SlideShare a Scribd company logo
The Onion Router
How Works?
BMS College of Engineering, Bangalore
By :- ONKAR BADIGER
Overview How TOR works?
• Why use TOR?
• Places of attack
• Anonymity network(TOR design)
• Chain of relays
• Encryption
• Bridges
• Extensions
• https everywhere
• Tor button
• Noscript
Why use TOR?
• Compromised ISP
• Monitoring ISP
• Monitored website
• Monitored network
• Filtered website(blocked)
ISP Destination
(website)
This is how we connect to internet
ISP
Destination
(website)
Anonymity network
Anonymity network must be between ISP and our destination
ISP
Destination
(website)
Anonymity network
Places of attack
Compromised ISP(untrusted ISP)
Monitored ISP
ISP
Destination
(website)
Anonymity network
Places of attack
Control parts of anonymity network may attack
ISP
Destination
(website)
Anonymity network
Places of attack
Website is monitoring to
advertise, collect data
etc.
Anonymity network Proxy? VPN?
RELAY
Anonymity network Proxy? VPN?
RELAY
TRUST
?
A
T
T
A
C
K
E
R
A
T
T
A
C
K
E
R
RELAY 1
RELAY 2
RELAY 3
ISP
TOR network
Can we trust relays?
RELAY 1
RELAY 2
RELAY 3
ISP
TOR network
What if entry/guard relay is corrupt?
RELAY 1
RELAY 2
RELAY 3
ISP
TOR network
What if exit relay is corrupt?
RELAY 1
RELAY 2
RELAY 3
ISP
TOR network
What if both entry & exit relay are corrupt?
Solution?
RELAY 1
RELAY 5
RELAY 2
RELAY 4
RELAY 3
ISP
TOR network
RELAY 7
RELAY 6 RELAY 8
RELAY 1
RELAY 5
RELAY 2
RELAY 4
RELAY 3
ISP
TOR network
KEY
KEY
KEY
Solution?
ENCRYPTION
RELAY 1
RELAY 5
RELAY 2
RELAY 4
RELAY 3
ISP
TOR network
KEY
KEY
KEY
unencrypted
https everywhere
RELAY
1
RELAY
5
RELAY
2
RELAY
4
RELAY
3
IS
P
TOR networkKE
Y
KE
Y
KE
Y unencrypte
d
How TOR manages relaying?
Tor button
Tor button
New tor circuit
Tor button is not all about relaying!
Tor button Not just relaying!
Security
Tor button Not just relaying!
Security
Bridges ?
• Entry relays
• Not listed in main TOR directory
Why use Bridges ?
• ISP blocks TOR
• You don’t want ISP to know that you are using TOR
Types of Bridges ?
Preconfigured bridge
Custom bridge
Tor button Not just relaying!
Network settings
Tor button Not just relaying!
Network settings
https://bridges.torproject.org/
bridges@torproject.org
No script
Blocks JavaScript
Blocks java
Blacks flash
Blocks other plugins
Protects against clickjacking
How TOR works?
• Why use TOR?
• Places of attack
• Anonymity network(TOR design)
• Chain of relays
• Encryption
• Bridges
• Extensions
• https everywhere
• Tor button
• Noscript
Check these out…
• How to setup tor relay?
• How to setup non exit tor relay?
• ORBOT (TOR for android)
• TAILS (live OS routed through TOR)
• Pluggable transports(fakes innocent traffic)
• Unblock TOR in college!
The Onion Router
Source : https://www.torproject.org/docs/documentation.html.en
ONKAR BADIGER

More Related Content

What's hot

Darknets - Introduction & Deanonymization of Tor Users By Hitesh Bhatia
Darknets - Introduction &  Deanonymization of Tor Users By Hitesh BhatiaDarknets - Introduction &  Deanonymization of Tor Users By Hitesh Bhatia
Darknets - Introduction & Deanonymization of Tor Users By Hitesh Bhatia
OWASP Delhi
 
ONION Routing - Jovial learning
ONION Routing - Jovial learningONION Routing - Jovial learning
ONION Routing - Jovial learning
Prasanna Shanmugasundaram
 
Tor
TorTor
Anonymity Systems: Tor
Anonymity Systems: TorAnonymity Systems: Tor
Anonymity Systems: Tor
antitree
 
Anonymous Connections And Onion Routing
Anonymous Connections And Onion RoutingAnonymous Connections And Onion Routing
Anonymous Connections And Onion RoutingAli Habeeb
 
Tor
TorTor
Tor Network
Tor NetworkTor Network
The Onion Routing (TOR)
The Onion Routing (TOR)The Onion Routing (TOR)
The Onion Routing (TOR)
Amrit Khandelwal
 
