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Responsibility to protect
The Responsibility to Protect (R2P or RtoP) is a global political commitment which was endorsed by all member
states of the United Nations at the 2005 World Summit to prevent genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes
against humanity.[1][2]
The principle of the Responsibility to Protect is based upon the underlying premise that sovereignty entails a
responsibility to protect all populations from mass atrocity crimes and human rights violations.[3][4][5] The principle is
based on a respect for the norms and principles of international law, especially the underlying principles of law relating to
sovereignty, peace and security, human rights, and armed conflict.[6][7]
The Responsibility to Protect provides a framework for employing measures that already exist (i.e., mediation, early
warning mechanisms, economic sanctions, and chapter VII powers) to prevent atrocity crimes and to protect civilians
from their occurrence. The authority to employ the use of force under the framework of the Responsibility to Protect rests
solely with United Nations Security Council and is considered a measure of last resort.[8] The United Nations Secretary-
General has published annual reports on the Responsibility to Protect since 2009 that expand on the measures available
to governments, intergovernmental organizations, and civil society, as well as the private sector, to prevent atrocity
crimes.[9][10][11][12][13][14][15][16]
The Responsibility to Protect has been the subject of considerable debate, particularly regarding the implementation of the
principle by various actors in the context of country-specific situations, such as Libya, Syria, Sudan and Kenya, for
example.[17][18][19][20][21][22] It has also been argued that commensurate with the responsibility to protect,
international law should also recognize a right for populations to offer militarily organized resistance to protect
themselves against genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes on a massive scale.[23]
1 Definition
1.1 The Scope of the Responsibility to Protect
1.2 Three Pillars of the Responsibility to Protect
1.3 The Responsibility to Protect and 'Humanitarian Intervention'
2 History of the Responsibility to Protect
2.1 1990s: Origins
2.2 2000: African Union proposes a right to intervene
2.3 2000: International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
2.4 2005 World Summit Outcome Document
2.5 Secretary-General's 2009 report
2.6 Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
3 United Nations
Contents](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/responsibilitytoprotectr2p-171204081625/85/RESPONSIBILITY-TO-PROTECT-R2P-1-320.jpg)
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139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use
appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of
the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner,
through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis
and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be
inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes,
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue
consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and
crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and
international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build
capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out.
140. We fully support the mission of the Special Advisor of the Secretary-General on the Prevention of
Genocide.
The above paragraphs in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document serve as the basis for the inter-governmental
agreement to the Responsibility to Protect. The General Assembly adopted the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document
in its resolution 60/1 of 2005.[24] The body subsequently committed to continue consideration of the Responsibility to
Protect with its Resolution A/Res/63/308 of October 2009.[25] The UN Security Council first reaffirmed the
Responsibility to Protect in Resolution 1674 (2006) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, recalling in particular
paragraphs 138 and 139 of the Summit Outcome regarding the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.[26]
The report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, which first articulated the
Responsibility to Protect in its December 2001 Report, envisioned a wide scope of application in its articulation of the
principle, which included "overwhelming natural or environmental catastrophes, where the state concerned is either
unwilling or unable to cope, or call for assistance, and significant loss of life is occurring or threatened."[5]
Heads of State and Government at the 2005 World Summit refined the scope of the Responsibility to Protect to the four
crimes mentioned in paragraphs 138 and 139, namely genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity, which are commonly referred to as 'atrocity crimes' or 'mass atrocity crimes'.[8]
As per the Secretary-General's 2009 Report on the Responsibility to Protect, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect,
"The responsibility to protect applies, until Member States decide otherwise, only to the four specified crimes and
violations: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity...To try to extend it to cover other
calamities, such as HIV/AIDS, climate change or the response to natural disasters, would undermine the 2005
consensus and stretch the concept beyond recognition or operational utility."[27]
The focused scope is part of what the UN Secretary-General has termed a "narrow but deep approach" to the
Responsibility to Protect: A narrow application to four crimes, but a deep approach to response, employing the wide array
of prevention and protection instruments available to Member States, the United Nations system, regional and
The Scope of the Responsibility to Protect](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/responsibilitytoprotectr2p-171204081625/85/RESPONSIBILITY-TO-PROTECT-R2P-3-320.jpg)
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subregional organizations and civil society.[27]
The Responsibility to Protect consists of three important and mutually-reinforcing pillars, as articulated in the 2009
Report of the Secretary-General on the issue, and which build off of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit
Outcome Document and the intergovernmental agreement to the principle:
1. Pillar I: The protection responsibilities of the state;
2. Pillar II: International assistance and capacity-building;
3. Pillar III: Timely and decisive response.[27]
As seen in the 2005 World Outcome Document the UN Member States unanimously agreed to uphold their Responsibility
to Protect. Pillar I being the protection responsibilities of the state, paragraph 138 (see definition) states “Each individual
state has the responsibility to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against
humanity”. Under Pillar I many countries are able to uphold these principles of preventing mass atrocity crimes. As Pillar
II leads on to international assistance and capacity-building. The international community is sent to help populations in
need before further crises break out. States who may be willing but are either incapable or too weak to uphold their
responsibility now may receive international support as a result of R2P. Pillar III is to deliver a timely and decisive
response. This movement is a prevention method for mass atrocity crimes when a state fails to protect its populations. In
reference to paragraph 139 “The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use
appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the [UN]
Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity”.[28][29]
According to the UN Secretary-General's 2012 report, the three pillars of the Responsibility to Protect are not sequential
and are of equal importance. "Without all three, the concept would be incomplete. All three pillars must be implemented
in a manner fully consistent with the purposes, principles, and provisions of the Charter."[13] The pillared approach is
intended to reinforce, not undermine state sovereignty. As per the 2009 report of the Secretary-General, "By helping
States to meet their core protection responsibilities, the responsibility to protect seeks to strengthen sovereignty, not
weaken it. It seeks to help States to succeed, not just to react when they fail."[27]
The Responsibility to Protect differs from humanitarian intervention in four important ways. First, humanitarian
intervention only refers to the use of military force, whereas R2P is first and foremost a preventive principle that
emphasizes a range of measures to stem the risk of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity
before the crimes are threatened or occur. The use of force may only carried out as a measure last resort, when all other
non-coercive measures have failed, and only when it is authorized by the UN Security Council.[30] This is in contrast to
the principle of 'humanitarian intervention', which allows for the use of force as a humanitarian imperative without the
authorization of such bodies like the Security Council.
The second point relates to the first. As a principle, the Responsibility to Protect is rooted firmly in existing international
law, especially the law relating to sovereignty, peace and security, human rights, and armed conflict.[31]
Third, while humanitarian interventions have in the past been justified in the context of varying situations, R2P focuses
only on the four mass atrocity crimes: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. The first three
crimes are clearly defined in international law and codified in the Rome Statute (http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/EA
9AEFF7-5752-4F84-BE94-0A655EB30E16/0/Rome_Statute_English.pdf) that established the International Criminal
Three Pillars of the Responsibility to Protect
The Responsibility to Protect and 'Humanitarian Intervention'](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/responsibilitytoprotectr2p-171204081625/85/RESPONSIBILITY-TO-PROTECT-R2P-4-320.jpg)
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Court. Ethnic cleansing is not a crime defined under international law, but has been defined by the UN as "a purposeful
policy designed by one ethnic or religious group to remove by violent and terror-inspiring means the civilian population of
another ethnic or religious group from certain geographic areas".[32]
Finally, while humanitarian intervention assumes a "right to intervene", the R2P is based on a "responsibility to
protect".[30] Humanitarian intervention and the R2P both agree on the fact that sovereignty is not absolute. However, the
R2P doctrine shifts away from state-centered motivations to the interests of victims by focusing not on the right of states
to intervene but on a responsibility to protect populations at risk.[33] In addition, it introduces a new way of looking at the
essence of sovereignty, moving away from issues of "control" and emphasising "responsibility" to one's own citizens and
the wider international community.[34]
The norm of the R2P was borne out of the international community's failure to respond to tragedies such as the Rwandan
Genocide in 1994 and the Srebrenica massacre in 1995. Kofi Annan, who was Assistant Secretary-General at the UN
Department for Peacekeeping Operations during the Rwandan genocide,[35] realized the international community's
failure to respond. In the wake of the Kosovo intervention, 1999, Annan insisted that traditional notions of sovereignty
had been redefined: “States are now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples”,[36] he said,
while U.S. President Bill Clinton cited human rights concerns in 46% of the hundreds of remarks that he made justifying
intervention in Kosovo. [37] In 2000, and in his capacity as UN Secretary-General, Annan wrote the report "We the
Peoples" on the role of the United Nations in the 21st Century, and in this report he posed the following question: "if
humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a
Srebrenica – to gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?"[38]
Many critics of the R2P's third pillar claim that R2P is a Western concept, but it was the African Union (AU) that
pioneered the concept that the international community has a responsibility to intervene in crisis situations if a state is
failing to protect its population from mass atrocity crimes.[39] In 2000, the AU incorporated the right to intervene in a
member state, as enshrined in Article 4(h) of its Constitutive Act, which declares "[t]he right of the Union to intervene in a
Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and
crimes against humanity".[40] The AU also adopted the Ezulwini Consensus in 2005, which welcomed R2P as a tool for
the prevention of mass atrocities.[41]
In September 2000, the Canadian government established the International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty (ICISS) to answer Annan's question "if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on
sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and systematic violations of human rights
that affect every precept of our common humanity?" In February 2001, at the third round table meeting of the ICISS in
London, Gareth Evans, Mohamed Sahnoun, and Michael Ignatieff suggested the phrase "responsibility to protect" as a
way to avoid the "right to intervene" or "obligation to intervene" doctrines and yet keep a degree of duty to act to resolve
humanitarian crises.[42]
History of the Responsibility to Protect
1990s: Origins
2000: African Union proposes a right to intervene
2000: International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/responsibilitytoprotectr2p-171204081625/85/RESPONSIBILITY-TO-PROTECT-R2P-5-320.jpg)
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In 2001, ICISS released a report titled "The Responsibility to Protect" (http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Repor
t.pdf). In a radical reformulation of the meaning of state sovereignty, the report argued that sovereignty entailed not only
rights but also responsibilities, specifically a state's responsibility to protect its people from major violations of human
rights. This idea rested on earlier work by Francis Deng and Roberta Cohen regarding internally displaced persons.[43]
Inspiration may also be attributed to Jan Eliasson, who in response to a questionnaire on internally displaced persons
distributed by Francis Deng, stated that assisting populations at risk within their own country was "basically a question of
striking a balance between sovereignty and solidarity with people in need."[44] The ICISS report further asserted that,
where a state was "unable or unwilling" to protect its people, the responsibility should shift to the international
community and "the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect." The ICISS argued
that any form of military intervention is "an exceptional and extraordinary measure", and, as such, to be justified it must
meet certain criteria, including:[45]
Just cause: There must be "serious and irreparable harm occurring to human beings, or imminently likely to occur".
Right intention: The main intention of the military action must be to prevent human suffering.
Last resort: Every other measure besides military invention has to have already been taken into account. (This does
not mean that every measurement has to have been applied and been shown to fail, but that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that only military action would work in that situation.)
Proportional means: The military means must not exceed what is necessary "to secure the defined human
protection objective".
Reasonable prospects: The chance of success must be reasonably high, and it must be unlikely that the
consequences of the military intervention would be worse than the consequences without the intervention.
Right authority: The military action has to have been authorized by the Security Council.
As the ICISS report was released in 2001, right around the time of the Second Gulf War, many thought that would be the
end of this new norm. However, at the 2005 World Summit, where the largest number of heads of state and government in
the history of the UN convened, the R2P was unanimously adopted.[46] While the outcome was close to the ideas of the
ICISS report, there were some notable differences: the R2P would now only apply to mass atrocity crimes (genocide, war
crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing), rather than human rights violations; no mention was made of the
criteria of intervention (see above); and the UN Security Council was made the only body allowed to authorize
intervention. The paragraphs also stress the importance of regional organizations and the role they can play through
Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.
The results of this summit led to world leaders agreeing on holding each other accountable if they fail to uphold the new
responsibilities. Decidedly if one state fails to uphold their responsibility this is now where State Sovereignty may be
broken in order to protect people in danger of such crimes. First peaceful action is to be taken through humanitarian,
diplomatic, or other means. If these fail to resolve the matter, the international community should come together in a
“timely and decisive manner”. This shall all be worked on a case-by-case basis through the UN Security Council as well as
the UN Charter.[47]
2005 World Summit Outcome Document
Secretary-General's 2009 report](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/responsibilitytoprotectr2p-171204081625/85/RESPONSIBILITY-TO-PROTECT-R2P-6-320.jpg)
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On 12 January 2009, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon issued a report entitled Implementing the Responsibility to
Protect (http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/implementing%20the%20rtop.pdf). The report was the first comprehensive
document from the UN Secretariat on the R2P, following Ban's stated commitment to turn the concept into policy. The
Secretary-General's report set the tone and the direction for the discussion on the subject at the UN. The report proposes
three-pillar approach to the R2P:
Pillar One stresses that states have the primary responsibility to protect their populations from genocide, war
crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.
Pillar Two addresses the international community's commitment to help states build capacity to protect their
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, and to help those under
stress before crises and conflicts break out.
Pillar Three focuses on the responsibility of international community to act in a timely and decisive way to prevent
and halt genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity when a state manifestly fails to
protect its populations.
The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (GCR2P) is an international non-governmental organization that
conducts research and advocacy for the Responsibility to protect. The Centre is based at the Graduate Center, CUNY, New
York City with an office also located in Geneva.[48]
At the 2005 World Summit, UN member states included R2P in the Outcome Document agreeing to Paragraphs 138 and
139. These paragraphs gave final language to the scope of R2P. It applies to the four mass atrocities crimes only. It also
identifies to whom the R2P protocol applies; i.e., nations first, and regional and international communities second.
Paragraphs 138 and 139 state:
138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including
their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in
accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to
exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability.
139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use
appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of
the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner,
through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis
and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be
inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes,
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue
consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and
crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
United Nations](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/responsibilitytoprotectr2p-171204081625/85/RESPONSIBILITY-TO-PROTECT-R2P-7-320.jpg)
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international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build
capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity and to assisting those under stress before crises and conflicts break out.[49]
Since then, the UN has been actively engaged with the development of the R2P. Several resolutions, reports, and debates
have emerged through the UN forum.
The Security Council has reaffirmed its commitment to the R2P in several resolutions. The first such resolution came in
April 2006, when the Security Council reaffirmed the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 in Resolution 1674 (https://w
ww.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1674(2006)), formalizing their support for the R2P. In 2009, the
Council again recognized states' primary responsibility to protect and reaffirmed paragraphs 138 and 139 in resolution
1894 (https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1894(2009)).
Additionally, the Security Council has mentioned the R2P in several country-specific resolutions:
Darfur: Resolution 1706 (https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1706(2006)) in 2006
Libya: Resolution 1970 (https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1970(2011)), Resolution
1973 (https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1973(2011)) in 2011, Resolution 2016 (http
s://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2016(2011)) in 2011, and Resolution 2040 (https://ww
w.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2040(2012)) in 2012
Côte d'Ivoire: Resolution 1975 (https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1975(2011)) in
2011
Yemen: Resolution 2014 (https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2014(2011)) in 2011
Mali: Resolution 2085 (https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2085(2012)) in 2012 and
Resolution 2100 (https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2100(2013)) in 2013
Sudan and South Sudan: Resolution 1996 (https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1996(20
11)) in 2011 and Resolution 2121 (https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2109(2013)) in
2013
In January 2009, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon released UN Secretariat's first comprehensive report on the R2P,
called Implementing the Responsibility to Protect
(http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/implementing%20the%20rtop.pdf).[50] His report led to a debate in the General
Assembly in July 2009 and the first time since 2005 that the General Assembly had come together to discuss the R2P.
Ninety-four member states spoke. Most supported the R2P principle, although some important concerns were voiced.
They discussed how to implement the R2P in crisis situations around the world. The debate highlighted the need for
regional organizations like the African Union to play a strong role in implementing R2P; the need for stronger early
warning mechanisms in the UN; and the need to clarify the roles UN bodies would play in implementing R2P.[51][52]
One outcome of the debate was the first resolution referencing R2P adopted by the General Assembly. The Resolution
(A/RES/63/308) showed that the international community had not forgotten about the concept of the R2P and it decided
"to continue its consideration of the responsibility to protect".[53]
Security Council
Secretary-General reports](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/responsibilitytoprotectr2p-171204081625/85/RESPONSIBILITY-TO-PROTECT-R2P-8-320.jpg)
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In subsequent years, the Secretary-General would release a new report, followed by another debate in the General
Assembly.
In 2010, the report was titled Early Warning, Assessment and the Responsibility to Protect (http://www.globalr2p.org/m
edia/files/2010_a64864.pdf). The informal interactive dialogue was held on 9 August 2010, with 49 member states, two
regional organizations, and two civil society organizations speaking at the event. The discussion had a resoundingly
positive tone, with virtually all of those that spoke stressing a need to prevent atrocities and agreeing that effective early
warning is a necessary condition for effective prevention and early action. Objections were expressed by a small number of
member states; namely Nicaragua, Iran, Pakistan, Sudan, and Venezuela.[54][55]
In 2011, the report analyzed The Role of Regional and Subregional Arrangements in Implementing the Responsibility to
Protect (http://www.globalr2p.org/media/files/2011_a65877.pdf). At the debate on 12 July 2011, statements were made
by 43 member states, three regional organizations, and four civil society representatives. The biggest challenge to R2P was
considered cooperation with, and support between, the UN and regional bodies in times of crisis. Member states
acknowledged the importance of resolving this challenge through the unique advantages regional organizations possess in
preventing and reacting to mass atrocities.[56][57]
In 2012, the focus was on Responsibility to Protect: Timely and Decisive Response (http://www.globalr2p.org/media/file
s/unsg-report_timely-and-decisive-response.pdf). The debate followed on 5 September 2012 saw interventions address
the third pillar of the R2P and the diversity of non-coercive and coercive measures available for a collective response to
mass atrocity crimes.[58]
In 2013, the Secretary-General focused on Responsibility to Protect: State responsibility and prevention (http://www.glo
balr2p.org/media/files/n1338693.pdf). The debate following the report was held on 11 September 2013. A panel of UN,
member state, and civil society experts delivered presentations, after which 68 member states, 1 regional organization, and
2 civil society organizations made statements.[59][60]
In 2004, following the genocidal violence in Rwanda and the Balkans, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan appointed Juan
E. Méndez as Special Adviser to fill critical gaps in the international system that allowed those tragedies to go unchecked.
In 2007, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon appointed Francis M. Deng on a full-time basis at the level of Under-Secretary-
General. Around the same time, he also appointed Edward Luck as the Special Adviser who focuses on the R2P, on a part-
time basis at the level of Assistant Secretary-General.[61]
The Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect leads the conceptual, political, institutional, and operational
development of the R2P. The Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide acts as a catalyst to raise awareness of the
causes and dynamics of genocide, to alert relevant actors where there is a risk of genocide, and to advocate and mobilize
for appropriate action. The mandates of the two Special Advisers are distinct but complementary. The efforts of their
Office include alerting relevant actors to the risk of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity;
enhancing the capacity of the UN to prevent these crimes, including their incitement; and working with member states,
regional and sub-regional arrangements, and civil society to develop more effective means of response when they do
occur.[61]
Both Special Advisers Deng and Luck ended their assignments with the Office in July 2012. On 17 July 2012, Secretary-
General Ban Ki-moon appointed Adama Dieng of Senegal as his Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide.[61] On 12
July 2013, Jennifer Welsh of Canada was appointed as the Special Advisor on the Responsibility to Protect.[62]
Special Advisors on the Prevention of Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/responsibilitytoprotectr2p-171204081625/85/RESPONSIBILITY-TO-PROTECT-R2P-9-320.jpg)
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From December 2007 to January 2008, Kenya was swept by a wave of ethnic violence triggered by a disputed presidential
election held on 27 December 2007. On 30 December 2007, Mwai Kibaki was declared the winner of the presidential
elections and was sworn in as president a couple of hours later. The announcement of the results triggered widespread and
systematic violence resulting in more than 1,000 deaths and the displacement of over 500,000 civilians. Clashes were
characterized by the ethnically targeted killings of people aligned with the two major political parties, the Orange
Democratic Movement (ODM) and the Party of National Unity (PNU).[63]
External intervention was almost immediate. French Foreign and European Affairs Minister Bernard Kouchner made an
appeal to the UN Security Council in January 2008 to react "in the name of the responsibility to protect" before Kenya
plunged into a deadly ethnic conflict. On 31 December 2007, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon issued a statement
expressing concern for the ongoing violence and calling for the population to remain calm and for Kenyan security forces
to show restraint. On 10 January 2008, former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan was accepted by both the ODM and the
PNU as the African Union Chief Mediator. Mediation efforts led to the signing of a power-sharing agreement on 28
February 2008. The agreement established Mwai Kibaki as President and Raila Odinga as Prime Minister, as well as the
creation of three commissions: the Commission of Inquiry on Post-Election Violence (CIPEV); the Truth, Justice and
Reconciliation Commission; and the Independent Review Commission on the General Elections. This rapid and
coordinated reaction by the international community was praised by Human Rights Watch as "a model of diplomatic
action under the 'Responsibility to Protect' principles".[64]
On 30 March 2011, in response to the escalating post-election violence against the population of Ivory Coast in late 2010
and early 2011, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1975 (https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.a
sp?symbol=S/RES/1975(2011)) condemning the gross human rights violations committed by supporters of both ex-
President Laurent Gbagbo and President Ouattara. The resolution cited "the primary responsibility of each State to protect
civilians", called for the immediate transfer of power to President Ouattara, the victor in the elections, and reaffirmed that
the United Nations Operation in Ivory Coast (UNOCI) could use "all necessary means to protect life and property." On 4
April 2011, in an effort to protect the people of Ivory Coast from further atrocities, UNOCI began a military operation,[65]
and President Gbagbo's hold on power ended on 11 April when he was arrested by President Ouattara's forces. In
November 2011, President Gbagbo was transferred to the International Criminal Court to face charges of crimes against
humanity as an "indirect co-perpetrator" of murder, rape, persecution, and other inhumane acts.[66] On 26 July 2012, the
Council adopted resolution 2062 (https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2062(2012))
renewing the mandate of UNOCI until 31 July 2013.
Libya was the first case where the Security Council authorized a military intervention citing the R2P. Following
widespread and systematic attacks against the civilian population by the Libyan regime, and language used by Muammar
Gaddafi that reminded the international community of the genocide in Rwanda, the Security Council unanimously
adopted resolution 1970 on 26 February 2011, making explicit reference to the R2P. Deploring what it called "the gross
and systematic violation of human rights" in strife-torn Libya, the Security Council demanded an end to the violence,
In practice
Kenya 2007/2008
Ivory Coast 2011
Libya 2011](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/responsibilitytoprotectr2p-171204081625/85/RESPONSIBILITY-TO-PROTECT-R2P-10-320.jpg)
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"recalling the Libyan authorities' responsibility to protect its population", and
imposed a series of international sanctions. The Council also decided to refer
the situation to the International Criminal Court.
In resolution 1973, adopted on 17 March 2011, the Security Council
demanded an immediate ceasefire in Libya, including an end to ongoing
attacks against civilians, which it said might constitute "crimes against
humanity". The Council authorized member states to take "all necessary
measures" to protect civilians under threat of attack in the country, while
excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan
territory. A few days later, acting on the resolution, NATO planes started
striking at Gaddafi's forces.[67] NATO subsequently came under scrutiny for
its behavior during the air strikes; concerns included the fact that the
intervention quickly moved to regime-change and that there were allegations regarding aerial bombardments that may
have caused civilian casualties.[68]
In December 2012, a loose rebel coalition named the Séléka initiated a military campaign to overthrow the government of
the Central African Republic (CAR) and its then-president, Francois Bozizé. The Séléka, composed mostly of factions of
armed groups in the northeast of the state, accused Bozizé's government of neglecting their region. They rapidly captured
several strategic towns and were poised to take the capital city of Bangui. A hasty intervention by Chad and the Economic
Community of Central African States (ECCAS) persuaded the Séléka to negotiate with Bozizé's government. The result, the
Libreville Agreement of January 2013, installed a three-year power-sharing arrangement.[69]
However, ECCAS failed to monitor the implementation of the Libreville Agreement and Bozizé did not undertake any of
the reforms necessary under the transition agreement. Séléka resurged and took control of Bangui and fifteen of CAR's
sixteen provinces on 24 March 2013. Séléka's leader, Michel Djotodia, proclaimed himself President, set up the National
Transitional Council (NTC), and suspended CAR's constitution. A hurried ECCAS summit on 4 April 2013, which did not
yet recognize Djotodia as President, called for the creation of a Transitional National Council (TNC), which would create a
new constitution, conduct elections in eighteen months, and select an interim President. On 13 April, the TNC chose the
sole candidate vying for interim president position, Michel Djotodia.[69]
From December 2012 onward, Séléka forces, who are predominantly Muslim, committed grave human rights abuses
against civilians throughout the country and especially targeted the majority Christian population. In response, Christian
civilians formed "anti-balaka" ("anti-machete") militias, which have conducted vicious reprisals against Muslims.
Extrajudicial killings of Muslim and Christian civilians have been carried out, including "door to door" searches by rival
militias and mobs seeking potential victims.[70]
The situation in CAR rapidly deteriorated after 5 December 2013, after an attack in Bangui by anti-balaka militias and
loyalists of ousted President François Bozizé. The attack against former Séléka rebels sparked widespread violence
throughout the capital as well as in Ouham province in the northwest. The violence marked a significant escalation of the
conflict in CAR. Anti-balaka forces launched another attack against Muslim neighborhoods of Bangui on 20 December,
spurring a cycle of renewed violence that led to at least 71 deaths by 24 December. A mass grave of at least 30 people who
were reportedly executed and exhibited signs of torture was discovered on 25 December. The UN Office for the
President Barack Obama speaking
on the military intervention in Libya
at the National Defense University.
Central African Republic (CAR) 2013](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/responsibilitytoprotectr2p-171204081625/85/RESPONSIBILITY-TO-PROTECT-R2P-11-320.jpg)
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Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimates a further 40 civilians were killed on 25 December as violence
continued between anti-balaka and ex-Séléka forces. Eight African Union (AU) peacekeepers were also killed between 25
and 26 December.[71]
According to OCHA, by September 2013 there were almost 400,000 internally displaced people and about 65,000 new
refugees in neighbouring countries. Humanitarian agencies have alerted public opinion to the critical situation, stressing
that 2.3 million CAR citizens (half the population) are in need of humanitarian assistance.[72]
The crisis in the CAR is a case for the R2P, due to mass atrocity crimes being committed by both sides.[73] During a
Security Council briefing on 25 November, UN Deputy-Secretary-General Jan Eliasson said that the world faced "a
profoundly important test of international solidarity and of our responsibility to protect" in CAR. The Security Council
passed Resolution 2127 (https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2127(2013)) on 5 December,
emphasizing that the NTC has the primary responsibility to protect the civilian population in CAR. The resolution granted
a Chapter VII mandate to AU and French forces to protect civilians and restore security, imposed an arms embargo, and
established a UN Commission of Inquiry.[71]
In the beginning, the international response to the coup was purely diplomatic: members of the International Contact
Group insisted that Michel Djotodia respect the principles set out in the Libreville agreement. The African Union was the
first to react when it announced a new African-led International Support Mission for CAR (MISCA) in July 2013.
However, MISCA has not been effective in reversing the deteriorating security situation. Although its mandate is well-
defined, there is general agreement that it does not have the resources to fulfill its mission. The UN General Assembly put
CAR on the international agenda in September. Resolution 2121 (https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbo
l=S/RES/2121(2013)), adopted on 10 October 2013 and sponsored by France, strengthened and broadened the mandate of
the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA). Aware that MISCA alone is unable to
adequately tackle the growing insecurity, France has changed its initial position from disengagement to military
contribution, as announced by François Hollande on 20 November 2013, who said that French forces would be reinforced
by almost 1,000 troops for a six-month period.[72] France began to deploy troops in CAR after receiving authorization
from the Security Council on 5 December 2013 with Resolution 2127, which authorizes MISCA and French forces to take
"all necessary measures" to protect civilians and restore security in CAR. French soldiers immediately began to patrol in
Bangui.[71]
On 7 February 2014, it was reported that the International Criminal Court's chief prosecutor Fatou Bensouda said that she
had "opened a preliminary investigation into possible war crimes in the Central African Republic".[74]
Over the last five years, Syria has been in constant conflict, which has led to the death of over 270,000 people, 4.8 million
refugees, and over 6.6 million internally displaced persons. To help stop these atrocities International Syria Support
Group (ISSG), the UN, European Union and the league of Arab states as well as other countries, had agreed to meet to
discuss the situation at stake. The conclusion was made that the full implementation of UN Security Council Resolution
2254, which increased the delivery of humanitarian aid, as well as a nationwide cessation of hostilities, was required in
order to help those in need. Syrian government while working with allied militias has committed large-scale massacres,
perpetrated war crimes and gross violations of international humanitarian law, as a matter of state policy. After Syria’s
Commission of Inquiry's third report had stated that the government had committed the crimes against humanity through
extermination, murder, rape and other forms of sexual violence, torture, imprisonment and enforced disappearance and
CAR and the R2P
Syria](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/responsibilitytoprotectr2p-171204081625/85/RESPONSIBILITY-TO-PROTECT-R2P-12-320.jpg)
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other inhuman acts. Due to this statement the UN Human Rights Council has adopted at least 16 different resolutions with
regard to the atrocities taking place in Syria. Despite all efforts and resolutions adopted to help uphold Right To Protect,
humanitarian aid has had limited success in reaching the affected populations. The Syrian government is responsible for
the well being of its people.[75]
The country of Burundi is at grave risk for a possible civil war, if violence is not stopped. The civilians of Burundi face the
serious and eminent risk of mass atrocities due to the ongoing political violence that threatens the stability of Burundi.
The citizens of Burundi are being harmed through mass atrocity crimes due to targeted killings, widespread violations and
abuses of human rights. Violence had increased after President Pierre Nkurnziza had announced he was seeking a third
term in the country’s elections. Violence had increased due to President Nkurnziza instructing his citizens to disarm or
face action by Burundian Security forces and be labeled enemies of the nation. Office of high commissioner for human
rights reports cases of sexual violence by security forces, hate speech and incitement to violence by some government
officials. In order for this country to become stable again it is crucial for the country to uphold its R2P, as well as make
peace-building gains.[76]
With the current armed conflict in Yemen, many civilians are left to face mass atrocity crimes. These crimes are a result of
the violence between pro-government forces and regional military as the fight against the Houthi rebels. The Houthi
rebels and pro-Saleh currently control a majority of Yemen, including the capital Sana’a. In addition to the violence
between these groups the nation also been seeing Saudi-led air strikes for months. This has resulted in over 3,200 civilian
deaths since March 2015. The violence has also led to 2.4 million Yemeni civilians being forcibly displaced leaving 82
percent, equivalent to 21.2 million of its people requiring humanitarian assistance. Without exception of the government
allied forces, the nation has also seen civilian infrastructure and humanitarian workers being targeted. All of the violence
being displayed has led to many other armed groups taking advantage of the unsettlement of the nation. With this being
said Yemen is currently unable to uphold its responsibility to protect and is in need of other member states support.[77]
Anne-Marie Slaughter from Princeton University has called R2P "the most important shift in our conception of
sovereignty since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648."[78]
Louise Arbour from the International Crisis Group said that "The responsibility to protect is the most important and
imaginative doctrine to emerge on the international scene for decades."[79]
Francis Deng, former UN Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide, stated that "R2P is one of the most powerful and
promising innovations on the international scene."[79]
Political scientist Alex Bellamy argues (i) that there is evidence of behavioral change in the way international society
responds to mass killing and (ii) that R2P considerations have influenced behavior.[80] On the first point, Bellamy argues
that criticism of R2P as insufficient change is driven by a small subset of cases (Darfur, Libya and Syria) that are not
indicative of strong trends. On the second point, Bellamy finds that R2P language is used in UNSC deliberations and in the
rhetoric of world leaders.
Burundi
Yemen
Praise for R2P
Criticism of R2P](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/responsibilitytoprotectr2p-171204081625/85/RESPONSIBILITY-TO-PROTECT-R2P-13-320.jpg)
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R2P and certain implementations of it have come under criticism by some states and individuals.
One of the main concerns surrounding R2P is that it infringes upon national sovereignty.[81] This concern is rebutted by
the Secretary General Ban Ki-moon in the report Implementing the Responsibility to Protect. According to the first pillar
of R2P, the state has the responsibility to protect its populations from mass atrocities and ethnic cleansing, and according
to the second pillar the international community has the responsibility to help states fulfill their responsibility. Advocates
of R2P claim that the only occasions where the international community will intervene in a state without its consent is
when the state is either allowing mass atrocities to occur, or is committing them, in which case the state is no longer
upholding its responsibilities as a sovereign. In this sense, R2P can be understood as reinforcing sovereignty.[82] In 2004,
the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, set up by Secretary-General Kofi Annan, endorsed the emerging
norm of R2P, stating that there is a collective international responsibility "...exercisable by the Security Council
authorizing military intervention as a last resort, in the event of genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing,
and serious violations of humanitarian law which sovereign governments have proved powerless or unwilling to
prevent."[67]
On March 19, 2011, the Security Council approved Resolution 1973, which reiterated the responsibility of the Libyan
authorities to protect the Libyan population. The UNSC resolution reaffirmed "that parties to armed conflicts bear the
primary responsibility to take all feasible steps to ensure the protection of civilians."[83] It demanded "an immediate
ceasefire in Libya, including an end to the current attacks against civilians, which it said might constitute 'crimes against
humanity'.... It imposed a ban on all flights in the country's airspace, a no-fly zone, and tightened sanctions on the Gadaffi
regime and its supporters."[83] The resolution passed, with 10 in favor, 0 against, and 5 abstentions. Two of the five
abstentions were China and Russia, both of which are permanent members of the Security Council.[83][84] The
subsequent military action by NATO resulted in mixed opinions. Detractors of the intervention believe that problems in
Libya are best resolved by Libyans.
