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Copyright ©2011Savid
Social Media and
Mobile Security:
Can you steal from me now? Bad.
Michael A. Davis
Chief Executive Officer
Savid Technologies, Inc.
http://www.savidtech.com
Agenda
• Trends that you must get in front of
• Macro-Social-Economic Models
• Two Sides of the Problem
– Mobile Device Management
– Mobile Device Application Security
• Social Media
• Ask Questions
Who am I?
• Michael A. Davis
– CEO of Savid Technologies
• IT Security Consulting
• Risk Assessments/Auditing
• Security Remediation
– Speaker at Major Security Conferences
• Defcon, CanSecWest, Toorcon, Hack In The Box
– Open Source Software Developer
• Snort
• Nmap
• Dsniff
Author
InformationWeek Contributor
Your gut knows work
anywhere mobility is
here to stay…
But to what extent??
Mobility Trends
Devices w/ Broadband CY2010 CY2015 Increase
Tablets $600M $6B 1000%
Netbooks $1.2B $6B 500%
Mobility Trends
• Google Android flavors
• RIM Blackberry
• Apple iPhone
• Microsoft Phone
• Nokia Symbian
• HP webOS
• Don’t forget tablets!
Smart Device Growth
Mobility Struggles
BYOD vs.
Enterprise-
owned devices
Combat security
threats & meet
compliance
requirements
Manage multiple
device platforms
& apps
Gauge device
usage and
control user
parameters
But…
• Fragmentation makes management impossible
without software
Mobile Device Risks at Every Layer
• NETWORK: Interception of data over the air.
– WiFi has al the same problems as laptops
– GSM has shown some cracks. Chris Paget demo DEFCON 2010
• HARDWARE: Baseband layer attacks
– Memory corruption defects in firmware used to root your device
– Demonstrated at Black Hat DC 2011 by Ralf-Philipp Weinmann
• OS: Defects in kernel code or vendor supplied system code
– Every time iPhone or Android rooted/jailbroken this is usually the
cause
• APPLICATION: Apps with vulnerabilities and malicious code have access
to your data and device sensors
– Your device isn’t rooted but all your email and pictures are stolen,
your location is tracked, and your phone bill is much higher than
usual.
Mobile App Ecosystem
Mobile platform providers have different levels of controls over
their respective ecosystems
Platform Signing Revocation Approval
Android Anonymous, self-
signed
Yes No
iOS Signed by Vendor Yes Policy & Quality
Blackberry Signed with Vendor
issued key
Yes No
Windows Phone Signed by Vendor Yes Policy, Quality &
Security
Symbian Signed by Vendor Yes Quality
Malicious Functionality
1. Activity monitoring and data retrieval
2. Unauthorized dialing, SMS, and payments
3. Unauthorized network connectivity (exfiltration or
4. command & control)
5. UI Impersonation
6. System modification (rootkit, APN proxy config)
7. Logic or Time bomb
Vulnerabilities
7. Sensitive data leakage (inadvertent or side channel)
8. Unsafe sensitive data storage
9. Unsafe sensitive data transmission
10. Hardcoded password/keys
The Veracode Top 10 List
Activity monitoring and data
retrieval• Risks:
– Sending each email sent on the device to a hidden 3rd party address
– Listening in on phone calls or simply open microphone recording.
– Stored data, contact list or saved email messages retrieved.
• The following are examples of mobile data that attackers can monitor and
intercept:
– Messaging (SMS and Email)
– Audio (calls and open microphone recording)
– Video (still and full-motion)
– Location
– Contact list
– Call history
– Browsing history
– Input
– Data files
Activity monitoring and data
retrievalExamples:
Secret SMS Replicator for Android
http://www.switched.com/2010/10/28/sms-replicator-forwards-texts-
banned-android/
RBackupPRO for Symbian
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/05/23/symbian_signed_spyware/
Unauthorized dialing, SMS, and payments
• Directly monetize a compromised device
• Premium rate phone calls, premium rate SMS texts, mobile payments
• SMS text message as a spreading vector for
worms.
