyond logistics and that such
>> A strong, well-equipped national military force
vital assets will be of help only when they are part of a
can bring important benefits to the humanitarian
coordinated humanitarian plan that is specific to the crisis
response to a natural disaster, even one with
in question.
peripheral ‘complexity’, as is the case with
Pakistan Kashmir and the Northwest Frontier region.

In the case of Pakistan, there are three elements in play: >> The logistical and information role of the military
should ideally not be allowed to bleed over into
>> ‘exemplary’ civil–military interaction in the roles such as assessment and coordination, which
response to the 2005 earthquake are better lodged within a humanitarian-response
>> manipulation of aid during the 2008–2009 surge capacity that is sympathetic to the norms espoused
in conflict—known as the ‘displacement crisis’ by humanitarians and at odds with military culture.
>> the shadow of the Global War on Terror >> Importantly, a military deeply embedded in the
and armed conflict in the response to the political structure, as is the Pakistani military, can
unprecedented flooding of 2010. be mobilised rapidly but arrives unrestrained by
civilian or humanitarian oversight and is in danger of
The dominance of the military in Pakistan colours all aspects
being dismissive of humanitarian considerations.
of political life and shapes external policy and domestic
politics as well as the economy. There is little space for The displacement crisis of 2008–09
elected civil administrations to operate, and in any case and the flooding in 2010
such administrations are seen as invariably corrupt and If the 2005 earthquake response was an example of
self-interested. Moreover, Pakistan is a nuclear state, with successful civil–military cooperation, not so the two
the world’s fastest growing nuclear arsenal and a huge subsequent crises. The so-called displacement crisis of
army. Other important features are a population of over 2008–09 and the 2010 floods entailed a completely different
180 million that is growing rapidly, a faltering economy, rapid relationship between humanitarian agencies and the military.
urbanisation, and ever-reducing prospects of a viable future The shadow of the Global War on Terror and the military’s
for many. The regional brinkmanship of Pakistan’s politics is a role in pushing back different sets of Pakistani armed groups
further cause for concern. Additionally, Pakistan is on course changed the dynamics: militant attacks, counter-insurgency
for many disasters, including water shortages, in the future. operations and a surge in fighting beginning in 2008 resulted
in the displacement—including by force—of hundreds of
The 2005 earthquake
thousands of civilians. The result was a complex and deadly
On 8 October 2005 a devastating earthquake to hit Kashmir
situation; according to one estimate, 35 000 civilians were
and the Northwest Frontier region: there were 75 000 deaths
killed between 2008 and 2010.6
and over 100 000 injured; more than half a million homes
were destroyed over a large area. Winter was approaching. Access to vulnerable groups was denied in many locations,
Pakistan had little experience in disaster preparedness and there was heavy-handed control and manipulation of
and response, but the military swung into action and are humanitarian aid. Disrespect for principles and the blurring
widely considered to have done a good job in difficult of lines between military, political and relief objectives
circumstances. Relief and military interests converged, became major concerns. Access was constrained both


on security grounds and because of the military’s desire agencies openly flouted the UN decision not to use military
to keep humanitarian agencies away from certain areas. assets because civilian alternatives were available.
Non‑objection certificates were used to curtail access or to
force agencies to do the military’s bidding. Afghanistan and the perils of stabilisation
Beneficiary lists became a point of contention: the military The challenges in the civil–military relationship evident in
wanted to control these so that the ‘bad guys’ would not the cases of Haiti and Pakistan pale in comparison with
receive assistance. As a result, many vulnerable groups those in Afghanistan. Afghanistan was, and remains, a
received little or no assistance. There were also serious totally different ball game, where the tension between the
protection problems: large numbers of people were forcibly role of the military and its interaction with non-government
displaced from Swat and other areas and then forced to organisations often reached breaking point. The question
return to their area of origin when the military decided they at hand is a very important one, at the heart of the
should, rather than when it was safe to do so. world‑ordering debate: how do we transform dangerous
situations that are perceived as threatening to ‘our’ interests
Moreover, the aid community had assumed it could apply into more benign environments that fit with ‘our’ ideas of
the ‘quake model’ of cooperation with the Pakistani military what liberal peace in the borderlands should look like?
