The International Food Policy Research Institute's 2011 Global Food Policy Report analyzes major developments in global food policy in 2011. Key developments include: 1) Agriculture and food security rose to the top of development agendas as investments increased from countries, international organizations, and private groups. 2) Volatile food prices remained a challenge as staple grain reserves were low and a few countries dominated exports, though prices fell in the second half of 2011 due to good harvests and a stronger dollar. 3) Interconnected challenges around agriculture, nutrition, health, climate change, and natural resources received more recognition, though further action is still needed to address issues like the 2011 famine in the Horn of Africa.

2. About IFPRI
The International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI®) was established in 1975 to identify and ana-
lyze alternative national and international strategies and policies for meeting food needs of the developing
world on a sustainable basis, with particular emphasis on low-income countries and on the poorer groups
in those countries. While the research effort is geared to the precise objective of contributing to the reduc-
tion of hunger and malnutrition, the factors involved are many and wide-ranging, requiring analysis of
underlying processes and extending beyond a narrowly defined food sector. The Institute’s research pro-
gram reflects worldwide collaboration with governments and private and public institutions interested in
increasing food production and improving the equity of its distribution. Research results are disseminated
to policymakers, opinion formers, administrators, policy analysts, researchers, and others concerned with
national and international food and agricultural policy.
IFPRI is a member of the CGIAR Consortium.

5. Copyright © 2012 International Food Policy Research Institute. All rights reserved. Sections of
this material may be reproduced for personal and not-for-profit use without the express written
permission of but with acknowledgment to IFPRI. To reproduce material contained herein for
profit or commercial use requires express written permission. To obtain permission, contact the
Communications Division at ifpri-copyright@cgiar.org.
International Food Policy Research Institute
2033 K Street, NW
Washington, DC 20006-1002, USA
Telephone: +1-202-862-5600
www.ifpri.org
DOI: 10.2499/9780896295476
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
2011 global food policy report / International Food Policy Research Institute.
p. cm.
title: Global food policy report
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN 978-0-89629-547-6 (alk. paper)
1. Nutrition policy. I. International Food Policy Research Institute. II. Title: Global food
policy report.
TX359.A12 2012
363.8’62—dc23
2012010851
PHOTO CREDITS
Cover image: © 2011 Tim Dirven/Panos
Chapter images: Page x © 2011 Tim Dirven/Panos; page 14 © 2011 G.M.B. Akash/Panos;
page 24 © 2011 Sven Torfinn/Panos; page 38 © 2011 Patrick Brown/Panos;
page 48 © 2008 Warren Clarke/Panos; page 54 © 2010 Jenny Matthews/Panos;
page 62 © 2011 Sven Torfinn/Panos; page 68 © 2011 Zerihun Sewunet/ILRI;
page 78 © 2011 Fernando Moleres/Panos.
Cover design: Julia Vivalo / Book design and layout: David Popham.

6. Contents
Preface� � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � vii
Acknowledgments � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � ix
Chapter 1 Overview: Major Food Policy Developments in 2011 � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 1
Shenggen Fan, IFPRI
What Influenced Food Policy in 2011? � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 11
Chapter 2 Food Prices: Riding the Rollercoaster � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 15
Maximo Torero, IFPRI
Chapter 3 Disasters: Déjà Vu in the Horn of Africa � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 25
Derek Headey, IFPRI
Chapter 4 Climate Change and Agriculture: Modest Advances, Stark
New Evidence � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 39
Gerald C. Nelson and Tolulope Olofinbiyi, IFPRI
Chapter 5 Biofuels, Environment, and Food: The Story Gets More Complicated � � � � 49
David Laborde and Siwa Msangi, IFPRI
Chapter 6 Agriculture, Nutrition, and Health: Connecting the Dots � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 55
Rajul Pandya-Lorch, Heidi Fritschel, Zhenya Karelina, and Sivan Yosef, IFPRI
Chapter 7 Land Degradation: Land under Pressure � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 63
Ephraim Nkonya, Jawoo Koo, and Paswel Marenya, IFPRI;
Rachel Licker, University of Wisconsin, Madison
Chapter 8 New Players: Stepping into the Global Food System � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 69
Kevin Chen and P. K. Joshi, IFPRI
Chapter 9 Regional Developments: Food Policy Taking Shape at the Local Level � � � 79
Food Policy Tools and Indicators � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 88
Notes� � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 105
Contributors � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 112
v

8. Preface
Since 2007, two rounds of food price hikes have contributed to millions of people being hungry or mal-
nourished. The same factors that contributed to the 2007–08 food price crisis triggered similar price
spikes in 2011—factors including a declining growth rate of agricultural productivity, high energy prices
leading to expanded biofuel production, depreciation of the US dollar, strong demand from emerging
economies for agricultural products, and weather shocks. With such complex forces at work, it is clear that
the food policies necessary to ensure that all people have access to safe, sufficient, nutritious, and sustain-
ably grown food must go beyond traditional agricultural production. Fittingly, demand for evidence-based
research to inform those policies is higher than ever, and the International Food Policy Research Institute
(IFPRI) produces global public goods to respond to that need.
IFPRI’s 2011 Global Food Policy Report—the first in a new annual series—provides an in-depth, con-
textualized look at the past year’s major food policy developments and events. It both raises and answers
these key questions: What happened in food policy in 2011 and why? What challenges and opportunities
resulted? What could have been done differently? What should be done in the future?
In 2011, agriculture moved to the forefront of the international development agenda. In addition to pro-
ducing adequate food, agriculture’s crucial role in improving nutrition and health, sustainably making use
of land and other natural resources, and helping to address global threats like climate change has received
long-overdue recognition. Investments in the sector are rising, and contributions are coming from indus-
trialized countries as well as emerging and developing economies, the private sector, and philanthropic
entities. In addition to higher investments, policymakers also scaled up collaboration across borders, in
particular in their efforts to control food price volatility through the provision of better market informa-
tion. This type of global policymaking must continue to take into account that legislation in one country
(particularly trade and environmental policies regarding biofuels) can harm food security in others. Inter-
national agenda-setting meetings, like the Rio+20 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Develop-
ment in June 2012, cannot neglect the concerns of the poor. As the humanitarian crisis in the Horn of
Africa starkly reminds us, however, research agendas and information-sharing are not enough to avert or
solve a problem; preventive actions are also needed.
The topics covered in the 2011 Global Food Policy Report were selected after numerous consultations by
a strategic advisory council consisting of policymakers, researchers, and other experts that sought to rep-
resent the most profound, relevant, and broadly applicable food policy issues that arose in 2011. IFPRI’s
Board of Trustees and senior staff then provided feedback on major development and research topics, and
a review of related print and broadcast media from 2011 was conducted. Finally, leading policymakers
and food experts from around the world were asked for their opinions on how to best capture national and
regional perspectives.
Contributions were commissioned from experts, scholars, and stakeholders on topics that represent
either a new development in food policy, a major change in food policy, or a new way of looking at a food
policy issue. The topics are regional or global in scope and feature high-quality research results as well as
expert opinions that will enhance the quality of debate.
IFPRI’s 2011 Global Food Policy Report is the first of its kind, and I hope it will contribute to an
enriched research agenda that informs sound food policies to the benefit of the world’s poorest and most
vulnerable people. I welcome your feedback, comments, and suggestions at ifpri@cgiar.org.
SHENGGEN FAN
Director General

10. Acknowledgments
This report was prepared under the overall leadership of Shenggen Fan and a core team comprising
Alexander J. Stein, Zhenya Karelina, Klaus von Grebmer, Rajul Pandya-Lorch, and Gwendolyn Stansbury.
It benefitted greatly from the strategic insights of a committee of advisers, including Robert Bos, Margaret
Catley-Carlson, Marion Guillou, Monty Jones, Agnes M. Kalibata, Michiel A. Keyzer, Justin Y. Lin, Mari E.
Pangestu, Martin Pineiro, Prabhu Pingali, Beatriz da Silveira Pinheiro, Keming Qian, M. S. Swaminathan,
Eric Tollens, Rhoda Tumusiime, Joachim von Braun, Emorn Wasantwisut, and Derek Yach. IFPRI’s
Board of Trustees provided additional guidance and inputs, as did the members of IFPRI’s Senior
Management Team.
Excellent text and data contributions were made by Perrihan Al-Riffai, Kym Anderson, Suresh Babu,
Ousmane Badiane, Nienke Beintema, Samuel Benin, Deborah Brautigam, Clemens Breisinger, Bruce
Campbell, Rahul Chaturvedi, Kevin Chen, Cindy Cox, S. Mahendra Dev, Betina Dimaranan, Paul
Dorosh, Olivier Ecker, Shenggen Fan, Heidi Fritschel, Sara Gustafson, Derek Headey, Jikun Huang, Kabba
Joiner, P. K. Joshi, Suneetha Kadiyala, Zhenya Karelina, Jawoo Koo, David Laborde, Rachel Licker, Tsitsi
Makombe, Sohail J. Malik, Paswel Marenya, Geraldo B. Martha Jr., John McDermott, Ruth Meinzen-Dick,
Siwa Msangi, Gerald Nelson, Alejandro Nin Pratt, Ephraim Nkonya, Tolulope Olofinbiyi, Steven Were
Omamo, Robert Paarlberg, Amanda Palazzo, Rajul Pandya-Lorch, Amber Peterman, Prabhu Pingali,
Beatriz da Silveira Pinheiro, Nilam Prasai, Agnes Quisumbing, Jagdeesh Rao Puppala, Claudia Ringler,
M. S. Swaminathan, Maria Theresa Tenorio, Peter Timmer, Maximo Torero, Klaus von Grebmer, Stanley
Wood, Derek Yach, Sivan Yosef, and Bingxin Yu.
In addition, the following people provided thoughtful statements about what influenced food pol-
icy in 2011: Bekele Geleta, José Graziano da Silva, Marion Guillou, Jeremy Hobbs, Michiel A. Keyzer,
Rachel Kyte, Jiayang Li, Justin Yifu Lin, David Nabarro, Kanayo Nwanze, John Parker, Carlos Perez del
Castillo, Keming Qian, Rajiv Shah, Josette Sheeran, Kathy Spahn, Eric Tollens, Joachim von Braun, and
Emorn Wasantwisut.
Production of this report was led by IFPRI’s Publications Department, including Adrienne Chu, Patricia
Fowlkes, Heidi Fritschel, Corinne Garber, Michael Go, Marcia MacNeil, Lucy McCoy, Andrea Pedolsky,
David Popham, Ashley St. Thomas, Julia Vivalo, and John Whitehead. In addition, valuable research sup-
port was provided by Joanna Brzeska, Zhenya Karelina, Tolulope Olofinbiyi, and Ana Ramirez.
The report benefitted greatly from careful peer review by IFPRI’s Publications Review Committee,
chaired by Gershon Feder, and many anonymous scholars and experts who reviewed the research and
provided insightful comments on the preliminary drafts.

12. Chapter 1
OVERVIEW
Major Food Policy
Developments in 2011
Shenggen Fan, IFPRI
T he year 2011 highlighted ongoing chal-
lenges to global food security, from food price
volatility, extreme weather shocks, and famine
to unrest and conflicts. On the policy front, major devel-
opments at the global and national levels both offered
grounds for encouragement and pointed to areas where
further action is needed.
First, the good news: after many years of neglect, agriculture and food secu-
rity are back on the development and political agendas. Both China and India
continued to expand their spending on food security and agricultural produc-
tion. Some 20 African countries have adopted national agricultural and food
security investment plans in which they will devote 10 percent of their national
budget to agriculture to achieve agricultural growth of 6 percent a year. The
US Agency for International Development (USAID) moved forward with its
Feed the Future Initiative, begun in 2010, and the World Bank Group main-
tained its recent increased annual commitments to agriculture and related
sectors at about US$6 billion. The Consultative Group on International Agri-
cultural Research (CGIAR)—a global partnership for sustainable develop-
ment, of which IFPRI is a part—initiated an array of large, innovative research
programs in 2011. And the Bill Melinda Gates Foundation refreshed its
agriculture strategy with a strong focus on agricultural development in Sub-
Saharan Africa and South Asia.
More broadly, agriculture was increasingly seen as part of a larger con-
text. It is becoming clear that agriculture contributes not just to food produc-
tion, but also to human nutrition and health—conditions that in turn can
affect agricultural productivity and overall economic growth. Agriculture is

13. also an important element in a number of other reserves are extremely low and staple grains are
interlocking systems. It has strong ties to water, exported by just a few countries. However, favorable
land, and energy, which are, like agriculture harvests in major producing regions and a stronger
itself, under increasing pressure. And many of the US dollar induced a fall in dollar-denominated
events of 2011 underlined how food security— prices during the second half of the year.
that is, availability of and access to sufficient, safe, What do rising or volatile food prices mean for
nutritious food to maintain a healthy and active the poor? Higher food prices cut into the budgets
life—is linked to other notions of security. These of poor consumers but could raise the incomes of
include economic security (related to employ- poor producers if they produce more than they
ment, incomes, and gender), sociopolitical security consume. Volatile food prices, however, harm both
(related to inequality, governance, and conflicts), consumers and producers by increasing uncer-
and environmental security (related to natu- tainty and making it difficult for households to
ral resources). budget for food consumption and to plan for pro-
New thinking has been accompanied by new duction. Still, more needs to be learned about the
actors entering the global food system. In 2011, specific impacts of price volatility on the diets of
for the first time, the agriculture ministers of the the poor, particularly women and children. In Ethi-
Group of 20 (G20) countries met and agreed to opia, for example, research on the 2007–08 food
work together to tackle food price volatility and price crisis found that female-headed households
food insecurity. Emerging economies such as were especially vulnerable to food price shocks.1
Brazil, China, and India have gained an increas- Shifts in food prices stimulated new policies and
ing voice in international decisionmaking, moving initiatives during the year. As mentioned, the G20
from being aid recipients to aid donors and trading ministers of agriculture came together to design
partners, with their own global agendas. an action plan to reduce price volatility, regulate
This overview reviews the major food policy commodity markets, and promote long-term agri-
developments of 2011, drawing largely on the cultural productivity. Toward the end of the year,
chapters in this report, which look back at the the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian
year in detail. Nations, plus China, Japan, and South Korea (alto-
gether known as ASEAN+3) established an emer-
gency rice reserve to help ensure long-term food
FOOD PRICE LEVELS AND VOLATILITY
security in the region.
Global food prices rose during the first half of 2011 Some national policies taken in response to
and fell during the second half of the year. The food changes in food prices may have increased the
price index of the Food and Agriculture Orga- strain on the global food system. To raise pro-
nization of the United Nations, which measures ducer incomes, the government of Thailand, the
monthly change in the international prices of a bas- world’s largest exporter of milled rice, established
ket of food commodities, reached a record high in a rice subsidy scheme that threatened to shrink
February but moved steadily downward from June its exports and contribute to higher global rice
to December, ending lower for the year. Still, food prices—a trend observed in the second half of the
price volatility remained high in 2011. year. Several countries, including China, turned to
The factors that pushed up prices during the large grain imports to build up strategic reserves,
2007–08 food price crisis were again at play during raising concerns about tighter grain markets.
the 2010–11 crisis, including high oil prices, bio-
fuel policies that promote the expansion of biofuel
NATURAL AND HUMAN-CAUSED
production, increased weather-related shocks such
SHOCKS
as droughts and floods, and growing demand from
emerging economies. Further, the world remains The world saw some of the most severe natural
vulnerable to food price swings because grain disasters on record in 2011. The 9.0-magnitude
2 Major Food Policy Developments in 2011

14. CLIMATE CHANGE
earthquake and tsunami in Japan; the severe floods
or storms in Brazil, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thai- The record-breaking extreme weather events of
land, and the United States; and the drought in 2011 suggested that climate change will put addi-
the Horn of Africa imposed large economic losses tional pressure on world agriculture in the com-
during the year. According to the International ing decades. The year provided more evidence
Disaster Database, more than 200 natural disas- that greenhouse gas emissions are rising and
ters, affecting nearly 100 million people around that climate change is already affecting agricul-
the world, occurred during the year.2 Munich Re, a tural productivity.
reinsurance company in Germany, estimated that The encouraging progress made at the annual
2011 natural disasters imposed economic losses of climate conventions in 2010 in Cancun and
a record US$380 billion—more than double those in 2011 in Durban helped address the disap-
of 2010 and far above the record losses of 2005.3 pointment created by the failure of the 2009
Poor and hungry people are particularly suscep- Copenhagen negotiations to result in binding
tible to these natural shocks. commitments and gave a greater place to agricul-
In the Horn of Africa, severe drought due to ture in global climate change negotiations. A key
consecutive poor rainy seasons was the worst result was the creation of the Durban Platform for
experienced in 60 years. Extreme drought condi- Enhanced Action. This platform, which includes
tions triggered a widespread crisis in the region all the Kyoto Protocol signatories plus the United
that was especially catastrophic in Somalia. Many States, is a mechanism for forging a treaty by
parts of the Horn, especially the lowland areas, 2015, whose goal is to bring both developed and
saw large crop losses, significant depletion of graz- developing countries together under a legally
ing resources, skyrocketing food prices, and sub- binding agreement by 2020.
stantial livestock and human mortality. The dire Outside of formal negotiations, countries and
situation attracted belated policy and media atten- regions are proceeding with their own efforts to
tion as more than 13 million people, principally adapt to and mitigate climate change, even in the
pastoralists and farmers, were affected and their face of a difficult macroeconomic climate. China,
food and nutrition security was severely under- India, and Kenya, for instance, have all undertaken
mined. Vulnerable groups such as women and significant agricultural adaptation and mitiga-
children experienced acute food insecurity and tion activities. The progress made at the national
undernutrition. The United Nations Children’s and subnational levels should not overshadow the
Fund reported that more than 320,000 children principle of common but different responsibili-
suffered from severe malnutrition at the height of ties, enshrined in the United Nations Framework
the crisis. Convention on Climate Change text. Rather, these
Droughts in the Horn of Africa are not new, national and subnational activities could be the
but the scale of the 2010–11 crisis has been basis of a binding multilateral agreement to pursue
unusual. Although exposure to natural shocks is low-emission development strategies.
inevitable, human vulnerability to these shocks
is not. Reducing vulnerability means improving
BIOFUELS
society’s ability to cope and build resiliency in the
face of future shocks. Given the severity of the Biofuel policy changes in 2011 were dominated
drought in the Horn of Africa and the frequency by the European Union, the United States, and
of humanitarian emergencies in the region, a con- Brazil. In the United States, the Biofuels Market
certed effort is needed to catalyze a transforma- Expansion Act of 2011 came into law, and debate
tion, combining innovation, experimentation, centered on whether the Volumetric Ethanol
and political commitment to enhance resiliency Excise Tax Credit—a tax credit for blending etha-
and mitigate the chronic stresses that also impede nol into gasoline—should be repealed. Research
progress in the region. suggests that this tax credit, combined with the
Overview 3

15. ethanol blending mandate, results in both welfare European Union during 2011. A central question
and efficiency losses.4 In addition, the Round- concerns biofuel production and indirect land use
table for Sustainable Biofuels was launched as a change—that is, whether the growing use of land
mechanism for certifying biofuel producers who for biofuel crops ultimately leads to conversion of
adhere to standards of low environmental impact natural land to cropland, diminishing the extent to
and fair labor practices. This certification could which biofuel production cuts carbon emissions.
facilitate their compliance with European Union As of December 2011, the European Commission
regulations and provide a “green label” that could had not released its report on biofuel impacts, but
earn them a price premium as the market fur- once the research provides more conclusive impact
ther develops. findings and policy options, the region should be
The environmental impacts of biofuel produc- able to move forward with adjusting its Renewable
tion were an important topic of investigation in the Energy Directive.
WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM ON AGRICULTURE
A “New Vision for Agriculture” is presented at the
World Economic Forum in Switzerland, promoting
market-based solutions to accelerate sustainable G20 AGRICULTURE MINISTERS MEET
agricultural growth. The first-ever meeting of the G20 agriculture
January 28
ministers, in Paris, yields a proposal to tackle
food price volatility and strengthen food security.
June 22–23
CHINA NO.1 DOCUMENT
China’s No. 1 Document focuses for the eighth consecutive
year on water conservation and water infrastructure, due to
the previous year’s droughts and floods.
January 29
AFRICA/INDIA FORUM SUMMIT
IFPRI NUTRITION/HEALTH CONFERENCE At the second Africa–India Forum Summit
More than 1,000 people attend the IFPRI-organized in Addis Abba, Ethiopia, “Enhancing
conference, “Leveraging Agriculture for Improving Partnership, Shared Vision,” leaders
Nutrition and Health,” in New Delhi, India. release a framework to reinforce coopera-
February 10–12 tion between African countries and India.
May 24–25
JAN FEB MAR APR M AY JUN
previous highest peak, 224 in 2008
238
FOOD For most of 2011
food prices were
PRICE above the 2008
peak. Only in the
INDEX The Food Price Index measures weighted average international last three months
DEC 2011
JAN 2011
prices of basic food commodities. The prices from 2002–2004 did prices fall
FEBRUARY 2011
PEAKS highest peak in FPI history were set to 100 to serve as baseline for the index.
below the previous
peak of 224.

16. THE FOOD AND AGRICULTURE NEXUS
Brazil, China, and India have also substantially
developed and revised their biofuel policies in In an increasingly interlinked global environment,
ways that could have a large impact on food secu- policymakers have begun to more overtly recog-
rity both within their own borders and outside nize the links between agriculture and nutrition,
of them. health, water, and energy.
Finally, the 2011 disaster at Japan’s Fukushima The agriculture, nutrition, and health nexus
Daiichi nuclear plant revived debate on the poten- came to prominence in early 2011 with an inter-
tial drawbacks of nuclear power, and a number of national conference “Leveraging Agriculture for
countries are reducing their reliance on nuclear Improving Nutrition and Health” in New Delhi,
energy or phasing it out entirely. This debate may organized by IFPRI and its 2020 Vision Initia-
cause countries to shift to bioenergy, leading to fur- tive. This conference inspired and supported a
ther increases in global food prices. range of new initiatives, including the launch
NATIONAL FOOD SECURITY BILL IN INDIA
UN FOCUSES ON NONCOMMUNICABLE DISEASES The Indian government introduces the National
The first-ever United Nations General Assembly on the prevention Food Security Bill in parliament, shifting to a
and control of noncommunicable diseases declares the need for a rights-based approach to food security.
whole-government approach that includes the agricultural sector. FOOD/NUTRITION SECURITY December 22
September 19–20 IN AFRICA
Africa Food and Nutrition Security
UN ON LAND-DEGRADATION BONN 2011 CONFERENCE LOOKS AT
Day takes place for the second time
The United Nations General Assembly calls for building a FOOD SECURITY
and examines “Investing in
land-degradation-neutral world, a target reflecting the green economy The German government hosts the Bonn2011
Intra-Africa Trade for Food and
theme of the Rio+20 UN Conference on Sustainable Development. Conference on water, energy, and food
Nutrition Security.”
September 19–20 security links in preparation for the Rio +20
October 31
RUSSIA LIFTS EXPORT BAN ON GRAIN UN Conference on Sustainable Development.
Russia removes grain export bans put in place the November 16–18
previous year after wildfires destroyed a significant
amount of the annual harvest. ASEAN RICE RESERVE UN: CLIMATE CHANGE
July 1 ASEAN (Association of
AGREEMENT
Southeast Nations) Plus
UN DECLARES SOMALIA FAMINE At the United Nations Climate
Three ministers endorse
The United Nations announces that the Change Conference in Durban,
the establishment of a
drought in the Horn of Africa has led to South Africa, the attendees
rice emergency reserve
outright famine in areas of Somalia. decide to adopt a universal
scheme.
July 20 legal agreement on climate
October 7
change before 2015.
November 28–December 9
JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC
11
SEPTEMBER 2011 number of people
Over 13.3 million targeted to receive
HOW MANY
people in the Horn
food aid at the
of Africa were
affected by one of million height of the crisis
WERE HUNGRY? the worst droughts
10
in 60 years. time between the first
HORN OF AFRICA
JUN 2011
FEB 2012
alerts about a looming
crisis and the peak of
FOOD CRISIS months the famine
SOURCE: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

17. of a major research program called “Agricul- for strengthening linkages across sectors and
ture for Improved Nutrition and Health” by achieving win–win outcomes.
the CGIAR. Several development agencies—
USAID, with its Feed the Future Initiative, and
LAND
the United Kingdom Department for Inter-
national Development—also began to design A rising world population, growing demand for
or redesign their programs to better tap the food, fiber, and biofuels, and recent spikes in global
links among agriculture, nutrition, and health. food prices have placed increased pressure on land,
During 2011, 24 countries with high rates of resulting in more land degradation and increas-
undernutrition joined the Scaling Up Nutrition ing land prices, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa,
initiative, a movement bringing together govern- East Asia, and parts of Latin America.
ments, civil society, the private sector, research Several major land policy developments trans-
institutions, and the United Nations to sup- pired in 2011. The United Nations General Assem-
port countries in their efforts to develop nutri- bly convened a high-level meeting to address
tion- sensitive national plans. More than 100 desertification, land degradation, and drought,
organizations also endorsed the movement. In with government representatives highlighting not
Sub-Saharan Africa, efforts to integrate nutrition only the threat posed by land degradation to social,
and health into agriculture development strate- economic, and environmental sustainability, but
gies were made on the continental, regional, and also the need for future investment in sustainable
country level in the form of workshops, confer- land management. Several initiatives—specifically,
ences, and action plans. These efforts included the FAO’s Global Soil Partnership as well as the
an agreement between the New Partnership for Economics of Land Degradation initiative under-
Africa’s Development and the Global Alliance for taken by Germany, the European Commission,
Improved Nutrition to develop a five-year joint and the United Nations Convention to Combat
program to fully integrate nutrition security into Desertification—were launched as mechanisms
the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Develop- for strengthening sustainable land management
ment Program. through knowledge building and sharing. New
The links among food, water, and energy evidence presented at these events by IFPRI
also gained attention in late 2011 with the con- researchers shows that policymakers should pay
ference “The Water, Energy, and Food Secu- attention to land degradation not just in dry areas,
rity Nexus” in Bonn, Germany. The Food and but also on many high-quality irrigated lands.
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations More should be done to assure the availability of
(FAO) launched a new addition to its State of the fertilizers in areas where additional fertilizer use is
World report series with a report called The State needed and appropriate to improve soil fertility.
of the World’s Land and Water Resources, examin- One dimension of land management policies
ing the availability of cultivable land, the state of that particularly occupied public discourse in
land degradation, and institutions for managing 2011 was the issue of foreign land acquisitions—
scarce land and water.5 often described as “land grabbing”—especially
Despite progress, more can be done to maxi- in Sub-Saharan Africa. Such acquisitions have
mize the opportunities presented by the links the potential to inject much-needed investment
among agriculture and other sectors. One barrier into agriculture in developing countries, but they
to collaboration between agriculture and other can also harm the food security and livelihoods
development fields is a lack of common metrics of the local poor. Large-scale land deals may also
for measuring the impact of agricultural inter- have negative impacts on gender equity if they
ventions on other development outcomes such as erode women’s customary land rights.6 Reports
health, nutrition, and natural resources. And more on the issue in 2011 by the FAO, the World Bank,
research is needed to identify viable opportunities and the International Fund for Agricultural
6 Major Food Policy Developments in 2011

18. Development all highlighted the need for gov- New “players”—such as the private
ernments to ensure responsible investment in
agriculture and to strengthen land administration sector, emerging economies, and
systems that respect the rights, livelihoods, and
resources of all citizens.7 philanthropic organizations—are
NEW PLAYERS
increasingly reshaping the structure
New “players”—such as the private sector, emerg- and nature of the global food policy
ing economies, and philanthropic organizations—
are increasingly reshaping the structure and nature landscape.
of the global food policy landscape. Not only are
these new players a largely untapped source of the development of policy positions on food price
financial support to food security efforts in devel- volatility and food insecurity that fed directly
oping countries, but they also offer a wealth of into the 2011 deliberations of the G20 agricul-
knowledge and expertise, providing new oppor- ture ministers. Public–private partnerships have
tunities to address the increasing complexity and been launched to promote sustainable agricultural
challenges facing the global food system. growth, reduce hunger, and improve nutrition.
In 2011 these new players became more For instance, PepsiCo has signed several agree-
entrenched in global food policymaking processes. ments with international organizations to sup-
For example, the G20 is quickly claiming a growing port increased agricultural production (especially
role, next to the G8, as a principal forum for man- among smallholders) alongside long-term nutri-
aging global economic problems. The action plan tional and economic security efforts in countries
of the G20 agriculture ministers also emphasized such as China, Ethiopia, and Mexico. Similarly, pri-
the importance of strengthening the engagement vate philanthropic and civil society organizations
of nonstate actors, especially the private sector, in have continued to be major supporters of agricul-
global food security efforts. Emerging economies tural development, nutrition, poverty alleviation,
such as Brazil, China, and India have increased and natural resource management.
their engagement, especially in terms of forging Still, the opportunities presented by these new
South–South cooperation. In 2011, for example, the players have not been fully harnessed. For example,
FAO and China made three-party agreements with the private sector’s presence in many global food
Liberia and Senegal to provide Chinese technical security platforms is essentially limited to multi-
assistance to food security initiatives and projects. national corporations, and there is no real platform
One noteworthy development has been the initia- for engaging smaller companies. And until recently,
tion of cooperation agreements between the Bill the traditional aid donor community—represented
Melinda Gates Foundation and emerging economies by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
such as Brazil and China in support of agricultural and Development’s Development Assistance Com-
and health innovations in the developing world. mittee—has not involved new players.
Other 2011 initiatives demonstrate the private
sector’s increasing involvement in global food secu-
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
rity efforts. The World Economic Forum released
a “Roadmap for Stakeholders” as part of its New Some regional developments shaped food secu-
Vision for Agriculture Initiative. This initiative—a rity and agriculture, as well as development more
collaboration among the World Economic Forum’s broadly, over the course of 2011.
partner companies—promotes market-based strat- In parts of North Africa and the Middle East,
egies for sustainable agricultural development. In long-standing factors—ranging from youth unem-
parallel, the Forum’s partner CEOs contributed to ployment to growing income disparities and high
Overview 7

19. risk of food insecurity—led to the Arab Spring, protections have negatively affected the agricul-
mainly in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia, but also in ture sector in developing countries.
Bahrain, Syria, and Yemen. Addressing the chal-
lenges that gave rise to the Arab Spring will require
OUTLOOK FOR 2012 AND
more inclusive development strategies. To improve
OPPORTUNITIES FOR ACTION
household food security, governments in the region
will need to adopt policies that stimulate inclusive Overall, 2011 and the years immediately preced-
growth, such as employment generation for the ing it have revealed serious weaknesses facing the
young and poor, as well as expanded and well- global food system—lack of ability to respond to
targeted safety nets. volatile food prices, extreme weather, and inad-
African countries made significant progress in equate response to food emergencies were among
implementing the Comprehensive Africa Agricul- the most visible. But chronic, long-term problems
ture Development Programme (CAADP) in 2011. such as food and nutrition insecurity also point
This program is the African Union’s continent- to areas where the food system can do better. We
wide framework to boost agricultural productivity also face uncertainties. It is not yet clear whether
and food security. Six countries signed compacts the global economic slowdown will worsen or
committing them to achieving an agricultural sec- be reversed. Addressing all of these issues in a
tor growth rate of 6 percent a year and to raising resource-scarce world will require keeping agri-
funding for the sector to at least 10 percent of the culture and food security issues high on the global
national budget—bringing the total number of agenda in 2012 and beyond.
signatory countries to 29. About 20 of these coun- Without preventive action, several hot spots
tries have developed national investment plans, could erupt in food crisis in 2012. Early warn-
and 6 have received funding totaling US$270 bil- ing systems are once again pointing to the risks
lion from the Global Agriculture and Food Secu- posed by drought in Africa—this time in the Sahel
rity Program. region, including Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, and
In India, Parliament introduced the National Senegal. The experience in the Horn of Africa
Food Security Bill, which would provide rice, was a tragic reminder of the need to move quickly
wheat, and coarse grains at low prices to more and aggressively to head off humanitarian crises.
than half of India’s 1.2 billion people, making it Uncertainty also surrounds North Korea, long a
the world’s largest antihunger program. China recipient of food aid, which is undergoing a leader-
announced plans to boost agricultural productiv- ship transition.
ity through increased public investments in water Participants in the major international events
conservation and irrigation. Its water conservation of 2012 need to keep the spotlight on food policy
investments will total about US$630 billion over issues. The G8 summit in the United States in May
the next 10 years. and the G20 Summit in Los Cabos, Mexico, in June
In Central America and the Caribbean, high could reinforce those groups’ earlier emphasis on
and volatile prices and natural disasters raised global food security and ensure that previous finan-
concerns about “a hungrier” region. In October cial commitments are honored. It is important that
2011, the ministers of agriculture of the Americas discussions and decisions at the Rio+20 conference
approved a declaration emphasizing the impor- on the green economy and sustainable develop-
tance of increasing investment in agriculture to ment not neglect the poor, who need better access
reduce hunger and poverty and help improve social to food, jobs, and natural resources, as well as a
stability in the hemisphere. secure social protection system.
In Europe and the United States, contin- More broadly, food policy decisionmak-
ued policy support to biofuel production, farm ers will face a number of challenges in 2012 and
subsidies, a hostile attitude toward agricultural beyond. The long-term problems of chronic food
biotechnology (mainly in Europe), and trade and nutrition insecurity persist, although they are
8 Major Food Policy Developments in 2011

20. Looking Back
Looking Forward
ENCOURAGING EVENTS IN 2011 NOT WHAT WE HOPED FOR IN 2011 WHAT TO WATCH FOR IN 2012
Agriculture, nutrition, and health climbed High and extremely volatile food prices How are governments responding to
up on the national and global agendas, in the first half of the year threatened the financial crises and how does this affect
and the nexus of agriculture, food, land, food security of millions of people (see their development assistance, especially
water, and energy has received more Chapter 2). in the fields of agriculture and nutri-
attention (see Chapter 6). tion security?
Biofuel policies in the United States
The world’s major political leaders made and the European Union have not been How much progress is being made on
food policy a high priority, with the G20 changed to take into account their impact the various initiatives taken in 2011, like
agreement on an Action Plan on Food on land-use change and food price volatil- the G20 Action Plan or the G8’s repeated
Price Volatility and Agriculture. ity (see Chapter 5). commitment to improve food security?
At the World Economic Forum, the The Doha Round of trade negotiations What impact are noncommercial transac-
world’s business and society leaders gave was still not finalized, so countries con- tions in futures markets and the increas-
agriculture a boost when they initiated tinued to maintain domestic policies that ing trading volume of index funds having
their New Vision for Agriculture. undermine the trading prospects of devel- on high and volatile prices of agricultural
oping countries and the sustainability of commodities? (See Chapter 2.)
Encouraging progress was made at the
the global food system.
climate change conference in Durban, To what extent is agriculture being inte-
acknowledging the role agriculture can Setting a clear international standard or grated in environmental and sustainability
play in the mitigation of and adaptation to “code of conduct” for large-scale for- discussions, including EarthSummit 2012
climate change (see Chapter 4). eign investment in land has received too or the ongoing climate change debate?
little attention.
China’s focus on agricultural policy bore What are the new leaders of the World
fruit as total grain production exceeded African countries are not meeting their Bank, the Food and Agriculture Organiza-
570 million tons, a new record (see Chap- target of allocating at least 10 percent tion of the United Nations, and the World
ter 9). of national budgetary resources Food Programme doing to promote nutri-
to agriculture. tion security and agriculture?
India’s Parliament introduced a National
Food Security Bill to provide affordable The international community responded Are the lessons learned during the crisis
grains to more than half of its 1.2 billion slowly and too late to the disaster that in the Horn of Africa being applied to
people (see Chapter 9). was unfolding in the Horn of Africa (see increase effectiveness and impact when
Chapter 3). addressing the emerging crises in the
New initiatives like Feed the Future, the
Sahel and North Korea?
Global Agriculture and Food Security Hunger still persists globally: nearly one
Program, and South-South cooperations billion people go hungry every day. The How is the balance of power shifting in
boosted agriculture investments. 2011 Global Hunger Index indicates that agricultural research, technology, produc-
more than two dozen countries have tion, and trade, with emerging economies
Promoting mother and child nutrition
“alarming” or “extremely alarming” hun- pushing the agricultural agenda? (See
gained momentum as it became widely
ger levels. Chapter 8.)
accepted that the nutrition in the 1,000
days between conception and a child’s Which countries are making the most
second birthday are of crucial importance progress toward achieving the first Millen-
for the child’s future. nium Development Goal, and why?
Overview 9