India's UN Ambassador Hardeep Singh Puri stated that "the Libyan case has already given R2P a bad name" and that "the
only aspect of the resolution of interest to them (international community) was use of all necessary means to bomb the
hell out of Libya". Puri also alleged that civilians had been supplied with arms and that the no-fly zone had been
implemented only selectively.[85]
Critics in the media also suggested that R2P-based intervention in Libya was used as a means to carry out regime-change,
extending and undermining the purpose of the doctrine. While the doctrine was initially invoked to protect against
government reprisals in rebel-held Benghazi, the resulting operation grew in scope to support the total overthrow of the
government. Critics feel this experience has yielded global skepticism concerning proposed UN intervention in Syria the
same year, putting the future of R2P in question. [86]
Several attempts were made by the U.S. government in the course of 2011 to 2013 to pass Security Council resolutions
invoking R2P to justify military intervention in the Syrian Civil War. These were vetoed by Russia and China. The Russian
and Chinese governments both issued statements to the effect that, in their opinion, R2P had been abused by the U.S. as a
Infringement of national sovereignty
Libya, 2011
Syria, 2011: Russian and Chinese repudiation of abuse of R2P](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/responsibilitytoprotectr2p-171204081625/85/RESPONSIBILITY-TO-PROTECT-R2P-14-320.jpg)
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pretext for "regime change", more particularly in the case of Libya, and that as far as they were concerned they would be
extremely suspicious of any future Security Council resolutions invoking R2P, based on past experience. According to the
UN's own 4 October 2011 coverage of the meeting of the Security Council:
[Russia's UN Ambassador Vitaly Churkin] was alarmed that compliance with Security Council resolutions in
Libya had been considered a model for future actions by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). It
was important to see how that model had been implemented. The demand for a ceasefire had turned into a
civil war, the humanitarian, social and military consequences of which had spilled beyond Libya. The arms
embargo had turned into a naval blockade on west Libya. Such models should be excluded from global
practice.
[…] [China's UN Ambassador Li Baodong] hoped that the [Syrian] Government would follow through on
reform and a process of dialogue. The Council should encourage those objectives while respecting Syria's
sovereignty's [sic] and territorial integrity. Any action it took should contribute to peace and stability and
comply with the United Nations Charter principles of non-interference in internal affairs.[87]
The question of military intervention under the third pillar of R2P remains controversial.[88] Several states have argued
that R2P should not allow the international community to intervene militarily on states, because to do so is an
infringement upon sovereignty. Others argue that this is a necessary facet of R2P, and is necessary as a last resort to stop
mass atrocities. A related argument surrounds the question as to whether more specific criteria should be developed to
determine when the Security Council should authorize military intervention.[89]
Political scientist Roland Paris, a proponent of R2P, argues that several problems regarding usefulness and legitimacy
inherent to R2P make it vulnerable to criticism: "the more R2P is employed as a basis for military action, the more likely it
is to be discredited, but paradoxically, the same will hold true if R2P’s coercive tools go unused."[90] Paris lists the
following problems as inherent to R2P, making it difficult for proponents of R2P to defend R2P and emboldening
critics:[90]
The mixed-motives problem - The legitimacy of R2P rests upon its altruistic aim. However, states will often be
wary to engage in humanitarian intervention unless the intervention is partly rooted in self-interest. The appearance
that the intervention is not strictly altruistic consequently leads some to question its legitimacy.
The counterfactual problem - When R2P is successful, there will not be any clear-cut evidence of its success: a
mass atrocity that did not occur but would have occurred without intervention. Defenders of R2P consequently have
to rely on counterfactual arguments.
The conspicuous harm problem - While the benefits of the intervention will not be clearly visible, the
destructiveness and costs of the intervention will be visible. This makes it more difficult for proponents of the
intervention to defend the intervention. The destruction caused by the intervention also makes some question the
legitimacy of the intervention due to the stated purpose of preventing harm.
Military intervention
Structural Problems](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/responsibilitytoprotectr2p-171204081625/85/RESPONSIBILITY-TO-PROTECT-R2P-15-320.jpg)
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Responsibility to protect
The Responsibility to Protect (R2P or RtoP) is a global political commitment which was endorsed by all member
states of the United Nations at the 2005 World Summit to prevent genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes
against humanity.[1][2]
The principle of the Responsibility to Protect is based upon the underlying premise that sovereignty entails a
responsibility to protect all populations from mass atrocity crimes and human rights violations.[3][4][5] The principle is
based on a respect for the norms and principles of international law, especially the underlying principles of law relating to
sovereignty, peace and security, human rights, and armed conflict.[6][7]
The Responsibility to Protect provides a framework for employing measures that already exist (i.e., mediation, early
warning mechanisms, economic sanctions, and chapter VII powers) to prevent atrocity crimes and to protect civilians
from their occurrence. The authority to employ the use of force under the framework of the Responsibility to Protect rests
solely with United Nations Security Council and is considered a measure of last resort.[8] The United Nations Secretary-
General has published annual reports on the Responsibility to Protect since 2009 that expand on the measures available
to governments, intergovernmental organizations, and civil society, as well as the private sector, to prevent atrocity
crimes.[9][10][11][12][13][14][15][16]
The Responsibility to Protect has been the subject of considerable debate, particularly regarding the implementation of the
principle by various actors in the context of country-specific situations, such as Libya, Syria, Sudan and Kenya, for
example.[17][18][19][20][21][22] It has also been argued that commensurate with the responsibility to protect,
international law should also recognize a right for populations to offer militarily organized resistance to protect
themselves against genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes on a massive scale.[23]
1 Definition
1.1 The Scope of the Responsibility to Protect
1.2 Three Pillars of the Responsibility to Protect
1.3 The Responsibility to Protect and 'Humanitarian Intervention'
2 History of the Responsibility to Protect
2.1 1990s: Origins
2.2 2000: African Union proposes a right to intervene
2.3 2000: International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
2.4 2005 World Summit Outcome Document
2.5 Secretary-General's 2009 report
2.6 Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
3 United Nations
Contents](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/responsibilitytoprotectr2p-171204081625/85/RESPONSIBILITY-TO-PROTECT-R2P-24-320.jpg)
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139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use
appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of
the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner,
through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis
and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be
inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes,
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue
consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and
crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and
international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build
capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out.
140. We fully support the mission of the Special Advisor of the Secretary-General on the Prevention of
Genocide.
The above paragraphs in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document serve as the basis for the inter-governmental
agreement to the Responsibility to Protect. The General Assembly adopted the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document
in its resolution 60/1 of 2005.[24] The body subsequently committed to continue consideration of the Responsibility to
Protect with its Resolution A/Res/63/308 of October 2009.[25] The UN Security Council first reaffirmed the
Responsibility to Protect in Resolution 1674 (2006) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, recalling in particular
paragraphs 138 and 139 of the Summit Outcome regarding the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.[26]
The report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, which first articulated the
Responsibility to Protect in its December 2001 Report, envisioned a wide scope of application in its articulation of the
principle, which included "overwhelming natural or environmental catastrophes, where the state concerned is either
unwilling or unable to cope, or call for assistance, and significant loss of life is occurring or threatened."[5]
Heads of State and Government at the 2005 World Summit refined the scope of the Responsibility to Protect to the four
crimes mentioned in paragraphs 138 and 139, namely genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity, which are commonly referred to as 'atrocity crimes' or 'mass atrocity crimes'.[8]
As per the Secretary-General's 2009 Report on the Responsibility to Protect, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect,
"The responsibility to protect applies, until Member States decide otherwise, only to the four specified crimes and
violations: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity...To try to extend it to cover other
calamities, such as HIV/AIDS, climate change or the response to natural disasters, would undermine the 2005
consensus and stretch the concept beyond recognition or operational utility."[27]
The focused scope is part of what the UN Secretary-General has termed a "narrow but deep approach" to the
Responsibility to Protect: A narrow application to four crimes, but a deep approach to response, employing the wide array
of prevention and protection instruments available to Member States, the United Nations system, regional and
The Scope of the Responsibility to Protect](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/responsibilitytoprotectr2p-171204081625/85/RESPONSIBILITY-TO-PROTECT-R2P-26-320.jpg)
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subregional organizations and civil society.[27]
The Responsibility to Protect consists of three important and mutually-reinforcing pillars, as articulated in the 2009
Report of the Secretary-General on the issue, and which build off of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit
Outcome Document and the intergovernmental agreement to the principle:
1. Pillar I: The protection responsibilities of the state;
2. Pillar II: International assistance and capacity-building;
3. Pillar III: Timely and decisive response.[27]
As seen in the 2005 World Outcome Document the UN Member States unanimously agreed to uphold their Responsibility
to Protect. Pillar I being the protection responsibilities of the state, paragraph 138 (see definition) states “Each individual
state has the responsibility to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against
humanity”. Under Pillar I many countries are able to uphold these principles of preventing mass atrocity crimes. As Pillar
II leads on to international assistance and capacity-building. The international community is sent to help populations in
need before further crises break out. States who may be willing but are either incapable or too weak to uphold their
responsibility now may receive international support as a result of R2P. Pillar III is to deliver a timely and decisive
response. This movement is a prevention method for mass atrocity crimes when a state fails to protect its populations. In
reference to paragraph 139 “The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use
appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the [UN]
Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity”.[28][29]
According to the UN Secretary-General's 2012 report, the three pillars of the Responsibility to Protect are not sequential
and are of equal importance. "Without all three, the concept would be incomplete. All three pillars must be implemented
in a manner fully consistent with the purposes, principles, and provisions of the Charter."[13] The pillared approach is
intended to reinforce, not undermine state sovereignty. As per the 2009 report of the Secretary-General, "By helping
States to meet their core protection responsibilities, the responsibility to protect seeks to strengthen sovereignty, not
weaken it. It seeks to help States to succeed, not just to react when they fail."[27]
The Responsibility to Protect differs from humanitarian intervention in four important ways. First, humanitarian
intervention only refers to the use of military force, whereas R2P is first and foremost a preventive principle that
emphasizes a range of measures to stem the risk of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity
before the crimes are threatened or occur. The use of force may only carried out as a measure last resort, when all other
non-coercive measures have failed, and only when it is authorized by the UN Security Council.[30] This is in contrast to
the principle of 'humanitarian intervention', which allows for the use of force as a humanitarian imperative without the
authorization of such bodies like the Security Council.
The second point relates to the first. As a principle, the Responsibility to Protect is rooted firmly in existing international
law, especially the law relating to sovereignty, peace and security, human rights, and armed conflict.[31]
Third, while humanitarian interventions have in the past been justified in the context of varying situations, R2P focuses
only on the four mass atrocity crimes: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. The first three
crimes are clearly defined in international law and codified in the Rome Statute (http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/EA
9AEFF7-5752-4F84-BE94-0A655EB30E16/0/Rome_Statute_English.pdf) that established the International Criminal
Three Pillars of the Responsibility to Protect
The Responsibility to Protect and 'Humanitarian Intervention'](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/responsibilitytoprotectr2p-171204081625/85/RESPONSIBILITY-TO-PROTECT-R2P-27-320.jpg)
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Court. Ethnic cleansing is not a crime defined under international law, but has been defined by the UN as "a purposeful
policy designed by one ethnic or religious group to remove by violent and terror-inspiring means the civilian population of
another ethnic or religious group from certain geographic areas".[32]
Finally, while humanitarian intervention assumes a "right to intervene", the R2P is based on a "responsibility to
protect".[30] Humanitarian intervention and the R2P both agree on the fact that sovereignty is not absolute. However, the
R2P doctrine shifts away from state-centered motivations to the interests of victims by focusing not on the right of states
to intervene but on a responsibility to protect populations at risk.[33] In addition, it introduces a new way of looking at the
essence of sovereignty, moving away from issues of "control" and emphasising "responsibility" to one's own citizens and
the wider international community.[34]
The norm of the R2P was borne out of the international community's failure to respond to tragedies such as the Rwandan
Genocide in 1994 and the Srebrenica massacre in 1995. Kofi Annan, who was Assistant Secretary-General at the UN
Department for Peacekeeping Operations during the Rwandan genocide,[35] realized the international community's
failure to respond. In the wake of the Kosovo intervention, 1999, Annan insisted that traditional notions of sovereignty
had been redefined: “States are now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples”,[36] he said,
while U.S. President Bill Clinton cited human rights concerns in 46% of the hundreds of remarks that he made justifying
intervention in Kosovo. [37] In 2000, and in his capacity as UN Secretary-General, Annan wrote the report "We the
Peoples" on the role of the United Nations in the 21st Century, and in this report he posed the following question: "if
humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a
Srebrenica – to gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?"[38]
Many critics of the R2P's third pillar claim that R2P is a Western concept, but it was the African Union (AU) that
pioneered the concept that the international community has a responsibility to intervene in crisis situations if a state is
failing to protect its population from mass atrocity crimes.[39] In 2000, the AU incorporated the right to intervene in a
member state, as enshrined in Article 4(h) of its Constitutive Act, which declares "[t]he right of the Union to intervene in a
Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and
crimes against humanity".[40] The AU also adopted the Ezulwini Consensus in 2005, which welcomed R2P as a tool for
the prevention of mass atrocities.[41]
In September 2000, the Canadian government established the International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty (ICISS) to answer Annan's question "if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on
sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and systematic violations of human rights
that affect every precept of our common humanity?" In February 2001, at the third round table meeting of the ICISS in
London, Gareth Evans, Mohamed Sahnoun, and Michael Ignatieff suggested the phrase "responsibility to protect" as a
way to avoid the "right to intervene" or "obligation to intervene" doctrines and yet keep a degree of duty to act to resolve
humanitarian crises.[42]
History of the Responsibility to Protect
1990s: Origins
2000: African Union proposes a right to intervene
2000: International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/responsibilitytoprotectr2p-171204081625/85/RESPONSIBILITY-TO-PROTECT-R2P-28-320.jpg)
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In 2001, ICISS released a report titled "The Responsibility to Protect" (http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Repor
t.pdf). In a radical reformulation of the meaning of state sovereignty, the report argued that sovereignty entailed not only
rights but also responsibilities, specifically a state's responsibility to protect its people from major violations of human
rights. This idea rested on earlier work by Francis Deng and Roberta Cohen regarding internally displaced persons.[43]
Inspiration may also be attributed to Jan Eliasson, who in response to a questionnaire on internally displaced persons
distributed by Francis Deng, stated that assisting populations at risk within their own country was "basically a question of
striking a balance between sovereignty and solidarity with people in need."[44] The ICISS report further asserted that,
where a state was "unable or unwilling" to protect its people, the responsibility should shift to the international
community and "the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect." The ICISS argued
that any form of military intervention is "an exceptional and extraordinary measure", and, as such, to be justified it must
meet certain criteria, including:[45]
Just cause: There must be "serious and irreparable harm occurring to human beings, or imminently likely to occur".
Right intention: The main intention of the military action must be to prevent human suffering.
Last resort: Every other measure besides military invention has to have already been taken into account. (This does
not mean that every measurement has to have been applied and been shown to fail, but that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that only military action would work in that situation.)
Proportional means: The military means must not exceed what is necessary "to secure the defined human
protection objective".
Reasonable prospects: The chance of success must be reasonably high, and it must be unlikely that the
consequences of the military intervention would be worse than the consequences without the intervention.
Right authority: The military action has to have been authorized by the Security Council.
As the ICISS report was released in 2001, right around the time of the Second Gulf War, many thought that would be the
end of this new norm. However, at the 2005 World Summit, where the largest number of heads of state and government in
the history of the UN convened, the R2P was unanimously adopted.[46] While the outcome was close to the ideas of the
ICISS report, there were some notable differences: the R2P would now only apply to mass atrocity crimes (genocide, war
crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing), rather than human rights violations; no mention was made of the
criteria of intervention (see above); and the UN Security Council was made the only body allowed to authorize
intervention. The paragraphs also stress the importance of regional organizations and the role they can play through
Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.
The results of this summit led to world leaders agreeing on holding each other accountable if they fail to uphold the new
responsibilities. Decidedly if one state fails to uphold their responsibility this is now where State Sovereignty may be
broken in order to protect people in danger of such crimes. First peaceful action is to be taken through humanitarian,
diplomatic, or other means. If these fail to resolve the matter, the international community should come together in a
“timely and decisive manner”. This shall all be worked on a case-by-case basis through the UN Security Council as well as
the UN Charter.[47]
2005 World Summit Outcome Document
Secretary-General's 2009 report](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/responsibilitytoprotectr2p-171204081625/85/RESPONSIBILITY-TO-PROTECT-R2P-29-320.jpg)
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On 12 January 2009, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon issued a report entitled Implementing the Responsibility to
Protect (http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/implementing%20the%20rtop.pdf). The report was the first comprehensive
document from the UN Secretariat on the R2P, following Ban's stated commitment to turn the concept into policy. The
Secretary-General's report set the tone and the direction for the discussion on the subject at the UN. The report proposes
three-pillar approach to the R2P:
Pillar One stresses that states have the primary responsibility to protect their populations from genocide, war
crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.
Pillar Two addresses the international community's commitment to help states build capacity to protect their
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, and to help those under
stress before crises and conflicts break out.
Pillar Three focuses on the responsibility of international community to act in a timely and decisive way to prevent
and halt genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity when a state manifestly fails to
protect its populations.
The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (GCR2P) is an international non-governmental organization that
conducts research and advocacy for the Responsibility to protect. The Centre is based at the Graduate Center, CUNY, New
York City with an office also located in Geneva.[48]
At the 2005 World Summit, UN member states included R2P in the Outcome Document agreeing to Paragraphs 138 and
139. These paragraphs gave final language to the scope of R2P. It applies to the four mass atrocities crimes only. It also
identifies to whom the R2P protocol applies; i.e., nations first, and regional and international communities second.
Paragraphs 138 and 139 state:
138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including
their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in
accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to
exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability.
139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use
appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of
the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner,
through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis
and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be
inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes,
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue
consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and
crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
United Nations](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/responsibilitytoprotectr2p-171204081625/85/RESPONSIBILITY-TO-PROTECT-R2P-30-320.jpg)
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international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build
capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity and to assisting those under stress before crises and conflicts break out.[49]
Since then, the UN has been actively engaged with the development of the R2P. Several resolutions, reports, and debates
have emerged through the UN forum.
The Security Council has reaffirmed its commitment to the R2P in several resolutions. The first such resolution came in
April 2006, when the Security Council reaffirmed the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 in Resolution 1674 (https://w
ww.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1674(2006)), formalizing their support for the R2P. In 2009, the
Council again recognized states' primary responsibility to protect and reaffirmed paragraphs 138 and 139 in resolution
1894 (https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1894(2009)).
Additionally, the Security Council has mentioned the R2P in several country-specific resolutions:
Darfur: Resolution 1706 (https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1706(2006)) in 2006
Libya: Resolution 1970 (https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1970(2011)), Resolution
1973 (https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1973(2011)) in 2011, Resolution 2016 (http
s://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2016(2011)) in 2011, and Resolution 2040 (https://ww
w.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2040(2012)) in 2012
Côte d'Ivoire: Resolution 1975 (https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1975(2011)) in
2011
Yemen: Resolution 2014 (https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2014(2011)) in 2011
Mali: Resolution 2085 (https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2085(2012)) in 2012 and
Resolution 2100 (https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2100(2013)) in 2013
Sudan and South Sudan: Resolution 1996 (https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1996(20
11)) in 2011 and Resolution 2121 (https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2109(2013)) in
2013
In January 2009, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon released UN Secretariat's first comprehensive report on the R2P,
called Implementing the Responsibility to Protect
(http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/implementing%20the%20rtop.pdf).[50] His report led to a debate in the General
Assembly in July 2009 and the first time since 2005 that the General Assembly had come together to discuss the R2P.
Ninety-four member states spoke. Most supported the R2P principle, although some important concerns were voiced.
They discussed how to implement the R2P in crisis situations around the world. The debate highlighted the need for
regional organizations like the African Union to play a strong role in implementing R2P; the need for stronger early
warning mechanisms in the UN; and the need to clarify the roles UN bodies would play in implementing R2P.[51][52]
One outcome of the debate was the first resolution referencing R2P adopted by the General Assembly. The Resolution
(A/RES/63/308) showed that the international community had not forgotten about the concept of the R2P and it decided
"to continue its consideration of the responsibility to protect".[53]
Security Council
Secretary-General reports](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/responsibilitytoprotectr2p-171204081625/85/RESPONSIBILITY-TO-PROTECT-R2P-31-320.jpg)
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In subsequent years, the Secretary-General would release a new report, followed by another debate in the General
Assembly.
In 2010, the report was titled Early Warning, Assessment and the Responsibility to Protect (http://www.globalr2p.org/m
edia/files/2010_a64864.pdf). The informal interactive dialogue was held on 9 August 2010, with 49 member states, two
regional organizations, and two civil society organizations speaking at the event. The discussion had a resoundingly
positive tone, with virtually all of those that spoke stressing a need to prevent atrocities and agreeing that effective early
warning is a necessary condition for effective prevention and early action. Objections were expressed by a small number of
member states; namely Nicaragua, Iran, Pakistan, Sudan, and Venezuela.[54][55]
In 2011, the report analyzed The Role of Regional and Subregional Arrangements in Implementing the Responsibility to
Protect (http://www.globalr2p.org/media/files/2011_a65877.pdf). At the debate on 12 July 2011, statements were made
by 43 member states, three regional organizations, and four civil society representatives. The biggest challenge to R2P was
considered cooperation with, and support between, the UN and regional bodies in times of crisis. Member states
acknowledged the importance of resolving this challenge through the unique advantages regional organizations possess in
preventing and reacting to mass atrocities.[56][57]
In 2012, the focus was on Responsibility to Protect: Timely and Decisive Response (http://www.globalr2p.org/media/file
s/unsg-report_timely-and-decisive-response.pdf). The debate followed on 5 September 2012 saw interventions address
the third pillar of the R2P and the diversity of non-coercive and coercive measures available for a collective response to
mass atrocity crimes.[58]
In 2013, the Secretary-General focused on Responsibility to Protect: State responsibility and prevention (http://www.glo
balr2p.org/media/files/n1338693.pdf). The debate following the report was held on 11 September 2013. A panel of UN,
member state, and civil society experts delivered presentations, after which 68 member states, 1 regional organization, and
2 civil society organizations made statements.[59][60]
In 2004, following the genocidal violence in Rwanda and the Balkans, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan appointed Juan
E. Méndez as Special Adviser to fill critical gaps in the international system that allowed those tragedies to go unchecked.
In 2007, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon appointed Francis M. Deng on a full-time basis at the level of Under-Secretary-
General. Around the same time, he also appointed Edward Luck as the Special Adviser who focuses on the R2P, on a part-
time basis at the level of Assistant Secretary-General.[61]
The Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect leads the conceptual, political, institutional, and operational
development of the R2P. The Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide acts as a catalyst to raise awareness of the
causes and dynamics of genocide, to alert relevant actors where there is a risk of genocide, and to advocate and mobilize
for appropriate action. The mandates of the two Special Advisers are distinct but complementary. The efforts of their
Office include alerting relevant actors to the risk of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity;
enhancing the capacity of the UN to prevent these crimes, including their incitement; and working with member states,
regional and sub-regional arrangements, and civil society to develop more effective means of response when they do
occur.[61]
Both Special Advisers Deng and Luck ended their assignments with the Office in July 2012. On 17 July 2012, Secretary-
General Ban Ki-moon appointed Adama Dieng of Senegal as his Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide.[61] On 12
July 2013, Jennifer Welsh of Canada was appointed as the Special Advisor on the Responsibility to Protect.[62]
Special Advisors on the Prevention of Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/responsibilitytoprotectr2p-171204081625/85/RESPONSIBILITY-TO-PROTECT-R2P-32-320.jpg)
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From December 2007 to January 2008, Kenya was swept by a wave of ethnic violence triggered by a disputed presidential
election held on 27 December 2007. On 30 December 2007, Mwai Kibaki was declared the winner of the presidential
elections and was sworn in as president a couple of hours later. The announcement of the results triggered widespread and
systematic violence resulting in more than 1,000 deaths and the displacement of over 500,000 civilians. Clashes were
characterized by the ethnically targeted killings of people aligned with the two major political parties, the Orange
Democratic Movement (ODM) and the Party of National Unity (PNU).[63]
External intervention was almost immediate. French Foreign and European Affairs Minister Bernard Kouchner made an
appeal to the UN Security Council in January 2008 to react "in the name of the responsibility to protect" before Kenya
plunged into a deadly ethnic conflict. On 31 December 2007, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon issued a statement
expressing concern for the ongoing violence and calling for the population to remain calm and for Kenyan security forces
to show restraint. On 10 January 2008, former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan was accepted by both the ODM and the
PNU as the African Union Chief Mediator. Mediation efforts led to the signing of a power-sharing agreement on 28
February 2008. The agreement established Mwai Kibaki as President and Raila Odinga as Prime Minister, as well as the
creation of three commissions: the Commission of Inquiry on Post-Election Violence (CIPEV); the Truth, Justice and
Reconciliation Commission; and the Independent Review Commission on the General Elections. This rapid and
coordinated reaction by the international community was praised by Human Rights Watch as "a model of diplomatic
action under the 'Responsibility to Protect' principles".[64]
On 30 March 2011, in response to the escalating post-election violence against the population of Ivory Coast in late 2010
and early 2011, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1975 (https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.a
sp?symbol=S/RES/1975(2011)) condemning the gross human rights violations committed by supporters of both ex-
President Laurent Gbagbo and President Ouattara. The resolution cited "the primary responsibility of each State to protect
civilians", called for the immediate transfer of power to President Ouattara, the victor in the elections, and reaffirmed that
the United Nations Operation in Ivory Coast (UNOCI) could use "all necessary means to protect life and property." On 4
April 2011, in an effort to protect the people of Ivory Coast from further atrocities, UNOCI began a military operation,[65]
and President Gbagbo's hold on power ended on 11 April when he was arrested by President Ouattara's forces. In
November 2011, President Gbagbo was transferred to the International Criminal Court to face charges of crimes against
humanity as an "indirect co-perpetrator" of murder, rape, persecution, and other inhumane acts.[66] On 26 July 2012, the
Council adopted resolution 2062 (https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2062(2012))
renewing the mandate of UNOCI until 31 July 2013.
Libya was the first case where the Security Council authorized a military intervention citing the R2P. Following
widespread and systematic attacks against the civilian population by the Libyan regime, and language used by Muammar
Gaddafi that reminded the international community of the genocide in Rwanda, the Security Council unanimously
adopted resolution 1970 on 26 February 2011, making explicit reference to the R2P. Deploring what it called "the gross
and systematic violation of human rights" in strife-torn Libya, the Security Council demanded an end to the violence,
In practice
Kenya 2007/2008
Ivory Coast 2011
Libya 2011](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/responsibilitytoprotectr2p-171204081625/85/RESPONSIBILITY-TO-PROTECT-R2P-33-320.jpg)
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"recalling the Libyan authorities' responsibility to protect its population", and
imposed a series of international sanctions. The Council also decided to refer
the situation to the International Criminal Court.
In resolution 1973, adopted on 17 March 2011, the Security Council
demanded an immediate ceasefire in Libya, including an end to ongoing
attacks against civilians, which it said might constitute "crimes against
humanity". The Council authorized member states to take "all necessary
measures" to protect civilians under threat of attack in the country, while
excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan
territory. A few days later, acting on the resolution, NATO planes started
striking at Gaddafi's forces.[67] NATO subsequently came under scrutiny for
its behavior during the air strikes; concerns included the fact that the
intervention quickly moved to regime-change and that there were allegations regarding aerial bombardments that may
have caused civilian casualties.[68]
In December 2012, a loose rebel coalition named the Séléka initiated a military campaign to overthrow the government of
the Central African Republic (CAR) and its then-president, Francois Bozizé. The Séléka, composed mostly of factions of
armed groups in the northeast of the state, accused Bozizé's government of neglecting their region. They rapidly captured
several strategic towns and were poised to take the capital city of Bangui. A hasty intervention by Chad and the Economic
Community of Central African States (ECCAS) persuaded the Séléka to negotiate with Bozizé's government. The result, the
Libreville Agreement of January 2013, installed a three-year power-sharing arrangement.[69]
However, ECCAS failed to monitor the implementation of the Libreville Agreement and Bozizé did not undertake any of
the reforms necessary under the transition agreement. Séléka resurged and took control of Bangui and fifteen of CAR's
sixteen provinces on 24 March 2013. Séléka's leader, Michel Djotodia, proclaimed himself President, set up the National
Transitional Council (NTC), and suspended CAR's constitution. A hurried ECCAS summit on 4 April 2013, which did not
yet recognize Djotodia as President, called for the creation of a Transitional National Council (TNC), which would create a
new constitution, conduct elections in eighteen months, and select an interim President. On 13 April, the TNC chose the
sole candidate vying for interim president position, Michel Djotodia.[69]
From December 2012 onward, Séléka forces, who are predominantly Muslim, committed grave human rights abuses
against civilians throughout the country and especially targeted the majority Christian population. In response, Christian
civilians formed "anti-balaka" ("anti-machete") militias, which have conducted vicious reprisals against Muslims.
Extrajudicial killings of Muslim and Christian civilians have been carried out, including "door to door" searches by rival
militias and mobs seeking potential victims.[70]
The situation in CAR rapidly deteriorated after 5 December 2013, after an attack in Bangui by anti-balaka militias and
loyalists of ousted President François Bozizé. The attack against former Séléka rebels sparked widespread violence
throughout the capital as well as in Ouham province in the northwest. The violence marked a significant escalation of the
conflict in CAR. Anti-balaka forces launched another attack against Muslim neighborhoods of Bangui on 20 December,
spurring a cycle of renewed violence that led to at least 71 deaths by 24 December. A mass grave of at least 30 people who
were reportedly executed and exhibited signs of torture was discovered on 25 December. The UN Office for the
President Barack Obama speaking
on the military intervention in Libya
at the National Defense University.
Central African Republic (CAR) 2013](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/responsibilitytoprotectr2p-171204081625/85/RESPONSIBILITY-TO-PROTECT-R2P-34-320.jpg)
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Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimates a further 40 civilians were killed on 25 December as violence
continued between anti-balaka and ex-Séléka forces. Eight African Union (AU) peacekeepers were also killed between 25
and 26 December.[71]
According to OCHA, by September 2013 there were almost 400,000 internally displaced people and about 65,000 new
refugees in neighbouring countries. Humanitarian agencies have alerted public opinion to the critical situation, stressing
that 2.3 million CAR citizens (half the population) are in need of humanitarian assistance.[72]
The crisis in the CAR is a case for the R2P, due to mass atrocity crimes being committed by both sides.[73] During a
Security Council briefing on 25 November, UN Deputy-Secretary-General Jan Eliasson said that the world faced "a
profoundly important test of international solidarity and of our responsibility to protect" in CAR. The Security Council
passed Resolution 2127 (https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2127(2013)) on 5 December,
emphasizing that the NTC has the primary responsibility to protect the civilian population in CAR. The resolution granted
a Chapter VII mandate to AU and French forces to protect civilians and restore security, imposed an arms embargo, and
established a UN Commission of Inquiry.[71]
In the beginning, the international response to the coup was purely diplomatic: members of the International Contact
Group insisted that Michel Djotodia respect the principles set out in the Libreville agreement. The African Union was the
first to react when it announced a new African-led International Support Mission for CAR (MISCA) in July 2013.
However, MISCA has not been effective in reversing the deteriorating security situation. Although its mandate is well-
defined, there is general agreement that it does not have the resources to fulfill its mission. The UN General Assembly put
CAR on the international agenda in September. Resolution 2121 (https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbo
l=S/RES/2121(2013)), adopted on 10 October 2013 and sponsored by France, strengthened and broadened the mandate of
the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA). Aware that MISCA alone is unable to
adequately tackle the growing insecurity, France has changed its initial position from disengagement to military
contribution, as announced by François Hollande on 20 November 2013, who said that French forces would be reinforced
by almost 1,000 troops for a six-month period.[72] France began to deploy troops in CAR after receiving authorization
from the Security Council on 5 December 2013 with Resolution 2127, which authorizes MISCA and French forces to take
"all necessary measures" to protect civilians and restore security in CAR. French soldiers immediately began to patrol in
Bangui.[71]
On 7 February 2014, it was reported that the International Criminal Court's chief prosecutor Fatou Bensouda said that she
had "opened a preliminary investigation into possible war crimes in the Central African Republic".[74]
Over the last five years, Syria has been in constant conflict, which has led to the death of over 270,000 people, 4.8 million
refugees, and over 6.6 million internally displaced persons. To help stop these atrocities International Syria Support
Group (ISSG), the UN, European Union and the league of Arab states as well as other countries, had agreed to meet to
discuss the situation at stake. The conclusion was made that the full implementation of UN Security Council Resolution
2254, which increased the delivery of humanitarian aid, as well as a nationwide cessation of hostilities, was required in
order to help those in need. Syrian government while working with allied militias has committed large-scale massacres,
perpetrated war crimes and gross violations of international humanitarian law, as a matter of state policy. After Syria’s
Commission of Inquiry's third report had stated that the government had committed the crimes against humanity through
extermination, murder, rape and other forms of sexual violence, torture, imprisonment and enforced disappearance and
CAR and the R2P
Syria](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/responsibilitytoprotectr2p-171204081625/85/RESPONSIBILITY-TO-PROTECT-R2P-35-320.jpg)
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other inhuman acts. Due to this statement the UN Human Rights Council has adopted at least 16 different resolutions with
regard to the atrocities taking place in Syria. Despite all efforts and resolutions adopted to help uphold Right To Protect,
humanitarian aid has had limited success in reaching the affected populations. The Syrian government is responsible for
the well being of its people.[75]
The country of Burundi is at grave risk for a possible civil war, if violence is not stopped. The civilians of Burundi face the
serious and eminent risk of mass atrocities due to the ongoing political violence that threatens the stability of Burundi.