Anonymous Security Scanning and Browsing
Anonymous Security Scanning and BrowsingAnonymous Security Scanning and Browsing
Anonymous Security Scanning and Browsing
Abhilash Venkata
 
(130727) #fitalk anonymous network concepts and implementation
(130727) #fitalk   anonymous network concepts and implementation(130727) #fitalk   anonymous network concepts and implementation
(130727) #fitalk anonymous network concepts and implementation
INSIGHT FORENSIC
 
DEF CON 27 - ROGER DINGLEDINE -tor censorship arms race
DEF CON 27 - ROGER DINGLEDINE -tor censorship arms raceDEF CON 27 - ROGER DINGLEDINE -tor censorship arms race
DEF CON 27 - ROGER DINGLEDINE -tor censorship arms race
Felipe Prado
 
osint + python: extracting information from tor network and darkweb
osint + python: extracting information from tor network and darkweb osint + python: extracting information from tor network and darkweb
osint + python: extracting information from tor network and darkweb
Jose Manuel Ortega Candel
 
Anonymous traffic network
Anonymous traffic networkAnonymous traffic network
Anonymous traffic network
Apurv Singh Gautam
 
Week14_Web_Presentation
Week14_Web_PresentationWeek14_Web_Presentation
Week14_Web_Presentationguestb64a7e
 
Darkweb + Python: discover, analyze and extract information from hidden services
Darkweb + Python: discover, analyze and extract information from hidden servicesDarkweb + Python: discover, analyze and extract information from hidden services
Darkweb + Python: discover, analyze and extract information from hidden services
Jose Manuel Ortega Candel
 
Firewall
FirewallFirewall
Firewalllyndyv
 
Information security using onion routing(tor)
Information security using onion routing(tor)Information security using onion routing(tor)
Information security using onion routing(tor)
Kaustubh Joshi
 
Weaponization of IoT
Weaponization of IoTWeaponization of IoT
Weaponization of IoT
Jose L. Quiñones-Borrero
 

What's hot (18)

Darknets - Introduction & Deanonymization of Tor Users By Hitesh Bhatia
Darknets - Introduction &  Deanonymization of Tor Users By Hitesh BhatiaDarknets - Introduction &  Deanonymization of Tor Users By Hitesh Bhatia
Darknets - Introduction & Deanonymization of Tor Users By Hitesh Bhatia
 
ONION Routing - Jovial learning
ONION Routing - Jovial learningONION Routing - Jovial learning
ONION Routing - Jovial learning
 
Tor
TorTor
Tor
 
Anonymity Systems: Tor
Anonymity Systems: TorAnonymity Systems: Tor
Anonymity Systems: Tor
 
Anonymous Connections And Onion Routing
Anonymous Connections And Onion RoutingAnonymous Connections And Onion Routing
Anonymous Connections And Onion Routing
 
Tor
TorTor
Tor
 
Tor Network
Tor NetworkTor Network
Tor Network
 
The Onion Routing (TOR)
The Onion Routing (TOR)The Onion Routing (TOR)
The Onion Routing (TOR)
 
Anonymous Security Scanning and Browsing
Anonymous Security Scanning and BrowsingAnonymous Security Scanning and Browsing
Anonymous Security Scanning and Browsing
 
(130727) #fitalk anonymous network concepts and implementation
(130727) #fitalk   anonymous network concepts and implementation(130727) #fitalk   anonymous network concepts and implementation
(130727) #fitalk anonymous network concepts and implementation
 
DEF CON 27 - ROGER DINGLEDINE -tor censorship arms race
DEF CON 27 - ROGER DINGLEDINE -tor censorship arms raceDEF CON 27 - ROGER DINGLEDINE -tor censorship arms race
DEF CON 27 - ROGER DINGLEDINE -tor censorship arms race
 
osint + python: extracting information from tor network and darkweb
osint + python: extracting information from tor network and darkweb osint + python: extracting information from tor network and darkweb
osint + python: extracting information from tor network and darkweb
 
Anonymous traffic network
Anonymous traffic networkAnonymous traffic network
Anonymous traffic network
 
Week14_Web_Presentation
Week14_Web_PresentationWeek14_Web_Presentation
Week14_Web_Presentation
 
Darkweb + Python: discover, analyze and extract information from hidden services
Darkweb + Python: discover, analyze and extract information from hidden servicesDarkweb + Python: discover, analyze and extract information from hidden services
Darkweb + Python: discover, analyze and extract information from hidden services
 
Firewall
FirewallFirewall
Firewall
 
Information security using onion routing(tor)
Information security using onion routing(tor)Information security using onion routing(tor)
Information security using onion routing(tor)
 