and was unprepared for a complex response in a conflict
setting. Most agencies, including the United Nations, were The following paragraphs look at the polarising matter of
more anxious to safeguard their historical relationships with stabilisation from a humanitarian perspective, as a subset
the Government of Pakistan rather than pressing for the of the broader ‘coherence’, or ‘joined-up government’,
support of humanitarian principles. agenda in dealing with conflict and crisis. On the face
of it, coordination between all involved would seem to
The UN leadership was inexperienced in humanitarian make sense. The underlying theme of the proponents of
matters or lacked leadership, or both. It was unable to stabilisation is ‘If only we had a clear and effective division
negotiate access to the conflict areas and did not even of labour between the civil, military, development and
try to enter into a conversation with the ‘other side’ in humanitarian actors, between the outsiders and the local
relation to access to and protection of civilians. The nadir authorities in “hot” stabilization situations, then our goals
was reached when the UN political representative stated, would be within our grasp’.
‘Assistance should follow military gains’. The exceptions were
the International Committee of the Red Cross, Médecins But this point of view can be disputed. We are not all in
Sans Frontières and the Office for the Coordination of the same boat. Aid agencies that provide humanitarian
Humanitarian Affairs, which strived to work according to assistance do not have goals in common with those of the
principle in a very difficult environment. military in places such as Afghanistan and Somalia. From a
humanitarian perspective, one can argue that humanitarian
The response to the 2010 floods—a disaster on an action needs to be protected and insulated from stabilisation
enormous scale—benefited from the experience of the and politically motivated initiatives.
post-quake disaster management institution building of the
Pakistani authorities, but it suffered from the consequences There are two questions here:
of the instrumentalisation of humanitarian action in the >> Should humanitarian action be linked to,
‘displacement crisis’. Again, access was strictly controlled by or included in, comprehensive or coherent
the military. In some areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, approaches to conflict resolution?
only national staff were allowed in; in others not even them.
>> Even if such action is not included, what is the impact of
Humanitarian principles were put under severe stress these approaches on principled humanitarian action?
on the ‘last resort’ decision about whether military air
The answer to the first question is straightforward:
assets—including NATO assets from the Afghan theatre—
humanitarians should not take sides. They should not make
should be used.
pronouncements on whether a war is just or unjust because
The lesson learnt there concerns the question of when a to do so is to undermine their ability to respond to need.
‘natural disaster’ is not a natural disaster. The Pakistani floods Obviously, then, they should not engage in controversies
show the importance of narratives, how those narratives of a political nature and, even less, engage in action with a
shape the response, and the consequences of labelling. Most belligerent. Neutrality is not an end in itself: it is a means
of the aid organisations accepted the ‘natural disaster’ label of fulfilling the humanitarian imperative. Furthermore, the
and saw no problem in cooperating with the military, or even perception of being associated with a belligerent carries
NATO. The UN country team was split on this, and some potentially deadly consequences for humanitarian aid workers.


The answer to the second question is more complicated, if ‘aid’ … ‘During a recent mission, the Afghan National
not murky. And this murkiness spreads across political and Army and their coalition mentors provided relief to
the assistance participants alike. the Afghan people. In return for their generosity,
the ANA asked the elders to provide them with
In Afghanistan the United Nations is, and is seen as, aligned
assistance in tracking down anti-government forces’.
with the US-led intervention. The UN’s humanitarian
capacity is weak and further diminished by its association >> Recently there has been a surge in night searches
with an integrated mission that is intimately linked to the of NGO compounds—in particular, medical
International Security Assistance Force. clinics. This is not only in violation of international
humanitarian law: it also exposes NGO staff to the
The majority of non-government organisations do not fare
perception that they are associated with coalition
much better since many work as implementing partners
forces or passing intelligence information to them.
for government programs or, even if they do not, are
nonetheless seen as part of the international enterprise that These examples show that, even if humanitarian agencies
supports the government.7 The defence of humanitarian are not involved in stabilisation activities, such activities can
principles is left to the International Committee of the Red have potentially dangerous consequences for the perceived
Cross, and recently Médecins Sans Frontières, which are the neutrality and impartiality of the agencies and their staff.
only international organisations capable of working neutrally, They are likely to make the negotiation of humanitarian
impartially and independently. access—which requires a minimum degree of acceptance
and trust from all belligerents—more difficult. So far, only
To complicate matters, with the exception of Switzerland,
the International Committee of the Red Cross and Médecins
all the donors in Afghanistan are also belligerents. They are
Sans Frontières have had a steady dialogue on access and
reluctant to admit that there is a humanitarian crisis and
acceptance in areas dominated by different elements of the
would rather see ‘their’ non-government organisations as
armed opposition.
force multipliers for their political and military objectives.
