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Marco Slaviero




Proofing against malware
         attacks
        PROOF AGAINST MALWARE
Summary
• State of anti-malware

• Chronic malware treatment




                 PROOF AGAINST MALWARE
Malware? What‟s that?

• Obvious                   • Less obvious
  –   Virii                      – “Legal” rootkits (ala
  –   Spyware                      Sony)
  –   Worms                      – EULA-protected tools
  –   Trojans                    – Dual purpose tools
                                 – Poorly designed tools




                PROOF AGAINST MALWARE
INTENT MATTERS




    PROOF AGAINST MALWARE
CAN WE DETERMINE
PROGRAM INTENT IN A
  GENERAL WAY?




      PROOF AGAINST MALWARE
Specific solutions
• Real-time / point-in-time
• Signatures
  – Byte sequences on disk
  – Byte sequences over the network
  – Known suspicious system calls




                 PROOF AGAINST MALWARE
Antimalware fails
• Polymorphic malware
  – Encrypt the virus, and include a tiny
    decryption engine that runs first.
  – Response: virtualise the first couple of
    hundred instructions, then see if known
    signatures are present
• Metamorphic malware
  – Alter the instruction sequence such that it
    remains semantically identical, but
    syntactically different

                   PROOF AGAINST MALWARE
Examples
• Signature stream:
  “Our computing systems are generally very
  insecure.”

• Polymorphic manipulation:
  “Replace each „ZZ‟ with an „e‟ in the next sentence.
  Our computing systZZms arZZ gZZnZZrally vZZry
  insZZcurZZ”.

• Metamorphic manipulation:
  “Mankind‟s information systems do not exhibit safe
  security practices.”


                    PROOF AGAINST MALWARE
Dan Geer‟s security monoculture




           PROOF AGAINST MALWARE
Artificial distinctions




       PROOF AGAINST MALWARE
SO, CAN WE MALWARE-
 PROOF A COMPUTER?




      PROOF AGAINST MALWARE
Safe from infection




     PROOF AGAINST MALWARE
Safe from infection #2




       PROOF AGAINST MALWARE
Safe from infection #3




                        &

       PROOF AGAINST MALWARE
State of the art




   PROOF AGAINST MALWARE
And it ignores the unexpected




          PROOF AGAINST MALWARE
Verdict




 NO

PROOF AGAINST MALWARE
DOES IT GET LESS GLOOMY?




        PROOF AGAINST MALWARE
Side bar: Attack Graphs
Create and host
   malicious        Obtain target‟s        Entice user to
   website          contact details         click on link



 Exploit flaw in
  unpatched         Download body            Execute
 Adobe Flash          of malware             malware
    Player


                       Upload
Search disk for     documents via
 information          configured
                        proxy



                   PROOF AGAINST MALWARE
LENGTHEN THE ATTACK
      GRAPH




      PROOF AGAINST MALWARE
Not like this




  PROOF AGAINST MALWARE
Or this




PROOF AGAINST MALWARE
Better…




PROOF AGAINST MALWARE
MOST IMPORTANT: PROTECT
 THE ORGANISATION, NOT
     THE COMPUTER




        PROOF AGAINST MALWARE
Where does your risk lie?




        PROOF AGAINST MALWARE
Practical strategies: Home users
• Not much infrastructure to lengthen attack
  chains

• Consider
  – Decentralising your online life
  – Multiple (virtual) machines, each devoted to a
    single level of task
  – Security by isolation
  – Examples: VMWare, Qubes

                  PROOF AGAINST MALWARE
Qubes




         http://qubes-os.org/Architecture.html


PROOF AGAINST MALWARE
Practical strategies: Enterprise users
• Regular stuff (remove unneeded software, patch,
  segregated networks, etc)
• Expect that you‟re infected
• Develop rapid response measures to detect and
  isolate infection using signatures on both the host
  and network.
• Monitor and log process execution
• Whitelist binaries
• Close access channels (no browsing, severe email
  limitations, no flash disks)
• Risk management: loss is inevitable, absorb the
  cost
• Introduce heterogeneity

                    PROOF AGAINST MALWARE
Side bar: walled gardens




        PROOF AGAINST MALWARE
BUT DON’T FOOL YOURSELF.

    YOU’RE STILL NOT
    MALWARE-PROOF.


        PROOF AGAINST MALWARE
Thank you to Prof. Ojo and TUT for the
             opportunity