Weaponization of IoT
Weaponization of IoTWeaponization of IoT
Weaponization of IoT
 

Viewers also liked

TOR NETWORK
TOR NETWORKTOR NETWORK
TOR NETWORK
Rishikese MR
 
Tor Presentation
Tor PresentationTor Presentation
Tor Presentation
Hassan Faraz
 
Onion routing and tor: Fundamentals and Anonymity
Onion routing and tor: Fundamentals and AnonymityOnion routing and tor: Fundamentals and Anonymity
Onion routing and tor: Fundamentals and Anonymity
anurag singh
 
Tor: The Second Generation Onion Router
Tor: The Second Generation Onion RouterTor: The Second Generation Onion Router
Tor: The Second Generation Onion Router
Mohammed Bharmal
 
Onion network architecture
Onion network architectureOnion network architecture
Onion network architecture
mahdi ataeyan
 
Introduction to anonymity network tor
Introduction to anonymity network torIntroduction to anonymity network tor
Introduction to anonymity network tor
Khaled Mosharraf
 
Dependency Injection або Don’t call me, I’ll call you
Dependency Injection або Don’t call me, I’ll call youDependency Injection або Don’t call me, I’ll call you
Dependency Injection або Don’t call me, I’ll call youDmytro Mindra
 
Tor
TorTor
Advanced penetration testing - Amarendra Godbole
Advanced penetration testing - Amarendra GodboleAdvanced penetration testing - Amarendra Godbole
Advanced penetration testing - Amarendra Godbole
IndicThreads
 
Collaboration, Big Data and the search for the Higgs Boson
Collaboration, Big Data and the  search for the Higgs BosonCollaboration, Big Data and the  search for the Higgs Boson
Collaboration, Big Data and the search for the Higgs BosonSuma Pria Tunggal
 
Hacking Tor ( How does Tor work ?)
Hacking Tor ( How does Tor work ?)Hacking Tor ( How does Tor work ?)
Hacking Tor ( How does Tor work ?)
Saprative Jana
 
Easiest way to start with Shell scripting
Easiest way to start with Shell scriptingEasiest way to start with Shell scripting
Easiest way to start with Shell scripting
Akshay Siwal
 
Anti tree firesheep
Anti tree firesheepAnti tree firesheep
Anti tree firesheep
antitree
 
Onion architecture
Onion architectureOnion architecture
Onion architecture
Vidyasagar Machupalli
 
Tor network seminar by 13504
Tor network seminar  by 13504 Tor network seminar  by 13504
Tor network seminar by 13504
Prashant Rana
 
Vodafone beta factory - GEC 2015
Vodafone beta factory - GEC 2015Vodafone beta factory - GEC 2015
Vodafone beta factory - GEC 2015
Marcello Viti
 
I2P (Invisible Internet Project)
I2P (Invisible Internet Project)I2P (Invisible Internet Project)
I2P (Invisible Internet Project)
Shail Shah
 
Onion Architecture with S#arp
Onion Architecture with S#arpOnion Architecture with S#arp
Onion Architecture with S#arp
Gary Pedretti
 
TDC 2016 - Desvendando o Onion Architecture
TDC 2016 - Desvendando o Onion ArchitectureTDC 2016 - Desvendando o Onion Architecture
TDC 2016 - Desvendando o Onion Architecture
Wildtech
 
Secure Shell - a Presentation on Ethical Hacking
Secure Shell - a Presentation on Ethical HackingSecure Shell - a Presentation on Ethical Hacking
Secure Shell - a Presentation on Ethical Hacking
Nitish Kasar
 

Viewers also liked (20)

TOR NETWORK
TOR NETWORKTOR NETWORK
TOR NETWORK
 
Tor Presentation
Tor PresentationTor Presentation
Tor Presentation
 
Onion routing and tor: Fundamentals and Anonymity
Onion routing and tor: Fundamentals and AnonymityOnion routing and tor: Fundamentals and Anonymity
Onion routing and tor: Fundamentals and Anonymity
 
Tor: The Second Generation Onion Router
Tor: The Second Generation Onion RouterTor: The Second Generation Onion Router
Tor: The Second Generation Onion Router
 
Onion network architecture
Onion network architectureOnion network architecture
Onion network architecture
 
Introduction to anonymity network tor
Introduction to anonymity network torIntroduction to anonymity network tor
Introduction to anonymity network tor
 
Dependency Injection або Don’t call me, I’ll call you
Dependency Injection або Don’t call me, I’ll call youDependency Injection або Don’t call me, I’ll call you
Dependency Injection або Don’t call me, I’ll call you
 
Tor
TorTor
Tor
 
Advanced penetration testing - Amarendra Godbole
Advanced penetration testing - Amarendra GodboleAdvanced penetration testing - Amarendra Godbole
Advanced penetration testing - Amarendra Godbole
 
Collaboration, Big Data and the search for the Higgs Boson
Collaboration, Big Data and the  search for the Higgs BosonCollaboration, Big Data and the  search for the Higgs Boson
Collaboration, Big Data and the search for the Higgs Boson
 
Hacking Tor ( How does Tor work ?)
Hacking Tor ( How does Tor work ?)Hacking Tor ( How does Tor work ?)
Hacking Tor ( How does Tor work ?)
 