Indirectly, therefore, stabilisation operations affect In summary, there are good practical reasons for
humanitarianism because that is where the money is, and separating or insulating principled humanitarian action
NGOs are obliged to balance principle with institutional from stabilisation activities. There are also strong ethical
survival. It would appear that until recently they tended and policy reasons for doing so. Humanitarian action
to choose the latter over the former. There is a ‘rice bowl’ derives its legitimacy from universal principles enshrined
problem here: if the NGOs are unwilling to do the bidding in the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration
of the stabilisation donors, the private contractors or the of Human Rights, and international humanitarian law.
military itself will do the job. Such principles often do not sit well with the Security
Council’s political compromises: politics—the ‘art of
There have been many instances of a flagrant blurring of the
the possible’—is not necessarily informed by principle.
lines. The following are examples:
Incorporating a function that draws legitimacy from the UN
>> In 2008–2009 USAID sought applications for a five‑year Charter (or the Universal Declaration) in a management
$150 million project. The request documentation structure born of political compromise in the Security
detailed several alarming objectives. Among Council is questionable and possibly self-defeating.
others, USAID asked organisations to implement
The question of better insulation of humanitarian action, if
‘post‑battlefield cleanup’ operations, essentially asking
not its complete separation from politics and stabilisation
that they work with communities in the aftermath
approaches, is likely to remain an unresolved one on the
of a battle and operate in or alongside provincial
humanitarian agenda for some time. The International
reconstruction teams, which, as military–assistance
Committee of the Red Cross and other Dunantist
hybrids, were supposed to win hearts and minds and
humanitarians remain wary of, if not hostile to, the
communicate a narrative of successful development.
militarisation of aid inherent in stabilisation agendas.
>> There has been improper use of the term ‘humanitarian’
As a humanitarian, I want to keep out of partisan politics
by the military. A NATO–ISAF press release8 reads,
because that is the best guarantee I have of being able to
‘Humanitarian assistance operations are helping both
assist and protect the most vulnerable, wherever they may
the people of Afghanistan and coalition forces fight
be. As a citizen, I want peace and a more just world. I am
the global war on terror …’ Under a strategy known
therefore interested in actions that address the root causes
as ‘information operations’, remote villages receive
of conflict rather than just binding up the wounds. The


questions here are: Does it work? Are my citizen taxpayer control to areas hitherto ‘pre-capitalist’ or surviving at the
dollars, euros and pounds being well spent? margins of the capitalist system. When the objective of the
external intervention is peacebuilding or nation building the
It does not seem so. The Bonn process, which was
record so far is dubious. The assumption that it is possible to
supposed to usher in a durable peace in Afghanistan, has
engineer rapid and durable change through a combination
badly backfired. In 2002–03, when there were fewer than
of military means and humanitarian assistance and to steer
4000 International Security Assistance Force troops in
this change from the outside is as yet unproven. It might
Afghanistan, aid agencies had access to all provinces. Now,
be possible to smother a crisis for a time (as in Bosnia), but
with more than 30 times as many troops being present,
ultimately peacebuilding is about social transformation: like
non-government organisations have access to maybe a
democracy, it cannot be imposed from the outside; it has to
fifth of the country. The conflict has intensified, so have
be illuminated from within.
civilian casualties, and resentment of ‘foreign occupation’ is
more widespread. Now that foreign troop withdrawals are There are three practical, or solution-focused, conclusions
accelerating, there is a risk that the country will slide back one can draw:
into the kind of civil war that eventuated after the collapse of
>> Debate is good, and it helps to contextualise
the Soviet-backed regime in 1992.
complex situations and the variations in ‘stabilisation’
The argument about the effectiveness of stabilisation approaches. In places such as Iraq and Afghanistan
operations has so far been mainly ideological. On one it should be possible to agree that narrowly defined
side are the proponents of linking assistance and security. humanitarian action—saving and protecting the
This can be done brutally in a counter-insurgency lives of civilians caught up in crisis and conflict—
context—‘If you tell us where the Taliban are, we will give can and should be kept separate from partisan
you assistance’. Or it can be done more subtly, as with the or politically motivated stabilisation operations.
