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Electronic mail security
Outline

•   Pretty Good Privacy (PGP)

•   S/MIME

•   Recommended web sites




                                          2
                                          2
Security facilities in the TCP/IP protocol stack




                                                   3
                                                   3
Pretty Good Privacy

•   Philip R. Zimmerman is the creator of PGP (1992).

•   PGP provides
       confidentiality
       and authentication
    service that can be used for electronic mail and file storage
    applications.




                                                                    4
                                                                    4
Why Is PGP Popular?

•   It is available free on a variety of platforms.

•   Wide range of applicability

•   Based on well known algorithms. (Why ?, Is it Secure ?)

•   Not developed or controlled by governmental or standards
    organizations (Is-it trust worthy)




                                                               5
                                                               5
Operational Description

    •Notations                            Z = Compression using ZIP
          Ks = Session key used in        Algorithm
          symmetric encryption scheme     R64 = Conversion to Radix 64
          PRa = Private key of user A,    ASCII format
          used in public-key encryption   EP = Public key encryption
          scheme                          DP = Public key decryption
          PUa = Public key of user A,     EC = Symmetric Encryption
          used in public-key encryption   DC = Symmetric Decryption
          scheme                          H = Hash Function (SHA-1
                                          Used, 160 bit hash)
•    Consist of five services:
                                          | | : Concatenation
          Authentication
          Confidentiality
          Compression
          E-mail compatibility
          Segmentation
                                                                         6
                                                                         6
Authentication

•   The sender creates a message

•   SHA-1 is used to generate a 160-bit hash code of the message

•   The hash code is encrypted with RSA using the sender’s private
    key, and the result is prepended to the message

•   The reciever uses RSA with sender’s public key to decrypt and
    recover the hash code

•   The reciever generates a new hash code for the mesage and
    compares it with the decryupted hash code.


                                                                     7
Confidentiality

•   The sender generates a message and a random 128-bit number
    to be used as a session key for this message only

•   The message is encrypted using CAST -128 / IDEA / #DES with
    the session key.

•   The session key is encrypted with RSA using recipients public key
    and is prepended to the message

•   The reciever uses RSA with its private key to decrypt and recover
    the session key.

•   The session key is used to decrypt the message

                                                                        8
PGP Cryptographic Function




   E[PUb, Ks]




                             9
                             9
PGP Cryptographic Function




                             10
                              10
Compression

•   PGP compresses the message after applying the signature but
    before encryption

•   The placement of the compression algorithm is critical.

•   The compression algorithm used is ZIP (described in appendix G or
    search internet)

•   Message encryption is applied after compression to strengthen
    cryptographic security.




                                                                        11
                                                                         11
E-mail Compatibility

•   The scheme used is radix-64 conversion (see appendix or online).

•   The use of radix-64 expands the message by 33%.




                                                                       12
                                                                        12
Segmentation and Reassembly

•   Often restricted to a maximum message length of 50,000 octets.

•   Longer messages must be broken up into segments.

•   PGP automatically subdivides a message that is to large.

•   The receiver strip of all e-mail headers and reassemble the block.




                                                                         13
                                                                          13
Transmission and Reception of PGP Messages assembly




                                                      14
                                                       14
Format of PGP Message




                        15
                         15
General Structure of Private and Public Key Rings
 • Keys need to be stored and organized in a systematic way for
     efficient and effective use by all parties

 •   Scheme used in PGP providesa pair of data structure at each node
       To store public / private key pairs owned by that node (Private Key
        Ring)
       To store public keys of other users known at this node (Public Key Ring)




                                                                                   16
General Structure of Private and Public Key
                  Rings


           Least significant 64 bits




                                              17
PGP Message Generation




                         18
PGP Message Reception




                        19
The Use of Trust

           •    No specification for establishing certifying authorities or for
                establishing trust
           •    Provides means of
                        Using trust
                        Associating trust with public keys
                        Exploiting trust information.
           •    Basic Structure
                        Key legitimacy field : indicates the extent to which PGP will trust
See Table 7.2




                         public key for user
                 (W. Stallings)




                        Signature trust field : Indicates the degree to PGP user trusts the
                         signer to certify public keys
                        Owner trust field : Indicates degree to which public key is trusted to
                         sign other public-key certificates; assigned by user


                                                                                                  20
                                                                                                   20
PGP Trust Model (Example)




                             21

      (Reading Assignment)
Revoking Public Keys

•   The owner issue a key revocation certificate.