The citizens of Burundi are being harmed through mass atrocity crimes due to targeted killings, widespread violations and
abuses of human rights. Violence had increased after President Pierre Nkurnziza had announced he was seeking a third
term in the country’s elections. Violence had increased due to President Nkurnziza instructing his citizens to disarm or
face action by Burundian Security forces and be labeled enemies of the nation. Office of high commissioner for human
rights reports cases of sexual violence by security forces, hate speech and incitement to violence by some government
officials. In order for this country to become stable again it is crucial for the country to uphold its R2P, as well as make
peace-building gains.[76]
With the current armed conflict in Yemen, many civilians are left to face mass atrocity crimes. These crimes are a result of
the violence between pro-government forces and regional military as the fight against the Houthi rebels. The Houthi
rebels and pro-Saleh currently control a majority of Yemen, including the capital Sana’a. In addition to the violence
between these groups the nation also been seeing Saudi-led air strikes for months. This has resulted in over 3,200 civilian
deaths since March 2015. The violence has also led to 2.4 million Yemeni civilians being forcibly displaced leaving 82
percent, equivalent to 21.2 million of its people requiring humanitarian assistance. Without exception of the government
allied forces, the nation has also seen civilian infrastructure and humanitarian workers being targeted. All of the violence
being displayed has led to many other armed groups taking advantage of the unsettlement of the nation. With this being
said Yemen is currently unable to uphold its responsibility to protect and is in need of other member states support.[77]
Anne-Marie Slaughter from Princeton University has called R2P "the most important shift in our conception of
sovereignty since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648."[78]
Louise Arbour from the International Crisis Group said that "The responsibility to protect is the most important and
imaginative doctrine to emerge on the international scene for decades."[79]
Francis Deng, former UN Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide, stated that "R2P is one of the most powerful and
promising innovations on the international scene."[79]
Political scientist Alex Bellamy argues (i) that there is evidence of behavioral change in the way international society
responds to mass killing and (ii) that R2P considerations have influenced behavior.[80] On the first point, Bellamy argues
that criticism of R2P as insufficient change is driven by a small subset of cases (Darfur, Libya and Syria) that are not
indicative of strong trends. On the second point, Bellamy finds that R2P language is used in UNSC deliberations and in the
rhetoric of world leaders.
Burundi
Yemen
Praise for R2P
Criticism of R2P](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/responsibilitytoprotectr2p-171204081625/85/RESPONSIBILITY-TO-PROTECT-R2P-36-320.jpg)
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R2P and certain implementations of it have come under criticism by some states and individuals.
One of the main concerns surrounding R2P is that it infringes upon national sovereignty.[81] This concern is rebutted by
the Secretary General Ban Ki-moon in the report Implementing the Responsibility to Protect. According to the first pillar
of R2P, the state has the responsibility to protect its populations from mass atrocities and ethnic cleansing, and according
to the second pillar the international community has the responsibility to help states fulfill their responsibility. Advocates
of R2P claim that the only occasions where the international community will intervene in a state without its consent is
when the state is either allowing mass atrocities to occur, or is committing them, in which case the state is no longer
upholding its responsibilities as a sovereign. In this sense, R2P can be understood as reinforcing sovereignty.[82] In 2004,
the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, set up by Secretary-General Kofi Annan, endorsed the emerging
norm of R2P, stating that there is a collective international responsibility "...exercisable by the Security Council
authorizing military intervention as a last resort, in the event of genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing,
and serious violations of humanitarian law which sovereign governments have proved powerless or unwilling to
prevent."[67]
On March 19, 2011, the Security Council approved Resolution 1973, which reiterated the responsibility of the Libyan
authorities to protect the Libyan population. The UNSC resolution reaffirmed "that parties to armed conflicts bear the
primary responsibility to take all feasible steps to ensure the protection of civilians."[83] It demanded "an immediate
ceasefire in Libya, including an end to the current attacks against civilians, which it said might constitute 'crimes against
humanity'.... It imposed a ban on all flights in the country's airspace, a no-fly zone, and tightened sanctions on the Gadaffi
regime and its supporters."[83] The resolution passed, with 10 in favor, 0 against, and 5 abstentions. Two of the five
abstentions were China and Russia, both of which are permanent members of the Security Council.[83][84] The
subsequent military action by NATO resulted in mixed opinions. Detractors of the intervention believe that problems in
Libya are best resolved by Libyans.
India's UN Ambassador Hardeep Singh Puri stated that "the Libyan case has already given R2P a bad name" and that "the
only aspect of the resolution of interest to them (international community) was use of all necessary means to bomb the
hell out of Libya". Puri also alleged that civilians had been supplied with arms and that the no-fly zone had been
implemented only selectively.[85]
Critics in the media also suggested that R2P-based intervention in Libya was used as a means to carry out regime-change,
extending and undermining the purpose of the doctrine. While the doctrine was initially invoked to protect against
government reprisals in rebel-held Benghazi, the resulting operation grew in scope to support the total overthrow of the
government. Critics feel this experience has yielded global skepticism concerning proposed UN intervention in Syria the
same year, putting the future of R2P in question. [86]
Several attempts were made by the U.S. government in the course of 2011 to 2013 to pass Security Council resolutions
invoking R2P to justify military intervention in the Syrian Civil War. These were vetoed by Russia and China. The Russian
and Chinese governments both issued statements to the effect that, in their opinion, R2P had been abused by the U.S. as a
Infringement of national sovereignty
Libya, 2011
Syria, 2011: Russian and Chinese repudiation of abuse of R2P](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/responsibilitytoprotectr2p-171204081625/85/RESPONSIBILITY-TO-PROTECT-R2P-37-320.jpg)
![12/4/2017 Responsibility to protect - Wikipedia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsibility_to_protect 15/23
pretext for "regime change", more particularly in the case of Libya, and that as far as they were concerned they would be
extremely suspicious of any future Security Council resolutions invoking R2P, based on past experience. According to the
UN's own 4 October 2011 coverage of the meeting of the Security Council:
[Russia's UN Ambassador Vitaly Churkin] was alarmed that compliance with Security Council resolutions in
Libya had been considered a model for future actions by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). It
was important to see how that model had been implemented. The demand for a ceasefire had turned into a
civil war, the humanitarian, social and military consequences of which had spilled beyond Libya. The arms
embargo had turned into a naval blockade on west Libya. Such models should be excluded from global
practice.
[…] [China's UN Ambassador Li Baodong] hoped that the [Syrian] Government would follow through on
reform and a process of dialogue. The Council should encourage those objectives while respecting Syria's
sovereignty's [sic] and territorial integrity. Any action it took should contribute to peace and stability and
comply with the United Nations Charter principles of non-interference in internal affairs.[87]
The question of military intervention under the third pillar of R2P remains controversial.[88] Several states have argued
that R2P should not allow the international community to intervene militarily on states, because to do so is an
infringement upon sovereignty. Others argue that this is a necessary facet of R2P, and is necessary as a last resort to stop
mass atrocities. A related argument surrounds the question as to whether more specific criteria should be developed to
determine when the Security Council should authorize military intervention.[89]
Political scientist Roland Paris, a proponent of R2P, argues that several problems regarding usefulness and legitimacy
inherent to R2P make it vulnerable to criticism: "the more R2P is employed as a basis for military action, the more likely it
is to be discredited, but paradoxically, the same will hold true if R2P’s coercive tools go unused."[90] Paris lists the
following problems as inherent to R2P, making it difficult for proponents of R2P to defend R2P and emboldening
critics:[90]
The mixed-motives problem - The legitimacy of R2P rests upon its altruistic aim. However, states will often be
wary to engage in humanitarian intervention unless the intervention is partly rooted in self-interest. The appearance
that the intervention is not strictly altruistic consequently leads some to question its legitimacy.
The counterfactual problem - When R2P is successful, there will not be any clear-cut evidence of its success: a
mass atrocity that did not occur but would have occurred without intervention. Defenders of R2P consequently have
to rely on counterfactual arguments.
The conspicuous harm problem - While the benefits of the intervention will not be clearly visible, the
destructiveness and costs of the intervention will be visible. This makes it more difficult for proponents of the
intervention to defend the intervention. The destruction caused by the intervention also makes some question the
legitimacy of the intervention due to the stated purpose of preventing harm.
Military intervention
Structural Problems](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/responsibilitytoprotectr2p-171204081625/85/RESPONSIBILITY-TO-PROTECT-R2P-38-320.jpg)
Uploaded byMYO AUNG Myanmar
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT R2P
The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is a global political commitment adopted by UN member states in 2005 to prevent genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, emphasizing that sovereignty entails a responsibility to protect populations from such atrocities. It consists of three pillars: state protection responsibilities, international assistance and capacity-building, and timely and decisive response, with military intervention regarded as a last resort and authorized by the UN Security Council. R2P has generated extensive discussion regarding its implementation and is seen as a framework for both prevention and response to mass atrocity crimes.
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RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT R2P
- 1. 12/4/2017 Responsibility toprotect - Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsibility_to_protect 1/23 Responsibility to protect The Responsibility to Protect (R2P or RtoP) is a global political commitment which was endorsed by all member states of the United Nations at the 2005 World Summit to prevent genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.[1][2] The principle of the Responsibility to Protect is based upon the underlying premise that sovereignty entails a responsibility to protect all populations from mass atrocity crimes and human rights violations.[3][4][5] The principle is based on a respect for the norms and principles of international law, especially the underlying principles of law relating to sovereignty, peace and security, human rights, and armed conflict.[6][7] The Responsibility to Protect provides a framework for employing measures that already exist (i.e., mediation, early warning mechanisms, economic sanctions, and chapter VII powers) to prevent atrocity crimes and to protect civilians from their occurrence. The authority to employ the use of force under the framework of the Responsibility to Protect rests solely with United Nations Security Council and is considered a measure of last resort.[8] The United Nations Secretary- General has published annual reports on the Responsibility to Protect since 2009 that expand on the measures available to governments, intergovernmental organizations, and civil society, as well as the private sector, to prevent atrocity crimes.[9][10][11][12][13][14][15][16] The Responsibility to Protect has been the subject of considerable debate, particularly regarding the implementation of the principle by various actors in the context of country-specific situations, such as Libya, Syria, Sudan and Kenya, for example.[17][18][19][20][21][22] It has also been argued that commensurate with the responsibility to protect, international law should also recognize a right for populations to offer militarily organized resistance to protect themselves against genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes on a massive scale.[23] 1 Definition 1.1 The Scope of the Responsibility to Protect 1.2 Three Pillars of the Responsibility to Protect 1.3 The Responsibility to Protect and 'Humanitarian Intervention' 2 History of the Responsibility to Protect 2.1 1990s: Origins 2.2 2000: African Union proposes a right to intervene 2.3 2000: International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 2.4 2005 World Summit Outcome Document 2.5 Secretary-General's 2009 report 2.6 Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect 3 United Nations Contents
- 2. 12/4/2017 Responsibility toprotect - Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsibility_to_protect 2/23 3.1 Security Council 3.2 Secretary-General reports 3.3 Special Advisors on the Prevention of Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect 4 In practice 4.1 Kenya 2007/2008 4.2 Ivory Coast 2011 4.3 Libya 2011 4.4 Central African Republic (CAR) 2013 4.4.1 CAR and the R2P 4.5 Syria 4.6 Burundi 4.7 Yemen 5 Praise for R2P 6 Criticism of R2P 6.1 Infringement of national sovereignty 6.2 Libya, 2011 6.3 Syria, 2011: Russian and Chinese repudiation of abuse of R2P 6.4 Military intervention 6.5 Structural Problems 7 See also 8 Further reading 9 References 9.1 Sources 10 External links The Responsibility to Protect is a political commitment unanimously adopted by all members of the United Nations General Assembly at the 2005 World Summit and articulated in paragraphs 138-139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document: 138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability. Definition
- 3. 12/4/2017 Responsibility toprotect - Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsibility_to_protect 3/23 139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out. 140. We fully support the mission of the Special Advisor of the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide. The above paragraphs in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document serve as the basis for the inter-governmental agreement to the Responsibility to Protect. The General Assembly adopted the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document in its resolution 60/1 of 2005.[24] The body subsequently committed to continue consideration of the Responsibility to Protect with its Resolution A/Res/63/308 of October 2009.[25] The UN Security Council first reaffirmed the Responsibility to Protect in Resolution 1674 (2006) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, recalling in particular paragraphs 138 and 139 of the Summit Outcome regarding the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.[26] The report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, which first articulated the Responsibility to Protect in its December 2001 Report, envisioned a wide scope of application in its articulation of the principle, which included "overwhelming natural or environmental catastrophes, where the state concerned is either unwilling or unable to cope, or call for assistance, and significant loss of life is occurring or threatened."[5] Heads of State and Government at the 2005 World Summit refined the scope of the Responsibility to Protect to the four crimes mentioned in paragraphs 138 and 139, namely genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, which are commonly referred to as 'atrocity crimes' or 'mass atrocity crimes'.[8] As per the Secretary-General's 2009 Report on the Responsibility to Protect, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, "The responsibility to protect applies, until Member States decide otherwise, only to the four specified crimes and violations: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity...To try to extend it to cover other calamities, such as HIV/AIDS, climate change or the response to natural disasters, would undermine the 2005 consensus and stretch the concept beyond recognition or operational utility."[27] The focused scope is part of what the UN Secretary-General has termed a "narrow but deep approach" to the Responsibility to Protect: A narrow application to four crimes, but a deep approach to response, employing the wide array of prevention and protection instruments available to Member States, the United Nations system, regional and The Scope of the Responsibility to Protect
- 4. 12/4/2017 Responsibility toprotect - Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsibility_to_protect 4/23 subregional organizations and civil society.[27] The Responsibility to Protect consists of three important and mutually-reinforcing pillars, as articulated in the 2009 Report of the Secretary-General on the issue, and which build off of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document and the intergovernmental agreement to the principle: 1. Pillar I: The protection responsibilities of the state; 2. Pillar II: International assistance and capacity-building; 3. Pillar III: Timely and decisive response.[27] As seen in the 2005 World Outcome Document the UN Member States unanimously agreed to uphold their Responsibility to Protect. Pillar I being the protection responsibilities of the state, paragraph 138 (see definition) states “Each individual state has the responsibility to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity”. Under Pillar I many countries are able to uphold these principles of preventing mass atrocity crimes. As Pillar II leads on to international assistance and capacity-building. The international community is sent to help populations in need before further crises break out. States who may be willing but are either incapable or too weak to uphold their responsibility now may receive international support as a result of R2P. Pillar III is to deliver a timely and decisive response. This movement is a prevention method for mass atrocity crimes when a state fails to protect its populations. In reference to paragraph 139 “The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the [UN] Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity”.[28][29] According to the UN Secretary-General's 2012 report, the three pillars of the Responsibility to Protect are not sequential and are of equal importance. "Without all three, the concept would be incomplete. All three pillars must be implemented in a manner fully consistent with the purposes, principles, and provisions of the Charter."[13] The pillared approach is intended to reinforce, not undermine state sovereignty. As per the 2009 report of the Secretary-General, "By helping States to meet their core protection responsibilities, the responsibility to protect seeks to strengthen sovereignty, not weaken it. It seeks to help States to succeed, not just to react when they fail."[27] The Responsibility to Protect differs from humanitarian intervention in four important ways. First, humanitarian intervention only refers to the use of military force, whereas R2P is first and foremost a preventive principle that emphasizes a range of measures to stem the risk of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity before the crimes are threatened or occur. The use of force may only carried out as a measure last resort, when all other non-coercive measures have failed, and only when it is authorized by the UN Security Council.[30] This is in contrast to the principle of 'humanitarian intervention', which allows for the use of force as a humanitarian imperative without the authorization of such bodies like the Security Council. The second point relates to the first. As a principle, the Responsibility to Protect is rooted firmly in existing international law, especially the law relating to sovereignty, peace and security, human rights, and armed conflict.[31] Third, while humanitarian interventions have in the past been justified in the context of varying situations, R2P focuses only on the four mass atrocity crimes: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. The first three crimes are clearly defined in international law and codified in the Rome Statute (http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/EA 9AEFF7-5752-4F84-BE94-0A655EB30E16/0/Rome_Statute_English.pdf) that established the International Criminal Three Pillars of the Responsibility to Protect The Responsibility to Protect and 'Humanitarian Intervention'
- 5. 12/4/2017 Responsibility toprotect - Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsibility_to_protect 5/23 Court. Ethnic cleansing is not a crime defined under international law, but has been defined by the UN as "a purposeful policy designed by one ethnic or religious group to remove by violent and terror-inspiring means the civilian population of another ethnic or religious group from certain geographic areas".[32] Finally, while humanitarian intervention assumes a "right to intervene", the R2P is based on a "responsibility to protect".[30] Humanitarian intervention and the R2P both agree on the fact that sovereignty is not absolute. However, the R2P doctrine shifts away from state-centered motivations to the interests of victims by focusing not on the right of states to intervene but on a responsibility to protect populations at risk.[33] In addition, it introduces a new way of looking at the essence of sovereignty, moving away from issues of "control" and emphasising "responsibility" to one's own citizens and the wider international community.[34] The norm of the R2P was borne out of the international community's failure to respond to tragedies such as the Rwandan Genocide in 1994 and the Srebrenica massacre in 1995. Kofi Annan, who was Assistant Secretary-General at the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations during the Rwandan genocide,[35] realized the international community's failure to respond. In the wake of the Kosovo intervention, 1999, Annan insisted that traditional notions of sovereignty had been redefined: “States are now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples”,[36] he said, while U.S. President Bill Clinton cited human rights concerns in 46% of the hundreds of remarks that he made justifying intervention in Kosovo. [37] In 2000, and in his capacity as UN Secretary-General, Annan wrote the report "We the Peoples" on the role of the United Nations in the 21st Century, and in this report he posed the following question: "if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?"[38] Many critics of the R2P's third pillar claim that R2P is a Western concept, but it was the African Union (AU) that pioneered the concept that the international community has a responsibility to intervene in crisis situations if a state is failing to protect its population from mass atrocity crimes.[39] In 2000, the AU incorporated the right to intervene in a member state, as enshrined in Article 4(h) of its Constitutive Act, which declares "[t]he right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity".[40] The AU also adopted the Ezulwini Consensus in 2005, which welcomed R2P as a tool for the prevention of mass atrocities.[41] In September 2000, the Canadian government established the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) to answer Annan's question "if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and systematic violations of human rights that affect every precept of our common humanity?" In February 2001, at the third round table meeting of the ICISS in London, Gareth Evans, Mohamed Sahnoun, and Michael Ignatieff suggested the phrase "responsibility to protect" as a way to avoid the "right to intervene" or "obligation to intervene" doctrines and yet keep a degree of duty to act to resolve humanitarian crises.[42] History of the Responsibility to Protect 1990s: Origins 2000: African Union proposes a right to intervene 2000: International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
- 6. 12/4/2017 Responsibility toprotect - Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsibility_to_protect 6/23 In 2001, ICISS released a report titled "The Responsibility to Protect" (http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Repor t.pdf). In a radical reformulation of the meaning of state sovereignty, the report argued that sovereignty entailed not only rights but also responsibilities, specifically a state's responsibility to protect its people from major violations of human rights. This idea rested on earlier work by Francis Deng and Roberta Cohen regarding internally displaced persons.[43] Inspiration may also be attributed to Jan Eliasson, who in response to a questionnaire on internally displaced persons distributed by Francis Deng, stated that assisting populations at risk within their own country was "basically a question of striking a balance between sovereignty and solidarity with people in need."[44] The ICISS report further asserted that, where a state was "unable or unwilling" to protect its people, the responsibility should shift to the international community and "the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect." The ICISS argued that any form of military intervention is "an exceptional and extraordinary measure", and, as such, to be justified it must meet certain criteria, including:[45] Just cause: There must be "serious and irreparable harm occurring to human beings, or imminently likely to occur". Right intention: The main intention of the military action must be to prevent human suffering. Last resort: Every other measure besides military invention has to have already been taken into account. (This does not mean that every measurement has to have been applied and been shown to fail, but that there are reasonable grounds to believe that only military action would work in that situation.) Proportional means: The military means must not exceed what is necessary "to secure the defined human protection objective". Reasonable prospects: The chance of success must be reasonably high, and it must be unlikely that the consequences of the military intervention would be worse than the consequences without the intervention. Right authority: The military action has to have been authorized by the Security Council. As the ICISS report was released in 2001, right around the time of the Second Gulf War, many thought that would be the end of this new norm. However, at the 2005 World Summit, where the largest number of heads of state and government in the history of the UN convened, the R2P was unanimously adopted.[46] While the outcome was close to the ideas of the ICISS report, there were some notable differences: the R2P would now only apply to mass atrocity crimes (genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing), rather than human rights violations; no mention was made of the criteria of intervention (see above); and the UN Security Council was made the only body allowed to authorize intervention. The paragraphs also stress the importance of regional organizations and the role they can play through Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. The results of this summit led to world leaders agreeing on holding each other accountable if they fail to uphold the new responsibilities. Decidedly if one state fails to uphold their responsibility this is now where State Sovereignty may be broken in order to protect people in danger of such crimes. First peaceful action is to be taken through humanitarian, diplomatic, or other means. If these fail to resolve the matter, the international community should come together in a “timely and decisive manner”. This shall all be worked on a case-by-case basis through the UN Security Council as well as the UN Charter.[47] 2005 World Summit Outcome Document Secretary-General's 2009 report
- 7. 12/4/2017 Responsibility toprotect - Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsibility_to_protect 7/23 On 12 January 2009, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon issued a report entitled Implementing the Responsibility to Protect (http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/implementing%20the%20rtop.pdf). The report was the first comprehensive document from the UN Secretariat on the R2P, following Ban's stated commitment to turn the concept into policy. The Secretary-General's report set the tone and the direction for the discussion on the subject at the UN. The report proposes three-pillar approach to the R2P: Pillar One stresses that states have the primary responsibility to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. Pillar Two addresses the international community's commitment to help states build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, and to help those under stress before crises and conflicts break out. Pillar Three focuses on the responsibility of international community to act in a timely and decisive way to prevent and halt genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity when a state manifestly fails to protect its populations. The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (GCR2P) is an international non-governmental organization that conducts research and advocacy for the Responsibility to protect. The Centre is based at the Graduate Center, CUNY, New York City with an office also located in Geneva.[48] At the 2005 World Summit, UN member states included R2P in the Outcome Document agreeing to Paragraphs 138 and 139. These paragraphs gave final language to the scope of R2P. It applies to the four mass atrocities crimes only. It also identifies to whom the R2P protocol applies; i.e., nations first, and regional and international communities second. Paragraphs 138 and 139 state: 138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability. 139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect United Nations
- 8. 12/4/2017 Responsibility toprotect - Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsibility_to_protect 8/23 international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting those under stress before crises and conflicts break out.[49] Since then, the UN has been actively engaged with the development of the R2P. Several resolutions, reports, and debates have emerged through the UN forum. The Security Council has reaffirmed its commitment to the R2P in several resolutions. The first such resolution came in April 2006, when the Security Council reaffirmed the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 in Resolution 1674 (https://w ww.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1674(2006)), formalizing their support for the R2P. In 2009, the Council again recognized states' primary responsibility to protect and reaffirmed paragraphs 138 and 139 in resolution 1894 (https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1894(2009)). Additionally, the Security Council has mentioned the R2P in several country-specific resolutions: Darfur: Resolution 1706 (https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1706(2006)) in 2006 Libya: Resolution 1970 (https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1970(2011)), Resolution 1973 (https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1973(2011)) in 2011, Resolution 2016 (http s://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2016(2011)) in 2011, and Resolution 2040 (https://ww w.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2040(2012)) in 2012 Côte d'Ivoire: Resolution 1975 (https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1975(2011)) in 2011 Yemen: Resolution 2014 (https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2014(2011)) in 2011 Mali: Resolution 2085 (https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2085(2012)) in 2012 and Resolution 2100 (https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2100(2013)) in 2013 Sudan and South Sudan: Resolution 1996 (https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1996(20 11)) in 2011 and Resolution 2121 (https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2109(2013)) in 2013 In January 2009, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon released UN Secretariat's first comprehensive report on the R2P, called Implementing the Responsibility to Protect (http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/implementing%20the%20rtop.pdf).[50] His report led to a debate in the General Assembly in July 2009 and the first time since 2005 that the General Assembly had come together to discuss the R2P. Ninety-four member states spoke. Most supported the R2P principle, although some important concerns were voiced. They discussed how to implement the R2P in crisis situations around the world. The debate highlighted the need for regional organizations like the African Union to play a strong role in implementing R2P; the need for stronger early warning mechanisms in the UN; and the need to clarify the roles UN bodies would play in implementing R2P.[51][52] One outcome of the debate was the first resolution referencing R2P adopted by the General Assembly. The Resolution (A/RES/63/308) showed that the international community had not forgotten about the concept of the R2P and it decided "to continue its consideration of the responsibility to protect".[53] Security Council Secretary-General reports
- 9. 12/4/2017 Responsibility toprotect - Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsibility_to_protect 9/23 In subsequent years, the Secretary-General would release a new report, followed by another debate in the General Assembly. In 2010, the report was titled Early Warning, Assessment and the Responsibility to Protect (http://www.globalr2p.org/m edia/files/2010_a64864.pdf). The informal interactive dialogue was held on 9 August 2010, with 49 member states, two regional organizations, and two civil society organizations speaking at the event. The discussion had a resoundingly positive tone, with virtually all of those that spoke stressing a need to prevent atrocities and agreeing that effective early warning is a necessary condition for effective prevention and early action. Objections were expressed by a small number of member states; namely Nicaragua, Iran, Pakistan, Sudan, and Venezuela.[54][55] In 2011, the report analyzed The Role of Regional and Subregional Arrangements in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect (http://www.globalr2p.org/media/files/2011_a65877.pdf). At the debate on 12 July 2011, statements were made by 43 member states, three regional organizations, and four civil society representatives. The biggest challenge to R2P was considered cooperation with, and support between, the UN and regional bodies in times of crisis. Member states acknowledged the importance of resolving this challenge through the unique advantages regional organizations possess in preventing and reacting to mass atrocities.[56][57] In 2012, the focus was on Responsibility to Protect: Timely and Decisive Response (http://www.globalr2p.org/media/file s/unsg-report_timely-and-decisive-response.pdf). The debate followed on 5 September 2012 saw interventions address the third pillar of the R2P and the diversity of non-coercive and coercive measures available for a collective response to mass atrocity crimes.[58] In 2013, the Secretary-General focused on Responsibility to Protect: State responsibility and prevention (http://www.glo balr2p.org/media/files/n1338693.pdf). The debate following the report was held on 11 September 2013. A panel of UN, member state, and civil society experts delivered presentations, after which 68 member states, 1 regional organization, and 2 civil society organizations made statements.[59][60] In 2004, following the genocidal violence in Rwanda and the Balkans, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan appointed Juan E. Méndez as Special Adviser to fill critical gaps in the international system that allowed those tragedies to go unchecked. In 2007, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon appointed Francis M. Deng on a full-time basis at the level of Under-Secretary- General. Around the same time, he also appointed Edward Luck as the Special Adviser who focuses on the R2P, on a part- time basis at the level of Assistant Secretary-General.[61] The Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect leads the conceptual, political, institutional, and operational development of the R2P. The Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide acts as a catalyst to raise awareness of the causes and dynamics of genocide, to alert relevant actors where there is a risk of genocide, and to advocate and mobilize for appropriate action. The mandates of the two Special Advisers are distinct but complementary. The efforts of their Office include alerting relevant actors to the risk of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity; enhancing the capacity of the UN to prevent these crimes, including their incitement; and working with member states, regional and sub-regional arrangements, and civil society to develop more effective means of response when they do occur.[61] Both Special Advisers Deng and Luck ended their assignments with the Office in July 2012. On 17 July 2012, Secretary- General Ban Ki-moon appointed Adama Dieng of Senegal as his Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide.[61] On 12 July 2013, Jennifer Welsh of Canada was appointed as the Special Advisor on the Responsibility to Protect.[62] Special Advisors on the Prevention of Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect
