A HAZOP (Hazard and Operability) study is a systematic technique used to identify potential hazards and operability problems in processes. It involves a team reviewing a process and its design to identify possible deviations from safe operation. The document outlines the HAZOP process including preparation, terminology, meeting procedures, follow up actions and documentation. Key aspects include selecting a team with relevant expertise, gathering process information, using guide words to identify deviations, assessing risks, recommending safeguards, and documenting actions.
A Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study is a systematic technique used to identify potential hazards and operability problems in processes. It involves a multidisciplinary team systematically examining a process or operation using guidewords to identify deviations from the design intent and hazards associated with those deviations. The document provides an overview of HAZOP studies, including their objectives, methodology, terminology, and examples of their application.
This document provides guidelines for conducting Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) studies according to Saudi Aramco's procedures. It describes the basic concepts of HAZOP including identifying how a process may deviate from its design intent. The document outlines the typical steps to conduct a HAZOP study, including defining objectives and scope, assembling a multi-disciplinary team, conducting the study, and documenting results. It also provides guidance on applying HAZOP at different stages of a project from early design to existing operations.
Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) | Gaurav Singh RajputGaurav Singh Rajput
This document provides an overview of Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) studies. It begins with defining what a HAZOP study is, which is a systematic technique used to identify potential hazards and operating problems in industrial processes. The document then discusses the origins and development of HAZOP methodology. It provides details on the objectives, procedures, guidelines and key aspects of conducting a HAZOP study, including dividing the process into sections, using guide words to identify possible deviations, and documenting causes, consequences and recommended actions. Overall, the document serves as an introduction to HAZOP studies, covering their fundamental principles and approaches.
Hazop Fundamentals Online Training iFluidsJohn Kingsley
This document provides an overview of HAZOP (Hazard and Operability) studies. It defines key terms like hazard, risk, and PHA. It explains that a HAZOP is a systematic technique used to identify potential problems in a process. It should be performed by a multidisciplinary team and involves analyzing deviations from the design intent using guidewords at nodes on piping and instrumentation diagrams. The team evaluates causes, consequences and recommends safeguards to address any issues identified.
A Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study is a structured and systematic examination of a planned or existing process or operation in order to identify and evaluate problems that may represent risks to personnel or equipment, or prevent efficient operation.
This document provides an overview of Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA), a semi-quantitative risk assessment tool. LOPA evaluates risk scenarios by analyzing the initiating event frequency, consequence severity if the scenario occurs, and likelihood of failure of independent protection layers. The document discusses how to identify scenarios and protection layers, estimate initiating event frequencies and protection layer failure probabilities, and calculate risk. LOPA is used to determine if sufficient protection layers exist to reduce risk to a tolerable level for a given scenario.
A Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study is a structured technique used to identify potential problems in processes. It involves dividing a system into nodes and having a team apply guide words like "no", "more", "less" to process parameters at each node to identify possible deviations from design intent. The team then analyzes the causes and consequences of deviations and recommends actions. Key aspects of a HAZOP include composing a multidisciplinary team, using guide words and parameters at study nodes, and documenting results in a report with worksheets.
This document provides an overview of Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) studies, which are a technique used to identify potential hazards and operability problems in processes. It describes the origins, purpose, methodology, and typical components of a HAZOP study. Key aspects covered include identifying potential deviations from normal operating conditions using guidewords, determining causes and consequences of deviations, evaluating existing safeguards, and developing recommendations to address identified hazards. The document also outlines the HAZOP process, including defining nodes to segment the system, assigning a team to conduct the study, and systematically analyzing each node using guidewords across parameters.
A Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study is a systematic technique used to identify potential hazards and operability problems in processes. It involves a multidisciplinary team systematically examining a process or operation using guidewords to identify deviations from the design intent and hazards associated with those deviations. The document provides an overview of HAZOP studies, including their objectives, methodology, terminology, and examples of their application.
This document provides guidelines for conducting Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) studies according to Saudi Aramco's procedures. It describes the basic concepts of HAZOP including identifying how a process may deviate from its design intent. The document outlines the typical steps to conduct a HAZOP study, including defining objectives and scope, assembling a multi-disciplinary team, conducting the study, and documenting results. It also provides guidance on applying HAZOP at different stages of a project from early design to existing operations.
Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) | Gaurav Singh RajputGaurav Singh Rajput
This document provides an overview of Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) studies. It begins with defining what a HAZOP study is, which is a systematic technique used to identify potential hazards and operating problems in industrial processes. The document then discusses the origins and development of HAZOP methodology. It provides details on the objectives, procedures, guidelines and key aspects of conducting a HAZOP study, including dividing the process into sections, using guide words to identify possible deviations, and documenting causes, consequences and recommended actions. Overall, the document serves as an introduction to HAZOP studies, covering their fundamental principles and approaches.
Hazop Fundamentals Online Training iFluidsJohn Kingsley
This document provides an overview of HAZOP (Hazard and Operability) studies. It defines key terms like hazard, risk, and PHA. It explains that a HAZOP is a systematic technique used to identify potential problems in a process. It should be performed by a multidisciplinary team and involves analyzing deviations from the design intent using guidewords at nodes on piping and instrumentation diagrams. The team evaluates causes, consequences and recommends safeguards to address any issues identified.
A Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study is a structured and systematic examination of a planned or existing process or operation in order to identify and evaluate problems that may represent risks to personnel or equipment, or prevent efficient operation.
This document provides an overview of Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA), a semi-quantitative risk assessment tool. LOPA evaluates risk scenarios by analyzing the initiating event frequency, consequence severity if the scenario occurs, and likelihood of failure of independent protection layers. The document discusses how to identify scenarios and protection layers, estimate initiating event frequencies and protection layer failure probabilities, and calculate risk. LOPA is used to determine if sufficient protection layers exist to reduce risk to a tolerable level for a given scenario.
A Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study is a structured technique used to identify potential problems in processes. It involves dividing a system into nodes and having a team apply guide words like "no", "more", "less" to process parameters at each node to identify possible deviations from design intent. The team then analyzes the causes and consequences of deviations and recommends actions. Key aspects of a HAZOP include composing a multidisciplinary team, using guide words and parameters at study nodes, and documenting results in a report with worksheets.
