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Mobile Communication and its Security Analysis
by
K Gunjan
Agenda
•evolution of mobile communication
•1G technology
•2G technology
•GSM architecture
•GSM channels
•SIM
•Sharing Spectrum
•Authentication and Encryption Scheme
•GSM calling sequence
•GSM called sequence
•Security issues
Evolution of Mobile Comm
Ancient time: light for comm... eg ship,becon..
150 BC: smoke signals...color/strength
1794: optical telegraphy
1877: First wireline telephone
1895: wireless telegraphy
1915: wireless voice
transmission(AM)
1928: TV broadcast
1933: FM patented.. radios in 1950s
Evolution of Mobile Comm
1946: Mobile Telephone was introduced
System:MTS,
Device wt:36KG
In Bell System, used in St. Louis
Setup by operator,
Only 3 channels for whole metro
1960: Bell Labs -> Celular concept
1970: Mobile User M<=>PSTN
System: IMTS(improved mobile tele service)
Reduced size and wt
Eliminate setup by operator
32 channels across 3 bands
450-470MHz
Other wireless systems:
Push to talk(PTT)
AMTS-Advance Mobile tele system
Etc
These were also called
mobile radio systems
1G technology
=>Deployed in early 1990s
1.AMPS-Advanced Mobile Phone System
Developed and deployed in USA
2.NMT-Nordic mobile Tele System
developed and deployed in Scandinavian
countries
3.TACS-Total Access Communication System
developed in UK, Deployed in Europe
.
1G technology
All analog
FDMA + FM
Only voice
Poor Voice quality
Poor battery life
Large phone size
Poor handoff reliability
No Roaming—
even between two same technology
1G technology
No security
 Analog Signals does not allow advance encryption methods
hence there is no security
 FM receivers can be used to listen in on any conversation
 Anyone could collect a large database of identity etc by driving
around and go into business by reprogramming stolen phones
and reselling them.
 Airtime thefts were also reported
2G technology
Deployed in early 90s
Three popular systems: GSM, D-AMPS and CDMA One/IS-95
Digital systems
SMS
MMS-Multi Media Messages
Data Service-GPRS-64kbps
Roaming
Voice encryption provision
Better security
GSM
GSM is the most popular 2G Technology
Developed in Europe and has European standards
Low data rate: 9.6 kbps
Higher data rates using 2G:
GPRS: General Packet Radio Service
2.5G
171kbps(50kbps)
EDGE: Enhanced Data Rates for GSM Evolution
2.75G
473.6kbps(100kbps)
GSM
New network elements required to achieve higher data rate:
Serving GPRS Support Node (SGSN),
The SGSN handles all packet switched data within the network and is
responsible for the authentication and tracking of the users. The SGSN performs
the same functions as the MSC for voice traffic
Gateway GPRS Support Node (GGSN).
The GGSN is the interface from the GSM/GPRS network to external networks.
The GGSN is also responsible for the allocation of IP-addresses.
GSM ARCHITECHTURE
Service
Provisioning &
billing/CRM
CDR archive
CRBT system
USSD
gateways
STPMNP D/B
USAU
SMP
Voucher
Centers
OMC
Architecture form network perspective
MPLS,
Routers
E1s
STP
GSM Links
Motivation
Understand it
&
Look for CIA
GSM ARCHITECHTURE
GSM Protocol stack
GSM Protocol stack
Sharing Spectrum
GSM uses TDMA & FDMA
Sharing Spectrum
GSM channels
GSM channels
31
Subscriber Identification Module (SIM)
Smart Card – a single chip computer containing
OS, File System, Applications
Protected by PIN
Owned by operator (i.e. trusted)
SIM applications can be written with SIM Toolkit
Contains PIN, Ki and Kc
Contains A3, A5 and A8 algos
32
Authentication and Encryption Scheme
A3
Mobile Station Radio Link GSM Operator
A8
A5
A3
A8
A5
Ki Ki
Challenge RAND 128bit
KcKc 64 bit
mi Encrypted Data mi
SIM
Signed response (SRES32 bit)
SRESSRES
Fn Fn
Authentication: are SRES
values equal?