- 10. 12/4/2017 Responsibility toprotect - Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsibility_to_protect 10/23 From December 2007 to January 2008, Kenya was swept by a wave of ethnic violence triggered by a disputed presidential election held on 27 December 2007. On 30 December 2007, Mwai Kibaki was declared the winner of the presidential elections and was sworn in as president a couple of hours later. The announcement of the results triggered widespread and systematic violence resulting in more than 1,000 deaths and the displacement of over 500,000 civilians. Clashes were characterized by the ethnically targeted killings of people aligned with the two major political parties, the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) and the Party of National Unity (PNU).[63] External intervention was almost immediate. French Foreign and European Affairs Minister Bernard Kouchner made an appeal to the UN Security Council in January 2008 to react "in the name of the responsibility to protect" before Kenya plunged into a deadly ethnic conflict. On 31 December 2007, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon issued a statement expressing concern for the ongoing violence and calling for the population to remain calm and for Kenyan security forces to show restraint. On 10 January 2008, former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan was accepted by both the ODM and the PNU as the African Union Chief Mediator. Mediation efforts led to the signing of a power-sharing agreement on 28 February 2008. The agreement established Mwai Kibaki as President and Raila Odinga as Prime Minister, as well as the creation of three commissions: the Commission of Inquiry on Post-Election Violence (CIPEV); the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission; and the Independent Review Commission on the General Elections. This rapid and coordinated reaction by the international community was praised by Human Rights Watch as "a model of diplomatic action under the 'Responsibility to Protect' principles".[64] On 30 March 2011, in response to the escalating post-election violence against the population of Ivory Coast in late 2010 and early 2011, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1975 (https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.a sp?symbol=S/RES/1975(2011)) condemning the gross human rights violations committed by supporters of both ex- President Laurent Gbagbo and President Ouattara. The resolution cited "the primary responsibility of each State to protect civilians", called for the immediate transfer of power to President Ouattara, the victor in the elections, and reaffirmed that the United Nations Operation in Ivory Coast (UNOCI) could use "all necessary means to protect life and property." On 4 April 2011, in an effort to protect the people of Ivory Coast from further atrocities, UNOCI began a military operation,[65] and President Gbagbo's hold on power ended on 11 April when he was arrested by President Ouattara's forces. In November 2011, President Gbagbo was transferred to the International Criminal Court to face charges of crimes against humanity as an "indirect co-perpetrator" of murder, rape, persecution, and other inhumane acts.[66] On 26 July 2012, the Council adopted resolution 2062 (https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2062(2012)) renewing the mandate of UNOCI until 31 July 2013. Libya was the first case where the Security Council authorized a military intervention citing the R2P. Following widespread and systematic attacks against the civilian population by the Libyan regime, and language used by Muammar Gaddafi that reminded the international community of the genocide in Rwanda, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1970 on 26 February 2011, making explicit reference to the R2P. Deploring what it called "the gross and systematic violation of human rights" in strife-torn Libya, the Security Council demanded an end to the violence, In practice Kenya 2007/2008 Ivory Coast 2011 Libya 2011
- 11. 12/4/2017 Responsibility toprotect - Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsibility_to_protect 11/23 "recalling the Libyan authorities' responsibility to protect its population", and imposed a series of international sanctions. The Council also decided to refer the situation to the International Criminal Court. In resolution 1973, adopted on 17 March 2011, the Security Council demanded an immediate ceasefire in Libya, including an end to ongoing attacks against civilians, which it said might constitute "crimes against humanity". The Council authorized member states to take "all necessary measures" to protect civilians under threat of attack in the country, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory. A few days later, acting on the resolution, NATO planes started striking at Gaddafi's forces.[67] NATO subsequently came under scrutiny for its behavior during the air strikes; concerns included the fact that the intervention quickly moved to regime-change and that there were allegations regarding aerial bombardments that may have caused civilian casualties.[68] In December 2012, a loose rebel coalition named the Séléka initiated a military campaign to overthrow the government of the Central African Republic (CAR) and its then-president, Francois Bozizé. The Séléka, composed mostly of factions of armed groups in the northeast of the state, accused Bozizé's government of neglecting their region. They rapidly captured several strategic towns and were poised to take the capital city of Bangui. A hasty intervention by Chad and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) persuaded the Séléka to negotiate with Bozizé's government. The result, the Libreville Agreement of January 2013, installed a three-year power-sharing arrangement.[69] However, ECCAS failed to monitor the implementation of the Libreville Agreement and Bozizé did not undertake any of the reforms necessary under the transition agreement. Séléka resurged and took control of Bangui and fifteen of CAR's sixteen provinces on 24 March 2013. Séléka's leader, Michel Djotodia, proclaimed himself President, set up the National Transitional Council (NTC), and suspended CAR's constitution. A hurried ECCAS summit on 4 April 2013, which did not yet recognize Djotodia as President, called for the creation of a Transitional National Council (TNC), which would create a new constitution, conduct elections in eighteen months, and select an interim President. On 13 April, the TNC chose the sole candidate vying for interim president position, Michel Djotodia.[69] From December 2012 onward, Séléka forces, who are predominantly Muslim, committed grave human rights abuses against civilians throughout the country and especially targeted the majority Christian population. In response, Christian civilians formed "anti-balaka" ("anti-machete") militias, which have conducted vicious reprisals against Muslims. Extrajudicial killings of Muslim and Christian civilians have been carried out, including "door to door" searches by rival militias and mobs seeking potential victims.[70] The situation in CAR rapidly deteriorated after 5 December 2013, after an attack in Bangui by anti-balaka militias and loyalists of ousted President François Bozizé. The attack against former Séléka rebels sparked widespread violence throughout the capital as well as in Ouham province in the northwest. The violence marked a significant escalation of the conflict in CAR. Anti-balaka forces launched another attack against Muslim neighborhoods of Bangui on 20 December, spurring a cycle of renewed violence that led to at least 71 deaths by 24 December. A mass grave of at least 30 people who were reportedly executed and exhibited signs of torture was discovered on 25 December. The UN Office for the President Barack Obama speaking on the military intervention in Libya at the National Defense University. Central African Republic (CAR) 2013
- 12. 12/4/2017 Responsibility toprotect - Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsibility_to_protect 12/23 Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimates a further 40 civilians were killed on 25 December as violence continued between anti-balaka and ex-Séléka forces. Eight African Union (AU) peacekeepers were also killed between 25 and 26 December.[71] According to OCHA, by September 2013 there were almost 400,000 internally displaced people and about 65,000 new refugees in neighbouring countries. Humanitarian agencies have alerted public opinion to the critical situation, stressing that 2.3 million CAR citizens (half the population) are in need of humanitarian assistance.[72] The crisis in the CAR is a case for the R2P, due to mass atrocity crimes being committed by both sides.[73] During a Security Council briefing on 25 November, UN Deputy-Secretary-General Jan Eliasson said that the world faced "a profoundly important test of international solidarity and of our responsibility to protect" in CAR. The Security Council passed Resolution 2127 (https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2127(2013)) on 5 December, emphasizing that the NTC has the primary responsibility to protect the civilian population in CAR. The resolution granted a Chapter VII mandate to AU and French forces to protect civilians and restore security, imposed an arms embargo, and established a UN Commission of Inquiry.[71] In the beginning, the international response to the coup was purely diplomatic: members of the International Contact Group insisted that Michel Djotodia respect the principles set out in the Libreville agreement. The African Union was the first to react when it announced a new African-led International Support Mission for CAR (MISCA) in July 2013. However, MISCA has not been effective in reversing the deteriorating security situation. Although its mandate is well- defined, there is general agreement that it does not have the resources to fulfill its mission. The UN General Assembly put CAR on the international agenda in September. Resolution 2121 (https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbo l=S/RES/2121(2013)), adopted on 10 October 2013 and sponsored by France, strengthened and broadened the mandate of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA). Aware that MISCA alone is unable to adequately tackle the growing insecurity, France has changed its initial position from disengagement to military contribution, as announced by François Hollande on 20 November 2013, who said that French forces would be reinforced by almost 1,000 troops for a six-month period.[72] France began to deploy troops in CAR after receiving authorization from the Security Council on 5 December 2013 with Resolution 2127, which authorizes MISCA and French forces to take "all necessary measures" to protect civilians and restore security in CAR. French soldiers immediately began to patrol in Bangui.[71] On 7 February 2014, it was reported that the International Criminal Court's chief prosecutor Fatou Bensouda said that she had "opened a preliminary investigation into possible war crimes in the Central African Republic".[74] Over the last five years, Syria has been in constant conflict, which has led to the death of over 270,000 people, 4.8 million refugees, and over 6.6 million internally displaced persons. To help stop these atrocities International Syria Support Group (ISSG), the UN, European Union and the league of Arab states as well as other countries, had agreed to meet to discuss the situation at stake. The conclusion was made that the full implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2254, which increased the delivery of humanitarian aid, as well as a nationwide cessation of hostilities, was required in order to help those in need. Syrian government while working with allied militias has committed large-scale massacres, perpetrated war crimes and gross violations of international humanitarian law, as a matter of state policy. After Syria’s Commission of Inquiry's third report had stated that the government had committed the crimes against humanity through extermination, murder, rape and other forms of sexual violence, torture, imprisonment and enforced disappearance and CAR and the R2P Syria
- 13. 12/4/2017 Responsibility toprotect - Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsibility_to_protect 13/23 other inhuman acts. Due to this statement the UN Human Rights Council has adopted at least 16 different resolutions with regard to the atrocities taking place in Syria. Despite all efforts and resolutions adopted to help uphold Right To Protect, humanitarian aid has had limited success in reaching the affected populations. The Syrian government is responsible for the well being of its people.[75] The country of Burundi is at grave risk for a possible civil war, if violence is not stopped. The civilians of Burundi face the serious and eminent risk of mass atrocities due to the ongoing political violence that threatens the stability of Burundi. The citizens of Burundi are being harmed through mass atrocity crimes due to targeted killings, widespread violations and abuses of human rights. Violence had increased after President Pierre Nkurnziza had announced he was seeking a third term in the country’s elections. Violence had increased due to President Nkurnziza instructing his citizens to disarm or face action by Burundian Security forces and be labeled enemies of the nation. Office of high commissioner for human rights reports cases of sexual violence by security forces, hate speech and incitement to violence by some government officials. In order for this country to become stable again it is crucial for the country to uphold its R2P, as well as make peace-building gains.[76] With the current armed conflict in Yemen, many civilians are left to face mass atrocity crimes. These crimes are a result of the violence between pro-government forces and regional military as the fight against the Houthi rebels. The Houthi rebels and pro-Saleh currently control a majority of Yemen, including the capital Sana’a. In addition to the violence between these groups the nation also been seeing Saudi-led air strikes for months. This has resulted in over 3,200 civilian deaths since March 2015. The violence has also led to 2.4 million Yemeni civilians being forcibly displaced leaving 82 percent, equivalent to 21.2 million of its people requiring humanitarian assistance. Without exception of the government allied forces, the nation has also seen civilian infrastructure and humanitarian workers being targeted. All of the violence being displayed has led to many other armed groups taking advantage of the unsettlement of the nation. With this being said Yemen is currently unable to uphold its responsibility to protect and is in need of other member states support.[77] Anne-Marie Slaughter from Princeton University has called R2P "the most important shift in our conception of sovereignty since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648."[78] Louise Arbour from the International Crisis Group said that "The responsibility to protect is the most important and imaginative doctrine to emerge on the international scene for decades."[79] Francis Deng, former UN Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide, stated that "R2P is one of the most powerful and promising innovations on the international scene."[79] Political scientist Alex Bellamy argues (i) that there is evidence of behavioral change in the way international society responds to mass killing and (ii) that R2P considerations have influenced behavior.[80] On the first point, Bellamy argues that criticism of R2P as insufficient change is driven by a small subset of cases (Darfur, Libya and Syria) that are not indicative of strong trends. On the second point, Bellamy finds that R2P language is used in UNSC deliberations and in the rhetoric of world leaders. Burundi Yemen Praise for R2P Criticism of R2P
- 14. 12/4/2017 Responsibility toprotect - Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsibility_to_protect 14/23 R2P and certain implementations of it have come under criticism by some states and individuals. One of the main concerns surrounding R2P is that it infringes upon national sovereignty.[81] This concern is rebutted by the Secretary General Ban Ki-moon in the report Implementing the Responsibility to Protect. According to the first pillar of R2P, the state has the responsibility to protect its populations from mass atrocities and ethnic cleansing, and according to the second pillar the international community has the responsibility to help states fulfill their responsibility. Advocates of R2P claim that the only occasions where the international community will intervene in a state without its consent is when the state is either allowing mass atrocities to occur, or is committing them, in which case the state is no longer upholding its responsibilities as a sovereign. In this sense, R2P can be understood as reinforcing sovereignty.[82] In 2004, the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, set up by Secretary-General Kofi Annan, endorsed the emerging norm of R2P, stating that there is a collective international responsibility "...exercisable by the Security Council authorizing military intervention as a last resort, in the event of genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing, and serious violations of humanitarian law which sovereign governments have proved powerless or unwilling to prevent."[67] On March 19, 2011, the Security Council approved Resolution 1973, which reiterated the responsibility of the Libyan authorities to protect the Libyan population. The UNSC resolution reaffirmed "that parties to armed conflicts bear the primary responsibility to take all feasible steps to ensure the protection of civilians."[83] It demanded "an immediate ceasefire in Libya, including an end to the current attacks against civilians, which it said might constitute 'crimes against humanity'.... It imposed a ban on all flights in the country's airspace, a no-fly zone, and tightened sanctions on the Gadaffi regime and its supporters."[83] The resolution passed, with 10 in favor, 0 against, and 5 abstentions. Two of the five abstentions were China and Russia, both of which are permanent members of the Security Council.[83][84] The subsequent military action by NATO resulted in mixed opinions. Detractors of the intervention believe that problems in Libya are best resolved by Libyans. India's UN Ambassador Hardeep Singh Puri stated that "the Libyan case has already given R2P a bad name" and that "the only aspect of the resolution of interest to them (international community) was use of all necessary means to bomb the hell out of Libya". Puri also alleged that civilians had been supplied with arms and that the no-fly zone had been implemented only selectively.[85] Critics in the media also suggested that R2P-based intervention in Libya was used as a means to carry out regime-change, extending and undermining the purpose of the doctrine. While the doctrine was initially invoked to protect against government reprisals in rebel-held Benghazi, the resulting operation grew in scope to support the total overthrow of the government. Critics feel this experience has yielded global skepticism concerning proposed UN intervention in Syria the same year, putting the future of R2P in question. [86] Several attempts were made by the U.S. government in the course of 2011 to 2013 to pass Security Council resolutions invoking R2P to justify military intervention in the Syrian Civil War. These were vetoed by Russia and China. The Russian and Chinese governments both issued statements to the effect that, in their opinion, R2P had been abused by the U.S. as a Infringement of national sovereignty Libya, 2011 Syria, 2011: Russian and Chinese repudiation of abuse of R2P
- 15. 12/4/2017 Responsibility toprotect - Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsibility_to_protect 15/23 pretext for "regime change", more particularly in the case of Libya, and that as far as they were concerned they would be extremely suspicious of any future Security Council resolutions invoking R2P, based on past experience. According to the UN's own 4 October 2011 coverage of the meeting of the Security Council: [Russia's UN Ambassador Vitaly Churkin] was alarmed that compliance with Security Council resolutions in Libya had been considered a model for future actions by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). It was important to see how that model had been implemented. The demand for a ceasefire had turned into a civil war, the humanitarian, social and military consequences of which had spilled beyond Libya. The arms embargo had turned into a naval blockade on west Libya. Such models should be excluded from global practice. […] [China's UN Ambassador Li Baodong] hoped that the [Syrian] Government would follow through on reform and a process of dialogue. The Council should encourage those objectives while respecting Syria's sovereignty's [sic] and territorial integrity. Any action it took should contribute to peace and stability and comply with the United Nations Charter principles of non-interference in internal affairs.[87] The question of military intervention under the third pillar of R2P remains controversial.[88] Several states have argued that R2P should not allow the international community to intervene militarily on states, because to do so is an infringement upon sovereignty. Others argue that this is a necessary facet of R2P, and is necessary as a last resort to stop mass atrocities. A related argument surrounds the question as to whether more specific criteria should be developed to determine when the Security Council should authorize military intervention.[89] Political scientist Roland Paris, a proponent of R2P, argues that several problems regarding usefulness and legitimacy inherent to R2P make it vulnerable to criticism: "the more R2P is employed as a basis for military action, the more likely it is to be discredited, but paradoxically, the same will hold true if R2P’s coercive tools go unused."[90] Paris lists the following problems as inherent to R2P, making it difficult for proponents of R2P to defend R2P and emboldening critics:[90] The mixed-motives problem - The legitimacy of R2P rests upon its altruistic aim. However, states will often be wary to engage in humanitarian intervention unless the intervention is partly rooted in self-interest. The appearance that the intervention is not strictly altruistic consequently leads some to question its legitimacy. The counterfactual problem - When R2P is successful, there will not be any clear-cut evidence of its success: a mass atrocity that did not occur but would have occurred without intervention. Defenders of R2P consequently have to rely on counterfactual arguments. The conspicuous harm problem - While the benefits of the intervention will not be clearly visible, the destructiveness and costs of the intervention will be visible. This makes it more difficult for proponents of the intervention to defend the intervention. The destruction caused by the intervention also makes some question the legitimacy of the intervention due to the stated purpose of preventing harm. Military intervention Structural Problems
- 16. 12/4/2017 Responsibility toprotect - Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsibility_to_protect 16/23 The end-state problem - Humanitarian intervention is prone to expand the mission beyond simply averting mass atrocities. When successful at averting mass atrocities, the intervenors will often be forced to take upon themselves more expansive mandates to ensure that threatened populations will be safe after the intervenors leave. The inconsistency problem - Due to the aforementioned problems, in addition to the belief that a particular military action is likely to cause more harm than good, states may fail to act in situations where mass atrocities loom. The failure to intervene in any and all situations where there is a risk of mass atrocities lead to charges of inconsistency. Sovereignty Human rights Human security Universal Declaration of Human Rights Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide United Nations International Criminal Court Rwandan Genocide Srebrenica Genocide Peacekeeping Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect Orford, Anne. International Authority and Responsibility to Protect. Cambridge University Press. 2011. Global Responsibility to Protect (http://www.brill.com/global-responsibility-protect) Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect Judson, A. M. Where is R2P grounded in international law (http://otago.ourarchive.ac.nz/handle/10523/2279), Otago University, 2012. Baylis and Smith, The Globalization of World Politics, Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 394 Deng, Francis, Rothchild, Donald, et al. "Sovereignty as Responsibility Conflict Management in Africa". (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, September 1996). c. 290pp. Downes, Paul. Melville's Benito Cereno and Humanitarian Intervention South Atlantic Quarterly. 103.2–3. Spring/Summer 2004, pp. 465–488. Evans, Gareth. The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For All. (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, September 2008) Evans, Gareth and Mohamed Sahnoun. "The Responsibility to Protect" Foreign Affairs. November/December 2002. Hehir, Aidan. "The Responsibility to Protect: Sound and Fury Signifying Nothing?" International Relations. 24/2 2010. Gallagher, Adrian. 'A Clash of Responsibilities: Engaging with Realist Critiques of the R2P', Global Responsibility to Protect, vol. 4, no. 3, 2012, 334–357. See also Further reading
- 17. 12/4/2017 Responsibility toprotect - Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsibility_to_protect 17/23 Köchler, Hans, Humanitarian Intervention in the Context of Modern Power Politics. Is the Revival of the Doctrine of "Just War" Compatible with the International Rule of Law? (Studies in International Relations, XXVI.) Vienna: International Progress Organization, 2001. Axworthy, Lloyd; Rock, Allan (2009). "R2P: A New and Unfinished Agenda". Global Responsibility to Protect. 1 (1): 54–69. doi:10.1163/187598409x405479 (https://doi.org/10.1163%2F187598409x405479). Bazirake, Joseph Besigye; Bukuluki, Paul (2015). "'A critical reflection on the conceptual and practical limitations of the Responsibility to Protect'". The International Journal of Human Rights. 19 (8): 1017–1028. doi:10.1080/13642987.2015.1082844 (https://doi.org/10.1080%2F13642987.2015.1082844). Bellamy, Alex J (2006). "'Whither the Responsibility to Protect: Humanitarian Intervention and the 2005 World Summit'". Ethics and International Affairs. 20 (2): 143–177. doi:10.1111/j.1747-7093.2006.00012.x (https://doi.or g/10.1111%2Fj.1747-7093.2006.00012.x). Bellamy, A. J. (2008). "'Conflict prevention and the responsibility to protect'". Global Governance. 14 (2): 135–156. Bellamy, Alex J (2008). "'The Responsibility to Protect and the problem of military intervention'". International Affairs. 84 (4): 615–639. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2346.2008.00729.x (https://doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1468-2346.2008.00 729.x). Bellamy, A. J. (2009). "'Realizing the Responsibility to Protect'". International Studies Perspectives. 10 (2): 111– 128. doi:10.1111/j.1528-3585.2009.00365.x (https://doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1528-3585.2009.00365.x). Bellamy, Alex J. 2009. Responsibility to Protect: The Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities, Cambridge: Polity. Bellamy, A. J. (2010). "'The responsibility to protect and Australian foreign policy'". Australian Journal of International Affairs. 64 (4): 432–448. doi:10.1080/10357710903544106 (https://doi.org/10.1080%2F10357710903 544106). Bellamy, Alex J (2010). "The Responsibility to Protect: Five Years On". Ethics and International Affairs. 24 (2): 143– 169. doi:10.1111/j.1747-7093.2010.00254.x (https://doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1747-7093.2010.00254.x). Bellamy, Alex J. 2011. Global politics and the responsibility to protect: from words to deeds. Abingdon: Routledge. Bellamy, Alex J.; Davies, Sara E. (2009). "'The Responsibility to Protect in the Asia-Pacific Region'". Security Dialogue. 40 (6): 547–574. doi:10.1177/0967010609349907 (https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0967010609349907). Breau, Susan C (2006). "The Impact of the Responsibility to Protect on Peacekeeping". Journal of Conflict & Security Law. 11 (3): 429–64. doi:10.1093/jcsl/krl022 (https://doi.org/10.1093%2Fjcsl%2Fkrl022). Briggs, E. Donald, Walter C. Soderlund and Abdel Salam Sidahmed. 2010. The responsibility to protect in Darfur: the Role of Mass Media. Lanham: Lexington Books. Chandler, David. 2005. ‘The Responsibility to Protect: Imposing the Liberal Peace’. In Peace Operations and Global Order, eds Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams. London: Routledge. Chataway, Teresa (2007). "'Towards normative consensus on responsibility to protect'". Griffith Law Review. 16 (1): 193–224. doi:10.1080/10383441.2007.10854588 (https://doi.org/10.1080%2F10383441.2007.10854588). Dallaire, Romeo (2005). "'The Responsibility to Protect'". New England Journal of Public Policy. 19: 2. Contessi, Nicola P. "Multilateralism, intervention and norm contestation: China’s stance on Darfur in the UN security council." Security Dialogue 41, 3 (2010): 323-344. Davies, Sara, Alex J. Bellamy and Luke Glanville. 2011. The Responsibility to Protect and International Law. Leiden Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. Doyle, Michael W (2011). "'International Ethics and the Responsibility to Protect'". International Studies Review. 13 (1): 72–84. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2486.2010.00999.x (https://doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1468-2486.2010.00999.x).
- 18. 12/4/2017 Responsibility toprotect - Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsibility_to_protect 18/23 Evans, Gareth (2004). "'When is it Right to Fight?'". Survival. 46 (3): 59–82. doi:10.1093/survival/46.3.59 (https:// doi.org/10.1093%2Fsurvival%2F46.3.59). Evans, Gareth. 2004. ‘The Responsibility to Protect: Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention’. Proceedings of the Annual Meeting, reprinted in American Society of International Law 98: 78-89. Evans, G., The Responsibility to Protect: End Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and for All, Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2008 Evans, Gareth (2009). "'Russia, Georgia and the Responsibility to Protect'". Amsterdam Law Forum. 1 (2): 25–28. Hunt, Charles T.; Bellamy, Alex J. (2011). "'Mainstreaming the Responsibility to Protect in Peace Operations'". Civil Wars. 13 (1): 1–20. doi:10.1080/13698249.2011.555688 (https://doi.org/10.1080%2F13698249.2011.555688). Ban, Ki-moon, The Role of Regional and Sub-Regional Arrangements in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, A/65/877–S/2011/39, 28 June 2011. Luck, Edward C., ‘The United Nations and the Responsibility to Protect’, Stanley Foundation Policy Analysis Brief, August 2008 Luck, Edward C (2011). "'The Responsibility to Protect: Growing Pains or Early Promise?'". Ethics & International Affairs. 24 (4): 34. Pattison, James. 2010. Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility To Protect. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Paley, Gregory R., 2005. The responsibility to protect: East, West and Southern African perspectives on preventing and responding to humanitarian crises. Waterloo, Ontario: Project Ploughshares. Pingeot, Lou and Wolfgang Obenland, 2014. In whose name? A critical view on the Responsibility to Protect (http:// www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/images/pdfs/In_whose_name_web.pdf). Bonn, Germany/New York: Global Policy Forum/Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung—New York Office. Ramesh Thakur and William Malley. Theorising the Responsibility to Protect. Cambridge University Press, 2015. ISBN 978-1-107-62194-7. Teitt, Sarah (2011). "'The Responsibility to Protect and China's Peacekeeping Policy'". International Peacekeeping. 18 (3): 298–312. doi:10.1080/13533312.2011.563085 (https://doi.org/10.1080%2F13533312.2011.563085). Thakur, Ramesh (2003). "'In defence of the responsibility to protect'". The International Journal of Human Rights. 7 (3): 160–178. doi:10.1080/13642980310001726196 (https://doi.org/10.1080%2F13642980310001726196). Thakur, Ramesh (2005). "'A Shared Responsibility for a More Secure World'". Global Governance. 11 (3): 281–289. Thakur, Ramesh Chandra. 2011. The Responsibility to Protect: Norms, Laws, and the Use of Force in International Politics. New York: Routledge. Thakur, Ramesh. 2016. Review article: The Responsibility to Protect at 15. International Affairs. (https://www.chath amhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/publications/ia/inta92-2-10-thakur_0.pdf) Voinov Kohler, Juliette and Richard H. Cooper. 2008. The Responsibility to Protect: the Global Moral Compact for the 21st Century. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Weiss, Thomas and Don Hubert. 2001. The Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background. Ottawa: ICISS. Weiss, Thomas G (2004). "'The Sunset of Humanitarian Intervention? The Responsibility to Protect in a Unipolar Era'". Security Dialogue. 35 (2): 135–153. doi:10.1177/0967010604044973 (https://doi.org/10.1177%2F09670106 04044973).
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- 21. 12/4/2017 Responsibility toprotect - Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsibility_to_protect 21/23 42. Haines, Steven; Kassimeris, George, ed. (2010), "Chapter 18, Humanitarian Intervention: Genocide, Crimes against Humanity and the Use of Force" (https://books.google.com/books?id=gnxWaFyEE0QC&pg=PA307&dq=%22Human itarian+Intervention:+Genocide,+Crimes+against+Humanity+and+the+Use+of+Force%22&hl=en&sa=X&ei=U18 OT5L-Gq230gGF9IG-Aw&ved=0CDEQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=%22Humanitarian%20Intervention%3A%20Genocid e%2C%20Crimes%20against%20Humanity%20and%20the%20Use%20of%20Force%22&f=false), The Ashgate research companion to modern warfare (https://books.google.com/books?id=gnxWaFyEE0QC), Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, pp. 307–329, ISBN 978-0-7546-7410-8 43. Roberta Cohen (25 March 2010). "Reconciling Responsibility to Protect with IDP Protection" (http://www.brookings. edu/research/articles/2010/03/25-internal-displacement-cohen). The Brookings Institution. 44. Mooney, Erin (2010). "Something Old, Something New, Something Borrrowed...Something Blue? The Protection Potential of a Marriage of Concepts between R2P and IDP Protection". Global Responsibility to Protect. 2: 74. 45. Evans, G (2006). "From Humanitarian Intervention to the Responsibility to Protect". Wisconsin International Law Journal. 3 (2): 710. 46. http://www.who.int/hiv/universalaccess2010/worldsummit.pdf 47. "The Responsibility to Protect" (https://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/pdf/Backgrounder%20R2P%2020 14.pdf) (PDF). 48. "About Us" (https://www.hrw.org/node/75138). Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. Retrieved 2015-01-21. 49. "2005 World Summit Outcome" (http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/about-rtop). Sixtieth session, items 48 and 121 of the provisional agenda. A/60/L.1. United Nations General Assembly. articles 138–140, p. 31. 15 September 2005. Retrieved 1 July 2012. 50. "Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit, Implementing the responsibility to protect: Report of the Secretary-General. A/63/677" (http://globalr2p.org/pdf/SGR2PEng.pdf) (PDF). General distribution to the media. United Nations General Assembly, Sixty-third session: Agenda items 44 and 107. January 12, 2009. Retrieved 2012-01-07. 51. "Implementing the responsibility to protect. The 2009 General Assembly Debate: An Assessment" (http://globalr2p. org/media/pdf/GCR2P_General_Assembly_Debate_Assessment.pdf) (PDF). GCR2P Report. Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies. CUNY. August 2009. Retrieved 2012-01-07. 52. "Report on the General Assembly Plenary Debate on the Responsibility to Protect" (http://responsibilitytoprotect.or g/ICRtoPGAdebate.pdf) (PDF). International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, New York, NY. September 15, 2009. Retrieved 2012-01-07. 53. "Resolution adopted by the General Assembly, 63/308. The responsibility to protect. A/RES/63/308" (http://globalr2 p.org/media/pdf/UNResolutionA63L.80Rev.1.pdf) (PDF). General distribution to the media. United Nations General Assembly, Sixty-third session: Agenda items 44 and 107. October 7, 2009. Retrieved 2012-01-07. Decides to continue its consideration of the responsibility to protect. 105th plenary meeting, September 14, 2009. 54. "UN General Assembly Informal Interactive Dialogue on "Early Warning, Assessment and the Responsibility to Protect", 2010 : Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect" (http://www.globalr2p.org/resources/342). globalr2p.org. 55. "President of the 64th Session of the UN General Assembly" (https://www.un.org/ga/president/64/thematic/r2p.sht ml). un.org. 56. http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICRtoP%20Report%20on%20RIGO%20GA%20dialogue%20on%20RtoP%20FINAL(1 57. "Initiatives of the President of the 65th Session – General Assembly of the United Nations" (https://www.un.org/en/ ga/president/65/initiatives/RtoPdialogue.html). un.org. 58. "World Not Fulfilling 'Never Again' Vow, Secretary-General Tells" (https://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/ga112 70.doc.htm). un.org. 59. "UN General Assembly Informal Interactive Dialogue on the Responsibility to Protect: State Responsibility and Prevention, 2013: Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect" (http://www.globalr2p.org/resources/471). globalr2p.org.
- 22. 12/4/2017 Responsibility toprotect - Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsibility_to_protect 22/23 60. "Prevention at Core of Responsibility to Protect, Secretary-General Stresses" (https://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/ 2013/sgsm15269.doc.htm). un.org. 61. "Office of The Special Adviser on The Prevention of Genocide" (https://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/). un.org. 62. "Secretary-General Appoints Jennifer Welsh of Canada Special Adviser" (https://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/201 3/sga1424.doc.htm). un.org. 63. "The Crisis in Kenya" (http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-kenya). responsibilitytoprotect.org. 64. "Ballots to Bullets: Organized Political Violence and Kenya's Crisis of Governance: The Response of International Actors" (https://www.hrw.org/reports/2008/kenya0308/10.htm). hrw.org. 65. "Presidential Elections. UNOCI Resources – United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire" (https://www.un.org/en/peac ekeeping/missions/unoci/elections.shtml). un.org. 66. "Crisis in Côte d'Ivoire" (http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-ivory-coast). responsibilitytoprotect.org. 67. "Background Information on the Responsibility to Protect — Outreach Programme on the Rwanda Genocide and the United Nations" (https://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/about/bgresponsibility.shtml). un.org. 68. "Crisis in Libya" (http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-libya#violence). responsibilitytoprotect.org. 69. "Crisis in CAR" (http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-the-central-african-republic). responsibilitytoprotect.org. 70. "Central African Republic: Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect" (http://www.globalr2p.org/regions/central _african_republic). globalr2p.org. 71. http://www.globalr2p.org/media/files/car-timeline-22-jan-14.pdf 72. http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/central-africa/B096-central-african-republic-better-late-than- never.pdf 73. "Central African Republic: Sectarian Atrocities Escalate – Human Rights Watch" (https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/1 2/18/central-african-republic-sectarian-atrocities-escalate). hrw.org. 74. "ICC opens CAR 'war crimes' preliminary investigation" (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-26089189). BBC News. 75. "Populations at Risk: Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect" (http://www.globalr2p.org/regions/). www.globalr2p.org. Retrieved 2016-04-25. 76. "Burundi" (http://www.globalr2p.org/regions/burundi). www.globalr2p.org. Retrieved 2016-04-25. 77. "Populations at Risk" (http://www.globalr2p.org/regions/yemen). 78. World Archipelago. "Macmillan" (http://us.macmillan.com/responsibilitytoprotect/RichardCooper). macmillan.com. 79. "Gareth Evans – The Responsibility to Protect" (http://gevans.org/r2pbook.html). gevans.org. 80. Bellamy, Alex J. (2015-06-01). "The Responsibility to Protect Turns Ten" (http://journals.cambridge.org/article_S08 92679415000052). Ethics & International Affairs. 29 (02): 161–185. doi:10.1017/S0892679415000052 (https://doi. org/10.1017%2FS0892679415000052). ISSN 1747-7093 (https://www.worldcat.org/issn/1747-7093). 81. Moran, Rick; Horowitz, David, editor (March 28, 2011). "Libya and the Soros Doctrine" (http://frontpagemag.com/2 011/03/28/libya-and-the-soros-doctrine/). FrontPage Mag. Retrieved January 7, 2012. 82. Ban Ki-moon, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, p. 7-8 83. "Security Council Approves 'No-fly Zone' over Libya, authorizing 'all necessary measures' to protect civilians, by vote of 10 in favour with 5 abstentions. (Includes the full text of resolution 1973)" (https://www.un.org/News/Press/doc s/2011/sc10200.doc.htm#Resolution). Security Council SC/10200. United Nations, Department of Public Information, News and Media Division, New York, NY. March 17, 2011. Retrieved 2012-01-07. 84. "Libya: Nigeria votes in favour of no-fly resolution" (http://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/03/libya-nigeria-votes-in-fa vour-of-no-fly-resolution/). Vanguard (Nigeria). 18 March 2011. 85. "Selective Use of R2P to Secure Regime Change: India" (http://news.outlookindia.com/items.aspx?artid=752417). 86. "R2P, R.I.P" (https://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/08/opinion/r2p-rip.html). New York Times. 8 November 2011.