Examples:
Premium rate SMS – Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakePlayer.a
https://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9180561/New_Android_malware
_texts_premium_rate_numbers
Premium rate phone call –Windows Mobile Troj/Terdial-A
http://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2010/04/10/windows-mobile-terdial-
trojan-expensive-phone-calls/
Exfiltration or command & control
• Spyware or other malicious functionality typically requires exfiltration to be of
benefit to the attacker.
• Mobile devices are designed for communication. Many potential vectors that a
malicious app can use to send data to the attacker.
• The following are examples of communication channels attackers can use for
exfiltration and command and control:
– Email
– SMS
– HTTP get/post
– TCP socket
– UDP socket
– DNS exfiltration
– Bluetooth
– Blackberry Messenger
Drive by Malware
UI impersonation
• Similar to phishing attacks that impersonating website of their bank or
online service.
• Web view applications on the mobile device can proxy to legitimate
website.
• Malicious app creates UI that impersonates that of the phone’s native UI
or the UI of a legitimate application.
• Victim is asked to authenticate and ends up sending their credentials to an
attacker.
Example:
Proxy/MITM 09Droid Banking apps
http://www.theinquirer.net/inquirer/news/1585716/fraud-hits-android-apps-
market
System modification (rootkit, APN proxy config)
• Malicious applications will often attempt to modify the system
configuration to hide their presence. This is often called rootkit behavior.
• Configuration changes also make certain attacks possible. An example is
modifying the device proxy configuration or APN (Access Point Name).
• Example
Android “DroidDream” Trojans Rootkit Phone
http://www.androidpolice.com/2011/03/01/the-mother-of-all-android-
malware-has-arrived-stolen-apps-released-to-the-market-that-root-your-
phone-steal-your-data-and-open-backdoor
Logic or Time bomb [CWE-511]
Logic or time bombs are classic backdoor
techniques that trigger malicious activity based
on a specific event, device usage or time.
Sensitive data leakage [CWE-200]
• Sensitive data leakage can be either inadvertent or side channel.
• A legitimate apps usage of device information and authentication credentials
can be poorly implemented thereby exposing this sensitive data to 3rd parties.
– Location
– Owner ID info: name, number, device ID
– Authentication credentials
– Authorization tokens
Example:
Sensitive data leakage -Storm8 Phone Number Farming
http://www.boingboing.net/2009/11/05/iphone-game-dev-accu.html
Android “DroidDream” Trojans steal data
http://www.androidpolice.com/2011/03/01/the-mother-of-all-android-malware-
has-arrived-stolen-apps-released-to-the-market-that-root-your-phone-steal-your-
data-and-open-backdoor
Unsafe sensitive data storage [CWE-312]
• Mobile apps often store sensitive data such as banking and payment system
PIN numbers, credit card numbers, or online service passwords.
• Sensitive data should always be stored encrypted so that attackers cannot
simply retrieve this data off of the file system.
• It should be noted that storing sensitive data without encryption on
removable media such as a micro SD card is especially risky.
Examples:
Citibank insecure storage of sensitive data
http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/201994/citi_iphone_app_flaw_r
aises_questions_of_mobile_security.html
Wells Fargo Mobile application 1.1 for Android stores a username and password,
along with account balances, in clear text.
http://osvdb.org/show/osvdb/69217
Unsafe sensitive data transmission [CWE-319]
• It is important that sensitive data is encrypted in transmission lest it be
eavesdropped by attackers.
• Mobile devices are especially susceptible because they use wireless
communications exclusively and often public WiFi, which is known to be
insecure.
• SSL is one of the best ways to secure sensitive data in transit.
– Beware of downgrade attack if it allows degrading HTTPS to HTTP.
– Beware of not failing on invalid certificates. This would enable that a
man-in-the-middle attack.
Hardcoded password/keys [CWE-798]
• The use of hardcoded passwords or keys is sometimes used as a shortcut by
developers to make the application easier to implement, support, or debug.
• Once this hardcoded password is discovered through reverse engineering it
renders the security of the application or the systems it authenticates to with
this password ineffective.