This document provides an overview of Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) studies, which are a technique used to identify potential hazards and operability problems in processes. It describes the origins, purpose, methodology, and typical components of a HAZOP study. Key aspects covered include identifying potential deviations from normal operating conditions using guidewords, determining causes and consequences of deviations, evaluating existing safeguards, and developing recommendations to address identified hazards. The document also outlines the HAZOP process, including defining nodes to segment the system, assigning a team to conduct the study, and systematically analyzing each node using guidewords across parameters.
This document discusses conducting a Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study. A HAZOP study is a systematic technique used to identify potential hazards and operating problems in a process. It involves examining process diagrams and considering how deviations from normal operating conditions could lead to hazardous situations. The document outlines the origins and development of HAZOP studies, their objectives, how and why they are used, and key aspects of conducting one such as focusing on specific nodes, parameters, and guide words to identify deviations, causes, consequences and actions.
One the most important problem in the chemical, oil&gas or nuclear Industry is the Risk Assessment evaluation. In the theoretical studies, the part of risk analysis is sometimes not considered because the case of study is not real or it hasn't been still industrialized. In the real industry there are different processes for industrializing a product. The HAZOP technique is one example of Risk assessment tecniques. For further information go to: http://www.cholarisk.com/
The document discusses Process Safety Management (PSM) and provides an overview of its key elements. PSM is a comprehensive management system that proactively avoids incidents in hazardous industries handling toxic chemicals. It integrates risk management across 14 elements, including employee participation, process hazard analysis, operating procedures, training, and compliance audits. The presentation aims to help organizations manage process safety risks in a more structured way.
Process safety aims to prevent incidents involving hazardous materials that could endanger workers, property, and the environment. It involves applying engineering and operating practices to control hazards. Key elements of process safety management include process hazard analysis, operating procedures, employee participation, training, contractor management, pre-startup safety reviews, mechanical integrity programs, emergency response planning, compliance audits, and incident investigation. The goal is to anticipate, identify, evaluate, and control hazards to protect people and prevent accidents.
The document discusses HAZOP (Hazard and Operability) studies and QRA (Qualitative Risk Analysis) studies conducted in process industries. It provides details on how HAZOP studies work, including forming a HAZOP team, identifying system elements and parameters, considering potential deviations, and identifying hazards. It also discusses QRA methodology which includes hazard identification, scenario selection, frequency and consequence estimation. The document emphasizes the importance of HAZOP and QRA studies in identifying risks and improving safety.
At the end of this presentation, you can explain the concepts, as below:
1) Distinction between Hazard, Harm, and Risk
2) HAZOP Analysis Concept
3) Importance of HAZOP application, merits and demerits
4) HAZOP methodology and related Phases
5) Working with PHA Pro Software
This is about HAZOP (Hazard and Operability Study), a risk assessment technique used in various industries.For a detailed training course and certification in HAZOP please visit http://www.abhisam.com/hazop-training-course.html
Event tree analysis and risk assessmentSalah Mansour
The document discusses event tree analysis, a technique used in accident investigation. It involves identifying an initiating event, then safety systems/barriers that could prevent escalation. An event tree diagrams the potential outcomes as each barrier succeeds or fails. Probabilities are assigned to determine the likelihood of consequences like continued safe operation or an accident. The document provides steps to construct an event tree including identifying the event and barriers, drawing the tree, and calculating outcome probabilities. It also discusses using event tree analysis to determine metrics like mean time between shutdowns or failures.
Fault tree analysis (FTA) and event tree analysis (ETA) are probabilistic risk assessment techniques. [FTA] works backwards from an accident to identify causes, representing them in a logic diagram with gates and basic events. [ETA] works forwards from an initiating event through safety functions to outcomes. The document outlines the steps and uses of FTA and ETA, providing examples to illustrate fault tree and event tree construction and accident sequence description.
A Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study is a structured and systematic examination of a planned or existing process or operation in order to identify and evaluate problems that may represent risks to personnel or equipment, or prevent efficient operation.
The HAZOP technique was initially developed to analyze chemical process systems, but has later been extended to other types of systems and also to complex operations and to software systems.
This document describes Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP) which is a technique used to identify potential hazards and operability problems in processes and operations. A HAZOP is conducted by a multi-disciplinary team and involves systematically evaluating deviations from the design intent of a system using guide words. The team identifies potential causes of deviations and evaluates their consequences. The document outlines the HAZOP procedure, roles of team members, when HAZOPs should be conducted, and provides an example of a HAZOP worksheet. It also describes the What If analysis technique which involves a team brainstorming potential hazards by answering questions about failures and abnormal scenarios.
This document provides an overview and introduction to a HAZOP (Hazard and Operability Study) training workshop. It discusses the key drivers for process safety regulations like OSHA PSM, including several major industrial accidents. It then explains what a HAZOP study is, how it fits into Process Hazard Analysis requirements, and provides definitions and methodology descriptions for conducting a HAZOP. The document is intended to introduce participants to HAZOP and provide essential background information on regulatory frameworks and best practices for process safety management.
The document discusses various techniques for hazard identification and risk assessment, including Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP), Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA), and safety audits. It provides details on how to conduct HAZOPs, including composing the team, using guide words to identify deviations from the process's intentions, and documenting the results. The document also discusses how to apply these techniques at different stages of a project's lifecycle to identify hazards, their causes and consequences, and remedial actions needed to control risks.
Process Safety Management in Design, Construction & Commissioning | Lalit K...Cairn India Limited
This document discusses process safety management during design, construction, and commissioning of oil and gas facilities. It outlines major hazards in the oil industry such as fires and explosions. It summarizes past disasters like the 1984 San Juanico disaster in Mexico and the 2007 LPG fire at a Texas refinery. The document discusses lessons learned like siting facilities away from housing and having effective gas detection and emergency isolation. It also outlines strategies for inherent, passive, active, and procedural safety. Key aspects of process safety are covered for different project stages from conceptualization to commissioning.