21. sometimes overshadowed by more dramatic events policies are where global forces translate into on-
and acute crises. We will soon reach the 2015 tar- the-ground impact, so good governance and effec-
get date of the Millennium Development Goals, tive leadership and implementation can make a big
almost certainly without having met the goal of difference. Some countries would benefit greatly
halving hunger globally. South Asia and Sub- from a stronger emphasis on building the capac-
Saharan Africa, in particular, still show alarm- ity—that is, the skills and knowledge—of policy-
ing levels of food and nutrition insecurity, despite makers and program implementers at all levels.
the progress achieved in recent years. In addition, This outlook points to some high-priority areas
more work will be needed to reach an effective for action in 2012. First, the G20 should take fur-
international agreement on climate change. ther steps to rein in food price volatility by, for
We must find new ways to exploit the links example, doing more to reduce the competition
between agriculture and other sectors, including between biofuel and food production and to dis-
health, nutrition, water, and energy. Paying attention courage trade restrictions that exacerbate price
to gender equity will help make investments and swings. Second, the international community
interventions in these areas more effective. Because should consolidate global and regional agricul-
agriculture is at the nexus of all of these areas, we tural growth strategies and create or strengthen
need to leverage it for broad development outcomes. the institutions and capacities needed to make
At the same time, it will be important to set up a these strategies work. In particular, this year’s G8
global system to measure, track, and monitor the summit should work to ensure that the industrial
impacts among agriculture, food and nutrition secu- countries meet their financial commitment in
rity, energy, and natural resources. In addition, to support of a country-led development process for
allocate resources more effectively, we should begin achieving food security in developing countries.
to base the prices of natural resources and food on Third, participants in the Rio+20 meeting should
their full value to society, including their social and integrate economic, social, and environmental
environmental costs, such as impacts on climate sustainability efforts and commit to concrete
change and health. All of these actions require skills action to meet the long-term challenges of devel-
and knowledge at the national and local level, so opment, including poor nutrition, degraded soils,
capacity building can help improve outcomes. and scarce water. Finally, a broad intersectoral
These events and challenges will play out in dif- coalition should work together to address issues
ferent ways in each country. National and local related to nutrition, food, and health. ■
10 Major Food Policy Developments in 2011

22. What Influenced Food
Policy in 2011?
Most spectacular in 2011 was the turn of events on world When food prices rose in 2008, hasty responses like ban-
wheat markets from price spike to near collapse: In the ning food exports helped drive 100 million people into
spring the media expected a second world food crisis, pos- poverty—the first increase in decades. When food prices
sibly worse than 2007–08. Until July, and particularly head rose again in 2011, the world avoided poor policy responses
of the meeting of G20 agricultural ministers, speculators and invested instead in long-term food security. During
and index funds were being accused more than ever of the world’s worst drought in 60 years, this approach was
causing hunger. But then wheat prices dropped, and atten- validated by Kenya and Ethiopia’s ability to avoid famine,
tion to speculation waned, hopefully making room for thanks in part to President Obama’s Feed the Future initia-
policy attention to larger, more long-term issues, such as tive and its emphasis on building resilience through agri-
rural finance. cultural development.
—Michiel A. Keyzer, Director, Centre for World Food —Rajiv Shah, Administrator,
Studies, VU University, Amsterdam United States Agency for International Development,
Washington, DC
Amid drought in the Horn of Africa, floods in South East
Asia, and rain shortfalls in the Sahel, 2011 has clearly In 2011 two events were important: one was the eighth
shown the devastating impact of climate-related shocks on consecutive year of bumper harvest of Chinese grains at
food security. These crises have focused policy attention on a record of 571 million tons, which surely contributes to a
the urgent need to build the resilience of smallholder agri- more stable world grain market; and the other was the G20
culture and poor rural people’s livelihoods. Going forward, Agriculture Ministers Summit in Paris. A new era of inter-
and in light of the UN Climate Change Conference in Dur- national cooperation on global food security is approaching
ban, resilience is likely to remain a critical component of and emerging countries such as Brazil, China, India, and
food security policies, initiatives, and development efforts Indonesia will play increasingly important roles.
at all levels. —Jiayang Li, President, Chinese Academy of Agricultural
Sciences, Beijing
—Kanayo F. Nwanze, President, International Fund for
Agricultural Development, Rome
The developing world was again hit by food price and sup-
The Arab Spring posed the biggest challenge to food policy ply volatility in 2011. In contrast to 2008, the demand for
in 2011—and showed why it matters. Arab countries are effective actions to advance food and nutritional security
squeezed on all sides by high imported food prices, spiral- was front and center. The Committee on World Food Secu-
ing costs of food subsidies, and the dual burdens of mal- rity explicitly stated that agricultural policies and pub-
nutrition and obesity, which will rise with population lic investment should prioritize nutrition and sustainable
growth. The region is also the most vulnerable to global small-scale food production and increase the resilience of
warming, water scarcity, and export bans. Without good local and traditional food systems and biodiversity, a goal
policy and research, feeding the Arab world will grow ever we are fully committed to implementing.
more challenging. —Kathy Spahn, President and Chief Executive Officer,
Helen Keller International, New York
—John Parker, Globalization Editor,
Economist, London
WHAT INFLUENCED FOOD POLICY IN 2011? 11

23. The Democratic Republic of the Congo, which contains stories of 2011, and has real potential to influence national
75 percent of the world’s second largest rainforest, wants to food policy.
be a leader in reducing emissions from forests. Financing —Rachel Kyte, Vice President of Sustainable
is expected to run in the billions of dollars, which demon- Development, World Bank, Washington, DC
strates the government’s increased commitment to agri-
culture. Speculation in agricultural commodities was also The G20 process, with the creation of the Agricultural
high on the agenda in 2011. There is little evidence that Market Information System and general recognition of the
speculators systematically drive food prices, but they do importance of better information significantly influenced
affect price volatility. However, limiting speculative trading food policy in 2011. So did the growing acceptance of the
might do more harm than good. The G20 decided to create UN Food and Agriculture Organization’s findings (in the
more transparency and asked the UN’s Food and Agricul- 2011 State of Food and Agriculture report) that promot-
ture Organization to monitor trading more closely. ing gender equality and equity would bring the number of
—Eric Tollens, Professor Emeritus, Katholieke hungry down by 150 million. Also FAO’s launch of a new
Universiteit, Leuven, Belgium agricultural paradigm, “Save and Grow,” which is designed
to increase global food production sustainably.
For the first time the G20 placed a high priority on agricul- —José Graziano da Silva, Director General, Food and
ture. Price volatility and food security were priorities of the Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome
French presidency. Interest in these issues continues into
2012 under the Mexican presidency and is likely to gener- The increasing momentum of the Scaling Up Nutrition
ate significant investments in agriculture, thus addressing movement was evident in 2011. The movement supported
declining productivity. country-led efforts to improve nutrition through coopera-
—Justin Yifu Lin, Senior Vice President and Chief tive partners working across sectors toward a common
Economist, World Bank, Washington, DC goal. Scaling Up Nutrition promotes both direct nutri-
tion interventions and nutrition-sensitive strategies such
Persistent high food prices, among other things, triggered as improving agricultural practices to increase availabil-
the formation of land markets, leading to excessive com- ity of nutrient-rich crops. The 2011 international confer-
mercial pressure on land in a context of ill-defined property ence “Leveraging Agriculture for Improving Nutrition
rights. A new landscape of energy policy emerged—shale and Health,” coordinated by the 2020 Vision Initiative of
gas, bioenergy, and partial exits from atomic energy in IFPRI, sparked the interests of global counterparts and
Germany and Japan. It comes with indirect linkages to served as a timely complement to the Scaling Up Nutrition
agriculture (in the form of opportunity costs) and raises collective effort.
challenges to address climate change. Food policy was also —Emorn Wasantwisut, Senior Advisor, Institute of
significantly advanced by the G20 debate and proposals Nutrition, Mahidol University, Salaya, Thailand
to increase agriculture aid, commodity trading improve-
ments, and the related US and European follow-up that will I am pleased with last year’s extraordinary commitment
accommodate more transparency and less speculation. by world leaders to improve human nutrition, which has
—Joachim von Braun, Director, Department for Economic stimulated the emergence of a country-led movement to
and Technological Change, Center for Development “Scale Up Nutrition.” I am particularly impressed with
Research, Bonn, Germany the way this has engaged a broad range of stakeholders
and is encouraging nutrition-sensitive agricultural, indus-
Climate-smart agriculture increases productivity, strength- trial, health, education, employment, social welfare, and
ens farmers’ resilience, and reduces agriculture’s con- economic policies. I welcome the focus on improving the
tribution to climate change by reducing greenhouse gas coverage of specific actions to improve nutrition from
emissions and increasing carbon storage on farmland. conception to a child’s second birthday and on politi-
Growing global recognition of climate-smart agricul- cal accountability for equitable improvement in nutri-
ture and its potential to offer triple wins for food security, tion within the context of policies for food, health, and
adaptation and mitigation was one of the major success social security.
—David Nabarro, Special Representative of the United
Nations Secretary General on Food Security
and Nutrition, New York
12 WHAT INFLUENCED FOOD POLICY IN 2011?

24. For the eighth consecutive year, China’s total grain pro- In Canada, the most important food policy event was influ-
duction increased, reaching 571 million tons last year enced by ideology rather than market or resource policy
and exceeding 550 metric tons for the first time in half shifts: the government’s decision to abolish the Canadian
a century. This helped China fight domestic consumer- Wheat Board which for decades has sold all Western Cana-
price inflation and stabilize world food prices. Also, a dian wheat. This will open up new market opportunities for
study group headed by Yuan Longping, China’s father of the international wheat majors. On water issues, there were
hybrid rice, announced that the yield of hybrid rice per Mu interesting indications that the Indian national government
exceeds 900 kilogram in one of its trial sites. This would is looking for the political and financial space to assume a
contribute greatly to Chinese and world food security. larger role, for example, by including major irrigation canal
—Keming Qian, Director General, Department of investments in its next five-year plan.
Development and Planning, Ministry of —Margaret Catley-Carlson, Chair, Crop Diversity Trust,
Agriculture, Beijing Rome, and Patron, Global Water Partnership, Stockholm
In 2011 Oxfam launched its most ambitious campaign: In our 2011 World Disasters Report, the IFRC addressed one
GROW. Food prices, flattening yields, climate change, of the most persistent critical issues facing our word today:
unfair trade, failing markets, inequality between men and hunger. As an Ethiopian, I saw first-hand my country’s ter-
women and land grabs are all connected and contributing rible famine and I know what it means for people to starve.
to a global food system that is dominated by a few powerful Globally, an estimated 925 million people do not have
governments and companies, while failing the majority of enough to eat, and as the population grows between now and
people. GROW will push policy and practice changes from 2050, global food supplies will come under even greater pres-
the global to local levels to grow more food more fairly sure. Governments must acknowledge the right to food and
and sustainably. implement comprehensive, community-centered hunger pre-
—Jeremy Hobbs, Executive Director, Oxfam vention programs now and increase equitable and sustain-
International, Oxford, England able investments in food security.
—Bekele Geleta, Secretary General, International
The destabilizing effects and uncertainties created by the Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent
recent price hikes of major staple foods and the food crises Societies, Geneva
and famine in the Horn of Africa, have raised food security
concerns to a higher political level, receiving more atten- The G20 focused on food security and price volatility and
tion and priority consideration than in the past in the agen- led to international research initiatives to secure an ade-
das of decisionmakers in governments. This is an important quate level of production. The Wheat Initiative was decided
step forward, since food security is a highly political issue to promote highly productive wheat systems adapted to
that requires political solutions, rather than a humanitar- climate change. The GEO-GLAM project aims to moni-
ian issue that needs technical solutions as it was often seen tor cultivated areas in order to predict harvests, as better
in the past. anticipation prevents the formation of “bubbles” in agricul-
—Carlos Pérez del Castillo, Chair, CGIAR Consortium tural markets. In 2011, G20 decisions represented a major
Board, Montpellier, France step forward in coordinating efforts to improve World
Food Security.
The importance of an integrated approach to food security —Marion Guillou, Chief Executive Officer,
that IFPRI has helped prioritize is vital in today’s world. French National Institute for Agricultural
The year 2011 and the famine in the Horn of Africa rein- Research, Paris
forced the role of social safety net programs in providing a
broad package of support for the most vulnerable—from
specialized nutrition products to protect the minds and
bodies of young children, to investments in sustainable
land management to help communities’ build resiliency
to drought.
—Josette Sheeran, Executive Director, World Food
Programme, Rome
WHAT INFLUENCED FOOD POLICY IN 2011? 13

26. Chapter 2
FOOD PRICES
Riding the Rollercoaster
Maximo Torero, IFPRI
T he world faces a new food economy
that likely involves both higher and more
volatile food prices, and evidence of both
phenomena was on view in 2011. After the food price
crisis of 2007–08, food prices started rising again in
June 2010, with international prices of maize and wheat
roughly doubling by May 2011. The peak came in Feb-
ruary 2011, in a spike that was even more pronounced
than that of 2008, according to the food price index of
the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations. When prices of specific commodities are
adjusted for inflation, though, the 2011 price spike did
not reach the levels of 2008 (Figure 1).
Although the food price spikes of 2008 and 2011 did not reach the heights of
the 1970s, price volatility—the amplitude of price movements over a particular
period of time—has been at its highest level in the past 50 years. This volatility
has affected wheat and maize prices in particular. For hard wheat, for exam-
ple, there were an average of 27 days of excessive price volatility a year between
January 2001 and December 2006 (according to a measure of price volatility
recently developed at IFPRI1). From January 2007 to December 2011, the average
number of days of excessive volatility more than doubled to 76 a year (Figure 2).2
High and volatile food prices are two different phenomena with distinct
implications for consumers and producers. High food prices may harm poorer

27. FIGURE 1 Inflation-adjusted prices of agricultural commodities and oil, 1990–2011
450 100
90
Weekly crude oil prices (US$ per barrel)
400 Maize
Weekly agricultural commodity
Hard wheat 80
350
prices (US$ per metric ton)
Rice
70
300 Soybeans
Crude oil 60
250
50
200
40
150
30
100
20
50 10
0 0
2011
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, FAOSTAT database, http://faostat.fao.org/; International Grains Council, World
Grain Statistics 2009 (London, 2009); US Energy Information Administration, World Crude Oil Prices (online data) (Washington, DC, 2011), www.
eia.gov. Note: Prices are adjusted for inflation using a consumer price index base year of 1982–84 (that is, 1982–84 = 100). Maize is US No. 2 Yel-
low, wheat is US No. 2 Hard Red Winter, rice is White Thai A1 Super, soybeans are US No. 1 Yellow, and crude oil is the spot price for West Texas
Intermediate at Cushing, Oklahoma.
consumers because they need to spend more and pesticides? Should they pay for high-quality
money on their food purchases and therefore may seeds? Without a good idea of how much they will
have to cut back on the quantity or the quality of earn from their products, farmers may become
the food they buy or economize on other needed more pessimistic in their long-term planning and
goods and services. For food producers, higher dampen their investments in areas that could
food prices could raise their incomes—but only improve their productivity. (The positive rela-
if they are net sellers of food, if increased global tionship between price volatility and producers’
prices feed through to their local markets, and if the expected losses can be modeled in a simple profit
price developments on global markets do not also maximization model assuming producers are price
increase their production costs. For many produc- takers. Still, it is important to mention that there
ers, particularly smallholders, some of these condi- is no uniform empirical evidence of the behavioral
tions were not met in the food price crisis of 2011. response of producers to volatility.) By reducing
Apart from these effects of high food prices, supply, such a response could lead to higher prices,
price volatility also has significant effects on food which in turn would hurt consumers.
producers and consumers. Greater price volatility It is important to remember that in rural areas
can lead to greater potential losses for producers the line between food consumers and producers is
because it implies price changes that are larger and blurry. Many households both consume and pro-
faster than what producers can adjust to. Uncer- duce agricultural commodities. Therefore, if prices
tainty about prices makes it more difficult for farm- become more volatile and these households reduce
ers to make sound decisions about how and what their spending on seeds, fertilizer, and other inputs,
to produce. For example, which crops should they this may affect the amount of food available for
produce? Should they invest in expensive fertilizers their own consumption. And even if the households
16 Riding the Rollercoaster

28. FIGURE 2 Excessive food price variability for with biofuel mandates, farmers have ramped up
hard wheat production of such crops, increasing the demand
for land, water, and nutrients—and therefore the
160
production costs of other food crops. Furthermore,
140
the production of biofuel crops strengthens the
excessive price volatility
Number of days of
120 links between the highly volatile energy markets
100 and food markets, thereby increasing the volatility
80 of food prices. With more countries, such as India
and Peru, enacting biofuel mandates, food price
60
volatility is likely to increase even further. Flexible
40
biofuel mandates that will not contribute to food
20 price volatility could represent alternative mecha-
0 nisms to reduce the potentially negative impact
of biofuel policies.3
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
Extreme weather and climate change. Ex-­
treme weather events helped raise food prices and
Source: C. Martins-Filho, F. Yao, and M. Torero, “High Order Con-
ditional Quantile Estimation Based on Nonparametric Models of fuel price volatility in 2007–08 and 2010–11,4 and
Regression,” www.foodsecurityportal.org/sites/default/files/ climate scenarios predict more variable weather
martins-filho_torero_yao_2011_0.pdf. Accessed April 3, 2012.
events in the future.5 More intense and frequent
natural disasters (such as droughts and floods)
are net sellers of food, producing less and having resulting from climate change could trigger sig-
less to sell will reduce their household income and nificant yield losses and subsequent price increases
thus still affect their consumption decisions. and higher volatility. Indeed, IFPRI simulations
Finally, increased price volatility over time can show that climate change is likely to push prices up,
also generate larger profits for investors, drawing regardless of whether population (and thus demand
new players into the market for agricultural com- for food) grows faster or slower. In contrast to the
modities. Increased price volatility may thus lead to 20th century, when inflation-adjusted prices of
increased—and potentially speculative—trading staple grains declined, in the first half of the 21st
that in turn can exacerbate price swings further. century, these prices are likely to rise.6
Commodity futures trading. One signal of
higher price volatility has been the significant
DRIVERS BEHIND RECENT FOOD
PRICE VOLATILITY
Among the key factors playing a role in creat- FIGURE 3 Share of US maize crop used to
produce ethanol, 1995–2010
ing price volatility are increasing biofuel produc-
tion, the medium- and long-term effects of climate 400 40
Maize production
(millions of metric tons)
change, and higher levels of trading in commodity 350 % of maize 35
Maize production
used for ethanol
futures markets. Export restrictions in important 300 30
% of maize
food-producing countries also contributed to price 250 25
increases and market jitters in 2010 and 2011. 200 20
Biofuel policies. With oil prices at significantly 150 15
high levels during 2011, and with the European 100 10
Union and the United States subsidizing and set- 50 5
0 0
ting mandates for biofuel production, farmers
1995 2000 2005 2010
have shifted their cultivation toward biofuel crops,
most of which are also used as food or feed, such as Source: Data from Earth Policy Institute, Data Center: Climate, Energy,
maize, sugar, and oilseeds (Figure 3). To comply and Transportation (2011), www.earth-policy.org/data_center/C23.
Food Prices 17

29. increase in the volume of agricultural commod- Changes in futures prices have been shown to
ity futures traded in the Chicago Board of Trade, lead to changes in day-to-day, or “spot,” prices. This
a leading agricultural futures exchange. (Futures pattern of increasing commodity futures trading
are contracts between a buyer and a seller that and higher prices for commodity futures can create
specify a current price for a commodity to be a vicious circle that exacerbates the volatility of spot
delivered on a certain date in the future. These prices for food commodities to excessive levels.7
contracts can themselves be traded by inves- Other factors. Today’s agricultural markets
tors who do not physically own the commod- have three characteristics that make the price
ity or plan to take delivery of it.) From 2005 to responses to these challenges more extreme.
2006, the average monthly volume of futures First, export markets for the main staple com-
trading for wheat and maize grew by more than modities—rice, maize, wheat, and soybeans—are
60 percent. In 2007, traded volumes again rose either highly concentrated in a few countries or
significantly for wheat, maize, rice, and soybeans. very “thin” (that is, only a small share of produc-
In fact, the average monthly volume of trading tion is traded) (Figure 5). Given these high levels
in soybean futures was 40 percent larger than of concentration, the world’s capacity to cope with
in 2006 (Figure 4). Futures trading continued shocks is limited. Any incidence of poor weather
to increase during 2010–11 for all commodi- or other production shocks in these countries
ties. Between March 2006 and December 2011, will immediately affect global prices and price
the volume of commodity index funds trading volatility. Similarly, any policy changes—such as
increased (in terms of the number of transactions trade bans, customs taxes, or other restrictions on
of 5,000 bushels) by 157 percent, 200 percent, exports—in any of the top exporters will signifi-
and 169 percent for maize, soybeans, and soft cantly affect the levels and volatility of food prices
wheat at the Chicago Board of Trade and by (see Figure 6). Research suggests that such poli-
124 percent for hard wheat at the Kansas City cies explained almost 40 percent of the increase in
Board of Trade. Investors have increased their the world market price for rice during the 2007–08
trading of food commodity futures, but only food price crisis.8
2 percent of these futures contracts have resulted Second, the world’s stocks of cereals are now
in the delivery of real goods. For maize, for exam- at historically low levels (Figure 7). This situation
ple, the volume of futures traded on exchanges leaves the world vulnerable to food price spikes and
worldwide is more than three times greater than threatens the proper functioning of markets. The
the global production of maize. world’s cereals stocks, measured as a ratio of stocks
FIGURE 4 Monthly volume of futures trading, 2002–11
10
on future contracts (millions)
9 Wheat
Total number of trades
8 Maize
7 Soybeans
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Source: Chicago Board of Trade.
18 Riding the Rollercoaster

30. FIGURE 5 Major exporters’ shares of global maize, wheat, and rice exports, 2008
MAIZE WHEAT RICE RICE
84% 63% 95% (paddy)
85% (milled)
United States - 53.0% United States - 22.9% United States - 90.4% Thailand - 36.4%
Argentina - 15.1% France - 12.4% Paraguay - 1.4% Vietnam - 19.9%
Brazil - 6.3% Canada - 12.0% France - 1.2% Pakistan - 10.9%
France - 6.0% Russian Federation - 8.9% China - 1.1% India - 10.4%
India - 3.5% Argentina - 6.7% Brazil - 0.9% United States - 7.2%
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, FAOSTAT database, http://faostat.fao.org/. Note: Paddy rice is mostly exported
by the United States, and milled rice is exported by other countries.
to cereals use, were similarly very low when wheat allow for the transport, marketing, and processing
prices spiked in the 1970s, 1995–96, 2007–08, and of grains.9 Given the current low levels, sometimes
2010–11. This indicates that for the market to func- only a small dip in grain stocks leads to problems.
tion effectively, the food system must hold a mini- In 2007–08 grain stocks were only about 60 mil-
mum level of grain stocks to be able to respond lion tons less than in 2004–05, representing a
to unexpected shocks (such as bad weather) and decline of just 2.7 percent of global production. But
when prices rose sharply in 2007–08, this differ-
ence in grain stocks was enough to contribute to
FIGURE 6 Effects of trade policy reactions for
selected countries on world wheat prices serious price increases, especially for commodi-
ties whose production is concentrated in just a few
■ Effects of interactions between import and export policies countries, such as rice.10
■ Decrease in import duties (to keep domestic prices low)
■ Increase in export taxes (to keep domestic prices low)
■ Initial demand increase or supply decrease
FIGURE 7 Ratio of cereals stocks to use,
25 1996/97–2011/12
Increase in world wheat prices (percent)
World
20 35
World excluding China
use ratio, 1996–2011
30
Cereals stocks to
Effect
of policy 25
15 reactions
20
15
10
10
Effect of the 5
5 initial change in 0
demand or supply
2004/05
2008/09
2005/06
2000/01
2003/04
2006/07
1998/99
2002/03
1999/00
1996/97
2009/10
2007/08
2001/02
1997/98
2010/11
2011/12
0
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations,
Source: A. Bouet and D. Laborde, Economics of Export Taxation in a Food Outlook (Rome, various years). Note: World excluding China is
Context of Food Crisis: A Theoretical and CGE Approach Contribution, shown because China is an outlier in terms of reserves, and there are
IFPRI Discussion Paper 994 (Washington, DC: International Food Policy several questions about the quality of its reports.
Research Institute, 2010).
Food Prices 19

31. Third, appropriate and timely information on temporary disruptions in supply. The first, from
food production, stock levels, and price forecast- Brian Wright and Alex Evans, is for an interna-
ing is sorely lacking. When information deficits tional food agency,11 following the example of the
lead to overreactions by policymakers, the result International Energy Agency. This food agency
can be soaring prices. would report on stock levels and develop proto-
cols for the global response to shortages to help
prevent market panic. Two criticisms have been
ACTIONS AND PROPOSALS
directed at this proposal. First, generating better
In the wake of the two recent food price crises, information on stocks will likely involve consider-
some actions have been taken and many propos- able effort and international coordination—and
als have been put forward to prevent such events therefore cost. Currently, information is lacking
from occurring again. These can be grouped by the not only on the public stocks held by key pro-
objectives they try to achieve: (1) better informa- ducer countries such as China and India, but also
tion and more research, (2) easier trade in agricul- on the stocks held by private enterprises, which
tural commodities, (3) larger food reserves and consider them commercial secrets. Second, with
better-managed grain stocks, (4) more active use this information asymmetry, it is not clear how the
of financial instruments to influence agricultural proposed agency would identify the threshold of
commodity markets, and (5) stricter regulation stocks at which international collaboration would
of these markets. Scholars and policymakers are be required or how countries would agree on an
debating the merits, feasibility, and likely effective- emergency response.
ness of many aspects of these proposals. The second proposal, from Carlos Martins-
Better information and more research. Rec- Filho, Maximo Torero, and Feng Yao, consists of an
ognizing the need for better information, the early-warning mechanism for identifying abnor-
Group of 20 (G20) countries agreed in June 2011 mally high price volatility in the futures prices of
to launch the Agricultural Market Information Sys- staple food crops on a daily basis.12 This informa-
tem (AMIS). The AMIS is designed to encourage tion could help reduce the potential asymmetry
major players in global agrifood markets to cooper- of information between buyers and sellers and
ate more and to share data and information. If it is thereby help dampen price volatility. There is one
properly linked to existing early warning systems main caveat for this model: it currently operates
at global and national levels, it could substantially only for commodities traded on the futures market,
improve countries’ ability to make sound decisions but it could be extended to spot markets if better
on food security and help reduce price volatility. price information existed.
To make the AMIS effective, countries and regions Easier trade in agricultural commodities. In
need to develop transparent and publicly accessible the 2007–08 and 2010–11 food price crises, many
systems for monitoring food security and collect- countries responded by cutting exports or boost-
ing data so that they can provide appropriate infor- ing imports in ways that worsened price increases.
mation on food production balances and reserves. Some proposals therefore aim to facilitate trade to
In addition, the system will require the full partici- reduce risks in grain trading when supplies are low
pation of private agrifood companies, which hold and to avoid disruptions in global grain markets.
much of the world’s stocks of grain. So far, private One proposal is for a food import financing facility
companies are merely urged to participate in the that would help poor countries afford food imports
AMIS on a voluntary basis, and without their par- at times of high prices, as well as an international
ticipation the information will be incomplete and grain clearinghouse arrangement to ensure the
the system will have limited impact. availability of staple food imports.13 This clearing-
Two other key proposals have been made to house would guarantee contracts for grain deliver-
improve information and coordination in ways ies, reducing the risk that exporters would renege
that would increase market confidence and relieve on contracts when supplies are tight. In a different
20 Riding the Rollercoaster

32. BOX 1
Trade Restrictions Amplify Food Price Spikes
Kym Anderson, University of Adelaide
I n 2011 export bans continued to hurt
poor people. Governments often raise
import barriers during turbulent times to
As a result, many of them lowered their
food import restrictions, and some even
switched to food-import subsidies. This
and wheat of around two-fifths, one-
fifth, and one-tenth, respectively;
• domestic prices of wheat would have
mitigate immediate domestic concerns further exacerbated the international price
risen less on average across all coun-
such as unemployment, but during the spike—which meant it weakened the ini-
tries if trade restrictions had not been
recent global financial and food price tial attempt by food-exporting countries
changed; and
crises some countries raised export bar- to shield their consumers.
riers.1 Such government action aims to New evidence on the extent of the • altered trade restrictions caused rice
make exporting food more difficult and change in domestic relative to inter- price increases in both high-income
expensive, thereby protecting domestic national prices in food exporting and and developing countries to be only
consumers from the effects of an interna- importing countries reveals that one-quarter to one-third less than
tional food price spike. Examples in 2011 what they otherwise would have been.
• historically, only around half the move-
were bans on grain exports in Tanzania,
ment in international food prices The policy conclusion is this: in our
Ethiopia, and Russia—all of which were
is transmitted to domestic markets globalizing world, attempts to insulate
lifted before the end of the year. Such
within the first year; domestic consumers from international
responses exacerbate the price spike (by
food price spikes are mostly futile. Those
restricting supplies in the international • both grain-exporting and grain-import-
actions hurt all food-importing countries
market) and affect the international wel- ing countries react to food price spikes
by increasing the price of their imports.
fare transfer associated with that spike in with a similar speed and on a similar
Stronger World Trade Organization dis-
terms of trade (which defines how much a scale when restricting trade;
ciplines on both exports and imports are
country needs to export in exchange for a
• the changes in restrictions on global clearly needed to limit how much damage
given import volume).2
grain trade during 2006–08 are such beggar-thy-neighbor government
Much less appreciated is the fact that
responsible for estimated increases in responses can do in the global market-
governments of food-importing countries
the international prices of rice, maize, place when food prices spike.
are equally concerned for their consumers.
approach, other observers propose preventing humanitarian assistance, could be managed by the
export bans to avoid any disruption of supplies.14 World Food Programme. In 2011, in response to
Larger food reserves and better-managed this proposal, the G20 proposed studying the feasi-
grain stocks. Proposals have been put forth for bility of a global humanitarian emergency reserve
physical reserves, including emergency reserves,15 through a pilot program in West Africa under the
international coordinated grain reserves,16 regional leadership of the Economic Community of West
reserves, and country-level reserves. African States and with the support of the World
An emergency reserve is a modest stock of Food Programme.
about 300,000–500,000 metric tons of basic Global or regional reserves will require a trigger
grains—about 5 percent of current global food mechanism that determines when to release stocks
aid flows—which would be supplied by the main to calm markets in times of stress, and it is essen-
grain-producing countries and funded by a group tial that such a mechanism be transparent. The
of more than a dozen countries. This reserve, to proposed early warning system for price volatility,
be used exclusively for emergency response and mentioned earlier, could be a solution.
Food Prices 21

33. Finally, a physical reserve, whether regional or consumers to hedge against downside or upside
global, will not resolve the problem of links among price risks on a pilot basis. The second is a World
the financial, energy, and food commodity mar- Bank proposal to facilitate governments’ access
kets. This is a key problem that could be extremely to risk management markets. It entails helping to
relevant if excessive speculation is indeed a cause of structure and execute financial and physical com-
extreme price spikes. modity risk hedging and to build capacity related
More active use of financial instruments. Two to the legal, regulatory, and technical requirements
major proposals are linked to the use of financial associated with using these tools. Both of these
instruments: (1) virtual reserves17 and (2) a tool- initiatives will need to be evaluated to ensure their
box of market-based risk management tools. effectiveness, viability, and sustainability.
A virtual reserve would involve intervening in Stricter regulation. Since late 2005 problems
futures markets based on price volatility data from have plagued the futures and cash markets for
the early warning mechanism already described or, maize, soybeans, and wheat. The main problem
in extreme cases, a decision by a technical commit- is lack of convergence between cash and futures
tee. This intervention would consist of executing prices. To address this issue, the US Commodity
a number of progressive short sales (that is, sell- Futures Trading Commission, other agencies in
ing a firm promise to deliver the commodity at a the US government, and the European Commis-
later date at a specified price) until futures prices sion, along with the futures industry, have moved
and spot prices decline to specified acceptable lev- forward with setting seasonal storage rates, impos-
els. This increase in short sales would reduce spot ing limits on the number of delivery certificates
prices and should lower extreme price volatility by an entity can hold for noncommercial purposes,
cutting the probability of abnormal returns. Most and putting out an additional issue of the Commit-
of the time, futures contracts would be settled ments of Traders report to increase transparency.
through offsetting purchases or sales—in other For example, in October 2011 the US Commod-
words, the whole operation would be virtual. Only ity Futures Trading Commission approved caps on
rarely would it be necessary to obtain the neces- speculation in food, energy, and metals, restrict-
sary grain supply to comply with futures contract ing the size of positions to 25 percent of deliver-
delivery requirements. A virtual reserve has several able supply. If the structural changes put in place
advantages compared with a physical reserve: it is do not significantly improve the price convergence
just a signaling mechanism; it does not put more between futures and cash prices, then a cash-set-
stress on commodity markets; it does not incur the tled contract must be seriously considered.
significant storage and opportunity costs of a phys-
ical reserve; it resolves the problem of the inter-
CONCLUSIONS
linkages between the financial and the commodity
markets; and given that it is only a signal, it should The global food price crises of 2007–08 and 2010–
have only a minimal effect on markets. 11 led to economic difficulties for the poor, con-
The toolbox, proposed in the 2011 meeting of tributed to political turmoil in many countries,
the G20 ministers of agriculture, would include and in the long run could undermine confidence
mechanisms such as physical or financial commod- in global food markets, thereby hampering these
ity price hedges, insurance, and guarantee instru- markets’ performance in balancing fundamen-
ments, as well as countercyclical lending, which tal changes in supply, demand, and production
could help vulnerable countries mitigate the risks costs. More important, food price crises can result
associated with excessive food price volatility. Two in unreasonable or unwanted price fluctuations
initiatives are being implemented. The first, under that can harm the poor, especially by compromis-
the management of the International Finance Cor- ing their nutrition security. One consequence is
poration, involves a new Agriculture Price Risk long-term, irreversible nutritional damage, espe-
Management tool that will allow producers and cially among children. Therefore these recent food
22 Riding the Rollercoaster

34. BOX 2
market episodes highlight the need to reform the
architecture of international financial and agricul-
tural markets to address the problem of price spikes Rethinking the Role
and protect the most needy and vulnerable.
In response to the food price crises, a mix of of Food Reserves
policy actions have been taken. Many countries Peter Timmer, Professor Emeritus, Harvard University
have tried to build up costly national reserves, and
others have focused on increasing self-sufficiency.
Still others have lost confidence in the reliability of I n 2011, the world again saw proof that large food reserves
dampen the volatility of food prices, as large rice stocks in
India kept global rice prices from following wheat and maize
food trade in global markets, which has led some
countries to acquire farmland overseas to ensure prices to record high levels. Although they are costly to main-
tain, larger food reserves provide supplies in times of crisis. More
national food security. In addition, some countries
importantly, in vulnerable countries, reserves build confidence
are pressing for more regulation of commodity
that trade remains the most efficient mechanism for stabilizing
exchanges—however, whether this would pre-
domestic food economies. Low levels of foodgrain reserves, on
vent extreme price spikes or instead distort mar- the other hand, make commodity markets nervous and subject
kets even further is questioned. All of these policy to sudden demand and supply shocks—and even to speculative
actions threaten to move food and agriculture mar- activities. Therefore, if less volatile food prices are desired, two
kets further away from efficient arrangements. A questions remain: How large should grain reserves be? And who
more promising step may be regionally coordinated should own them?
reserves, as recently planned by the Association Private markets have a clear and coherent answer to the first
of Southeast Asian Nations. This global problem question, but only if governments stay out of the business of
needs international institutional responses. holding grain stocks. Long-standing models show that optimal
The analysis here points to three clear messages. storage levels exist when price expectations match the expected
First, we need to respond to the structural prob- returns from holding grain in storage. Unfortunately, with
regards to ownership, foodgrain stocks held in private hands are
lems faced by the agricultural sector—that is, the
usually insufficient to provide a politically acceptable level of
concentration of global exports of staple grains
food security, especially in large countries. This typically results
among just a few exporters, the low levels of global
in governments stepping in to stabilize domestic food prices,
grain stocks, and the lack of appropriate informa- using one of two basic methods: (1) imposing restrictions on
tion. Second, it is crucial to evaluate the effects of food trade, which tends to increase price volatility in world mar-
policies designed to promote biofuels and invest- kets, or (2) enabling public ownership of food reserves, which
ments in derivative markets, such as commodity can be expensive.
futures, as well as the limited actions taken to cope The evidence supporting the need for large grain reserves
with the risks of climate change, such as weather clearly exists, but collective action at the global level is not likely.
insurance. Finally, we will need to carefully moni- Helping countries build up their own domestic reserves, how-
tor many current actions being taken to reduce the ever, is possible. Larger reserves will help stabilize the global
frequency of price spikes and excessive volatility to food economy and thus allow trade to play a larger (and less
assess how cost-effectively they cope with the new disruptive) role. If the international development community, in
partnership with governments of large countries, wants a more
developments in global food markets. ■
stable global food economy, we need to change the long-run
incentives for stockholding behavior and use increased stocks
to build confidence in the role of the international market for
foodgrains. Because holding larger stocks will turn out to be very
expensive, a scenario can be imagined where the larger stocks
are built gradually and steadily create renewed confidence in the
world grain market as prices become more stable. Stocks will
then be reduced (gradually) as the reality of the fiscal burden
sinks in. What should remain is the renewed trust in trade and
how it can help even large countries sustain their food security.
Food Prices 23