Easiest way to start with Shell scripting
Easiest way to start with Shell scriptingEasiest way to start with Shell scripting
Easiest way to start with Shell scripting
 
Anti tree firesheep
Anti tree firesheepAnti tree firesheep
Anti tree firesheep
 
Onion architecture
Onion architectureOnion architecture
Onion architecture
 
Tor network seminar by 13504
Tor network seminar  by 13504 Tor network seminar  by 13504
Tor network seminar by 13504
 
Vodafone beta factory - GEC 2015
Vodafone beta factory - GEC 2015Vodafone beta factory - GEC 2015
Vodafone beta factory - GEC 2015
 
I2P (Invisible Internet Project)
I2P (Invisible Internet Project)I2P (Invisible Internet Project)
I2P (Invisible Internet Project)
 
Onion Architecture with S#arp
Onion Architecture with S#arpOnion Architecture with S#arp
Onion Architecture with S#arp
 
TDC 2016 - Desvendando o Onion Architecture
TDC 2016 - Desvendando o Onion ArchitectureTDC 2016 - Desvendando o Onion Architecture
TDC 2016 - Desvendando o Onion Architecture
 
Secure Shell - a Presentation on Ethical Hacking
Secure Shell - a Presentation on Ethical HackingSecure Shell - a Presentation on Ethical Hacking
Secure Shell - a Presentation on Ethical Hacking
 

Similar to How TOR works?

Anonymity in the web based on routing protocols
Anonymity in the web based on routing protocolsAnonymity in the web based on routing protocols
Anonymity in the web based on routing protocols
Biagio Botticelli
 
SSL overview
SSL overviewSSL overview
Network security basics
Network security basicsNetwork security basics
Network security basics
Skillspire LLC
 
APIdays Barcelona 2019 - Introduction to Onion Services to secure APIs with P...
APIdays Barcelona 2019 - Introduction to Onion Services to secure APIs with P...APIdays Barcelona 2019 - Introduction to Onion Services to secure APIs with P...
APIdays Barcelona 2019 - Introduction to Onion Services to secure APIs with P...
apidays
 
ProjectTox: Free as in freedom Skype replacement
ProjectTox: Free as in freedom Skype replacementProjectTox: Free as in freedom Skype replacement
ProjectTox: Free as in freedom Skype replacement
Wei-Ning Huang
 
Attack all the layers secure 360
Attack all the layers secure 360Attack all the layers secure 360
Attack all the layers secure 360
Scott Sutherland
 
Tor network
Tor networkTor network
Tor network
Jyaasa Technologies
 
Setting Up .Onion Addresses for your Enterprise, v3.5
Setting Up .Onion Addresses for your Enterprise, v3.5Setting Up .Onion Addresses for your Enterprise, v3.5
Setting Up .Onion Addresses for your Enterprise, v3.5
Alec Muffett
 
Anonymity Network TOR
Anonymity Network TOR Anonymity Network TOR
Anonymity Network TOR
A.K.M Bahalul Haque Pallob
 
Acpe 2014 Internet Anonymity Using Tor
Acpe 2014  Internet Anonymity Using TorAcpe 2014  Internet Anonymity Using Tor
Acpe 2014 Internet Anonymity Using Tor
Jack Maynard
 
Unified Threat Management
Unified Threat ManagementUnified Threat Management
Unified Threat Management
Tapas Shome
 
Linux routing and firewall for beginners
Linux   routing and firewall for beginnersLinux   routing and firewall for beginners
Linux routing and firewall for beginners
n|u - The Open Security Community
 
Guide to protecting networks - Eric Vanderburg
Guide to protecting networks - Eric VanderburgGuide to protecting networks - Eric Vanderburg
Guide to protecting networks - Eric Vanderburg
Eric Vanderburg
 
Luminati presentation
Luminati presentationLuminati presentation
Luminati presentation
Amir Gershon
 
Spectre coin
Spectre coinSpectre coin
Spectre coin
faraz Safarpour
 
Why and How to use Onion Networking - #EMFCamp2018
Why and How to use Onion Networking - #EMFCamp2018Why and How to use Onion Networking - #EMFCamp2018
Why and How to use Onion Networking - #EMFCamp2018
Alec Muffett
 