Basic understanding of HAZOP it covers:
-Basic understanding of HAZOP
-HAZOP requirements
-How it works
-Case study
-HAZOP team
-Advantage & disadvantage
The document provides an outline and overview of the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) and its efforts to improve global process safety. The summary is:
CCPS was formed in 1985 in response to the Bhopal disaster to lead collaborative efforts to eliminate catastrophic chemical process incidents through tools, training, and sharing best practices. CCPS engages over 200 corporate members and the chemical industry worldwide. It develops guidelines, training programs, and process safety education to protect workers, facilities, and the environment.
The document discusses the key elements of Process Safety Management (PSM), a regulation promulgated by OSHA to prevent chemical disasters like the 1984 Bhopal disaster. It outlines the 14 elements of PSM, which include process hazards analysis, mechanical integrity, compliance audits, and emergency response. For each element, it provides the purpose, requirements, and tips for real-world implementation to help companies effectively achieve the safety goals of the PSM standard.
Safety in your company is a top priority, have you completed a process hazard analysis recently? When you complete a thorough PHA it improves safety, benefits your employees, streamlines the process and boosts your bottom line. In this slideshow, you can learn more about what a Process Hazard Analysis is, how it is completed properly and what to do with that information.
The term Prestartup Safety Review (PSSR) first received prominence in the process industries with the introduction of the Process Safety Management (PSM) regulations.
This document provides guidance on conducting a hazards and operability (HAZOP) study. It describes the key steps, which include:
1. Defining nodes within the process to focus the analysis. Nodes represent sections where conditions undergo significant change.
2. Identifying process parameters like flow, pressure, and temperature for each node and establishing safe operating limits.
3. Using guidewords like "high", "low", and "no" to identify potential deviations and associated hazards within each node.
4. Discussing how each hazard could be "announced" or detected. If no detection exists, additional instrumentation may be recommended.
5. Determining consequences of hazards with and without existing safeguards.
This document discusses Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP). It provides an overview of the HAZOP methodology, including that it involves a team systematically using guidewords to identify deviations from the design intent and their potential causes and consequences. The document also gives examples of applying the HAZOP technique to analyze specific components, like conducting a HAZOP study on a shell and tube heat exchanger using relevant guidewords. Overall, the HAZOP method aims to identify hazards as well as operability problems for improved safety and operations.
This document discusses conducting a Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study. A HAZOP study is a systematic technique used to identify potential hazards and operating problems in a process. It involves examining process diagrams and considering how deviations from normal operating conditions could lead to hazardous situations. The document outlines the origins and development of HAZOP studies, their objectives, how and why they are used, and key aspects of conducting one such as focusing on specific nodes, parameters, and guide words to identify deviations, causes, consequences and actions.
One the most important problem in the chemical, oil&gas or nuclear Industry is the Risk Assessment evaluation. In the theoretical studies, the part of risk analysis is sometimes not considered because the case of study is not real or it hasn't been still industrialized. In the real industry there are different processes for industrializing a product. The HAZOP technique is one example of Risk assessment tecniques. For further information go to: http://www.cholarisk.com/
The document discusses Process Safety Management (PSM) and provides an overview of its key elements. PSM is a comprehensive management system that proactively avoids incidents in hazardous industries handling toxic chemicals. It integrates risk management across 14 elements, including employee participation, process hazard analysis, operating procedures, training, and compliance audits. The presentation aims to help organizations manage process safety risks in a more structured way.
Process safety aims to prevent incidents involving hazardous materials that could endanger workers, property, and the environment. It involves applying engineering and operating practices to control hazards. Key elements of process safety management include process hazard analysis, operating procedures, employee participation, training, contractor management, pre-startup safety reviews, mechanical integrity programs, emergency response planning, compliance audits, and incident investigation. The goal is to anticipate, identify, evaluate, and control hazards to protect people and prevent accidents.
The document discusses HAZOP (Hazard and Operability) studies and QRA (Qualitative Risk Analysis) studies conducted in process industries. It provides details on how HAZOP studies work, including forming a HAZOP team, identifying system elements and parameters, considering potential deviations, and identifying hazards. It also discusses QRA methodology which includes hazard identification, scenario selection, frequency and consequence estimation. The document emphasizes the importance of HAZOP and QRA studies in identifying risks and improving safety.
At the end of this presentation, you can explain the concepts, as below:
1) Distinction between Hazard, Harm, and Risk
2) HAZOP Analysis Concept
3) Importance of HAZOP application, merits and demerits
4) HAZOP methodology and related Phases
5) Working with PHA Pro Software
This is about HAZOP (Hazard and Operability Study), a risk assessment technique used in various industries.For a detailed training course and certification in HAZOP please visit http://www.abhisam.com/hazop-training-course.html
Event tree analysis and risk assessmentSalah Mansour
The document discusses event tree analysis, a technique used in accident investigation. It involves identifying an initiating event, then safety systems/barriers that could prevent escalation. An event tree diagrams the potential outcomes as each barrier succeeds or fails. Probabilities are assigned to determine the likelihood of consequences like continued safe operation or an accident. The document provides steps to construct an event tree including identifying the event and barriers, drawing the tree, and calculating outcome probabilities. It also discusses using event tree analysis to determine metrics like mean time between shutdowns or failures.
Fault tree analysis (FTA) and event tree analysis (ETA) are probabilistic risk assessment techniques. [FTA] works backwards from an accident to identify causes, representing them in a logic diagram with gates and basic events. [ETA] works forwards from an initiating event through safety functions to outcomes. The document outlines the steps and uses of FTA and ETA, providing examples to illustrate fault tree and event tree construction and accident sequence description.
A Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study is a structured and systematic examination of a planned or existing process or operation in order to identify and evaluate problems that may represent risks to personnel or equipment, or prevent efficient operation.
The HAZOP technique was initially developed to analyze chemical process systems, but has later been extended to other types of systems and also to complex operations and to software systems.
This document describes Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP) which is a technique used to identify potential hazards and operability problems in processes and operations. A HAZOP is conducted by a multi-disciplinary team and involves systematically evaluating deviations from the design intent of a system using guide words. The team identifies potential causes of deviations and evaluates their consequences. The document outlines the HAZOP procedure, roles of team members, when HAZOPs should be conducted, and provides an example of a HAZOP worksheet. It also describes the What If analysis technique which involves a team brainstorming potential hazards by answering questions about failures and abnormal scenarios.