Authentication and Encryption Scheme
* A3 Input: 128-bit RAND random challenge, Ki 128- bit private key
• A3 Output: 32-bit SRES signed response
• A8 Input: 128-bit RAND random challenge, Ki 128-bit private key
• A8 Output: 64-bit Kc Cipher Key, used for A5
GSM Basic Call Sequence
The process for calling MS and called MS are
two independent flow. The calling party begins
with channel request and ends with TCH
assignment competition. In general, the calling
party includes following several stages: access
process, authentication and ciphering process,
TCH assignment process. So, we take the
sequence from mobile to land as example, in this
sequence, we mainly devote to the calling party.
Mobile to Land Sequence
MS BSS MSC VLR HLR
1 CHANNEL REQUEST <RACH>
<AGCH>DCCH ASSIGN
SIGNALING LINK
ESTABLISHED
PSTN
MS BSS MSC VLR HLR
1 CHANNEL REQUEST <RACH>
<AGCH>DCCH ASSIGN
<SDCCH>
SIGNALING LINK
ESTABLISHED
2 REQ. FOR SERVICE
CR
CC
PSTN
Mobile to Land Sequence
Mobile to Land Sequence
MS BSS MSC VLR HLR
1 CHANNEL REQUEST <RACH>
<AGCH>DCCH ASSIGN
SIGNALING LINK
ESTABLISHED
PSTN
MS BSS MSC VLR HLR
1 CHANNEL REQUEST <RACH>
<AGCH>DCCH ASSIGN
<SDCCH>
SIGNALING LINK
ESTABLISHED
2 REQ. FOR SERVICE
CR
CC
PSTN
Mobile to Land Sequence
MS BSS MSC VLR HLR
1 CHANNEL REQUEST <RACH>
<AGCH>DCCH ASSIGN
<SDCCH>
SIGNALING LINK
ESTABLISHED
2 REQ. FOR SERVICE
CR
CC
3 AUTHENTICATION
SET Cipher MODE
PSTN
Mobile to Land Sequence
MS BSS MSC VLR HLR
1 CHANNEL REQUEST <RACH>
<AGCH>DCCH ASSIGN
<SDCCH>
SIGNALING LINK
ESTABLISHED
2 REQ. FOR SERVICE
CR
CC
3 AUTHENTICATION
SET Cipher MODE
4 SET-UP
<SDCCH>
Call Info
PSTN
SFOC
Mobile to Land Sequence
MS BSS MSC VLR HLR
1 CHANNEL REQUEST <RACH>
<AGCH>DCCH ASSIGN
<SDCCH>
SIGNALING LINK
ESTABLISHED
2 REQ. FOR SERVICE
CR
CC
3 AUTHENTICATION
SET Cipher MODE
4 SET-UP
<SDCCH>
Call Info
5 EQUIP. ID REQ.
PSTN
SFOC
Mobile to Land Sequence
MS BSS MSC VLR HLR
1 CHANNEL REQUEST <RACH>
<AGCH>DCCH ASSIGN
<SDCCH>
SIGNALING LINK
ESTABLISHED
2 REQ. FOR SERVICE
CR
CC
3 AUTHENTICATION
SET Cipher MODE
4 SET-UP
<SDCCH>
Call Info
5 EQUIP. ID REQ.
6 COMPLETE CALL
CALL PROCEEDING
<SDCCH>
PSTN
SFOC
Mobile to Land Sequence
Mobile to Land Sequence
7 ASSIG. COMMAND
<SDCCH>
ASSIG. COMPLETE
circuit<FACCH>
MS BSS MSC VLR HLR PSTN
7 ASSIG. COMMAND
<SDCCH>
ASSIG. COMPLETE
Address Complete(ACM)
Alerting
circuit<FACCH>
Initial and Final Address
8 Message (IFAM)
MS hears ring
tone from land
phone
<FACCH>
MS BSS MSC VLR HLR PSTN
Mobile to Land Sequence
7 ASSIG. COMMAND
<SDCCH>
ASSIG. COMPLETE
Address Complete(ACM)
Alerting
<FACCH>
9 Answer (ANS)Connect
circuit<FACCH>
Initial and Final Address
8 Message (IFAM)
MS hears ring
tone from land
phone
<FACCH>
Ring tone
stops
MS BSS MSC VLR HLR PSTN
Mobile to Land Sequence
7 ASSIG. COMMAND
<SDCCH>
ASSIG. COMPLETE
Address Complete(ACM)
Alerting
<FACCH>
9 Answer (ANS)Connect
10 Connect Acknowledge
<FACCH>
circuit<FACCH>
<TCH>
Initial and Final Address
8 Message (IFAM)
MS hears ring
tone from land
phone
<FACCH>
Ring tone
stops
HELLO!