Trick or XFLTReaT a.k.a. Tunnel All The Things
Trick or XFLTReaT a.k.a. Tunnel All The ThingsTrick or XFLTReaT a.k.a. Tunnel All The Things
Trick or XFLTReaT a.k.a. Tunnel All The Things
Balazs Bucsay
 
Kerberos
KerberosKerberos
Kerberos
Prafull Johri
 
When DevOps and Networking Intersect by Brent Salisbury of socketplane.io
When DevOps and Networking Intersect by Brent Salisbury of socketplane.ioWhen DevOps and Networking Intersect by Brent Salisbury of socketplane.io
When DevOps and Networking Intersect by Brent Salisbury of socketplane.io
DevOps4Networks
 
Workshop on Network Security
Workshop on Network SecurityWorkshop on Network Security
Workshop on Network Security
UC San Diego
 

Similar to How TOR works? (20)

Anonymity in the web based on routing protocols
Anonymity in the web based on routing protocolsAnonymity in the web based on routing protocols
Anonymity in the web based on routing protocols
 
SSL overview
SSL overviewSSL overview
SSL overview
 
Network security basics
Network security basicsNetwork security basics
Network security basics
 
APIdays Barcelona 2019 - Introduction to Onion Services to secure APIs with P...
APIdays Barcelona 2019 - Introduction to Onion Services to secure APIs with P...APIdays Barcelona 2019 - Introduction to Onion Services to secure APIs with P...
APIdays Barcelona 2019 - Introduction to Onion Services to secure APIs with P...
 
ProjectTox: Free as in freedom Skype replacement
ProjectTox: Free as in freedom Skype replacementProjectTox: Free as in freedom Skype replacement
ProjectTox: Free as in freedom Skype replacement
 
Attack all the layers secure 360
Attack all the layers secure 360Attack all the layers secure 360
Attack all the layers secure 360
 
Tor network
Tor networkTor network
Tor network
 
Setting Up .Onion Addresses for your Enterprise, v3.5
Setting Up .Onion Addresses for your Enterprise, v3.5Setting Up .Onion Addresses for your Enterprise, v3.5
Setting Up .Onion Addresses for your Enterprise, v3.5
 
Anonymity Network TOR
Anonymity Network TOR Anonymity Network TOR
Anonymity Network TOR
 
Acpe 2014 Internet Anonymity Using Tor
Acpe 2014  Internet Anonymity Using TorAcpe 2014  Internet Anonymity Using Tor
Acpe 2014 Internet Anonymity Using Tor
 
Unified Threat Management
Unified Threat ManagementUnified Threat Management
Unified Threat Management
 
Linux routing and firewall for beginners
Linux   routing and firewall for beginnersLinux   routing and firewall for beginners
Linux routing and firewall for beginners
 
Guide to protecting networks - Eric Vanderburg
Guide to protecting networks - Eric VanderburgGuide to protecting networks - Eric Vanderburg
Guide to protecting networks - Eric Vanderburg
 
Luminati presentation
Luminati presentationLuminati presentation
Luminati presentation
 
Spectre coin
Spectre coinSpectre coin
Spectre coin
 
Why and How to use Onion Networking - #EMFCamp2018
Why and How to use Onion Networking - #EMFCamp2018Why and How to use Onion Networking - #EMFCamp2018
Why and How to use Onion Networking - #EMFCamp2018
 
Trick or XFLTReaT a.k.a. Tunnel All The Things
Trick or XFLTReaT a.k.a. Tunnel All The ThingsTrick or XFLTReaT a.k.a. Tunnel All The Things
Trick or XFLTReaT a.k.a. Tunnel All The Things
 
Kerberos
KerberosKerberos
Kerberos
 
When DevOps and Networking Intersect by Brent Salisbury of socketplane.io
When DevOps and Networking Intersect by Brent Salisbury of socketplane.ioWhen DevOps and Networking Intersect by Brent Salisbury of socketplane.io
When DevOps and Networking Intersect by Brent Salisbury of socketplane.io
 
Workshop on Network Security
Workshop on Network SecurityWorkshop on Network Security
Workshop on Network Security
 

Recently uploaded

Introduction to CHERI technology - Cybersecurity
Introduction to CHERI technology - CybersecurityIntroduction to CHERI technology - Cybersecurity
Introduction to CHERI technology - Cybersecurity
mikeeftimakis1
 
GridMate - End to end testing is a critical piece to ensure quality and avoid...
GridMate - End to end testing is a critical piece to ensure quality and avoid...GridMate - End to end testing is a critical piece to ensure quality and avoid...
GridMate - End to end testing is a critical piece to ensure quality and avoid...
ThomasParaiso2
 