•   Normal signature certificate with a revoke indicator.

•   Corresponding private key is used to sign the certificate.




                                                                 22
                                                                  22
S/MIME

•   Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extension (RFC5751)


•   S/MIME on the IETF standard track
      Will be the commercial standard for secure e-mails


•   Uses X.509 certificates (Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #7) to
    sign/encrypt messages
        PKCS # 7: An updated Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
          –   CMS is the IETF's standard for cryptographically protected messages which is
              used to digitally sign, digest, authenticate or encrypt digital data.
•   Provides same features as PGP
      authentication, message integrity and non-repudiation of origin
          – provided by use of digital signatures
      privacy, data security
          – provided by use of encryption


•   PGP for personal e-mail security, S/MIME for professional e-mail security                23
                                                                                              23
S/MIME Fucntion

•   Enveloped Data
     Consists of encrypted content of any type and encrypteed-content
      encryption key
•   Signed Data
     Digital signature is formed by taking the message digest and then
      encrypted with public key
     Contents + Signature are encoded using base64 encoding
     Can only viewed by recipeint with S/MIME capabilities.
•   Clear-Signed Data
     Digital signature are formed and encoded using base64
     All can see message but can not verify signature.
•   Singed and Enveloped Data
     Encrypted data may be signed
     Signed data or clear-signed data may be encrypted

                                                                          24
Plain Mail (just MIME)
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary=bar

      --bar
      Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
      Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

      =A1Hola Michael!

      How do you like the new S/MIME specification?

      It's generally a good idea to encode lines that begin with
      From=20because some mail transport agents will insert a greater-
      than (>) sign, thus invalidating the signature.
      Also, in some cases it might be desirable to encode any =20
      trailing whitespace that occurs on lines in order to ensure =20
      that the message signature is not invalidated when passing =20
      a gateway that modifies such whitespace (like BITNET). =20

      --bar
      Content-Type: image/jpeg
      Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64

      iQCVAwUBMJrRF2N9oWBghPDJAQE9UQQAtl7LuRVndBjrk4EqYBIb3h5QXIX/LC//
      jJV5bNvkZIGPIcEmI5iFd9boEgvpirHtIREEqLQRkYNoBActFBZmh9GC3C041WGq
      uMbrbxc+nIs1TIKlA08rVi9ig/2Yh7LFrK5Ein57U/W72vgSxLhe/zhdfolT9Brn
      HOxEa44b+EI=

      --bar--                                                            25
                                                                          25
S/MIME filenames




Media Type                                      File
                                                Extension
application/pkcs7-mime (SignedData,             .p7m
EnvelopedData)
application/pkcs7-mime (degenerate SignedData   .p7c
certificate management message)

application/pkcs7-mime (CompressedData)         .p7z

application/pkcs7-signature (SignedData)        .p7s




                                                            26
                                                             26
S/MIME singed message
Content-Type: multipart/signed;
       protocol="application/pkcs7-signature";
       micalg=sha1; boundary=boundary42

   --boundary42
   Content-Type: text/plain

   This is a clear-signed message.

   --boundary42
   Content-Type: application/pkcs7-signature; name=smime.p7s
   Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
   Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=smime.p7s

   ghyHhHUujhJhjH77n8HHGTrfvbnj756tbB9HG4VQpfyF467GhIGfHfYT6
   4VQpfyF467GhIGfHfYT6jH77n8HHGghyHhHUujhJh756tbB9HGTrfvbnj
   n8HHGTrfvhJhjH776tbB9HG4VQbnj7567GhIGfHfYT6ghyHhHUujpfyF4
   7GhIGfHfYT64VQbnj756

  --boundary42--
                                                               27
                                                                27
Algorithms Used in S/MIME
•   Message Digesting
      MUST : Absolute Requirement
         – SHA-1
      SHOULD : May be required in particular cases
         – MD5 (Receiver)


•   Digital Signatures
      MUST : DSS (Sender / Receiver)
      SHOULD : RSA (Key size of 512 – 1024 bits) (Sender / Receiver)


•   Encryption with one time session key
      MUST
         – Triple-DES (Sender / Receiver)
      SHOULD
         – AES, RC2/40 (Sender)
                                                                        28
                                                                         28
Algorithms Used in S/MIME