MS BSS MSC VLR HLR PSTN
BILLING STARTS
Mobile to Land Sequence
MS BSS MSC VLR HLR
1 CHANNEL REQUEST <RACH>
<AGCH>DCCH ASSIGN
<SDCCH>
SIGNALING LINK
ESTABLISHED
2 REQ. FOR SERVICE
CR
CC
3 AUTHENTICATION
SET Cipher MODE
PSTN
Mobile to Land Sequence
MS BSS MSC VLR HLR
1 CHANNEL REQUEST <RACH>
<AGCH>DCCH ASSIGN
<SDCCH>
SIGNALING LINK
ESTABLISHED
2 REQ. FOR SERVICE
CR
CC
3 AUTHENTICATION
SET Cipher MODE
4 SET-UP
<SDCCH>
Call Info
PSTN
SFOC
Mobile to Land Sequence
MS BSS MSC VLR HLR
1 CHANNEL REQUEST <RACH>
<AGCH>DCCH ASSIGN
<SDCCH>
SIGNALING LINK
ESTABLISHED
2 REQ. FOR SERVICE
CR
CC
3 AUTHENTICATION
SET Cipher MODE
4 SET-UP
<SDCCH>
Call Info
5 EQUIP. ID REQ.
PSTN
SFOC
Mobile to Land Sequence
MS BSS MSC VLR HLR
1 CHANNEL REQUEST <RACH>
<AGCH>DCCH ASSIGN
<SDCCH>
SIGNALING LINK
ESTABLISHED
2 REQ. FOR SERVICE
CR
CC
3 AUTHENTICATION
SET Cipher MODE
4 SET-UP
<SDCCH>
Call Info
5 EQUIP. ID REQ.
6 COMPLETE CALL
CALL PROCEEDING
<SDCCH>
PSTN
SFOC
Mobile to Land Sequence
Mobile to Land Sequence
7 ASSIG. COMMAND
<SDCCH>
ASSIG. COMPLETE
circuit<FACCH>
MS BSS MSC VLR HLR PSTN
7 ASSIG. COMMAND
<SDCCH>
ASSIG. COMPLETE
Address Complete(ACM)
Alerting
circuit<FACCH>
Initial and Final Address
8 Message (IFAM)
MS hears ring
tone from land
phone
<FACCH>
MS BSS MSC VLR HLR PSTN
Mobile to Land Sequence
7 ASSIG. COMMAND
<SDCCH>
ASSIG. COMPLETE
Address Complete(ACM)
Alerting
<FACCH>
9 Answer (ANS)Connect
circuit<FACCH>
Initial and Final Address
8 Message (IFAM)
MS hears ring
tone from land
phone
<FACCH>
Ring tone
stops
MS BSS MSC VLR HLR PSTN
Mobile to Land Sequence
7 ASSIG. COMMAND
<SDCCH>
ASSIG. COMPLETE
Address Complete(ACM)
Alerting
<FACCH>
9 Answer (ANS)Connect
10 Connect Acknowledge
<FACCH>
circuit<FACCH>
<TCH>
Initial and Final Address
8 Message (IFAM)
MS hears ring
tone from land
phone
<FACCH>
Ring tone
stops
HELLO!
MS BSS MSC VLR HLR PSTN
BILLING STARTS
Mobile to Land Sequence
GSM Basic Call Sequence
For the called party, the flow for the called party
begins when MSC sends paging command to the
called party, ends when two party start talk. In
general, this call flow includes several stages:
access process, authentication and ciphering
process, TCH assignment process, talk process,
release process.
MS BSS MSC VLR HLR GMSC
(MSISDN)
(MSISDN)(IMSI)
(MSRN)
(MSRN)
(LAI & TMSI)
(TMSI)(TMSI)
Initial and Final
1 Address Message
PSTN
(MSRN) (MSRN)
2 Send Routing Info
3 Routing Info Ack
Initial and Final
Address Message
4 Send Info For I/C
Call Setup
5 Page
Paging Request
<PCH>
Land to Mobile Sequence
<FACCH>
(channel) (circuit)
<FACCH>
9 Assignment
Command
Assignment
Complete
Alert
<TCH>
<FACCH>10 Connect
Connect ACK ANS
<TCH>
Hello...