20240605 QFM017 Machine Intelligence Reading List May 2024
20240605 QFM017 Machine Intelligence Reading List May 202420240605 QFM017 Machine Intelligence Reading List May 2024
20240605 QFM017 Machine Intelligence Reading List May 2024
Matthew Sinclair
 
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: FIDO Security Aspects.pdf
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: FIDO Security Aspects.pdfFIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: FIDO Security Aspects.pdf
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: FIDO Security Aspects.pdf
FIDO Alliance
 
UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 4
UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 4UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 4
UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 4
DianaGray10
 
GraphRAG is All You need? LLM & Knowledge Graph
GraphRAG is All You need? LLM & Knowledge GraphGraphRAG is All You need? LLM & Knowledge Graph
GraphRAG is All You need? LLM & Knowledge Graph
Guy Korland
 
GraphSummit Singapore | The Future of Agility: Supercharging Digital Transfor...
GraphSummit Singapore | The Future of Agility: Supercharging Digital Transfor...GraphSummit Singapore | The Future of Agility: Supercharging Digital Transfor...
GraphSummit Singapore | The Future of Agility: Supercharging Digital Transfor...
Neo4j
 
Removing Uninteresting Bytes in Software Fuzzing
Removing Uninteresting Bytes in Software FuzzingRemoving Uninteresting Bytes in Software Fuzzing
Removing Uninteresting Bytes in Software Fuzzing
Aftab Hussain
 
Why You Should Replace Windows 11 with Nitrux Linux 3.5.0 for enhanced perfor...
Why You Should Replace Windows 11 with Nitrux Linux 3.5.0 for enhanced perfor...Why You Should Replace Windows 11 with Nitrux Linux 3.5.0 for enhanced perfor...
Why You Should Replace Windows 11 with Nitrux Linux 3.5.0 for enhanced perfor...
SOFTTECHHUB
 
Pushing the limits of ePRTC: 100ns holdover for 100 days
Pushing the limits of ePRTC: 100ns holdover for 100 daysPushing the limits of ePRTC: 100ns holdover for 100 days
Pushing the limits of ePRTC: 100ns holdover for 100 days
Adtran
 
Transcript: Selling digital books in 2024: Insights from industry leaders - T...
Transcript: Selling digital books in 2024: Insights from industry leaders - T...Transcript: Selling digital books in 2024: Insights from industry leaders - T...
Transcript: Selling digital books in 2024: Insights from industry leaders - T...
BookNet Canada
 
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: Passkeys and the Road Ahead.pdf
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: Passkeys and the Road Ahead.pdfFIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: Passkeys and the Road Ahead.pdf
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: Passkeys and the Road Ahead.pdf
FIDO Alliance
 
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: The WebAuthn API and Discoverable Credentials.pdf
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: The WebAuthn API and Discoverable Credentials.pdfFIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: The WebAuthn API and Discoverable Credentials.pdf
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: The WebAuthn API and Discoverable Credentials.pdf
FIDO Alliance
 
By Design, not by Accident - Agile Venture Bolzano 2024
By Design, not by Accident - Agile Venture Bolzano 2024By Design, not by Accident - Agile Venture Bolzano 2024
By Design, not by Accident - Agile Venture Bolzano 2024
Pierluigi Pugliese
 
Secstrike : Reverse Engineering & Pwnable tools for CTF.pptx
Secstrike : Reverse Engineering & Pwnable tools for CTF.pptxSecstrike : Reverse Engineering & Pwnable tools for CTF.pptx
Secstrike : Reverse Engineering & Pwnable tools for CTF.pptx
nkrafacyberclub
 
National Security Agency - NSA mobile device best practices
National Security Agency - NSA mobile device best practicesNational Security Agency - NSA mobile device best practices
National Security Agency - NSA mobile device best practices
Quotidiano Piemontese
 
Climate Impact of Software Testing at Nordic Testing Days
Climate Impact of Software Testing at Nordic Testing DaysClimate Impact of Software Testing at Nordic Testing Days
Climate Impact of Software Testing at Nordic Testing Days
Kari Kakkonen
 
GDG Cloud Southlake #33: Boule & Rebala: Effective AppSec in SDLC using Deplo...
GDG Cloud Southlake #33: Boule & Rebala: Effective AppSec in SDLC using Deplo...GDG Cloud Southlake #33: Boule & Rebala: Effective AppSec in SDLC using Deplo...
GDG Cloud Southlake #33: Boule & Rebala: Effective AppSec in SDLC using Deplo...
James Anderson
 
