The document summarizes Operation Sumatra Assist, the Australian Defense Force's (ADF) response to the 2004 Boxing Day tsunami in Indonesia. It discusses [1] the initial ADF deployment of medical personnel, engineers, and aircraft to provide relief; [2] the establishment of facilities like a field hospital and water purification plants to aid survivors; and [3] the challenges of coordinating relief efforts with other countries' militaries and aid organizations. The ADF response was praised for its speed, cultural sensitivity when working with Indonesian communities, and professionalism under difficult conditions in providing emergency relief.

1. OPERATION SUMATRA ASSIST
ADF response to the Boxing Day Tsunami
MAJGEN (Ret) David Chalmers
The Boxing Day 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami was a disaster of a magnitude that is
difficult to comprehend from the relative security of our Australian lounge rooms. At
7.58am on Sunday the 26th of December, a 9.4 Richter scale magnitude earthquake
occurred with an epicentre off the west coast of Sumatra. Several buildings collapsed in
the provincial capital Banda Aceh, although damage to the city was relatively light. Yet
a far more powerful force of nature was not far away. Within 15 minutes a tsunami
estimated by Indonesian authorities to have peaked at 34 metres struck the coastline.
Like a gigantic scythe this huge wall of water swept houses, bridges, roads and people
away, leaving little but the foundations of coastal villages as it receded. More than a
third of the cities of Banda Aceh and Meulaboh were totally destroyed, with thousands of
tonnes of wreckage and mud pushed into the areas that escaped the direct effect of the
wave.
Some 220,000 people died, many of whom were washed out to sea. But over 100,000
bodies remained, covered in mud and buried in amongst the debris left behind in the two
cities. Another 500,000 people lost homes - many lost all of their extended family and
their business or livelihood as well.
Australia‟s response to the tragedy was swift. Our Government made an immediate
decision to provide as much assistance as we could, with the result that General Cosgrove
rang the Indonesian Chief of Defence, General Sutarto, to offer military support. Joint
level planning was already well underway, so we were able to respond very quickly after
being invited by General Sutarto to help in Aceh.
On the 28th of December an Australian C130 transport aircraft landed in Banda Aceh, the
first relief support to arrive. In fact, it landed only just after the Indonesian commander
General Bambang Darmono arrived, and before he had had a chance to set up his
headquarters or begin any planning. This C130 was the tip of a major Australian
Defence Force (ADF) relief operation, which quickly grew to involve a deployed force of
some 1100 Australian, New Zealand and British service personnel, which was named
Operation Sumatra Assist. The force itself was given the designation Combined Joint
Task Force 629 or CJTF629.
The mission that was given to me as Force Commander, was as specific as the available
information allowed – „go and do some good‟. This was caveated by the strategic
imperative to do so in a manner that enhanced rather than harmed our relationship with
Indonesia: in other words undertaking our operations with cultural sensitivity and in a
manner that respected Indonesian sovereignty.
A number of challenges faced the CJTF as we deployed into Sumatra. The most
significant was the initial lack of any substantial information regarding where and how
our effort could best be directed. We did know that there were a large number of victims

2. 2
and displaced people, with estimates growing by the hour in the first few days.
Acquisition of more specific data was hampered by the total paralysis of the Achenese
provincial government due to losses amongst its staff. Compounding this, access into
Aceh was constrained by the limited capacity of airheads and the destruction of ports and
the west coast roads. Most survivors could only be reached by boat or helicopter.
I also needed to be concerned about the threat to the safety of the CJTF posed by both the
environment and security situation in Aceh. The unburied dead and lack of either
sanitation or clean water for survivors posed a serious threat to the health of would be
relief workers. Security constraints also posed a dilemma for an unarmed force – the
terrorist threat was high and Aceh‟s insurgency war continued despite a ceasefire.
A final concern was the so called “Second wave” of the tsunami - the crowd of
volunteers, aid organisations and military forces that flooded into Aceh during January
and February. Some were invited by the Indonesian government, but most had just
decided to help. Many organisations came without logistic support and some were more
of a burden than a boon. This complex and daily changing cast of characters
overwhelmed the ability of the Indonesian authorities, and the United Nations when they
arrived, to synchronise effectively.
In the absence of much information in the first few hours after the tsunami, Australia‟s
response was based on our experience some years ago in providing assistance after the
Papua New Guinea tsunami. Our initial C130 deployment was followed within 48 hours
by a small team of medical personnel and Army engineers. The immediacy of this
response helped save lives; we had a surgical team working in the Indonesian military
(TNI) hospital in Banda Aceh by December 30th. Sadly, while thousands of casualties
needed treatment, there were fewer injured than we expected; apparently most of those in
the disaster zone had been killed. The engineers also made a huge impact through the
water purification plant they set up in the centre of Banda Aceh. The Convent Water
Point, as it was known, provided thousands of litres of safe drinking water through
January and February, until we eventually handed it over to the Red Cross. It became a
very visible symbol of the ADF‟s speed of response and commitment.
Concurrently, the RAAF established a Forward Command Element and our C130s began
flying in much needed medical supplies and food to Aceh. Within a week a Field
Hospital, six helicopters, engineer reconnaissance teams and the force headquarters were
deploying into Medan and then forward to Banda Aceh. The hospital was augmented by
a New Zealand medical team, and two of the helicopters were British. We also had a
Kiwi C130 flying as part of the combined joint force.