Address Complete
MS BSS MSC VLR HLR GMSC PSTN
Billing
starts
Ring Tone at
the land
phone
Ringing stops
at land phoneSubscriber
picks up
Land to Mobile Sequence
Attacks on GSM
OSMOCOMBB
sniffing
MIMT attack on call
MIMT attack on SMS
Attack using data card
………
…..
…
..
.
Twitter: @Gunjan_cn
Gunjan.cn@gmail.com

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Kumar gunjan 20160213 mobile communication security

  • 1. Mobile Communication and its Security Analysis by K Gunjan
  • 2. Agenda •evolution of mobile communication •1G technology •2G technology •GSM architecture •GSM channels •SIM •Sharing Spectrum •Authentication and Encryption Scheme •GSM calling sequence •GSM called sequence •Security issues
  • 3. Evolution of Mobile Comm Ancient time: light for comm... eg ship,becon.. 150 BC: smoke signals...color/strength 1794: optical telegraphy 1877: First wireline telephone 1895: wireless telegraphy 1915: wireless voice transmission(AM) 1928: TV broadcast 1933: FM patented.. radios in 1950s
  • 4. Evolution of Mobile Comm 1946: Mobile Telephone was introduced System:MTS, Device wt:36KG In Bell System, used in St. Louis Setup by operator, Only 3 channels for whole metro
  • 5. 1960: Bell Labs -> Celular concept 1970: Mobile User M<=>PSTN System: IMTS(improved mobile tele service) Reduced size and wt Eliminate setup by operator 32 channels across 3 bands 450-470MHz
  • 6. Other wireless systems: Push to talk(PTT) AMTS-Advance Mobile tele system Etc These were also called mobile radio systems
  • 7. 1G technology =>Deployed in early 1990s 1.AMPS-Advanced Mobile Phone System Developed and deployed in USA 2.NMT-Nordic mobile Tele System developed and deployed in Scandinavian countries 3.TACS-Total Access Communication System developed in UK, Deployed in Europe .
  • 8. 1G technology All analog FDMA + FM Only voice Poor Voice quality Poor battery life Large phone size Poor handoff reliability No Roaming— even between two same technology
  • 9. 1G technology No security  Analog Signals does not allow advance encryption methods hence there is no security  FM receivers can be used to listen in on any conversation  Anyone could collect a large database of identity etc by driving around and go into business by reprogramming stolen phones and reselling them.  Airtime thefts were also reported
  • 10. 2G technology Deployed in early 90s Three popular systems: GSM, D-AMPS and CDMA One/IS-95 Digital systems SMS MMS-Multi Media Messages Data Service-GPRS-64kbps Roaming Voice encryption provision Better security
  • 11. GSM GSM is the most popular 2G Technology Developed in Europe and has European standards Low data rate: 9.6 kbps Higher data rates using 2G: GPRS: General Packet Radio Service 2.5G 171kbps(50kbps) EDGE: Enhanced Data Rates for GSM Evolution 2.75G 473.6kbps(100kbps)
  • 12. GSM New network elements required to achieve higher data rate: Serving GPRS Support Node (SGSN), The SGSN handles all packet switched data within the network and is responsible for the authentication and tracking of the users. The SGSN performs the same functions as the MSC for voice traffic Gateway GPRS Support Node (GGSN). The GGSN is the interface from the GSM/GPRS network to external networks. The GGSN is also responsible for the allocation of IP-addresses.
  • 13. GSM ARCHITECHTURE Service Provisioning & billing/CRM CDR archive CRBT system USSD gateways STPMNP D/B USAU SMP Voucher Centers OMC
  • 14. Architecture form network perspective MPLS, Routers E1s STP
  • 24. 31 Subscriber Identification Module (SIM) Smart Card – a single chip computer containing OS, File System, Applications Protected by PIN Owned by operator (i.e. trusted) SIM applications can be written with SIM Toolkit Contains PIN, Ki and Kc Contains A3, A5 and A8 algos
  • 25. 32 Authentication and Encryption Scheme A3 Mobile Station Radio Link GSM Operator A8 A5 A3 A8 A5 Ki Ki Challenge RAND 128bit KcKc 64 bit mi Encrypted Data mi SIM Signed response (SRES32 bit) SRESSRES Fn Fn Authentication: are SRES values equal?
  • 26. Authentication and Encryption Scheme * A3 Input: 128-bit RAND random challenge, Ki 128- bit private key • A3 Output: 32-bit SRES signed response • A8 Input: 128-bit RAND random challenge, Ki 128-bit private key • A8 Output: 64-bit Kc Cipher Key, used for A5
  • 27.