GraphSummit Singapore | The Art of the Possible with Graph - Q2 2024
GraphSummit Singapore | The Art of the  Possible with Graph - Q2 2024GraphSummit Singapore | The Art of the  Possible with Graph - Q2 2024
GraphSummit Singapore | The Art of the Possible with Graph - Q2 2024
Neo4j
 
The Future of Platform Engineering
The Future of Platform EngineeringThe Future of Platform Engineering
The Future of Platform Engineering
Jemma Hussein Allen
 

Recently uploaded (20)

Introduction to CHERI technology - Cybersecurity
Introduction to CHERI technology - CybersecurityIntroduction to CHERI technology - Cybersecurity
Introduction to CHERI technology - Cybersecurity
 
GridMate - End to end testing is a critical piece to ensure quality and avoid...
GridMate - End to end testing is a critical piece to ensure quality and avoid...GridMate - End to end testing is a critical piece to ensure quality and avoid...
GridMate - End to end testing is a critical piece to ensure quality and avoid...
 
20240605 QFM017 Machine Intelligence Reading List May 2024
20240605 QFM017 Machine Intelligence Reading List May 202420240605 QFM017 Machine Intelligence Reading List May 2024
20240605 QFM017 Machine Intelligence Reading List May 2024
 
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: FIDO Security Aspects.pdf
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: FIDO Security Aspects.pdfFIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: FIDO Security Aspects.pdf
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: FIDO Security Aspects.pdf
 
UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 4
UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 4UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 4
UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 4
 
GraphRAG is All You need? LLM & Knowledge Graph
GraphRAG is All You need? LLM & Knowledge GraphGraphRAG is All You need? LLM & Knowledge Graph
GraphRAG is All You need? LLM & Knowledge Graph
 
GraphSummit Singapore | The Future of Agility: Supercharging Digital Transfor...
GraphSummit Singapore | The Future of Agility: Supercharging Digital Transfor...GraphSummit Singapore | The Future of Agility: Supercharging Digital Transfor...
GraphSummit Singapore | The Future of Agility: Supercharging Digital Transfor...
 
Removing Uninteresting Bytes in Software Fuzzing
Removing Uninteresting Bytes in Software FuzzingRemoving Uninteresting Bytes in Software Fuzzing
Removing Uninteresting Bytes in Software Fuzzing
 
Why You Should Replace Windows 11 with Nitrux Linux 3.5.0 for enhanced perfor...
Why You Should Replace Windows 11 with Nitrux Linux 3.5.0 for enhanced perfor...Why You Should Replace Windows 11 with Nitrux Linux 3.5.0 for enhanced perfor...
Why You Should Replace Windows 11 with Nitrux Linux 3.5.0 for enhanced perfor...
 
Pushing the limits of ePRTC: 100ns holdover for 100 days
Pushing the limits of ePRTC: 100ns holdover for 100 daysPushing the limits of ePRTC: 100ns holdover for 100 days
Pushing the limits of ePRTC: 100ns holdover for 100 days
 
Transcript: Selling digital books in 2024: Insights from industry leaders - T...
Transcript: Selling digital books in 2024: Insights from industry leaders - T...Transcript: Selling digital books in 2024: Insights from industry leaders - T...
Transcript: Selling digital books in 2024: Insights from industry leaders - T...
 
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: Passkeys and the Road Ahead.pdf
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: Passkeys and the Road Ahead.pdfFIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: Passkeys and the Road Ahead.pdf
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: Passkeys and the Road Ahead.pdf
 
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: The WebAuthn API and Discoverable Credentials.pdf
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: The WebAuthn API and Discoverable Credentials.pdfFIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: The WebAuthn API and Discoverable Credentials.pdf
FIDO Alliance Osaka Seminar: The WebAuthn API and Discoverable Credentials.pdf
 
By Design, not by Accident - Agile Venture Bolzano 2024
By Design, not by Accident - Agile Venture Bolzano 2024By Design, not by Accident - Agile Venture Bolzano 2024
By Design, not by Accident - Agile Venture Bolzano 2024
 
Secstrike : Reverse Engineering & Pwnable tools for CTF.pptx
Secstrike : Reverse Engineering & Pwnable tools for CTF.pptxSecstrike : Reverse Engineering & Pwnable tools for CTF.pptx
Secstrike : Reverse Engineering & Pwnable tools for CTF.pptx
 
National Security Agency - NSA mobile device best practices
National Security Agency - NSA mobile device best practicesNational Security Agency - NSA mobile device best practices
National Security Agency - NSA mobile device best practices
 
Climate Impact of Software Testing at Nordic Testing Days
Climate Impact of Software Testing at Nordic Testing DaysClimate Impact of Software Testing at Nordic Testing Days
Climate Impact of Software Testing at Nordic Testing Days
 
GDG Cloud Southlake #33: Boule & Rebala: Effective AppSec in SDLC using Deplo...
GDG Cloud Southlake #33: Boule & Rebala: Effective AppSec in SDLC using Deplo...GDG Cloud Southlake #33: Boule & Rebala: Effective AppSec in SDLC using Deplo...
GDG Cloud Southlake #33: Boule & Rebala: Effective AppSec in SDLC using Deplo...
 