Example:
Mastercard sample code:
http://jack-mannino.blogspot.com/2011/02/scary-scary-mobile-banking.html
final String companyId = "your-company-id-here";
final String companyPassword = "your-company-password-
here";
Determine Your Risk
• Your risk is unique depending on use of mobile
apps
• Start with e-mail, then calendar, then
contacts, then the device
• Use DLP to prevent the data form reaching
email in the first place
• Tablets should use RDP/Citrix to access “rich”
applications
• Enforce policy from the get go
• Form a Cross functional Mobility Council. Engage end
users – “Consumerization.”
• Prioritize Goals & Establish Mobility Plan
• Determine Applications that can be used
• Make the plan part of approved policy
– Define policy
– Document End User License Agreement
– Define who pays for the device (all/none/partial subsidy)
– Establish data security & management controls
– Deployment with proper tools
Strategy
• Think outside the box. At minimum, entertain cutting
edge MDM vendors with new ideas.
• MDM software can lessen the blow of multi-platform
madness. Ultimately makes multi-platform management
cheaper and more effective!
Security
Concerns
Security
Concerns
Support
Quality
Support
Quality
Performance
Optimization
Performance
Optimization
Cost
Control
Cost
Control
Mobile Management Over Time
Strategy
• Enroll devices in a controlled fashion vs. free-for-all
• Control Device Access to Corporate Network
– ActiveSync, Wi-Fi, VPN
• Enforce user-to-device authentication with pin code
• Set full or partial “lock/wipe” policies depending on who
owns the device
• Be leery of platforms without embedded crypto. Encrypt
devices and data cards, when possible.
• Deliver firewall and antivirus capabilities, if possible
• Whitelist Mobile Applications
Tactics
• Activesync features vary by phone platform and the
version of Exchange you use
• Users can be enrolled in ActiveSync…meaning it off for
everyone until turned on for individuals.
• Email / Calendar / Contacts / Tasks pushing and sync
• Full device wipe
• Device passwords
• Encrypted storage cards
• Bandwidth reductions
• Disable Wi-Fi / Bluetooth
And more…
The Basics - ActiveSync
• Maybe ActiveSync does not offer enough control?
• Mobile Device Manager platforms from a wide array of
vendors offer all sorts of control
• Before buying:
– Do your research well. They need to support the major
platforms.
– Don’t always take the first offer. Look at 3 minimum.
– Attempt to identify the visionaries
– Determine your business requirements and how they fit
– Verify vendor financial viability
• This space is moving fast
I want my MDM
• Multi-platform MDM that uses an agent software and
selective wipe.
• Multiple policies can be employed to monitor for
situations that exceed permitted bounds. Ex: “If you
jailbreak your device, you can’t VPN to Corp.”
• Comprehensive control & features across all major
platforms. User self servicing.
• MobileIron speaks:
– “prepare to support 3 mobile OS platforms!”
– “IT should not be surprised that lines of business are building
apps. IT can turn from being a blocker to an enabler.”
MDM Approach Example: MobileIron
Why Mobility Is Exploding
Mobile Payments
mybanktracker.com
paymentscouncil.org.uk
tomnoyes.wordpress.com
katu.com
iranmobin.com
Social Media Risks
Privacy
Leaks
social
media
attacks
Privacy Leaks
• Reveal sensitive information
• Defamation of others / organizations
• This can be inadvertent or deliberate
• And the repercussions include
– Reputation damage
– Damage to organization
– Fines
Privacy Leak Example
• July 2009: The wife of the chief of the British
secret service MI6 posted highly revealing details
on her Facebook page
• Her privacy settings meant anyone in the
"London" network could view her updates – up to
200 million people
• Information revealed included
– Family details
– Personal photos
– Location of their home
Threats Posed By Social Media
Mobile Privacy
• Data Collection
• Data Retention
• Data Sharing
What do your apps do?
Unaware Users
• Photos contain data on location,
etc
• Twitter, FB post
Location
• FB/Twitter filter
photo data but
phone doesn’t
• Once a photo, video or message is sent by mobile
phone, the user can never regain total control of
the content.