36. Chapter 3
DISASTERS
Déjà Vu in the
Horn of Africa
Derek Headey, IFPRI
T he year 2011 will be remembered for
some of the most severe “natural” disasters
on record. There were major natural disasters
in both developed and developing countries (see “Food
Security Food Safety” map on the following pages):
powerful earthquakes in Japan, New Zealand, and Tur-
key; major floods in Pakistan (see Box 3), Southeast Asia,
and Australia; and significant droughts in the Horn of
Africa and parts of the Sahel. Within this list, there is sub-
stantial diversity in terms of the severity of the shocks, in
whether they were slow-moving or sudden-onset disasters,
in whether the shocks were effectively one-time events or
a more regular feature of the landscape, and in whether
the societies affected by the disaster were relatively resil-
ient or relatively vulnerable.
In lowland areas of the Horn of Africa, droughts and floods are frequent
events, although the scale of the 2011 food emergency was somewhat unusual.
The drought began with failed rains in late 2010 and mid-2011. In some parts
of the Horn of Africa—particularly parts of Somalia—the drought was the
worst in 60 years. Moreover, at the peak of the drought—around August
2011—more than 13 million people were in need of food assistance. The
United Nations Children’s Fund reported that more than 320,000 children
were suffering from severe malnutrition in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and

37. FOOD SECURITY FOOD SAFETY
WHERE DISASTERS STRUCK IN 2011
GERMANY
E. COLI OUTBREAK IN GERMANY
The outbreak spread to countries all over Europe
UNITED STATES and North America. More than 4,000 people became
ill and 50 people died. As a result of food safety
concerns, consumption of fruits and vegetables
declined in Europe, and individual countries
imposed precautionary trade restrictions.
May –June 2011
FLOODING IN US MIDWEST
Numerous levees were breached along the Missouri River, flooding
MEXICO thousands of acres of farmland. Estimated losses exceeded
US$2 billion. The flooding reached the Canadian Prairies, where
property and agriculture losses were expected to surpass US$1 billion.
Summer 2011
DROUGHT IN NORTHERN MEXICO
Nearly 900,000 hectares of farmland
(some 2.2 million acres) were
devastated, and 1.7 million head of
livestock were lost.
late 2010 –January 2011
US SOUTHERN PLAINS/SOUTHWEST DROUGHT AND HEAT WAVE
A majority of range and pasture land were classified as being in
“very poor” condition. Total direct losses to crops, livestock, and
timber approached US$10 billion.
Spring/Fall 2011
NATURAL DISASTER LEGEND THE HIGH PRICE OF MOTHER NATURE
Natural disasters around the world caused a record
FLOODING US$380 billion in economic losses in 2011. That’s
more than twice the tally for 2010, and about
UAK
CYCLONE ARTHQ E AND TS
TOE UN
US$115 billion more than the previous record.
UE OMIC
A
DROUGHT CON LOS
MI
D
1E SE
ES
01
JAPANESE LOSS
EARTHQUAKE
S
2
NOMIC
CO
LOSSES
2010 E
TSUNAMI
FOOD-BORNE DISEASE
FAMINE/FOOD SCARCITY more than half of total losses in 2011
26 Déjà Vu in the Horn of Africa

38. FOOD INSECURITY IN NORTH KOREA
A bitter winter, crop loss, and a lack of resources
to secure outside cereal supplies left 3.5 million
DROUGHT IN NORTHERN CHINA people highly vulnerable to food shortages.
Hitting eight provinces and affecting 34 million people December 2011
in the north of the People's Republic of China, drought
damage to the wheat harvest was likely a factor in an
increase in worldwide wheat prices in early 2011.
late 2010 –January 2011
N. KOREA
JAPAN
CHINA
PAKISTAN
FLOODS IN CENTRAL/SOUTHERN CHINA
Floods inundated portions of 12 provinces.
Torrential rain in the Yangtze delta reduced
ERITREA THAILAND
CAMBODIA
vegetable production by 20%, pushing up
DJIBOUTI
prices for green vegetables by as much as
ETHIOPIA FLOODING IN CAMBODIA 40%. There were also reports of shortages
SOUTH SUDAN
SOMALIA More than 1.5 million people were of fruits and grains.
UGANDA
KENYA
affected by floods, which destroyed June –September 2011
more than10% of the rice crop.
November 2011
MAJOR FLOODS DURING THAI MONSOON SEASON
Severe flash flooding affected 60 out of 77 provinces,
damaging at least 1.6 million hectares of standing crops.
July –late November 2011
AUSTRALIA
DROUGHT AND FAMINE IN THE HORN OF AFRICA
Drought, conflict, and high food and fuel prices affected
more than 13 million people. Direct food transfers, cash,
and vouchers provided a lifeline to the hungry within
FLOODING CYCLONE IN EASTERN AUSTRALIA
Somalia, and Somali refugees fleeing to Djibouti, Ethiopia,
A series of floods affected 70 towns and more than
and Kenya. More than 50,000 people may have died.
200,000 people. The grain industry was expected to lose
July 2011– present
about US$400 million in revenue and experience grain
losses of up to 500,000 tons. Estimates suggested fruit
and vegetable revenue would decline by 9% for 2010–11,
FLOODING IN PAKISTAN a combined loss of approximately US$792 million.
Severe flooding affected more than 5 million December 2010 –January 2011
people and destroyed more than half a million
hectares of standing crops. 75,000 head of
livestock were lost, more than 70% of crops
were destroyed or damaged, as were almost JAPAN’S EARTHQUAKE, TSUNAMI, AND NUCLEAR CRISIS
70% of food stocks in the affected region. A 9.0 magnitude earthquake and a tsunami set off a nuclear
September 2011 crisis because of huge leaks of radiation. Detection of
radioactivity in some food samples led to concerns about food
safety and trade restrictions by some countries.
March 2011
SOURCES: Food Security and Food Safety: Earth Policy Institute; European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control; The Guardian; United States Department of Commerce National Disasters 27
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; Oxfam; PricewaterhouseCoopers; National Committee for Disaster Management (Cambodia); Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations; United Nations World Health Organization; United Nations World Food Programme; World Bank. The High Price of Mother Nature: Munich Re.

39. Somalia. The situation in Somalia was particularly development assistance? And what steps need to be
grave: 4 million people—more than half of the taken to improve development and relief efforts to
country’s population—were in crisis (Figure 1). render the peoples of the Horn more resilient to the
Of these, 750,000 were officially declared as next drought?
experiencing famine. Since mid-2011, thousands
are known to have died, especially infants and
WHY IS THE HORN OF AFRICA
small children.
SO VULNERABLE?
Given the severity of this drought, and the fre-
quency of humanitarian emergencies in the region, Unlike some of the other disasters of 2011, the crisis
several troubling questions arise. Why is the region in the Horn of Africa is not a one-time event. Since
seemingly more vulnerable now than in the past, the Great African Famine of 1982–84, vulnerabil-
especially after decades of humanitarian and ity (Figure 2) and aid dependency appear to have
BOX 3
After the Floods: Pakistan and Food Security
Paul Dorosh and Sohail J. Malik, IFPRI
U nusually heavy monsoon rains con-
tributed to severe flooding in parts
of Pakistan in 2010 and 2011. From July
• prioritizing social protection of the
most vulnerable groups,
funding and implementation—caused in
part by donor reluctance in the face of
a deteriorating governance and law and
• raising awareness about new
to August 2010, flood waters covered order situation—plagued the response
programs,
50,000 square kilometers and affected to the Pakistan 2010 floods. Thankfully,
more than 18 million people (about one- • ensuring the participation of key stake- domestic wheat prices in Pakistan
tenth of the total national population), holders (from a multisector base as remained stable due to a good harvest
resulting in about 2,000 flood-related well as the community) in the decisions in April 2010 and abundant private and
deaths, loss of 500,000 livestock, and made for each program, public stocks. The Pakistani authori-
damage to or destruction of 2.2 million ties processed 1.5 million flood-affected
• tailoring interventions to specific needs
hectares of standing crops, 1.7 million households and provided almost 900,000
of vulnerable groups, and
homes, and 10,000 schools. Then, close households with emergency shelter.
on the heels of this disaster, the 2011 • providing temporary work schemes. About 6 million people received food
flood struck southern parts of Pakistan assistance in monthly rations through
In particular, the experience of the
in August through October. Although it January 2011. The Government of
1998 Bangladesh flood—where poor
affected a smaller area than the 2010 Pakistan also initiated a Citizen’s Damage
households had a continuing debt burden
flood and only about half as many people, Compensation Program designed to give
of about US$100 (equivalent to a month
the combined human and physical costs to each of the 1.5 million affected fami-
and half’s average consumption) even
underscored the importance of continued lies a one-time payment of approximately
fifteen months after the flooding—high-
improvements in disaster rehabilitation US$230 (in the form of a debit card or
lighted the importance of private-sector
and recovery in Pakistan.1 “Watan Card”). An ex post evaluation
borrowing in the coping strategies of the
Earlier experiences in Pakistan and of program effectiveness, including tar-
poor and the need to consider substantial
other South Asian countries have shown geting of payments and other aspects,
transfers to these households to avoid
that disaster recovery should incorporate should yield additional useful lessons and
long-term adverse effects.
livelihood strategies for affected house- insights for future disaster preparedness
While Pakistan benefited from some
holds, including and relief and recovery in Pakistan.2
of the experiences of the past, delays in
28 Déjà Vu in the Horn of Africa

40. FIGURE 1 Estimated food insecurity at the height of the Horn of Africa famine
POPULATION REQUIRING ESTIMATED FOOD
ASSISTANCE SECURITY LEVELS
Djibouti 165,642
No acute food insecurity
Kenya 4,310,587 SAUDI Moderately food insecure
Somalia 4,000,000
RED ARABIA
Highly food insecure
Ethiopia 4,828,757
Extremely food insecure
TOTAL 13,304,986 SEA
Famine
Source: OCHA (09/08/11)
SUDAN
SOURCE: FEWS NET, Current Conditions
ERITREA Sana’a SEPTEMBER 2011
Asmara
Khartoum
YEMEN
TIGRAY
Gulf
Gonder
of
Aden
Weldiya
AFAR
DJIBOUTI
Djibouti Bossaso
AMHARA Dese
BENESHANGUL
GUMUZ AWDAL GALBEED
WOQOOYI BARI
DIRE DAWA Borama SANAAG
Hargeysa Burco
Addis Ababa Harrar
ADDIS ABABA HARAR
TOGDHEER
SOOL
Laas Caanood
Gambela
Garoowe
NUGAL
SOUTH GAMBELLA
ETHIOPIA
SUDAN SOMALI
Megalo Gaalkacyo
Werder
SNNPR MUDUG
Gode
OROMIYA
Dhuusamarreeb
DOLLO ADO
REFUGEE
Ferfer SOMALIA
COMPLEX Dollo BAKOOL Belet
Todenyang Ado
Weyne GALGADUD
KAKUMA Xuder
REFUGEE Moyale
p CAMP MANDERA Garbahaarey
HIRAN
MIDDLE SHABELLE
Baidoa
TURKANA MARSABIT El Wak Jowhar
GEDO BAY
Loiyanggalani
Afgooye
Lokichar WAJIR BANADIR
UGANDA WEST Wajir MIDDLE Mogadishu
POKOT
K E N YA JUBA LOWER
SHABELLE
Marka
E. MARAKWET
TRANS-NZOIA SAMBURU
ISIOLO Du’aale
BARINGO LOWER
Kampala BUNGOMA UASIN
GISHU JUBA
INDIAN
BUSIA
KAKAMEGA
NANDI
LAIKIPIA
MERU
Meru
GARISSA
SIAYA VIHIGA
NYANDARUA NITHI
KISUMU KERICHO
HOMA BAY
NYAMIRA
NAKURU
NYERI
KIRINYAGA
MURANGA EMBU
DADAAB Kismaayo
OCEAN
MIGORI KISII BOMET KIAMBU REFUGEE
NAROK
Nairobi COMPLEX
MACHAKOS
Kigali KITUI
TANA RIVER
NAIROBI
MAKUENI
KAJIADO LAMU
Bujumbura KILIFI
TAITA TAVETA
MOMBASSA
Mombassa
KWALE
TA N Z A N I A 0 60 120 180 240
mi
km
0 80 160 240
Dar es Salaam
Source: US Agency for International Development, http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/disaster_assistance/countries/horn_of_africa/template/
maps/fy2012/hoa_10072011.pdf. Notes: Data for this map were estimated for September 2011.
Disasters 29

41. FIGURE 2 Number of people adversely affected by droughts in the Horn of Africa, 1970–2010
14
Ethiopia
12
“affected” by drought (millions)
Kenya
Estimated number of people
Somalia
10
Djibouti
8
6
4
2
0
70
72
74
76
78
80
82
84
86
88
90
92
94
96
98
00
02
04
06
08
10
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
20
20
20
20
20
20
Source: EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database (Université Catholique de Louvain, Brussels, 2011), www.emdat.be. Notes: The
estimates here are only approximate. In addition to the problems of identifying affected people, there are degrees of impact that are not recorded,
as well as possible omissions in earlier periods due to less effective measurement, poor governance, and so on. Also, these data do not distinguish
between pastoralist and nonpastoralist populations, particularly in Ethiopia, making it difficult to gauge the impacts of droughts in pastoralist
areas specifically.
increased over time. In Kenya, droughts accompa- gripped by famine was the conflict in that region
nied by food emergencies occurred in six of the past (Figure 1). The conflict has likely increased food
eight years. But what explains this disturbing trend? insecurity through several channels. First, with-
Is it because droughts and floods are more frequent, out an effective government, southern Somalia
because people are more vulnerable, or both? has not been able to develop the kinds of disaster
There is not yet evidence of widespread climate risk management institutions and social safety-net
change in the Somali region of Ethiopia,1 but rain- programs found in other countries in the region.
fall in Kenya appears to have declined substantially, Second, Al Shabab has excluded the World Food
and some observers predict that climate change will Programme from the areas it controls, greatly
soon increase drought frequency in the region. inhibiting the supply of emergency goods and ser-
Even so, most experts on the region see the vices (Box 4). And third, conflict has significantly
apparent increase in food insecurity as a function constrained people’s mechanisms for coping with
of socioeconomic factors as well as climatic events. drought, such as their ability to move their herds
This thinking partly reflects previous research on and to engage in trade to sell off livestock and get
famines and food insecurity, stemming from the access to affordable food supplies. Local conflict
seminal work of Nobel laureate Amartya Sen.2 Sen has been shown to inhibit herd mobility in various
hypothesized that people starve not because of regions of Ethiopia and Kenya.4
aggregate food shortages, but because they cannot Not only can conflict amplify the effects of
get access to food. But other observers argue that drought, but drought can cause conflict by exacer-
famine also has deeper social and political causes, bating competition over scarce grazing lands and
such as conflict, corruption, and other forms of water supplies. For Somalia a recent study argues
economic and political mismanagement.3 that rainfall shortages push down real livestock
In the most recent crisis, most people agree that prices (and therefore household incomes), which in
a major reason that southern Somalia alone was turn leads to more frequent conflict as young men
30 Déjà Vu in the Horn of Africa

42. BOX 4
Humanitarian Aid: How Can We Do Better?
Steven Were Omamo, World Food Programme
D rought, conflict, and high food and
fuel prices affected the lives of more
than 13 million people in the Horn of
2011, in particular in Ethiopia, Kenya, and
Uganda.
For WFP, investments in enhanced
meeting the nutritional needs of the
weakest members of society by provid-
ing highly nutritious supplementary
Africa region—Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, preparedness also paid off, especially food products;
Somalia, and Uganda—in 2011. Working decisions to use a newly created advance-
• strengthen the capacity of national
closely with governments and other part- purchasing facility to acquire and pre-
governments to develop institutional
ners, the World Food Programme (WFP) position food in areas likely to require
arrangements and mechanisms to
targeted 11 million people affected by the food assistance. Preliminary analysis by
address crises, with an emphasis on
crisis. By December, employing a range WFP, the African Union, and other part-
approaches that balance short-term
of interventions, including direct food ners suggests operation of regional emer-
interventions with medium- and long-
transfers, cash, and vouchers, WFP had gency food reserves and expanded use
term investments that address low
reached almost 8 million people across of weather-index insurance could further
productivity and other causes of food
the region, providing a critical lifeline improve preparedness in situations such
and nutrition insecurity; and
to vulnerable Somalis within Somalia in as the one in the Horn of Africa.1
particular, and also to Somali refugees Looking ahead, key policy challenges • support the African Union Commission
fleeing to Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya. facing WFP and other humanitarian actors and the Intergovernmental Authority
The bulk of WFP’s food assistance reached center on how to strengthen the resiliency for Development in creating a process
drought-affected populations in Ethiopia, of communities living in drought-prone to address critical regional policy and
Kenya, and Uganda. However, insecurity areas, using humanitarian assistance to institutional gaps, especially by more
and poor infrastructure within Somalia help farmers and pastoralists adapt to effectively linking assessment and
prevented WFP from reaching all targeted changes in weather patterns. To that end, early warning alerts with timely and
populations. agencies must find ways to effective action.
Despite falling short of its goal, an
• better integrate relief efforts into lon- These actions can limit the negative
important lesson for WFP emerged.
ger-term solutions that build resilience effects of a natural or human-caused
Investments by national governments and
among communities in drought-prone crisis, which will reduce suffering and
other partners in improved land-use man-
areas, expanding scope for recovery increase the impact of humanitarian aid.
agement and other resilience-enhancing
and rehabilitation;
measures ensured that populations that
required food assistance during previous • protect productive assets of affected
droughts did not need such support in populations, with a special focus on
look for alternative forms of income.5 Unbundling declining resilience of pastoralists and ex-pastoral-
the exact relationships between drought, conflict, ists.6 Households’ resilience is chiefly a function of
and food insecurity is difficult, but it seems likely their assets (livestock, education, land) and their
that conflict is both a cause and consequence of coping mechanisms (mobility, income diversifica-
food insecurity. tion). Livestock is the largest economic sector in
Conflict is an obvious socioeconomic explana- the Horn, and for many households, it is the most
tion of food insecurity in the Horn, but it is by no important asset and an important source of income
means the only one. Many studies of the Horn— and milk and other products for their own con-
particularly outside Somalia—have focused on the sumption. Given the region’s abundant land and
Disasters 31

43. variable rainfall, moving livestock from place to population growth was particularly rapid and land
place has traditionally been an effective way of cop- resources relatively constrained.10 Other research
ing with drought. suggests that the increasing competition over land
Historically, however, there has been a long- in much of the region is largely a result of human
standing debate on whether mobile livestock rear- population growth (partly owing to migrants from
ing is sustainable. Some early critics argued that nonpastoralist areas).11
the difficulty of managing common resources led Policies and institutional factors may also be
to excessive herd build-up and boom-and-bust contributing to land fragmentation and reduced
cycles, overgrazing and land degradation, and herd mobility. There have been significant efforts
depletion of water resources.7 In the 1990s and to expand irrigation in pastoralist areas, attempts
2000s, however, a growing body of evidence sug- to develop ranch-style livestock systems, and a con-
gested that herd build-up in post-drought years was sequent breakdown of community-based property
a rational attempt to increase overall herd resilience right systems (through, for example, accelerated
to subsequent droughts.8 There is also now a fairly fencing of previously communal land). Underlying
broad consensus that pastoralism does not lead to many of these trends are government policies and
permanent damage to rangelands.9 institutions that have typically done a poor job of
protecting pastoralists’ property rights.
Whatever its underlying causes, loss of mobility
Given the Horn of Africa’s abundant significantly weakens pastoralists’ coping capac-
ity. Areas with reduced mobility have been hard-
land and variable rainfall, moving est hit in recent droughts in Kenya and Ethiopia.
And more generally, sedentary farmers—typically
livestock from place to place has ex-pastoralists—are poorer and more vulnerable
than pastoralists, precisely because pastoralists can
traditionally been an effective way of use mobility as a coping mechanism. Yet despite
substantial evidence on the potential benefits of
coping with drought. pastoralism in this kind of environment, central
governments—which are often wary of mobile
populations that regularly cross national borders
Yet this does not mean that the issue of the unchecked—typically underappreciate the need
region’s “carrying capacity” is no longer relevant. for mobility.
Even if pastoralists’ herd management strategies In summary, the reasons why the region is
are individually rational and ecologically sound, seemingly more vulnerable are far more com-
human and livestock populations have grown rap- plex than is often understood. Yes, drought is a
idly in many parts of the Horn, and this growth major factor, as is the oft-cited conflict in Somalia.
has taken place on a fixed natural resource base. In Yet underlying these shocks are slower-moving
many parts of the Horn, human population growth stresses—such as the reduction of herd sizes
rates have been close to 3 percent a year, and fertil- and the loss of herd mobility—that have under-
ity rates remain high. At these rates, the population mined the resilience of communities in the
will double every 25 to 30 years. region. Identifying the deeper sources of these
The growing number of humans and animals stresses is far from easy, but many informed
seems to be increasing vulnerability in some parts observers agree that there is a vicious cycle at
of this region. For example, pastoralists reported a work related to interactions between population
50 percent decline in median herd size over 1980– growth, local conflicts, land fragmentation, and
98 in northern Kenya, a region where human reduced mobility.12
32 Déjà Vu in the Horn of Africa

44. INCREASING RESILIENCE IN THE
occupations are very much a negative coping strat-
HORN OF AFRICA
egy since they damage the environment and can
Enhancing resilience in the Horn of Africa impede pastoralism by removing the shrubs upon
requires striking a balance between strengthen- which livestock feed.
ing pastoralism—the region’s traditional and This evidence suggests that if pastoralist econo-
still dominant economic activity—and promot- mies are to diversify, they should do so by expand-
ing meaningful economic diversification. As it ing irrigated farming and increasing migration to
is, the region is already more diversified than is urban areas. In the short to medium run, however,
implied by the label “pastoralist.” For example, in the basic issue is how many new entrants these
the Somali region of Ethiopia, almost 70 percent alternative livelihoods can absorb. For example, a
of households engage in livestock rearing, but a recent analysis estimated that additional irrigation
large share also produce crops (43.4 percent), fire- investments in arid and semi-arid lowland regions
wood (17.0 percent), and charcoal (14.7 percent). in East Africa could profitably absorb a minimum
A smaller number of households engage in of 3.2 percent of its rural population in 2020 and a
various cottage industries such as mat making maximum of 12.6 percent, depending on assump-
(6.3 percent), services (10.0 percent), trading tions about viable farm size and irrigation costs
(3.8 percent), and general labor or employment (Table 2).16 The percentage absorbed could be
(2.4 percent).13 Other regions show similar or somewhat larger if the estimates include rainwater
even greater degrees of diversity.14 harvesting, which essentially offers seasonal irriga-
However, the most common alternative live- tion opportunities.
lihoods generate low returns. Agro-pastoralism But there are reasons to be cautious about irriga-
(a sector often composed of failed pastoralists) tion potential. Dryland irrigation schemes in the
typically pays significantly less than pastoralism, region have often adopted inappropriate practices
whereas irrigated farming pays somewhat more or technologies that have quickly become unsus-
and urban livelihoods pay much more (Table 1). tainable and unprofitable. Irrigation schemes can
Table 1 masks the fact that agro-pastoralists’ rain- also restrict pastoralists’ access to key water points
fed farming is an extremely volatile livelihood, per- and dry-season grazing lands. And there are ques-
haps more so than pastoralism (since pastoralists tions about how sustainable arid and semi-arid low-
can cope with drought through increased mobil- land irrigation is in the context of the lower rainfall
ity). Moreover, the major secondary occupations of predicted by climate change models, as well as
collecting and selling natural products, such as fire- about negative downstream impacts on neighbor-
wood and charcoal, pay the lowest of all.15 These ing communities.17
TABLE 1 Well-being by livelihood type in the Somali region of Ethiopia, 2005
Dietary diversity Children
Livelihood type Average incomea Adult literacy (%)
scoreb immunized (%)
Pastoralism 217 (340) 4.3 24.4 13.7
Agro-pastoralism 97 (199) 3.4 19.6 11.4
Irrigated farming 254 (345) 3.9 35.4 12.5
Urban 1,081 (1,103) 6.8 49.4 49.9
Source: S. Devereux, Vulnerable Livelihoods in Somali Region, Ethiopia, Research Report No. 57 (Sussex, UK: Institute of Development
Studies, 2006).
aIncome is in 2005 birr per month. Figures in parentheses reflect average income when households with zero income are excluded from
the calculation.
b Dietary diversity score is the number of different food groups consumed in the preceding 24 hours, with the indicator ranging from 0 to
13 food types.
Disasters 33

45. TABLE 2 Profitably irrigable area in the arid and semi-arid lowlands of East African countries
Percentage of six-person rural
Estimated profitable Projected rural households that could work:
Irrigation cost
increase in population in 2020
scenario 1 IRRIGATED 0.5 IRRIGATED
irrigated areas (hectares) (millions)
HECTARE HECTARE
Low 522,850 50.0 6.3 12.6
Medium 320,689 50.0 3.9 7.8
High 266,085 50.0 3.2 6.4
Source: Authors’ estimates based on data and methods described in D. Headey, A. S. Taffesse, and L. You, Enhancing Resilience in the Horn of
Africa: An Exploration into Alternative Investment Options, IFPRI Discussion Paper 01176 (Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research
Institute, 2012).
Migration and urbanization may seem more of which have strengths and weaknesses. Mobile
promising, but the main prerequisite for success- schools, for example, are compatible with pasto-
ful migration and urbanization is greater invest- ralism but tend to have poor-quality teachers and
ment in education, since the alternative is usually limited resources. Boarding schools are potentially
low-return informal employment or crime. Cur- more attractive—and could be linked with school
rently, education outcomes in pastoralist areas are feeding programs and health interventions—but
deplorable (see, for example, Figure 3 for Ethiopia). their promotion needs to be compatible with cul-
Yet there is tremendous potential for scaling up tural and religious norms.
education. Improving education outcomes will Health and nutrition interventions are also
not only facilitate economic diversification and important ways of building up human capital.
migration, but also reduce fertility rates, empower Although chronic malnutrition (reflected in
women, and even improve local governance and stunted growth) is relatively low in pastoralist
community-based animal health and extension areas, acute malnutrition (reflected in wasting) is
services. Moreover, the age distribution in pastoral- generally extremely high19 because of high expo-
ist areas is heavily tilted toward the very young, so sure to drought and acute food shortages, as well
a big push on education could have major impacts as extremely poor access to health services (recall
even in the next 10 years or so. And the demand for the low immunization rates in Table 1). Adequate
education appears to have increased substantially health and nutrition are not only important in
among pastoralist communities.18 their own right, but also necessary for improving
school attendance and performance, so a broader
The age distribution in pastoralist strategy for human capital development in the
region will yield high dividends. And health inter-
areas is heavily tilted toward ventions are at the top of pastoralists’ own devel-
opment priorities.20
the very young, so a big push Although diversifying the region’s economies
is pivotal, it is also important to make pastoral-
on education could have major ism more profitable and resilient for two rea-
sons. First, diversification strategies take time
impacts. to bear fruit and have limited capacity to absorb
more people in the near future. Second, mobile
livestock rearing has a comparative advantage
The mobility and isolation of pastoralists pres- in a land-abundant region with volatile rainfall.
ent challenges to scaling up education, but there Indeed, in some ways livestock trade in the region
are ways to overcome these, such as boarding has been doing very well. During the 1990s,
schools, distance learning, and mobile schools, all Somalia’s livestock exports to Kenya doubled.21
34 Déjà Vu in the Horn of Africa

46. FIGURE 3 Literacy status in Ethiopia by pastoralist and nonpastoralist districts
Percentage of people who are literate
10
– 31–40 61–70 Pastoralist woredas
11–20 41–50 71–80 Lakes
21–30 51–60 81–90 Natural reserves and parks
No data
Source: Author’s construction based on data from the Central Statistical Agency (CSA) of Ethiopia. Note: A woreda is a district.
Disasters 35

47. In the 2000s, Ethiopia’s formal livestock exports notice of livestock auctions). Cellular phones
rose from just US$8 million in 2004 to just over have been used to disseminate early warnings and
US$200 million in 2010. 22 The vast majority of price data, but more could be done to make mar-
Ethiopia’s livestock exports—90 to 95 percent— kets more competitive. In smaller livestock mar-
are sourced from pastoralist areas.23 These posi- kets, traders often appear to have more bargaining
tive trends come on the back of strong overseas power than pastoralists, who can ill afford to trek
demand and higher prices. unsold animals back to their grazing lands. One
solution could be to establish specific market days
and shift to an auction-based system.25 In the-
Improving market access and ory, these relatively simple institutional changes
should increase the prices received by pastoralists
integration would allow pastoralists and even promote broader commercialization of
the sector.
to buy and sell livestock before a Changes related to trade and animal health are
also needed to render the pastoralist sector more
drought rather than lose their herds viable. Most livestock exports in the region remain
informal, partly because of onerous regulations
to drought-induced mortality. and poor customs infrastructure.26 In Ethiopia,
emergency animal health interventions typically
But how can the livestock sector be further have low returns since the main constraints during
developed in a manner that is pro-poor? Efforts to drought are food and water.27 However, improving
develop pastoralism have focused on commercial- animal health in normal times remains extremely
ization—that is, promoting greater engagement important both for protecting and building up this
with markets—and improved drought manage- key household asset, and for preventing the spread
ment, but there is little evidence that commercial- of diseases and subsequent bans on livestock
ization interventions in the Horn have benefited exports, which can impose a huge economic cost
the poor (partly because the evidence base is on the region.
weak).24 Moreover, there are signs that inequality Better management and regulation of land and
in pastoralist areas may be increasing. Large herd- water resources will also be critical. In addition
ers have increasingly engaged in overseas mar- to suffering from the effects of conflict over land
kets and coped relatively well with drought, while and water, herders have felt the negative impacts
poor herders have often failed to sell their livestock of irrigation schemes, “land grabs,” and the gener-
before drought and subsequently lost most of their ally poor protection of community property rights.
herds. These ex-pastoralists are therefore forced These land policies are not only unjust, but also
to work as hired herders or in agro-pastoralism or inefficient because they inhibit the performance of
other low-return activities. the livestock sector and interfere with the prin-
Improving market access and integration would cipal mechanism pastoralists use to cope with
allow pastoralists to buy and sell livestock before drought. This record reflects the pervasive margin-
a drought rather than lose their herds to drought- alization of pastoralist communities by national
induced mortality. To achieve this, road infra- governments. In recent years, though, a number
structure is obviously a high priority, bearing in of interventions and institutions have been devel-
mind the need to keep such investments strategic oped to redress this marginalization,28 and signifi-
and cost-effective in low-population-density areas. cant advances have been made in resolving local
Information systems could be better developed conflicts, including regulation of grazing and water
to provide weather forecasts and early warnings, resources.29
livestock prices, and other pertinent information Finally, the need for evidence-based strategies is
for both traders and pastoralists (such as advance an issue that pervades every aspect of development
36 Déjà Vu in the Horn of Africa

48. strategies in the region. Even the most experienced mitigate the disadvantages of distance and the
researchers on the Horn of Africa acknowledge the vagaries of the climate, but figuring out what works
lack of information on what works and what does and what does not will require greater experimen-
not. Developing evidenced-based strategies means tation and more rigorous evaluation.
trying out technological and institutional inno-
vations to cope with the region’s problems—and
MOVING FORWARD
then rigorously evaluating those innovations. Rel-
evant ideas and technologies can be imported from Major climatic shocks in the Horn of Africa are
extensive livestock systems elsewhere in the world, inevitable, but human vulnerability to these shocks
such as Africa, Australia, Central Asia and China, is not. Promoting social, economic, and ecological
the Middle East, and North America. New technol- transformation in the region could build up resil-
ogies could include greater use of cellular phones ience to these shocks and mitigate the slower-
for market and early warning information, satellite- moving stresses that also undermine progress
based weather information on rainfall and pasture in the Horn. Achieving that resilience requires
availability, index-based livestock insurance, and investing more in both livestock and nonlive-
improved seeds. Institutional innovations might stock sectors, rapidly expanding infrastructure
include improved regulation of water points, cre- and human capital, making synergistic improve-
ation of livestock corridors (especially where irriga- ments in disaster risk management and develop-
tion schemes are present), strategic investments in ment interventions, and improving governance and
infrastructure with stronger links to livestock cen- conflict resolution efforts. The precise instruments
ters, value-chain interventions (such as fattening of for achieving these outcomes are less obvious, but
livestock), mobile schools and clinics, and public– they must inevitably be the product of innova-
private partnerships to encourage private invest- tion, experimentation, and—not least—political
ment in the region. All of these schemes could help commitment. ■
Disasters 37

50. Chapter 4
CLIMATE CHANGE AND AGRICULTURE
Modest Advances,
Stark New Evidence
Gerald C. Nelson and Tolulope Olofinbiyi, IFPRI
T he year 2011 brought both good and
bad news about climate change and agricul-
ture. The good news is that after initial steps
toward rebuilding confidence in the United Nations’
climate change negotiations were taken in Cancun in
December 2010, further progress occurred in Durban in
2011. And outside the formal negotiations process, many
countries have begun to implement their own mecha-
nisms to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and to adapt to
some climate changes that increasingly seem inevitable.
The bad news includes growing evidence that climate change has already
affected agricultural productivity1 and will put increasing pressure on agricul-
ture in the coming decades. Recordbreaking extreme weather events around
the world in 2011 offered a glimpse of the challenges climate change will bring.
Farmers worldwide will need to adapt to higher temperatures and shifting pre-
cipitation patterns. In addition, climate variability will likely cut into global
food production, exacerbating the existing problems of poverty, food insecu-
rity, and malnutrition. In addition, after declining in the wake of the global
financial crisis, greenhouse gas emissions are once again rising rapidly, making
the climate change challenge to food security much greater.
REBUILDING CONFIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL
NEGOTIATIONS, SLOWLY
Delegates to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
arrived in Copenhagen in December 2009 with great optimism that an agree-
ment could be reached to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and provide