‘clear‑shape‑hold‑build’, or so-called integrated, approaches A space needs to be reserved for card-carrying
when assistance was provided to win over ‘swing districts’. humanitarians working according to time-tested
Brutal or subtle, the ideological contention is that assistance principles and engaging with all sets of belligerents.
‘delivers’ security.
>> Situations evolve with time. In Afghanistan, victory,
On the other side of the argument this claim is disputed. peace and ‘post-conflictness’ were declared
Development is always a conflict-based process involving far too soon—hence the unprecedented levels
winners and losers. It is about politics. Reducing poverty of instrumentalisation and blurring of lines, the
in places such as Afghanistan is obviously a worthy and consequent attacks against aid workers, and the
necessary goal of itself, but expecting poverty reduction difficulties of reaching those in need of life-saving
efforts to bring ‘security’ is a stretch. Arguing about help. Other situations show that when a threshold
provincial reconstruction teams and ‘hearts and minds’ of stability is reached or when there is basic
operations will be productive only if verifiable facts can be agreement among all involved on what should
relied on. The evidence now shows convincingly that buying be the way forward (in Sierra Leone or Nepal, for
hearts and minds with small-scale projects does not work.9 example) comprehensive and coherent approaches
One study concludes, ‘There is little evidence this approach make more sense, and, if necessary, the military
is generating stability …’10 can have a role in implementing an agreed plan.
There is danger in seeking quick impacts. Remember the >> In relation to the role of the military in crisis response,
Taliban commander telling his captors, ‘You Americans have we have doctrine (the Oslo Guidelines, which enshrine
watches; we have time’. There is also danger in throwing the principle of ‘last resort’), we have practice, and
money at complex problems. Sloppy aid does not win hearts we have extreme variation in contexts. The Pakistan
and minds. earthquake shows that in a ‘natural disaster’ setting
much can be achieved by civil–military interaction and
even cooperation. But when the context changes (the
Humanitarian action to 2020 spread of armed conflict, floods, and huge numbers
Looking ahead, it is useful to consider stabilisation of people displaced) the risk of militarisation and
operations as an integral part of global governance and manipulation of aid becomes high. Haiti confirms this:
world ordering: they are aimed at making the ‘borderlands’ many Haitians resented the overbearing militarisation
safe for globalisation; they are part of the process of of the response. Afghanistan confirms it, too.
extension of the dominant forms of production and social


It might well be that Afghanistan is an aberration: many saw >> The settling of tectonic plates leading to a more complex
it as a laboratory of new approaches, but the experiment multipolar world is, however, likely to lead to localised,
has largely failed. And it might well be, as some studies are and in some cases extremely violent, conflicts. Some
showing, that we are witnessing a global decline in conflict will argue that in today’s asymmetrical conflicts there is
as a source of human suffering.11 no space for neutrality, but recent crises such as those
in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq and Somalia demonstrate
But then another cause for concern rears its head. If it
the exact opposite: the shrinking of humanitarian space
is true that conflict as a vector of humanitarian need is
and the instrumentalisation of humanitarian action
declining, vulnerability linked to climate change, natural
have had deleterious effects for communities needing
hazards, poor governance, technological, and possibly
assistance, for the security of humanitarian aid workers,
civilisation‑changing, or ‘black swan’, events seem to be
and for the credibility of the aid workers’ organisations.
increasing. If this trend is confirmed in the longer term, it will
probably be the future focus of humanitarian agencies. And >> New players will become much more active in the relief
this is where the military and the civilian agencies are likely arena. China, India, Brazil and Indonesia are likely to
to interact. bring different perspectives and operational approaches
that will challenge the current Northern or western
In such disaster settings, Northern humanitarian agencies
functioning of the humanitarian enterprise. It is likely
will inevitably clash with the logic of the state. Again, the
that assistance from these countries will compete
comfortable interventionist spirit of Northern humanitarians
with that provided by the established agencies and
will be increasingly challenged by states and civil society
that it will be much more ‘state-centric’ compared
organisations in the South. It will also be necessary to deal
with the current norm. What this means in terms of
with ‘compound catastrophic events’, where disasters,
the protection of at-risk communities and their rights
poor or dysfunctional governance, criminality and service
at times of crisis is as yet unclear. On the positive
breakdown exacerbate the crisis. It is debatable whether
side, one can expect local groups to be much better
traditional humanitarian approaches are adequate to
informed through the internet and social media and in
respond to such rapidly changing forms of vulnerability and
a much better position to demand accountability and
the rising risks they entail in contexts where the state will
transparency in relation to the provision of assistance.
have primary responsibility for responding.
