OverviewAnonymity systemsReview of how Tor worksTor Project Inc.Helper tools and accessoriesAdvanced Tor controlAttack Vectors
Anonymity SystemsJAPI2PFreenetXerobankBotnets
FreenetStorage network p2p basedShares files on your system to other nodesPlausabile Deniability
I2POpposing design of TorUDP basedDarknet design Java, Python, and C API’sMixed routing based on packetsSplits tunneling between upstream and downstream“Garlic Routing” – mix streams together to prevent traffic analysisVariable latency design
TorTor (not TOR) – previously stood for The Onion RouterProvides a method of anonymity by passing data between proxies
Tor Network
TerminologyCell – your messageCircuit – tunnel made up of relaysEntry Node: first hop into the Tor networkExit Node: last hop before destinationRelay Node: middle hopBridge Node: nodes not listed in the Tor directory to evade filtering
Who’s Using Tor?WhistleblowersWikileaks – runs hidden serviceMilitariesfield opscommand and control using hidden servicesChinese journalists and dissidents
Tor Project501(c)(3) NFPFreely availableFull spec and full documentation
Project Financeshttps://www.torproject.org/about/financials.html
Current Project SponsorsFederal Grant: International Program to Support Democracy Human Rights and Labor$632,189International Broadcasting BureauVoice of America, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio and TV Martí, Radio Free Asia, Radio Sawa/Alhurra TV$270,000Stichting.NetAssociation of NFP’s in the Netherlands$38,279Google: $29,083ITT: $27,000Other: $9,997https://www.torproject.org/about/sponsors.html.en
Past FundersDARPA and Naval Research Labratory 2001-2006EFF – 2004-2005
Tor Performance
Number of Relays
Number of Users
Tor ToolsTorbuttonTor Browser BundleVidaliaTorCheckArmTor-ramdiskAnthony G. Basile from Buffalo
Tor Control Portauthenticate "“extendcircuit 0 a,b,c,…extendcircuit 0 a,bseteventscircsetconfconfitemMapaddress google.com=a.bGetconfconfitemTelnet to the control port Create custom circuits (long or short)Show live circuit informationChange configuration on the flyMap a site to an exit nodeReload a configuration
Attacks
Tor Passive Attack VectorsTraffic profiling – entry and exit analysisCleartext exit node transmissionFingerprinting  - OS, browser, configuration, activityTiming correlationNetwork partitioningEnd to end Size correlation
Tor Active Attack VectorsCompromised keysMalicious web serversMalicious Exit/Relay nodesDoS non-controlled nodesTimestamping and taggingInjecting or replacing unencrypted infoMalicious Tor client
Tor Client Side AttacksDNS rebindingDisbanding attack – javascript, java, flashHistory disclosureTimezone information (partitioning)
Social Engineering AttacksGetting more traffic“Use my relay. I have huge tubes!”“Nick’s relay sucks”“I’ve added a feature to my node.”Replacement687474703a2f2f7777772e726f63686573746572323630302e636f6d2f6861782fPartitioning“Don’t use servers from this country”“These servers are amazing!”
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Anonymity Systems: Tor