51. financial support to help developing countries when they would undertake the final political
adapt to climate change. Most of the world’s lead- negotiations needed to close the deal. As the sec-
ers were scheduled to arrive in the second week, ond week arrived, however, a deal was nowhere
BOX 5
Better Tools for Tackling Climate Change
Bruce Campbell, CGIAR Research Program on Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security
F armers and policymakers in developing
countries need support in their struggle
to adjust to global changes in climate.
seasonal climate forecasts in East and
West Africa. The Program’s research-
ers also produced a study on “Mapping
greatest impact. For example, research-
ers implemented a baseline food security
and climate adaptation survey covering
They must have evidence to weigh the Hotspots of Climate Change and Food more than 5,000 households in more than
pros and cons of different strategies and Insecurity in the Global Tropics” to iden- 250 villages across 36 sites in 12 coun-
policies. Providing that support through tify food insecure areas most vulnerable tries in East and West Africa and South
research-based evidence is the goal of to the impacts of future climate change, Asia.5 The data gathered in the past year
the CGIAR Research Program on Climate across the priority regions for the CGIAR will help provide decisionmakers with
Change, Agriculture and Food Security centers.2 A workshop and paper series evidence-based results and useful tools
(CCAFS), which was in its first full year examined how new institutions, property for designing and testing approaches to
of operation in 2011. Inevitably, adjust- rights arrangements, and agricultural adaptation and mitigation. When their
ing to climate change will mean making technologies can improve livelihoods and work is completed, researchers will be
complex tradeoffs among food security, reduce greenhouse gas emissions.3 As able to report whether certain techniques
livelihoods, and the environment both at part of its ongoing work on gender, the were successful. The Program has also
grassroots levels and in the corridors of Program issued grants to six female sci- created the Climate Change Adaptation
power. Sound research will help policy- entists working in Program target regions and Mitigation Knowledge Network, an
makers, farmers, and others affected by to study the links among gender, climate information service and a key tool for
climate change understand the implica- change, agriculture, and food security.4 practitioners, donors, policymakers, and
tions of their decisions when making dif- Climate change was on the agenda of researchers interested in food security and
ficult compromises. many international institutions in 2011, climate change. The Network is a map-
Progressive climate change threatens including two large conferences: the based online platform that brings climate,
farmers in developing countries, who United Nations Framework Convention agriculture, and socioeconomic informa-
must adapt their farming practices to the on Climate Change in Durban, South tion together, and uses multimedia to
changes ahead in order to survive. Studies Africa, and the International Conference share stories of farmers living at research
by CCAFS Program scientists published on Climate Change and Food Security in sites across the tropics.
in the book Crop Adaptation to Climate Beijing, China. Key agricultural organiza- Climate change affects agriculture
Change describe how climate change tions (including the Program, the World and food security in a variety of ways, so
could threaten production of important Bank, and IFAD) coordinated Agriculture choosing the best mitigation and adapta-
food crops such as potatoes, beans, and Rural Development Day, a parallel tion techniques requires thorough research.
bananas, and cassava—and how specific event at the UN conference that focused The CGIAR Research Program on Climate
adaptation strategies such as new plant on galvanizing international support for a Change, Agriculture and Food Security con-
breeds could neutralize or at least signifi- new work program on agricultural climate tributed significant evidence in 2011, but
cantly lessen the impact.1 As part of the change adaptation and mitigation. this is only the beginning of an undertaking
Program’s work on adaptation through The Program’s work in 2011 focused that must reach beyond a single research
managing climate risks, researchers have on taking stock and developing the rele- program to match climate change’s com-
been training farmers on interpreting vant research strategies that will have the plexity with its own breadth and depth.
40 Modest Advances, Stark New Evidence

52. in sight. The impending arrival of several political The 2011 Durban round of negotiations was
leaders on Friday, the official closing day, meant widely perceived as particularly important for
that negotiators needed to engage in extremely Africa, because a successful outcome would reflect
high-level talks to develop some kind of agreement. well on the continent and because Africa is likely
After several sleepless nights, the negotiators took to be seriously affected by climate change2 and so
note of a document called the Copenhagen Accord, would have much to gain from a successful out-
emanating from several high-level meetings. This come. One of the key challenges was the pend-
accord enshrined the goal of keeping the average ing expiration of the Kyoto Protocol in 2012. The
temperature rise to 2°C and pledged US$10 billion protocol set binding targets for emissions for most
a year from developed countries over the next three developed countries (the United States was not a
years, rising to US$100 billion a year by 2020, to signatory and therefore not a party to the emissions
help poor countries adapt to climate change. None reduction commitments). Without an extension of
of these commitments, however, were binding, and the protocol, countries would no longer be legally
it is unclear that any have been or will be met. bound to reduce their emissions.
Although the Copenhagen negotiations were
unsuccessful overall, they marked the start of a
push to formally include agriculture in the negotia- Although the Copenhagen negotiations
tion outcomes, with the first Agriculture and Rural
Development Day providing a convening venue were unsuccessful overall, they marked
for those concerned about the challenges to agri-
culture from climate change. Buttons bearing the the start of a push to formally include
slogan “No agriculture, no deal!” made their first
appearance and have become an increasingly com- agriculture in the negotiation outcomes.
mon sight at United Nations negotiations.
At the following year’s convention, delegates With African agriculture especially threatened
arrived in Cancun in late November 2010 with by climate change, a major push was made to per-
greatly lowered expectations and no plans for the suade the negotiators to include an official work
attendance of large numbers of heads of state. program on agriculture. The activities of the third
With low expectations as a starting point, the Agriculture and Rural Development Day were
eventual outcomes were substantial. Negotia- organized around this goal, and major public fig-
tors approved a large number of documents, col- ures, including former UN secretary general Kofi
lectively called the Cancun Accord. Important Annan and Jacob Zuma, president of South Africa,
elements included the reaffirmation of the 2°C pressed the negotiators to approve the work pro-
temperature increase target, improved reporting gram on agriculture.
requirements, and the start of a process to design By the last Friday of the negotiations, it was
a Green Climate Fund. The second Agriculture unclear whether anything would be achieved. But
and Rural Development Day was held, with dele- negotiators agreed to continue their work and
gates pushing negotiators to formally include agri- extended their string of sleepless nights, ultimately
culture in any outcomes and calling for approval finishing Sunday morning. The outcome of this
of an official work program on agriculture. Unfor- effort is called the Durban Platform for Enhanced
tunately, the work program was lost in the final Action. A key element of the platform is that all
days of the negotiations when it got caught up in Kyoto signatories plus the United States agreed to
disagreements about whether individual sectors forge a treaty by 2015 that would bring all coun-
should be singled out and a perception by some tries, developed and developing, under a legally
negotiators that a work program would focus only binding agreement by 2020. For the first time,
on mitigation and ignore adaptation. China and India, two of the world’s largest emit-
ters of greenhouse gases, agreed to this principle.
Climate Change and Agriculture 41

53. The Green Climate Fund was formally established crop yields. The study suggests that implement-
and awaits contributions from member coun- ing agricultural water interventions on a large scale
tries. A second commitment period for the Kyoto can significantly raise agricultural productivity and
Protocol was approved with the reduction targets increase farmer livelihoods.3 Still, more needs to
to be determined at a meeting in 2012. However, be done to increase the adaptation of agricultural
Canada, one of the important countries to sign systems in India because climate change threats
on to the first commitment period, announced it to productivity are expected to grow. Additional
would not join the second period, and other devel- adaptation strategies—such as more efficient use
oped countries have suggested that they may follow of water, promotion of eco-friendly technologies,
suit. Finally, although the negotiators did not adopt shifts in cropping patterns, and agricultural insur-
an official work program on agriculture, they did ance—should be considered, and adaptation and
approve a process for developing a work program mitigation programs should be mainstreamed into
for approval at the next negotiating session, to be national agricultural strategies.
held in Qatar beginning in late November 2012.
China
The government of China, which launched a
GOING IT ALONE: INCREASING
national Climate Change Program in 2007, has
PROGRESS OUTSIDE FORMAL
explored several strategies and activities to help
NEGOTIATIONS
the agricultural sector adapt to climate change.4
Although progress remains extremely slow in the Some of the efforts include improvements to agri-
official negotiating process, countries around the cultural infrastructure and increased investment
world are beginning to devote substantial resources in research and development of new technologies.
to agricultural adaptation and mitigation activi- To improve agricultural infrastructure, the govern-
ties that could have high payoffs today and lead to ment has, for example, accelerated the construc-
increased resilience tomorrow. tion of water-saving irrigation projects. As part
of special funding arrangements established for
India climate change adaptation, China has invested in
India continues to launch adaptation programs new technologies such as cloud seeding to pro-
at both the national and state levels. Adaptation mote reliable rainfall. The government has also
activities in different areas of the country include increased pilot projects on different types of insur-
efforts to improve and diversify crops, conserve ance policies. Because these efforts were initiated
soils, develop watersheds, manage irrigation water, recently, their effectiveness has not been assessed
and improve disaster management through, for and documented.
example, drought and flood proofing. An example
of one of these activities is a community water- Kenya
shed project designed to explore low-cost water A recent study of four agroecological zones in
conservation solutions to improve crop yields in Kenya shows there are win-win-win agricultural
the face of drought in the community of Kotha- practices that can pay off in terms of adaptation,
pally in Andhra Pradesh, India. This long-term mitigation, and profitability. For example, when
project, developed by the International Crops poor smallholder producers use sustainable agri-
Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics at the cultural management practices, they not only
request of the government of Andhra Pradesh, was increase their resilience to climate change and
designed with and managed by the community. variability, but also contribute directly to reducing
A recent impact study showed that the project’s greenhouse gas emissions and increasing agricul-
water management practices improved infiltration tural productivity and profitability. In particular,
and water-holding capacity of the soil, increasing soil nutrient management—applying combina-
water availability by 10 to 30 percent and raising tions of inorganic fertilizer, mulch, and manure—is
42 Modest Advances, Stark New Evidence

54. FIGURE 1 Carbon dioxide emissions in developed and developing countries, 1990–2010 (PgC)
5.0
Developed: Production
Developed: Consumption
4.5
Developing: Production
Developing: Consumption
Developed countries (Annex B)
4.0
CO2 emissions (Pg C)
3.5
3.0
Developing countries (non-Annex B)
2.5
2.0
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Source: Figure 2 in G. P. Peters, G. Marland, C. Le Quéré, T. Boden, J. G. Canadell, and M. R. Raupach, “Rapid Growth in CO2 Emissions after the
2008–2009 Global Financial Crisis,” Nature Climate Change 2, no. 1 (2012): 2–4, doi:10.1038/nclimate1332. Note: Carbon dioxide emissions are
for fossil fuels.
shown to enhance crop yields, soil carbon stocks, include climate change adaptation and mitigation
and incomes from agricultural production. Simi- in their agricultural productivity and food security
larly, introducing improved feeds for dairy cattle strategies and policies. It will also require improv-
decreases methane emissions per liter of milk and ing farmers’ access to financial resources, such as
increases profitability in most parts of Kenya. voluntary carbon markets and adaptation and miti-
These improved practices can allow livestock pro- gation funds.5
ducers to reduce the numbers of livestock and
lower overall emissions while increasing food pro-
NEW EVIDENCE ON THE THREATS TO
duction and food security. In the arid zone, farmers
AGRICULTURE FROM CLIMATE CHANGE
can use irrigation and soil and water conservation
methods to maximize soil carbon and agricul- To illustrate the challenges in mitigating green-
tural profits. These win-win-win actions, however, house gas emissions, Figure 1 contrasts trends in
have yet to be strategically exploited. To do so will domestic carbon dioxide emissions in developed
require building capacity among decisionmakers and developing countries. For developed coun-
at the national level to ensure that they explicitly tries, emissions from domestic production have
Climate Change and Agriculture 43

55. Recent research strongly suggests that were in the Kyoto Protocol. As incomes in devel-
oping countries grow, they must pursue low-emis-
rising temperatures and accompanying sions development strategies.
Climate scientists are increasingly confident
changes in precipitation, have already of the link between recent anthropogenic emis-
sions of greenhouse gases and rising temperatures
had observable effects on agriculture. such as those experienced in Iowa, in the heart
of the US Corn Belt. Researchers have demon-
remained relatively flat for the past 30 years, with strated the threat to US maize production from
a large dip in 2008 as the global economic crisis higher temperatures based on a detailed statisti-
reduced economic activity. Emissions from con- cal analysis of actual maize yields from 1950 to
sumption have continued to grow in the form of 2005.6 Their findings show that as average growing
emissions associated with imports produced in devel- season temperatures rise to 28°C, yields are rela-
oping countries. tively little affected. However, once temperatures
In stark contrast, developing-country emissions surpass the threshold of about 30°C, yields drop
have grown dramatically, surpassing those from precipitously. Another study using extensive maize
developed countries by the late 2000s. The green experimental data from International Maize and
shaded area indicates that a significant and growing Wheat Improvement Center trials in Sub-Saharan
portion of developing-country emissions are from Africa had broadly similar results.7 Under optimal
production for export to developed countries, but management, when the mean growing season tem-
emissions from domestic consumption have sur- perature is less than 22°C, a 1°C increase in tem-
passed those from developed-country consumption. perature has a small but positive effect on yields.
This situation makes it increasingly obvious that But as the average growing season temperature
developing countries should not be excluded from exceeds 25°C, the effect becomes negative, causing
national commitments to reduce emissions, as they roughly a 30 percent decline in yields. And during
FIGURE 2 Change in growing season temperature, 1980–2008
60 3
40 2
1
20
0
0
−1
−20 −2
−40 −3
−100 −50 0 50 100 150
Source: Figure 1 in D. B. Lobell, W. Schlenker, and J. Costa-Roberts, “Climate Trends and Global Crop Production since 1980,” Science 333, no. 6042 (2011): 616–620,
doi:10.1126/science.1204531.
44 Modest Advances, Stark New Evidence

56. FIGURE 3 Estimated net impact of climate trends for 1980–2008 on crop yields, divided by the overall
yield trend
Maize Wheat
United
China
States
China India
United
Brazil
States
France Russia
India France
World World
−20 −10 0 10 20 −20 −10 0 10 20
% yield impact % yield impact
Rice Soy
United
China
States
India Brazil
Indonesia Argentina
Bangladesh China
Vietnam Paraguay
World World
−20 −10 0 10 20 −20 −10 0 10 20
% yield impact % yield impact
Source: Figure 3 in D. B. Lobell, W. Schlenker, and J. Costa-Roberts, “Climate Trends and Global Crop Production since 1980,” Science 333,
no. 6042 (2011): 616–620, doi:10.1126/science.1204531.
a drought, the yield declines begin at lower temper- yields (Figure 3). For maize, climate change had
atures and can be greater than 40 percent. essentially no effect on US yield trends, whereas it
Other recent research strongly suggests that substantially slowed yield growth in Brazil, China,
rising temperatures in the second half of the 20th and France. In some countries, however, regional
century and early years of the 21st century, and crop production has benefited from higher tem-
accompanying changes in precipitation, have peratures. The growing area has shifted northward
already had observable effects on agriculture. for maize in the United States, rice in China, and
Although growing season temperature changed wheat in Russia.
only slightly in North America from 1980 to 2008,
it increased dramatically in other parts of the
THE CHALLENGE TO FOOD SECURITY
world, particularly China and Europe (Figure 2).
The consequence of the differing temperature The precise temperature and precipitation changes
increases can clearly be seen in the changes in that climate change will bring, as well as the
Climate Change and Agriculture 45

57. FIGURE 4 Scenarios of climate change and food security
Food security could improve with high income . . . or decline with low income growth
growth and low population growth . . . and high population growth
3,600
Developed countries
3,400
3,200
3,000 All developing
countries
2,800
2,600
2,400
Low-income developing
countries
2,200
2,000
1,800
40
50
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
30
20
10
15
45
25
35
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
Perfect mitigation CSIRO A1B MIROC B1
CSIRO B1 Climate mean MIROC A1B
Source: Figure 3.1 in G. C. Nelson, M. W. Rosegrant, A. Palazzo, I. Gray, C. Ingersoll, R. Robertson, S. Tokgoz, et al., Food Security, Farming, and
Climate Change to 2050: Scenarios, Results, Policy Options, IFPRI Research Monograph (Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research
Institute, 2010). Notes: The dashed red lines show calorie availability in an unrealistic scenario with perfect mitigation (that is, all emissions stop
today and the existing momentum in the climate system is also stopped). The solid lines of various colors reflect outcomes with plausible climate
results from two general circulation models, each with two scenarios, from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s Special Report on
Emissions Scenarios. The shift in values in 2025 reflects the assumption that maize-based ethanol will be replaced with cellulosic ethanol around
2025. This change will reduce the demand for maize, lower its price, and make more calories available for human consumption.
context within which they will take place, are still of climate change scenarios and two overarching
uncertain. Consequently, to design policies that scenarios of the development context. The opti-
can protect populations vulnerable to climate mistic scenario reflects high income growth and
change and increase the likelihood of achieving low population growth, representing a situation of
sustainable food security, it is critical to under- sustainable development. The pessimistic scenario
stand the impacts of climate change under different consists of low income growth and high popula-
scenarios. Figure 4 shows how climate change will tion growth.
likely challenge food security. It reports average Three messages stand out from the results in
calorie availability per person per day—an imper- Figure 4. First, sustainable development, embodied
fect measure of food availability—under a range in the optimistic scenario, is key to improving the
46 Modest Advances, Stark New Evidence

58. well-being of the poorest. With sustainable devel- with growing evidence of negative climate
opment, calorie availability improves dramatically change effects on agriculture, the likelihood
in the 40 countries with the lowest income today. of nonlinear effects of temperature on yields,
Second, climate change significantly reduces calo- and hints of the added burden of more frequent
rie availability around the world, as shown by the extreme weather events suggest an extremely
gap between a scenario of perfect mitigation and serious challenge for sustainable food secu-
the rest of the climate change scenarios. Finally, rity. Renewed efforts to reduce greenhouse gas
although the different climate change scenarios emissions and redoubled efforts to develop crop
have substantially different consequences for agri- and livestock varieties, along with management
cultural productivity, the final outcomes for calorie systems that remain productive with higher
availability are similar. This result is due to dra- temperatures and more extremes in heat and pre-
matic differences in trade flows in the different cipitation, are crucial. In 2011, the body of evi-
scenarios. Thus, relatively open international trade dence on the threat to food security from climate
will be a crucial part of adapting to climate change. change became increasingly robust. The chal-
Rapidly increasing greenhouse gas emissions, lenge is to find the resources to address the prob-
especially in developing countries, combined lems before they overwhelm us. ■
Climate Change and Agriculture 47

60. Chapter 5
BIOFUELS, ENVIRONMENT, AND FOOD
The Story Gets More
Complicated
David Laborde and Siwa Msangi, IFPRI
P olicy discussions over biofuels in 2011
reflected the increasing complexity of the issue
over the past decade. Originally promoted as a
way of decreasing dependence on fossil fuels and avoiding
the carbon emissions generated by them, biofuel produc-
tion has now been widely recognized to have strong links
to agricultural markets and even land-use patterns. The
first-generation biofuels currently in commercial use—
biodiesel made from vegetable oil and ethanol made from
sugarcane or maize—have the strongest links to agricul-
tural markets and land use, although there are important
by-products that can be used as feed in order to offset
these effects. Given the areas of scientific uncertainty that
still remain over the impact of biofuels on food security
and the environment, decisionmaking has become com-
plex and, in some cases, contentious.
Nearly a dozen international institutions came together in 2011 to issue a
joint report that addressed the issue of biofuels and food prices and called for
eliminating distortive biofuel policies, especially where the environmental
benefits are not as high as expected.1 The Group of 20 (G20) also raised the
issue of biofuels in 2011 as part of its overall concern with food security. The
G20 countries recognized the need to examine the role of biofuels in food
price volatility and to adjust biofuel mandates when market situations warrant

61. interventions. They did not, however, make more potentially important decisions in 2012. Although
definitive statements about biofuels and their links the policy debate focused on the environment,
to food prices because of disagreements between any decisions made regarding biofuel production
large producers (like Brazil) and net food import- will have implications for global food markets,
ers (like China) on the importance of these links.2 given the volume of crop-based feedstocks that
The role of policy support to domestic biofuels sec- are converted annually.
tors—in the form of tax credits, subsidies, and tar-
iffs against imported ethanol (for the United States
EUROPEAN UNION
and the European Union)—remains a concern for
key stakeholders. In the European Union the consumption of bio-
Indeed, key countries display different social fuels is a key component of a decision to reduce
preferences in handling the delicate issue of food– greenhouse gas emissions from the transport sec-
fuel links depending on the local dynamics of tor by replacing fossil fuels with renewable energy.
agricultural demand and supply. In Brazil, the In 2003 a European Union directive set a target
flexibility of sugar-ethanol mills allows producers of 5.75 percent for renewable-energy use in the
to shift easily between ethanol and sugar produc- transport sector by 2010. In 2009 the European
tion based on prevailing market conditions for Union adopted the Renewable Energy Directive,
food (sugar) and fuel (ethanol/gasoline) and pro- which has a target of 10 percent by 2020. Although
vides them with constant, year-round outputs in renewable energy can include electricity, hydro-
their supply chain. Since 2008 Brazil has reduced gen, or second-generation biofuels (that is, etha-
its exports of ethanol to the world market, in part nol and biodiesel made from nonfood feedstocks
because of rising US production and exports, such as agricultural residues and switchgrass), the
increased demand for sugar from large consumers main mechanism for meeting this target is and will
like India, and high and uncompetitive prices in its remain first-generation biofuels.
domestic ethanol market.3 As a result, in 2010 and The directive also established environmen-
2011 Brazil found itself importing ethanol from tal sustainability criteria for biofuels, including a
the United States, boosting US biofuel revenues, minimum rate of direct greenhouse gas emission
and making the US tariff against Brazilian ethanol savings (35 percent in 2009, rising to 50 percent
imports inconsequential. in 2017) and restrictions on the types of land that
China has backed off of aggressive expansion of may be converted to production of biofuel feed-
biofuel production in the past five years because of stock crops. This restriction covers direct land-use
concerns about domestic grain markets and prices. changes only. The revised Fuel Quality Directive,
China’s biofuel production started rapidly with adopted at the same time as the Renewable Energy
the building of four state-owned ethanol plants in Directive, is more technical, includes identical sus-
2001. By 2007, it had produced a total of 1.35 mil- tainability criteria, and targets a 6 percent reduc-
lion tons of ethanol, placing it third in the world. At tion in greenhouse gas emissions from transport
that point, this rapid rise was halted and the use of fuels by 2020.
cereals in biofuel production was capped.4 Because reducing emissions is officially the only
Despite some attention to the impacts of bio- goal of Europe’s biofuel policy, policymakers set
fuels on food security, much of the policy discussion a high priority on getting a correct assessment of
over biofuels in 2011 focused on environmental con- the greenhouse gas balance sheet of biofuels. Such
cerns.5 International biofuel markets are domi- an assessment would account for the diversion of
nated by the European Union and the United land use in biofuel production, which can reverse
States, the largest consumers and producers of the conclusion about biofuel’s capacity to reduce
biodiesel and ethanol, respectively. While neither carbon emissions.6 Land-use changes occur when
adopted major policy changes in 2011, the year farmers, domestically and abroad, replace produc-
was still one of intense debate, paving the way for tion historically dedicated to food and feed with
50 The Story Gets More Complicated

62. production of biofuel crops or when they convert During 2011 the discussions became more
natural land to cropland. These land-use changes intense. On the one hand, biofuel producers dis-
are considered direct if farmers convert natural agreed with the concept of indirect land-use
land cover directly to cropland for growing the change and claimed that even the debate and
feedstock crop used in biofuels within the biofuel- uncertainty about future legislation deters invest-
producing country. On the other hand, land-use ments and is costly to Europe’s economy and cli-
changes are considered indirect if changes in market mate change strategy. On the other hand, many
prices cause another crop to expand into natural members of the European scientific community
land cover or if a reduction in exports from the and observers from the United States asked the
biofuel-producing country (such as maize from the Commission to reconsider its position regard-
United States) causes farmers in other countries to ing biofuels and urged it not to make emissions
convert natural land to cropland to expand produc- accounting mistakes regarding biofuels. Non-
tion of those (or other) crops. Given the complex governmental and environmental groups actively
nature of domestic and international market link- highlighted the social risks linked to biofuels (such
ages, indirect land use changes are much harder as “land grabbing” and competition between food
to verify and observe than direct land-use conver- and fuel uses) as well as the environmental risks
sions. Therefore, in 2009 the European Council (such as increased emissions). Although the Euro-
(representing the governments of member states) pean Commission had not yet released its impact
and Parliament asked the European Commis- evaluation report by the end of 2011, it did release a
sion to examine the question of indirect land-use new modeling exercise conducted by IFPRI on the
change, including possible measures to avoid it, land-use issue in October.8 Reflecting the fact that
and report back on the issue by the end of 2010. the merits of first-generation biofuels are highly
The Commission then launched four stud- disputed, the Commission also stated that it would
ies to examine indirect land-use change issues. no longer support biofuel projects in its overseas
One study, conducted by the International Food development policies.
Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), analyzed the
impact of the European biofuels mandate and
UNITED STATES
possible changes in Europe’s biofuel trade poli-
cies on global agricultural production and the In the United States, discussions of biofuel pol-
environmental performance of the European icy take place at two levels. At the federal level,
biofuel policy, as spelled out in the Renewable the US Environmental Protection Agency regu-
Energy Directive.7 The report suggested that indi- lates biofuel blending through the Renewable Fuel
rect land-use change was a valid concern but that Standard. At the state level, some ambitious states
there was a high degree of uncertainty regard- have set up their own biofuel policies (such as
ing its magnitude. Following these investiga- California’s Low Carbon Fuel Standard), seeking
tions and public consultation, in December 2010 to improve upon the Renewable Fuel Standard in
the Commission published a report acknowl- terms of environmental performance.
edging that indirect land-use change can reduce In 2011 there were a number of policy discus-
the greenhouse gas emissions savings associated sions at the federal level about whether the biofuel
with biofuels. Because of the many uncertainties, tax credit—called the Volumetric Ethanol Excise
however, the Commission did not deliver a clear Tax Credit—should be repealed. In an atmosphere
recommendation about whether and how mea- of increasing fiscal austerity within the United
surement of indirect land-use change should be States, an unusual alliance of fiscal and social con-
included in the legislative framework. The Com- servatives and environmentally minded opponents
mission announced that new research would be of biofuels emerged around the issue of repealing
conducted and that an impact assessment report the tax credit. Researchers have pointed out the
would propose several policy options. welfare and efficiency losses that result when such
Biofuels, Environment, And Food 51

63. a tax credit is combined with a blending mandate, country in order to come up with a standard that
which is part of the federal Renewable Fuel Stan- could both lead to reduced use of high-carbon fuels
dard policy.9 Food security concerns have been and meet the concerns about energy security and
raised over the effects of tax credits and subsidies affordability that are major components in the US
on biofuel production and, in turn, on the level and debate about energy policy.
stability of agricultural and food prices.10 Some
have pointed out, however, that energy prices were
ROUNDTABLE FOR SUSTAINABLE
a stronger driver of past growth in biofuel produc-
BIOFUELS
tion than tax credits alone.11
What if the current Renewable Fuel Standard Within the wider international community, there
were replaced with (or complemented by) a policy have been efforts to promote the sustainable pro-
focused on lowering the carbon intensity of fuel, duction of biofuels and to provide producers with
such as California’s Low Carbon Fuel Standard? guidelines and incentives for ensuring that biofuels
The essential difference between the two policies are low in carbon content relative to fossil-based
involves the incentives for biofuel producers and alternatives, as well as compatible with interna-
blenders. Because the Renewable Fuel Standard tional standards of decent work and fair compensa-
awards credits based on the production and blend- tion. Following the example of other initiatives for
ing of ethanol and biodiesel, it rewards biofuel pro- sustainable production, the Roundtable for Sus-
duction regardless of whether and how much that tainable Biofuels was launched in 2011 as a mecha-
production reduces carbon emissions. In contrast, nism for certifying biofuel producers who adhere
the Low Carbon Fuel Standard allocates credits to to standards of low environmental impact and fair
blenders who achieve a specified reduction in car- labor practices. This certification allows them to
bon intensity of the blended fuel. It is thus a direct receive a price premium, similar to the price pre-
incentive to reduce carbon intensity in transport mium earned by fair-trade coffee producers. The
and other fuels. California’s policy favors, for exam- Roundtable was designed in a way that makes the
ple, sugar-based ethanol and second-generation standards needed to reach official “sustainable”
biofuels from cellulosic sources, such as switch- status compatible with those applied to certify the
grass and miscanthus, over the maize-based ethanol biofuels imported into Europe under the Renew-
currently favored under existing national policy.12 able Energy Directive. Over time, the Roundtable
If a policy similar to the Low Carbon Fuel for Sustainable Biofuels standards might be ratch-
Standard—aimed at reducing carbon intensity by eted up to encourage biofuel producers to further
15 percent—were adopted nationally and used to reduce the carbon intensity of biofuels; they could
complement the existing Renewable Fuel Standard, also include the indirect environmental effects of
simulations show that the amount of maize-based biofuels, especially those related to changes in land
ethanol produced and consumed in the United use and land cover.
States would fall by 11.8 billion liters by 2035,
while ethanol from cellulosic feedstocks would
LOOKING AHEAD
increase by 12.5 billion liters by the same year.13
Such a shift could have important implications for Food and energy markets will continue to interact
international markets and land-use change outside in the future, creating fast-changing market oppor-
the United States.14 tunities for producers of feedstock crops like sugar
At present, a number of initiatives and studies and maize, regardless of whether they are supplying
are being conducted in the United States to see if food, feed, or fuel sectors. But domestic trade poli-
it is feasible to scale up a California-like policy on cies and restrictions can lead to market disruptions
a wider regional basis. A national low-carbon fuel and sharp price spikes, as seen in 2008 and 2010.
policy would need to take into account the differ- One of the main lessons of the food price crises of
ent fuel demands of the various subregions of the the past several years is that open trade is essential to
52 The Story Gets More Complicated

64. allow goods to freely flow to where their use is most FIGURE 1 and EU use of maize and rapeseed oil in biofuel
US
highly valued and to allow for adjustments that will production and other industrial uses, 2000/01–
minimize market disruptions.15 2024/25
In the European Union and the United States, 180 12
EU rapeseed oil use (million metric tons)
the use of maize and rapeseed oil in biofuel produc-
US maize use (million metric tons)
160
tion grew quickly until 2008/09, and this growth 10
140
will likely stabilize as the US mandates for maize-
120 8
based ethanol are met in 2015 and as policies in the
industrialized countries encourage the use of alter- 100
6
native fuels with lower environmental impacts (see 80
US maize
Figure 1). The significant rise in the use of maize 60 4
EU rapeseed oil
in the United States—which nearly tripled over 40
the period 2000 to 2009—implies that the maize 2
20
market will be tight in the face of future changes,
0 0
unless supply expands and grain inventory lev-
1
3
5
7
9
1
3
5
7
9
1
3
5
/0
/0
/0
/0
/0
/1
/1
/1
/1
/1
/2
/2
/2
els are rebuilt. Even though the rate of growth in
00
02
04
06
08
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
rapeseed oil use is much smaller in comparison, its
effect in tightening market conditions for vegetable
oils will be similar. Source: Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute, FAPRI-ISU World Agricultural
Outlook 2011 (Ames, IA: Iowa State ­ niversity, 2011). Note: Maize use includes food,
U
The US Volumetric Ethanol Excise Tax Credit and rapeseed-oil use includes other industrial uses.
was scheduled to expire at the beginning of 2012,
leaving the production and blending of ethanol to
be driven by market forces. Given rising oil prices, energy biomass) will promote innovation and
it is likely that demand will continue pushing etha- encourage the US biofuels sector to diversify its
nol production above existing mandate levels. It sources of feedstock beyond grains to include
remains to be seen whether the expiration of the agricultural residues (such as the maize stover left
tax credit will have an appreciable impact on US behind after harvesting). This may serve to relieve
domestic feed prices for maize or on exports of US pressures on market demand for grain and on the
maize to the world market (which have, in turn, land required to produce it. Careful assessment,
their own effect on world prices). As long as oil however, is still necessary to measure the agro-
prices remain stable or rise slightly, there is little nomic consequences of removing these residues
expectation that the profitability (and volume) of from the field.
US ethanol production will be affected much. If It is expected that the European Commission
demand for ethanol from Brazil or other countries will make a formal biofuel policy recommendation
rises, that would introduce an additional driver in 2012 followed by a legislative process involv-
for ethanol production that is independent of the ing the European Parliament. Any decision by the
effects of any US policy instrument and would European Commission will have global conse-
help remove the topic of ethanol subsidies from US quences because, besides changing the level and
political debate during this pivotal election year. nature of biofuel production in Europe, it will serve
If the food price increases seen in 2011 persist as a model for lobbies and policymakers in many
into 2012, they will continue to provide increas- other countries.
ing revenue to US grain producers while raising Given the trajectory of the biofuels debate dur-
the cost of feed for livestock producers and of ing 2011, policy discussions over the production
biofuel feedstock for US ethanol producers. Any and blending of biofuels seem likely to continue
US policies in 2012 to create incentives for the and will be fed by new research findings on the
use of second-generation biofuel feedstocks (such implications of biofuel policies for food security
as switchgrass, miscanthus, or other dedicated and the environment. ■
Biofuels, Environment, And Food 53

66. Chapter 6
AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION, AND HEALTH
Connecting the Dots
Rajul Pandya-Lorch, Heidi Fritschel, Zhenya Karelina, and Sivan Yosef, IFPRI
T he agriculture, nutrition, and health
nexus came to prominence in 2011. With
1 billion people continuing to suffer from food
insecurity, and with vitamin and mineral deficiencies com-
promising the nutrition and health of billions of people, the
international development community began to ask how
much more could agriculture do to improve human well-
being if it explicitly included nutrition and health goals?
What kind of changes could maximize agriculture’s con-
tribution to human health and nutrition, and how could
improved human health and nutrition contribute to a more
productive and sustainable agricultural system?1
Although the agriculture, health, and nutrition sectors all seek to improve
human well-being, agriculture has rarely been explicitly deployed as a tool to
address nutrition and health challenges. With agriculture moving higher on
the global agenda, in part because of volatile food prices, there is growing rec-
ognition that it is an opportune time to bring together the agriculture, nutri-
tion, and health sectors and unleash the potential of agriculture—as a supplier
of food, a source of income, and an engine for growth—to sustainably reduce
malnutrition and ill-health for the world’s most vulnerable people (see Box 6).
CREATING MOMENTUM AND
BUILDING ON IT
Early in the year, about 1,000 leaders and practitioners in the sectors related
to agriculture, nutrition, and health came together at an international confer-
ence called “Leveraging Agriculture for Improving Nutrition and Health,”

67. organized by IFPRI and its 2020 Vision Initiative in the value chain; identified key levers and incen-
New Delhi (http://2020conference.ifpri.info/). At tives for leveraging agriculture; and assessed critical
this conference, participants took stock of available research and action gaps. Ultimately, they catalyzed
knowledge on the interactions among agriculture, a process to reimagine how to make these linkages
nutrition, and health; explored opportunities for work better to enable more nutrition- and health-
enhancing nutrition and cutting health risks along friendly agricultural investments (see Box 7).
BOX 6
Agricultural Research Takes on the Nutrition and
Health Challenge
John McDermott, CGIAR Research Program on Agriculture for Improved Nutrition and Health
M alnutrition and disease are wide-
spread and persistent global chal-
lenges. Agriculture is central to both,
address the most severe micronutrient
deficiencies
fundamentally new perspective on agri-
food system research and development,
including
• Improvement of value chains to
but agricultural growth alone has been
increase foods’ nutritional value from • looking beyond food production to
insufficient to achieve targets for reduc-
production to consumption, including processing, distribution, and consump-
ing malnutrition and improving health,
food-value-chain analysis and develop- tion through deeper engagement with
such as United Nations Millennium
ment done by other CGIAR programs the private sector and other value-
Development Goal 1 on underweight
chain actors;
children or Millennium Development • Reduction of the risk of agriculture-
Goal 4 on child mortality. One-third of associated diseases by enhancing food • taking a more integrative view through
children in South Asia are underweight, safety and controlling zoonoses as well joint efforts of agriculture, health, and
and more than 33 percent of childhood as emerging diseases, and by mitigat- social development sectors using new
deaths in low-income countries are linked ing diseases associated with agricul- metrics and tools for joint planning
to undernutrition, most significantly in tural intensification and assessment; and
rural Sub-Saharan Africa. To enhance the
Research outputs will contribute to • focusing on the perspective of the
agricultural contribution, the Consultative
development impacts along three path- poor—by, for example, assessing live-
Group on International Agricultural
ways: improving the nutritional quality lihood and risk tradeoffs rather than
Research (CGIAR) has developed a pro-
and food safety of food value chains, using the standard hazard-avoidance
gram to research agricultural actions for
providing knowledge and technologies to perspective.
improving human nutrition and health.1
improve the performance of agriculture-
This new research program, launched This new agricultural research program
nutrition-health development programs,
in January 2012, has four interlinked will focus on South Asia and Sub-Saharan
and providing knowledge and evidence
components. One integrates agriculture, Africa. Through investing in new tools,
for improved policymaking and invest-
nutrition, and health programs and poli- approaches, and evidence to usefully
ment decisions.
cies, while the other three components guide agricultural policy and practice, the
For better nutrition and health for
focus specifically on developing agricul- CGIAR expects to have a major impact
the poor, agricultural researchers will
tural solutions that improve nutrition and on enhancing agricultural contributions
need to work closely with nutrition and
health: to global, regional, and national efforts
public health researchers and link with
to accelerate better nutrition and reduce
• Production and distribution of more food-value-chain actors, development
agriculture-associated disease burdens
nutritious staple crops, biofortified program implementers, and policymak-
among the poor.
with pro-vitamin A, iron, or zinc, to ers. Behind these partnerships will be a
56 Connecting the Dots