This document provides an overview and introduction to a HAZOP (Hazard and Operability Study) training workshop. It discusses the key drivers for process safety regulations like OSHA PSM, including several major industrial accidents. It then explains what a HAZOP study is, how it fits into Process Hazard Analysis requirements, and provides definitions and methodology descriptions for conducting a HAZOP. The document is intended to introduce participants to HAZOP and provide essential background information on regulatory frameworks and best practices for process safety management.
The document discusses various techniques for hazard identification and risk assessment, including Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP), Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA), and safety audits. It provides details on how to conduct HAZOPs, including composing the team, using guide words to identify deviations from the process's intentions, and documenting the results. The document also discusses how to apply these techniques at different stages of a project's lifecycle to identify hazards, their causes and consequences, and remedial actions needed to control risks.
Process Safety Management in Design, Construction & Commissioning | Lalit K...Cairn India Limited
This document discusses process safety management during design, construction, and commissioning of oil and gas facilities. It outlines major hazards in the oil industry such as fires and explosions. It summarizes past disasters like the 1984 San Juanico disaster in Mexico and the 2007 LPG fire at a Texas refinery. The document discusses lessons learned like siting facilities away from housing and having effective gas detection and emergency isolation. It also outlines strategies for inherent, passive, active, and procedural safety. Key aspects of process safety are covered for different project stages from conceptualization to commissioning.
Basic understanding of HAZOP it covers:
-Basic understanding of HAZOP
-HAZOP requirements
-How it works
-Case study
-HAZOP team
-Advantage & disadvantage
The document provides an outline and overview of the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) and its efforts to improve global process safety. The summary is:
CCPS was formed in 1985 in response to the Bhopal disaster to lead collaborative efforts to eliminate catastrophic chemical process incidents through tools, training, and sharing best practices. CCPS engages over 200 corporate members and the chemical industry worldwide. It develops guidelines, training programs, and process safety education to protect workers, facilities, and the environment.
The document discusses the key elements of Process Safety Management (PSM), a regulation promulgated by OSHA to prevent chemical disasters like the 1984 Bhopal disaster. It outlines the 14 elements of PSM, which include process hazards analysis, mechanical integrity, compliance audits, and emergency response. For each element, it provides the purpose, requirements, and tips for real-world implementation to help companies effectively achieve the safety goals of the PSM standard.
Safety in your company is a top priority, have you completed a process hazard analysis recently? When you complete a thorough PHA it improves safety, benefits your employees, streamlines the process and boosts your bottom line. In this slideshow, you can learn more about what a Process Hazard Analysis is, how it is completed properly and what to do with that information.
The term Prestartup Safety Review (PSSR) first received prominence in the process industries with the introduction of the Process Safety Management (PSM) regulations.
This document provides guidance on conducting a hazards and operability (HAZOP) study. It describes the key steps, which include:
1. Defining nodes within the process to focus the analysis. Nodes represent sections where conditions undergo significant change.
2. Identifying process parameters like flow, pressure, and temperature for each node and establishing safe operating limits.
3. Using guidewords like "high", "low", and "no" to identify potential deviations and associated hazards within each node.
4. Discussing how each hazard could be "announced" or detected. If no detection exists, additional instrumentation may be recommended.
5. Determining consequences of hazards with and without existing safeguards.
This document discusses Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP). It provides an overview of the HAZOP methodology, including that it involves a team systematically using guidewords to identify deviations from the design intent and their potential causes and consequences. The document also gives examples of applying the HAZOP technique to analyze specific components, like conducting a HAZOP study on a shell and tube heat exchanger using relevant guidewords. Overall, the HAZOP method aims to identify hazards as well as operability problems for improved safety and operations.
This document provides an overview of Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP). It defines HAZOP as a formal procedure to identify hazards in chemical processes. The summary includes:
- HAZOP identifies potential hazards, failures, and operability problems through a team approach including designers, operators, and safety experts.
- The HAZOP process involves dividing the system into nodes, applying guide words like "no," "more," and "part of" to process parameters to suggest deviations, and evaluating causes and consequences to recommend actions.
- Benefits of HAZOP include fewer problems during commissioning and operation, improved safety and product quality, and evidence of due diligence for insurers.
The document provides details of a project to produce bioethanol from glycerol using Enterobacter aerogenes TISTR1468. It summarizes the production process, which involves micro-aerobic fermentation, stripping, binary distillation, extraction, and flash vaporization. Key production metrics are given, such as a production rate of 3676.47 kg of bioethanol per hour. It also lists several chapters that require improvement work, such as redesigning the bioreactors, correcting heat integration calculations, completing control loops and relief valves on piping and instrumentation diagrams, and redesigning process units based on new stream data.
A hazard and operability study (HAZOP) is a structured and systematic examination of a planned or existing process or operation in order to identify and evaluate problems that may represent risks to personnel or equipment, or prevent efficient operation.
Visit www.icarus-orm.com to learn more.
This document summarizes a design project for a fixed bed catalytic reactor. It includes an executive summary highlighting the economic and environmental benefits of the project. The design basis and constraints are outlined. Environmental considerations like mist formation and corrosion are addressed. The design was optimized using software tools, and equipment was sized. Capital costs were estimated for the reactor and other plant equipment based on mechanical designs and cost data. Appendices provide detailed calculations and specifications for the reactor design and equipment.
This document contains guide words used for HAZOP (Hazard and Operability Study) analysis. It lists potential deviations in areas such as flow, level, pressure, temperature and other process parameters. Guide words identify possible abnormalities including high, low, reverse, empty or unintended conditions. Deviations related to composition, concentration, reactions, noise, odor and other factors are also addressed.
El HAZOP es una técnica de análisis de riesgos que identifica desviaciones potenciales en las variables de proceso de un sistema e investiga sus causas y consecuencias. El proceso implica dividir el sistema en subsistemas y nudos, aplicar "palabras guía" como más, menos o diferente a las variables en cada nudo, y evaluar las desviaciones, causas, consecuencias y acciones correctivas. El objetivo es mejorar la seguridad identificando riesgos y realizando modificaciones necesarias.