- 23. 12/4/2017 Responsibility toprotect - Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsibility_to_protect 23/23 IPI's Edward C. Luck briefs UN General Assembly on R2P, 9 August 2010 (http://www.ipinst.org/news/general-anno uncement/185-we-should-not-wait-for-the-bad-news-ed-luck-says-at-un-general-assembly-meeting.html) Whose Responsibility to Protect? (http://mantlethought.org/roundtable/r2p), debate between four R2P practitioners, October 2009. Newt Gingrich and George J. Mitchell, Report Card from America: UN Reform (http://www.aei.org/publications/filte r.all,pubID.23488/pub_detail.asp), International Herald Tribune, 28 November 2005 (American Enterprise Institute) Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (http://globalr2p.org/) International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect (http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/) Asia-Pacific Centre for R2P (http://www.r2pasiapacific.org/) Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Responsibility_to_protect&oldid=811616305" This page was last edited on 22 November 2017, at 20:16. Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License; additional terms may apply. By using this site, you agree to the Terms of Use and Privacy Policy. Wikipedia® is a registered trademark of the Wikimedia Foundation, Inc., a non-profit organization. 87. "Security Council Fails to Adopt Draft Resolution Condemning Syria's Crackdown" (https://www.un.org/News/Press/ docs/2011/sc10403.doc.htm). un.org. 88. Seybolt, Taylor B. (2007). Humanitarian military intervention: the conditions for success and failure (https://books.g oogle.com/books?id=m1O1lcF2GqsC&pg=PA2&dq=%22The+concept+of+states'+responsibility+to+protect+civilia ns+drew+sharp+reactions%22&hl=en&sa=X&ei=5s0IT6DSBIrX0QGr6rH3Cw&ved=0CDAQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q =%22The%20concept%20of%20states'%20responsibility%20to%20protect%20civilians%20drew%20sharp%20re actions%22&f=false). New York, NY: Oxford University Press Inc. p. 2. ISBN 978-0-19-925243-5. 89. "Responsibility to Protect: The 'Real' Debate on R2P – STWR – Share The World's Resources" (http://www.stwr.org/ the-un-people-politics/responsibility-to-protect-the-real-debate-on-r2p.html). stwr.org. 90. Paris, Roland (2014-12-09). "Is it possible to meet the 'Responsibility to Protect'?" (https://www.washingtonpost.co m/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/12/09/is-it-possible-to-meet-the-responsibility-to-protect/). The Washington Post. ISSN 0190-8286 (https://www.worldcat.org/issn/0190-8286). Retrieved 2016-04-23. Sources External links
- 24. 12/4/2017 Responsibility toprotect - Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsibility_to_protect 1/23 Responsibility to protect The Responsibility to Protect (R2P or RtoP) is a global political commitment which was endorsed by all member states of the United Nations at the 2005 World Summit to prevent genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.[1][2] The principle of the Responsibility to Protect is based upon the underlying premise that sovereignty entails a responsibility to protect all populations from mass atrocity crimes and human rights violations.[3][4][5] The principle is based on a respect for the norms and principles of international law, especially the underlying principles of law relating to sovereignty, peace and security, human rights, and armed conflict.[6][7] The Responsibility to Protect provides a framework for employing measures that already exist (i.e., mediation, early warning mechanisms, economic sanctions, and chapter VII powers) to prevent atrocity crimes and to protect civilians from their occurrence. The authority to employ the use of force under the framework of the Responsibility to Protect rests solely with United Nations Security Council and is considered a measure of last resort.[8] The United Nations Secretary- General has published annual reports on the Responsibility to Protect since 2009 that expand on the measures available to governments, intergovernmental organizations, and civil society, as well as the private sector, to prevent atrocity crimes.[9][10][11][12][13][14][15][16] The Responsibility to Protect has been the subject of considerable debate, particularly regarding the implementation of the principle by various actors in the context of country-specific situations, such as Libya, Syria, Sudan and Kenya, for example.[17][18][19][20][21][22] It has also been argued that commensurate with the responsibility to protect, international law should also recognize a right for populations to offer militarily organized resistance to protect themselves against genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes on a massive scale.[23] 1 Definition 1.1 The Scope of the Responsibility to Protect 1.2 Three Pillars of the Responsibility to Protect 1.3 The Responsibility to Protect and 'Humanitarian Intervention' 2 History of the Responsibility to Protect 2.1 1990s: Origins 2.2 2000: African Union proposes a right to intervene 2.3 2000: International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 2.4 2005 World Summit Outcome Document 2.5 Secretary-General's 2009 report 2.6 Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect 3 United Nations Contents
- 25. 12/4/2017 Responsibility toprotect - Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsibility_to_protect 2/23 3.1 Security Council 3.2 Secretary-General reports 3.3 Special Advisors on the Prevention of Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect 4 In practice 4.1 Kenya 2007/2008 4.2 Ivory Coast 2011 4.3 Libya 2011 4.4 Central African Republic (CAR) 2013 4.4.1 CAR and the R2P 4.5 Syria 4.6 Burundi 4.7 Yemen 5 Praise for R2P 6 Criticism of R2P 6.1 Infringement of national sovereignty 6.2 Libya, 2011 6.3 Syria, 2011: Russian and Chinese repudiation of abuse of R2P 6.4 Military intervention 6.5 Structural Problems 7 See also 8 Further reading 9 References 9.1 Sources 10 External links The Responsibility to Protect is a political commitment unanimously adopted by all members of the United Nations General Assembly at the 2005 World Summit and articulated in paragraphs 138-139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document: 138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability. Definition
- 26. 12/4/2017 Responsibility toprotect - Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsibility_to_protect 3/23 139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out. 140. We fully support the mission of the Special Advisor of the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide. The above paragraphs in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document serve as the basis for the inter-governmental agreement to the Responsibility to Protect. The General Assembly adopted the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document in its resolution 60/1 of 2005.[24] The body subsequently committed to continue consideration of the Responsibility to Protect with its Resolution A/Res/63/308 of October 2009.[25] The UN Security Council first reaffirmed the Responsibility to Protect in Resolution 1674 (2006) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, recalling in particular paragraphs 138 and 139 of the Summit Outcome regarding the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.[26] The report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, which first articulated the Responsibility to Protect in its December 2001 Report, envisioned a wide scope of application in its articulation of the principle, which included "overwhelming natural or environmental catastrophes, where the state concerned is either unwilling or unable to cope, or call for assistance, and significant loss of life is occurring or threatened."[5] Heads of State and Government at the 2005 World Summit refined the scope of the Responsibility to Protect to the four crimes mentioned in paragraphs 138 and 139, namely genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, which are commonly referred to as 'atrocity crimes' or 'mass atrocity crimes'.[8] As per the Secretary-General's 2009 Report on the Responsibility to Protect, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, "The responsibility to protect applies, until Member States decide otherwise, only to the four specified crimes and violations: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity...To try to extend it to cover other calamities, such as HIV/AIDS, climate change or the response to natural disasters, would undermine the 2005 consensus and stretch the concept beyond recognition or operational utility."[27] The focused scope is part of what the UN Secretary-General has termed a "narrow but deep approach" to the Responsibility to Protect: A narrow application to four crimes, but a deep approach to response, employing the wide array of prevention and protection instruments available to Member States, the United Nations system, regional and The Scope of the Responsibility to Protect
- 27. 12/4/2017 Responsibility toprotect - Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsibility_to_protect 4/23 subregional organizations and civil society.[27] The Responsibility to Protect consists of three important and mutually-reinforcing pillars, as articulated in the 2009 Report of the Secretary-General on the issue, and which build off of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document and the intergovernmental agreement to the principle: 1. Pillar I: The protection responsibilities of the state; 2. Pillar II: International assistance and capacity-building; 3. Pillar III: Timely and decisive response.[27] As seen in the 2005 World Outcome Document the UN Member States unanimously agreed to uphold their Responsibility to Protect. Pillar I being the protection responsibilities of the state, paragraph 138 (see definition) states “Each individual state has the responsibility to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity”. Under Pillar I many countries are able to uphold these principles of preventing mass atrocity crimes. As Pillar II leads on to international assistance and capacity-building. The international community is sent to help populations in need before further crises break out. States who may be willing but are either incapable or too weak to uphold their responsibility now may receive international support as a result of R2P. Pillar III is to deliver a timely and decisive response. This movement is a prevention method for mass atrocity crimes when a state fails to protect its populations. In reference to paragraph 139 “The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the [UN] Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity”.[28][29] According to the UN Secretary-General's 2012 report, the three pillars of the Responsibility to Protect are not sequential and are of equal importance. "Without all three, the concept would be incomplete. All three pillars must be implemented in a manner fully consistent with the purposes, principles, and provisions of the Charter."[13] The pillared approach is intended to reinforce, not undermine state sovereignty. As per the 2009 report of the Secretary-General, "By helping States to meet their core protection responsibilities, the responsibility to protect seeks to strengthen sovereignty, not weaken it. It seeks to help States to succeed, not just to react when they fail."[27] The Responsibility to Protect differs from humanitarian intervention in four important ways. First, humanitarian intervention only refers to the use of military force, whereas R2P is first and foremost a preventive principle that emphasizes a range of measures to stem the risk of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity before the crimes are threatened or occur. The use of force may only carried out as a measure last resort, when all other non-coercive measures have failed, and only when it is authorized by the UN Security Council.[30] This is in contrast to the principle of 'humanitarian intervention', which allows for the use of force as a humanitarian imperative without the authorization of such bodies like the Security Council. The second point relates to the first. As a principle, the Responsibility to Protect is rooted firmly in existing international law, especially the law relating to sovereignty, peace and security, human rights, and armed conflict.[31] Third, while humanitarian interventions have in the past been justified in the context of varying situations, R2P focuses only on the four mass atrocity crimes: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. The first three crimes are clearly defined in international law and codified in the Rome Statute (http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/EA 9AEFF7-5752-4F84-BE94-0A655EB30E16/0/Rome_Statute_English.pdf) that established the International Criminal Three Pillars of the Responsibility to Protect The Responsibility to Protect and 'Humanitarian Intervention'
- 28. 12/4/2017 Responsibility toprotect - Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsibility_to_protect 5/23 Court. Ethnic cleansing is not a crime defined under international law, but has been defined by the UN as "a purposeful policy designed by one ethnic or religious group to remove by violent and terror-inspiring means the civilian population of another ethnic or religious group from certain geographic areas".[32] Finally, while humanitarian intervention assumes a "right to intervene", the R2P is based on a "responsibility to protect".[30] Humanitarian intervention and the R2P both agree on the fact that sovereignty is not absolute. However, the R2P doctrine shifts away from state-centered motivations to the interests of victims by focusing not on the right of states to intervene but on a responsibility to protect populations at risk.[33] In addition, it introduces a new way of looking at the essence of sovereignty, moving away from issues of "control" and emphasising "responsibility" to one's own citizens and the wider international community.[34] The norm of the R2P was borne out of the international community's failure to respond to tragedies such as the Rwandan Genocide in 1994 and the Srebrenica massacre in 1995. Kofi Annan, who was Assistant Secretary-General at the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations during the Rwandan genocide,[35] realized the international community's failure to respond. In the wake of the Kosovo intervention, 1999, Annan insisted that traditional notions of sovereignty had been redefined: “States are now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples”,[36] he said, while U.S. President Bill Clinton cited human rights concerns in 46% of the hundreds of remarks that he made justifying intervention in Kosovo. [37] In 2000, and in his capacity as UN Secretary-General, Annan wrote the report "We the Peoples" on the role of the United Nations in the 21st Century, and in this report he posed the following question: "if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?"[38] Many critics of the R2P's third pillar claim that R2P is a Western concept, but it was the African Union (AU) that pioneered the concept that the international community has a responsibility to intervene in crisis situations if a state is failing to protect its population from mass atrocity crimes.[39] In 2000, the AU incorporated the right to intervene in a member state, as enshrined in Article 4(h) of its Constitutive Act, which declares "[t]he right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity".[40] The AU also adopted the Ezulwini Consensus in 2005, which welcomed R2P as a tool for the prevention of mass atrocities.[41] In September 2000, the Canadian government established the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) to answer Annan's question "if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and systematic violations of human rights that affect every precept of our common humanity?" In February 2001, at the third round table meeting of the ICISS in London, Gareth Evans, Mohamed Sahnoun, and Michael Ignatieff suggested the phrase "responsibility to protect" as a way to avoid the "right to intervene" or "obligation to intervene" doctrines and yet keep a degree of duty to act to resolve humanitarian crises.[42] History of the Responsibility to Protect 1990s: Origins 2000: African Union proposes a right to intervene 2000: International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
- 29. 12/4/2017 Responsibility toprotect - Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsibility_to_protect 6/23 In 2001, ICISS released a report titled "The Responsibility to Protect" (http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Repor t.pdf). In a radical reformulation of the meaning of state sovereignty, the report argued that sovereignty entailed not only rights but also responsibilities, specifically a state's responsibility to protect its people from major violations of human rights. This idea rested on earlier work by Francis Deng and Roberta Cohen regarding internally displaced persons.[43] Inspiration may also be attributed to Jan Eliasson, who in response to a questionnaire on internally displaced persons distributed by Francis Deng, stated that assisting populations at risk within their own country was "basically a question of striking a balance between sovereignty and solidarity with people in need."[44] The ICISS report further asserted that, where a state was "unable or unwilling" to protect its people, the responsibility should shift to the international community and "the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect." The ICISS argued that any form of military intervention is "an exceptional and extraordinary measure", and, as such, to be justified it must meet certain criteria, including:[45] Just cause: There must be "serious and irreparable harm occurring to human beings, or imminently likely to occur". Right intention: The main intention of the military action must be to prevent human suffering. Last resort: Every other measure besides military invention has to have already been taken into account. (This does not mean that every measurement has to have been applied and been shown to fail, but that there are reasonable grounds to believe that only military action would work in that situation.) Proportional means: The military means must not exceed what is necessary "to secure the defined human protection objective". Reasonable prospects: The chance of success must be reasonably high, and it must be unlikely that the consequences of the military intervention would be worse than the consequences without the intervention. Right authority: The military action has to have been authorized by the Security Council. As the ICISS report was released in 2001, right around the time of the Second Gulf War, many thought that would be the end of this new norm. However, at the 2005 World Summit, where the largest number of heads of state and government in the history of the UN convened, the R2P was unanimously adopted.[46] While the outcome was close to the ideas of the ICISS report, there were some notable differences: the R2P would now only apply to mass atrocity crimes (genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing), rather than human rights violations; no mention was made of the criteria of intervention (see above); and the UN Security Council was made the only body allowed to authorize intervention. The paragraphs also stress the importance of regional organizations and the role they can play through Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. The results of this summit led to world leaders agreeing on holding each other accountable if they fail to uphold the new responsibilities. Decidedly if one state fails to uphold their responsibility this is now where State Sovereignty may be broken in order to protect people in danger of such crimes. First peaceful action is to be taken through humanitarian, diplomatic, or other means. If these fail to resolve the matter, the international community should come together in a “timely and decisive manner”. This shall all be worked on a case-by-case basis through the UN Security Council as well as the UN Charter.[47] 2005 World Summit Outcome Document Secretary-General's 2009 report
- 30. 12/4/2017 Responsibility toprotect - Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsibility_to_protect 7/23 On 12 January 2009, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon issued a report entitled Implementing the Responsibility to Protect (http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/implementing%20the%20rtop.pdf). The report was the first comprehensive document from the UN Secretariat on the R2P, following Ban's stated commitment to turn the concept into policy. The Secretary-General's report set the tone and the direction for the discussion on the subject at the UN. The report proposes three-pillar approach to the R2P: Pillar One stresses that states have the primary responsibility to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. Pillar Two addresses the international community's commitment to help states build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, and to help those under stress before crises and conflicts break out. Pillar Three focuses on the responsibility of international community to act in a timely and decisive way to prevent and halt genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity when a state manifestly fails to protect its populations. The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (GCR2P) is an international non-governmental organization that conducts research and advocacy for the Responsibility to protect. The Centre is based at the Graduate Center, CUNY, New York City with an office also located in Geneva.[48] At the 2005 World Summit, UN member states included R2P in the Outcome Document agreeing to Paragraphs 138 and 139. These paragraphs gave final language to the scope of R2P. It applies to the four mass atrocities crimes only. It also identifies to whom the R2P protocol applies; i.e., nations first, and regional and international communities second. Paragraphs 138 and 139 state: 138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability. 139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect United Nations
- 31. 12/4/2017 Responsibility toprotect - Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsibility_to_protect 8/23 international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting those under stress before crises and conflicts break out.[49] Since then, the UN has been actively engaged with the development of the R2P. Several resolutions, reports, and debates have emerged through the UN forum. The Security Council has reaffirmed its commitment to the R2P in several resolutions. The first such resolution came in April 2006, when the Security Council reaffirmed the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 in Resolution 1674 (https://w ww.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1674(2006)), formalizing their support for the R2P. In 2009, the Council again recognized states' primary responsibility to protect and reaffirmed paragraphs 138 and 139 in resolution 1894 (https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1894(2009)). Additionally, the Security Council has mentioned the R2P in several country-specific resolutions: Darfur: Resolution 1706 (https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1706(2006)) in 2006 Libya: Resolution 1970 (https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1970(2011)), Resolution 1973 (https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1973(2011)) in 2011, Resolution 2016 (http s://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2016(2011)) in 2011, and Resolution 2040 (https://ww w.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2040(2012)) in 2012 Côte d'Ivoire: Resolution 1975 (https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1975(2011)) in 2011 Yemen: Resolution 2014 (https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2014(2011)) in 2011 Mali: Resolution 2085 (https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2085(2012)) in 2012 and Resolution 2100 (https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2100(2013)) in 2013 Sudan and South Sudan: Resolution 1996 (https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1996(20 11)) in 2011 and Resolution 2121 (https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2109(2013)) in 2013 In January 2009, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon released UN Secretariat's first comprehensive report on the R2P, called Implementing the Responsibility to Protect (http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/implementing%20the%20rtop.pdf).[50] His report led to a debate in the General Assembly in July 2009 and the first time since 2005 that the General Assembly had come together to discuss the R2P. Ninety-four member states spoke. Most supported the R2P principle, although some important concerns were voiced. They discussed how to implement the R2P in crisis situations around the world. The debate highlighted the need for regional organizations like the African Union to play a strong role in implementing R2P; the need for stronger early warning mechanisms in the UN; and the need to clarify the roles UN bodies would play in implementing R2P.[51][52] One outcome of the debate was the first resolution referencing R2P adopted by the General Assembly. The Resolution (A/RES/63/308) showed that the international community had not forgotten about the concept of the R2P and it decided "to continue its consideration of the responsibility to protect".[53] Security Council Secretary-General reports
- 32. 12/4/2017 Responsibility toprotect - Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsibility_to_protect 9/23 In subsequent years, the Secretary-General would release a new report, followed by another debate in the General Assembly. In 2010, the report was titled Early Warning, Assessment and the Responsibility to Protect (http://www.globalr2p.org/m edia/files/2010_a64864.pdf). The informal interactive dialogue was held on 9 August 2010, with 49 member states, two regional organizations, and two civil society organizations speaking at the event. The discussion had a resoundingly positive tone, with virtually all of those that spoke stressing a need to prevent atrocities and agreeing that effective early warning is a necessary condition for effective prevention and early action. Objections were expressed by a small number of member states; namely Nicaragua, Iran, Pakistan, Sudan, and Venezuela.[54][55] In 2011, the report analyzed The Role of Regional and Subregional Arrangements in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect (http://www.globalr2p.org/media/files/2011_a65877.pdf). At the debate on 12 July 2011, statements were made by 43 member states, three regional organizations, and four civil society representatives. The biggest challenge to R2P was considered cooperation with, and support between, the UN and regional bodies in times of crisis. Member states acknowledged the importance of resolving this challenge through the unique advantages regional organizations possess in preventing and reacting to mass atrocities.[56][57] In 2012, the focus was on Responsibility to Protect: Timely and Decisive Response (http://www.globalr2p.org/media/file s/unsg-report_timely-and-decisive-response.pdf). The debate followed on 5 September 2012 saw interventions address the third pillar of the R2P and the diversity of non-coercive and coercive measures available for a collective response to mass atrocity crimes.[58] In 2013, the Secretary-General focused on Responsibility to Protect: State responsibility and prevention (http://www.glo balr2p.org/media/files/n1338693.pdf). The debate following the report was held on 11 September 2013. A panel of UN, member state, and civil society experts delivered presentations, after which 68 member states, 1 regional organization, and 2 civil society organizations made statements.[59][60] In 2004, following the genocidal violence in Rwanda and the Balkans, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan appointed Juan E. Méndez as Special Adviser to fill critical gaps in the international system that allowed those tragedies to go unchecked. In 2007, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon appointed Francis M. Deng on a full-time basis at the level of Under-Secretary- General. Around the same time, he also appointed Edward Luck as the Special Adviser who focuses on the R2P, on a part- time basis at the level of Assistant Secretary-General.[61] The Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect leads the conceptual, political, institutional, and operational development of the R2P. The Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide acts as a catalyst to raise awareness of the causes and dynamics of genocide, to alert relevant actors where there is a risk of genocide, and to advocate and mobilize for appropriate action. The mandates of the two Special Advisers are distinct but complementary. The efforts of their Office include alerting relevant actors to the risk of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity; enhancing the capacity of the UN to prevent these crimes, including their incitement; and working with member states, regional and sub-regional arrangements, and civil society to develop more effective means of response when they do occur.[61] Both Special Advisers Deng and Luck ended their assignments with the Office in July 2012. On 17 July 2012, Secretary- General Ban Ki-moon appointed Adama Dieng of Senegal as his Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide.[61] On 12 July 2013, Jennifer Welsh of Canada was appointed as the Special Advisor on the Responsibility to Protect.[62] Special Advisors on the Prevention of Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect
- 33. 12/4/2017 Responsibility toprotect - Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsibility_to_protect 10/23 From December 2007 to January 2008, Kenya was swept by a wave of ethnic violence triggered by a disputed presidential election held on 27 December 2007. On 30 December 2007, Mwai Kibaki was declared the winner of the presidential elections and was sworn in as president a couple of hours later. The announcement of the results triggered widespread and systematic violence resulting in more than 1,000 deaths and the displacement of over 500,000 civilians. Clashes were characterized by the ethnically targeted killings of people aligned with the two major political parties, the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) and the Party of National Unity (PNU).[63] External intervention was almost immediate. French Foreign and European Affairs Minister Bernard Kouchner made an appeal to the UN Security Council in January 2008 to react "in the name of the responsibility to protect" before Kenya plunged into a deadly ethnic conflict. On 31 December 2007, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon issued a statement expressing concern for the ongoing violence and calling for the population to remain calm and for Kenyan security forces to show restraint. On 10 January 2008, former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan was accepted by both the ODM and the PNU as the African Union Chief Mediator. Mediation efforts led to the signing of a power-sharing agreement on 28 February 2008. The agreement established Mwai Kibaki as President and Raila Odinga as Prime Minister, as well as the creation of three commissions: the Commission of Inquiry on Post-Election Violence (CIPEV); the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission; and the Independent Review Commission on the General Elections. This rapid and coordinated reaction by the international community was praised by Human Rights Watch as "a model of diplomatic action under the 'Responsibility to Protect' principles".[64] On 30 March 2011, in response to the escalating post-election violence against the population of Ivory Coast in late 2010 and early 2011, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1975 (https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.a sp?symbol=S/RES/1975(2011)) condemning the gross human rights violations committed by supporters of both ex- President Laurent Gbagbo and President Ouattara. The resolution cited "the primary responsibility of each State to protect civilians", called for the immediate transfer of power to President Ouattara, the victor in the elections, and reaffirmed that the United Nations Operation in Ivory Coast (UNOCI) could use "all necessary means to protect life and property." On 4 April 2011, in an effort to protect the people of Ivory Coast from further atrocities, UNOCI began a military operation,[65] and President Gbagbo's hold on power ended on 11 April when he was arrested by President Ouattara's forces. In November 2011, President Gbagbo was transferred to the International Criminal Court to face charges of crimes against humanity as an "indirect co-perpetrator" of murder, rape, persecution, and other inhumane acts.[66] On 26 July 2012, the Council adopted resolution 2062 (https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2062(2012)) renewing the mandate of UNOCI until 31 July 2013. Libya was the first case where the Security Council authorized a military intervention citing the R2P. Following widespread and systematic attacks against the civilian population by the Libyan regime, and language used by Muammar Gaddafi that reminded the international community of the genocide in Rwanda, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1970 on 26 February 2011, making explicit reference to the R2P. Deploring what it called "the gross and systematic violation of human rights" in strife-torn Libya, the Security Council demanded an end to the violence, In practice Kenya 2007/2008 Ivory Coast 2011 Libya 2011
- 34. 12/4/2017 Responsibility toprotect - Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsibility_to_protect 11/23 "recalling the Libyan authorities' responsibility to protect its population", and imposed a series of international sanctions. The Council also decided to refer the situation to the International Criminal Court. In resolution 1973, adopted on 17 March 2011, the Security Council demanded an immediate ceasefire in Libya, including an end to ongoing attacks against civilians, which it said might constitute "crimes against humanity". The Council authorized member states to take "all necessary measures" to protect civilians under threat of attack in the country, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory. A few days later, acting on the resolution, NATO planes started striking at Gaddafi's forces.[67] NATO subsequently came under scrutiny for its behavior during the air strikes; concerns included the fact that the intervention quickly moved to regime-change and that there were allegations regarding aerial bombardments that may have caused civilian casualties.[68] In December 2012, a loose rebel coalition named the Séléka initiated a military campaign to overthrow the government of the Central African Republic (CAR) and its then-president, Francois Bozizé. The Séléka, composed mostly of factions of armed groups in the northeast of the state, accused Bozizé's government of neglecting their region. They rapidly captured several strategic towns and were poised to take the capital city of Bangui. A hasty intervention by Chad and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) persuaded the Séléka to negotiate with Bozizé's government. The result, the Libreville Agreement of January 2013, installed a three-year power-sharing arrangement.[69] However, ECCAS failed to monitor the implementation of the Libreville Agreement and Bozizé did not undertake any of the reforms necessary under the transition agreement. Séléka resurged and took control of Bangui and fifteen of CAR's sixteen provinces on 24 March 2013. Séléka's leader, Michel Djotodia, proclaimed himself President, set up the National Transitional Council (NTC), and suspended CAR's constitution. A hurried ECCAS summit on 4 April 2013, which did not yet recognize Djotodia as President, called for the creation of a Transitional National Council (TNC), which would create a new constitution, conduct elections in eighteen months, and select an interim President. On 13 April, the TNC chose the sole candidate vying for interim president position, Michel Djotodia.[69] From December 2012 onward, Séléka forces, who are predominantly Muslim, committed grave human rights abuses against civilians throughout the country and especially targeted the majority Christian population. In response, Christian civilians formed "anti-balaka" ("anti-machete") militias, which have conducted vicious reprisals against Muslims. Extrajudicial killings of Muslim and Christian civilians have been carried out, including "door to door" searches by rival militias and mobs seeking potential victims.[70] The situation in CAR rapidly deteriorated after 5 December 2013, after an attack in Bangui by anti-balaka militias and loyalists of ousted President François Bozizé. The attack against former Séléka rebels sparked widespread violence throughout the capital as well as in Ouham province in the northwest. The violence marked a significant escalation of the conflict in CAR. Anti-balaka forces launched another attack against Muslim neighborhoods of Bangui on 20 December, spurring a cycle of renewed violence that led to at least 71 deaths by 24 December. A mass grave of at least 30 people who were reportedly executed and exhibited signs of torture was discovered on 25 December. The UN Office for the President Barack Obama speaking on the military intervention in Libya at the National Defense University. Central African Republic (CAR) 2013
- 35. 12/4/2017 Responsibility toprotect - Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsibility_to_protect 12/23 Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimates a further 40 civilians were killed on 25 December as violence continued between anti-balaka and ex-Séléka forces. Eight African Union (AU) peacekeepers were also killed between 25 and 26 December.[71] According to OCHA, by September 2013 there were almost 400,000 internally displaced people and about 65,000 new refugees in neighbouring countries. Humanitarian agencies have alerted public opinion to the critical situation, stressing that 2.3 million CAR citizens (half the population) are in need of humanitarian assistance.[72] The crisis in the CAR is a case for the R2P, due to mass atrocity crimes being committed by both sides.[73] During a Security Council briefing on 25 November, UN Deputy-Secretary-General Jan Eliasson said that the world faced "a profoundly important test of international solidarity and of our responsibility to protect" in CAR. The Security Council passed Resolution 2127 (https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2127(2013)) on 5 December, emphasizing that the NTC has the primary responsibility to protect the civilian population in CAR. The resolution granted a Chapter VII mandate to AU and French forces to protect civilians and restore security, imposed an arms embargo, and established a UN Commission of Inquiry.[71] In the beginning, the international response to the coup was purely diplomatic: members of the International Contact Group insisted that Michel Djotodia respect the principles set out in the Libreville agreement. The African Union was the first to react when it announced a new African-led International Support Mission for CAR (MISCA) in July 2013. However, MISCA has not been effective in reversing the deteriorating security situation. Although its mandate is well- defined, there is general agreement that it does not have the resources to fulfill its mission. The UN General Assembly put CAR on the international agenda in September. Resolution 2121 (https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbo l=S/RES/2121(2013)), adopted on 10 October 2013 and sponsored by France, strengthened and broadened the mandate of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA). Aware that MISCA alone is unable to adequately tackle the growing insecurity, France has changed its initial position from disengagement to military contribution, as announced by François Hollande on 20 November 2013, who said that French forces would be reinforced by almost 1,000 troops for a six-month period.[72] France began to deploy troops in CAR after receiving authorization from the Security Council on 5 December 2013 with Resolution 2127, which authorizes MISCA and French forces to take "all necessary measures" to protect civilians and restore security in CAR. French soldiers immediately began to patrol in Bangui.[71] On 7 February 2014, it was reported that the International Criminal Court's chief prosecutor Fatou Bensouda said that she had "opened a preliminary investigation into possible war crimes in the Central African Republic".[74] Over the last five years, Syria has been in constant conflict, which has led to the death of over 270,000 people, 4.8 million refugees, and over 6.6 million internally displaced persons. To help stop these atrocities International Syria Support Group (ISSG), the UN, European Union and the league of Arab states as well as other countries, had agreed to meet to discuss the situation at stake. The conclusion was made that the full implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2254, which increased the delivery of humanitarian aid, as well as a nationwide cessation of hostilities, was required in order to help those in need. Syrian government while working with allied militias has committed large-scale massacres, perpetrated war crimes and gross violations of international humanitarian law, as a matter of state policy. After Syria’s Commission of Inquiry's third report had stated that the government had committed the crimes against humanity through extermination, murder, rape and other forms of sexual violence, torture, imprisonment and enforced disappearance and CAR and the R2P Syria
- 36. 12/4/2017 Responsibility toprotect - Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsibility_to_protect 13/23 other inhuman acts. Due to this statement the UN Human Rights Council has adopted at least 16 different resolutions with regard to the atrocities taking place in Syria. Despite all efforts and resolutions adopted to help uphold Right To Protect, humanitarian aid has had limited success in reaching the affected populations. The Syrian government is responsible for the well being of its people.[75] The country of Burundi is at grave risk for a possible civil war, if violence is not stopped. The civilians of Burundi face the serious and eminent risk of mass atrocities due to the ongoing political violence that threatens the stability of Burundi. The citizens of Burundi are being harmed through mass atrocity crimes due to targeted killings, widespread violations and abuses of human rights. Violence had increased after President Pierre Nkurnziza had announced he was seeking a third term in the country’s elections. Violence had increased due to President Nkurnziza instructing his citizens to disarm or face action by Burundian Security forces and be labeled enemies of the nation. Office of high commissioner for human rights reports cases of sexual violence by security forces, hate speech and incitement to violence by some government officials. In order for this country to become stable again it is crucial for the country to uphold its R2P, as well as make peace-building gains.[76] With the current armed conflict in Yemen, many civilians are left to face mass atrocity crimes. These crimes are a result of the violence between pro-government forces and regional military as the fight against the Houthi rebels. The Houthi rebels and pro-Saleh currently control a majority of Yemen, including the capital Sana’a. In addition to the violence between these groups the nation also been seeing Saudi-led air strikes for months. This has resulted in over 3,200 civilian deaths since March 2015. The violence has also led to 2.4 million Yemeni civilians being forcibly displaced leaving 82 percent, equivalent to 21.2 million of its people requiring humanitarian assistance. Without exception of the government allied forces, the nation has also seen civilian infrastructure and humanitarian workers being targeted. All of the violence being displayed has led to many other armed groups taking advantage of the unsettlement of the nation. With this being said Yemen is currently unable to uphold its responsibility to protect and is in need of other member states support.[77] Anne-Marie Slaughter from Princeton University has called R2P "the most important shift in our conception of sovereignty since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648."[78] Louise Arbour from the International Crisis Group said that "The responsibility to protect is the most important and imaginative doctrine to emerge on the international scene for decades."[79] Francis Deng, former UN Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide, stated that "R2P is one of the most powerful and promising innovations on the international scene."[79] Political scientist Alex Bellamy argues (i) that there is evidence of behavioral change in the way international society responds to mass killing and (ii) that R2P considerations have influenced behavior.[80] On the first point, Bellamy argues that criticism of R2P as insufficient change is driven by a small subset of cases (Darfur, Libya and Syria) that are not indicative of strong trends. On the second point, Bellamy finds that R2P language is used in UNSC deliberations and in the rhetoric of world leaders. Burundi Yemen Praise for R2P Criticism of R2P
- 37. 12/4/2017 Responsibility toprotect - Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsibility_to_protect 14/23 R2P and certain implementations of it have come under criticism by some states and individuals. One of the main concerns surrounding R2P is that it infringes upon national sovereignty.[81] This concern is rebutted by the Secretary General Ban Ki-moon in the report Implementing the Responsibility to Protect. According to the first pillar of R2P, the state has the responsibility to protect its populations from mass atrocities and ethnic cleansing, and according to the second pillar the international community has the responsibility to help states fulfill their responsibility. Advocates of R2P claim that the only occasions where the international community will intervene in a state without its consent is when the state is either allowing mass atrocities to occur, or is committing them, in which case the state is no longer upholding its responsibilities as a sovereign. In this sense, R2P can be understood as reinforcing sovereignty.[82] In 2004, the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, set up by Secretary-General Kofi Annan, endorsed the emerging norm of R2P, stating that there is a collective international responsibility "...exercisable by the Security Council authorizing military intervention as a last resort, in the event of genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing, and serious violations of humanitarian law which sovereign governments have proved powerless or unwilling to prevent."[67] On March 19, 2011, the Security Council approved Resolution 1973, which reiterated the responsibility of the Libyan authorities to protect the Libyan population. The UNSC resolution reaffirmed "that parties to armed conflicts bear the primary responsibility to take all feasible steps to ensure the protection of civilians."[83] It demanded "an immediate ceasefire in Libya, including an end to the current attacks against civilians, which it said might constitute 'crimes against humanity'.... It imposed a ban on all flights in the country's airspace, a no-fly zone, and tightened sanctions on the Gadaffi regime and its supporters."[83] The resolution passed, with 10 in favor, 0 against, and 5 abstentions. Two of the five abstentions were China and Russia, both of which are permanent members of the Security Council.[83][84] The subsequent military action by NATO resulted in mixed opinions. Detractors of the intervention believe that problems in Libya are best resolved by Libyans. India's UN Ambassador Hardeep Singh Puri stated that "the Libyan case has already given R2P a bad name" and that "the only aspect of the resolution of interest to them (international community) was use of all necessary means to bomb the hell out of Libya". Puri also alleged that civilians had been supplied with arms and that the no-fly zone had been implemented only selectively.[85] Critics in the media also suggested that R2P-based intervention in Libya was used as a means to carry out regime-change, extending and undermining the purpose of the doctrine. While the doctrine was initially invoked to protect against government reprisals in rebel-held Benghazi, the resulting operation grew in scope to support the total overthrow of the government. Critics feel this experience has yielded global skepticism concerning proposed UN intervention in Syria the same year, putting the future of R2P in question. [86] Several attempts were made by the U.S. government in the course of 2011 to 2013 to pass Security Council resolutions invoking R2P to justify military intervention in the Syrian Civil War. These were vetoed by Russia and China. The Russian and Chinese governments both issued statements to the effect that, in their opinion, R2P had been abused by the U.S. as a Infringement of national sovereignty Libya, 2011 Syria, 2011: Russian and Chinese repudiation of abuse of R2P
- 38. 12/4/2017 Responsibility toprotect - Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsibility_to_protect 15/23 pretext for "regime change", more particularly in the case of Libya, and that as far as they were concerned they would be extremely suspicious of any future Security Council resolutions invoking R2P, based on past experience. According to the UN's own 4 October 2011 coverage of the meeting of the Security Council: [Russia's UN Ambassador Vitaly Churkin] was alarmed that compliance with Security Council resolutions in Libya had been considered a model for future actions by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). It was important to see how that model had been implemented. The demand for a ceasefire had turned into a civil war, the humanitarian, social and military consequences of which had spilled beyond Libya. The arms embargo had turned into a naval blockade on west Libya. Such models should be excluded from global practice. […] [China's UN Ambassador Li Baodong] hoped that the [Syrian] Government would follow through on reform and a process of dialogue. The Council should encourage those objectives while respecting Syria's sovereignty's [sic] and territorial integrity. Any action it took should contribute to peace and stability and comply with the United Nations Charter principles of non-interference in internal affairs.[87] The question of military intervention under the third pillar of R2P remains controversial.[88] Several states have argued that R2P should not allow the international community to intervene militarily on states, because to do so is an infringement upon sovereignty. Others argue that this is a necessary facet of R2P, and is necessary as a last resort to stop mass atrocities. A related argument surrounds the question as to whether more specific criteria should be developed to determine when the Security Council should authorize military intervention.[89] Political scientist Roland Paris, a proponent of R2P, argues that several problems regarding usefulness and legitimacy inherent to R2P make it vulnerable to criticism: "the more R2P is employed as a basis for military action, the more likely it is to be discredited, but paradoxically, the same will hold true if R2P’s coercive tools go unused."[90] Paris lists the following problems as inherent to R2P, making it difficult for proponents of R2P to defend R2P and emboldening critics:[90] The mixed-motives problem - The legitimacy of R2P rests upon its altruistic aim. However, states will often be wary to engage in humanitarian intervention unless the intervention is partly rooted in self-interest. The appearance that the intervention is not strictly altruistic consequently leads some to question its legitimacy. The counterfactual problem - When R2P is successful, there will not be any clear-cut evidence of its success: a mass atrocity that did not occur but would have occurred without intervention. Defenders of R2P consequently have to rely on counterfactual arguments. The conspicuous harm problem - While the benefits of the intervention will not be clearly visible, the destructiveness and costs of the intervention will be visible. This makes it more difficult for proponents of the intervention to defend the intervention. The destruction caused by the intervention also makes some question the legitimacy of the intervention due to the stated purpose of preventing harm. Military intervention Structural Problems
- 39. 12/4/2017 Responsibility toprotect - Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsibility_to_protect 16/23 The end-state problem - Humanitarian intervention is prone to expand the mission beyond simply averting mass atrocities. When successful at averting mass atrocities, the intervenors will often be forced to take upon themselves more expansive mandates to ensure that threatened populations will be safe after the intervenors leave. The inconsistency problem - Due to the aforementioned problems, in addition to the belief that a particular military action is likely to cause more harm than good, states may fail to act in situations where mass atrocities loom. The failure to intervene in any and all situations where there is a risk of mass atrocities lead to charges of inconsistency. Sovereignty Human rights Human security Universal Declaration of Human Rights Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide United Nations International Criminal Court Rwandan Genocide Srebrenica Genocide Peacekeeping Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect Orford, Anne. International Authority and Responsibility to Protect. Cambridge University Press. 2011. Global Responsibility to Protect (http://www.brill.com/global-responsibility-protect) Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect Judson, A. M. Where is R2P grounded in international law (http://otago.ourarchive.ac.nz/handle/10523/2279), Otago University, 2012. Baylis and Smith, The Globalization of World Politics, Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 394 Deng, Francis, Rothchild, Donald, et al. "Sovereignty as Responsibility Conflict Management in Africa". (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, September 1996). c. 290pp. Downes, Paul. Melville's Benito Cereno and Humanitarian Intervention South Atlantic Quarterly. 103.2–3. Spring/Summer 2004, pp. 465–488. Evans, Gareth. The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For All. (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, September 2008) Evans, Gareth and Mohamed Sahnoun. "The Responsibility to Protect" Foreign Affairs. November/December 2002. Hehir, Aidan. "The Responsibility to Protect: Sound and Fury Signifying Nothing?" International Relations. 24/2 2010. Gallagher, Adrian. 'A Clash of Responsibilities: Engaging with Realist Critiques of the R2P', Global Responsibility to Protect, vol. 4, no. 3, 2012, 334–357. See also Further reading
- 40. 12/4/2017 Responsibility toprotect - Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsibility_to_protect 17/23 Köchler, Hans, Humanitarian Intervention in the Context of Modern Power Politics. Is the Revival of the Doctrine of "Just War" Compatible with the International Rule of Law? (Studies in International Relations, XXVI.) Vienna: International Progress Organization, 2001. Axworthy, Lloyd; Rock, Allan (2009). "R2P: A New and Unfinished Agenda". Global Responsibility to Protect. 1 (1): 54–69. doi:10.1163/187598409x405479 (https://doi.org/10.1163%2F187598409x405479). Bazirake, Joseph Besigye; Bukuluki, Paul (2015). "'A critical reflection on the conceptual and practical limitations of the Responsibility to Protect'". The International Journal of Human Rights. 19 (8): 1017–1028. doi:10.1080/13642987.2015.1082844 (https://doi.org/10.1080%2F13642987.2015.1082844). Bellamy, Alex J (2006). "'Whither the Responsibility to Protect: Humanitarian Intervention and the 2005 World Summit'". Ethics and International Affairs. 20 (2): 143–177. doi:10.1111/j.1747-7093.2006.00012.x (https://doi.or g/10.1111%2Fj.1747-7093.2006.00012.x). Bellamy, A. J. (2008). "'Conflict prevention and the responsibility to protect'". Global Governance. 14 (2): 135–156. Bellamy, Alex J (2008). "'The Responsibility to Protect and the problem of military intervention'". International Affairs. 84 (4): 615–639. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2346.2008.00729.x (https://doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1468-2346.2008.00 729.x). Bellamy, A. J. (2009). "'Realizing the Responsibility to Protect'". International Studies Perspectives. 10 (2): 111– 128. doi:10.1111/j.1528-3585.2009.00365.x (https://doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1528-3585.2009.00365.x). Bellamy, Alex J. 2009. Responsibility to Protect: The Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities, Cambridge: Polity. Bellamy, A. J. (2010). "'The responsibility to protect and Australian foreign policy'". Australian Journal of International Affairs. 64 (4): 432–448. doi:10.1080/10357710903544106 (https://doi.org/10.1080%2F10357710903 544106). Bellamy, Alex J (2010). "The Responsibility to Protect: Five Years On". Ethics and International Affairs. 24 (2): 143– 169. doi:10.1111/j.1747-7093.2010.00254.x (https://doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1747-7093.2010.00254.x). Bellamy, Alex J. 2011. Global politics and the responsibility to protect: from words to deeds. Abingdon: Routledge. Bellamy, Alex J.; Davies, Sara E. (2009). "'The Responsibility to Protect in the Asia-Pacific Region'". Security Dialogue. 40 (6): 547–574. doi:10.1177/0967010609349907 (https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0967010609349907). Breau, Susan C (2006). "The Impact of the Responsibility to Protect on Peacekeeping". Journal of Conflict & Security Law. 11 (3): 429–64. doi:10.1093/jcsl/krl022 (https://doi.org/10.1093%2Fjcsl%2Fkrl022). Briggs, E. Donald, Walter C. Soderlund and Abdel Salam Sidahmed. 2010. The responsibility to protect in Darfur: the Role of Mass Media. Lanham: Lexington Books. Chandler, David. 2005. ‘The Responsibility to Protect: Imposing the Liberal Peace’. In Peace Operations and Global Order, eds Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams. London: Routledge. Chataway, Teresa (2007). "'Towards normative consensus on responsibility to protect'". Griffith Law Review. 16 (1): 193–224. doi:10.1080/10383441.2007.10854588 (https://doi.org/10.1080%2F10383441.2007.10854588). Dallaire, Romeo (2005). "'The Responsibility to Protect'". New England Journal of Public Policy. 19: 2. Contessi, Nicola P. "Multilateralism, intervention and norm contestation: China’s stance on Darfur in the UN security council." Security Dialogue 41, 3 (2010): 323-344. Davies, Sara, Alex J. Bellamy and Luke Glanville. 2011. The Responsibility to Protect and International Law. Leiden Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. Doyle, Michael W (2011). "'International Ethics and the Responsibility to Protect'". International Studies Review. 13 (1): 72–84. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2486.2010.00999.x (https://doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1468-2486.2010.00999.x).