68. BOX 7
Several development agencies have begun to
design or redesign their programs to better tap
these links. For instance, Feed the Future, the IFPRI’s 2020 Conference:
United States’ multibillion-dollar global hun-
ger and food security initiative, explicitly seeks Tracking the Outcomes
to accelerate inclusive agriculture sector growth Robert Paarlberg, Wellesley College and Harvard
and improve nutritional status through sustain- University
able country-owned development programs. The
United Kingdom Department for International
Development has substantially scaled up its sup-
T he 2011 “”Leveraging Agriculture for Improving Nutrition and
Health” Conference, organized by IFPRI and its 2020 Vision
Initiative, had significant useful effects on participants, in addi-
port for nutrition programming and research and is
tion to informing global discourse and potential new initiatives.
including agriculture, food, and nutrition security
Conferees learned how to advance an integrated approach to
research as part of its program in South Asia. agriculture, nutrition, and health more effectively in their respec-
In Sub-Saharan Africa, the New Partnership for tive workplaces. While most conferees arrived already believing the
Africa’s Development and the Global Alliance for sectors should be viewed and managed jointly rather than in isola-
Improved Nutrition signed an agreement to develop tion, their attendance strengthened these opinions—as shown by
a five-year joint program to fully integrate nutrition pre- and post-conference surveys. Conferees gained valuable new
security into the Comprehensive Africa Agricul- information and connected to a wider set of cross-sector networks.
ture Development Program (CAADP) framework. The 2020 Conference also produced measurable impacts on
Representatives from the ministries of agricul- public and professional discourse. Between October 2010 and May
ture, nutrition, and health and other counterparts 2011, the international journalists invited to the conference wrote
from 17 West African countries came together at 33 stories about the conference, and 25 other media stories were
published in English, French, and German. Significant institutional
a CAADP workshop in Dakar in November 2011
reporting on the conference included 22 stories presented in vari-
to examine how nutrition can be integrated into
ous donor and stakeholder outlets. This media coverage helped
national agricultural development plans, with spe-
increase the visibility of conference themes. Google searches at
cial attention to addressing country-specific nutri- regular intervals revealed a significant uptick in the Internet pres-
tion problems. In October 2011 President Yoweri ence of the conference’s central theme; the average number of
Museveni launched the Uganda Nutrition Action retrieved web pages containing the phrase “linking agriculture,
Plan (2011–2016), developed by the Uganda nutrition, and health” increased from about 9,300 in the precon-
National Planning Authority in collaboration with ference period to more than 13,500 in the post-conference period.
several ministries, with a strong message to the Finally, surveys and interviews revealed that this New Delhi
public on what foods to grow to avoid malnutri- conference inspired or supported a range of important initiatives,
tion. Malawi organized a groundbreaking national including follow-on meetings and consultation; efforts to contact
conference in September 2011 that brought together government decisionmakers on agriculture, nutrition, and health
policymakers and planners in the agriculture, nutri- issues; new initiatives by donors; and even some provisional pro-
tion, and health sectors to coordinate and integrate grammatic and institutional change. One immediate, tangible impact
their activities to help agriculture in Malawi contrib- was a decision by the Canadian International Development Agency
to give an additional US$6–10 million grant to the HarvestPlus proj-
ute to the health and nutrition of the population.
ect on biofortification. In addition the conference further strength-
In late 2010 a road map was produced for the Scal-
ened the agriculture, nutrition, and health themes in the new CGIAR
ing Up Nutrition (SUN) movement—a broad part-
Research Program on Agriculture for Improved Nutrition and Health,
nership of international and donor organizations.2 an international initiative to create a network of educational insti-
The movement gathered considerable momentum tutions working in the areas of agriculture, nutrition, and health.
during 2011 when the road map began to be trans- China’s State Food and Nutrition Consultation Committee vowed to
lated into action. By January 2012, 24 high-burden create a food safety and nutrition development institute as well.
countries had committed to the SUN movement and The durability and extent of such changes during the longer
begun setting nutrition goals and targets. More than term will depend in part on whether IFPRI commits resources to
100 organizations around the world have endorsed sustained leadership in the areas of agriculture, nutrition, and
health outreach and policy research.1
Agriculture, Nutrition, and Health 57

69. it. The movement supports national governments in energy and essential nutrients. But to get access to
developing and operationalizing nutrition-sensitive food, people do not necessarily need to produce it
national plans and aligns financial and technical sup- themselves; they can also buy it. The agricultural
port for nutrition. A large part of the SUN move- system may help increase people’s access to food by
ment's approach consists of incorporating specific allowing them to produce more food (if they farm
pro-nutrition actions into other areas such as food themselves) or by lowering food prices or raising
security, agriculture, and health. their incomes (if they purchase food). By improv-
Other initiatives included the United Nations ing their access to food, agriculture has the poten-
high-level meeting on noncommunicable diseases tial to greatly improve people’s nutrition and health.
in September 2011. This meeting involved only lim- At the same time, some agricultural conditions and
ited participation by the agriculture sector, but the practices can lead to disease and poor health for
declaration that resulted from the meeting noted both farmers and consumers.3 For example, agricul-
the need for a whole-of-government approach that tural practices may increase farmers’ risk of becom-
includes the agriculture sector. With its report ing infected with animal diseases, expose farmers to
Bringing Agriculture to the Table: How Agriculture and dangerous pesticides, or introduce toxins into foods.
Food Can Play a Role in Preventing Chronic Disease, In many agrarian countries, agricultural growth
the Chicago Council on Global Affairs provided is more effective in reducing undernutrition than
clear analysis and recommendations on how agri- growth in other sectors. However, the composi-
culture can contribute to better health. tion of agricultural growth, the distribution of
Despite opportunities to improve health out- this growth, and the conditions under which such
comes through the agriculture nexus approach, growth takes place all matter. Growth in agricul-
involving the health sector in the discussions has tural subsectors where poor people are engaged,
been challenging (see Box 8). One of the key bar- such as staple crops, contributes more to reducing
riers to collaboration between the agriculture and poverty and increasing calorie intake than growth
health communities is a lack of common metrics. in, for instance, export crops. Later in the devel-
Therefore, in May 2011, IFPRI and the Leverhulme opment process, growth in other sectors besides
Center for Integrative Research on Agriculture agriculture becomes more important in improv-
and Health brought together health and agricul- ing food and nutrition security. Yet neither agricul-
ture experts to find common ways of measuring the tural growth nor nonagricultural growth alone is
health outcomes of agriculture interventions. sufficient to reduce child undernutrition or micro-
Building on the momentum of the 2020 Con- nutrient malnutrition—complementary programs
ference, the Consultative Group on International in nutrition, health, water and sanitation, and
Agricultural Research (CGIAR) developed a behavior change communication also need to be
major new research program called “Agriculture implemented and targeted to vulnerable popula-
for Improved Nutrition and Health,” which was tions, especially women and children.4
launched in January 2012 with the overarching The links among agriculture, health, and nutrition
aim of improving the nutrition and health of poor often work differently for men and women. In many
people by exploiting the many synergies between parts of the world, men and women spend money dif-
agriculture, nutrition, and health (see Box 6). ferently: women are more likely to spend the income
they control on food, healthcare, and education for
their children. Increased equality between men
LINKING AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION,
and women can translate into greater agricultural
AND HEALTH
productivity. If this productivity is accompanied
In many ways, the links among agriculture, nutri- by more income and strong bargaining power for
tion, and health are already at work, but the syner- women, it can result in better health and nutrition.
gies may not always be optimal. Agriculture is the Opportunities to improve nutrition and reduce
primary source of food to meet people’s need for health risks exist all along the agricultural value
58 Connecting the Dots

70. BOX 8
Public Health and Agriculture: Working Together
Kabba T. Joiner, Helen Keller International
T he agriculture and health sectors
have long been separated by fun-
damentally different societal func-
Agriculture can contribute to public
health directly through improved agri-
cultural products. In general, improving
challenges are overcome. Representatives
from both sectors need to
• take cross-sectoral action at the com-
tions and institutional organization. diets—by improving food products—
munity level;
However, both health and agriculture reduces the burden of chronic diseases.
representatives made a marked effort Integrating the agriculture and health • increase funding in units of the health
to bring the two sectors closer together sectors also improves food safety by sector that can work with agriculture;
in 2011, forming some promising links making it possible to establish bet-
• create formal arrangements, assign
between agriculture and health orga- ter surveillance systems from farm to
responsibilities, and develop skills
nizations. Programs that have emerged table. But more can be done than just
for intersectoral negotiation and
more recently in Sub-Saharan Africa growing better-quality crops. For a long
decisionmaking;
include the Baby Friendly Community time, agriculture was not considered
Initiative in The Gambia, Millennium a primary weapon in the elimination • establish reliable communication and
Villages in Mali, Gardens for Health in of micronutrient malnutrition. Food links among researchers, policymakers,
Rwanda, and Agriculture for Children’s systems were developed with little and practitioners in both sectors;
Empowerment in Liberia. attention to balanced nutrient require-
• ensure mutual consultation in priority
Agriculture can make both direct and ments that support good health and
setting and activities like data collec-
indirect contributions to health. Growth well-being. Now HarvestPlus and other
tion; and
in agriculture leads to increased rural organizations are addressing this issue
income, which is positively related to bet- through the breeding of mineral- and • strengthen human capital in both
ter health status when community health vitamin-rich crops, such as orange- sectors by reviewing curricula or by
infrastructure is financed by profits from fleshed (that is, carotene-rich) sweet exchanging staff and sharing facilities.
agriculture. Sustained agricultural devel- potatoes and high-iron pearl millet.
Decisionmakers in agriculture and
opment can indirectly lead to significant Collaborations between the agriculture
health should push for more innovation
progress in rural health. In particular, if and health sectors can lead to substantial
and cross-sectoral participation to pro-
women’s incomes grow, they use health- improvements in diet quality in devel-
duce better outcomes. They must go off
care services more frequently, which oping countries, but they can flourish
the beaten path in order to maximize the
improves maternal and child health. only if certain human and institutional
benefits from their collaboration.
chain. A value-chain approach to development are increasingly using risk analysis to help them
can incorporate nutrition goals and thereby make decide on regulatory and other actions to reduce
nutritious foods more available and affordable for health risks along the food value chain.5
the poor. This approach starts by looking at every Many interventions are being tried to under-
component of the food supply chain from field to stand and deal with these challenges. Examples
fork—including production, postharvest process- include biofortification (the breeding of new variet-
ing, marketing, and trade—and determining where ies of food crops with improved nutritional con-
value for nutrition can be integrated. The food tent); schemes to increase household production
value chain also involves many hazards—micro- and consumption of micronutrient-rich vegetables,
biological, physical, and chemical hazards, as well fruits, and animal-source foods; local production
as occupational hazards—that pose challenges for of foods for school feeding programs; and proj-
producing and consuming safe food. Policymakers ects to integrate agriculture, nutrition, and health
Agriculture, Nutrition, and Health 59

71. services.6 So far, however, there is little concrete 2. Don’t wait to act but move ahead based on avail-
evidence on how agriculture–nutrition linkages able information and common sense.
work. One crucial task then is to compile the evi-
3. Communicate better to build awareness, raise
dence base on these links. Many more studies are
interest, provide options, and attract “champi-
needed on the nutritional impacts of agricultural
ons” to promote action.
interventions, more nutrition-relevant data need to
be generated and collected, and nutritional indica- 4. Fill the knowledge gaps on what type of agricul-
tors should be included in evaluations of agricul- tural growth is best for nutrition and health and
tural programs. what types of governance arrangements and
The 2020 Conference highlighted four impor- partnerships are needed at the local, regional,
tant sets of tools that could help to leverage agri- and global levels.
culture for better nutrition and health. Economic
5. Focus on education by developing multidisci-
levers include, at the broadest level, agricultural
plinary university-level education programs that
growth or overall economic growth (with the
inculcate broader thinking among future leaders
caveat that growth alone is not enough to solve
in agriculture, nutrition, and health, and break
the nutrition problem). “Fat taxes” and “thin sub-
down the “silos” between the sectors.
sidies” have the potential to influence people’s
economic access to healthy foods in industrial 6. Build the evidence base by collecting relevant data
counties, but more targeted approaches to improv- in a timely fashion, improving tools and meth-
ing poor people’s diets may be more appropri- ods, and investing in monitoring and evaluation.
ate in developing countries. Social levers involve
7. Collaborate across sectors by creating mutual
bringing people together across sectors and within
accountability and looking for ways to work
communities to jointly work toward improving
together while not losing the advantages of deep
nutrition and health. Governance levers require
sectoral expertise.
government leadership at all levels—from national
to provincial to local. Changes in policies and pro- 8. Use all available levers for change, including eco-
grams are not enough to get people in different nomic, social, governance, and science and tech-
ministries and institutions to work together—it is nology levers that can maximize agriculture’s
important to devise incentives to get them to do so contribution to nutrition and health.
and to devote the time and resources necessary to
9. Correct market failures by using public poli-
work across sectors. Science and technology levers
cies such as investments, subsidies, education,
require not only allocating more resources to gen-
trade, and tax policies, as markets alone may not
eral agricultural research and development to keep
achieve socially optimal agriculture, nutrition,
the pipeline for innovation, discovery, and dissem-
and health outcomes.
ination full, but also targeting more resources spe-
cifically to nutrition- and health-relevant research, 10. Look at food systems, not just agricultural sys-
such as work on nutrient-rich vegetables and other tems; consider all the stages from field to fork;
crops and livestock. and be sensitive to the sustainability of natu-
A number of recurring themes7 emerged during ral resources.
the 2020 Conference and are engaging the interna-
11. Proactively engage the health sector and find ways
tional community:
to reach out and include the health sector in agri-
1. Improve investments by making existing ones cultural activities.
more nutrition- and health-friendly, prioritiz- 12. Recognize that women are at the nexus of the three
ing and scaling up successes, and generating sectors and direct policies and programs to
new ones that exploit the links among agricul- women to simultaneously strengthen agricul-
ture, nutrition, and health. ture and enhance nutrition and health.
60 Connecting the Dots

72. The nexus approach is spilling over to other sec- resources more sustainably, to improve people’s
tors. The food-water-energy nexus gained a great livelihoods, and to support more inclusive eco-
deal of attention in late 2011 with the Bonn2011 nomic growth. Looking ahead, it is important to
Nexus Conference (see Box 9). In an increasingly build an evidence base that will improve under-
interlinked global environment, a nexus approach standing and help identify viable opportunities
to agriculture offers considerable potential to to strengthen linkages across sectors and achieve
improve nutrition and health, to manage natural mutually beneficial outcomes. ■
BOX 9
Food, Water, and Energy: Understanding the Nexus
Claudia Ringler, IFPRI
D uring the last few years, the cross-
sectoral linkages on the supply side
of agriculture have become more appar-
Increasingly it is not only water availabil-
ity that is being compromised, but also
water quality. Investments in the sector
• develop clear national food and nutri-
tion policies that take into account
the consequences for water and
ent as key agricultural inputs have grown have been insufficient in most developing energy;
scarcer and more expensive. Key among countries to meet growing demand for
• reduce water, food, and energy subsi-
these linkages are those of agriculture clean and safe water.
dies that lower resource-use efficiency
and food with water, land and energy Less is known about the interlinkages
and have adverse impacts on the poor
resources, and environmental/biodiversity between energy and food and among
and the environment;
outcomes. The food-water-energy nexus energy, water, and food. However, the
has come to the forefront in discussions at growing interdependence of food and oil • maximize complementarities between
several international forums in the run-up prices as a result of increased energy use public and private stakeholders in
to the Rio+20 United Nations Conference in agriculture and the growing share of food, water, and energy provision;
on Sustainable Development that will take foodcrop use as biofuels have made the
• promote resource-use-efficient tech-
place in Brazil in June of 2012. One such need for joint policy development appar-
nology development and dissemina-
forum, the Bonn2011 conference on “The ent. Higher energy prices have driven up
tion, particularly technologies the poor
Water, Energy, and Food Security Nexus: food prices and reduced the availability
can afford;
Solutions for the Green Economy,” con- of land and water for food production
cluded that “achieving water, energy and (due to competition from expanded bio- • promote tenure security for both water
food security, and consequently reduc- fuel production). At the same time, poor and land;
ing hunger and eradicating poverty, is a people’s access to sufficient food, water,
• focus and strengthen crop and other
central future challenge that is possible to and energy remains unacceptably low,
agricultural research at the food-
overcome, even under difficult and chal- particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa and
water-energy nexus (for example,
lenging global economic conditions.”1 South Asia.
drought-tolerant, high-yielding,
Much work has been done on water These linkages thus demand holisti-
nutrient-use-efficient crops); and
and food interlinkages. Water supply cally developed programs and policies.
is essential for food production, which This is particularly crucial because food • create markets and trade solutions that
depletes about 80 percent of global fresh- production will need to increase substan- ensure least-cost input flow for farmers
water withdrawals annually. Population tially in the next four decades to meet and consumers.
growth, economic growth, urbanization, growing demand. To achieve food security
If food, water, and energy connections
and industrialization have fueled increas- without compromising sustainable water
remain unaddressed, global food security
ing water scarcity, putting as much as and energy supplies, improved policies,
will not be achieved, particularly for the
half of all global grain production at risk institutions, and investments should
rural poor.
of insufficient water resources by 2050.2 include the following principles:
Agriculture, Nutrition, and Health 61

74. Chapter 7
LAND DEGRADATION
Land under Pressure
Ephraim Nkonya, Jawoo Koo, and Paswel Marenya, IFPRI;
Rachel Licker, University of Wisconsin, Madison
I n October 2011, the global population
reached 7 billion people, a milestone that highlights
the enormous pressure on the planet’s ecosystems. In
the face of this population growth, the farmland on which
global food production depends is degrading rapidly. About
24 percent of global land area has been affected by land
degradation. This area is equivalent to the annual loss of
about 1 percent of global land area, which could produce
20 million tons of grain each year, or 1 percent of global
annual grain production. Globally, 1.5 billion people and
42 percent of the very poor live on degraded lands.1
Population is growing fastest in the developing countries. In Sub-Saharan
Africa, annual population growth of 2.3 percent has led to ever smaller areas of
arable land per capita. Between 1961 and 2009, per capita arable land in Sub-
Saharan Africa fell by about 76 square meters a year, the steepest drop in the
world (Figure 1).
How can this crowded world feed growing numbers of people? The most
feasible solution is to sustainably raise agricultural productivity on existing
land. This means halting land degradation to avoid losing even more valu-
able farmland. It also means raising soil fertility on existing farmland to boost
yields and addressing other challenges, on and off farms, that have contributed
to low agricultural productivity.
ACHIEVING ZERO LAND DEGRADATION
In September 2011 the United Nations General Assembly called for building a
world with no land degradation. And, in October 2011, parliamentarians of the
United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification reaffirmed this goal by

75. FIGURE 1 Annual loss of per capita arable land and regulation, linked with national institutions
in developing countries, 1961–2009 and policies, can give local communities the tools
they need to manage natural resources such as
Loss of arable land per capita
80 land, water, and forests. For example, a 2011 study
(square meters/year) 70
of four African countries showed that the number
60
50 of land and water management by-laws enacted by
40 communities was strongly correlated with the level
30 of decentralization in each country.3 The findings
20
suggested that the more decentralized a country
10
0
is, the more likely local communities will take col-
lective action to address natural resource chal-
Sub-Saharan Africa
South Asia
Latin America
and the Caribbean
Southeast Asia
World
lenges. Of course, strong local governments and
other local organizations alone are not sufficient for
sustainable natural resource management. House-
holds and communities also need access to mar-
kets, remunerative prices, and other incentives.
Source: Preliminary analysis based on linear regression model from
data from Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, In the past 20 years, international cooperation
FAOSTAT database. on natural resource management has risen rapidly
because of increasing awareness of how the ben-
issuing a declaration calling for zero land degrada- efits of better resource management and the costs
tion and for adopting sustainable land management of resource degradation cross boundaries. Carbon
as the way to achieve sustainable development. markets—valued at US$142 billion in 20104 —and
other international environmental programs have
New Evidence contributed to global efforts to reduce deforestation
In pursuing these goals, we can draw on new evi- and other sustainable natural resource management
dence about causes of land degradation and solu- programs in developing countries.
tions to it. Although the conventional wisdom
holds that increasing population density is a major The Example of Brazil
driver of land degradation, recent studies suggest Brazil has dramatically reduced deforestation,
that land improvement is possible even in countries thanks to actions taken by local and central gov-
with high population density. For example, there ernments in cooperation with the international
was a positive association between an increase in community. In the 1990s and early 2000s, Brazil
population density and land improvement between enacted laws and regulations to protect forests,
1981 and 2006 globally and in East Asia, but a neg- but deforestation was rampant, reaching a peak of
ative association in Sub-Saharan Africa and South 72,000 square kilometers in 2003–04.5 Then state
Asia.2 The land improvement in East Asia was and municipal governments, as well as the federal
attributed largely to policies promoting tree plant- government, set laws and by-laws enforcing the
ing and forest plantation programs in China and deforestation moratorium. And Brazilians started
Korea. China, for example, has the largest number participating in Clean Development Mecha-
of certified emission reduction credits in the world. nism projects. With more than 180 such projects
These credits, issued to developing countries that in operation, Brazil has the third-largest num-
implement carbon-reducing projects, are certified ber of certified emission reduction credits, after
according to standards set by the Clean Develop- China and India.6 Land users who signed a bind-
ment Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol. ing contract promising not to clear forests were
More is also being learned about how effective compensated. By 2008–09, just five years later,
governance—especially local governance—can deforestation had plummeted to 7,000 square
reduce land degradation. Strong local institutions kilometers—a reduction of 74 percent.7 Moreover,
64 Land under Pressure

76. BOX 10
India: Common Lands and Food Security
Jagdeesh Rao Puppala and Rahul Chaturvedi, Foundation for Ecological Security
I n a landmark judgment issued in January
2011, India’s Supreme Court ruled that
arrangements for effective self-governance
taken measures to improve tenure security,
strengthen institutional arrangements for
local governance, and restore common
of rural households on commons: across
the 3,000 households surveyed, 53 per-
cent accessed commons for agricultural
of community property at the local level be lands. At the national level, preliminary inputs, 69 percent for livestock graz-
made and that those encroaching on “com- policy planning also calls for a commons ing, 62 percent for domestic and live-
mons” be evicted. “Commons” refers not policy and increased public investments to stock water requirements, 74 percent
only to common pool resources like forests, help build common property regimes.1 for fuelwood collection, and 37 percent
pastures, riverbeds, bodies of water, and In addition to contributing to food for food items for household consump-
farmland owned jointly by the community and nutritional security, commons help tion.2 Roughly 45 percent of the total
and enjoyed by all but also to genetic mate- maintain critical ecological functions for fodder requirement is met by common
rial such as seeds and livestock breeds the sustenance of farming systems. Forest resources, and commons are estimated to
adapted by local communities. These commons play a crucial role in maintaining contribute 20 to 40 percent to household
shared resource systems and village govern- stream flows, groundwater recharge, and annual incomes. Despite all of this, com-
ments are crucial to sustaining the farming nutrient transfers. They serve as habitats mons have long been neglected in policies
systems—and, thereby, the livelihoods for pollinators and pest predators, thereby and programs that aim to restore natural
and food security—of the more than 300 building the resilience of agro-ecosystems, resources. However, recent developments,
million people living and working in rural and provide an institutional setting that including the 2011 Supreme Court ruling,
communities in India, where common lands energizes collective action while minimiz- indicate that this is beginning to change,
are estimated to constitute roughly 15 to 25 ing undesirable individual action that can and the role of local communities in
percent of the geographical area. lead to the exploitation of resources. effectively governing natural resources is
In response to the Supreme Court judg- A 2010 study in rainfed areas of India receiving recognition and leading to more
ment, some state governments have already underscores the continuing dependence decentralized governance.
while Brazil’s agricultural area has remained rela- in global food demand between now and 2050.9
tively unchanged, at 68.5 million hectares, since Meeting the increase in food demand will mean
2005, food production in Brazil appears to have raising crop productivity in regions where there
increased by 11–17 percentage points between is a wide gap between actual yields and potential
2007 and 2009.8 This is a good example of how yields. In the developed regions and East Asia,
government policies and strategies can help agri- growth in crop yields is slowing as the gap between
culture-based economies achieve sustainable land potential and actual yields narrows. For the three
management in collaboration with the interna- major cereals—rice, wheat, and maize—the larg-
tional community. est yield gaps occur in Sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern
Europe and Central Asia, and South Asia.10
In Sub-Saharan Africa, which has the widest
SUSTAINABLY INCREASING
gaps between actual and potential yields, these
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY
gaps can be closed by investing in, for example,
Besides halting land degradation, it is crucial to agricultural research, improvements in market con-
produce more food on current farmland. Research- ditions, and better rural services, which will pro-
ers have shown that land productivity will have vide technical support and incentives for increasing
to meet more than three-quarters of the growth productivity. But among the most important steps
Land Degradation 65

77. to increase agricultural productivity and address large shares of their agricultural budgets to fertil-
land degradation is managing soil fertility. izer subsidies may be able to increase the returns to
Organic inputs such as manure and crop resi- public spending by giving subsidies on the condi-
dues have been shown to raise crop yields and tion that the beneficiary adopts an easily verifiable
improve soil ecology.11 By increasing soil’s water- organic input practice such as agroforestry.14
holding capacity and carbon content, organic Despite its win-win-win advantage of greater
inputs can help both adapt to and mitigate climate yield, profit, and environmental services, adoption
change. Organic soil fertility management can also of integrated soil fertility management is low—often
reduce the amount of nitrogen fertilizer required. lower than the use of synthetic fertilizer or organic
One study found that when leguminous trees were inputs alone (Table 1). There may be several reasons
planted on maize plots in East and Southern Africa, for this low adoption rate. Farmers are less likely to
the maize required up to 75 percent less synthetic adopt this practice when they have little household
nitrogen fertilizer.12 Reduced use of nitrogen fertil- capital, are far from roads and markets, and have
izer could, in turn, reduce the water pollution that no livestock to produce manure and help transport
results when farmers apply too much fertilizer. bulky inputs. According to preliminary research
In fact, research conducted in Sub-Saharan results, women farmers are more likely to use
Africa has shown that integrated soil fertility man- organic inputs and less likely to use synthetic fertil-
agement—the use of organic inputs, improved crop izer than men, but greater endowments of finan-
varieties, and judicious amounts of synthetic fertil- cial and physical assets increase their propensity to
izers—is more profitable than the use of organic adopt integrated soil fertility management practices.
inputs or synthetic fertilizers alone. A recent study The capacity of agricultural extension services
conducted in Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Nigeria, and in Sub-Saharan Africa to provide integrated soil
Uganda showed that as farmers applied more fertility management technologies is low. Only
organic inputs and fertilizers, both maize yields and a small share of agricultural extension agents in
soil carbon increased. Over a 30-year period, farm- Nigeria and Uganda, for example, were shown to
ers who combined synthetic fertilizer and organic provide advisory services on organic inputs. Most
inputs experienced increasing or flat maize yields, of their agricultural advisory services focused on
whereas farmers who used organic inputs or syn- improved seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides.15
thetic fertilizer alone experienced falling yields.
Further analysis showed that by using integrated
CONCLUSION
soil fertility management, farmers could increase the
financial return to applying one kilogram of nitro- In 2011 two United Nations bodies adopted
gen by an average of about 60 percent, compared ambitious goals for halting land degradation
with use of fertilizer alone.13 Countries that allocate and achieving sustainable development. These
TABLE 1 Adoption of integrated soil fertility management in six Sub-Saharan African countries
Farmers' rate of adoption (%)
Soil inputs
KENYA MALAWI MALI NIGER NIGERIA UGANDA
Organic inputs and synthetic fertilizer 19.6 14.7 17.7 0.0 7.5 2.0
Organic inputs alone 29.4 18.6 38.7 1.0 12.1 11.9
Synthetic fertilizer alone 10.5 70.8 16.3 0.1 45.3 6.1
Sources: Kenya, Niger, Nigeria, and Uganda: Compiled from E. Nkonya, F. Place, J. Pender, M. Mwanjololo, A. Okhimamhe, E. Kato, S. Crespo,
J. Ndjeunga, and S. Traore, Climate Risk Management through Sustainable Land Management in Sub-Saharan Africa, IFPRI Discussion Paper 01126
(Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute, 2011); Mali: Government of Mali, Recensement general de l’agriculture, Campagne
agricole 2004–2005; Malawi: Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security household survey 2008. Note: In this case, organic inputs consist of ani-
mal manure. Farmers are considered to be using integrated soil fertility management when they adopt both organic inputs and synthetic fertilizer
(all farmers had already adopted improved crop varieties).
66 Land under Pressure

78. BOX 11
Women’s Land Tenure Matters
Ruth Meinzen-Dick, Amber Peterman, and Agnes Quisumbing, IFPRI
S ecure land tenure is widely recognized
as crucial for investments, productivity,
sustainability, and status. Without secure
productivity and development outcomes
for the next generation.3
Currently, women are less likely to be
the legal system is important but unlikely
to have much effect on its own. The
implementation of reforms such as
rights over their land, people do not have landholders than men. When women do removing restrictions on women's land
the incentive to invest in long-term sus- have access to land, they usually cultivate ownership, making provisions for joint
tainability or productivity enhancements smaller and less fertile holdings. According titling, and reforming family law so that
on their land and may not even have to the Gender and Land Rights database women can inherit land and retain rights
the authority to make investments as maintained by the Food and Agriculture in case of divorce or widowhood requires
straightforward as planting trees. Secure Organization of the United Nations, on attention and resources. This may involve
tenure reduces vulnerability to evic- average women account for less than 5 offering legal literacy programs to inform
tion and strengthens bargaining power, percent of agricultural landholders in West administrators and judges, as well as
both outside and within the household. Asia and North Africa, 15 percent in Sub- the general public, about the reforms
Although most analysis of land tenure Saharan Africa, and 25 percent in Latin and working with customary authorities
has focused on the household, there is America.4 But even this is an incomplete to discuss the importance of women’s
increasing acknowledgment that the gen- picture of legal status because landholding land rights. Including women on local
der distribution of land rights both across may not confer many rights to the female land administration committees can
and within households also matters. The landholder. A recent study in Uganda sug- encourage them to register their land.
2010–11 State of Food and Agriculture gests that, even when men and women An analysis in its early stages suggests
Report highlights how the gender gap in reported holding land jointly, women were that in Ethiopia’s land registration pro-
access to productive resources constrains much less likely to have any documenta- cess, having more women on the local
agricultural productivity.1 Other reports tion in their name.5 This would make them land committees increased attendance
and organizations have also shown that susceptible to losing land rights if their at meetings relating to land registration
control of land is important for women’s husband decided to sell the land or if they and raised awareness of the new family
security, status, and bargaining power.2 were divorced or widowed. code that aims to strengthen women’s
The 2012 World Development Report What can be done to strengthen property rights.6 This and other studies
recommends strengthening women’s land women’s land rights? In many develop- show that improving women’s land rights
rights as an important action for improv- ing countries, legal reforms are often should be done through multiple chan-
ing gender equality, a development objec- ignored if they run counter to customary nels, rather than through simple, one-
tive in its own right that will also enhance law and practice. Therefore, reforming step solutions.
goals will be difficult, but not impossible, to governance while also enhancing interna-
meet. The evidence presented here suggests tional cooperation.
several avenues for achieving a world with no Second, instead of focusing solely on fertilizer
land degradation. subsidies, countries should use broader and more
First, efforts to promote sustainable land cost-effective incentives to encourage farmers to
management need to improve local and national adopt integrated soil fertility management. ■
Land Degradation 67

80. Chapter 8
NEW PLAYERS
Stepping into the Global
Food System
Kevin Chen and P. K. Joshi, IFPRI
E nsuring global food security has tra-
ditionally been perceived as the responsibil-
ity of a few industrial countries and United
Nations agencies, but the strengthening of many develop-
ing countries and institutions is also contributing to the
global agenda of ensuring food security, alleviating pov-
erty and ending hunger. The emergence of new players has
been a growing trend for several years. In 2011, key devel-
opments marked an unprecedented degree of influence
by new players, including countries such as Brazil, China,
and India; new institutions such as charitable founda-
tions; and the private sector, on the global food gover-
nance system.
RISE OF THE EMERGING ECONOMIES AS
NONTRADITIONAL DONORS
The emerging economies—particularly Brazil, China, and India—have grown
at remarkably high rates in the past decade,1 and in 2011 these three econo-
mies accounted for more than 20 percent of global gross domestic product
(Figure 1). These are not the only emerging economies assuming roles as
major global players. The Group of 20 (G20) countries, representing two-
thirds of the world’s population, 90 percent of world gross domestic product,
and 80 percent of world trade, are quickly overtaking the G7 and the G8 as

81. FIGURE 1 Emerging economies’ share in global action plan on food price volatility and agriculture.
gross domestic product (GDP), And on October 30, 2011, the agriculture min-
population, and crop production, 2011 isters of Brazil, China, India, and Russia met in
Chengdu, China, to discuss agricultural develop-
30
Brazil ment and cooperation among themselves and with
25
other developing countries. These ministers believe
Percentage
China
20
India that the stable and robust agricultural develop-
15
ment of their countries is important to world food
10
security and see this as an especially critical strat-
5
egy for reducing hunger in the South.2 Emerging
0
GDP Population Maize Rice Wheat economies increasingly affect growth and develop-
ment prospects in developing countries through
Source: GDP and population data are from the International Finance direct links, such as aid, trade, and foreign direct
Corporation. Crop production data are from the Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations, FAOSTAT database, faostat.fao.
investments, and through indirect linkages, such as
org. Note: Share of crop production is for 2010. commodity prices and competition in Third-World
markets.3
In December 2011, the Fourth High-Level
the principal forum for managing global economic Forum on Aid Effectiveness, held in Busan, South
problems. These emerging economies are chang- Korea, highlighted the increasing importance of
ing the structure and nature of the global landscape South–South cooperation in development.4 South–
and global governance, and their important role in South cooperation is now seen as a seamless part of
addressing global food security, in particular, was the International Fund for Agricultural Develop-
frequently acknowledged and discussed at high- ment’s country program.5
level ministerial meetings in 2011. A number of emerging economies—includ-
On June 22 and 23, 2011, for example, the G20 ing Brazil, China, India, Malaysia, South Africa,
agricultural ministers met in Paris to develop an Turkey, and a number of countries in the Middle
BOX 12
China and African Agriculture: Rumors and Realities
Deborah Brautigam, IFPRI
S eparating rumors from realities about
Chinese engagement in African
agriculture is not easy. Reports have
agriculture is both more diverse and
smaller than is often believed.
Take Chinese aid, for example.
Thus, in an experiment launched in
2006, Chinese aid is financing 20 agro-
technology research, training, and dem-
claimed the Chinese set up a US$5 bil- Between 1964 and 2009, Chinese aid onstration centers in Africa. A Chinese
lion fund for African agriculture, sent a teams constructed at least 142 agricul- research institute or agribusiness firm
million farm workers to Africa, pledged tural projects, including state farms, is building each one at a cost of US$6
US$800 million to modernize agriculture irrigation schemes, and demonstra- to 9 million. The centers will specialize
in Mozambique, or farmed huge tracts tion centers for African governments. in activities chosen by the host country.
in Zimbabwe or Ethiopia. Fieldwork by Yet these projects’ poor sustainabil- For example, Ethiopia wants its center to
several researchers presents a different ity caused the Chinese to revise their demonstrate the complete value chain for
picture: Chinese engagement in African approach and give Chinese companies a horticulture exports. China will provide
leadership role. additional aid to help run each center
70 Stepping into the Global Food System