This document provides guidelines for conducting a Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) which is part of New South Wales' integrated risk assessment process for hazardous developments. A HAZOP systematically examines a facility's design and operation to identify potential hazards and issues. Section 2 outlines the HAZOP methodology which involves a team using "guide words" to evaluate each part of a facility. Section 3 describes the requirements for reporting the study results. The report documents any design or procedural changes resulting from the HAZOP.
This document analyzes the feasibility of manufacturing 100,000 vials per year of Rituximab, a monoclonal antibody used to treat cancer. It considers various production processes including microbial fermentation using E. coli and yeast expression systems as well as mammalian cell culture using CHO cells, which is selected as the preferred method. Material and energy balances are performed to determine raw material requirements and facility needs. Equipment is designed and sized. The total capital investment is estimated to be Rs. 1,302.2 lakhs with an IRR of 52.76% and payback period of 3 years 7 months, indicating the project is financially viable.
BE Chemical Engineering Design Project Production Of Propylene Oxidepatrickconneran
The document summarizes the design of a plant to produce 100,000 tonnes per year of 99.8% propylene oxide. It describes the selection of the cumene hydroperoxide process and provides details on the design of the key equipment, including oxidation, epoxidation, and distillation reactors and columns. It also discusses cost estimates, environmental impact assessments, hazard and operability studies, and the proposed site layout.
The document discusses the meaning, significance, and application of Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) and Hazard Identification (HAZID) studies for oil and gas engineering, procurement, and construction (EPC) pipeline and process facilities projects. It explains that HAZOP and HAZID studies identify hazards in a system and possible incidents in order to reduce risks. They provide a systematic assessment of hazards and result in improved systems, procedures, and safety awareness. The studies are most beneficial when conducted early in the design process or on existing facilities.
The Effectiveness of the Hazard and Operability Study Methodology in Process ...PECB
HAZOP is the acronym for HAZard and OPerability study. It is a structured and systematic examination of a planned or existing product, process, procedure or system. It is used to identify risks to people, equipment, environment and/or organizational objectives, focusing primarily on the design intent of the particular system.
The presentation introduces best practice approaches in conducting a HAZOP Study based on IEC Standard- 61882.
In this webinar, the presenter speaks freely of his experience in leading an actual HAZOP Study and highlights the advantages of this risk assessment technique.
Main points covered:
• How to create awareness of the use of the Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) Methodology in process Hazard Analysis (PHA)?
• How to familiarize Potential HAZOP Team Members with their Roles and Responsibilities in the HAZOP Examination of a Typical Facility?
A Case Summary Study Approach will be used based on the presenter’s own experience of leading an actual HAZOP Study.
Presenter:
This session was presented by PECB Trainer Jacob McLean, Principal Consultant and Managing Director of Kaizen Training & Management Consultants Limited.
Link of the recorded session published on YouTube: https://youtu.be/IvsrlHFADTo
1. The document outlines the objectives and presentation outlines for a final year design project to establish a stearic acid production plant with an annual capacity of 100,000 MT in Indonesia.
2. The key objectives are to develop the process flow diagram and engineering design for the plant, perform process integration and economic analyses, and ensure the plant's design complies with environmental and safety regulations.
3. The presentation will include sections on the design of equipment, process control and instrumentation, process integration, environmental considerations, economic analysis, and plant safety and layout.
This document summarizes the key outcomes and recommendations from a HAZOP study conducted on the engineering design for a project to tie gas well Bb-1047 into Remote Manifold Station 3 (RMS-3) in the Arab-D zone. The HAZOP study identified 14 nodes in the process and instrumentation diagrams, but only 8 nodes were examined in detail. 38 recommendations were made, with most relating to improvements in design. Key recommendations included further studies on check valve requirements, pressure safety valve setpoints, and managing depressurization of gas lines. Action was assigned to contractors to address the recommendations by January 2015.
A report on accident scenarios in process plants & how hazop can take lead ro...Ravi chandra kancherla
The document provides an overview of chemical accidents, their management and prevention. It discusses key lessons learned from major accidents like Bhopal and Visakhapatnam. Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) methods like HAZOP play an important role in identifying hazards and preventing accidents. HAZOP, in particular, is a systematic and rigorous technique to examine process parameters and anticipate how processes could fail to identify safety measures.
Safety Audit can be defined as verifying the existence and implementation of elements of occupational safety and health system and for verifying the system’s ability to achieve defined safety objectives.
This presentation will give you an overview of Audit, Safety Audit, Audit Process, Auditor attributes. It also discusses about the different reference standards in India related to safety audit and will give you some take home points.
Hazop study on sewage treatment plant at educational institutioneSAT Publishing House
IJRET : International Journal of Research in Engineering and Technology is an international peer reviewed, online journal published by eSAT Publishing House for the enhancement of research in various disciplines of Engineering and Technology. The aim and scope of the journal is to provide an academic medium and an important reference for the advancement and dissemination of research results that support high-level learning, teaching and research in the fields of Engineering and Technology. We bring together Scientists, Academician, Field Engineers, Scholars and Students of related fields of Engineering and Technology
The Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) is a structured and systematic assessment of a complex system, (such as process facility) in order to identify the hazards that can cause potential danger to Personnel, Equipment, Environment, as well as system operability.
iFluids Engineering is a leading provider of HAZOP study consulting services in India & have extensive experience working on HAZOP studies in India, Qatar, Oman, Tunisia, and many other countries
This document provides an overview of Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP), a structured technique for identifying potential hazards and operability problems in systems. HAZOP involves examining a system and considering how intended design and operations could deviate using guide words. It is useful for risk assessments of facilities, equipment, and processes. The methodology involves defining the system scope, preparing by selecting a team and guide words, and then systematically examining each part of the system to identify potential deviations, consequences, and risk control measures. HAZOP relies on subject matter experts to brainstorm deviations and is intended to comprehensively and inductively identify risks from the bottom-up.
HAZOP, or a Hazard and Operability Study, is a systematic way to identify possible hazards in a work process. In this approach, the process is broken down into steps, and every variation in work parameters is considered for each step, to see what could go wrong. HAZOP’s meticulous approach is commonly used with chemical production and piping systems, where miles of pipes and numerous containers can cause logistical headaches.