•   Asymmetric encryption of the session key
     MUST
        – RSA with key sizes of 512 to 1024 bits (Sender / Receiver)
     SHOULD
        – Diffie-Hellman (for session keys). (Sender / Receiver)


•   Creation of MAC
     MUST : HMAC with SHA-1 (Receiver)
     SHOULD : HMAC with SHA-1 (Sender)




                                                                       29
Recommended Web Sites




•   PGP home page: www.pgp.com
•   MIT distribution site for PGP
•   GOOGLE -> PGP
•   S/MIME Central: RSA Inc.’s Web Site




                                          30
                                           30

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Lecture 8 mail security

  • 2. Outline • Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) • S/MIME • Recommended web sites 2 2
  • 3. Security facilities in the TCP/IP protocol stack 3 3
  • 4. Pretty Good Privacy • Philip R. Zimmerman is the creator of PGP (1992). • PGP provides  confidentiality  and authentication service that can be used for electronic mail and file storage applications. 4 4
  • 5. Why Is PGP Popular? • It is available free on a variety of platforms. • Wide range of applicability • Based on well known algorithms. (Why ?, Is it Secure ?) • Not developed or controlled by governmental or standards organizations (Is-it trust worthy) 5 5
  • 6. Operational Description •Notations Z = Compression using ZIP Ks = Session key used in Algorithm symmetric encryption scheme R64 = Conversion to Radix 64 PRa = Private key of user A, ASCII format used in public-key encryption EP = Public key encryption scheme DP = Public key decryption PUa = Public key of user A, EC = Symmetric Encryption used in public-key encryption DC = Symmetric Decryption scheme H = Hash Function (SHA-1 Used, 160 bit hash) • Consist of five services: | | : Concatenation  Authentication  Confidentiality  Compression  E-mail compatibility  Segmentation 6 6
  • 7. Authentication • The sender creates a message • SHA-1 is used to generate a 160-bit hash code of the message • The hash code is encrypted with RSA using the sender’s private key, and the result is prepended to the message • The reciever uses RSA with sender’s public key to decrypt and recover the hash code • The reciever generates a new hash code for the mesage and compares it with the decryupted hash code. 7
  • 8. Confidentiality • The sender generates a message and a random 128-bit number to be used as a session key for this message only • The message is encrypted using CAST -128 / IDEA / #DES with the session key. • The session key is encrypted with RSA using recipients public key and is prepended to the message • The reciever uses RSA with its private key to decrypt and recover the session key. • The session key is used to decrypt the message 8
  • 9. PGP Cryptographic Function E[PUb, Ks] 9 9
  • 11. Compression • PGP compresses the message after applying the signature but before encryption • The placement of the compression algorithm is critical. • The compression algorithm used is ZIP (described in appendix G or search internet) • Message encryption is applied after compression to strengthen cryptographic security. 11 11
  • 12. E-mail Compatibility • The scheme used is radix-64 conversion (see appendix or online). • The use of radix-64 expands the message by 33%. 12 12
  • 13. Segmentation and Reassembly • Often restricted to a maximum message length of 50,000 octets. • Longer messages must be broken up into segments. • PGP automatically subdivides a message that is to large. • The receiver strip of all e-mail headers and reassemble the block. 13 13
  • 14. Transmission and Reception of PGP Messages assembly 14 14
  • 15. Format of PGP Message 15 15
  • 16. General Structure of Private and Public Key Rings • Keys need to be stored and organized in a systematic way for efficient and effective use by all parties • Scheme used in PGP providesa pair of data structure at each node  To store public / private key pairs owned by that node (Private Key Ring)  To store public keys of other users known at this node (Public Key Ring) 16
  • 17. General Structure of Private and Public Key Rings Least significant 64 bits 17
  • 20. The Use of Trust • No specification for establishing certifying authorities or for establishing trust • Provides means of  Using trust  Associating trust with public keys  Exploiting trust information. • Basic Structure  Key legitimacy field : indicates the extent to which PGP will trust See Table 7.2 public key for user (W. Stallings)  Signature trust field : Indicates the degree to PGP user trusts the signer to certify public keys  Owner trust field : Indicates degree to which public key is trusted to sign other public-key certificates; assigned by user 20 20