Privacy Solutions
• It is the email threat all over again
• Inherit trust of “friends” leads to bad choices
• Facebook, twitter, myspace
– All rip with malware and privacy problems
• Instant Messaging is also a growing medium
for malware distribution
• This is nothing more than social engineering
USER EDUCATION IS KEY
Conclusion
Contact Information
Michael A. Davis
mdavis@savidtech.com
708-532-2843
Twitter: @mdavisceo

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ISACA CACS 2012 - Mobile Device Security and Privacy

  • 1. Copyright ©2011Savid Social Media and Mobile Security: Can you steal from me now? Bad. Michael A. Davis Chief Executive Officer Savid Technologies, Inc. http://www.savidtech.com
  • 2. Agenda • Trends that you must get in front of • Macro-Social-Economic Models • Two Sides of the Problem – Mobile Device Management – Mobile Device Application Security • Social Media • Ask Questions
  • 3. Who am I? • Michael A. Davis – CEO of Savid Technologies • IT Security Consulting • Risk Assessments/Auditing • Security Remediation – Speaker at Major Security Conferences • Defcon, CanSecWest, Toorcon, Hack In The Box – Open Source Software Developer • Snort • Nmap • Dsniff
  • 6. Your gut knows work anywhere mobility is here to stay… But to what extent?? Mobility Trends
  • 7. Devices w/ Broadband CY2010 CY2015 Increase Tablets $600M $6B 1000% Netbooks $1.2B $6B 500% Mobility Trends
  • 8. • Google Android flavors • RIM Blackberry • Apple iPhone • Microsoft Phone • Nokia Symbian • HP webOS • Don’t forget tablets! Smart Device Growth
  • 9. Mobility Struggles BYOD vs. Enterprise- owned devices Combat security threats & meet compliance requirements Manage multiple device platforms & apps Gauge device usage and control user parameters
  • 10. But… • Fragmentation makes management impossible without software
  • 11. Mobile Device Risks at Every Layer • NETWORK: Interception of data over the air. – WiFi has al the same problems as laptops – GSM has shown some cracks. Chris Paget demo DEFCON 2010 • HARDWARE: Baseband layer attacks – Memory corruption defects in firmware used to root your device – Demonstrated at Black Hat DC 2011 by Ralf-Philipp Weinmann • OS: Defects in kernel code or vendor supplied system code – Every time iPhone or Android rooted/jailbroken this is usually the cause • APPLICATION: Apps with vulnerabilities and malicious code have access to your data and device sensors – Your device isn’t rooted but all your email and pictures are stolen, your location is tracked, and your phone bill is much higher than usual.
  • 12. Mobile App Ecosystem Mobile platform providers have different levels of controls over their respective ecosystems Platform Signing Revocation Approval Android Anonymous, self- signed Yes No iOS Signed by Vendor Yes Policy & Quality Blackberry Signed with Vendor issued key Yes No Windows Phone Signed by Vendor Yes Policy, Quality & Security Symbian Signed by Vendor Yes Quality
  • 13. Malicious Functionality 1. Activity monitoring and data retrieval 2. Unauthorized dialing, SMS, and payments 3. Unauthorized network connectivity (exfiltration or 4. command & control) 5. UI Impersonation 6. System modification (rootkit, APN proxy config) 7. Logic or Time bomb Vulnerabilities 7. Sensitive data leakage (inadvertent or side channel) 8. Unsafe sensitive data storage 9. Unsafe sensitive data transmission 10. Hardcoded password/keys The Veracode Top 10 List
  • 14. Activity monitoring and data retrieval• Risks: – Sending each email sent on the device to a hidden 3rd party address – Listening in on phone calls or simply open microphone recording. – Stored data, contact list or saved email messages retrieved. • The following are examples of mobile data that attackers can monitor and intercept: – Messaging (SMS and Email) – Audio (calls and open microphone recording) – Video (still and full-motion) – Location – Contact list – Call history – Browsing history – Input – Data files
  • 15. Activity monitoring and data retrievalExamples: Secret SMS Replicator for Android http://www.switched.com/2010/10/28/sms-replicator-forwards-texts- banned-android/ RBackupPRO for Symbian http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/05/23/symbian_signed_spyware/