- 41. 12/4/2017 Responsibility toprotect - Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsibility_to_protect 18/23 Evans, Gareth (2004). "'When is it Right to Fight?'". Survival. 46 (3): 59–82. doi:10.1093/survival/46.3.59 (https:// doi.org/10.1093%2Fsurvival%2F46.3.59). Evans, Gareth. 2004. ‘The Responsibility to Protect: Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention’. Proceedings of the Annual Meeting, reprinted in American Society of International Law 98: 78-89. Evans, G., The Responsibility to Protect: End Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and for All, Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2008 Evans, Gareth (2009). "'Russia, Georgia and the Responsibility to Protect'". Amsterdam Law Forum. 1 (2): 25–28. Hunt, Charles T.; Bellamy, Alex J. (2011). "'Mainstreaming the Responsibility to Protect in Peace Operations'". Civil Wars. 13 (1): 1–20. doi:10.1080/13698249.2011.555688 (https://doi.org/10.1080%2F13698249.2011.555688). Ban, Ki-moon, The Role of Regional and Sub-Regional Arrangements in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, A/65/877–S/2011/39, 28 June 2011. Luck, Edward C., ‘The United Nations and the Responsibility to Protect’, Stanley Foundation Policy Analysis Brief, August 2008 Luck, Edward C (2011). "'The Responsibility to Protect: Growing Pains or Early Promise?'". Ethics & International Affairs. 24 (4): 34. Pattison, James. 2010. Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility To Protect. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Paley, Gregory R., 2005. The responsibility to protect: East, West and Southern African perspectives on preventing and responding to humanitarian crises. Waterloo, Ontario: Project Ploughshares. Pingeot, Lou and Wolfgang Obenland, 2014. In whose name? A critical view on the Responsibility to Protect (http:// www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/images/pdfs/In_whose_name_web.pdf). Bonn, Germany/New York: Global Policy Forum/Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung—New York Office. Ramesh Thakur and William Malley. Theorising the Responsibility to Protect. Cambridge University Press, 2015. ISBN 978-1-107-62194-7. Teitt, Sarah (2011). "'The Responsibility to Protect and China's Peacekeeping Policy'". International Peacekeeping. 18 (3): 298–312. doi:10.1080/13533312.2011.563085 (https://doi.org/10.1080%2F13533312.2011.563085). Thakur, Ramesh (2003). "'In defence of the responsibility to protect'". The International Journal of Human Rights. 7 (3): 160–178. doi:10.1080/13642980310001726196 (https://doi.org/10.1080%2F13642980310001726196). Thakur, Ramesh (2005). "'A Shared Responsibility for a More Secure World'". Global Governance. 11 (3): 281–289. Thakur, Ramesh Chandra. 2011. The Responsibility to Protect: Norms, Laws, and the Use of Force in International Politics. New York: Routledge. Thakur, Ramesh. 2016. Review article: The Responsibility to Protect at 15. International Affairs. (https://www.chath amhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/publications/ia/inta92-2-10-thakur_0.pdf) Voinov Kohler, Juliette and Richard H. Cooper. 2008. The Responsibility to Protect: the Global Moral Compact for the 21st Century. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Weiss, Thomas and Don Hubert. 2001. The Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background. Ottawa: ICISS. Weiss, Thomas G (2004). "'The Sunset of Humanitarian Intervention? The Responsibility to Protect in a Unipolar Era'". Security Dialogue. 35 (2): 135–153. doi:10.1177/0967010604044973 (https://doi.org/10.1177%2F09670106 04044973).
- 42. 12/4/2017 Responsibility toprotect - Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsibility_to_protect 19/23 1. "Responsibility to Protect – Office of The Special Adviser on The Prevention of Genocide" (https://www.un.org/en/pr eventgenocide/adviser/responsibility.shtml). www.un.org. Retrieved 2016-03-21. 2. "About the Responsibility to Protect" (http://www.globalr2p.org/about_r2p). www.globalr2p.org. Retrieved 2016-03-21. 3. "Mission Statement" (https://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/index.shtml). United Nations: Office of the special adviser on the prevention of genocide. Retrieved 2012-01-07. 4. "Sovereignty as Responsibility" (http://www.brookings.edu/research/books/1996/sovrnty). The Brookings Institution. Retrieved 2016-03-21. 5. "The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty" (htt p://www.globalr2p.org/media/files/iciss_report.pdf) (PDF). ICISS. December 2001. 6. http://otago.ourarchive.ac.nz/handle/10523/2279. (Judson 2012). 7. Hehir, Aidan; Cunliffe, Philip, ed. (2011), "Chapter 7, The responsibility to protect and international law" (https://bo oks.google.com/books?id=k206yi2PlWUC&pg=PA84&dq=%227+The+responsibility+to+protect+and+international +law%22&hl=en&sa=X&ei=ZNULT-T6MOPi0QG-s4XRBQ&sqi=2&ved=0CC8Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=%227%20T he%20responsibility%20to%20protect%20and%20international%20law%22&f=false), Critical Perspectives on the Responsibility to Protect: Interrogating Theory, Practice (https://books.google.com/books?id=k206yi2PlWUC), New York, NY: Taylor and Francis e-Library, pp. 84–100, ISBN 0-203-83429-1 8. "Paragraphs 138-139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document" (http://www.globalr2p.org/media/files/wsod_ 2005.pdf) (PDF). GCR2P. 9. "Office of The Special Adviser on The Prevention of Genocide" (https://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/res ponsibility.shtml). www.un.org. Retrieved 2016-03-21. 10. "Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Report of the Secretary-General (2009)" (http://www.globalr2p.org/me dia/files/implementing_the_responsibility_to_protect.pdf) (PDF). GCR2P. 11. "Early warning, assessment and the responsibility to protect: Report of the Secretary-General (2010)" (http://www. globalr2p.org/media/files/2010_a64864.pdf) (PDF). GCR2P. 12. "The role of regional and sub-regional organizations in implementing the responsibility to protect: Report of the Secretary-General (2011)" (http://www.globalr2p.org/media/files/2011_a65877.pdf) (PDF). GCR2P. 13. "Responsibility to Protect: Timely and decisive response: Report of the Secretary-General (2012)" (http://www.glob alr2p.org/media/files/unsg-report_timely-and-decisive-response.pdf) (PDF). GCR2P. 14. "Responsibility to protect: State responsibility and prevention (2013)" (http://www.globalr2p.org/media/files/n1338 693.pdf) (PDF). GCR2P. 15. "Fulfilling our collective responsibility: international assistance and the responsibility to protect: Report of the Secretary-General (2014)" (http://www.globalr2p.org/media/files/sg-report-pillar-ii.pdf) (PDF). GCR2P. 16. "A vital and enduring commitment: implementing the responsibility to protect: Report of the Secretary-General (2015)" (http://www.globalr2p.org/media/files/report-of-the-secretary-general-on-the-responsibility-to-protect.pdf) (PDF). GCR2P. 17. "Libya and the Responsibility to Protect" (http://www.cfr.org/libya/libya-responsibility-protect/p24480). Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved 2016-03-21. 18. "R2P down but not out after Libya and Syria" (https://www.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights/gareth-evans/r2p- down-but-not-out-after-libya-and-syria). openDemocracy. Retrieved 2016-03-21. 19. "Debating the Responsibility to Protect in Libya, Syria" (http://icrtopblog.org/2012/04/06/debating-the-responsibility -to-protect-in-libya-syria/). ICRtoP Blog. Retrieved 2016-03-21. 20. Tutu, Desmond (2008-11-09). "Taking the responsibility to protect" (https://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/19/opinion/ 19iht-edtutu.1.10186157.html). The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331 (https://www.worldcat.org/issn/0362-4331). Retrieved 2016-03-21. 21. "The 'Responsibility to Protect' at 10" (http://www.e-ir.info/2015/03/29/r2p-at-10/). E-International Relations. Retrieved 2016-03-21. References
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- 46. 12/4/2017 Responsibility toprotect - Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsibility_to_protect 23/23 IPI's Edward C. Luck briefs UN General Assembly on R2P, 9 August 2010 (http://www.ipinst.org/news/general-anno uncement/185-we-should-not-wait-for-the-bad-news-ed-luck-says-at-un-general-assembly-meeting.html) Whose Responsibility to Protect? (http://mantlethought.org/roundtable/r2p), debate between four R2P practitioners, October 2009. Newt Gingrich and George J. Mitchell, Report Card from America: UN Reform (http://www.aei.org/publications/filte r.all,pubID.23488/pub_detail.asp), International Herald Tribune, 28 November 2005 (American Enterprise Institute) Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (http://globalr2p.org/) International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect (http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/) Asia-Pacific Centre for R2P (http://www.r2pasiapacific.org/) Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Responsibility_to_protect&oldid=811616305" This page was last edited on 22 November 2017, at 20:16. Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License; additional terms may apply. By using this site, you agree to the Terms of Use and Privacy Policy. Wikipedia® is a registered trademark of the Wikimedia Foundation, Inc., a non-profit organization. 87. "Security Council Fails to Adopt Draft Resolution Condemning Syria's Crackdown" (https://www.un.org/News/Press/ docs/2011/sc10403.doc.htm). un.org. 88. Seybolt, Taylor B. (2007). Humanitarian military intervention: the conditions for success and failure (https://books.g oogle.com/books?id=m1O1lcF2GqsC&pg=PA2&dq=%22The+concept+of+states'+responsibility+to+protect+civilia ns+drew+sharp+reactions%22&hl=en&sa=X&ei=5s0IT6DSBIrX0QGr6rH3Cw&ved=0CDAQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q =%22The%20concept%20of%20states'%20responsibility%20to%20protect%20civilians%20drew%20sharp%20re actions%22&f=false). New York, NY: Oxford University Press Inc. p. 2. ISBN 978-0-19-925243-5. 89. "Responsibility to Protect: The 'Real' Debate on R2P – STWR – Share The World's Resources" (http://www.stwr.org/ the-un-people-politics/responsibility-to-protect-the-real-debate-on-r2p.html). stwr.org. 90. Paris, Roland (2014-12-09). "Is it possible to meet the 'Responsibility to Protect'?" (https://www.washingtonpost.co m/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/12/09/is-it-possible-to-meet-the-responsibility-to-protect/). The Washington Post. ISSN 0190-8286 (https://www.worldcat.org/issn/0190-8286). Retrieved 2016-04-23. Sources External links
- 47. 12/4/2017 What Isthe “Responsibility to Protect”? https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brookings-now/2013/07/24/what-is-the-responsibility-to-protect/ 1/5 R Brookings Now What Is the “Responsibility to Protect”? Fred Dews Wednesday, July 24, 2013 ebel forces in the Democratic Republic of the Congo have executed and raped scores of women and children in the last few months. In Syria, as a result of the civil war, the UN says an average of 6,000 people per day are eeing their homes, the worst refugee crisis in 20 years. South Sudan’s army has been accused of human rights violations as it wages a counter-insurgency campaign. What responsibility do countries have to protect civilians from such human rights violations, and, indeed, what right does any country (or countries) have to intervene across another’s borders to protect rights? In 2005, world leaders unanimously af rmed the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P), a set of principles designed to protect civilians from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to provide norms to guide answers to these questions.
- 48. 12/4/2017 What Isthe “Responsibility to Protect”? https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brookings-now/2013/07/24/what-is-the-responsibility-to-protect/ 2/5 In a new report, “The United States and R2P: From Words to Action,” co-authors Madeleine Albright, former U.S. secretary of state, and Richard Williamson, a Brookings nonresident scholar and former special envoy to Sudan, review implementation of the R2P norms and recommend a number of steps to strengthen them, including speci c steps the U.S. government should take to provide global leadership. Despite universal agreement on the principles, they nd signi cant problems in their realization:
- 49. 12/4/2017 What Isthe “Responsibility to Protect”? https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brookings-now/2013/07/24/what-is-the-responsibility-to-protect/ 3/5 But all too often, the promise of R2P has been more noteworthy in its breach than in the honoring of our commitments. Despite the lofty ambitions of its framers, the crimes R2P was intended to prevent have continued at a shocking pace in the last few years, not only in Syria but also in such diverse places as Sri Lanka, Kyrgyzstan, the DRC, and Sudan The report represents the larger efforts of a working group jointly convened by Brookings, The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, and the U.S. Institute of Peace. The leaders of these three organizations explain that the continuing threat of genocide and other forms of mass atrocity make this an appropriate time to revisit R2P. “Over the past eight years,” they write: … R2P has become part of the international vocabulary in discussing genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. But in the United States, the concept is little known and frequently misunderstood. Therefore, we thought it useful to ask the working group to help to explain this concept to the American public, assess its application in specific cases, acknowledge obstacles and limitations to its implementation, and suggest how the United States might play a constructive—indeed, leadership—role in advancing the goals of R2P.
- 50. 12/4/2017 What Isthe “Responsibility to Protect”? https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brookings-now/2013/07/24/what-is-the-responsibility-to-protect/ 4/5 The report’s summary recommendations are: In major speeches before national and international audiences, the president and other senior U.S. of cials should articulate a clear vision of U.S. support for all three pillars of R2P—and should not shy away from using the phrase. The U.S. government should consider any credible early warning of mass atrocities anywhere in the world to require an immediate high-level policy review to identify alternatives and take steps to reduce the likelihood of catastrophe. The U.S. government should launch a diplomatic initiative with the UN Secretariat and like-minded nations to strengthen the global capacity to prevent the atrocities covered by R2P. Executive branch departments of the U.S. government should engage relevant congressional committees and their leading members on more effective R2P implementation. Congress in turn should hold regular hearings on the administration’s atrocity prevention efforts and ensure that the administration has plans in place for countries considered to have the greatest risk of mass atrocities in the future. The U.S. government should strive to improve the effectiveness of the International Criminal Court as a means of deterring and prosecuting war crimes and, where appropriate, expand its policy of positive engagement with the court. Congress should approve full funding for international crisis prevention and stabilization measures, including development assistance, pro-democratic programs, UN peacekeeping, other relevant UN activities, and support for training and equipping the emergency response forces of regional organizations. The U.S. government should launch a comprehensive study of the extent to which modern technologies can be used to support the purposes of R2P. The goal should be to develop public-private partnerships to better use emerging technologies to predict, prevent, and respond to threats of mass atrocities.
- 51. 12/4/2017 What Isthe “Responsibility to Protect”? https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brookings-now/2013/07/24/what-is-the-responsibility-to-protect/ 5/5 The U.S. government should take steps to make permanent the Atrocities Prevention Board and other reforms designed to increase its capacity to prevent genocide and other war atrocities.
- 52. 12/4/2017 Background Informationon the Responsibility to Protect — Outreach Programme on the Rwanda Genocide and the United Nations http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/about/bgresponsibility.shtml 1/5 Welcome to the United Nations. It's your world. UN Homepage Home About the Programme Preventing Genocide Supporting Survivors Get Involved News Timeline Annual Commemoration Educational Materials Events Exhibits Documents Multimedia Related Links Contact Us Twitter RSS Join our e-mail list Background Information on the Responsibility to Protect Who is responsible for protecting people from gross violations of human rights? Emergence of the concept Debating the right to "humanitarian intervention" (1990s) Following the tragedies in Rwanda and the Balkans in the 1990s, the international comm debate how to react effectively when citizens’ human rights are grossly and systematical question at the heart of the matter was whether States have unconditional sovereignty o whether the international community has the right to intervene in a country for humanita In his Millennium Report of 2000, then Secretary-General Kofi Annan, recalling the failure Council to act in a decisive manner in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, put forward a States: "If humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica, to gross and systematic violation of human rights that offe common humanity?" From humanitarian intervention to the responsibility to protect (2001) The expression "responsibility to protect" was first presented in the report of the Interna Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), set up by the Canadian Government in Dece Commission had been formed in response to Kofi Annan's question of when the internati intervene for humanitarian purposes. Its report, "The Responsibility to Protect," found th gave a State the right to "control" its affairs, it also conferred on the State primary "resp the people within its borders. It proposed that when a State fails to protect its people — ability or a lack of willingness — the responsibility shifts to the broader international com Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (2004) In 2004, the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, set up by Secretary-G endorsed the emerging norm of a responsibility to protect — often called "R2P" — stating collective international responsibility, "exercisable by the Security Council authorizing mi last resort, in the event of genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing and se humanitarian law which sovereign governments have proved powerless or unwilling to pr proposed basic criteria that would legitimize the authorization of the use of force by the including the seriousness of the threat, the fact that it must be a last resort, and the pro response. Skip to main navigation Skip to content
- 53. 12/4/2017 Background Informationon the Responsibility to Protect — Outreach Programme on the Rwanda Genocide and the United Nations http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/about/bgresponsibility.shtml 2/5 Report of the Secretary-General: In larger freedom (2005) In his report "In larger freedom," Secretary-General Kofi Annan "strongly agreed" with th the High-level Panel and suggested that a list of proposed criteria — including seriousnes proportionality and chance of success — be applied for the authorization of the use of for United Nations World Summit (2005) In September 2005, at the United Nations World Summit, all Member States formally acc of each State to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and c At the Summit, world leaders also agreed that when any State fails to meet that respons "international community") are responsible for helping to protect people threatened with peaceful means — including diplomatic, humanitarian and others — be inadequate and n "manifestly fail" to protect their populations, the international community should act coll decisive manner" — through the UN Security Council and in accordance with the UN Cha case basis and in cooperation with regional organizations as appropriate. In Practice The first time the Security Council made official reference to the responsibility to protect resolution 1674 on the protection of civilians in armed conflict. The Security Council refe August 2006, when passing resolution 1706 authorizing the deployment of UN peacekee Sudan. Recently, the responsibility to protect featured prominently in a number of resolu Security Council. Libya (2011) Following widespread and systematic attacks against the civilian population by the regim Jamahiriya (short: Libya), the UN Security Council, on 26 February 2011, unanimously a making explicit reference to the responsibility to protect. Deploring what it called "the gr violation of human rights" in strife-torn Libya, the Security Council demanded an end to the Libyan authorities’ responsibility to protect its population," and imposed a series of in The Council also decided to refer the situation to the International Criminal Court. In resolution 1973, adopted on 17 March 2011, the Security Council demanded an imme including an end to ongoing attacks against civilians, which it said might constitute "crim The Council authorized Member States to take "all necessary measures" to protect civilia attack in the country, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part few days later, acting on the resolution, NATO planes started striking at Qadhafi’s forces. Côte d’Ivoire (2011) In response to the escalating, post-election violence against the population of Côte d’Ivo early 2011, the UN Security Council, on 30 March 2011, unanimously adopted resolution gross human rights violations committed by supporters of both ex-President Laurent Gba Ouattara. The resolution cited "the primary responsibility of each State to protect civilian immediate transfer of power to President Ouattara, the victor in the elections, and reaffir Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) could use "all necessary means to protect life and pro protect the people of Côte d’Ivoire from further atrocities, UNOCI on 4 April 2011 began and President Gbagbo’s hold on power ended on 11 April when he was arrested by Presid In November 2011, President Gbagbo was transferred to the International Criminal Cour
- 54. 12/4/2017 Background Informationon the Responsibility to Protect — Outreach Programme on the Rwanda Genocide and the United Nations http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/about/bgresponsibility.shtml 3/5 crimes against humanity as an “indirect co-perpetrator” of murder, rape, persecution and On 26 July 2012, the Council adopted resolution 2062 renewing the mandate of UNOCI u South Sudan (2011) On 8 July 2011, the Security Council, in resolution 1996, established a UN peacekeeping (UNMISS), to — among other things — advise and assist the government in fulfilling its r civilians. South Sudan officially became an independent country on 9 July 2011, the clim possible by a 2005 peace deal that ended a long civil war. In December 2013, fighting be Government forces began, causing the displacement of approximately 706,000 people, 7 refuge at UNMISS bases. In February 2014, the Security Council reiterated its steadfast its vital mission on behalf of the international community to protect civilians in South Su nationals, as well as conduct human rights monitoring and investigations, and facilitate a in need. Yemen (2011) On 21 October 2011, resolution 2014 condemned human rights violations by the Yemeni encouraged an inclusive Yemeni-led political process of transition of power, including the Presidential elections. This resolution explicitly recalled the Yemeni Government’s "prima protect its population." Syria (2012) Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has stressed the urgent need for a political solution to e which over the past threeyears has claimed more than 100,000 lives and led to a dire hu has called on the region and the international community, in particular the Security Coun lend full support to the efforts of the Joint Special Representative of the United Nations a States, Lakhdar Brahimi, to help the Syrian people reach a political solution to the conflic Both the General Assembly and the Human Rights Council have strongly condemned the and systematic" human rights violations in Syria and demanded that the government im violence and protect its people. The High Commissioner for Human Rights recommended in Syria to the International Criminal Court and urged the Security Council to assume its the population of Syria. “The Government of Syria is manifestly failing to protect its populations,” the Secretary-G Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, Adama Dieng, said in a statement in December 2 community must act on the commitment made by all Heads of State and Government at Summit to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes a including their incitement,” said Mr. Dieng. Central African Republic (2013) The conflict in the Central African Republic (CAR) erupted when Séléka rebels launched a 2012, and has taken on increasingly sectarian overtones as mainly Christian militias hav October 2013, in resolution 2121, the Security Council emphasized “the primary respons African authorities to protect the population, as well as to ensure the security and unity i stressed “their obligation to ensure respect for international humanitarian law, human rig law.” In March 2014, the UN Secretary-General outlined his proposal for the establishme strong UN peacekeeping operation in the CAR.
- 55. 12/4/2017 Background Informationon the Responsibility to Protect — Outreach Programme on the Rwanda Genocide and the United Nations http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/about/bgresponsibility.shtml 4/5 Reports of the Secretary-General Implementing the responsibility to protect (2009) Based on the outcome document of the 2005 World Summit, a 2009 report by the Secre strategy around three pillars of the responsibility to protect: 1. The State carries the primary responsibility for protecting populations from genoc crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, and their incitement; 2. The international community has a responsibility to encourage and assist States in responsibility; 3. The international community has a responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, hu means to protect populations from these crimes. If a State is manifestly failing to populations, the international community must be prepared to take collective acti populations, in accordance with the UN Charter. Early warning, assessment and the responsibility to protect (2010) The Secretary-General’s report on early warning, assessment and the responsibility to pr and proposed ways to improve the UN’s ability to use early warnings more effectively, inc field operations, and improve early, flexible and balanced responses where there is risk o against humanity, war crimes or ethnic cleansing. The role of regional and sub-regional arrangements (2011) This report by the Secretary-General emphasized the need for global-regional collaborati the responsibility to protect. The report identified gaps and proposed ways for the UN to cooperation and draw on information from regional and sub-regional arrangements to ide and undertake or support timely and effective preventative action at the sub-regional, re While emphasizing that the responsibility to protect is universal and each region "must m report acknowledged that "each region will operationalize the principle at its own pace an The responsibility to protect: timely and decisive response (2012) The Secretary-General’s fourth report on the responsibility to protect, presented in Septe the idea of a “timely and decisive response” when a State failed to protect its people, inc tools and partners available, and the close connection between prevention and response State Responsibility and Prevention (2013) The Secretary-General’s fifth report on the responsibility to protect, published in August prevention. The report aims to provide analysis and strategies that can help States to fu to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cl The Secretary-General’s Special Advisers In 2004, the UN Secretary-General appointed the first Special Adviser on the Prevention Méndez, followed by Francis Deng in 2007 and Adama Dieng in 2012. The Special Advise
- 56. 12/4/2017 Background Informationon the Responsibility to Protect — Outreach Programme on the Rwanda Genocide and the United Nations http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/about/bgresponsibility.shtml 5/5 collecting information on massive and serious violations of human rights and inter law; acting as a mechanism of early warning to the Secretary-General, and through him Council; making recommendations to the Security Council, through the Secretary-General, or halt genocide; and liaising with the United Nations system on activities for the prevention of gen In 2008, the Secretary-General appointed Edward Luck as his Special Adviser on the Res Mr. Luck was succeeded, in June 2013, by Ms. Jennifer Welsh. The Special Adviser is resp development and refinement of the concept as well as for the continuation of the politica States and other stakeholders on further steps toward implementation. The joint office on Genocide Prevention and on the Responsibility to Protect is tasked wit enhancing existing arrangements, including for capacity building and for the gathering an information from the field, while adding value on its own in terms of new arrangements f sectoral assessment, common policy, and cumulative learning on how to anticipate, prev crises relating to the responsibility to protect. Copyright | Terms of Use | Privacy Notice | Site Index | Fraud Alert | Contact Us UN Web Services Section, Department of Public Information, © United Nations
- 57. Updated as of October2015 The Responsibility To Protect: A Background Briefing WHAT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND WHY DO WE NEED IT? The United Nations (UN) was established in 1945 to prevent conflicts between states. But with the end of the Cold War, inter-state aggression largely gave way to war and violence within, rather than between, states. When, during the 1990s, horrific violence broke out inside the borders of such countries as Somalia, Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, the world was ill-prepared to act and was paralyzed by disagreement over the limits of national sovereignty. Throughout the 1990s, the UN was deeply divided between those who insisted on a right of humanitarian intervention and those who viewed such a doctrine as an indefensible infringement upon national sovereignty. At the time Secretary-General Kofi Annan warned that the UN risked discrediting itself if it failed to respond to catastrophes such as Rwanda, and he challenged member states to agree on a legal and political framework for collective international action. In 1999 the failure of the UN Security Council to authorize action to halt "ethnic cleansing" in Kosovo provoked NATO to initiate an aerial bombardment on its own. This deeply divided the international community, pitting those who denounced the intervention as illegal against others who argued that legality mattered less than the moral imperative to save lives. This deadlock implied a pair of unpalatable choices: either states could passively stand by and let mass killing happen in order to strictly preserve the letter of international law, or they could circumvent the UN Charter and unilaterally carry out an act of war on humanitarian grounds. The 2001 report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) formulated the alternative principle of "the responsibility to protect," focusing not on the legal or moral "right" of outsiders to intervene but on the responsibility of all states to protect people at risk. In 2005 the UN World Summit unanimously accepted their "responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity." The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) concept sought to confront both the Rwanda tragedy and the Kosovo dilemma by stipulating that states have an obligation to protect their citizens from mass atrocity crimes; that the international community will assist them in doing so; and that, should the state be "manifestly failing" in its obligations, the international community is obliged to act. R2P, as it is commonly abbreviated, seeks to ensure that the international community never again fails to act in the face of genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity. By accepting a collective responsibility to protect, the international community has issued a solemn pledge that it cannot lightly ignore. WHAT FORMS OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE DOES THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT SEEK TO ADDRESS? The UN's 2005 World Summit Outcome Document explicitly limits the application of R2P to four types of mass atrocity crimes: genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity. These crimes have
- 58. been clearly definedin a range of documents, including in the founding statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). R2P does not apply to other grave threats to human security, whether from climate change, disease or many harmful and ruinous state policies, such as the suspension of civil liberties, endemic poverty, mass corruption or coups d'état. Other human rights instruments, legal frameworks and institutions are better suited to address these pressing issues. WHAT IS A MASS ATROCITY CRIME? The four types of extreme human rights abuse enumerated in the 2005 UN World Summit Outcome Document are captured by the shorthand, "mass atrocity" or "mass atrocity crime." These crimes are defined with varying degrees of precision in international law. Genocide is the subject of the 1948 Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which outlaws actions taken "with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group." The category of war crimes is the broadest. The founding statute of the ICC lists fifty such acts, including torture, hostage-taking, mistreating prisoners of war, targeting civilians, pillage, rape and sexual slavery, and the intentional use of starvation. R2P applies to such crimes even when they are committed in the course of a civil war or other internal conflict. While it may not be possible to specify an exact threshold, it is clear that the commission of war crimes involves widespread abuses by a party to the conflict. Crimes against humanity include, according to the ICC statute, extermination, enslavement, deportation, torture, rape, extreme forms of discrimination and "other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health." Such acts constitute crimes against humanity when they are widespread and systematic, and committed as conscious acts of policy. The term "ethnic cleansing" has recently come into general usage and is the least clearly defined of the four legal categories. It is understood to describe forced removal or displacement of populations, whether by physical expulsion or by intimidation through killing, acts of terror, rape and the like. HOW DOES THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT WORK? At the heart of R2P is the principle that states, with the aid of the international community, must act to prevent mass atrocity crimes. Central is the idea that concerned outsiders should help states prevent these gross abuses through what the World Summit Outcome Document characterizes as "diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means." This includes strengthening state capacity through economic assistance, rule-of-law reform and the building of inclusive political institutions or, when violence seems imminent, through direct mediation. The intense diplomatic engagement following the disputed election in Kenya (2007) and the work of neighbors and the UN to support the government of Burundi as it addressed ethnic conflict (1995-2005) demonstrate cooperative efforts to prevent atrocities. Only when such means have been clearly and demonstrably unsuccessful should the international community, acting through the UN Security Council, turn to coercive measures. These could include such measures as sanctions, arms embargoes or the threat to refer perpetrators to the ICC. Should peaceful means be inadequate and the state be manifestly failing or unwilling to protect its population, then-and only then- would the Security Council consider use of military force. WHEN IS MILITARY FORCE JUSTIFIED? Timely military intervention could have halted the genocidal horror in Rwanda. The ICISS report and the UN Secretary-General's In Larger Freedom document proposed five "precautionary principles" or "criteria of legitimacy" to help guide possible military action under the UN Charter. 1. The violence in question must include large-scale actual or threatened loss of life or ethnic cleansing; 2. The purpose of the intervention must be to prevent or halt suffering; 3. Military force must be the last resort; 4. The means must be commensurate with the ends sought;
- 59. 5. And theintervention must have a reasonable prospect of success. No formal principles presently exist to guide UN Security Council decision-making on the use of force. These prudential criteria can and should, however, continue to inform public debate and deliberations among governments. HOW DOES THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AFFECT THE IDEA OF SOVEREIGNTY? States have long accepted limits on their conduct, whether towards their own citizens or others. The UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights requires that states protect individual and social rights; the Geneva Conventions and various treaties and covenants prohibiting torture, human trafficking, slavery, or nuclear proliferation similarly restrict state behavior. At the same time, there has been a shift in the understanding of sovereignty, spurred both by a growing sensitivity to human rights and by a reaction to mass atrocity crimes perpetrated against civilians by their own leaders. Francis Deng, the former UN Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide and the former representative of the Secretary-General on internally displaced persons, developed the concept of "sovereignty as responsibility." Chief among those responsibilities, Deng and others have argued, is the responsibility to protect citizens from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. IS THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT A TOOL OF THE POWERFUL AGAINST THE WEAK? Critics of R2P insist that it will never be applied to major powers, and thus it is undermined by inconsistency. However, R2P imposes obligations on all United Nations member states to prevent mass atrocity crimes. R2P covers crimes occurring anywhere in the world, regardless of the status or prestige of the perpetrator. Given that the more powerful states have a far greater capacity to extend assistance - and far greater economic, diplomatic, logistical, and military capacity - their responsibility to respond and react to mass atrocity crimes is arguably greater. R2P is fundamentally about protecting the weak (those subjected to mass atrocity crimes) from unconscionable abuse of power. WHAT IS THE STANDING OF THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW? R2P is not yet a rule of customary international law, but it builds upon existing legal foundations, including the Genocide Convention, and can be described as an international "norm." A norm of international conduct is one that has gained wide acceptance among states and there could be no better demonstration of that acceptance in the case of R2P than the unanimously adopted language of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document. Once a norm has gained not only formal acceptance but widespread usage, it can become part of "customary international law." R2P continues to evolve both politically and legally. It has been formally invoked by the UN Human Rights Council, General Assembly and the Security Council, including through more than 35 resolutions regarding situations such as Central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Libya, Mali, South Sudan and Syria. WHAT IS THE STANDING OF THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT IN THE UN? Since the 2005 World Summit the UN and its member states have aided in the evolution of R2P through actions that encourage wider acceptance of the norm and facilitate its implementation. In August 2007 UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon appointed Dr. Edward Luck as his first Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect. Working closely with the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, the two Special Advisers and their Joint Office have helped advance R2P within the UN system. In July 2013 the Secretary-General appointed Dr. Jennifer Welsh as his second Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect. During November 2014 the Joint Office launched a new Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes as a tool for prevention of mass atrocities.