  • 28. GSM Basic Call Sequence The process for calling MS and called MS are two independent flow. The calling party begins with channel request and ends with TCH assignment competition. In general, the calling party includes following several stages: access process, authentication and ciphering process, TCH assignment process. So, we take the sequence from mobile to land as example, in this sequence, we mainly devote to the calling party.
  • 29. Mobile to Land Sequence MS BSS MSC VLR HLR 1 CHANNEL REQUEST <RACH> <AGCH>DCCH ASSIGN SIGNALING LINK ESTABLISHED PSTN
  • 30. MS BSS MSC VLR HLR 1 CHANNEL REQUEST <RACH> <AGCH>DCCH ASSIGN <SDCCH> SIGNALING LINK ESTABLISHED 2 REQ. FOR SERVICE CR CC PSTN Mobile to Land Sequence
  • 31. Mobile to Land Sequence MS BSS MSC VLR HLR 1 CHANNEL REQUEST <RACH> <AGCH>DCCH ASSIGN SIGNALING LINK ESTABLISHED PSTN
  • 32. MS BSS MSC VLR HLR 1 CHANNEL REQUEST <RACH> <AGCH>DCCH ASSIGN <SDCCH> SIGNALING LINK ESTABLISHED 2 REQ. FOR SERVICE CR CC PSTN Mobile to Land Sequence
  • 33. MS BSS MSC VLR HLR 1 CHANNEL REQUEST <RACH> <AGCH>DCCH ASSIGN <SDCCH> SIGNALING LINK ESTABLISHED 2 REQ. FOR SERVICE CR CC 3 AUTHENTICATION SET Cipher MODE PSTN Mobile to Land Sequence
  • 34. MS BSS MSC VLR HLR 1 CHANNEL REQUEST <RACH> <AGCH>DCCH ASSIGN <SDCCH> SIGNALING LINK ESTABLISHED 2 REQ. FOR SERVICE CR CC 3 AUTHENTICATION SET Cipher MODE 4 SET-UP <SDCCH> Call Info PSTN SFOC Mobile to Land Sequence
  • 35. MS BSS MSC VLR HLR 1 CHANNEL REQUEST <RACH> <AGCH>DCCH ASSIGN <SDCCH> SIGNALING LINK ESTABLISHED 2 REQ. FOR SERVICE CR CC 3 AUTHENTICATION SET Cipher MODE 4 SET-UP <SDCCH> Call Info 5 EQUIP. ID REQ. PSTN SFOC Mobile to Land Sequence
  • 36. MS BSS MSC VLR HLR 1 CHANNEL REQUEST <RACH> <AGCH>DCCH ASSIGN <SDCCH> SIGNALING LINK ESTABLISHED 2 REQ. FOR SERVICE CR CC 3 AUTHENTICATION SET Cipher MODE 4 SET-UP <SDCCH> Call Info 5 EQUIP. ID REQ. 6 COMPLETE CALL CALL PROCEEDING <SDCCH> PSTN SFOC Mobile to Land Sequence
  • 37. Mobile to Land Sequence 7 ASSIG. COMMAND <SDCCH> ASSIG. COMPLETE circuit<FACCH> MS BSS MSC VLR HLR PSTN
  • 38. 7 ASSIG. COMMAND <SDCCH> ASSIG. COMPLETE Address Complete(ACM) Alerting circuit<FACCH> Initial and Final Address 8 Message (IFAM) MS hears ring tone from land phone <FACCH> MS BSS MSC VLR HLR PSTN Mobile to Land Sequence
  • 39. 7 ASSIG. COMMAND <SDCCH> ASSIG. COMPLETE Address Complete(ACM) Alerting <FACCH> 9 Answer (ANS)Connect circuit<FACCH> Initial and Final Address 8 Message (IFAM) MS hears ring tone from land phone <FACCH> Ring tone stops MS BSS MSC VLR HLR PSTN Mobile to Land Sequence
  • 40. 7 ASSIG. COMMAND <SDCCH> ASSIG. COMPLETE Address Complete(ACM) Alerting <FACCH> 9 Answer (ANS)Connect 10 Connect Acknowledge <FACCH> circuit<FACCH> <TCH> Initial and Final Address 8 Message (IFAM) MS hears ring tone from land phone <FACCH> Ring tone stops HELLO! MS BSS MSC VLR HLR PSTN BILLING STARTS Mobile to Land Sequence