>> At the same time the need for a protected niche
This has implications for the scope and shape of a
for principled humanitarian agencies—such as the
humanitarian enterprise that is still based on Cold War and
International Committee of the Red Cross or Médecins
post–Cold War assumptions of what constitutes a crisis. The
Sans Frontières—will remain. This might result in
enterprise is essentially backward-looking. We are getting
a more modest humanitarian enterprise, closer in
better at dealing with last year’s crisis, and perhaps today’s.
ambition and intent to time-tested humanitarian
But is the enterprise adapted to the challenges that are likely
principles. Such an enterprise would stand a better
to come its way in the coming decades? How is it faring in
chance of saving and protecting lives in conflict
places such as Yemen and Syria? Not very well, it seems.
or complex political emergencies than today’s
Because of strong affirmations of state sovereignty (in Sudan increasingly politically driven and militarised forms
and Sri Lanka, for example) and because the nature of a of relief, on one hand, and emerging non-western
crisis can implicate the state directly in the response, it is ‘sovereignty-based’ discourses on the other.
possible to foresee a number of changes:
>> There will be more regulation and more pressure to Notes
conform to national state–driven agendas. This is 1
Development Initiatives figures for 2010: devint.org.
not necessarily a bad thing. Gone are the days of free
and easy humanitarian interventionism on the part
2
M Hardt & A Negri, Empire, Harvard University Press, Cambridge
MA, 2000.
of non-government organisations and UN agencies.
3
The US Stabilization Manual defines ‘medical stabilisation
>> Humanitarian agencies will inevitably engage with operations’ thus: ‘Stability operations are humanitarian relief missions
national militaries (and the international contingents that the military conducts outside the U.S. in pre-conflict, conflict and
coming to help them). When the state is legitimate and post-conflict countries, disaster areas or underdeveloped nations, and
the external intervention is agreed to by all involved, in coordination with other federal agencies, allied governments and
there is no reason that civilian and military agencies international organizations. The new policy elevates the importance
should not work together with a division of labour that of such military health support in stability operations, called Medical
respects their respective ethos and competence. Stability Operations (MSOs), to a DoD [Department of Defense] priority
that is comparable with combat operations’.


4
Actually, this is not so new. In 1976 Henry Kissinger stated, ‘Disaster
relief is becoming increasingly a major instrument of our foreign policy’.
5
In total, the Pakistani military deployed 60 000 troops to assist in
the earthquake response. This is about 10 per cent of its total strength.
6
The Costs of War project, Brown University, 2011.
7
Most, if not all, NGOs are multi-mandate organisations focused
principally on reconstruction, development, and advocacy or solidarity.
Some engage in humanitarian activities as part of their varied portfolio.
The absence of a critical mass of principled, or Dunantist, humanitarian
players affects the quality of the debate surrounding humanitarian
concerns and the ability to respond to these concerns on the ground.
8
23 December 2008.
9
The Feinstein International Center at Tufts University is completing
a series of case studies on the effectiveness of ‘hearts and minds’
operations in Afghanistan, with the aim of providing some evidence as
to whether these operations actually promote security. The final report
on this research will be issued in early 2012 (see fic.tufts.edu).
10
‘As political pressures to “show results” in troop contributing
countries intensify, more and more assistance is being channelled
through military actors to “win hearts and minds” while efforts to
address the underlying causes of poverty … are being sidelined.’
‘Development projects implemented with military money or through
military-dominated structures aim to achieve fast results but are often
poorly executed, inappropriate and do not have sufficient community
involvement to make them sustainable’—Actionaid–Oxfam, Quick
Impact, Quick Collapse: the dangers of militarized aid in Afghanistan,
Oxfam America, Washington DC, 2010.
11
Human Security Institute, University of British Columbia study,
available online.


Working Paper 03/2012 Civil-military interaction and the future of humanitarian action

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Working Paper 03/2012 Civil-military interaction and the future of humanitarian action