HAZOP and Hazard Analysis Systems
The document provides information about Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP). It describes the purpose and methodology of HAZOP studies, including identifying potential hazards, deviations, and operability issues. The document outlines when HAZOP studies should be conducted, who should be involved in the team, and the benefits of performing these studies, such as identifying safety and process improvements.
Risk analysis and management involves identifying hazards, analyzing and evaluating risks, and controlling risks. The key steps are identifying hazards, analyzing likelihood and consequences, evaluating risks using a risk matrix, and implementing controls to reduce risks to an acceptable level. Common hazard identification techniques include HAZID, HAZOP, JSA, HIRA, and FMEA which help identify hazards at early stages to prevent accidents and losses.
Risk analysis and management involves identifying hazards, assessing risks, and controlling risks. Key aspects include risk measurement as the likelihood and consequence of hazards, and risk management through analyzing, assessing, and controlling risks. Risk assessment techniques are used to identify hazards and evaluate associated risks in order to implement risk controls and reduce risks. Common techniques include job hazard analysis, HAZID, HAZOP, and preliminary hazard analysis. These techniques involve breaking down work or processes into components, applying parameters and guide words to identify possible deviations, and determining causes, consequences, and recommended controls.
HAZOP ANALYSIS
A Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study is a systematic technique used to identify potential problems in processes. It involves examining a system and considering how intended design can deviate. A multidisciplinary team applies guidewords to parameters at nodes to identify causes and consequences of deviations. The team then recommends safeguards. HAZOP is useful early in design and can be applied to processes, procedures, software and human factors. It provides a structured way to brainstorm hazards without requiring quantification of risks.
The document provides guidance on conducting a HAZOP (Hazard and Operability) study. It discusses:
- The purpose of a HAZOP study is to systematically identify potential hazards and operability problems in a process by examining how deviations from the design intent could occur.
- A HAZOP is conducted by a team representing different relevant disciplines, led by an experienced leader. The team works through a process using guidewords to generate questions about possible deviations.
- Thorough preparation, selection of the right team members, and follow up on recommendations are essential for a successful HAZOP study.
HAZOP is a technique used to identify hazards in a system through a systematic examination conducted by a multidisciplinary team. The team applies guidewords to variables to uncover possible failure modes and their effects. For example, applying guidewords like "no", "less", "more" to variables like "flow", "pressure", "temperature" in a pipeline system. The HAZOP process can identify hazards at any stage of the system lifecycle but requires a detailed system description. It aims to establish hazards and assess their severity to enable mitigation solutions.
The document discusses Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP), a technique used to identify potential hazards in chemical and nuclear process plants. A HAZOP is conducted by a multidisciplinary team who systematically reviews process parameters, such as flow, temperature and pressure, and identifies possible deviations from design intent using guide words. For each deviation, the team analyzes potential causes and consequences, and recommends actions to address hazards. The document provides examples of HAZOP guide words, process parameters, and outlines the typical HAZOP procedure and documentation format.
The document provides guidance on conducting a HAZOP (Hazard and Operability) study. It defines key terms related to a HAZOP study and outlines the HAZOP process. A HAZOP study requires a cross-functional team to identify potential hazards and issues in a systematic way. The team examines process sections and identifies possible deviations from design intentions, then analyzes the causes and consequences of deviations. The goal is to identify safety and operability issues to improve design and operations.
hazard identification methods in risk analysisssusera08fc81
The document discusses several hazard identification methods used in risk assessment:
- Hazard Identification (HAZID) Technique involves a team brainstorming hazards associated with different parts of a system.
- What-if Analysis uses questioning to identify potential upsets and ensure safeguards.
- Checklist Analysis evaluates a system against pre-established criteria in checklists.
- Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) Analysis uses guidewords to identify deviations from design and potential consequences.
- Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) considers how component failures can cause problems and ensures safeguards.
This document provides an introduction to hazard and operability (HAZOP) studies, which are systematic examinations of engineering and operational processes to identify potential hazards. It discusses what a HAZOP study is, why and when they are carried out, and how the study procedure works. A HAZOP study involves a team applying guide words like "no," "more," and "less" to process parameters at specific points to identify possible deviations from normal operation and their consequences. The document defines important HAZOP terminology and outlines the overall steps of a HAZOP study, including selecting a team, identifying the scope, performing the analysis, documenting results, and taking follow-up actions.
Understanding HAZOP: Implementation, Advantages, and Limitations in the Oil a...soginsider
Navigate through the intricacies of the Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) within the oil and gas industry in this engaging SlideShare presentation. Packed into 14 impactful slides, the presentation elaborates on fundamental aspects such as how HAZOP works, the steps involved in conducting a HAZOP study, its applications in designing new systems, and enhancing safety in existing ones. Furthermore, the dialogue extends to discuss the limitations of HAZOP and practical ways to overcome them.
The document discusses the Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study methodology. It provides an overview of the objectives, prerequisites, procedures and roles of a HAZOP study. Key aspects covered include the HAZOP team composition, the use of guidewords to identify potential deviations, documentation of the analysis using a worksheet, and generation of recommendations to address risks. The goal of a HAZOP study is to systematically and qualitatively identify potential hazards in a process to improve safety.
This document provides an overview of Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) studies. It defines HAZOP as a systematic technique used to identify potential hazards and operating problems in industrial processes. The document traces the origins and development of HAZOP studies since the 1960s. It describes the objective, methodology, and typical applications of HAZOP for improving safety and operability. Key aspects covered include identifying deviations from normal operating conditions, evaluating causes and consequences, and suggesting corrective actions.
This document provides an overview of Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP). It discusses the importance and methodology of HAZOP analysis, including forming a team, identifying system elements and parameters, considering deviations, and identifying hazards. Keywords such as "no", "less", and "more" are used to systematically analyze each part of a process. The document also briefly discusses applications of HAZOP for design, operational, and procedural assessments and compares it to other risk analysis tools. An example HAZOP study for an acetylene production industry is referenced.
1) Production and maintenance supervisors play a key role in plant safety management by overseeing staff, equipment, work conditions, and responding immediately to safety issues.