GraphSummit Singapore | The Art of the Possible with Graph - Q2 2024
GraphSummit Singapore | The Art of the  Possible with Graph - Q2 2024GraphSummit Singapore | The Art of the  Possible with Graph - Q2 2024
GraphSummit Singapore | The Art of the Possible with Graph - Q2 2024
 
The Future of Platform Engineering
The Future of Platform EngineeringThe Future of Platform Engineering
The Future of Platform Engineering
 

How TOR works?

Editor's Notes

  1. Tor is an anonymity tool used by those who want to stay private and uncensored when browsing the Internet. Based on Firefox
  2. In this presentation we will learn why there is need to use TOR(to be anonymous , but what really being anonymous means?) To know how TOR works we should know how it was designed based on the places where an attacker can attack Designing tor includes relay chain, encryption, bridges and use of extensions to carry out these operations Lastly we will into .onion websites(accessing deep websites)
  3. 1 ISP may steal your traffic and sell to others 2 Govt. may have asked ISP to monitor your network 3 Website you visit analysis data(your choices) to advertise 4 Your whole network may be monitored by some agency 5 Website you want to visit maybe blocked by national firewall
  4. Server logs everything Even if data is encrypted they can determine which pc is connecting to which website by data time analysis Data flows through single sever
  5. Server logs everything Even if data is encrypted they can determine which pc is connecting to which website by data time analysis Data flows through single sever
  6. Relay knows my pc is connecting to website Even if any other data analyzer watches data coming in and going out he can determine that which data is coming from which pc and going to which website
  7. Tor uses three relays R1 guard relay – are stable , have high bandwidth R2 middle relay –middle nodes used to transport traffic from the guard relay to the exit relay. This prevents the guard and exit relay from knowing each other. R3 exit relay-send traffic to the final destination intended by the client.
  8. Corrupt R1 can see data is coming from my pc but cant tell where it is going(it knows data is going to R2 but R2 is not destination of my pc)
  9. Corrupt R3 can see data is going to a website but cant tell where it is coming from
  10. If R1 and R3 collaborate then we are screwed R1 knows that my pc is connected to it R3 knows that it is connecting to website Both know they are connected to R2
  11. One possible solution is that there must be large number of relays so that the possibility of two corrupt relays to be through same network is very low And TOR has it!
  12. Tor browser on my pc encrypts data thrice which have three keys to decrypt R1 gets session key 1 decrypts it and sends to R2 Similarly this happens for R2 and R3 Since the data entering and leaving a relay is different , full circuit analysis is not possible
  13. Now we know that tor button does the relaying part. But what about the data leaving from exit relay? Its unencrypted Exit relay can determine the content of data
  14. To make the data leaving from exit relay to be secured tor uses https everywhere extension https everywhere automatically uses https security on many sites
  15. Tor button configures how tor connects to web Relay connections Security Allows to configure connection settings
  16. Tor button forms a tor circuit , connects you to random relays present in its directory 1)New tor circuit for this site provides a new set of relays but with the same guard/entry relay 2)New identity restarts tor browser and gives a new set of all three relays
  17. Its found that you are connected to the same guard/entry relay on a web browsing session Tor will reuse the same circuit for new TCP streams for 10 minutes, as long as the circuit is working fine. (If the circuit fails, Tor will switch to a new circuit immediately.)
  18. Security Allows to configure connection settings
  19. Security Allows to configure connection settings
  20. Bridges are entry relays that are not listed in the main TOR directory
  21. Bridges are entry relays that are not listed in the main TOR directory 1)Useful if ISP is filtering TOR relays 2)By comparing the IP address you are connecting to(entry relay) in the relay list they can determine that you are using TOR Since bridges are not listed in relay list they cant tell that you are using TOR
  22. Bridges which are preconfigured and provided with Tor Browser Custom bridges
  23. ISP may have blocked your access to tor by adding all the available relay list to their block list Option 1)Use bridges-provided bridges or custom bridges Option 2)If ISP got list of all publically available bridges then use proxy before TOR network
  24. The NoScript Firefox extension provides extra protection for Mozilla-based browsers: this free, open source add-on allows JavaScript, java, flash and other plugins to be executed only by trusted web sites of your choice (e.g. your online bank).
  25. What we learnt
  26. Thankyou