82. East—have recently emerged as active partners in FIGURE 2 Aid from emerging economies,
technical and economic cooperation in develop- 2005–09
ing regions, especially Africa. Official development
assistance—or foreign aid—from the emerg- ■ ODA from Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, and UAE
12
ing donors rose from US$4.6 billion in 2005 to ■ Foreign assistance from BRICS
US$10.4 billion in 2009 (Figure 2). These donors 10 ■ ODA from other non-OECD
DAC members
contributed about 10 percent of global aid flows 8
US $ Billion
in 2008.6
6
China is fast becoming a major investor in
Africa, although Chinese engagement in Afri- 4
can agriculture is both more diverse and smaller 2
than is generally perceived (see Box 12). In 2000, 0
China moved to consolidate this cooperation by 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
establishing the Forum on China–Africa Coopera-
tion, which meets every three years. As part of this Source: Reproduced from K. Smith, Non-DAC Donors and Humanitar-
ian Aid: Shifting Structures, Changing Trends (Somerset, UK: Develop-
initiative, China has significantly boosted its aid ment Initiatives, Global Humanitarian Assistance, 2011). Notes: Aid
budget in recent years, with a stronger emphasis on data are for official development assistance (ODA). OECD is Organ-
isation for Economic Co-operation and Development; BRICS is Brazil,
agricultural development. Overall aid from China Russia, India, China, and South Africa; and DAC is Development Assis-
to Africa is estimated to have almost quadrupled tance Committee.
from US$684 million in 2001 to US$2,476 million
in 2009.7 At the 2010 United Nations High-Level 5,000 agricultural personnel from these countries
Meeting on the Millennium Development Goals, to China for training. By 2011, China had already
China pledged to establish 30 demonstration cen- established 14 centers for agricultural research in a
ters for agricultural technologies in other develop- number of African countries.
ing countries, dispatch 3,000 agricultural experts India is also bolstering its cooperation with
and technicians to these countries, and invite Africa. For example, the Africa–India Forum
for at least three years. During this time, in Tanzania, tobacco in Zimbabwe, and communities, and large Chinese farms
Chinese experts will demonstrate how the nonspecific crops in Zambia, Ethiopia, are no exception. However, surprisingly
centers can develop income-generation Guinea, Benin, the Democratic Republic of little evidence exists for the common
activities to boost sustainability (while the Congo, and Cameroon. assumption that the Chinese plan to
also looking for new business opportuni- As of yet, few of the existing Chinese use African land for China’s own food
ties for their institutes and firms). investments in Africa appear to be larger security. China imports no grain from
In another experiment, Chinese com- than 5,000 hectares. Several larger Africa—instead, cotton, sesame seeds,
panies began to lease some of the old Chinese biofuel projects proposed in and tobacco head the list. Chinese
Chinese aid projects in the 1990s, as they Zambia (jatropha), Ethiopia (sugarcane), agroprocessing companies have con-
were privatized: Sukula sugar complex in and the Democratic Republic of Congo tractual partnerships with local small-
Mali, Magbass in Sierra Leone, and Koba (maize) have stalled or been abandoned. holders who grow cotton (in Malawi,
in Guinea, for instance. In 2004, China’s As a Chinese official commented in Mozambique, and Zambia) and tobacco
Ministry of Commerce started to encour- Tanzania: “Agriculture is risky. It is hard to (in Zimbabwe). The majority of Chinese
age country-specific opportunities for have [a] ‘win–win.’” farms appear to produce food for local
Chinese agricultural investment: cotton Land transfers frequently pres- markets. The evidence, at least for now,
in Egypt, fruit and nuts in Nigeria, sisal ent food security risks for local does not support the rumors.1
New Players 71

83. BOX 13
Brazil: An Emerging Power in Agriculture
Beatriz da Silveira Pinheiro and Geraldo B. Martha Jr., Embrapa
I n 2011, Brazil’s agricultural export sur-
plus exceeded US$70 billion. The overall
performance of Brazilian agriculture in
national food security. In addition, lower
food prices have effectively boosted other
sectors in the economy because paying
region and its fast achievements in
low-carbon agricultural technologies,
such as highly productive integrated
the last four decades has transformed the less for food frees up more income, espe- crop–livestock systems, will reinforce
country from a net importer of several cially for the poor. Brazil strongly focused its influence on world markets. So far,
products to one of the most relevant play- on technology-driven productivity gains, the country uses less than 50 percent
ers in the international agricultural com- which became an important additional of its geographic area as agricultural
modities market. To a great extent, the characteristic of agricultural production land. This fact, along with the possibil-
huge transformation was a response to an expansion. Without these gains, meet- ity of using agricultural technologies
increased demand for agricultural products ing 2006 production levels would have to ensure environmental protection
prompted by the industrialization process required an additional agricultural area and expand production, will further
of the 1960s to the 1980s. This industrial- 30 percent larger than the Amazon strengthen the country’s role in agricul-
ization period was associated with a grow- Biome in Brazil. tural markets.
ing and increasingly richer and more urban This vigorous increase in agricultural Unsurprisingly, Brazilian agriculture’s
population. The increased opportunity production also allowed for increased success story has awakened the intense
cost of labor for farmers led to a favorable exports. In the last two decades, Brazil interest of other developing countries,
environment for agricultural moderniza- diversified exports, and oilseeds, grains, mainly in Africa and in Latin America and
tion. Huge investments were made in and meats acquired great relevance. The the Caribbean, that want to know more
agricultural research and development resulting export surplus has guaranteed about tropical agricultural technolo-
efforts during the last four decades, even positive results for the Brazilian balance gies developed by Brazil. Responding
in the first years (1970s and 1980s) when of trade and supported food prices in to this increased demand, the Brazilian
the modernization of Brazilian agriculture domestic markets, with positive effects on Agricultural Research Corporation
was still just a promise. Brazilian farmers’ income. From a global (Embrapa) significantly expanded its
As food production increased more perspective, the increased volume of participation in cooperation projects
than food demand, real food prices Brazilian agricultural exports has made an in other tropical regions in the last five
decreased: in the period 1975–2010, con- important contribution to reducing world years, broadening the possibilities for
sumer food prices decreased by half. This hunger and food-price inflationary pres- fruitful partnerships with other countries.
huge drop in food prices, along with asso- sures in developing countries. The focus of Embrapa’s cooperation is on
ciated reduced price volatility, has allevi- Brazil’s experience in producing technology transfer, capacity strengthen-
ated inflationary pressures and ensured agricultural commodities in the tropical ing, and research cooperation.
Summit, launched in 2008, is paving the way for for Alleviation of Poverty and Hunger in Africa
greater cooperation, such as through the trans- in 2003.
fer of agricultural technologies that meet the real South Africa, itself a leader in agricultural tech-
needs of small-scale farmers in Africa. India is a nology, is a key player in the transfer of technolo-
leader in tropical technology—not only improved gies to fellow African countries. In Latin America,
varieties but also resources management tech- Brazil has been actively involved in South–South
nologies, which are just as important for meeting cooperation for agricultural development, both
farmers’ needs. India is also an active player in within Latin America and in other develop-
the Interregional Initiatives for India, Brazil, and ing regions, particularly Africa. In Africa, Bra-
South Africa—which established the Facility Fund zil initially focused on the Portuguese-speaking
72 Stepping into the Global Food System

84. countries of Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, transaction costs that lead to high food prices. At
and Mozambique, but the opening of Embrapa, the G20 agriculture ministers’ meeting on food
Brazil’s agricultural research agency, in Ghana security in Paris, participants discussed how the
in 2006 points to a new phase in its South–South private sector could help stabilize global food
cooperation. More recently, other African coun- markets and reduce price volatility. They jointly
tries, including Benin, the Democratic Republic of made a commitment to leveraging private-sector
the Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, and Kenya, investment, using technology and information to
signed technical cooperation agreements with stabilize global food markets and provide opportu-
Embrapa and began implementing joint projects. nities to poor farmers and consumers in the event
of price spikes and volatility and extraordinary
hunger levels. Their deliberations emphasized that
THE PRIVATE SECTOR
the private sector can help to solve food insecurity,
The private sector is also taking on a larger role but that its activities must be conducted in collabo-
in agricultural research, poverty alleviation, and ration with governments as part of an integrated
environmental sustainability. In January 2011, strategy to make the global food system more sus-
the World Economic Forum released an innova- tainable.9 The global leaders agreed on ways to bet-
tive road map for the agricultural development ter coordinate public- and private-sector efforts,
of its stakeholders.8 The roadmap, developed including the formation of national-level partner-
by 17 global companies, was designed to lever- ships to engage the private sector in sustainable
age public- and private-sector investment; share agricultural development and the creation of a
environmental best practices; develop agricultural global forum to exchange best practices and pro-
markets, including opportunities for small-scale vide inputs to the G20 on a regular basis.
farmers; and improve access to affordable and
nutritious food. It represents an important mile-
PHILANTHROPIC ORGANIZATIONS
stone in the private sector’s increased engagement
in the global discourse on agricultural develop- Private philanthropic and civil society organiza-
ment and food security. tions are promoting the global agricultural devel-
The private sector has now become one of the opment agenda on a much greater scale than just
World Food Programme’s top 10 donors. Fur- a decade ago. Many international nongovernmen-
thermore, new emergency protocols that empha- tal organizations are transforming themselves
size partnerships with the private sector were with new goals and approaches, by mobiliz-
put in place to help the World Food Programme ing resources for development programs, and by
improve its ability to save lives and livelihoods acting more independently from government-
in disasters and emergencies, most recently in financed programs.
Haiti, Pakistan, and the Horn of Africa. Another
initiative, the Food Retail Industry Challenge The private sector has now become
Fund by the United Kingdom’s Department for
International Development (DFID), is support- one of the World Food Programme’s
ing African farmers through innovative business
partnerships. The fund aims to improve the lives of top 10 donors.
African farmers by increasing European imports
of agricultural products from poorer countries
in Sub-Saharan Africa. So far, the fund supports The Bill Melinda Gates Foundation has
11 innovative partnerships linking farmers with invested in an agricultural development program
European markets. intended to help small farmers in Sub-Saharan
In developing countries, the value chains of Africa and South Asia boost their productivity,
most food commodities are inefficient, with high increase their incomes, and build better lives for
New Players 73

85. their families. In the past decade (Figure 3), it FIGURE 3 Top 10 donors to the CGIAR, 2000–10
has become an important donor to the Consulta-
tive Group on International Agricultural Research 700
600
(CGIAR). As of June 2011, the Foundation had
Millions of US$
500
committed about US$12 billion to agricultural
400
research and development, agricultural policies,
300
and access to market systems, as well as financial
200
services for the poor, water sanitation and hygiene,
100
and policy advocacy.
0
Other philanthropic organizations have also
Bill Melinda Gates
United States
World Bank
United Kingdom
European Commission
Canada
Foundation
Switzerland
Netherlands
Japan
Germany
emerged as major supporters of agricultural devel-
opment, poverty alleviation, natural resource
management, and risk management. For example,
the Sir Ratan Tata Trust and the Navajbai Ratan
Tata Trust in India are funding activities related
to drought proofing, microfinance, and a revival of Source: Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research,
the Green Revolution. During 2010–11 the Trust The CGIAR at 40 and Beyond: Impacts that Matter for the Poor and the
allocated US$31 million, of which 75 percent was Planet (Washington, DC, 2011).
for rural livelihoods and communities.10 The How-
ard G. Buffet Foundation has funded projects in among vulnerable communities. The Foundation
more than 74 countries, including 32 African coun- is also supporting global initiatives on conserva-
tries, on agriculture for nutrition. These projects tion agriculture. Similarly, the PepsiCo Foundation
are designed to benefit more than 1.5 million peo- (PepsiCo’s philanthropic arm) is developing part-
ple by addressing poor crop yields, limited success nerships and programs to improve health, environ-
with livestock, low incomes, and chronic hunger ment, and education in underserved regions.
BOX 14
Private Philanthropy and Public Policy
Prabhu Pingali, Bill Melinda Gates Foundation
T he rise of private nonprofit organiza-
tions during the past fifteen years has
transformed the nature of aid supply in
scale to sector-allocated official develop-
ment assistance.1
In the agriculture sector, the growth
success of the Green Revolution left the
global food system in a stagnant state.
The resulting stagnation and decline
a significant way. By 2011, the philan- of philanthropic giving in parallel to the in agricultural productivity growth has
thropic sector had added to the number emergence of new bilateral donors— been felt throughout most of Africa and
of organizations operating internation- such as Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Asia. The international community
ally and to total aid flows. Although no and South Africa (BRICS), and Korea— recently renewed its interest in agricul-
consolidated statistics exist, it is esti- comes at a critical time, when levels of ture following the 2007–08 and 2011
mated that global private aid doubled investment in agricultural development food price crises, and the trends in pri-
between 2004 and 2009. Likewise, at remain largely inadequate. The signifi- vate and bilateral giving may signal the
US$52.5 billion in 2009, the value of pri- cant withdrawal of donor support and beginning of a new surge in international
vate donations to developing countries national government attention to agri- agricultural development and, ultimately,
may well have become comparable in culture in the mid-1980s following the in improved food security worldwide.
74 Stepping into the Global Food System

86. Developments of 2011 continued into 2012, develop technologies and institutional changes
with Unilever launching a charitable foundation at needed to achieve a green revolution. AGRA
the World Economic Forum 2012 with the goal of received a grant of US$5 million for 2011 and 2012
helping more than 1 billion people improve their from the Bill Melinda Gates Foundation and the
health and well-being. It is also working with the Rockefeller Foundation to improve the productiv-
World Food Programme’s Project Laser Beam to ity and incomes of small-scale farmers in Africa
help eradicate hunger and poverty in Bangladesh by integrating its programs with those of partners
and Indonesia. It, in partnership with other orga- such as African governments, CGIAR centers, the
nizations, has committed US$50 million over five private sector, and various network programs in the
years to create a replicable and sustainable solution breadbasket regions of key countries.12
targeted at the ultra-poor, especially women.11
The Rockefeller Foundation has reoriented its
MOVING TOWARD A NEW
philanthropic mission to promote human well-
DEVELOPMENT DYNAMIC
being with greater focus on Africa. It launched
the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa The rise of new players has fueled calls for new
(AGRA) in partnership with the Bill Melinda state and nonstate players to become even more
Gates Foundation in 2006. This Africa-based and involved in the governance of global food security.
Africa-led organization is charged with sustain- The G20, in particular, has filled a gap in global
ably increasing the productivity and profitability governance by creating coalitions that connect
of smallholder farms throughout Africa. It seeks advanced and developing countries. For example,
to provide access to more resilient seeds that pro- the G20 affirmed its support for a widening role
duce higher and more stable yields, promote soil for the Committee on World Food Security at its
health and productivity, build more efficient local, June 2011 meeting of agriculture ministers.13 In its
national, and regional agricultural markets, pro- Ministerial Declaration, the G20 indicated its sup-
mote better policies, and build partnerships to port for the ongoing work of the Committee as the
Beyond aid flows, the philanthropic high-quality seeds and improving farm- research and development by the CGIAR,
sector has also changed the way in which management practices to streamlining and (2) national and local levels, in direct
aid to agriculture is being channeled methods of bringing crops to market. support of farmers and the situations
within countries. International nongov- The Bill Melinda Gates Foundation (including the knowledge, socioeconomic,
ernmental organizations and voluntary has emerged in recent years, alongside and ecological systems) they operate
organizations have been able to deliver major multilateral and bilateral donors, within. Investments have ranged from
essential services and public goods, as one of the leading contributors to the development of global public goods
thereby assuming critical roles that gov- agricultural development aid. It supplies (such as improved crop and livestock
ernments or international donors cannot. approximately US$400 million per year varieties, farming practices, and agricul-
Meanwhile, private foundations have in agriculture-sector grants, with a par- tural data and statistics) to implementing
focused on strengthening the capacity ticular focus on smallholder productivity and targeting successful programs (for
of local development institutions that growth in Sub-Saharan Africa and South example, through efforts to address local
can adapt solutions to local conditions. Asia. Through 2011, the Foundation com- market failures or to ensure that improved
In addition, through investments at all mitted US$2 billion to its Agricultural tools reach the hands of farmers). The
levels of agricultural value chains, private Development Program, which has Foundation believes that these collabora-
foundations have catalyzed the develop- helped initiate action among partners tive efforts will help enhance smallholder
ment and piloting of innovative solutions, at both (1) the global level, in support, productivity and reduce poverty in Sub-
approaches, and models—from planting for instance, of high-end agricultural Saharan Africa and South Asia.
New Players 75

87. BOX 15
The Private Sector and Food Security
Derek Yach, PepsiCo
I n 2011, PepsiCo Inc. announced a
partnership with the US Agency for
International Development and the
time, build an export to improve liveli-
hoods and also support part of PepsiCo’s
supply chain needs.
and profitability of their companies. These
goals often overlap with the objectives
of public organizations and others try-
United Nations World Food Programme This is one example of how private ing to end hunger and reduce poverty.
intended to create economic stability for companies can contribute to food secu- The World Economic Forum, with its New
smallholder chickpea farmers in Ethiopia. rity. PepsiCo, which has a large and grow- Vision for Agriculture, has recognized the
The partners are working together with ing chickpea-based hummus business, benefits of these public–private partner-
Ethiopian farmers, local food manufac- and other companies are constantly seek- ships and is stimulating and developing
turers, research institutes, and donors ing ways to create new markets, invest multistakeholder programs in several
to increase chickpea productivity among in emerging economies, advance healthy countries.1 The multistakeholder approach
smallholder farmers, develop food prod- nutrition, ensure environmental sustain- to global food policy appeals to food
ucts needed to reduce hunger, and, in ability, and drive the long-term growth companies because it reduces risks they
foremost inclusive international and intergovern- Organization of the United Nations. Many bilateral
mental platform. In particular, it stressed the Com- aid agencies, such as those of Germany, Japan, and
mittee’s responsibility for enhancing engagement the United Kingdom, are closing their bilateral pro-
with the private sector and strengthening North– grams in China but are actively exploring new part-
South, South–South, and triangular cooperation. nerships with China to aid Africa. For example,
after closing its bilateral program in March 2011,
DFID China started to develop activities under
The G20, in particular, has filled a gap the Global Development Partnership Programme,
which is DFID’s new framework to engage emerg-
in global governance by creating ing powers and new partners in global develop-
ment. The Programme will support collaborative
coalitions that cut across advanced activities with China in sectors such as agriculture,
climate change, and health, some of which will tar-
and developing countries. get selected developing countries.
The Bill Melinda Gates Foundation is also
At its own summit in October 2011 in Rome, the initiating its own cooperation with emerging
Committee on World Food Security included both economies in Africa.15 In November 2011, the
the private sector and philanthropic organizations Foundation announced a partnership with the
at the table for the first time. government of Brazil aimed at improving the
South–South cooperation is becoming part of agricultural productivity of small farmers in Sub-
the global agenda for aid effectiveness.14 Triangu- Saharan Africa and South Asia. A grant of about
lar cooperation between traditional aid donors, US$2.5 million was awarded to Embrapa to enable
emerging aid donors, and recipient countries is Brazilian and African agriculture research organi-
one way forward. Much of China’s commitment to zations to collaborate on agricultural development
African agriculture is embodied in its donation of to improve the productivity of smallholder farmers
US$30 million in 2009 to the Special Programme in the developing world. At almost the same time,
for Food Security of the Food and Agriculture the Gates Foundation and the Chinese Ministry
76 Stepping into the Global Food System

88. share with other sectors, such as those Chinese Ministry of Agriculture, PepsiCo lift local farmers out of poverty. In India,
related to climate change and the volatil- announced it would build and operate PepsiCo works with local academics and
ity of essential commodity prices, and with demonstration farms that use the most consumer insights groups to increase
other private companies, such as the risk advanced irrigation, fertilizer, and crop young women’s access to reasonably
of entering new markets. Multistakeholder management techniques. 2 PepsiCo dem- priced, iron-fortified, nutritious products
initiatives allow for deploying blended onstrated increase in potato yields in that allow the company to reach poor
public and private funding sources in ways China to 45 tons per hectare, meeting urban communities and share messages
that meet the private sector’s need for the global standard, while achieving up that resonate with them.4
profitability and development agencies’ to 50 percent reduction in water con- Companies such as PepsiCo have
need to enhance rural development and sumption in potato cultivation by imple- fresh perspectives and viewpoints useful
alleviate hunger. They also allow for scaled menting advanced irrigation techniques. 3 in the fight against hunger and poverty.
investments in infrastructure beneficial to In Mexico, through a partnership with However, the private sector does not have
business and society. the Inter-American Development Bank all the answers. Partnerships, collabora-
PepsiCo’s involvement in such multi- and the government, the company tion, and knowledge exchange between
stakeholder discussions and actions is has co-invested in building sunflower the private and public sectors, as well as
transforming how the company does production capability that will reduce civil society, are what will truly help solve
business and with whom it partners. For PepsiCo’s reliance on palm oil and, development challenges and benefit com-
example, in a joint initiative with the through advance-purchase agreements, munities worldwide.
of Science and Technology signed an agreement the 2011 World Economic Forum made no mention
to produce innovative technologies to boost the of smallholder farmers’ organizations or the Com-
progress of developing countries and promote mittee on World Food Security.17 At the same time,
the achievement of the Millennium Development the private sector has, until recently, been largely
Goals. These partnerships demonstrate the critical absent from the reformed Committee on World
role that emerging economies like Brazil and China Food Security, and its presence has been essentially
can play in driving innovation to reduce world limited to multinational corporations, although
poverty and hunger. new forms of private sector participation have been
Still, the opportunities presented by these new proposed.18 To involve new players and retain tradi-
players have not been fully harnessed.16 There seems tional players in the global food security system, it is
to be a consensus that increased investment in agri- essential to strengthen collaboration and build trust
culture should give priority to smallholder food among different stakeholders through the establish-
production, yet the New Vision for African Agricul- ment of strong coalitions of willing partners at the
ture launched by 17 multinational corporations at local, regional, and global levels. ■
New Players 77

90. Chapter 9
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
Food Policy Taking
Shape at the Local Level
A part from 2011’s global challenges and oppor-
tunities for food policy, important developments with
potentially wide repercussions took place in individual
regions and countries, which are discussed in this chapter. As 2011
opened, events in Tunisia ignited the “Arab Awakening” in North
Africa and the Arab world, posing new challenges for food security
in the region. To the south, Sub-Saharan Africa made progress on its
continent-wide framework for raising agricultural growth to improve
food security and reduce poverty. That region also pushed forward
with efforts to increase agricultural productivity and incomes while
pursuing economic transformation beyond agriculture. Therefore,
although a food crisis struck the Horn of Africa, progress elsewhere
belies the image of a continent mired in gloom. India, having already
achieved economic growth and higher agricultural productivity,
turned its attention to domestic food security. It responded to an
extraordinary right-to-food movement by implementing the world’s
largest antihunger program and revived other initiatives designed
to overcome malnutrition, which remains high despite the country’s
economic success.
Food security at home was also the primary goal of China’s major 2011 food
policies and investments, which focused on water conservation and agricul-
tural research and development. China also engaged in agricultural develop-
ment abroad, particularly in Africa—though its engagement is smaller and of
longer standing than often believed (see Box 12 in Chapter 8). Brazil has been
even more proactive in increasing its role in the global food system. By success-
fully expanding agricultural production, the country has solidified its position in

91. world agricultural markets and become an increas- readily as it does in the rest of the world. In most
ingly active player on the international scene (see countries, agricultural growth, for instance, leads to
Box 13 in Chapter 8). substantial reductions in child undernutrition, but
not in the Arab countries. Manufacturing and ser-
vice sector–led growth in the Arab region is more in
Middle East and North Africa line with the rest of the world, and, given a condu-
cive business environment, these sectors have large
The Arab Awakening potential to create jobs and drive improvement in
and Food Security the well-being of the poor.
Finding solutions to these challenges will
Clemens Breisinger, Olivier Ecker, Perrihan require a broad economic road map and country-
Al-Riffai, and Bingxin Yu, IFPRI
specific development strategies. Research can help
The self-immolation of a young Tunisian man in with evidence that identifies the pros and cons of
December 2010 sparked a wave of protests and alternative policy options. To improve food secu-
uprisings across the Arab world in 2011. The Arab rity and reduce poverty, Arab policymakers should
Awakening has most directly affected Bahrain, focus on the following key areas:
Egypt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen, but it
may also provide impetus for change in other Arab 1. Improve data and capacity for evidence-
countries. But with opportunities have come signif- based decisionmaking. Decisions based on
icant challenges for governments and civil society. flawed data can damage economies, harm peo-
In the short run, countries in transition have seen a ple’s well-being, and lead to significant finan-
sharp slowdown in economic growth and a related cial losses, so policymakers and voters need
rise in unemployment. In addition, political fluid- realistic and accurate baseline data. Currently,
ity, coupled with rising food and fuel prices, has led some official numbers, such as official poverty
to widespread increases in food and fuel subsidies, and inequality indicators, may underestimate
public-sector wages, and other government wel- the extent of the problems facing many Arab
fare spending.1 As a result, oil-importing countries countries. Admitting that these data are flawed
in particular face growing budget gaps, inflation will help increase the credibility of policy-
in both oil-exporting and oil-importing countries makers and allow them to set targets against
is expected to rise, and foreign exchange reserves which future progress can be more realistically
are expected to contract. Moreover, conflict and assessed. Countries should not only improve
security concerns have dampened tourism, remit- the quality of their data, but also make that data
tances, and foreign direct investment throughout more accessible.
the region.2 Mastering these short-term challenges
will be critical for a successful transition process. 2. Foster growth that enhances food security.
Achieving prosperity will also require address- Fostering economic growth is fundamental
ing long-standing challenges in the region. Not only for enhancing food security, yet certain types
political issues, but also socioeconomic issues likely of growth do more to improve food security
contributed to the onset of the Arab Awakening.3 at the country level, whereas other types of
These socioeconomic factors include unemploy- growth have stronger effects on household-
ment, especially among the youth, growing income level food security. Export-led growth gener-
disparities, and a high risk of food insecurity for ates foreign exchange revenues for food imports
both countries and households (Figure 1). While and thus improves food security at the coun-
public spending is relatively high in Arab countries, try level. Inclusive growth that generates jobs
it contributes less to economic growth than it does and increases incomes for the poor enhances
in other world regions. And economic growth does food security at the household level. Growth,
not trickle down to the poor in Arab countries as combined with appropriate tax systems, also
80 Food Policy Taking Shape at the Local Level

92. FIGURE 1 The risk of food insecurity in the Arab countries plus Iran and Turkey, 2011
Syria Turkey
Jordan 2.0
13.9 9.7
Lebanon 8.3 28.6 13.9 Kuwait
16.5 2.4 Qatar
Tunisia 3.8
6.5 West Bank 15.0 2.0
9.0 Gaza 4.0
31.9
Morocco 11.8
8.2 Iraq Iran
21.6 – 2.4
27.5 16.6
Algeria
7.3 Libya
15.6 3.4 Egypt Bahrain
21.0 8.7 2.9
30.7 9.0
Saudi Arabia
Mauritania
4.0
20.6 9.1 UAE
24.2 3.4
Sudan –
8.4 Yemen Oman
37.9 15.4 6.2
59.6 9.6
South Sudan Somalia
Risk of food insecurity
Low
Moderate
Djibouti
Serious 42.3
Alarming 32.6
Comoros
Extremely alarming
49.2
Only macro-level indicator available 47.0
Only micro-level indicator available
Oil exporters
Macro level: Food imports⁄(total exports + net remittances) (%)
Micro level: As measured by prevalence of child stunting (%)
Source: C. Breisinger, O. Ecker, P. Al-Riffai, and B. Yu, Beyond the Arab Awakening: Policies and Investments for Poverty Reduction and Food
Security, IFPRI Food Policy Report (Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute, 2012). Note: The risk of food insecurity describes
the vulnerability of countries (macro-level) and households (micro-level).
generates government revenues that can be must reallocate spending and improve spend-
directed to public spending on food security. ing efficiency to achieve development goals.
Both oil importers and oil exporters, however,
3. Improve the efficiency and allocation of should have a genuine interest in achieving
public spending. Arab countries urgently need higher returns on their spending. A wide array
to revisit the efficiency and allocation of public of country-specific factors affects public expen-
spending and make improvements where nec- diture efficiency, such as the level of economic
essary. In general, most oil-exporting coun- development, the size of the public sector,
tries with fiscal surpluses can compensate for public-sector competence, governance, political
inefficiencies by increasing spending, whereas stability, and security of property rights. As in
oil-importing countries with fiscal deficits the case of growth strategies, investment plans
Regional Developments 81

93. have to account for country-specific conditions. in the late 1990s and continues today. As a region,
These investment plans should also be aligned Sub-Saharan Africa is growing at average rates
with growth strategies at the subsector and sub- exceeding 5 percent annually.4 The next challenge
national levels to ensure maximum consistency for African countries is to move from recovery
and development impact. to economic transformation (see Box 16). Such a
transformation will require countries to raise pro-
Designing and implementing these and other ductivity in the agricultural and rural sectors while
policy and investment priorities will require vision- diversifying into higher-productivity, urban-based
ary leadership, sound laws and institutions, politi- manufacturing and service sectors that produce
cians who are accountable and listen to the voices higher-value goods and services. The result would
of the people, and a civil society that is patient be greater overall economic productivity and prog-
and accepts the tenets of democracy. The Arab ress in lifting rural incomes toward the level of
world has awakened. It is now time to take the urban incomes.
steps necessary for a food-secure Arab world with-
out poverty.
UNBALANCED GROWTH
During most of the period preceding the current
Africa recovery, overall productivity in African countries
has stagnated at best. This happened because labor
Moving beyond Recovery to migrated from the relatively better-performing
Economic Transformation agricultural sector into the nonagricultural sec-
tor, which is dominated by the less productive yet
Ousmane Badiane, IFPRI rapidly expanding service sector.5 Major factors
After decades of stagnation, African economies behind this process have been the relative neglect
embarked on a remarkable recovery that started of agriculture in national polices and the rapid
BOX 16
Pushing for Progress on Agriculture in Africa
Tsitsi Makombe, IFPRI
T he year 2011 brought significant
progress in the implementation of
the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture
following a technical review of the plan
and a business meeting that validated
the plan and determined how it would
reached the 10 percent budget target,
while 17 attained growth rates of at
least 6 percent in 2009.1 More countries
Development Programme, the African be financed. are expected to move toward the bud-
Union’s continent-wide framework guid- In the national agricultural invest- get target following their adoption of
ing national efforts to increase agricul- ment plans, countries have pledged national agricultural investment plans.
tural growth and progress toward poverty to raise their agricultural investment For example, Rwanda’s agricultural bud-
reduction and food and nutrition security. level. The Programme asks govern- get share was just 3.5 percent in 2007
Six countries held Programme roundtables ments to increase agricultural spending when the country signed its compact.
and signed compacts, bringing to 29 the to 10 percent of national budgets and But after Rwanda completed a national
number of countries that have done achieve an annual agricultural growth agricultural investment plan in 2009, the
so. Most countries have now adopted rate of 6 percent. Based on the latest country’s agricultural budget share rose
a national agricultural investment plan available data, only 8 countries have to 6.8 percent by 2010–11. 2
82 Food Policy Taking Shape at the Local Level

94. NOT JUST AGRICULTURE, BUT
pace of urbanization. Because the share of people
INDUSTRIALIZATION
employed in agriculture has fallen much faster
than their productivity has risen, agriculture as a To achieve successful structural change, coun-
percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) has tries need to produce more sophisticated, higher-
declined rapidly in most African countries. In value goods for which demand expands globally
most of these countries, labor has migrated out as incomes rise around the world. The decades of
of agriculture faster than it can be absorbed into economic stagnation preceding Africa’s current
the nonagriculture sector, undermining produc- recovery meant that African economies failed to
tivity growth—not only in agriculture, but in the promote product sophistication. From 1962 to
economy as a whole. The problem is as much slow 2000, the average indicator of the degree of sophis-
growth in agriculture as it is poor labor absorption tication of all products produced by African coun-
outside agriculture. tries was 50 to 60 percent lower than the estimated
For the average African country, the size average for a sample of 97 other countries.7 The
of the agriculture sector as a share of GDP is value of the estimated indicator for agricultural
nearly 20 percentage points smaller than one products not only is low, but has stagnated since
would expect based on the actual level of eco- the 1960s.
nomic development. The service sector, on the During the 1960s, most African countries pur-
other hand, is about 20 percentage points larger sued an industrialization strategy led by the pub-
than one would expect.6 This imbalance in the lic sector and designed to substitute for imported
growth of the two sectors has slowed produc- goods. The widespread failure of these efforts has
tivity and income growth across Africa. How left most African countries without any bold and
can African countries capitalize on the ongoing credible strategies for industrialization.
agricultural and economic growth recovery of Successful economic transformation is associ-
the past 15 years to boost the transformation of ated with a series of changes in the overall econ-
their economies? omy. These changes include a rise in the absolute
Donors intensified their Programme Engagement of civil society and the capacity and improve the quality of
alignment and harmonization efforts private sector has been limited in national agricultural investment plans.
in 2011. They funded the Programme some countries while some national For example, Strategic Analysis and
bilaterally and multilaterally through agricultural investment plans have Knowledge Support Systems in individ-
its Multi-donor Trust Fund and Global had unrealistic growth and poverty ual countries—which are being estab-
Agriculture and Food Security Program. reduction targets and funding require- lished with the technical support of
The Multi-donor Trust Fund supports ments. Nonetheless, these challenges the International Food Policy Research
Programme implementation processes are already being addressed. The New Institute and Regional Strategic Analysis
while the Global Agriculture and Food Partnership for Africa’s Development and Knowledge Support Systems—are
Security Program addresses potential (the African Union’s planning and expected to improve analytical and
underfunding of national agricultural coordinating agency) and develop- review capacities for evidence-based
investment plans. With a US$46.5 million ment partners commissioned guide- agricultural policy planning, implemen-
grant in 2011 to support Liberia’s national lines for nonstate-actor participation, tation, and monitoring and evaluation.
agricultural investment plan, the Global and the 7th Comprehensive Africa It is noteworthy that Programme imple-
Agriculture and Food Security Program Agriculture Development Programme mentation coincides with the conti-
has now allocated more than US$270 mil- Partnership Platform meeting, held in nent’s agricultural growth recovery. 3
lion to support the national agricultural March 2011, called for their system- Renewed agricultural growth provides
investment plans of six African countries. atic and targeted dissemination across a solid foundation for African countries
The Programme implementa- countries. Efforts are also underway as they work to implement their agricul-
tion process has had its challenges. to strengthen country implementation tural investment plans.
Regional Developments 83