3. 3
One of the early decisions that had to be taken was where to focus the ADF relief effort.
I had sufficient logistic and communications capability to support up to two locations, so
the option of putting the hospital in one area and the engineers elsewhere, depending on
the need for their respective capabilities, existed. I was also conscious that Banda Aceh
was likely to be over whelmed with relief support, while other areas received little or
none. On the other hand, we had already set up a useful foothold in Banda Aceh, and
force protection considerations militated toward reinforcing this initial lodgement.
Discussion with General Bambang led to what I regarded as a natural division of work –
the Singaporean Armed Forces in Meulaboh, the ADF to reinforce its effort in Banda
Aceh and the US Combined Support Group to focus on rotary wing lift in between.
CJTF 629 - FORCE DISPOSITION
• Forward Command Element
• 6 UH-1H Helicopters
• Field Hospital
• Engineers
• HMAS Kanimbla
• 6 C130
• Logistic Support Base
• 1 Kingair
• Combined joint Task Force HQ
Figure 1
Figure 1 shows how Australia had military forces deployed by mid January. I had my
headquarters in Medan, supported by our embassy staff in Jakarta. The ANZAC field
hospital, a helicopter detachment and an engineer group as well as a forward headquarters
were located in Banda Aceh, and a major logistics hub was established in Butterworth,
Malaysia. We were also assessing the feasibility of using the port of Sabang, on an island
just north of Banda Aceh, as a force extraction point; an option I eventually took.
I set up my headquarters in Medan for a number of reasons. Firstly because General
Cosgrove told me to – so in that regard it was not a difficult decision. I was also on a
knife-edge in balancing available sustainment air effort with the force flow I had into
Banda Aceh, so I had to keep to a minimum the people I had forward. But it was also
obvious that Medan was the logistics and co-ordination hub in the initial stages if the
operations. And in fact a few days after we arrived both the Singaporean and United
States forces also set up their headquarters in Medan.

4. 4
Providing the command and control of a combined joint force was a challenge for our
very small headquarters. This would have been much more difficult had I not had a small
but highly effective Civil Military Co-operation (CIMIC) capability. The CIMIC Teams
were my eyes and ears outside of the headquarters, especially with the hundreds of other
agencies seeking our support. Further, they provided a link with the Indonesian
Government and TNI, ensuring that our efforts were always in accordance with the
priorities set by the Indonesians. CIMIC teams were dispersed across the disaster area
providing support to ADF elements where and when required.
Understandably, the sheer scale of the disaster initially overwhelmed the Indonesian civil
and military agencies. No co-ordination mechanisms existed when we arrived, and
although good will and hard work were resulting in some aid getting to where it was
needed, the CIMIC staff made an assessment that Non-Government Organisations
(NGOs) were inundating military transport assets with requests. It was almost impossible
to apply the priorities set by the Indonesians, with often the loudest NGO voice or the
most convenient load being sent forward, rather than the most needed aid. Congestion at
airports was chronic and aid that was needed forward in the disaster area continued to
pile up. LTCOL David Mcguire resolved this problem with AusAID through the
establishment of a Civil Military Aid Coordination Conference. The CMACC, as it was
known, provided a central coordination point for military and civilian agencies and,
coupled with the creation of a Combined Air Operations Centre at Polonia airport, put the
Indonesians back in control of the relief effort.
Controlled by the Combined Air Operations Centre, our airlift group comprised six C130
transport aircraft, which flew both relief supplies and logistic sustainment for the CJTF
from Butterworth and Medan into Banda Aceh, and six Huey UH-1H helicopters. The
helicopters formed part of a fleet of some 75 rotary wing aircraft, which during January
formed the only means of ferrying food and water down to isolated communities on the
west coast. The crews lived on the side of the Banda Aceh airfield, in appallingly muddy
and noisy conditions, with frequent aftershocks an unpleasant reminder of the cause of
the tsunami.
Established by January 6th, the ANZAC Field Hospital was located at the Zainal Abidin
Hospital in Banda Aceh. The facility comprised an integrated surgical ward with a staff
of around 120 Australian and 30 New Zealand personnel. In addition to providing
medical support, medics and engineers had to clear the significant amount of mud, debris
and damaged hospital equipment that remained in the hospital buildings. Along with the
Indonesian infantry soldiers involved in the clean up, their endurance and motivation was
remarkable. Under the leadership of LTCOL Georgina Whelan, hospital staff undertook
a heavy workload, including treating some horrific injuries and confronting cases. But
there were also uplifting moments that helped the staff‟s morale, including the birth of 18
children in the hospital. One of these was named „Anzac‟ by his grateful parents, a
lasting reminder of the hospital‟s work in Aceh.
Having sailed from Sydney on New Years eve, HMAS Kanimbla arrived on January
13th, and landed our engineer group at Banda Aceh to commence work. The Australian
Army Engineer Detachment consisted of around 150 troops from the Darwin-based 1st