  • 41. MS BSS MSC VLR HLR 1 CHANNEL REQUEST <RACH> <AGCH>DCCH ASSIGN <SDCCH> SIGNALING LINK ESTABLISHED 2 REQ. FOR SERVICE CR CC 3 AUTHENTICATION SET Cipher MODE PSTN Mobile to Land Sequence
  • 42. MS BSS MSC VLR HLR 1 CHANNEL REQUEST <RACH> <AGCH>DCCH ASSIGN <SDCCH> SIGNALING LINK ESTABLISHED 2 REQ. FOR SERVICE CR CC 3 AUTHENTICATION SET Cipher MODE 4 SET-UP <SDCCH> Call Info PSTN SFOC Mobile to Land Sequence
  • 43. MS BSS MSC VLR HLR 1 CHANNEL REQUEST <RACH> <AGCH>DCCH ASSIGN <SDCCH> SIGNALING LINK ESTABLISHED 2 REQ. FOR SERVICE CR CC 3 AUTHENTICATION SET Cipher MODE 4 SET-UP <SDCCH> Call Info 5 EQUIP. ID REQ. PSTN SFOC Mobile to Land Sequence
  • 44. MS BSS MSC VLR HLR 1 CHANNEL REQUEST <RACH> <AGCH>DCCH ASSIGN <SDCCH> SIGNALING LINK ESTABLISHED 2 REQ. FOR SERVICE CR CC 3 AUTHENTICATION SET Cipher MODE 4 SET-UP <SDCCH> Call Info 5 EQUIP. ID REQ. 6 COMPLETE CALL CALL PROCEEDING <SDCCH> PSTN SFOC Mobile to Land Sequence
  • 45. Mobile to Land Sequence 7 ASSIG. COMMAND <SDCCH> ASSIG. COMPLETE circuit<FACCH> MS BSS MSC VLR HLR PSTN
  • 46. 7 ASSIG. COMMAND <SDCCH> ASSIG. COMPLETE Address Complete(ACM) Alerting circuit<FACCH> Initial and Final Address 8 Message (IFAM) MS hears ring tone from land phone <FACCH> MS BSS MSC VLR HLR PSTN Mobile to Land Sequence
  • 47. 7 ASSIG. COMMAND <SDCCH> ASSIG. COMPLETE Address Complete(ACM) Alerting <FACCH> 9 Answer (ANS)Connect circuit<FACCH> Initial and Final Address 8 Message (IFAM) MS hears ring tone from land phone <FACCH> Ring tone stops MS BSS MSC VLR HLR PSTN Mobile to Land Sequence
  • 48. 7 ASSIG. COMMAND <SDCCH> ASSIG. COMPLETE Address Complete(ACM) Alerting <FACCH> 9 Answer (ANS)Connect 10 Connect Acknowledge <FACCH> circuit<FACCH> <TCH> Initial and Final Address 8 Message (IFAM) MS hears ring tone from land phone <FACCH> Ring tone stops HELLO! MS BSS MSC VLR HLR PSTN BILLING STARTS Mobile to Land Sequence
  • 49. GSM Basic Call Sequence For the called party, the flow for the called party begins when MSC sends paging command to the called party, ends when two party start talk. In general, this call flow includes several stages: access process, authentication and ciphering process, TCH assignment process, talk process, release process.
  • 50. MS BSS MSC VLR HLR GMSC (MSISDN) (MSISDN)(IMSI) (MSRN) (MSRN) (LAI & TMSI) (TMSI)(TMSI) Initial and Final 1 Address Message PSTN (MSRN) (MSRN) 2 Send Routing Info 3 Routing Info Ack Initial and Final Address Message 4 Send Info For I/C Call Setup 5 Page Paging Request <PCH> Land to Mobile Sequence
  • 51. <FACCH> (channel) (circuit) <FACCH> 9 Assignment Command Assignment Complete Alert <TCH> <FACCH>10 Connect Connect ACK ANS <TCH> Hello... Address Complete MS BSS MSC VLR HLR GMSC PSTN Billing starts Ring Tone at the land phone Ringing stops at land phoneSubscriber picks up Land to Mobile Sequence
  • 52. Attacks on GSM OSMOCOMBB sniffing MIMT attack on call MIMT attack on SMS Attack using data card ……… ….. … .. .