- 60. The UN GeneralAssembly has held six informal interactive dialogues on R2P between 2009 and 2015. The UN Secretary-General released a report on R2P in advance of each of the interactive dialogues. The Secretary-General's 2009 report, entitled Implementing the responsibility to protect, introduced a three pillar strategy for R2P implementation. The three pillars are: Pillar 1: Every state has the Responsibility to Protect its populations from the four mass atrocity crimes. Pillar 2: The wider international community has the responsibility to encourage and assist individual states in meeting that responsibility. Pillar 3: If a state is manifestly failing to protect its populations, the international community must be prepared to take appropriate collective action in a timely and decisive manner and in accordance with the UN Charter. The three pillars have since served as a framework for discussing the different facets of prevention and response in mass atrocity risk situations and have been frequently invoked by member states when addressing R2P. The Secretary-General has addressed issues related to R2P’s implementation in his subsequent reports: Early warning, assessment and the responsibility to protect (2010), The role of regional and sub-regional arrangements in implementing the responsibility to protect (2011), Timely and decisive response (2012), State responsibility and prevention (2013), Fulfilling our collective responsibility: international assistance and the responsibility to protect (2014) and A vital and enduring commitment: implementing the responsibility to protect (2015). Member states have directly engaged with the R2P dialogue in many ways. Since 2009, 120 states and 5 regional organizations have participated in the UN General Assembly’s interactive dialogues on R2P. States also discuss R2P in other human rights forums, including in debates on the protection of civilians and at the Human Rights Council. The Group of Friends of the Responsibility to Protect is an informal cross-regional group of 50 UN member states that share a common interest in R2P and in advancing the norm within the UN-system. The Group of Friends, co-chaired by the governments of the Netherlands and Rwanda, made its first ever joint statement at the 2014 UN General Assembly Informal Interactive Dialogue on R2P. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? There are three major challenges as we continue to move R2P from theory to practice. The first is conceptual - to ensure that the scope, and limits, of the norm as it has evolved are well understood in all parts of the world. As new mass atrocity risk situations arise, there needs to be broad international consensus about how to respond in the context of R2P. The second challenge is institutional. There is a need to ensure that governments and intergovernmental organizations have available all the diplomatic, civilian and, as a last resort, military capability needed to ensure effective early warning and timely action. We need international institutions with a capacity to provide essential assistance to those countries who need it and to people desperately in need of protection. Since 2005 some governments have taken important steps towards implementing the Responsibility to Protect domestically, including through the appointment of a national R2P Focal Point. A national R2P Focal Point is a senior government official who facilitates domestic mechanisms for atrocity prevention. R2P Focal Points also engage in international cooperation by participating in a Global Network of R2P Focal Points, which is co- convened by the governments of Australia, Costa Rica, Denmark and Ghana. As of October 2015 51 member states and one regional organization, the European Union, had appointed an R2P Focal Point. The third challenge, as always, is political. We need to ensure that when and wherever mass atrocity crimes next occur, the necessary commitment will be there from international decision-makers. This means having consensual international arrangements in place for effective mobilization by both governments and civil society. It also requires that there is consistency in the application of R2P. The international community will continue to encounter difficult when confronting mass atrocity crimes. Crises threatening human security continue to arise, and with them debates over the most appropriate response. But R2P remains the best hope for those who aspire for a world free from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. R2P represents a potential historic end to impunity, injustice and inaction.
- 61. 12/4/2017 United NationsOffice on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect http://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/about-responsibility-to-protect.html 1/3 (index.html) (index.html) RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT United Nations (secretary-general.html) Member States (member-states.html) Regional Organisations (regional-organisations.html) Civil Society (civil-society.html) Key Documents (key-documents.html) About The responsibility to protect embodies a political commitment to end the worst forms of violence and persecution. It seeks to narrow the gap between Member States’ pre-existing obligations under international humanitarian and human rights law and the reality faced by populations at risk of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. Background Following the atrocities committed in the 1990s in the Balkans and Rwanda, which the international community failed to prevent, and the NATO military intervention in Kosovo, which was criticized by many as a violation of the prohibition of the use of force, the international community engaged in a serious debate on how to react to gross and systematic violations of human rights. In September 1999, while presenting his annual report to the UN General Assembly (http://www.un.org/press/en/1999/19990920.sgsm7136.html ), Kofi Annan reflected upon “the prospects for human security and intervention in the next century” and challenged the Member States to “find common ground in upholding the principles of the Charter, and acting in defence of common humanity”. He repeated the challenge in his 2000 Millennium Report (https://www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/pdfs/We_The_Peoples.pdf ), saying that: “if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an About (about-responsibility-to-protect.html)
- 62. 12/4/2017 United NationsOffice on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect http://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/about-responsibility-to-protect.html 2/3 unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica, to gross and systematic violation of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?” The challenge was taken by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), set up by the Canadian Government, which at the end of 2001 issued a report entitled The Responsibility to Protect (http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf). The concept of the responsibility to protect drew inspiration of Francis Deng’s idea of “State sovereignty as a responsibility” and affirmed the notion that sovereignty is not just protection from outside interference – rather is a matter of states having positive responsibilities for their population’s welfare, and to assist each other. Consequently, the primary responsibility for the protection of its people rested first and foremost with the State itself. However, a ‘residual responsibility’ also lied with the broader community of states, which was ‘activated when a particular state is clearly either unwilling or unable to fulfil its responsibility to protect or is itself the actual perpetrator of crimes or atrocities’ The subsequent report of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, entitled A more secure world: our shared responsibility (A/59/565 (https://documents-dds- ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/602/31/pdf/N0460231.pdf? OpenElement )) and the Secretary-General’s 2005 report In Larger Freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all (A/59/2005 (https://documents-dds- ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/270/78/pdf/N0527078.pdf? OpenElement)) endorsed the principle that State sovereignty carried with it the obligation of the State to protect its own people, and that if the State was unwilling or unable to do so, the responsibility shifted to the international community to use diplomatic, humanitarian and other means to protect them. Neither report asserted a basis to use force for this purpose other than Security Council authorisation under Chapter VII of the Charter as a last resort, in the event of genocide and other serious international crimes. At the 2005 high-level UN World Summit meeting, Member States finally committed to the principle of the responsibility to protect by including it into the outcome document of that meeting (A/RES/60/1 (https://documents-dds- ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/487/60/pdf/N0548760.pdf? OpenElement)). Though the concept adopted omitted some of the aspects proposed initially by the ICISS, it retains its fundamental aspects in relation to prevention of and response to the most serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. Adoption of the principle Group Photo of 2005 World Summit. UN Photo/Eskinder Debebe
- 63. 12/4/2017 United NationsOffice on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect http://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/about-responsibility-to-protect.html 3/3 In paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document (A/RES/60/1 (https://documents-dds- ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/487/60/pdf/N0548760.pdf? OpenElement)) Heads of State and Government affirmed their responsibility to protect their own populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and accepted a collective responsibility to encourage and help each other uphold this commitment. They also declared their preparedness to take timely and decisive action, in accordance with the United Nations Charter and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations, when national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations. 2005 World Summit Outcome Document Paragraphs on the Responsibility to Protect 138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability. 139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out. 140. We fully support the mission of the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide.
- 64. 12/4/2017 United NationsOffice on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect http://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/about-responsibility-to-protect.html 1/3 (index.html) (index.html) RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT United Nations (secretary-general.html) Member States (member-states.html) Regional Organisations (regional-organisations.html) Civil Society (civil-society.html) Key Documents (key-documents.html) About The responsibility to protect embodies a political commitment to end the worst forms of violence and persecution. It seeks to narrow the gap between Member States’ pre-existing obligations under international humanitarian and human rights law and the reality faced by populations at risk of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. Background Following the atrocities committed in the 1990s in the Balkans and Rwanda, which the international community failed to prevent, and the NATO military intervention in Kosovo, which was criticized by many as a violation of the prohibition of the use of force, the international community engaged in a serious debate on how to react to gross and systematic violations of human rights. In September 1999, while presenting his annual report to the UN General Assembly (http://www.un.org/press/en/1999/19990920.sgsm7136.html ), Kofi Annan reflected upon “the prospects for human security and intervention in the next century” and challenged the Member States to “find common ground in upholding the principles of the Charter, and acting in defence of common humanity”. He repeated the challenge in his 2000 Millennium Report (https://www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/pdfs/We_The_Peoples.pdf ), saying that: “if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an About (about-responsibility-to-protect.html)
- 65. 12/4/2017 United NationsOffice on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect http://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/about-responsibility-to-protect.html 2/3 unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica, to gross and systematic violation of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?” The challenge was taken by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), set up by the Canadian Government, which at the end of 2001 issued a report entitled The Responsibility to Protect (http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf). The concept of the responsibility to protect drew inspiration of Francis Deng’s idea of “State sovereignty as a responsibility” and affirmed the notion that sovereignty is not just protection from outside interference – rather is a matter of states having positive responsibilities for their population’s welfare, and to assist each other. Consequently, the primary responsibility for the protection of its people rested first and foremost with the State itself. However, a ‘residual responsibility’ also lied with the broader community of states, which was ‘activated when a particular state is clearly either unwilling or unable to fulfil its responsibility to protect or is itself the actual perpetrator of crimes or atrocities’ The subsequent report of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, entitled A more secure world: our shared responsibility (A/59/565 (https://documents-dds- ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/602/31/pdf/N0460231.pdf? OpenElement )) and the Secretary-General’s 2005 report In Larger Freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all (A/59/2005 (https://documents-dds- ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/270/78/pdf/N0527078.pdf? OpenElement)) endorsed the principle that State sovereignty carried with it the obligation of the State to protect its own people, and that if the State was unwilling or unable to do so, the responsibility shifted to the international community to use diplomatic, humanitarian and other means to protect them. Neither report asserted a basis to use force for this purpose other than Security Council authorisation under Chapter VII of the Charter as a last resort, in the event of genocide and other serious international crimes. At the 2005 high-level UN World Summit meeting, Member States finally committed to the principle of the responsibility to protect by including it into the outcome document of that meeting (A/RES/60/1 (https://documents-dds- ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/487/60/pdf/N0548760.pdf? OpenElement)). Though the concept adopted omitted some of the aspects proposed initially by the ICISS, it retains its fundamental aspects in relation to prevention of and response to the most serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. Adoption of the principle Group Photo of 2005 World Summit. UN Photo/Eskinder Debebe
- 66. 12/4/2017 United NationsOffice on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect http://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/about-responsibility-to-protect.html 3/3 In paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document (A/RES/60/1 (https://documents-dds- ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/487/60/pdf/N0548760.pdf? OpenElement)) Heads of State and Government affirmed their responsibility to protect their own populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and accepted a collective responsibility to encourage and help each other uphold this commitment. They also declared their preparedness to take timely and decisive action, in accordance with the United Nations Charter and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations, when national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations. 2005 World Summit Outcome Document Paragraphs on the Responsibility to Protect 138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability. 139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out. 140. We fully support the mission of the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide.
- 67. 12/4/2017 What Isthe “Responsibility to Protect”? https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brookings-now/2013/07/24/what-is-the-responsibility-to-protect/ 1/5 R Brookings Now What Is the “Responsibility to Protect”? Fred Dews Wednesday, July 24, 2013 ebel forces in the Democratic Republic of the Congo have executed and raped scores of women and children in the last few months. In Syria, as a result of the civil war, the UN says an average of 6,000 people per day are eeing their homes, the worst refugee crisis in 20 years. South Sudan’s army has been accused of human rights violations as it wages a counter-insurgency campaign. What responsibility do countries have to protect civilians from such human rights violations, and, indeed, what right does any country (or countries) have to intervene across another’s borders to protect rights? In 2005, world leaders unanimously af rmed the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P), a set of principles designed to protect civilians from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to provide norms to guide answers to these questions.
- 68. 12/4/2017 What Isthe “Responsibility to Protect”? https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brookings-now/2013/07/24/what-is-the-responsibility-to-protect/ 2/5 In a new report, “The United States and R2P: From Words to Action,” co-authors Madeleine Albright, former U.S. secretary of state, and Richard Williamson, a Brookings nonresident scholar and former special envoy to Sudan, review implementation of the R2P norms and recommend a number of steps to strengthen them, including speci c steps the U.S. government should take to provide global leadership. Despite universal agreement on the principles, they nd signi cant problems in their realization:
- 69. 12/4/2017 What Isthe “Responsibility to Protect”? https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brookings-now/2013/07/24/what-is-the-responsibility-to-protect/ 3/5 But all too often, the promise of R2P has been more noteworthy in its breach than in the honoring of our commitments. Despite the lofty ambitions of its framers, the crimes R2P was intended to prevent have continued at a shocking pace in the last few years, not only in Syria but also in such diverse places as Sri Lanka, Kyrgyzstan, the DRC, and Sudan The report represents the larger efforts of a working group jointly convened by Brookings, The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, and the U.S. Institute of Peace. The leaders of these three organizations explain that the continuing threat of genocide and other forms of mass atrocity make this an appropriate time to revisit R2P. “Over the past eight years,” they write: … R2P has become part of the international vocabulary in discussing genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. But in the United States, the concept is little known and frequently misunderstood. Therefore, we thought it useful to ask the working group to help to explain this concept to the American public, assess its application in specific cases, acknowledge obstacles and limitations to its implementation, and suggest how the United States might play a constructive—indeed, leadership—role in advancing the goals of R2P.
- 70. 12/4/2017 What Isthe “Responsibility to Protect”? https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brookings-now/2013/07/24/what-is-the-responsibility-to-protect/ 4/5 The report’s summary recommendations are: In major speeches before national and international audiences, the president and other senior U.S. of cials should articulate a clear vision of U.S. support for all three pillars of R2P—and should not shy away from using the phrase. The U.S. government should consider any credible early warning of mass atrocities anywhere in the world to require an immediate high-level policy review to identify alternatives and take steps to reduce the likelihood of catastrophe. The U.S. government should launch a diplomatic initiative with the UN Secretariat and like-minded nations to strengthen the global capacity to prevent the atrocities covered by R2P. Executive branch departments of the U.S. government should engage relevant congressional committees and their leading members on more effective R2P implementation. Congress in turn should hold regular hearings on the administration’s atrocity prevention efforts and ensure that the administration has plans in place for countries considered to have the greatest risk of mass atrocities in the future. The U.S. government should strive to improve the effectiveness of the International Criminal Court as a means of deterring and prosecuting war crimes and, where appropriate, expand its policy of positive engagement with the court. Congress should approve full funding for international crisis prevention and stabilization measures, including development assistance, pro-democratic programs, UN peacekeeping, other relevant UN activities, and support for training and equipping the emergency response forces of regional organizations. The U.S. government should launch a comprehensive study of the extent to which modern technologies can be used to support the purposes of R2P. The goal should be to develop public-private partnerships to better use emerging technologies to predict, prevent, and respond to threats of mass atrocities.
- 71. 12/4/2017 What Isthe “Responsibility to Protect”? https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brookings-now/2013/07/24/what-is-the-responsibility-to-protect/ 5/5 The U.S. government should take steps to make permanent the Atrocities Prevention Board and other reforms designed to increase its capacity to prevent genocide and other war atrocities.
- 72. 12/4/2017 R2P အႏ◌ၲရာယ◌ျမ ာႏ◌ိငံကိ ၿခိမ္◌းေ◌◌ျခာက္ေ◌နဟ အစိးရအ ဖဲ႔႐ံးဝ ကီး ေ◌◌ျပာ - DVB http://burmese.dvb.no/archives/240245 1/3 ႏိုင္ငံတႏိုင္ငံမွာ အစိုးရဟာ ေနထိုင္သူေတြကို မကာကြယ္ ႏိုင္ဘူး၊ လူေ တြ အေျမာက္ အျမား ဒုကၡေရာက္ တယ္ ၊ ေသဆုံးမႈျဖစ္တယ္ ဆိုရင္ ဝင္ေ ရာက္ စြက္ ဖက္ ႏိုင္တယ္ ဆိုတဲ့ R2P Responsibility to Protect အႏၲရာ ယ္ က ျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံကို ပိုၿခိမ္းေျခာက္ ေနတယ္ လို႔ ျပည္ ေထာင္စုအစိုးရအ ဖြဲ႔႐ံုး ဝန္ႀကီးဌာန ျပည္ ေထာင္စုဝန္ႀကီး ဦးေသာင္းထြန္းက ေျပာပါတယ္ ။ ႏိုင္ငံပိုင္ ႐ုပ္ျမင္သံၾကားဌာနနဲ႔ Sunday Talk တနဂၤေႏြေန႔ ေဆြးေႏြးခန္း မွာ ေျပာၾကားခဲ့ တာျဖစ္ပါတယ္ ။ “R2P က အႏၲရာယ္ ႀကီးပါတယ္ ။ ၁၉၉၃ ခုႏွစ္ေလာက္ က ယူဂိုစလားဗီး ယားႏိုင္ငံမွာ Ethnic Cleansing ရွိတယ္ ဆိုၿပီး အေရးယူခဲ့တာ ရွိပါတ ယ္ ။ အလားတူ ရဝမ္ဒါ၊ လစ္ဗ်ား စတဲ့ ႏိုင္ငံေတြမွာ ဒီလိုပဲ R2P ကို အေၾ ကာင္းျပၿပီး အေရးယူခဲ့တဲ့ ႏိုင္ငံေတြလည္ း ရွိပါတယ္ ။ R2P ဆိုတာ ႏ္ိုင္ငံ တႏိုင္ငံမွာ အစိုးရဟာ ေနထိုင္သူေတြကို မကာကြယ္ ႏိုင္ဘူး။ လူေတြ အေျမာက္ အျမား ဒုကၡေရာက္ တယ္ ၊ ေသဆုံးမႈျဖစ္တယ္ ဆိုရင္ ဝင္ေရာ က္ စြက္ ဖက္ ႏိုင္တယ္ ဆိုတာ ျဖစ္ပါတယ္ ။” By ဒီဗီြဘီ 27 November 2017 လူမႈေရး သတင္း R2P အႏၲရာယ္ က ျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံကို ၿခိမ္းေျခာက္ ေနဟု အစိုးရအဖြဲ႔႐ုံးဝန္ႀကီး ေျပာ
- 73. 12/4/2017 R2P အႏ◌ၲရာယ◌ျမ ာႏ◌ိငံကိ ၿခိမ္◌းေ◌◌ျခာက္ေ◌နဟ အစိးရအ ဖဲ႔႐ံးဝ ကီး ေ◌◌ျပာ - DVB http://burmese.dvb.no/archives/240245 2/3 Tags: R2P လုပ္ႏိုင္တဲ့ အဓိက ေလးခ်က္ ရွိတယ္ ။ Genocide လူမ်ဳိးစု ပ်က္ သု ဥ္းေအာင္လုပ္တာ၊ Ethnic Cleansing ေဒသမွာရွိတဲ့ လူမ်ဳိးစုကို ဖယ္ ရွား တာ၊ war crime စစ္တိုက္ တဲ့ အခ်ိန္မွာ အင္အားအလြန္အကြၽံသုံးၿပီး စစ္ ရာဇဝတ္ မႈျဖစ္ေအာင္ လုပ္တာနဲ႔ Crimes against Humanity လူသားေ တြကို ရာဇဝတ္ မႈ က် ဴးလြန္တာဆိုၿပီး ရွိတယ္ လို႔လည္ း ဝန္ႀကီးက ေျပာပါ တယ္ ။ “အစၥလာမၼစ္ႏိုင္ငံမ်ားအဖြဲ႔ အိုအိုင္စီ အပါအဝင္ ႏိုင္ငံအမ်ားစုက R2P နဲ႔ ၾ ကည့္ မယ္ ဆိုရင္ ဒီေနရာမွာ စိတ္ ပူရတယ္ ဆိုတဲ့ ႏုိင္ငံေတြဆို အဝါေရာင္ သတ္ မွတ္ တယ္ ။ ဒီထက္ တဆင့္ Ethnic Cleansing တို႔၊ Genocide တို႔ဆို လိေမၼာ္ ေရာင္နဲ႔ ေနာက္ ဆုံး Crisis ျဖစ္ေနၿပီဆိုတဲ့ ႏိုင္ငံေတြကို အ နီေရာင္ သတ္ မွတ္ ပါတယ္ ။ ျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံကို အနီေရာင္ထဲ ထည့္ ထားပါ တယ္ ။ အနီေရာင္ထဲ ထည့္ ထားတဲ့ အတြက္ က် ေနာ္ တို႔က ဒါအင္မတန္မွ အႏၲရာယ္ ႀကီးတယ္ ဆိုတာ၊ ပစ္မွတ္ ထားတယ္ ဆိုတာ ရွင္းေနၿပီ ျဖစ္ပါတ ယ္ ” လုိ႔လည္ း ေျပာခဲ့ပါတယ္ ။ ႏိုင္ငံအေနနဲ႔ အခုႀကဳံေနရတဲ့ ဖိအားက အခ်ဳပ္အျခာအာဏာပိုင္ဆိုင္မႈ၊ န ယ္ ေျမတည္ တံ့ ခိုင္ၿမဲမႈကုိ ထိပါးႏုိင္ၿပီး အဆမတန္ ဖိအားမ်ားတယ္ လို႔လ ည္ း ေျပာခဲ့ပါတယ္ ။ ရခိုင္အေရးနဲ႔ပတ္ သက္ လို႔ ၿပီးခဲ့တဲ့ ႏိုဝင္ဘာ ၁၆ ရက္ က ကုလလုံၿခဳံံေ ရးေကာင္စီ ဥကၠ႒ရဲ႕ေၾကညာခ်က္ တရပ္ ထုတ္ ျပန္ခဲ့ၿပီး အဲဒီမွာ အေရး ယူ ေဆာင္ရြက္ ႏိုင္တာ မရွိေပမယ့္ ရက္ ေပါင္း ၃ဝ အတြင္း ျပန္လည္ သုံးသပ္မယ္ ဆိုၿပီး ပါပါတယ္ ။ တိုးတက္ မႈ ရွိ၊ မရွိကို ရက္ ေပါင္း ၃ဝ ၾကာျမင့္တဲ့ အခါ ျပန္လည္ သုံးသပ္ၾ ကည့္ ၿပီး တိုးတက္ မႈမရွိရင္ အေရးယူမႈ ဒီထက္ တဆင့္တက္ လာမွာ ျဖစ္ ပါတယ္ ။ ဓာတ္ ပံု-MOI R2P အႏၲရာယ္ က ျမန္မာႏိုင္ငံကို ၿခိမ္းေျခာက္ ေနဟု အစိုးရအဖြဲ႔႐ုံးဝန္ႀကီး ေျပာ
- 74. https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=2010887655 861337&id=100008203668808 Shwe Yee WinLe November 29 at 7:51pm · ဖတ္ၾကည့္ၾကကပါ မဂၤလာကပါ ကိုမင္းလင္္ေရ R2P ဆိုတာ ဘာလဲဗ်? မင္းလင္္ ္ R2P ဆိုတာ အႏၱရာာ္္ကကးတဲ့ affair ္ေတႏိုင္ငႏိတႏိုင္ငႏိအတင္းမမာ ျဖဖ္္ေကပေ္ေၚရင္ျကပည္ကပအင္အားဖို္ေတအ္ေၚၚဲေအဆိုကပါႏိုင္ငႏိအတင္းႏိုင္ငႏိငား္ေတ အတက္ဝင္္ေရာက္္ေျဖေမင္း္ေဆာင္ရက္္င့္ responsibilty to protect ကို္ေ္ေတာကပါ္ အ္ေငးဖတ္္ေလး္ေျကပာျကပကပါအႏိိုး? မင္းလင္္ ္။ိုတ္ကဲ့့ႏိုင္ငႏိတႏိုင္ငႏိမမာ အဖိုးရ။ာ ္ေၚနိုင္ငသ္ေတကို မကာကာ္ႏိုင္ဘသး့ လသ္ေတ အ္ေျမာက္အျ အ္ေျမာက္အျမား ိုကက္ေရာက္တာ့္ ္ေငဆိုႏိးမးျဖဖ္တာ္ဆိုရင္ ဝင္ ဝင္္ေရာက္ဖက္ဖက္ႏိုင္တာ္ဆိုတဲ့ Responsibility to Protect အရR2P က အႏၲရာာ္္ကကးကပါတာ္္ ၁၉၉၃ ္ိုႏမဖ္္ေလာက္က ာသဂိုဖလားဗကးာားႏိုင္ငႏိမမာ Ethnic Cleansing ရမတာ္ဆိုၿကပကး အ္ေရးာသ္ဲ့တာ ရမကပါတာ္္ အလားတသ ရဝမ္ ါ့ လဖ္ဗ်ား ဖတဲ့ ႏိုင္ငႏိ္ေတမမာ ကလိုကပဲ R2P ကို အ္ေၾကာင္းျကပၿကပကး အ္ေရးာသ္ဲ့တဲ့ ႏိုင္ငႏိ္ေတလည္း ရမကပါတာ္္ R2P ဆိုတာ ႏ္ိုင္ငႏိတႏိုင္ငႏိမမာ အဖိုးရ။ာ္ေၚနိုင္ငသ္ေတကို မကာကာ္ႏိုင္ဘသး မကာကာ္ႏိုင္ဘသး္
- 75. ႏိုင္ငႏိငား္ေတ ိုကက္ေရာက္ၿကပကး ္ေငဆိုႏိးမးျဖဖ္တာ္ဆိုရင္ အဲ့ႏိုင္ငႏိအဖိုးရရဲ့္င့္ျကပ္္်က္မာသဘဲဝင္္ေရာက္ဖက္ဖက္ႏိုင္တာ္ ဆိုတဲ့လို ဆိုတဲ့လိုကပ္ကပိုင္္င့္ကပါ ဘာ္လို criteria ္ေတဆို က UN ရဲ႕အ္ေရးာသမး္ေတနဲအက်ႏိ္းဝင္မလဲ ကို ကိုမင္းလင္? R2P လိုကပ္ႏိုင္တဲ့ အ့ကcriteria ္ေလး္်က္ရမတာ္္ - Genocide လသမ်္းဖို ကပ်က္ငိုဥ္း္ေအာင္လိုကပ္တာ့ - Ethnic Cleansing ္ေ ငမမာရမတဲ့ လသမ်္းဖိုကို ဖာ္ရမားတာ့ -War crime ဖဖ္တိုက္တဲ့အ္်ၚ္မမာ အင္အားအလၚ္အကၽႏိငိုႏိးၿကပကး ဖဖ္ရာဇဝတ္မးျဖဖ္္ေအာင္ လိုကပ္တာၚဲေ - Crimes against Humanity လသငား္ေတကို ရာဇဝတ္မး က် းလၚ္တာ္ေတကပါ္ ။ိုတ္ကဲ့ အဲ့ ္ေ္ါင္းဖဥ္တ္ို္ိုမမာ အဆင့္ငတ္မမတ္္်က္ေမလား့ ဥကပမာ genocide ဆိုကပါ္ေတာ့ဗ်ာ ဘာ္္ေလာက္ကပမာာ ဆိုတာမ်္း ငတ္မမတ္တာေမကပါငလား? မင္းလင္္ ္ေမကပါတာ္္အဖစလာမမဖ္ႏိုင္ငႏိမ်ားအဖဲေ အိုအိုင္ဖက အကပါအဝင္ ႏိုင္ငႏိအမ်ားဖိုက R2P ၚဲေ ၾကည့္မာ္ဆိုရင္ က္ေၚရာမမာ ဖ ဖတ္ကပသရတာ္ဆိုတဲ့ ႏိုင္ငႏိ္ေတဆို အဝါ္ေရာင္ ငတ္မမတ္တာ္္ ကနက္တဆင့္ Ethnic Cleansing တိုေ့ Genocide တိုေဆို လ္ေမမာ္္ေရာင္ၚဲေ ္ေၚာက္ဆိုႏိး Crisis ျဖဖ္္ေၚၿကပကဆိုတဲ့ ႏိုင္ငႏိ္ေတကို အၚက္ေရာင္ ငတ္မမတ္ကပါတာ္္ ျမၚ္မာကို္ေရာ?