  • 21. PGP Trust Model (Example) 21 (Reading Assignment)
  • 22. Revoking Public Keys • The owner issue a key revocation certificate. • Normal signature certificate with a revoke indicator. • Corresponding private key is used to sign the certificate. 22 22
  • 23. S/MIME • Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extension (RFC5751) • S/MIME on the IETF standard track  Will be the commercial standard for secure e-mails • Uses X.509 certificates (Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #7) to sign/encrypt messages  PKCS # 7: An updated Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) – CMS is the IETF's standard for cryptographically protected messages which is used to digitally sign, digest, authenticate or encrypt digital data. • Provides same features as PGP  authentication, message integrity and non-repudiation of origin – provided by use of digital signatures  privacy, data security – provided by use of encryption • PGP for personal e-mail security, S/MIME for professional e-mail security 23 23
  • 24. S/MIME Fucntion • Enveloped Data  Consists of encrypted content of any type and encrypteed-content encryption key • Signed Data  Digital signature is formed by taking the message digest and then encrypted with public key  Contents + Signature are encoded using base64 encoding  Can only viewed by recipeint with S/MIME capabilities. • Clear-Signed Data  Digital signature are formed and encoded using base64  All can see message but can not verify signature. • Singed and Enveloped Data  Encrypted data may be signed  Signed data or clear-signed data may be encrypted 24
  • 25. Plain Mail (just MIME) Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary=bar --bar Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable =A1Hola Michael! How do you like the new S/MIME specification? It's generally a good idea to encode lines that begin with From=20because some mail transport agents will insert a greater- than (>) sign, thus invalidating the signature. Also, in some cases it might be desirable to encode any =20 trailing whitespace that occurs on lines in order to ensure =20 that the message signature is not invalidated when passing =20 a gateway that modifies such whitespace (like BITNET). =20 --bar Content-Type: image/jpeg Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 iQCVAwUBMJrRF2N9oWBghPDJAQE9UQQAtl7LuRVndBjrk4EqYBIb3h5QXIX/LC// jJV5bNvkZIGPIcEmI5iFd9boEgvpirHtIREEqLQRkYNoBActFBZmh9GC3C041WGq uMbrbxc+nIs1TIKlA08rVi9ig/2Yh7LFrK5Ein57U/W72vgSxLhe/zhdfolT9Brn HOxEa44b+EI= --bar-- 25 25
  • 26. S/MIME filenames Media Type File Extension application/pkcs7-mime (SignedData, .p7m EnvelopedData) application/pkcs7-mime (degenerate SignedData .p7c certificate management message) application/pkcs7-mime (CompressedData) .p7z application/pkcs7-signature (SignedData) .p7s 26 26
  • 27. S/MIME singed message Content-Type: multipart/signed; protocol="application/pkcs7-signature"; micalg=sha1; boundary=boundary42 --boundary42 Content-Type: text/plain This is a clear-signed message. --boundary42 Content-Type: application/pkcs7-signature; name=smime.p7s Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=smime.p7s ghyHhHUujhJhjH77n8HHGTrfvbnj756tbB9HG4VQpfyF467GhIGfHfYT6 4VQpfyF467GhIGfHfYT6jH77n8HHGghyHhHUujhJh756tbB9HGTrfvbnj n8HHGTrfvhJhjH776tbB9HG4VQbnj7567GhIGfHfYT6ghyHhHUujpfyF4 7GhIGfHfYT64VQbnj756 --boundary42-- 27 27
  • 28. Algorithms Used in S/MIME • Message Digesting  MUST : Absolute Requirement – SHA-1  SHOULD : May be required in particular cases – MD5 (Receiver) • Digital Signatures  MUST : DSS (Sender / Receiver)  SHOULD : RSA (Key size of 512 – 1024 bits) (Sender / Receiver) • Encryption with one time session key  MUST – Triple-DES (Sender / Receiver)  SHOULD – AES, RC2/40 (Sender) 28 28
  • 29. Algorithms Used in S/MIME • Asymmetric encryption of the session key  MUST – RSA with key sizes of 512 to 1024 bits (Sender / Receiver)  SHOULD – Diffie-Hellman (for session keys). (Sender / Receiver) • Creation of MAC  MUST : HMAC with SHA-1 (Receiver)  SHOULD : HMAC with SHA-1 (Sender) 29
  • 30. Recommended Web Sites • PGP home page: www.pgp.com • MIT distribution site for PGP • GOOGLE -> PGP • S/MIME Central: RSA Inc.’s Web Site 30 30