  • 16. Unauthorized dialing, SMS, and payments • Directly monetize a compromised device • Premium rate phone calls, premium rate SMS texts, mobile payments • SMS text message as a spreading vector for worms. Examples: Premium rate SMS – Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakePlayer.a https://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9180561/New_Android_malware _texts_premium_rate_numbers Premium rate phone call –Windows Mobile Troj/Terdial-A http://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2010/04/10/windows-mobile-terdial- trojan-expensive-phone-calls/
  • 17. Exfiltration or command & control • Spyware or other malicious functionality typically requires exfiltration to be of benefit to the attacker. • Mobile devices are designed for communication. Many potential vectors that a malicious app can use to send data to the attacker. • The following are examples of communication channels attackers can use for exfiltration and command and control: – Email – SMS – HTTP get/post – TCP socket – UDP socket – DNS exfiltration – Bluetooth – Blackberry Messenger
  • 19. UI impersonation • Similar to phishing attacks that impersonating website of their bank or online service. • Web view applications on the mobile device can proxy to legitimate website. • Malicious app creates UI that impersonates that of the phone’s native UI or the UI of a legitimate application. • Victim is asked to authenticate and ends up sending their credentials to an attacker. Example: Proxy/MITM 09Droid Banking apps http://www.theinquirer.net/inquirer/news/1585716/fraud-hits-android-apps- market
  • 20. System modification (rootkit, APN proxy config) • Malicious applications will often attempt to modify the system configuration to hide their presence. This is often called rootkit behavior. • Configuration changes also make certain attacks possible. An example is modifying the device proxy configuration or APN (Access Point Name). • Example Android “DroidDream” Trojans Rootkit Phone http://www.androidpolice.com/2011/03/01/the-mother-of-all-android- malware-has-arrived-stolen-apps-released-to-the-market-that-root-your- phone-steal-your-data-and-open-backdoor
  • 21. Logic or Time bomb [CWE-511] Logic or time bombs are classic backdoor techniques that trigger malicious activity based on a specific event, device usage or time.
  • 22. Sensitive data leakage [CWE-200] • Sensitive data leakage can be either inadvertent or side channel. • A legitimate apps usage of device information and authentication credentials can be poorly implemented thereby exposing this sensitive data to 3rd parties. – Location – Owner ID info: name, number, device ID – Authentication credentials – Authorization tokens Example: Sensitive data leakage -Storm8 Phone Number Farming http://www.boingboing.net/2009/11/05/iphone-game-dev-accu.html Android “DroidDream” Trojans steal data http://www.androidpolice.com/2011/03/01/the-mother-of-all-android-malware- has-arrived-stolen-apps-released-to-the-market-that-root-your-phone-steal-your- data-and-open-backdoor
  • 23. Unsafe sensitive data storage [CWE-312] • Mobile apps often store sensitive data such as banking and payment system PIN numbers, credit card numbers, or online service passwords. • Sensitive data should always be stored encrypted so that attackers cannot simply retrieve this data off of the file system. • It should be noted that storing sensitive data without encryption on removable media such as a micro SD card is especially risky. Examples: Citibank insecure storage of sensitive data http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/201994/citi_iphone_app_flaw_r aises_questions_of_mobile_security.html Wells Fargo Mobile application 1.1 for Android stores a username and password, along with account balances, in clear text. http://osvdb.org/show/osvdb/69217
  • 24. Unsafe sensitive data transmission [CWE-319] • It is important that sensitive data is encrypted in transmission lest it be eavesdropped by attackers. • Mobile devices are especially susceptible because they use wireless communications exclusively and often public WiFi, which is known to be insecure. • SSL is one of the best ways to secure sensitive data in transit. – Beware of downgrade attack if it allows degrading HTTPS to HTTP. – Beware of not failing on invalid certificates. This would enable that a man-in-the-middle attack.