95. and relative size of industrial output; an increase evidence-based policy planning and implementa-
in the number and nature of industrial goods; tion and creating opportunities for strategic pub-
new techniques for combining labor, capital, and lic-private partnerships and business-to-business
technology to produce goods in industry, as well alliances. Industrialization policies should also
as changes in the related costs; and a change in focus on the informal sector currently producing
the sources supplying the economy with exist- low-quality household goods. This sector has huge
ing and new products.8 In this process, industrial potential for enterprise growth and consolidation,
enterprises need to learn how to combine and as well as product improvement and innovation.14
recombine existing and new assets to establish
new businesses and create products to address
new markets.9 India
The risks and uncertainties faced by entrepre-
neurs in producing a new good for the first time are
a major determinant of an economy’s capacity to
Enshrining the Right to Food
diversify into higher-productivity goods. As they M. S. Swaminathan,
M. S. Swaminathan Research Foundation
increase their investments in agricultural devel-
opment,10 African countries also need renewed Hunger and malnutrition have long devastated
industrialization strategies to build on the current the people and progress of India. In 2011, the
recovery. Such strategies should target the tech- Indian government took a major step toward
nological, institutional, and infrastructural factors putting an end to this injustice nationwide (see
that raise the level of risk and uncertainty related to Box 17). With the introduction of the National
entrepreneurial innovation. Ultimately, industrial- Food Security Act, India’s “ship-to-mouth” exis-
ization policies should expand a country’s arsenal of tence (as the country’s previous reliance on food
technologies and its ability to apply them to create shipments is commonly termed) is en route to one
new, higher-valued goods.11 African countries will of food security and health through the imple-
need to rediscover ways of stimulating industrial mentation of the world’s largest social-protection
growth and may need to look at emerging Asian program against hunger using homegrown food.
countries, where public action in support of indus- In light of the conditions that have prevailed in
trial growth has been a central element of eco- India since its independence in 1947, the National
nomic development.12 Food Security Act is nothing short of historic, as it
Africa’s industrial policies should seek to positions institutions and individuals to radically
encourage the creation and growth of enterprises, reduce hunger and malnutrition. In the recent past,
not just in industry, but also in agribusiness and specifically during the 1960s, India received the
the informal sector. In the first three decades of the highest amount of concessional food aid world-
21st century, demand for food in Africa is expected wide; in 1966 alone, the country imported more
to grow by US$100 billion, of which one-third than 10 million tons of wheat. Today, based on the
could be met by smallholders.13 This rising demand requirements of the new National Food Security
creates a real incentive and opportunity for indus- Act, India is due to commit more than 60 mil-
trialization based on agribusiness in the medium lion tons of homegrown wheat, rice, and millet at a
term. Strategies should include not only programs highly subsidized price to citizens living below the
to raise productivity on farms, but also develop- poverty line. This is only one of the numerous ways
ment of new processing and packaging technolo- that this new Act (once it is carefully reviewed,
gies to support product innovation and creation slightly amended, and enacted as law) promises a
of competitive distribution networks and trans- multi-faceted attack on hunger.
port infrastructure that cross national boundaries. Despite India’s countless efforts to increase
The Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Develop- food and nutrition security in the past, wide-
ment Program can be helpful here by promoting spread improvements have been minimal. A
84 Food Policy Taking Shape at the Local Level

96. BOX 17
India’s Economy Roars Ahead but Nutritional Improvement
Is Stalled
P. K. Joshi and Suneetha Kadiyala, IFPRI; S. Mahendra Dev, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research
I ndia allocated additional resources in
2011 to ongoing programs aimed at
reducing poverty and ending hunger and
from US$2.60 billion in 2006–07 to
US$8.91 billion in 2010–11. This flag-
ship program aims to enhance livelihood
more accessible to the poor, or effective
at scale.
India has a long way to go to ensure
malnutrition. The country has high eco- security of households in rural areas by nutritional security. Some estimates
nomic growth, bumper foodgrain produc- providing at least 100 days of guaranteed suggest that with the current pace of
tion, and substantial food buffer stocks, wage employment in a year and mandates actions, the target of achieving the
which would usually indicate improve- 33 percent participation by women. first Millennium Development Goal to
ment in poverty and malnutrition num- The Scheme has generated employ- halve the number of undernourished
bers. However, poverty in India remains ment opportunities in rural areas and has people by 2015 will be achieved by
pervasive, malnutrition is widespread, had a positive impact on consumption India only in 2042—a 28-year lag.3
and the country’s nutritional status lags expenditure, intake of energy and pro- This is unacceptable given the country’s
far behind Brazil or China. To address this, tein, and asset accumulation by the rural outstanding economic performance.
the Government of India initiated, and is poor. The government intends to expand Programs and resources require con-
now supplementing, an array of programs the scope of the Mahatma Gandhi vergence, transparent institutions, and
and policy measures for the welfare of the National Rural Employment Guarantee inclusive governance for greater impact.
poor, especially women and children.1 Scheme by providing employment that Continued poverty and undernourishment
Currently, more than 40 percent of creates permanent assets for the country would undermine India's progress as a
India’s population earns less than US$1.25 (such as water conservation structures) high-performing emerging economy.
a day. Estimates show that one-third and builds infrastructure (such as rural The pathways between agriculture
of all Indian women are underweight; roads). To improve access to food, the and nutrition are now well recognized
almost half of Indian children are stunted public distribution system provides highly (see Chapter 6), which is why existing
and 40 percent are underweight; and subsidized food to the population below programs need to dovetail with agricul-
rates of micronutrient deficiencies are the poverty line. The public distribu- tural improvements. A disconnect exists
also extremely high. The key reasons for tion system is expected to be reoriented between agricultural production and
India’s nutrition numbers lagging so far and implemented through the proposed nutritional security when, as in India,
behind its economic numbers are (1) low Food Security Act. Implementation of the majority of farmers holding less than
agricultural productivity; (2) low incomes the Act was expected in 2011 but is cur- two hectares are net buyers of food.
for a majority of the rural population; and rently awaiting parliament approval. Production of high-value and nutritive
(3) poor people’s limited access to educa- Many observers see mixed results from commodities—such as milk, poultry,
tion and food, health, and nutrition pro- these programs, driven mainly by the meat, and fish—by smallholders would
grams.2 To boost incomes, among other variable quality of program governance augment their income and make them
concerns, the government’s budget outlay and lack of appropriate coordination by food and nutrition secure.
for the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural different departments. The challenge is
Employment Guarantee Scheme increased to make these programs efficient and
recent report states that “maternal and child individual’s nutritional status, has remained low
undernutrition levels remain persistently and for the past twenty-five years.16 But, how can
unacceptably high.”15 The 2011 edition of the this be so, when innovative programs designed
Human Development Report points out that to deliver nutrition, education, and healthcare in
body mass index, which is a good measure of an integrated ways (including the Integrated Child
Regional Developments 85

97. Development Service, the Mid-Day Meal Pro- begin to enable India to reap a demographic divi-
gramme, and other programs initiated by interna- dend from its youthful population.
tional agencies like UNICEF and the World Food With the right modifications and the will to
Programme) exist nationwide? carry it out, the Food Security Act will also cre-
The answer is a lack of convergence and syn- ate a win–win situation for both resource-poor
ergy between programs and across platforms. farmers and consumers. Procurement at a remuner-
The Food Security Act must therefore ensure ative price will be the greatest stimulus for increas-
that programs address all essential components ing farm productivity and production. For this
of food security. The draft of the bill introduced reason, substituting cash for grains, while tempt-
to Parliament in December 2011 focused only on ing, must be avoided; currency can be printed, but
economic access to food without making explicit grains can be produced only by farmers—who con-
reference to the other essential components of stitute nearly 700 million of India’s 1.2 billion peo-
food security, including access to clean drink- ple. It is the duty of a democratic society to ensure
ing water, sanitation, primary healthcare, and the well-being and survival of all people, and food
nutritional education. In its current form, the bill security for all will help to assure income security
also neglects to mention the role of farmers or for farm families.
of public participation, although the panchayat
raj institutions (whose members are elected by
residents of their villages) and particularly gram
China
sabhas (which provide a meeting where residents
can raise concerns) can play a vital role in ensur-
ing the effective and non-corrupt administration
Feeding a Billion People
of legal entitlements. Jikun Huang, Center for Chinese Agricultural
To achieve widespread sustainable food and Policy, Chinese Academy of Sciences
nutrition security, the draft legislation of the China’s most significant food policy develop-
National Food Security Act will need to be care- ment in 2011 was its decision to put food security
fully reviewed and strategically revised. The lifecycle firmly at the top of its list of concerns by making
approach to nutrition support should be embraced, three important policy decisions. First, the nation’s
and women should be granted legal entitlement as most important policy document—the Num-
heads of household so that they are equally empow- ber 1 Document—laid out plans to invest about
ered to make financial and food-related decisions US$630 billion in water conservancy in the next
for their families. The public distribution of food 10 years to combat increasing water scarcity. These
should be strengthened, and the food basket within plans include implementing institution and policy
it should be expanded beyond wheat and rice to reforms to improve water-use efficiency.
include nutritious cereals like jowar (sorghum), Second, China has released the 2012 Number 1
bajra (pearl millet), ragi (finger millet), and maize. Document specifically focused on innovation in
The Public Distribution System often sees diffi- agricultural science and technology and boost-
culty with targeting, which can be a major source of ing agricultural productivity. The annual growth
corruption. In states like Tamil Nadu and Kerala, rate of public spending on agricultural research
governments may be unwilling to shift from their and development in real terms increased from an
successful universal public distribution systems to average of 16 percent from 2000–09 to more than
a targeted national system, so an efficient system 20 percent in 2010–11 and is expected to grow in
must have well-defined exclusion criteria and pro- the coming years.
mote a culture of honesty (since those who do not Third, in November 2011 the national poverty
need social protection from public funds would not standard, measured as annual per capita income in
demand highly subsidized food). In 2012, we hope rural areas, was set at 2,300 yuan (about US$365),
to see the world’s largest social protection scheme almost double the poverty standard in 2009. This is
86 Food Policy Taking Shape at the Local Level

98. estimated to bring 13.4 percent of the rural popu- improved national food security. The driving
lation (or 128 million people) under the poverty forces of this success include China’s household
alleviation program, which will have significant responsibility system, which distributed land
implications for poverty reduction and household equally to rural households; the application of
food security. science and technology to agriculture; invest-
China’s ability to feed a population growing in ing in agricultural land and water; and market
both size and income has been impressive consid- reform. However, it is hard to see how these suc-
ering the country’s natural-resource constraints. cesses can continue without significant inno-
China supported more than 20 percent of the vation. For example, as Chinese citizens have
world’s population and achieved nearly 98 percent seen their incomes increase, their demand for
overall food self-sufficiency in 2010 despite per meat has also increased. This led China to shift
capita water availability that is only one-fourth of from being a net exporter of maize—which is
the world average and arable land that accounted used as feed for farm animals—to a net importer
for only 8 percent of the world total. China’s grain in 2010. Given China’s natural resource con-
production grew for seven consecutive years from straints, the country will likely become a more
2004 to 2010, and the government estimates that important maize importer in the near future,
grain production surpassed 570 million tons in making its food security more dependent on
2011, exceeding the record set just a year earlier. other countries. It is clear that while China’s
China’s agricultural success in the past accomplishments are impressive, great food-
three decades has contributed significantly to security challenges remain. ■
Regional Developments 87

99. FOOD POLICY TOOLS AND INDICATORS
To develop and implement effective food policies, decisionmakers
need resources, institutional capacity, political will, solid evidence, and timely
information, among other things. As part of IFPRI’s mission to find sus-
tainable ways to reduce poverty and end hunger and malnutrition, the Insti-
tute develops and shares global public goods, including tools and indicators
intended to help decisionmakers address real-life questions—ranging from
models and networks to datasets and indexes. The tools include interactive
ways to measure or conceptualize data; the indicators are standardized mea-
surements that signify thresholds for certain aspects of development. While
the content that can be extracted from these knowledge products is useful
in and of itself, its practical purposes are enhanced and better understood by
the various online networks that IFPRI co-facilitates that connect users to
each other and provide a platform for discussion. These resources also provide
benchmarks for monitoring and evaluating policies and programs to assess
what works, what doesn’t, and where improvements can be made.
Food Policy Tools methodologies, and facilitate partnerships with the
global research community.
AGRODEP aims to position African experts—
AGRODEP: AFRICAN GROWTH AND
rather than external actors—to take a leading role
DEVELOPMENT POLICY MODELING
in the study of strategic development questions and
CONSORTIUM
the broader agricultural growth and policy debates
As African countries strive to increase agricul- facing African countries. Started in 2010 by IFPRI
tural productivity and attain greater economic and several partners, AGRODEP is building a net-
growth, the policy reform process is fueling the work of African researchers with both the skills and
demand for policy-relevant research. Meeting this the modeling and data infrastructure to lead this
demand requires strengthened local capacities in effort. AGRODEP shares core economic models;
economic modeling, targeted partnerships, and establishes a central online database for statistical,
broadened linkages to the ongoing policy debate. economic, and geospatial data; and combines a net-
The African Growth and Development Policy work of experts with a community of practitioners.
(AGRODEP) Modeling Consortium was devel- All of this allows researchers to tackle major policy
oped to help meet this demand. AGRODEP’s goals questions facing African countries strategically.
are to mobilize a critical mass of modeling experts The AGRODEP website, launched in Octo-
within Africa’s policy research and analysis com- ber 2011, serves as a portal for economic data
munity, broaden access to innovative research and models and offers related resources, such
88 

100. as data-visualization tools. Event announce- visual representation of historical periods of exces-
ment pages facilitate networking activities among sive global price volatility from 2000 to the present,
AGRODEP members, staff, partners, and gover- as well as a daily volatility status. This status can
nance groups. alert policymakers when world markets are expe-
riencing a period of excessive food price volatility.
Website: www.agrodep.org
The information can then be used to determine
Contacts: Ousmane Badiane and Betina Dimaranan
appropriate country-level food-security responses,
Email: info-agrodep@agrodep.org
such as the release of physical food stocks. This
tool supports two recommendations of the 2011
FOOD SECURITY PORTAL G20 meetings. First, it provides information to the
Agriculture Market Information System (AMIS)
The price of food has far-reaching effects, having an
on price variability in global markets and identifies
impact on everything from poverty and nutrition
the presence and duration of excessive price vari-
to trade and markets to social and political unrest.
ability. Second, it supports the design of emergency
This makes access to accurate, relevant, and useful
humanitarian food reserves coordinated by the
global price and market information more impor-
World Food Programme (WFP).
tant than ever. The Food Security Portal is a unique
tool that provides users—including researchers, Website: www.foodsecurityportal.org
decisionmakers, and the media—with a one-stop Contact: Sara Gustafson
resource for the latest food security information. Email: s.gustafson@cgiar.org
The Portal informs the global food security dis-
cussion with breaking news; regularly updated data
FOOD SECURITY CASE MAPS
from leading organizations like the UN Food and
Agriculture Organization, the World Trade Orga- The Food Security Climate, Agriculture, and
nization, and the US Department of Agriculture; Socio-Economic Maps software (CASE Maps)
and interactive data-analysis tools. Policymakers is an interactive mapping tool policymakers and
can use the information and tools to track and ana- researchers can use to view potential changes in
lyze food security and price trends, enabling them agricultural supply, demand, and food security
to enact more informed, effective policies. based on different economic and biophysical driv-
The Food Security News Hot Spot heatmap ers over time and across the globe. These interac-
provides instant visualization of countries with the tive maps are based on data generated for Food
most food-security news items on a given day. The Security, Farming, and Climate Change to 2050,
data API in the developer toolkit contains data for published by IFPRI in 2010. CASE Maps display
more than 40 indicators related to food security, the exogenous model drivers and plausible future
commodity prices, economics, and human well- outcomes based on IFPRI’s International Model
being. Users can download this data to track calo- for Policy Analysis of Agricultural Commodities
rie supplies per capita, percent of undernourished and Trade (IMPACT) model.
children, consumer price indexes, global inflation, The CASE Maps translate numerical results into
poverty rates, exports, imports, population infor- a range of graphic representations, including scatter
mation, and more. plots, bar charts, time-series graphs, histograms,
One of the newest tools in the Food Security and other basic statistical outputs. Those inter-
Portal is the Excessive Food Price Variability Early ested in climate change and its potential effects
Warning System. This one-of-a-kind tool provides a on food security in developing countries can view
89


101. several indicators, including kilocalories available The Agricultural Domain Visualizer/Reporter
per capita per day, share of the population at risk of (ADVizR) allows users to map, tabulate, and chart
hunger, and the number of malnourished children a broad range of subnational agricultural develop-
age five or younger. CASE maps currently provide ment indicators according to selected geographic
indicators for 15 different scenarios using 3 overall domains (for example, districts, agroecological
population and income futures, each with 5 dif- zones, watersheds, farming systems, or market-
ferent climate scenarios. Users can download the sheds). Users select, in sequence, their target Sub-
indicators by country and region. The scenarios Saharan African subregion or country, as many as
provide a plausible range of outcomes based on the 20 development indicators of interest, and the spe-
current policy environment. This information can cific geographic domains by which the indicators
then be used as a starting point for thinking about should be reported.
possible policy and program changes. One of the HarvestChoice interfaces provides
access to a suite of spatial data exploration and
Website: www.ifpri.org/climatechange/casemaps.html
reporting tools (including the core functions of
Contacts: Gerald Nelson and Amanda Palazzo
ADVizR). The website also offers options for third
Email: ifpri-climatechange@cgiar.org
parties to embed these tools in their own sites.
Website: www.harvestchoice.org
HARVESTCHOICE
Contact: Maria Theresa Tenorio
The demand for tools to help prioritize and tar- Email: m.t.tenorio@cgiar.org
get cost-effective interventions with the greatest
impact on food security is increasing among policy
RESAKSS: REGIONAL STRATEGIC
and investment analysts and the decisionmakers
ANALYSIS AND KNOWLEDGE SUPPORT
they support. HarvestChoice is responding to this
SYSTEM
demand by generating knowledge products that
help guide strategic investments meant to improve The Regional Strategic Analysis and Knowledge
smallholder livelihoods in Sub-Saharan Africa Support System (ReSAKSS) was established in
through more productive, profitable, and sustain- response to the growing demand for credible
able farming. HarvestChoice’s hallmark approach information and analysis during the design of the
is a spatially explicit data and evaluation frame- Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development
work designed to better represent the significant Programme (CAADP). As a knowledge manage-
heterogeneity of farming systems and farm house- ment platform, it offers smallholders, researchers,
holds across the region. policymakers, and development professionals eas-
HarvestChoice’s online resources allow users to ily accessible data, analysis, tools, and research evi-
explore data, apply tools, and create intervention- dence. ReSAKSS is intended to promote dialogue
oriented maps that best address their own policy and facilitate the review, learning, and adoption of
and investment questions. HarvestChoice tools best practices associated with the CAADP agenda
can extract information from multiple fine-resolu- and increase awareness of agriculture’s role in pov-
tion data layers selected by the user. By selecting erty reduction and food and nutrition security.
demographic, market-access, and crop-production ReSAKSS operates as a multicountry network
layers, for example, users can tabulate population, of collaborating partners represented by regional
travel time to markets, and crop-area attributes of web-based platforms. It is organized around three
any geographic area they specify. main activities: (1) strategic analysis: providing
90 

102. data, tools, and analysis for monitoring key growth Food Policy
and poverty-reduction priorities and assessing the
impacts of interventions to address key questions, Indicators
such as whether and how the interventions are
having their desired impact on raising growth and
ASTI: AGRICULTURAL SCIENCE
reducing poverty and malnutrition; (2) knowledge
TECHNOLOGY INDICATORS
management: developing and maintaining a com- Policymakers are increasingly recognizing greater
mon pool of up-to-date information on key indica- investment in agricultural research and devel-
tors at various levels to support policy planning, opment as an essential element in increasing
analysis, and dialogue; documenting lessons from agricultural productivity. Data on the size and
research, policy analysis, impact assessment, and scope of research and development capacity and
practical experiences for improving future growth investments, together with the changing institu-
and poverty-reduction strategies; and facilitating tional structure and functioning of agricultural
access to knowledge products to support assess- research agencies, enhance our understanding of
ment, review, and benchmarking of growth and how agricultural research and development pro-
poverty-reduction strategies; and (3) capacity motes agricultural growth. Indicators derived
strengthening and policy communications: collabo- from such information allow the performance,
rating with national and regional networks to carry inputs, and outcomes of agricultural research and
out strategic analysis while exchanging the valu- development systems to be measured, monitored,
able skills, training, and practical experiences that and benchmarked.
can strengthen local capacities and enhance the The Agricultural Science Technology Indica-
communication of key issues, findings, and strate- tors (ASTI) initiative is one of the few sources of
gies with policymakers and other stakeholders. information on agricultural science and technology
statistics for low- and middle-income countries.
Website: www.resakss.org
ASTI provides comprehensive quantitative and
Contact: Samuel Benin
qualitative information and subsequent analyses
Email: s.benin@cgiar.org
on investment, capacity, and institutional trends
in agricultural research and development. (See
Table 1.) ASTI data and analyses assist research
and development managers and policymakers in
improved policy formulation and decisionmaking
at national, regional, and international levels. All
outputs are made available on the ASTI website.
Website: www.asti.cgiar.org
Contact: Nienke Beintema
Email: asti@cgiar.org
91


103. TABLE 1 Public sector agricultural research and development (RD) spending and staffing, by country
Public research spending Researchers
per million
Public economically Women as
Latest 2005 PPP 2005 US spending as engaged share of total
data dollars dollars a share of ag. FTE public population in researchers
Country available (millions) (millions) GDP (%) researchers agriculture (%)
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Benin 2008 21.6 9.0 0.57 115.4 13.26 16.9
Botswana 2008 19.0 9.0 4.32 97.4 63.00 29.8
Burkina Faso 2008 19.4 7.4 0.43 239.9 3.05 11.6
Burundi 2008 9.6 3.0 1.78 97.8 2.64 14.8
Congo, Republic of 2008 4.6 2.3 0.85 93.8 9.35 16.2
Côte d’Ivoire 2008 42.6 23.2 0.54 122.6 13.92 16.8
Eritrea 2008 3.0 1.2 0.45 121.9 2.07 32.0
Ethiopia 2008 68.6 17.8 0.27 1,318.3 2.24 6.8
Gabon 2008 1.6 0.8 0.20 61.4 8.37 22.4
Gambia, The 2008 2.5 0.7 0.50 37.7 4.38 13.7
Ghana 2008 95.4 39.2 0.90 537.1 16.48 17.0
Guinea 2008 4.0 1.3 0.18 229.2 1.05 3.2
Kenya 2008 171.5 67.0 1.30 1,011.5 13.36 26.8
Madagascar 2008 11.9 3.9 0.27 212.4 1.79 29.8
Malawi 2008 21.4 7.1 0.68 126.5 4.35 15.7
Mali 2008 24.7 11.2 0.57 312.7 9.66 13.4
Mauritania 2008 6.4 2.4 1.16 73.7 9.24 4.9
Mauritius 2008 22.1 11.0 3.92 158.3 432.84 41.4
Mozambique 2008 17.7 8.4 0.38 263.3 2.12 29.0
Namibia 2008 21.6 14.5 2.03 70.2 85.07 16.5
Niger 2008 6.2 2.6 0.17 93.4 1.53 8.3
Nigeria 2008 403.9 185.3 0.42 2,062.0 32.88 21.3
Rwanda 2008 18.1 6.1 0.53 104.2 4.54 14.6
Seychelles 2008 0.2 0.0 0.70 1.0 8.54 na
Senegal 2008 25.4 12.1 0.87 141.1 6.78 9.9
Sierra Leone 2008 5.9 2.2 0.31 66.6 4.63 5.2
South Africa 2008 272.1 165.7 2.02 783.9 215.81 40.1
Sudan 2008 51.5 22.8 0.27 1,020.5 7.47 36.2
Tanzania 2008 77.1 27.0 0.50 673.5 4.78 21.3
Togo 2008 8.7 4.0 0.47 62.7 6.25 9.9
Uganda 2008 87.7 30.5 1.24 298.7 8.33 21.5
Source: *PPP = purchasing power parity. **FTE = full-time equivalent. Notes: Table includes only countries where ASTI has conducted survey rounds since 2002.
Public agri­ ultural research and development (RD) includes government, higher-education, and nonprofit agencies but excludes the private sector. Purchasing power
c
parities (PPPs) measure the relative purchasing power of currencies across countries by eliminating national differences in pricing levels for a wide range of goods and
ser­ ices. PPPs are relatively stable over time, whereas exchange rates fluctuate considerably. Measuring researchers in full-time equivalents (FTEs) takes into account
v
the proportion of time researchers spend on RD activities. For example, four university professors who spend 25 percent of their time on research would individually
represent 0.25 FTEs and collectively be counted as one FTE.
92 

104. Table 1, continued
Public research spending Researchers
per million
Public economically Women as
Latest 2005 PPP 2005 US spending as engaged share of total
data dollars dollars a share of ag. FTE public population in researchers
Country available (millions) (millions) GDP (%) researchers agriculture (%)
Zambia 2008 8.1 4.4 0.29 208.5 2.58 22.9
Zimbabwe 2008 na na na 147.7 6.83 43.2
ASIA-PACIFIC
Bangladesh 2009 125.90 44.30 0.33 2081.30 27.59 15.8
China 2007 3,679.5 1,548.1 0.49 na na na
India 2003 1,426.4 474.4 0.36 16,703.7 60.87 13.9
Indonesia 2003 204.2 82.8 0.20 4,892.6 97.74 27.7
Korea 2002/03 522.7 402.6 1.66 2,201.8 na 40.0
Lao PDR 2003 10.4 2.9 0.24 123.4 56.92 22.3
Malaysia 2002 446.5 204.4 1.9 1,117.6 622.62 33.9
Myanmar 2003 4.6 4.6 0.06 618.7 32.60 54.2
Nepal 2009 23.0 7.3 0.24 388.6 33.15 9.5
Pakistan 2003 184.9 59.4 0.29 3,442.5 129.29 5.7
Papua New Guinea 2002 19.9 9.2 0.5 107.4 55.65 16.0
Philippines 2002 141.4 55.9 0.4 3,212.5 252.86 54.2
Sri Lanka 2003 52.6 18.4 0.52 577.2 138.58 32.6
Vietnam 2002/03 55.9 16.6 0.2 2,950.8 102.65 31.4
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
Argentina 2006 448.6 196.1 1.27 3,947.3 2745.01 41.7
Belize 2006 2.6 1.3 0.95 16.7 596.43 31.1
Brazil 2006 1,306.3 728.0 1.80 5,375.5 441.59 33.8
Chile 2006 98.1 58.4 1.22 690.3 702.97 29.7
Colombia 2006 152.4 71.1 0.50 998.9 280.74 31.7
Costa Rica 2006 29.9 15.9 0.93 282.9 865.08 27.4
Dominican Republic 2006 17.4 10.3 0.26 138.8 278.67 24.9
El Salvador 2006 5.7 0.3 0.15 76.9 124.26 14.8
Guatemala 2006 8.3 4.2 0.06 102.4 53.18 14.7
Honduras 2006 12.7 4.7 0.43 123.7 181.31 7.4
Mexico 2006 517.6 338.5 1.21 4,066.7 483.38 22.3
Nicaragua 2006 24.1 8.1 0.94 133.4 364.34 26.8
Panama 2006 10.0 5.7 0.50 166.7 653.57 16.1
Paraguay 2006 3.1 9.7 0.20 128.3 163.02 32.1
Uruguay 2006 59.8 32.4 1.99 400.4 2107.58 42.5
93


105. Table 1, continued
Public research spending Researchers
per million
Public economically Women as
Latest 2005 PPP 2005 US spending as engaged share of total
data dollars dollars a share of ag. FTE public population in researchers
Country available (millions) (millions) GDP (%) researchers agriculture (%)
MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
Iran (Islamic 2004 559.3 166.9 0.82 4,788.4 772.20 14.4
Republic of)
Jordan 2002/03 6.8 3.6 1.59 212.7 1849.13 13.2
Morocco 2002 128.6 70.8 0.95 654.8 208.54 18.4
Syrian Arab Republic 2002 77.7 136.4 0.45 1,358.1 1020.36 22.1
Tunisia 2002 51.2 22.9 0.91 440.8 574.00 27.6
SPEED DATABASE: STATISTICS ON Policymakers, researchers, and other stakehold-
PUBLIC EXPENDITURE FOR ECONOMIC ers can use this robust database for many purposes.
DEVELOPMENT The data allows users to examine historic trends
and composition of government resource alloca-
The Statistics on Public Expenditure for Economic
tion across sectors and make comparisons with
Development (SPEED) database is a resource
other countries in the region or at a similar level of
that houses information on agricultural and other
development. It also aids in the analysis of align-
sectoral public expenditures in 70 developing
ment of actual expenditure and broad development
countries from 1980 to 2009. (See, for example,
priorities in economic growth, poverty reduction,
spending details from 2005 in Table 2.) IFPRI
and food security to evaluate the link between
researchers have compiled data from multiple
strategy priorities and budget execution, moni-
sources, including the International Monetary
tor progress toward achieving development goals,
Fund, the World Bank, and national governments
identify funding gaps, and diagnose the efficiency
and conducted extensive data checks and adjust-
and cost effectiveness of public spending.
ments to ensure consistency over time that is
free of exchange-rate fluctuations and currency- Website: www.ifpri.org/ourwork/programs/
denomination changes. The SPEED database is priorities-public-investment/speed-database
updated periodically. Contact: Bingxin Yu (b.yu@cgiar.org)
94 

106. TABLE 2 Agricultural public expenditure for economic development, by country
Per capita agricultural
Agricultural expenditure of total
Agricultural expenditure, 2005 population, 2005 Ratio of agricultural
expenditure, 2005 US international dollars international dollars expenditure to
dollars (billions) (billions) (billions) agricultural GDP (%)
Country 1980 1995 2009 1980 1995 2009 1980 1995 2009 1980 1995 2009
EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC
China 7.14 8.87 68.6 17.20 21.37 165.17 17.1 17.2 121.0 10.9 4.5 19.1
Fiji 0.03 0.03 0.03 [1] 0.04 0.03 0.03 [1] 65.9 43.3 39.6 [1] 8.4 5.8 6.5 [1]
Indonesia 1.80 1.80 1.56 [1] 4.44 4.43 3.86 [1] 29.4 22.2 16.6 [1] 9.3 4.8 3.5 [1]
Malaysia 0.75 0.97 2.32 1.68 2.16 5.17 121.5 104.4 185.0 10.8 8.7 15.2
Mongolia 0.01 0.05 [1] 0.02 0.15 [1] 8.8 57.8 [1] 1.4 8.8 [1]
Myanmar 19.26 12.39 18.30 [1] 0.44 0.29 0.42 [1] 13.5 6.8 9.0 [1] 8.0 2.7 1.6 [1]
Papua New 0.08 0.05 0.02 [1] 0.19 0.12 0.06 [1] 57.6 25.4 8.9 [1] 8.3 3.1 1.2 [1]
Guinea
Philippines 0.43 0.86 1.14 1.08 2.16 2.89 22.8 31.2 31.5 3.2 5.7 7.2
Thailand 0.76 2.14 2.02 1.92 5.42 5.11 40.4 90.8 74.4 7.8 16.8 9.0
Vanuatu 0.001 0.003 0.003 [1] 0.003 0.01 0.01 [1] 23.0 31.5 25.3 [1] 4.4 5.5 3.2 [1]
Vietnam 0.33 0.71 1.12 2.38 15.1 27.4 4.6 4.7
EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA
Azerbaijan 0.08 0.19 [1] 0.27 0.61 [1] 34.4 69.6 [1] 6.2 12.5 [1]
Belarus 0.13 1.13 0.36 3.12 34.7 323.5 4.8 30.2
Bulgaria 0.02 0.14 0.04 0.37 5.0 48.6 0.5 8.8
Georgia 0.03 0.07 17.0 3.9
Kazakhstan 0.11 0.64 0.25 1.47 15.4 92.9 2.6 14.3
Kyrgyz 0.02 0.02 [1] 0.05 0.06 [1] 12.0 11.2 [1] 2.2 1.9 [1]
Republic
Latvia 0.06 0.43 0.10 0.81 41.6 357.3 7.3 83.7
Lithuania 0.28 0.34 0.51 0.62 140.8 187.0 17.7 36.6
Moldova 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.16 7.8 43.9 1.5 16.7
Romania 2.41 1.95 1.45 [1] 5.00 4.06 3.02 [1] 225.2 178.9 139.7 [1] 12.3 11.4 14.5 [1]
Russia 0.22 1.94 0.48 4.32 3.2 30.2 0.6 4.6
Turkey 0.54 0.58 2.98 [1] 0.90 0.97 4.99 [1] 20.3 16.4 71.2 [1] 0.2 1.1 6.3 [1]
Ukraine 0.54 1.64 35.8 7.5
Notes: [1] Data are from 2007. [2] Data are from 2008. [3] Data are from 2004.
95


107. Table 2, continued
Per capita agricultural
Agricultural expenditure of total
Agricultural expenditure, 2005 population, 2005 Ratio of agricultural
expenditure, 2005 US international dollars international dollars expenditure to
dollars (billions) (billions) (billions) agricultural GDP (%)
Country 1980 1995 2009 1980 1995 2009 1980 1995 2009 1980 1995 2009
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
Argentina 0.00 0.14 0.11 [1] 0.00 0.32 0.25 [1] 0.003 9.2 6.4 [1] 1.7 0.6 [1]
Bolivia 0.01 0.003 0.03 [1] 0.03 0.01 0.11 [1] 5.1 1.6 11.7 [1] 0.3 2.2 [1]
Brazil 2.98 0.61 [1] 5.18 1.06 [1] 32.0 5.6 [1] 7.4 1.1 [1]
Chile 0.18 0.17 0.41 [2] 0.30 0.28 0.68 [2] 26.6 19.6 40.5 [2] 6.8 2.3 8.4 [2]
Costa Rica 0.06 0.04 0.19 0.13 0.08 0.37 53.9 22.1 79.7 4.7 2.2 10.8
Dominican 0.30 0.19 0.13 [1] 0.53 0.33 0.23 [1] 90.8 41.6 24.3 [1] 12.1 9.4 5.0 [1]
Republic
El Salvador 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.50 0.53 0.10 107.6 92.4 16.5 13.4 13.9 2.3
Guatemala 0.14 0.05 0.06 0.26 0.09 0.12 37.0 8.9 8.7 3.8 1.3 1.6
Jamaica 0.08 0.10 0.13 0.16 51.6 58.6 7.3 14.2
Mexico 8.58 3.17 4.39 [1] 13.17 4.87 6.75 [1] 191.5 52.8 61.8 [1] 20.2 9.4 13.3 [1]
Panama 0.11 0.03 0.12 [1] 0.22 0.06 0.23 [1] 110.3 22.9 69.9 [1] 18.2 3.6 9.3 [1]
St. Vincent and 0.002 0.004 0.003 [1] 0.004 0.01 0.01 [1] 37.7 60.2 51.2 [1] 6.3 7.1 7.9 [1]
the Grenadines
Uruguay 0.04 0.04 0.06 [1] 0.07 0.08 0.11 [1] 23.2 25.6 34.0 [1] 1.6 3.5 3.0 [1]
MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
Algeria 0.53 1.23 1.21 2.84 42.8 81.4 7.2 9.6
Egypt 0.66 0.90 0.87 [1] 2.39 3.25 3.15 [1] 53.1 52.4 40.9 [1] 12.0 8.8 5.8 [1]
Iran 0.97 1.07 0.78 3.27 3.59 2.62 84.7 60.1 35.8 7.1 4.9 3.4
Jordan 0.02 0.11 0.05 [2] 0.03 0.19 0.08 [2] 14.3 44.5 13.7 [2] 5.0 32.4 11.0 [2]
Lebanon 0.02 0.02 [2] 0.04 0.03 [2] 11.6 8.4 [2] 1.8 1.1 [2]
Morocco 0.54 0.54 0.40 [1] 0.98 0.97 0.72 [1] 50.0 36.0 23.3 [1] 11.5 9.1 4.4 [1]
Syria 1.26 2.40 2.02 0.72 1.37 1.15 80.3 96.4 57.4 8.1 8.1 5.3
Tunisia 0.53 0.45 0.52 1.15 0.97 1.13 177.6 108.0 109.4 28.4 17.3 15.1
Yemen 0.02 0.04 0.07 [1] 0.05 0.10 0.20 [1] 5.7 6.9 9.1 [1] 1.7 2.4 [1]
SOUTH ASIA
Bangladesh 0.18 0.24 0.85 0.51 0.68 2.42 6.3 5.8 16.5 2.9 2.6 6.2
Bhutan 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.09 0.12 72.0 170.2 168.3 17.0 21.6 21.3
India 1.82 3.50 13.07 5.47 10.51 39.21 7.8 10.9 32.5 2.5 2.9 6.4
Maldives 0.003 0.02 0.005 0.01 0.04 0.01 33.3 141.6 25.2 0.1 0.8 0.3
Nepal 0.06 0.09 0.14 0.20 0.28 0.43 13.3 12.8 14.5 3.8 3.8 4.1
Pakistan 0.12 0.08 1.07 0.37 0.24 3.35 4.6 1.9 19.6 1.3 0.4 3.8
Sri Lanka 0.16 0.24 0.40 [2] 0.46 0.70 1.14 [2] 30.8 38.2 55.7 [2] 7.4 6.7 10.0 [2]
96 