5. 5
Combat Engineer Regiment, commanded by LTCOL Ian Cumming. The engineers
operated a number of water points throughout Aceh to provide potable water to local
communities and to the Banda Aceh Public Hospital. Another significant task was the
removal of debris from the city, and particularly clearing drains to allow floodwater to be
removed from the city. This was physically and psychologically demanding work, much
of it done by hand with the frequent discovery of bodies in the wreckage a constant
hazard. As a means of providing relief from debris clearing LTCOL Cumming tasked his
engineer sections to recover some of the fishing boats washed into the city, eventually
graduating from fairly small craft to relaunching a very large fishing boat.
One of the lessons I learnt during the operation was that speed of response in disaster
relief is critical. There will never be perfect situational awareness, so in the face of
uncertainty it‟s a matter of sending your best guess force structure and then shaping it as
you pile on. Although medical and engineer capabilities were most nation‟s „best guess‟,
and ours did magnificent work, niche capabilities turned out to be real force multipliers.
For example our air traffic controllers at Banda Aceh enabled a carrier group‟s worth of
helicopters to operate safely. Air load teams with forklift trucks and pallets were the
difference between aid piling up in warehouses and it flowing forward smoothly. And
the networks developed by CIMIC teams with both the Indonesians and other agencies
reduced the duplication of effort, improved the security of aid workers and greatly
expedited the aid effort.
Perhaps the most important issue for me throughout the operation was to maintain the
primacy of the Indonesian government in the relief effort. Whilst Aceh was devastated
by the earthquake and Tsunami, the Indonesian Government was still intact and had
control of the operation. If I had one criticism of some agencies involved in the relief
effort, it would be that they treated Indonesia as a failed state and largely ignored both the
Government and the TNI. The large number of volunteers, foreign military and aid
organisations which flooded into Aceh exacerbated congestion in the effected area.
Many of these organisations did not seek Indonesian guidance on requirements or
permission to deploy, nor were they self-sustaining. The sensitive cultural issues posed
by working in a conservative Muslim province, fearful of corruption by westerners, was a
potential vulnerability that radical Islamic organisations attempted to exploit through
information operations. I have the highest regard for the good judgement of Australian
junior soldiers who turned this vulnerability into a strength through their consistent and
mature understanding of the need for cultural sensitivity.
The emergency phase was over by the end of February, and with it the requirement for
military support to disaster relief work in Banda Aceh. We worked closely with AUSaid
to ensure that there was no disruption to the support being provided to the people of Aceh
during the transition from military to civilian aid. It then took four weeks of solid labour
to clean our equipment to Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service (AQIS) standards
– a very costly exercise. Our relationship with AQIS inspectors was good although they
were zealous in the performance of their duties. My extraction plan was to get out of the
way of ongoing disaster relief and reconstruction work while we went through this
process, by moving the force to Sabang to do our clean up. Even so, remaining in theatre
to clean equipment was a risk, one that may not be acceptable on future operations.

6. 6
I would summarise the keys to the success of the operation as:
 Sensitivity at all levels within the task force to the broader strategic objectives of
the operation.
 Very effective leadership at the Junior Non Commissioned Officer (NCO) level,
 Co-operation, flexibility and a sense of humour within the CJTF.
 The high standard of equipment and training existing within the ADF, and the
ability to deploy at very short notice.
 A small number of low cost, high outcome capabilities, particularly air traffic
controllers, water purification teams, CIMIC teams and the field hospital.
 Support of HMAS Kanimbla, without which the risks and difficulty in mounting
such an operation would be significantly higher.
With few exceptions, more than a thousand members of the ADF responded at short
notice to the challenges of the operation very professionally. Along with the Singaporean
Armed Forces, they set the benchmark for behaviour and work ethic, comparing very
favourably with other foreign military forces. Many more ADF members, although not
deployed, worked tirelessly in support of the operation. Leadership at every level, but
particularly by junior NCOs, was impressive. Much work was done in an environment
well outside the normal experience of CJTF members, largely due to the corpses
contained in the debris of Banda Aceh. Small teams, usually led by private soldiers or
corporals, did all that was asked of them and more, and set the tone and foundation for
the CJTF‟s success. I was indeed fortunate and very proud to command such a
professional force of soldiers, sailors and airmen.