  • 25. Hardcoded password/keys [CWE-798] • The use of hardcoded passwords or keys is sometimes used as a shortcut by developers to make the application easier to implement, support, or debug. • Once this hardcoded password is discovered through reverse engineering it renders the security of the application or the systems it authenticates to with this password ineffective. Example: Mastercard sample code: http://jack-mannino.blogspot.com/2011/02/scary-scary-mobile-banking.html final String companyId = "your-company-id-here"; final String companyPassword = "your-company-password- here";
  • 26. Determine Your Risk • Your risk is unique depending on use of mobile apps • Start with e-mail, then calendar, then contacts, then the device • Use DLP to prevent the data form reaching email in the first place • Tablets should use RDP/Citrix to access “rich” applications • Enforce policy from the get go
  • 27. • Form a Cross functional Mobility Council. Engage end users – “Consumerization.” • Prioritize Goals & Establish Mobility Plan • Determine Applications that can be used • Make the plan part of approved policy – Define policy – Document End User License Agreement – Define who pays for the device (all/none/partial subsidy) – Establish data security & management controls – Deployment with proper tools Strategy
  • 28. • Think outside the box. At minimum, entertain cutting edge MDM vendors with new ideas. • MDM software can lessen the blow of multi-platform madness. Ultimately makes multi-platform management cheaper and more effective! Security Concerns Security Concerns Support Quality Support Quality Performance Optimization Performance Optimization Cost Control Cost Control Mobile Management Over Time Strategy
  • 29. • Enroll devices in a controlled fashion vs. free-for-all • Control Device Access to Corporate Network – ActiveSync, Wi-Fi, VPN • Enforce user-to-device authentication with pin code • Set full or partial “lock/wipe” policies depending on who owns the device • Be leery of platforms without embedded crypto. Encrypt devices and data cards, when possible. • Deliver firewall and antivirus capabilities, if possible • Whitelist Mobile Applications Tactics
  • 30. • Activesync features vary by phone platform and the version of Exchange you use • Users can be enrolled in ActiveSync…meaning it off for everyone until turned on for individuals. • Email / Calendar / Contacts / Tasks pushing and sync • Full device wipe • Device passwords • Encrypted storage cards • Bandwidth reductions • Disable Wi-Fi / Bluetooth And more… The Basics - ActiveSync
  • 31. • Maybe ActiveSync does not offer enough control? • Mobile Device Manager platforms from a wide array of vendors offer all sorts of control • Before buying: – Do your research well. They need to support the major platforms. – Don’t always take the first offer. Look at 3 minimum. – Attempt to identify the visionaries – Determine your business requirements and how they fit – Verify vendor financial viability • This space is moving fast I want my MDM
  • 32. • Multi-platform MDM that uses an agent software and selective wipe. • Multiple policies can be employed to monitor for situations that exceed permitted bounds. Ex: “If you jailbreak your device, you can’t VPN to Corp.” • Comprehensive control & features across all major platforms. User self servicing. • MobileIron speaks: – “prepare to support 3 mobile OS platforms!” – “IT should not be surprised that lines of business are building apps. IT can turn from being a blocker to an enabler.” MDM Approach Example: MobileIron
  • 33. Why Mobility Is Exploding
  • 36. Privacy Leaks • Reveal sensitive information • Defamation of others / organizations • This can be inadvertent or deliberate • And the repercussions include – Reputation damage – Damage to organization – Fines
  • 37. Privacy Leak Example • July 2009: The wife of the chief of the British secret service MI6 posted highly revealing details on her Facebook page • Her privacy settings meant anyone in the "London" network could view her updates – up to 200 million people • Information revealed included – Family details – Personal photos – Location of their home
  • 38. Threats Posed By Social Media
  • 39. Mobile Privacy • Data Collection • Data Retention • Data Sharing What do your apps do?
  • 40. Unaware Users • Photos contain data on location, etc • Twitter, FB post Location • FB/Twitter filter photo data but phone doesn’t • Once a photo, video or message is sent by mobile phone, the user can never regain total control of the content.
  • 41. Privacy Solutions • It is the email threat all over again • Inherit trust of “friends” leads to bad choices • Facebook, twitter, myspace – All rip with malware and privacy problems • Instant Messaging is also a growing medium for malware distribution • This is nothing more than social engineering USER EDUCATION IS KEY
  • 42. Conclusion Contact Information Michael A. Davis mdavis@savidtech.com 708-532-2843 Twitter: @mdavisceo