2) Supervisors must ensure operations follow written procedures and personnel are properly trained. They provide daily updates on plant operations and procedures which are essential for efficient and reliable system management.
3) Supervisors participate in risk identification and integrity programs to reduce equipment failure and hazardous releases. They evaluate human and ergonomic factors and provide tips to reduce risks.
This document discusses hazard analysis and risk assessment. It defines hazard and risk, and outlines the main steps in hazard analysis and risk assessment. These include identifying hazards, determining who may be harmed and how, assessing dose-response and exposure, risk management and control. Hazard analysis techniques include checklists, safety audits, preliminary hazard analysis, failure modes and effects analysis, what-if analysis, and hazard and operability studies. Risk assessment involves quantifying risk based on probability and severity. The document emphasizes that hazard analysis and risk assessment should be ongoing processes throughout the lifecycle of a system.
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### Applications of TDM
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### Advantages of TDM
- **Efficient Use of Bandwidth**: TDM all
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2. CONTENTS
1. Introduction
2. HAZOP Preparation
Selection of HAZOP study team members
Information required for HAZOP study
Other responsibilities
3. HAZOP Terminology
System
Design Intent
HAZOP Guide words
Safeguards & Recommendations
HAZOP Study Record & Risk Assessment
4. HAZOP Meeting Procedure
5. HAZOP Following Up actions
6. HAZOP Closure
7. Documentation
3. 1. Introduction
Increasing demand by governments and public bodies for improved safety in addition
to a strong awareness within the industry that safe operation can also be highly efficient
and profitable, support the need for plant safety and effective safety management.
Advances in technology and trends to highly complex and integrated plant designs have
sensitized people for systematic and sustainable methods to identify hazards of which the
HAZOP study is generally recognized as the foremost solution being able to cover standard
and also new complex technology.
A Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study is a structured and systematic examination of
a planned or existing process or operation in order to identify and evaluate problems that
may represent a risk to personnel or equipment, or prevent efficient operation. A HAZOP is
a qualitative technique based on "guide words" and is carried out by a multi-disciplinary
team (the HAZOP Team) during one or more meetings.
A HAZOP is a design verification process. It should not be used as a design development
process. The HAZOP should be performed at the stage in the design process when all
preliminary engineering is complete and the basic design has been fixed. This includes
complete process design, process flow diagrams, P&ID’s, plant and equipment layout,
operating philosophy, control and instrumentation philosophy, utilities requirements,
specification and selection of major equipment items, protection systems, start up and
shutdown systems.
2. HAZOP Preparation
It is the responsibility of the Responsible Officer to initiate the HAZOP study where the
project or modification meets the criteria.
Selection of HAZOP study team members:
The Responsible Officer will first appoint an independent HAZOP Leader to act as
the Chairperson for the HAZOP meetings. The HAZOP Leader must be trained in HAZOP
methodology and have successfully completed a suitably recognised HAZOP Leader
Course, or equivalent experience, as approved by the Manager - Project Engineering.
The HAZOP Leader should be independent, i.e. with no responsibility for the process or
operations in the area where the process being reviewed is located.
4. HAZOP studies will be conducted using a team approach, with a minimum of four
members. The Responsible Officer together with the HAZOP Leader will select the
HAZOP team members to achieve the spread of knowledge and skills required for the
particular project, and may include:
1. Representative of the customer
2. A person with Process knowledge
3. A person with Safety & Environmental knowledge
4. A person with operating and/or maintenance experience in comparable
environment.
5. A person with Engineering/Design knowledge
5. Information required for HAZOP study
The following information should be assembled by the Responsible Officer and the
HAZOP Leader before the HAZOP study team commences work.
Essential Items:
1. Functionally complete P & ID for the process
2. System design philosophy and process description
Desirable Items:
1. Plot plans or layouts
2. Process flow diagrams
3. Piping class specifications
4. Equipment data sheets and purchase specifications
5. Vessel inventories
6. Relief valve specifications
7. Start up and emergency shut-down procedures
8. Emergency depressurizing system functions
9. Electrical area classification
10. Standards used
11. Procedures - operating and maintenance as applicable
Other responsibilities
The Responsible Officer is responsible for the following HAZOP study arrangements:
1. Organizing meeting dates, venue and notices to the attendees
2. Layout of venue and supply of stationery and other resources for the meeting
3. Provision of information required for the HAZOP study
4. Close out meeting date, venue and notice to the attendees.
6. 3. HAZOP Terminology
SYSTEM
A System is a specific location or logical part of the process or operation in which
possible deviations from the design intent are to be evaluated. Examples might be a heat
7. exchanger, vessel, pump, compressor and interconnecting pipeline or group of lines.
Systems should be progressively identified on the P&ID as the HAZOP study proceeds.
DESIGN INTENT
The design intent is a description of how the process is expected to behave at the
system being studied. This is qualitatively described as an activity eg feed, reaction,
transfer, heating, and quantitatively in process parameters such as pressure, temperature,
flow rate.
HAZOP GUIDE WORDS
All possible deviations in process parameters in a reactor or a pipeline are
considered to determine their causes and consequences. If a hazard is identified, first the
existing protective measures are analyzed with respect to the intensity of the hazard. If the
protective measures are not adequate, recommendations are given to mitigate the hazard.
HAZOP study involves a set of standardized GUIDEWORDS, which are required to initiate
8. analysis.
Examples of process parameters include the following:
Each guide word is combined with relevant process parameters and applied at each point
(study node, process section, or operating step) in the process that is being examined.
9. The following Table showed examples of creating deviation using guide words and
process parameters:
Safeguards
Safeguards are facilities, processes or procedures that help to reduce the likelihood
or frequency of the deviation, or to mitigate its consequences.
Examples of safeguards include the following.
1. Procedures to define what actions to take in the event of a deviation.
2. Increased frequency of inspection, servicing or calibration of critical items.
3. Facilities that draw attention to the deviation (eg indicators and alarms to inform
operators so that they can make the process safe).
4. Facilities that automatically compensate for the deviation (eg an automatic control.
5. System, usually an integrated part of the process control).
6. Facilities that prevent the deviation from occurring (eg excess flow valve).
7. Facilities that prevent further escalation of the deviation (eg by total trip of the
activity or process by a safety interlock, control system, or emergency shutdown
(ESD) system).