108. Table 2, continued
Per capita agricultural
Agricultural expenditure of total
Agricultural expenditure, 2005 population, 2005 Ratio of agricultural
expenditure, 2005 US international dollars international dollars expenditure to
dollars (billions) (billions) (billions) agricultural GDP (%)
Country 1980 1995 2009 1980 1995 2009 1980 1995 2009 1980 1995 2009
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Botswana 0.05 0.12 0.10 [1] 0.11 0.25 0.22 [1] 106.8 159.8 115.8 [1] 21.6 49.1 44.2 [1]
Cape Verde 0.002 0.02 0.002 0.02 6.2 44.3 2.5 14.6
Ethiopia 0.05 0.12 0.45 [1] 0.20 0.45 1.70 [1] 5.5 7.8 21.9 [1] 1.5 4.0 6.4 [1]
Ghana 0.06 0.02 0.01 [1] 0.13 0.04 0.03 [1] 12.0 2.3 1.3 [1] 0.1 0.6 0.4 [1]
Kenya 0.18 0.27 0.23 0.47 0.70 0.60 28.8 25.6 15.1 6.4 6.3 4.5
Lesotho 0.01 0.07 0.03 [2] 0.03 0.12 0.06 [2] 20.5 69.3 26.3 [2] 11.3 32.4 25.5 [2]
Liberia 0.02 0.01 0.000 [2] 0.05 0.02 0.000 [2] 25.9 9.1 0.05 [2] 3.9 10.7 0.02 [2]
Malawi 0.05 0.05 0.03 [1] 0.15 0.16 0.08 [1] 24.1 16.1 6.2 [1] 8.1 8.5 2.8 [1]
Mauritius 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.14 69.6 87.7 110.5 14.2 11.7 22.2
Namibia 0.10 0.11 [1] 0.15 0.16 [1] 92.1 72.4 [1] 17.7 13.7 [1]
Nigeria 0.53 0.14 0.23 [1] 1.16 0.31 0.51 [1] 15.3 2.8 3.5 [1] 1.8 0.4 0.5 [1]
Niger 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.08 7.6 5.5 2.9 3.0 2.3
Seychelles 0.01 0.002 [2] 0.01 0.004 [2] 152.2 44.0 [2] 25.0 10.7 [2]
South Africa 1.13 2.07 1.84 3.38 44.4 67.9 16.2 24.6
Swaziland 0.03 0.02 0.06 [1] 0.05 0.04 0.12 [1] 82.0 43.5 104.4 [1] 16.8 10.1 30.4 [1]
Uganda 0.003 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.03 0.23 0.7 1.3 7.1 0.6 0.4 2.2
Zambia 0.39 0.03 0.18 [1] 0.73 0.06 0.32 [1] 126.1 7.0 26.9 [1] 55.5 3.7 10.0 [1]
Zimbabwe 0.21 0.26 0.33 [1] 0.14 0.17 0.22 [1] 19.8 14.8 18.0 [1] 13.5 10.3 12.5 [3]
HIGH-INCOME OECD COUNTRIES
Australia 1.53 1.86 1.72 1.44 1.74 1.61 97.6 96.1 73.6 6.2 10.9 9.5
Canada 2.61 2.16 2.99 2.63 2.18 1.55 107.3 74.4 46.1 10.7 9.1 15.1
Czech Republic 0.49 1.99 0.82 3.34 79.5 319.6 10.2 60.6
Estonia 0.003 0.01 0.004 0.01 2.9 7.3 0.7 1.7
Finland 1.96 2.15 1.33 2.44 2.67 1.66 510.8 523.4 311.0 30.4 54.4 38.3
Greece 1.31 0.98 0.07 2.33 1.75 0.13 242.0 163.9 11.2 9.3 11.2 0.8
Hungary 3.38 1.27 2.57 5.24 1.97 3.99 489.7 191.0 398.5 22.6 20.4 70.0
Iceland 0.24 0.19 0.22 0.16 0.12 0.14 682.3 449.2 432.9 24.6 15.9 17.5
Ireland 1.51 0.83 0.76 1.88 1.03 0.95 549.4 286.5 474.5 37.8 18.9 58.7
Italy 0.002 0.10 1.38 0.002 0.14 1.91 0.04 2.5 31.7 0.001 0.3 6.5
Israel 0.71 0.61 0.22 [1] 0.86 0.74 0.27 [1] 230.9 138.6 38.4 [1] 17.8 12.9 3.7 [1]
Japan 16.09 10.52 15.90 13.68 8.95 13.52 118.0 71.9 106.8 17.3 13.6 25.8
Korea, Rep. 1.54 8.57 11.36 2.00 11.13 14.75 53.4 249.2 307.6 5.8 24.9 41.0
Luxembourg 0.07 0.07 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.13 255.7 217.7 263.8 49.0 47.2 135.3
New Zealand 1.18 0.27 0.49 1.12 0.26 0.46 354.3 70.8 106.4 19.5 4.6 7.6
Norway 3.85 3.24 2.10 2.79 2.35 1.52 682.0 538.1 314.9 64.0 46.3 50.9
Poland 1.05 2.94 1.78 5.02 46.4 131.1 6.5 21.6
97


109. Table 2, continued
Per capita agricultural
Agricultural expenditure of total
Agricultural expenditure, 2005 population, 2005 Ratio of agricultural
expenditure, 2005 US international dollars international dollars expenditure to
dollars (billions) (billions) (billions) agricultural GDP (%)
Country 1980 1995 2009 1980 1995 2009 1980 1995 2009 1980 1995 2009
Portugal 0.81 0.44 1.44 0.78 142.0 73.3 15.8 14.6
Slovenia 0.11 0.17 0.23 0.36 117.4 176.2 16.7 27.6
Spain 1.98 0.27 0.82 3.08 0.42 1.28 82.1 10.7 28.0 7.8 1.2 4.2
Sweden 2.28 1.18 0.81 1.81 0.94 0.64 217.8 106.2 68.7 22.8 14.4 11.9
Switzerland 2.29 3.12 2.52 [2] 1.69 2.30 1.85 [2] 267.4 327.3 244.4 [2] 26.1 47.3 47.6 [2]
United 5.41 1.49 3.67 4.96 1.37 3.36 87.8 23.5 54.3 21.5 4.9 22.9
Kingdom
United States 16.25 11.89 20.11 16.25 11.89 20.11 70.7 44.6 65.4 10.9 8.2 16.0
HIGH-INCOME NON-OECD COUNTRIES
Bahamas 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 55.2 66.7 50.5 12.0 10.9 13.4
Bahrain 0.01 0.01 0.01 [2] 0.02 0.02 0.02 [2] 45.4 39.7 22.8 [2] 16.7 16.2 9.5 [2]
Croatia 0.13 0.62 0.21 0.95 43.9 214.8 6.0 24.2
Cyprus 0.15 0.12 0.10 0.27 0.21 0.19 398.7 240.1 171.3 47.8 29.6 43.8
Kuwait 0.01 0.12 0.13 0.02 0.18 0.19 11.0 109.6 71.7 13.0 61.6 33.0
Malta 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.07 109.8 77.1 175.0 31.2 17.6 46.9
Oman 0.05 0.13 0.06 0.10 0.24 0.12 [1] 81.2 109.7 47.5 [1] 28.0 20.7 9.6 [1]
Singapore 0.02 0.03 0.04 [1] 0.03 0.04 0.06 12.6 12.1 11.1 5.3 19.3 24.4
United Arab 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.08 0.08 86.0 34.4 11.8 2.3 3.4 2.6
Emirates
GLOBAL HUNGER INDEX
scores took place in Angola, Bangladesh, Ethio-
Each year, IFPRI calculates the Global Hunger pia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, and Viet-
Index (GHI), which is designed to comprehen- nam. Hunger worsened, however, in the Burundi,
sively measure and track hunger globally and by Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic
country and region. To reflect the multidimen- of Congo, North Korea, and Swaziland.
sional nature of hunger, the GHI combines three By highlighting successes and failures in hunger
equally weighted indicators into one index num- reduction and providing insights into the drivers
ber: (1) the percentage of people who are under- of hunger, the GHI points to the geographic areas
nourished; (2) the percentage of children younger where policy action is most needed and suggests
than age five who are underweight; and (3) the where policy lessons can be learned.
mortality rate of children younger than age five.
Website: www.ifpri.org/publication/2011-global-hunger-index
According to the 2011 GHI, global hunger has
Contacts: Klaus von Grebmer or Tolulope Olofinbiyi
fallen slowly in the past two decades. (See specific
Email: k.vongrebmer@cgiar.org or t.olofinbiyi@cgiar.org
country scores for 2011 in Table 3.) From 1990
to 2011, the greatest improvements in absolute
98 

110. TABLE 3 Global Hunger Index scores (various years) by 2011 country rank
2001 2011 GHI Severity Scale
1990 1996 (data (data
(data (data from from ≥ 30.0 Extremely Alarming 5.0–9.9 Moderate
from from 1999– 2004– 20.0–29.9 Alarming ≤ 4.9 Low
Rank Country 1988–92) 1994–98) 2003) 09) 10.0–19.9 Serious No data
1 Gabon 8.4 6.8 7.3 5.2
2 Mauritius 8.0 7.4 6.0 5.4
2 Paraguay 7.7 5.5 5.2 5.4 2001 2011
1990 1996 (data (data
4 China 11.7 9.1 6.8 5.5 (data (data from from
4 El Salvador 10.1 9.0 5.4 5.5 from from 1999– 2004–
4 Kyrgyz Republic — 9.1 8.7 5.5 Rank Country 1988–92) 1994–98) 2003) 09)
7 Trinidad and 6.9 7.5 6.3 5.6 36 Sri Lanka 20.2 17.8 14.9 14.0
Tobago 38 Benin 21.5 20.2 16.9 14.7
8 Colombia 9.1 6.8 5.8 5.7 39 Gambia, The 15.8 20.3 16.4 15.0
9 Morocco 7.7 6.7 6.1 5.9 40 Nigeria 24.1 21.2 18.2 15.5
9 Peru 14.5 10.8 9.0 5.9 41 Myanmar 29.2 25.4 22.5 16.3
11 Turkmenistan — 10.1 8.8 6.2 42 Uganda 19.0 20.4 17.7 16.7
12 Uzbekistan — 9.1 10.7 6.3 43 Tajikistan — 24.4 24.5 17.0
13 South Africa 7.0 6.5 7.4 6.4 44 Burkina Faso 23.7 22.5 21.7 17.2
14 Panama 9.8 9.7 9.0 7.0 45 Guinea 22.4 20.3 22.4 17.3
15 Guyana 14.4 8.9 7.8 7.1 46 Cameroon 21.9 22.4 19.4 17.7
16 Ecuador 13.6 10.8 9.0 7.9 46 Zimbabwe 18.7 22.3 21.3 17.7
16 Honduras 13.4 13.2 10.1 7.9 48 Côte d’Ivoire 16.6 17.6 16.4 18.0
18 Suriname 10.4 9.4 10.0 8.0 49 Malawi 29.7 27.1 22.4 18.2
19 Thailand 15.1 11.9 9.5 8.1 50 Kenya 20.6 20.3 19.9 18.6
20 Ghana 21.0 16.1 13.0 8.7 51 North Korea 16.1 20.3 20.1 19.0
21 Nicaragua 22.6 17.8 12.3 9.2 52 Guinea-Bissau 21.7 22.3 22.8 19.5
22 Armenia — 14.4 11.3 9.5 53 Mali 27.9 26.3 23.2 19.7
23 Dominican 14.2 11.7 10.9 10.2 54 Cambodia 31.7 31.4 26.3 19.9
Republic
54 Nepal 27.1 24.6 23.0 19.9
24 Swaziland 9.1 12.3 12.6 10.5
56 Togo 26.6 22.2 23.6 20.1
25 Vietnam 25.7 21.4 15.5 11.2
57 Lao PDR 29.0 25.2 23.6 20.2
26 Mongolia 16.3 17.7 14.8 11.4
58 Tanzania 23.1 27.4 26.0 20.5
27 Philippines 19.9 17.5 14.1 11.5
59 Pakistan 25.7 22.0 21.9 20.7
28 Lesotho 12.7 13.9 13.8 11.9
60 Rwanda 28.5 32.7 25.2 21.0
29 Bolivia 17.0 14.6 12.5 12.2
61 Liberia 23.5 26.9 25.8 21.5
29 Indonesia 18.5 15.5 14.3 12.2
61 Sudan 29.2 24.7 25.9 21.5
31 Mauritania 22.7 16.9 16.9 12.7
63 Djibouti 30.8 25.8 25.3 22.5
32 Botswana 13.4 15.5 15.9 13.2
63 Madagascar 24.4 24.8 24.8 22.5
32 Congo, Rep. 23.2 24.2 16.0 13.2
65 Mozambique 35.7 31.4 28.4 22.7
34 Senegal 18.7 19.7 19.3 13.6
66 Niger 36.2 36.2 30.8 23.0
35 Namibia 20.3 18.7 16.3 13.8
67 India 30.4 22.9 24.1 23.7
36 Guatemala 15.1 15.8 15.1 14.0
68 Zambia 24.7 25.0 27.6 24.0
99


111. Table 3, continued
2001 2011 2001 2011
1990 1996 (data (data 1990 1996 (data (data
(data (data from from (data (data from from
from from 1999– 2004– from from 1999– 2004–
Rank Country 1988–92) 1994–98) 2003) 09) Rank Country 1988–92) 1994–98) 2003) 09)
69 Angola 43.0 40.7 33.4 24.2 76 Haiti 34.0 32.3 26.0 28.2
70 Bangladesh 38.1 36.3 27.6 24.5 77 Ethiopia 43.2 39.1 34.7 28.7
71 Sierra Leone 33.0 30.5 30.7 25.2 78 Chad 39.2 35.8 31.0 30.6
72 Yemen, Rep. 30.4 27.8 27.9 25.4 79 Eritrea — 37.7 37.6 33.9
73 Comoros 22.3 27.1 30.1 26.2 80 Burundi 31.4 36.3 38.5 37.9
74 Central African 27.6 28.6 27.7 27.0 81 Congo, 24.0 35.2 41.2 39.0
Republic Dem. Rep.
75 Timor-Leste — — 26.1 27.1
Countries with 2011 scores less than or equal to 4.9
2001 2011 2001 2011
1990 1996 (with (with 1990 1996 (with (with
(with (with data from data from (with (with data from data from
data from data from 1999- 2004- data from data from 1999- 2004-
Country 1988-92) 1994-98) 2003) 2009) Country 1988-92) 1994-98) 2003) 2009)
Albania 8.9 5.2 8.2 5 Latvia — 5 5 5
Algeria 6.4 7.2 5.9 5 Lebanon 5 5 5 5
Argentina 5 5 5 5 Libya 5 5 5 5
Azerbaijan — 15.0 7.8 5 Lithuania — 5 5 5
Belarus — 5 5 5 Macedonia, FYR — 5 5 5
Bosnia and 5 5 5 Malaysia 9.0 6.7 6.6 5
Herzegovina
Mexico 7.8 5 5 5
Brazil 7.6 6.2 5.3 5
Moldova — 5.9 5.2 5
Bulgaria 5 5 5 5
Montenegro — — — 5
Chile 5 5 5 5
Romania 5 5 5 5
Costa Rica 5 5 5 5
Russian 5 5 5
Croatia — 5 5 5 Federation
Cuba 5 6.5 5 5 Saudi Arabia 5.8 6.1 5 5
Egypt, Arab Rep. 7.8 6.6 5 5 Serbia — — — 5
Estonia — 5 5 5 Slovak Republic — 5 5 5
Fiji 6.1 5 5 5 Syrian Arab 7.7 5.6 5.4 5
Georgia — 8.9 6.0 5 Republic
Iran, Islamic Rep. 9.4 7.5 5.0 5 Tunisia 5 5 5 5
Jamaica 6.5 5.0 5 5 Turkey 5.7 5.2 5 5
Jordan 5 5 5 5 Ukraine — 5 5 5
Kazakhstan — 5 5.3 5 Uruguay 5 5 5 5
Kuwait 9.3 5 5 5 Venezuela, RB 6.6 7.0 6.4 5
100 

112. FOOD POLICY RESEARCH CAPACITY
(weighted as one-quarter of a PhD) is multiplied
INDICATORS
by the average proportion of time devoted to food
Local capacity to conduct food policy research and policy research activities.
analysis is essential for developing evidence-based The second indicator measures the number of
policies and facilitating their adoption. However, international journal articles per full-time PhD-
development of capacity indicators in the past has equivalent researcher for a country. This indica-
been thwarted by a lack of data and the spread of tor is based on the number of international journal
policy capacity over a wide range of institutions articles produced by the researchers in the sur-
within a country. In 2011, IFPRI started to system- veyed organizations of a country between 2006
atically document the food policy research capac- and 2010. To obtain this indicator, the journal arti-
ity in 25 selected developing countries, in an effort cles in the Web of Science and Econ Lit databases
to develop indicators that eventually can measure a related to socioeconomic and food policy issues
country’s domestic capacity to design, implement, were searched against the names of organizations.
and evaluate policies in the food, agriculture, and The total number of publications, which is the sum
natural resource sectors. This study defines any of the number of journal articles published by all
socioeconomic and policy-related research in the surveyed organizations on socioeconomic and
food, agriculture, and natural resource sectors as policy issues, is divided by the total number of full-
food policy research. time PhD-equivalent researchers in a country. This
At the current stage, two indicators measure indicator reflects the quality dimension of domes-
food policy research capacity at the country level. tic food policy research capacity.
The first indicator records the availability of quali- This preliminary set of data is the beginning
fied human resources for food policy research per of a continuing initiative that ultimately aims
one million people living in rural areas. (See results to generate a set of food policy capacity indica-
for 2010 in Table 4.) This indicator is based on the tors that can be easily monitored by IFPRI over
number of full-time PhD-equivalent research- time and effectively used by decisionmakers and
ers involved in food policy research in the key other stakeholders for designing capacity develop-
ministries and academic and research organiza- ment interventions.
tions in a country. To calculate this number, the
Contacts: Suresh Babu or Paul Dorosh
total number of PhD-equivalent researchers—the
Email: s.babu@cgiar.org or p.dorosh@cgiar.org
sum of researchers with a PhD, a master’s degree
(weighted as half of a PhD) and a bachelor’s degree
101


113. TABLE 4 Food policy research capacity indicators, 2010
Full-time
equivalent Publications
Full-time analysts/ by full-time
Analysts/ equivalent International researchers with equivalent
researchers analysts/ publications PhD per million researchers
(head count) in researchers with produced from rural population with PhD (over a
Country 2010 PhD in 2010 2006–10 in 2010 5-year period)
Afghanistan 43 3.488 0 0.135 0
Bangladesh 66 31.65 25 0.296 0.79
Benin 38 11.138 12 2.17 1.077
Burundi 35 3.25 0 0.436 0
Colombia 82 14.433 12 1.252 0.831
Ethiopia 74 21.55 21 0.315 0.974
Ghana 95 12.589 35 1.064 2.78
Guatemala 45 3.965 4 0.546 1.009
Honduras 32 1.87 5 0.481 2.674
Kenya 155 30.755 43 0.976 1.398
Liberia 34 0.515 0 0.335 0
Madagascar 186 17.913 8 1.239 0.447
Malawi 50 8.875 5 0.743 0.563
Mozambique 37 5.678 15 0.394 2.642
Nepal 26 6.375 2 0.26 0.314
Niger 28 8.563 4 0.663 0.467
Nigeria 349 78.188 21 0.983 0.269
Peru 41 9.464 16 1.146 1.691
Rwanda 37 5.84 1 0.678 0.171
Senegal 71 21.513 3 3.03 0.139
South Africa 198 64.413 183 3.364 2.841
Tanzania 91 8.413 12 0.255 1.426
Uganda 34 10.89 14 0.376 1.286
Zambia 35 9.3 9 1.119 0.968
Zimbabwe 36 9.52 11 1.227 1.155
AGRICULTURAL TOTAL FACTOR
resource allocation in production given a cer-
PRODUCTIVITY
tain technology (the “efficiency” component) and
Total factor productivity (TFP)—or, the total the adoption of new technologies (the “technical
amount of output relative to the total amount of change” component) that allow for new and more
inputs used to produce that output—is a key indi- efficient ways of producing outputs. (See Table 5.)
cator of the agricultural sector’s performance. In Economic policies in the past have had large nega-
the long run, TFP is the main driver of growth tive impacts on agricultural growth in several
in agriculture and can be affected by policies and developing countries through price distortions that
investment. It is determined by the efficiency of resulted in increasing inefficiency and stagnated
102 

114. or negative growth of TFP. On the other hand, the process of agricultural transformation in many
public investment in agricultural research and Asian and Latin American countries.
development has historically been a major driver
Contact: Alejandro Nin-Pratt (a.nin-pratt@cgiar.org)
of technical change in agriculture, contributing to
Table 5 Average annual growth of agricultural total factor productivity (TFP), efficiency, and technical change
(percent), various years
1981–90 1991–2000 2001–09
Technical Technical Technical
Region/country TFP Efficiency change TFP Efficiency change TFP Efficiency change
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.39 −0.03 0.44 1.99 1.27 0.71 2.26 1.60 0.66
Angola 2.01 2.01 0.00 5.26 4.94 0.31 4.25 4.25 −0.00
Burkina Faso −3.15 −4.21 1.11 1.68 1.68 0.00 8.84 8.47 0.34
Cameroon 0.54 0.54 0.00 1.73 0.71 1.01 3.36 3.03 0.33
Cote d’Ivoire 1.73 0.85 0.87 2.62 0.00 2.62 −0.05 −0.08 0.02
Ethiopia −0.76 −0.76 0.00 0.77 0.50 0.27 3.46 3.37 0.10
Ghana −0.32 −0.41 0.09 6.99 5.42 1.48 3.43 0.00 3.43
Guinea −1.73 −1.73 −0.00 −0.12 −0.13 0.00 0.56 0.56 0.00
Kenya 0.87 0.81 0.06 0.34 −0.26 0.59 −0.00 −0.55 0.54
Madagascar −0.28 −0.28 0.00 −1.22 −1.24 0.02 0.78 0.75 0.04
Malawi 0.42 0.42 0.00 4.93 3.38 1.50 −3.03 −4.80 1.86
Mali 1.11 1.11 0.00 −1.17 −1.30 0.13 5.91 5.35 0.53
Mozambique 0.10 0.10 0.00 2.04 1.37 0.67 8.27 6.03 2.11
Nigeria 2.25 2.23 0.02 3.80 1.78 1.98 1.65 0.00 1.65
Senegal 2.23 2.23 0.00 0.14 0.13 0.00 −1.32 −1.33 0.01
South Africa 1.52 −4.30 6.08 4.54 3.31 1.19 3.24 3.24 0.00
Sudan −1.73 −1.74 0.01 2.85 2.85 0.00 2.93 2.93 0.00
Tanzania 1.57 1.55 0.02 −0.24 −0.44 0.20 6.13 6.13 −0.00
Zambia 0.11 −0.03 0.14 1.37 0.14 1.23 0.57 −0.32 0.90
Zimbabwe 0.97 0.96 0.02 1.49 1.30 0.19 −6.06 −6.67 0.65
West Asia and North Africa 1.85 −0.37 2.24 1.75 0.24 1.51 2.64 0.52 2.14
Algeria 2.34 −2.34 4.80 2.76 1.57 1.17 4.00 3.95 0.05
Egypt 1.81 0.00 1.81 2.35 0.00 2.35 1.02 −0.02 1.04
Iran −0.39 −0.42 0.04 2.58 0.90 1.67 3.14 −0.43 3.59
Jordan 3.80 3.22 0.55 1.92 0.46 1.45 5.12 1.53 3.54
Lebanon 6.11 −0.00 6.11 1.47 −0.92 2.42 2.46 0.24 2.21
Libya 2.58 1.03 1.54 4.05 2.10 1.91 1.88 −2.08 4.05
Morocco 3.04 1.37 1.65 −0.57 −1.13 0.57 4.80 4.80 0.00
Syria −4.55 −4.97 0.45 1.91 0.48 1.42 0.06 −3.29 3.47
Tunisia 2.45 −2.23 4.79 −0.09 −1.07 0.99 1.97 1.97 0.00
Turkey 1.27 0.63 0.64 1.11 −0.01 1.12 1.97 −1.48 3.50
Source: IFPRI calculations, based on FAOSTAT data.
103


115. Table 5, continued
1981–90 1991–2000 2001–09
Technical Technical Technical
Region/country TFP Efficiency change TFP Efficiency change TFP Efficiency change
East and South Asia −0.13 −0.60 0.46 1.12 0.02 1.09 1.92 −0.11 2.02
Bangladesh 0.11 −0.57 0.68 2.82 0.57 2.24 3.77 0.00 3.77
China 0.90 0.62 0.28 2.96 2.90 0.06 −0.49 −2.02 1.56
Indonesia 0.56 0.00 0.56 2.93 −0.00 2.93 1.41 −0.00 1.41
India −0.24 −0.38 0.14 0.33 −0.37 0.70 −0.54 −1.09 0.55
Sri Lanka −0.54 −0.62 0.08 0.30 0.28 0.02 −1.74 −1.88 0.14
Mongolia 0.62 0.30 0.32 10.05 6.20 3.62 0.80 −0.92 1.73
Malaysia 0.85 −0.29 1.15 −0.88 −1.18 0.31 2.10 1.65 0.44
Nepal −0.02 −0.66 0.65 0.07 −0.37 0.44 8.76 2.32 6.30
Pakistan 0.06 −0.24 0.30 0.10 −1.17 1.28 −0.79 −2.23 1.48
Philippines −0.83 −1.50 0.68 0.58 0.19 0.40 6.86 1.49 5.30
Thailand −3.71 −3.81 0.10 0.06 −0.53 0.59 1.58 0.49 1.08
Vietnam 0.63 0.00 0.63 −5.86 −6.28 0.45 1.36 0.87 0.48
Latin America 0.54 −2.23 2.87 1.78 1.13 0.63 1.87 1.36 0.51
Argentina 0.96 0.49 0.47 −0.36 −1.34 1.00 4.01 2.10 1.87
Bolivia 0.19 0.19 0.00 2.04 2.04 0.00 −0.05 −0.05 0.00
Brazil 3.17 −1.43 4.66 1.04 0.14 0.90 5.19 5.19 0.00
Chile 0.84 −5.29 6.47 0.94 0.15 0.79 3.65 3.65 0.00
Colombia 0.45 −3.06 3.63 3.65 3.12 0.51 2.31 2.31 0.00
Costa Rica 3.06 −3.01 6.25 2.72 2.04 0.66 3.26 3.26 0.00
Dominican Republic 0.63 −0.31 0.94 1.20 0.43 0.76 4.32 0.00 4.32
Ecuador 0.32 −1.60 1.96 −1.40 −1.71 0.32 −0.90 −0.90 −0.00
El Salvador −1.29 −4.06 2.88 1.33 0.88 0.44 3.27 3.27 0.00
Guatemala 0.91 −0.98 1.91 1.41 0.94 0.46 1.44 0.87 0.57
Haiti −0.77 −0.77 0.00 −1.28 −1.31 0.03 −0.71 −0.75 0.04
Mexico −1.49 −5.40 4.14 2.34 1.22 1.11 2.32 1.95 0.36
Nicaragua −0.22 −4.10 4.05 5.68 5.21 0.45 −2.67 −2.67 0.00
Panama 0.24 −3.50 3.87 0.87 0.09 0.78 3.31 3.31 0.00
Peru 1.40 −0.39 1.80 3.31 3.22 0.08 2.05 2.04 0.01
Uruguay 1.37 0.59 0.78 1.73 0.99 0.74 1.12 −0.35 1.47
Venezuela −0.54 −5.20 4.91 4.99 3.18 1.75 −0.07 −0.07 0.00
All regions 0.66 −0.81 1.50 1.66 0.67 0.98 2.17 0.84 1.33
104 

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12 The information in this box is based on R. Paarlberg, 2020 Confer-
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4 Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation, Fourth
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Box 14
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6
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7
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(Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2009).
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2 PepsiCo, “PepsiCo to Partner with China’s Ministry of Agriculture
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food-security. Ministry-of-Agriculture-to-Promote-Sustainable-Fa09192011.html.
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3 PepsiCo, Greater China, Performance with Purpose: Sustainabil-
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12 Rockefeller Foundation, Grants and Grantees: Alliance for a CHAPTER 9
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111


123. CONTRIBUTORS
Perrihan Al-Riffai is a research analyst in the Develop- Betina Dimaranan is a research fellow in the Markets,
ment Strategy and Governance Division of the Interna- Trade, and Institution Division of the International
tional Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC. Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC.
Kym Anderson is George Gollin Professor of Econom- Paul Dorosh is director of the Development Strategy
ics at the University of Adelaide, Australia. and Governance Division at the International Food
Suresh Babu is a senior research fellow in the Partner- Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC.
ships, Impact, and Capacity Strengthening Unit of the Olivier Ecker is a postdoctoral fellow in the Develop-
International Food Policy Research Institute, Washing- ment Strategy and Governance Division of the Interna-
ton, DC. tional Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC.
Ousmane Badiane is director in Africa for the Inter- Shenggen Fan is director general of the International
national Food Policy Research Institute and head of its Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC.
West and Central Africa Office, Dakar, Senegal. Heidi Fritschel is a senior editor at the International
Nienke Beintema is program head of the Agricultural Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC.
Science Technology Indicators Initiative at the Inter- Sara Gustafson is a communications specialist at the
national Food Policy Research Institute, Rome. International Food Policy Research Institute, Washing-
Samuel Benin is a research fellow in the Development ton, DC.
Strategy and Governance Division of the International Derek Headey is a research fellow in the Development
Food Policy Research Institute, Kampala, Uganda. Strategy and Governance Division of the International
Deborah Brautigam is a senior research fellow in the Food Policy Research Institute, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
Development Strategy and Governance Division of the Jikun Huang is director of the Center for Chinese Agri-
International Food Policy Research Institute, Washing- cultural Policy, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing.
ton, DC.
Kabba T. Joiner is a senior policy adviser at Helen
Clemens Breisinger is a research fellow in the Develop- Keller International, Accra, Ghana.
ment Strategy and Governance Division of the Interna-
P. K. Joshi is director in South Asia for the Interna-
tional Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC.
tional Food Policy Research Institute, New Delhi.
Joanna Brzeska is a consultant for the Interna-
Suneetha Kadiyala is a research fellow in the Poverty,
tional Food Policy Research Institute. She is based
Health, and Nutrition Division of the International
in Luxembourg.
Food Policy Research Institute, New Delhi.
Bruce Campbell is director of the CGIAR Research
Zhenya Karelina was a research assistant in the Direc-
Program on Climate Change, Agriculture and Food
tor General’s Office of the International Food Policy
Security, Copenhagen, Denmark.
Research Institute, Washington, DC.
Rahul Chaturvedi is a senior program officer at the
Jawoo Koo is a research fellow in the Environment and
Foundation for Ecological Security, Anand, India.
Production Technology Division of the International
Kevin Chen is a senior research fellow in the Develop- Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC.
ment Strategy and Governance Division of the Interna-
David Laborde is a senior research fellow in the Mar-
tional Food Policy Research Institute, Beijing.
kets, Trade, and Institutions Division of the Interna-
Cindy Cox is a technical writer in the Environment and tional Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC.
Production Technology Division of the International
Rachel Licker is a graduate research assistant at the
Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC.
University of Wisconsin-Madison, US.
S. Mahendra Dev is director of the Indira Gandhi Insti-
Tsitsi Makombe is a program manager in the West and
tute of Development Research, Mumbai, India.
Central Africa Office of the International Food Policy
Research Institute, Dakar, Senegal.
112 

124. Sohail J. Malik is a visiting fellow in the Development Amanda Palazzo is a research analyst in the Envi-
Strategy and Governance Division of the International ronment and Production Technology Division of
Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC. the International Food Policy Research Institute,
Paswel Marenya is a postdoctoral fellow in the Envi- Washington, DC.
ronment and Production Technology Division of the Rajul Pandya-Lorch is head of the 2020 Vision
International Food Policy Research Institute, Washing- Initiative at the International Food Policy Research
ton, DC. Institute and chief of staff in the Director General’s
Geraldo B. Martha Jr. is a researcher at the Brazilian Office, Washington, DC.
Agricultural Research Corporation (Embrapa), Brasília. Amber Peterman is a research fellow in the Poverty,
John McDermott is director of the CGIAR Research Health, and Nutrition Division of the International
Program on Agriculture for Improved Nutrition and Food Policy Research Institute, Kampala, Uganda.
Health led by the International Food Policy Research Prabhu Pingali is deputy director for agricultural
Institute, Washington, DC. development at the Bill Melinda Gates Foundation,
Ruth Meinzen-Dick is a senior research fellow in the Seattle, Washington.
Environment and Production Technology Division Beatriz da Silveira Pinheiro is director of the Stra-
of the International Food Policy Research Institute, tegic Studies and Capacity Strengthening Division
Washington, DC. at the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation
Siwa Msangi is a senior research fellow in the Envi- (Embrapa), Brasília.
ronment and Production Technology Division of Nilam Prasai is a data curator in the Communications
the International Food Policy Research Institute, Division of the International Food Policy Research
Washington, DC. Institute, Washington, DC.
Gerald C. Nelson is a senior research fellow in the Agnes Quisumbing is a senior research fellow in the
Environment and Production Technology Division Poverty, Health, and Nutrition Division of the Interna-
of the International Food Policy Research Institute, tional Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC.
Washington, DC. Ana Ramirez is a research analyst in the Director Gen-
Alejandro Nin Pratt is a research fellow in the Develop- eral’s Office of the International Food Policy Research
ment Strategy and Governance Division of the Interna- Institute, Washington, DC.
tional Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC. Jagdeesh Rao Puppala is executive director of the
Ephraim Nkonya is a senior research fellow in the Foundation for Ecological Security, Anand, India.
Environment and Production Technology Division of Claudia Ringler is deputy director of the Environment
the International Food Policy Research Institute, and Production Technology Division at the Interna-
Washington, DC. tional Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC.
Tolulope Olofinbiyi is a research analyst in the Direc- Alexander J. Stein is a research coordinator in the
tor General’s Office of the International Food Policy Director General’s Office of the International Food
Research Institute, Washington, DC. Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC.
Steven Were Omamo is director and representative to M. S. Swaminathan is chairman of the M. S. Swaminathan
the African Union and the United Nations Economic Research Foundation, Chennai, India, and a member
Commission for Africa at the World Food Programme, of Parliament.
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
Maria Theresa Tenorio is a program analyst in the
Robert Paarlberg is Betty F. Johnson Professor of Environment and Production Technology Division of
Political Science at Wellesley College in Boston the International Food Policy Research Institute,
and associate professor at Harvard University, Washington, DC.
Cambridge, Massachusetts.
113


125. Peter Timmer is Thomas D. Cabot Professor of Devel- Derek Yach is senior vice president for global health and
opment Studies Emeritus at Harvard University, agriculture policy at PepsiCo, New York.
Cambridge, Massachusetts. Sivan Yosef is a project manager in the Director Gen-
Maximo Torero is director of the Markets, Trade, and eral’s Office of the International Food Policy Research
Institutions Division of the International Food Policy Institute, Washington, DC.
Research Institute, Washington, DC. He is also the Bingxin Yu is a research fellow in the Development
Institute’s director for Latin America. Strategy and Governance Division of the International
Klaus von Grebmer is a senior research fellow and Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC.
strategic advisor in the Director General’s Office at
the International Food Policy Research Institute,
Washington, DC.
Stanley Wood is a senior research fellow in the Envi-
ronment and Production Technology Division of
the International Food Policy Research Institute,
Washington, DC.
114 

126. T
he 2011 Global Food Policy Report is a new annual IFPRI publication that provides a
comprehensive, research-based analysis of major food policy challenges at the global,
regional, national, and local levels. It highlights important developments and events in
food policy that occurred in 2011, discusses lessons learned, offers policy recommendations,
presents IFPRI’s food policy tools and indicators, and takes a look forward into 2012.
The report reflects perspectives from across the globe. Its nine chapters, written by IFPRI researchers
and other food policy experts, provide state-of-the-art analysis on such crucial topics as:
• food price levels and volatility
• natural and human-caused disasters
• climate change
• biofuels
• the links between agriculture and nutrition, health, water, and energy
• sustainable land management
• regional developments
• new players in global food policy
The report features numerous tables, figures, infographics, and maps, as well as a collection of
stakeholders’ thoughts on what influenced food policy in 2011.
IFPRI ® ISBN 978-0- 89629-5 47-6
2033 K Street, NW • Washington, DC 20006-1002 • USA
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