- 76. မင္းလင္္ ္ျမၚ္မာႏိုင္ငႏိကို အၚက္ေရာင္နဲနည့္နားကပါတာ္္ အၚက္ေရာင္နဲ အၚက္ေရာင္နဲ နည့္နားတဲ့အတက္ က်္ေၚာ္တိုေက ါအင္မတၚ္မမ အႏၲရာ အႏၲရာာ္္ကကးတာ္ဆိုတာ့ ကပဖ္မမတ္နားတာ္ဆိုတာ ရမင္း္ေၚၿကပက အိုး...္ေတာ္္ေတာ္ဖအား္ေကပး္ႏိရ္ေၚၿကပကကပဲဗ်ာ့္ေၚာက္ဘာ္ေတဆက္ျဖဖ္လာႏို္င္္ေင းလဲဗ်ာ မင္းလင္္ ္ရ္ိုင္အ္ေရးၚဲေ ကပတ္ငက္လိုေျကပကး္ဲ့တဲ့ ႏိုဝင္ဘာ ၁ာ ရက္က ကိုလလိုႏိၿ္္ႏိႏိ္ေရး္ေကာင္ဖက ဥကစီရဲ ဥကစီရဲ႕္ေၾကညာ္်က္တရကပ္ နိုတ္ျကပၚ္္ဲ့ၿကပကး အဲ ကမမာ အ္ေရးာသ ္ေဆာ ္ေဆာင္ရက္ႏိုင္တာ မရမ္ေကပမာ့္ ရက္္ေကပါင္း ၃ဝ အတင္း ျကပၚ္လည္ ငိုႏိး ျကပၚ္လည္ ငိုႏိးငကပ္မာ္ဆိုၿကပကး ကပါကပါတာ္္ တိုးတက္မး ရမ့ မရမကိုရက္္ေကပါင္း ၃ဝ ၾကာျမင့္တဲ့အ္ါ ျကပၚ္လ ျကပၚ္လည္ငိုႏိးငကပ္ၾကည့္ၿကပကး တိုးတက္မးမရမရင္ အ္ေရးာသမး က ကနက္တဆင့္တက္လာမမာ ျဖဖ္ကပါတာ္္ က်္ေၚာ္တိုေအဖိုးရအ္ေၚၚဲေဘာ္ေတလိုကပ္ႏိုင္မာ္ နင္လဲဗ်ာ? မင္းလင္္ ္အရမ္း္ကကးဘာမမလိုကပ္မရဘသးဗ်္ အ္ိုကပိုကပ္ရ။ၚ္းမင္း္ကကးကိုဖတ္္ေ္ေတာ ဘာငာ္ေရးဆို္ေတာင္းကပဲ္ေတၚဲေဘာငာ္ေရး္ဲျ္ားမးမေမကပါဘသးလိုေျကပငတာ့ နက္္ေျကပးတဲ့အဖဲေ္ေတကို ဖဖဖ္လက္္ႏိတာ့ တေိုတ္ၚဲေငႏိတမၚ္္ေရးတိုးျမင့္တာ္ေလာက္ကပဲရမာ္္နင္တာ္ ရာႏးၚ္းျကပည့္ဖတ္မ္်ရ္ေငးဘသးဆိုတဲ့င္ေဘာ္ေကပါ့္ေၚာ္ ါဆို ဘာငာ္ေရးဖႏမကပ္မး္ေတျမၚ္မာမမာမေမဘသးဆိုတာကို ႏိုင္ငႏိတ
- 77. ႏိုင္ငႏိတကာကိုျကပရမာ္္ေကပါ့့ ငသတိုောႏိိုၾကကပါ့မလား? မင္းလင္္ ္ က္ေၚရာမမာကိုာ့္ေမ းကိုာ္ကပတ္ဆိုတာမ်္းဗ့် မငကတာ္ေနးကဖတဲ့ ရ္ိုင္အ့ကေိုာ္း္ေတ့ မတိၳလာအ္ေရးအ္င္း္ေတ့Time မဂၢဇင္း မမာကပါတဲ့ ။ိုကိုာ္္ေတာ္ၚဲေအ္ေကပါင္းအကပါတငိုက္ကိုလိတ္္ေကပးနားတာ္ေတက အ္ိုအ္် အ္ိုအ္်ၚ္မမာကၚ္ေလၚ္ေလာ္ႏိတာ္ေကပါ့ဗ်ာ အ္ိုတ္ေလာ ကကိုာ္္ေတာ္ၿငမ္္ေၚငလားလိုေ ့အမၚ္ေမရလိုေနင္တာ္ (ရာ္ငမ္း္ေငးလ်က္က္) ။သး....အ္ေရးာသရင္ ဘာ္ငသေကိုအ့ကနားမာ္နင္လဲဗ်? မင္းလင္္ ္အဖိုးရကပိုင္းနက္ တကပ္မ္ေတာ္္ေ္ါင္း္ေဆာင္ကပိုင္း္ေတကို အ္ေရးာသဖိုေငသတိုေကဖကားဥကးငၚ္း္ေၚတာ္ဗ် အဖိုးရႏမဖ္ကပိုင္းကဲ္ေၚတာ္ ဆိုတဲ့ ဖကားမ်္းက ငသတိုေ္ေျကပာတာ က်္ေၚာ္တိုေအဖိုးရဘက္ကမ္ေျကပာကပါဘသး္ ၂၀၀၈ ဖဲေဖည္းကပႏိိုအရ ဆိုရင္ လက္ေမအဖိုးရကပိုင္းက ကကဖစမမာ ္ေေမာင္နက္ရင္နက္ႏိုင္ရက္ၚဲေ မ္ေေမာင္နက္တာ ဘာ့္ေၾကာင့္ကပါလဲ မင္းလင္္ ္national reconciliation ဆိုတာ္ေၾကာင့္ကပဲနင္တာ္္ ိုတာကပင္လႏိိုလည္းေမ္ေငးတာ္္ေလ
- 78. အ္ေကာင္းဆႏိိုး္ေမ်မာ္လင့္ရမမာကပဲ ကိုမင္းလင္္ေရ....အ္ိုလို္ေျဖၾကား ္ေကပးတဲ့အတက္ ္ေက်းဇသးကပါ မင္းလင္္ ္။ိုတ္ကဲ့ရကပါတာ္္င္ဗ်ာ crd:LarryMin Lwin Via-ဥ္ေကပကကာလသငား #Nm #CD# https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=1898347927 147697&id=100009175248856 Moe Wai · Bangkok · ဖဖ္အာာာရမင္မ်ားႏမင့္ငသေအ္ေကပါင္းအ္ေဖာ္ မ်ား္ေၾကာက္လၚ္ေ္ေၚ္ေငာr2pအ္ေၾကာင္း လဖ္ဗ်ားမသဆလင္အာာာရမင္ က ါဖကတိုၚ္းက္ေတာ့ ္ေရကပိုတ္္ေျမာင္း ္ေဘးမမာအ္ေငျကပဖ္ငတ္္ႏိ္ဲ့ရကပါတာ္္ ငသတိုေ္ေၾကာက္္ေၚတဲ့ "R2P ဆိုတာက" ------------------- တာဝၚ္အရ ကာကာ္္ေကပးရျ္င္းလို႕ ္ေ္ေတဲ့ RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT ကို ("RtoP" ငို႕မ။ိုတ္ "R2P") ။ို ္ေ္ေတာ္္
- 79. ဘာ္ငသ္ေတက ကာကာ္္ေကပးမမာလည္း ဆို္ေတာ့ ကိုလငမဂၢတကပ့္္ေၚတိုး့ ဆကးတိုး ဖငည္ျဖင့္ အဖဲ႕အဖည္း္ေတက ဝင္္ေရာက္ ကာကာ္္ေကပးမမာ ျဖဖ္တာ္္ ကိုလတကပ္ႏမင့္ နိုအဖဲ႕္ေတ ကာကာ္္ေကပး လို႕ရ္ေအာင့္ ငက္ဆိုင္ရာ က႑အလိုက္ တာဝၚ္ာသနားတဲ့ ကိုလ အရာရမ္ေတႏမင့္ ႏိုင္ငႏိတကာ လသ႕အ္င့္အ္ေရး ္ေဖာင့္ၾကည့္ အဖဲ႕္ေတ၏ တင္ျကပ္်က္္ေကပေ မသတည္ျကပကး နိုႏိုင္ငႏိကို ဝင္္ေရာက္ ကာကာ္ ငင့္/ မငင့္ကို ကိုလ လိုႏိျ္ႏိို္ေရး ္ေကာင္ဖကက ဆိုႏိးျဖတ္ကပါတာ္္ ကိုလ လိုႏိျ္ႏိို္ေရး ္ေကာင္ဖကက ဆိုႏိးျဖတ္တာ္ ဆိုငည့္တိုင္္ေအာင္ နို္ေကာင္ဖကက င္ေဘာ မတသ္ေငာ္လည္း ျကပဖ္္်က္ရမာျကပကး အကရတ္ကို အ္ေမရကၚ္တကပ္ ဝင္္ေရာက္္ဲ့တာမ်္းလည္း ရမတာ္္ ကိုိုလငမဂၢ ကပဋညဥ္ဖာတမ္းမမာ ၚိုိုင္ငႏိတဖ္ၚိုိုင္ငႏိ ၏ အ္ေရးအရာမ်ားငည္ ၚိုိုင္ငႏိတကာ၏ ျငမ္း ္်မ္း္ေရးႏမင့္ လႏိိုိုျ္ႏိ္္ေရးကိုို န္ိုိုက္လာလ်မင္ ဖဖ္္ေရးအရ အငႏိိုိုးျကပ္္င့္ ရမငည္လို႕ဆိုနား တာ္္ အဲ က င္ေဘာၚဲ႕ ျကပဖ္္်က္ရမာျကပကး အ္ေမရကၚ္ က အကရတ္ကို ဝင္တာ္ေၾကာင့္ က် း္ေက်ာ္ဖဖ္
- 80. လို႕ကမ႓ာက ငတ္မမတ္နားတာ ျဖဖ္တာ္္ ကပနမကပိုင္းမမာR2P ၚဲ႕ ဝင္ဖို႕ လိုကပ္္ေငာ္လည္း လိုႏိျ္ႏိို္ေရး ္ေကာင္ဖကက င္ေဘာမတသညကလို႕ မဝင္ျဖဖ္္ဲ့ဘဲ ျဗတၚ္ၚဲ႕ မ။ာမတ္ဖဲ႕ျကပကး ျကပဖ္ ္်က္ရမာ က် း္ေက်ာ္္ဲ့ၾကတာ ျဖဖ္တာ္္ ္ေၚာက္တ္ိုက R2P ရဲ့ င္ေဘာ ငဘာဝအရ ၚိုင္ငႏိတၚိုင္ငႏိ၏ ျကပည္တင္း္ေရး။ာ ၚိုင္ငႏိတကာ ကို မန္ိုက္္ေငာ္လည္း မမ၏ျကပည္ငသလသနိုကို အဖိုးရ အာာာကပိုင္္ေတက ကာကာ္ရၚ္ ကပ်က္ ကက္္ဲ့လ်မင္လည္း ၚိုင္ငႏိတကာက ဖဖ္္ေရးအရ ဝင္္ေရာက္ ္ေဆာင္ရက္ ဖက္ဖက္္င့္က ရမ္ေၚျကပၚ္ တာ္္ လဖ္ဗ်ားကို R2P ၚဲ႕ဝင္တာ အဲ က င္ေဘာကပဲ္ R2P မမာ ဥကပ္ေ အရ ္်္ကပ္္ေႏမာင္မးး မရမငလို လက္္ေတ့ မည္ငို့ က်င့္ငႏိိုးမည္ ဆိုငည္ၚမင့္ ဖကပ္လ်ဥ္း လည္း ၚိုင္ငႏိတကာမမာ င္ေဘာ တသညကမး မရမ္ေငးကပါ္ အဲ္ေတာ့ အာသအဆတရကပ္လို႕ ဆို္ေငာ္လည္း ငသတို႕ ဝင္္်င္လမ်င္ အ္်ၚ္မ္ေရး ဝင္လာႏိုင္ တာ္္ အ္ေရမ႕္ေတာင္ အာရမမမာ R2P ဝင္လို႕ရတာ (၃က္) ႏိုင္ငႏိ ရမတာ္္ နကပ္ဆိုႏိးက 'ျမၚ္မာ' ကပါ္
- 81. က်ၚ္တာက ငကရလကၤာႏမင့္ ္ေျမာက္ကိုရကး ာားျဖဖ္တာ္္ ဗမာျကပည္က အလာ္တကသ ဝင္လို႕ရတဲ့ ႏိုင္ငႏိ တ္ို ျဖဖ္္ေၚတာက 'လသမ်္းတဖ္မ်္း လႏိိုးကို အဖိုလိုက္အျကပႏိ္လိုက္ ငတ္ျဖတ္မး့ ဖဖ္ရာဇဝတ္ က် းလၚ္မး့ လသမ်္းတႏိိုး ငတ္ ျဖတ္မး့ လသငား ျဖဖ္တည္မးကို ဆၚ္႕က်င္မး (Genocide, War Crimes, Ethnic Clea -nsing and Crimes against humanity)' ဖငျဖင့္ အားလိုႏိး္ေငာ အ္်က္အလက္္ေတ ၚဲ႕ ျကပကးျကပည့္ဖႏိို္ေၚတာ္္ ရ္ိုင္္ေ ငရမ ေို။င္ဂ်ာ မသဆလင္ ္ေျ္ာက္ငၚ္း ္ေက်ာ္ တဖက္ႏိုင္ငႏိကို အငက္လို ္ေျကပးရတဲ့ အတက္ ရမမ္း့ ကရင့္ က္်င္ လသမ်္းဖို္ေတ အ္ေကပေ မတရား ငတ္ျဖတ္ျ္င္း့ မို မ္းက်င့္ ျ္င္းကို ဖဖ္္ေရးအရ လက္ၚက္ငဖာ္ အငိုႏိး ျကပ္္ဲ့ျ္င္း္ေတႏမင့္ကပါ ဖို္ေကပါင္းျကပကး အႏၲရာ္ အရမ ဆိုႏိး တိုင္းျကပည္ အျဖဖ္ 'အၚက္ေရာင္' အဆင့္ကို ငတ္မမတ္နားတာ ျဖဖ္တာ္္ အဲငလို ငတ္မမတ္ႏိုင္္ေအာင္ ဗမာျကပည္တင္း မမာ လသ႕အ္င့္အ္ေရး ္်္း္ေဖာက္မး မမၚ္ငမမ်ကို တ္ိုျ္င္း့ တ္်က္ျ္င္း ္ေဖာင့္ၾကည့္ မမတ္တမ္း တင္ကာ ကိုလ လိုႏိျ္ႏိို္ေရး ္ေကာင္ဖကကို ငတင္း ္ေကပးကပို႕္ေၚတာလည္း အျ္ားငသ္ေတ မ။ိုတ္ဘသး့
- 82. အဲ့ က R2Pကို ္ေရးဆဲနားတဲ့ 'ကိုဖက အာၚၚ္ (Kofi A. Annan)' တို႕ အဖဲ႕ကပဲ ျဖဖ္တာ္္ အဲ ါ္ေၾကာင့္ အာၚၚ္ အဖကရင္္ႏိဖာကို င္ေဘာ အရ လက္္ႏိမာ္လို႕ ျကပငၚာ ဖျဖဖ္္ါဖမမာ မာိုတ္မလၚ္ ္ေျကပာ္ေကပမာ့္ ္ေၚာက္ကပိုင္းက် လက္မ္ႏိရဲဘဲ အ္ေင္ေၾကာက္္ေၚၾကတာ အနက္ကပါ အ္်က္္ေတ္ေၾကာင့္ျဖဖ္တာ္္ အ္်္ကပ္ ္ေျကပာရရင္ R2P ၚဲ႕ ကိုလက အမၚ္႕ ္ေကပးလိုက္ရင္ ါမမမ။ိုတ္လည္း ကိုလ လႏိိုျ္ႏိို က င္ေဘာတသငည္ ျဖဖ္္ေဖ မတသငည္ ျဖဖ္ ္ေဖ 'Southeast Asia Treaty Organizat -ion' လို႕္ေ္ေတဲ့ (SEATO) အဖဲ႕အဖည္း့ ငို႕မ။ိုတ္ကပါကလည္း အ္ေမရကၚ္တကပ္္ေတ ဥကးနိုကပ္ျကပာ္ေလး္ေတ ္ေဆာင္းျကပကး အ္်ၚ္မ္ေရး ဝင္္ေရာက္ နၚ္းငမ္း ႏိုင္တာ္ဆိုတာ ငတ္်ကပ္ဖို႕ ၾကကပ္ၾကကပ္ လိုကပါတာ္္ (Andrew Soe) ၃ ကဇင္ဘာ ၂၀၁၇္ https://www.facebook.com/DVBTVNews/posts/1646583348713492
- 83. Updated as of October2015 The Responsibility To Protect: A Background Briefing WHAT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND WHY DO WE NEED IT? The United Nations (UN) was established in 1945 to prevent conflicts between states. But with the end of the Cold War, inter-state aggression largely gave way to war and violence within, rather than between, states. When, during the 1990s, horrific violence broke out inside the borders of such countries as Somalia, Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, the world was ill-prepared to act and was paralyzed by disagreement over the limits of national sovereignty. Throughout the 1990s, the UN was deeply divided between those who insisted on a right of humanitarian intervention and those who viewed such a doctrine as an indefensible infringement upon national sovereignty. At the time Secretary-General Kofi Annan warned that the UN risked discrediting itself if it failed to respond to catastrophes such as Rwanda, and he challenged member states to agree on a legal and political framework for collective international action. In 1999 the failure of the UN Security Council to authorize action to halt "ethnic cleansing" in Kosovo provoked NATO to initiate an aerial bombardment on its own. This deeply divided the international community, pitting those who denounced the intervention as illegal against others who argued that legality mattered less than the moral imperative to save lives. This deadlock implied a pair of unpalatable choices: either states could passively stand by and let mass killing happen in order to strictly preserve the letter of international law, or they could circumvent the UN Charter and unilaterally carry out an act of war on humanitarian grounds. The 2001 report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) formulated the alternative principle of "the responsibility to protect," focusing not on the legal or moral "right" of outsiders to intervene but on the responsibility of all states to protect people at risk. In 2005 the UN World Summit unanimously accepted their "responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity." The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) concept sought to confront both the Rwanda tragedy and the Kosovo dilemma by stipulating that states have an obligation to protect their citizens from mass atrocity crimes; that the international community will assist them in doing so; and that, should the state be "manifestly failing" in its obligations, the international community is obliged to act. R2P, as it is commonly abbreviated, seeks to ensure that the international community never again fails to act in the face of genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity. By accepting a collective responsibility to protect, the international community has issued a solemn pledge that it cannot lightly ignore. WHAT FORMS OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE DOES THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT SEEK TO ADDRESS? The UN's 2005 World Summit Outcome Document explicitly limits the application of R2P to four types of mass atrocity crimes: genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity. These crimes have
- 84. been clearly definedin a range of documents, including in the founding statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). R2P does not apply to other grave threats to human security, whether from climate change, disease or many harmful and ruinous state policies, such as the suspension of civil liberties, endemic poverty, mass corruption or coups d'état. Other human rights instruments, legal frameworks and institutions are better suited to address these pressing issues. WHAT IS A MASS ATROCITY CRIME? The four types of extreme human rights abuse enumerated in the 2005 UN World Summit Outcome Document are captured by the shorthand, "mass atrocity" or "mass atrocity crime." These crimes are defined with varying degrees of precision in international law. Genocide is the subject of the 1948 Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which outlaws actions taken "with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group." The category of war crimes is the broadest. The founding statute of the ICC lists fifty such acts, including torture, hostage-taking, mistreating prisoners of war, targeting civilians, pillage, rape and sexual slavery, and the intentional use of starvation. R2P applies to such crimes even when they are committed in the course of a civil war or other internal conflict. While it may not be possible to specify an exact threshold, it is clear that the commission of war crimes involves widespread abuses by a party to the conflict. Crimes against humanity include, according to the ICC statute, extermination, enslavement, deportation, torture, rape, extreme forms of discrimination and "other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health." Such acts constitute crimes against humanity when they are widespread and systematic, and committed as conscious acts of policy. The term "ethnic cleansing" has recently come into general usage and is the least clearly defined of the four legal categories. It is understood to describe forced removal or displacement of populations, whether by physical expulsion or by intimidation through killing, acts of terror, rape and the like. HOW DOES THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT WORK? At the heart of R2P is the principle that states, with the aid of the international community, must act to prevent mass atrocity crimes. Central is the idea that concerned outsiders should help states prevent these gross abuses through what the World Summit Outcome Document characterizes as "diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means." This includes strengthening state capacity through economic assistance, rule-of-law reform and the building of inclusive political institutions or, when violence seems imminent, through direct mediation. The intense diplomatic engagement following the disputed election in Kenya (2007) and the work of neighbors and the UN to support the government of Burundi as it addressed ethnic conflict (1995-2005) demonstrate cooperative efforts to prevent atrocities. Only when such means have been clearly and demonstrably unsuccessful should the international community, acting through the UN Security Council, turn to coercive measures. These could include such measures as sanctions, arms embargoes or the threat to refer perpetrators to the ICC. Should peaceful means be inadequate and the state be manifestly failing or unwilling to protect its population, then-and only then- would the Security Council consider use of military force. WHEN IS MILITARY FORCE JUSTIFIED? Timely military intervention could have halted the genocidal horror in Rwanda. The ICISS report and the UN Secretary-General's In Larger Freedom document proposed five "precautionary principles" or "criteria of legitimacy" to help guide possible military action under the UN Charter. 1. The violence in question must include large-scale actual or threatened loss of life or ethnic cleansing; 2. The purpose of the intervention must be to prevent or halt suffering; 3. Military force must be the last resort; 4. The means must be commensurate with the ends sought;
- 85. 5. And theintervention must have a reasonable prospect of success. No formal principles presently exist to guide UN Security Council decision-making on the use of force. These prudential criteria can and should, however, continue to inform public debate and deliberations among governments. HOW DOES THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AFFECT THE IDEA OF SOVEREIGNTY? States have long accepted limits on their conduct, whether towards their own citizens or others. The UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights requires that states protect individual and social rights; the Geneva Conventions and various treaties and covenants prohibiting torture, human trafficking, slavery, or nuclear proliferation similarly restrict state behavior. At the same time, there has been a shift in the understanding of sovereignty, spurred both by a growing sensitivity to human rights and by a reaction to mass atrocity crimes perpetrated against civilians by their own leaders. Francis Deng, the former UN Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide and the former representative of the Secretary-General on internally displaced persons, developed the concept of "sovereignty as responsibility." Chief among those responsibilities, Deng and others have argued, is the responsibility to protect citizens from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. IS THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT A TOOL OF THE POWERFUL AGAINST THE WEAK? Critics of R2P insist that it will never be applied to major powers, and thus it is undermined by inconsistency. However, R2P imposes obligations on all United Nations member states to prevent mass atrocity crimes. R2P covers crimes occurring anywhere in the world, regardless of the status or prestige of the perpetrator. Given that the more powerful states have a far greater capacity to extend assistance - and far greater economic, diplomatic, logistical, and military capacity - their responsibility to respond and react to mass atrocity crimes is arguably greater. R2P is fundamentally about protecting the weak (those subjected to mass atrocity crimes) from unconscionable abuse of power. WHAT IS THE STANDING OF THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW? R2P is not yet a rule of customary international law, but it builds upon existing legal foundations, including the Genocide Convention, and can be described as an international "norm." A norm of international conduct is one that has gained wide acceptance among states and there could be no better demonstration of that acceptance in the case of R2P than the unanimously adopted language of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document. Once a norm has gained not only formal acceptance but widespread usage, it can become part of "customary international law." R2P continues to evolve both politically and legally. It has been formally invoked by the UN Human Rights Council, General Assembly and the Security Council, including through more than 35 resolutions regarding situations such as Central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Libya, Mali, South Sudan and Syria. WHAT IS THE STANDING OF THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT IN THE UN? Since the 2005 World Summit the UN and its member states have aided in the evolution of R2P through actions that encourage wider acceptance of the norm and facilitate its implementation. In August 2007 UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon appointed Dr. Edward Luck as his first Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect. Working closely with the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, the two Special Advisers and their Joint Office have helped advance R2P within the UN system. In July 2013 the Secretary-General appointed Dr. Jennifer Welsh as his second Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect. During November 2014 the Joint Office launched a new Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes as a tool for prevention of mass atrocities.
- 86. The UN GeneralAssembly has held six informal interactive dialogues on R2P between 2009 and 2015. The UN Secretary-General released a report on R2P in advance of each of the interactive dialogues. The Secretary-General's 2009 report, entitled Implementing the responsibility to protect, introduced a three pillar strategy for R2P implementation. The three pillars are: Pillar 1: Every state has the Responsibility to Protect its populations from the four mass atrocity crimes. Pillar 2: The wider international community has the responsibility to encourage and assist individual states in meeting that responsibility. Pillar 3: If a state is manifestly failing to protect its populations, the international community must be prepared to take appropriate collective action in a timely and decisive manner and in accordance with the UN Charter. The three pillars have since served as a framework for discussing the different facets of prevention and response in mass atrocity risk situations and have been frequently invoked by member states when addressing R2P. The Secretary-General has addressed issues related to R2P’s implementation in his subsequent reports: Early warning, assessment and the responsibility to protect (2010), The role of regional and sub-regional arrangements in implementing the responsibility to protect (2011), Timely and decisive response (2012), State responsibility and prevention (2013), Fulfilling our collective responsibility: international assistance and the responsibility to protect (2014) and A vital and enduring commitment: implementing the responsibility to protect (2015). Member states have directly engaged with the R2P dialogue in many ways. Since 2009, 120 states and 5 regional organizations have participated in the UN General Assembly’s interactive dialogues on R2P. States also discuss R2P in other human rights forums, including in debates on the protection of civilians and at the Human Rights Council. The Group of Friends of the Responsibility to Protect is an informal cross-regional group of 50 UN member states that share a common interest in R2P and in advancing the norm within the UN-system. The Group of Friends, co-chaired by the governments of the Netherlands and Rwanda, made its first ever joint statement at the 2014 UN General Assembly Informal Interactive Dialogue on R2P. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? There are three major challenges as we continue to move R2P from theory to practice. The first is conceptual - to ensure that the scope, and limits, of the norm as it has evolved are well understood in all parts of the world. As new mass atrocity risk situations arise, there needs to be broad international consensus about how to respond in the context of R2P. The second challenge is institutional. There is a need to ensure that governments and intergovernmental organizations have available all the diplomatic, civilian and, as a last resort, military capability needed to ensure effective early warning and timely action. We need international institutions with a capacity to provide essential assistance to those countries who need it and to people desperately in need of protection. Since 2005 some governments have taken important steps towards implementing the Responsibility to Protect domestically, including through the appointment of a national R2P Focal Point. A national R2P Focal Point is a senior government official who facilitates domestic mechanisms for atrocity prevention. R2P Focal Points also engage in international cooperation by participating in a Global Network of R2P Focal Points, which is co- convened by the governments of Australia, Costa Rica, Denmark and Ghana. As of October 2015 51 member states and one regional organization, the European Union, had appointed an R2P Focal Point. The third challenge, as always, is political. We need to ensure that when and wherever mass atrocity crimes next occur, the necessary commitment will be there from international decision-makers. This means having consensual international arrangements in place for effective mobilization by both governments and civil society. It also requires that there is consistency in the application of R2P. The international community will continue to encounter difficult when confronting mass atrocity crimes. Crises threatening human security continue to arise, and with them debates over the most appropriate response. But R2P remains the best hope for those who aspire for a world free from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. R2P represents a potential historic end to impunity, injustice and inaction.
- 87. 12/4/2017 Background Informationon the Responsibility to Protect — Outreach Programme on the Rwanda Genocide and the United Nations http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/about/bgresponsibility.shtml 1/5 Welcome to the United Nations. It's your world. UN Homepage Home About the Programme Preventing Genocide Supporting Survivors Get Involved News Timeline Annual Commemoration Educational Materials Events Exhibits Documents Multimedia Related Links Contact Us Twitter RSS Join our e-mail list Background Information on the Responsibility to Protect Who is responsible for protecting people from gross violations of human rights? Emergence of the concept Debating the right to "humanitarian intervention" (1990s) Following the tragedies in Rwanda and the Balkans in the 1990s, the international comm debate how to react effectively when citizens’ human rights are grossly and systematical question at the heart of the matter was whether States have unconditional sovereignty o whether the international community has the right to intervene in a country for humanita In his Millennium Report of 2000, then Secretary-General Kofi Annan, recalling the failure Council to act in a decisive manner in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, put forward a States: "If humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica, to gross and systematic violation of human rights that offe common humanity?" From humanitarian intervention to the responsibility to protect (2001) The expression "responsibility to protect" was first presented in the report of the Interna Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), set up by the Canadian Government in Dece Commission had been formed in response to Kofi Annan's question of when the internati intervene for humanitarian purposes. Its report, "The Responsibility to Protect," found th gave a State the right to "control" its affairs, it also conferred on the State primary "resp the people within its borders. It proposed that when a State fails to protect its people — ability or a lack of willingness — the responsibility shifts to the broader international com Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (2004) In 2004, the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, set up by Secretary-G endorsed the emerging norm of a responsibility to protect — often called "R2P" — stating collective international responsibility, "exercisable by the Security Council authorizing mi last resort, in the event of genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing and se humanitarian law which sovereign governments have proved powerless or unwilling to pr proposed basic criteria that would legitimize the authorization of the use of force by the including the seriousness of the threat, the fact that it must be a last resort, and the pro response. Skip to main navigation Skip to content
- 88. 12/4/2017 Background Informationon the Responsibility to Protect — Outreach Programme on the Rwanda Genocide and the United Nations http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/about/bgresponsibility.shtml 2/5 Report of the Secretary-General: In larger freedom (2005) In his report "In larger freedom," Secretary-General Kofi Annan "strongly agreed" with th the High-level Panel and suggested that a list of proposed criteria — including seriousnes proportionality and chance of success — be applied for the authorization of the use of for United Nations World Summit (2005) In September 2005, at the United Nations World Summit, all Member States formally acc of each State to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and c At the Summit, world leaders also agreed that when any State fails to meet that respons "international community") are responsible for helping to protect people threatened with peaceful means — including diplomatic, humanitarian and others — be inadequate and n "manifestly fail" to protect their populations, the international community should act coll decisive manner" — through the UN Security Council and in accordance with the UN Cha case basis and in cooperation with regional organizations as appropriate. In Practice The first time the Security Council made official reference to the responsibility to protect resolution 1674 on the protection of civilians in armed conflict. The Security Council refe August 2006, when passing resolution 1706 authorizing the deployment of UN peacekee Sudan. Recently, the responsibility to protect featured prominently in a number of resolu Security Council. Libya (2011) Following widespread and systematic attacks against the civilian population by the regim Jamahiriya (short: Libya), the UN Security Council, on 26 February 2011, unanimously a making explicit reference to the responsibility to protect. Deploring what it called "the gr violation of human rights" in strife-torn Libya, the Security Council demanded an end to the Libyan authorities’ responsibility to protect its population," and imposed a series of in The Council also decided to refer the situation to the International Criminal Court. In resolution 1973, adopted on 17 March 2011, the Security Council demanded an imme including an end to ongoing attacks against civilians, which it said might constitute "crim The Council authorized Member States to take "all necessary measures" to protect civilia attack in the country, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part few days later, acting on the resolution, NATO planes started striking at Qadhafi’s forces. Côte d’Ivoire (2011) In response to the escalating, post-election violence against the population of Côte d’Ivo early 2011, the UN Security Council, on 30 March 2011, unanimously adopted resolution gross human rights violations committed by supporters of both ex-President Laurent Gba Ouattara. The resolution cited "the primary responsibility of each State to protect civilian immediate transfer of power to President Ouattara, the victor in the elections, and reaffir Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) could use "all necessary means to protect life and pro protect the people of Côte d’Ivoire from further atrocities, UNOCI on 4 April 2011 began and President Gbagbo’s hold on power ended on 11 April when he was arrested by Presid In November 2011, President Gbagbo was transferred to the International Criminal Cour
- 89. 12/4/2017 Background Informationon the Responsibility to Protect — Outreach Programme on the Rwanda Genocide and the United Nations http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/about/bgresponsibility.shtml 3/5 crimes against humanity as an “indirect co-perpetrator” of murder, rape, persecution and On 26 July 2012, the Council adopted resolution 2062 renewing the mandate of UNOCI u South Sudan (2011) On 8 July 2011, the Security Council, in resolution 1996, established a UN peacekeeping (UNMISS), to — among other things — advise and assist the government in fulfilling its r civilians. South Sudan officially became an independent country on 9 July 2011, the clim possible by a 2005 peace deal that ended a long civil war. In December 2013, fighting be Government forces began, causing the displacement of approximately 706,000 people, 7 refuge at UNMISS bases. In February 2014, the Security Council reiterated its steadfast its vital mission on behalf of the international community to protect civilians in South Su nationals, as well as conduct human rights monitoring and investigations, and facilitate a in need. Yemen (2011) On 21 October 2011, resolution 2014 condemned human rights violations by the Yemeni encouraged an inclusive Yemeni-led political process of transition of power, including the Presidential elections. This resolution explicitly recalled the Yemeni Government’s "prima protect its population." Syria (2012) Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has stressed the urgent need for a political solution to e which over the past threeyears has claimed more than 100,000 lives and led to a dire hu has called on the region and the international community, in particular the Security Coun lend full support to the efforts of the Joint Special Representative of the United Nations a States, Lakhdar Brahimi, to help the Syrian people reach a political solution to the conflic Both the General Assembly and the Human Rights Council have strongly condemned the and systematic" human rights violations in Syria and demanded that the government im violence and protect its people. The High Commissioner for Human Rights recommended in Syria to the International Criminal Court and urged the Security Council to assume its the population of Syria. “The Government of Syria is manifestly failing to protect its populations,” the Secretary-G Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, Adama Dieng, said in a statement in December 2 community must act on the commitment made by all Heads of State and Government at Summit to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes a including their incitement,” said Mr. Dieng. Central African Republic (2013) The conflict in the Central African Republic (CAR) erupted when Séléka rebels launched a 2012, and has taken on increasingly sectarian overtones as mainly Christian militias hav October 2013, in resolution 2121, the Security Council emphasized “the primary respons African authorities to protect the population, as well as to ensure the security and unity i stressed “their obligation to ensure respect for international humanitarian law, human rig law.” In March 2014, the UN Secretary-General outlined his proposal for the establishme strong UN peacekeeping operation in the CAR.
- 90. 12/4/2017 Background Informationon the Responsibility to Protect — Outreach Programme on the Rwanda Genocide and the United Nations http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/about/bgresponsibility.shtml 4/5 Reports of the Secretary-General Implementing the responsibility to protect (2009) Based on the outcome document of the 2005 World Summit, a 2009 report by the Secre strategy around three pillars of the responsibility to protect: 1. The State carries the primary responsibility for protecting populations from genoc crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, and their incitement; 2. The international community has a responsibility to encourage and assist States in responsibility; 3. The international community has a responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, hu means to protect populations from these crimes. If a State is manifestly failing to populations, the international community must be prepared to take collective acti populations, in accordance with the UN Charter. Early warning, assessment and the responsibility to protect (2010) The Secretary-General’s report on early warning, assessment and the responsibility to pr and proposed ways to improve the UN’s ability to use early warnings more effectively, inc field operations, and improve early, flexible and balanced responses where there is risk o against humanity, war crimes or ethnic cleansing. The role of regional and sub-regional arrangements (2011) This report by the Secretary-General emphasized the need for global-regional collaborati the responsibility to protect. The report identified gaps and proposed ways for the UN to cooperation and draw on information from regional and sub-regional arrangements to ide and undertake or support timely and effective preventative action at the sub-regional, re While emphasizing that the responsibility to protect is universal and each region "must m report acknowledged that "each region will operationalize the principle at its own pace an The responsibility to protect: timely and decisive response (2012) The Secretary-General’s fourth report on the responsibility to protect, presented in Septe the idea of a “timely and decisive response” when a State failed to protect its people, inc tools and partners available, and the close connection between prevention and response State Responsibility and Prevention (2013) The Secretary-General’s fifth report on the responsibility to protect, published in August prevention. The report aims to provide analysis and strategies that can help States to fu to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cl The Secretary-General’s Special Advisers In 2004, the UN Secretary-General appointed the first Special Adviser on the Prevention Méndez, followed by Francis Deng in 2007 and Adama Dieng in 2012. The Special Advise
- 91. 12/4/2017 Background Informationon the Responsibility to Protect — Outreach Programme on the Rwanda Genocide and the United Nations http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/about/bgresponsibility.shtml 5/5 collecting information on massive and serious violations of human rights and inter law; acting as a mechanism of early warning to the Secretary-General, and through him Council; making recommendations to the Security Council, through the Secretary-General, or halt genocide; and liaising with the United Nations system on activities for the prevention of gen In 2008, the Secretary-General appointed Edward Luck as his Special Adviser on the Res Mr. Luck was succeeded, in June 2013, by Ms. Jennifer Welsh. The Special Adviser is resp development and refinement of the concept as well as for the continuation of the politica States and other stakeholders on further steps toward implementation. The joint office on Genocide Prevention and on the Responsibility to Protect is tasked wit enhancing existing arrangements, including for capacity building and for the gathering an information from the field, while adding value on its own in terms of new arrangements f sectoral assessment, common policy, and cumulative learning on how to anticipate, prev crises relating to the responsibility to protect. Copyright | Terms of Use | Privacy Notice | Site Index | Fraud Alert | Contact Us UN Web Services Section, Department of Public Information, © United Nations