8. Facilities that relieve the process from a hazardous deviation (eg pressure safety
valve (PSV) and vent systems)
As each cause and consequence scenario is identified, planned safeguards should be
reviewed to determine if they are adequate to either prevent the deviation or to protect the
System if the deviation occurs. Any decision on the adequacy of the safeguards should take
into consideration the magnitude of the potential consequences and the likelihood of the
event occurring with all the planned safeguards in place. This is reflected in the risk
assessment as below. Each scenario will usually have more than a single layer of protection.
For high risk deviations, it is useful to review each of the layers of protection before
determining the adequacy of the safeguards.
10. Recommendations
If the HAZOP Team recommends that additional safeguards or changes to the design
should be made to ensure the safety of the system, these recommendations must be
recorded on the HAZOP Record for further action after the HAZOP study. The name of the
person who will be responsible for the further actions should be recorded on the form next
to the assigned action.
HAZOP study record
HAZOP Study Record form is used to create a historic record of the HAZOP Study.
Details of discussions, decisions taken, risk assessments made and further actions
recommended during evaluation of each of the HAZOP Study Cards will be progressively
recorded by the HAZOP Secretary on the HAZOP Study Record form.
Risk Assessment
Risk assessments should be carried out to quantify the risks associated with
deviations and their potential consequences, and to assist in determining the adequacy of
planned safeguards and the possible need for further action. An initial informal risk
assessment should be carried out on each cause - consequence scenario based on the
inherent risk in the unprotected state.
The Risk Matrix included in the below table should be used as a guide. The risk
should then be re-assessed taking into consideration the planned safeguards and risk
reduction measures. For less important risks, the need for further action can be based on
the experience and judgment of the HAZOP Study Team.
11. Once the reasonable consequence and likelihood of each potential unwanted event
is determined, the risk can be ranked using the “Risk Assessment Matrix” below and
recorded on the HAZOP Study Record sheet.
For high risk scenarios, several layers of protection will usually be necessary to
reduce the risk to an acceptable level. If the HAZOP team agrees that, so long as the planned
12. safeguards are in place, the risk of an unwanted event occurring is reduced to an acceptable
level, then no further action is required.
For extreme risk scenarios, the adequacy of safeguards and the need for further
action should be quantitatively assessed using higher level risk assessment techniques
such as Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA), or Safety Integrity Level (SIL) analysis. The
risk assessment process and outcome should be recorded on the HAZOP Study Record form
against each item.
4. HAZOP Meeting Procedure
At the HAZOP meeting, the HAZOP Leader will act as Chairperson to lead the team
through each of the following steps.
a) Introduce the project:
Ensure all team members are familiar with the HAZOP process
Define the project for the team
Review the proposed process or modification using the Process and
Instrumentation Diagram (P&ID) and describe its operation
On the P&ID, divide the process to be studied into logical Systems.
b) Carry out HAZOP Study:
Select a particular System for detailed review and describe the design intent for that
System. Work through the guide words on the HAZOP Study Cards, following the
HAZOP Process Flow Chart.
For each guide word, establish if the deviation from normal conditions suggested by
the guide word could occur. If the deviation could occur, identify the possible causes
of the deviation.
Determine the possible consequences or problems if the deviation occurred.
Carry out an initial assessment of the risk associated with the identified
consequences Review any proposed safeguards to prevent or mitigate the
consequences.
Evaluate if the proposed safeguards adequately reduce the risk to an acceptable
level and if not, suggest further actions having regard to the consequences and the
safeguards already proposed.
Repeat procedure from [step (a)] above for the next System. Progressively complete
HAZOP Study Record form including recording of further actions.
13. Modifications must be assessed for impact during a variety of plant conditions (ie.
startup, running, plant upset, and plant shutdown). This aspect will be formally
documented where appropriate throughout the HAZOP, and must also feature as a specific
element considered within the agreement and sign-off of the final records of the HAZOP.
5. HAZOP Following Up actions
The Responsible Officer shall ensure that all actions arising from the HAZOP are
properly managed and are completed prior to commencing the modification or
HAZOP PROCESS FLOW CHART
14. commissioning the modified plant as determined during the HAZOP. The items recorded on
the HAZOP Study Record form SF1309 as requiring action shall be numbered and a
required date of completion established. This information shall be entered into the
“Recommendations” column on the HAZOP Study Record.
6. HAZOP Closure
When all follow-up actions are complete, the Responsible Officer shall note on the
HAZOP Study Record of Discussions (SF 1909) that all items have been completed and
make reference to the Inspection Reference Number in Cintellate. To assist in later
verification, a copy of the complete Cintellate record should be printed out after all actions
have been completed and attached to the HAZOP Study Record in the Project file.
Close out meeting:
The Responsible Officer will arrange a close out meeting to record completion of
outstanding issues.
Once all parties are satisfied that all issues arising from the study have been
adequately addressed and are reflected in the project design documentation, form HAZOP
Study Record of Discussions form shall be completed and signed off by the Responsible
Officer and the Customer Representative.
No commissioning activities associated with the modification or the new plant
covered by the HAZOP shall commence until form HAZOP Study Record of Discussions
(SF1909) has been signed off.
7. Documentation
The following HAZOP study information and documents are required for the files:
a) HAZOP Study Record which includes:
Project title
Project number (that is, work order number for the parent project)
Project scope
Study date
Participant names, job titles, organisation, brief profile
b) Signed off HAZOP Study Record of Discussions
c) The original copy of all P&IDs used in the study (with lines clearly identified)
d) Variations in guide words used.
15. e) Signed off Action Summary sheet
f) Signed off HAZOP Action sheets
The study Responsible Officer is responsible for the preparation and collation of the
output documentation from the HAZOP study, and for forwarding it to all attendees,
including the Chairperson who should sign off the HAZOP Study Record before filing by the
Responsible Officer.
The Responsible Officer ensures an electronic copy the documentation listed above
is filed in the Domino. Doc System in accordance with Management of Risk Assessment
Records. A hard copy of all this documentation will also be filed in the Project File by the
Project Officer.