       marco@sensepost.com




Questions? PROOF AGAINST MALWARE

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Proofing against malware

  • 1. Marco Slaviero Proofing against malware attacks PROOF AGAINST MALWARE
  • 2. Summary • State of anti-malware • Chronic malware treatment PROOF AGAINST MALWARE
  • 3. Malware? What‟s that? • Obvious • Less obvious – Virii – “Legal” rootkits (ala – Spyware Sony) – Worms – EULA-protected tools – Trojans – Dual purpose tools – Poorly designed tools PROOF AGAINST MALWARE
  • 4. INTENT MATTERS PROOF AGAINST MALWARE
  • 5. CAN WE DETERMINE PROGRAM INTENT IN A GENERAL WAY? PROOF AGAINST MALWARE
  • 6. Specific solutions • Real-time / point-in-time • Signatures – Byte sequences on disk – Byte sequences over the network – Known suspicious system calls PROOF AGAINST MALWARE
  • 7. Antimalware fails • Polymorphic malware – Encrypt the virus, and include a tiny decryption engine that runs first. – Response: virtualise the first couple of hundred instructions, then see if known signatures are present • Metamorphic malware – Alter the instruction sequence such that it remains semantically identical, but syntactically different PROOF AGAINST MALWARE
  • 8. Examples • Signature stream: “Our computing systems are generally very insecure.” • Polymorphic manipulation: “Replace each „ZZ‟ with an „e‟ in the next sentence. Our computing systZZms arZZ gZZnZZrally vZZry insZZcurZZ”. • Metamorphic manipulation: “Mankind‟s information systems do not exhibit safe security practices.” PROOF AGAINST MALWARE
  • 9. Dan Geer‟s security monoculture PROOF AGAINST MALWARE
  • 10. Artificial distinctions PROOF AGAINST MALWARE
  • 11. SO, CAN WE MALWARE- PROOF A COMPUTER? PROOF AGAINST MALWARE
  • 12. Safe from infection PROOF AGAINST MALWARE
  • 13. Safe from infection #2 PROOF AGAINST MALWARE
  • 14. Safe from infection #3 & PROOF AGAINST MALWARE
  • 15. State of the art PROOF AGAINST MALWARE
  • 16. And it ignores the unexpected PROOF AGAINST MALWARE
  • 18. DOES IT GET LESS GLOOMY? PROOF AGAINST MALWARE
  • 19. Side bar: Attack Graphs Create and host malicious Obtain target‟s Entice user to website contact details click on link Exploit flaw in unpatched Download body Execute Adobe Flash of malware malware Player Upload Search disk for documents via information configured proxy PROOF AGAINST MALWARE
  • 20. LENGTHEN THE ATTACK GRAPH PROOF AGAINST MALWARE
  • 21. Not like this PROOF AGAINST MALWARE
  • 24. MOST IMPORTANT: PROTECT THE ORGANISATION, NOT THE COMPUTER PROOF AGAINST MALWARE
  • 25. Where does your risk lie? PROOF AGAINST MALWARE
  • 26. Practical strategies: Home users • Not much infrastructure to lengthen attack chains • Consider – Decentralising your online life – Multiple (virtual) machines, each devoted to a single level of task – Security by isolation – Examples: VMWare, Qubes PROOF AGAINST MALWARE
  • 27. Qubes http://qubes-os.org/Architecture.html PROOF AGAINST MALWARE
  • 28. Practical strategies: Enterprise users • Regular stuff (remove unneeded software, patch, segregated networks, etc) • Expect that you‟re infected • Develop rapid response measures to detect and isolate infection using signatures on both the host and network. • Monitor and log process execution • Whitelist binaries • Close access channels (no browsing, severe email limitations, no flash disks) • Risk management: loss is inevitable, absorb the cost • Introduce heterogeneity PROOF AGAINST MALWARE
  • 29. Side bar: walled gardens PROOF AGAINST MALWARE
  • 30. BUT DON’T FOOL YOURSELF. YOU’RE STILL NOT MALWARE-PROOF. PROOF AGAINST MALWARE
  • 31. Thank you to Prof. Ojo and TUT for the opportunity marco@sensepost.com Questions? PROOF AGAINST MALWARE

Editor's Notes

  1. Dual purpose tools: remote access, HTC’s logging app on AndroidIgnoring basic questions. Are you being targetted specifically? Is the malware custom? What is its purpose? All of these impact on the question of whether they are (easily) prevented.
  2. i.e. a program could be malicious in the hands of one user, but a useful tool to another.e.g. remote access tools or even adware. What’s clear is that some software has no discernible benefit to the user. If the user is unaware of the software and it does not benefit the user, we can term it malware.
  3. No. Thus the definition of malware is fuzzy. Let’s look at a few way that it can be installed
  4. We treat virii and most malware as an infection, but not as an attack.Why is it that the solution to malware is disinfect, but solution to attack is reinstall? What’s different?If we reinstalled every virus infected machine, companies would close down.
  5. Not really, not only ethernet connections
  6. What about firewire, bluetooth, and other interconnects? Stuxnet
  7. Fending off thousands of new, “public”, malware samples
  8. Not looking at custom modifications and targetting
  9. So, can we malware-proof a computer?Since we:Require connectivity and interactioncan’t exactly define malwareHave masses of identical machinesImplement detection and prevention in easily bypassable mannersWe can conclude that the answer is NO.
  10. A few options.Improve monitoring, lengthen the attack graphs, focus on the organisation.
  11. Sequence of steps sketching out the attacker’s path
  12. i.e, increase complexity. Your information should not be one malware infection away from disclosure.
  13. Break in any one lock opens the gate
  14. Original object is unusable
  15. Most secure line of code is the one never written.
  16. i.e, increase complexity
  17. The tradeoff means that eventually you’ll hit security controls that aren’t worth it.Are you spending more on the controls than the data is worth? Are you causing an impact to the business worth more than the data?
  18. Security by isolation
  19. Increases the length of the attack chain. Does not close it off.
  20. i.e, increase complexity