A Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study is a structured, systematic technique used to identify hazards and risks in processes. It involves dividing a system into nodes and then using guide words and parameters to analyze each node for possible causes of deviation from the design intent. The HAZOP team evaluates the consequences of any deviations and recommends actions to address risks. A typical HAZOP study involves 7 steps: identifying risks, describing consequences, assessing probabilities, evaluating risks, categorizing risks, assessing risks with safeguards, and making recommendations. HAZOPs are commonly used in industries involving hazardous materials like oil, gas, chemicals and pharmaceuticals.
Basic understanding of HAZOP it covers:
-Basic understanding of HAZOP
-HAZOP requirements
-How it works
-Case study
-HAZOP team
-Advantage & disadvantage
Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) | Gaurav Singh RajputGaurav Singh Rajput
This document provides an overview of Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) studies. It begins with defining what a HAZOP study is, which is a systematic technique used to identify potential hazards and operating problems in industrial processes. The document then discusses the origins and development of HAZOP methodology. It provides details on the objectives, procedures, guidelines and key aspects of conducting a HAZOP study, including dividing the process into sections, using guide words to identify possible deviations, and documenting causes, consequences and recommended actions. Overall, the document serves as an introduction to HAZOP studies, covering their fundamental principles and approaches.
This document provides an overview of Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) studies. It defines HAZOP as a systematic technique used to identify potential hazards and operating problems in industrial processes. The document traces the origins and development of HAZOP studies since the 1960s. It describes the objective, methodology, and typical applications of HAZOP for improving safety and operability. Key aspects covered include identifying deviations from normal operating conditions, evaluating causes and consequences, and suggesting corrective actions.
A HAZOP (Hazard and Operability) study is conducted to systematically examine process systems for potential hazards arising from deviations from the design intent. Key aspects of a HAZOP study include:
- Dividing the system into nodes and selecting a process parameter for each node
- Applying guidewords like "no", "more", or "less" to the parameter to identify potential deviations
- Evaluating the causes and consequences of each deviation
- Recommending actions to address identified hazards
The document provides an example of conducting a HAZOP study on a reactor cooling system, identifying a loss of cooling function as a potential deviation. This could lead to a runaway reaction and overpressuring of the
The document discusses various techniques for hazard identification and risk assessment, including Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP), Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA), and safety audits. It provides details on how to conduct HAZOPs, including composing the team, using guide words to identify deviations from the process's intentions, and documenting the results. The document also discusses how to apply these techniques at different stages of a project's lifecycle to identify hazards, their causes and consequences, and remedial actions needed to control risks.
The Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) is a structured and systematic assessment of a complex system, (such as process facility) in order to identify the hazards that can cause potential danger to Personnel, Equipment, Environment, as well as system operability.
iFluids Engineering is a leading provider of HAZOP study consulting services in India & have extensive experience working on HAZOP studies in India, Qatar, Oman, Tunisia, and many other countries
A Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study is a systematic technique used to identify potential hazards and operability problems in processes. It involves a multidisciplinary team systematically examining a process or operation using guidewords to identify deviations from the design intent and hazards associated with those deviations. The document provides an overview of HAZOP studies, including their objectives, methodology, terminology, and examples of their application.
HAZOP I Hazard and operability study I Risk Assessment I Gaurav Singh RajputGaurav Singh Rajput
The document describes a hazard and operability (HAZOP) study for a proposed olefin dimerization unit. A HAZOP study identifies potential hazards and operating problems by systematically applying guide words like "no," "more," and "less" to process parameters at critical locations. The summary provides results of applying the guide words to the line section from an intermediate storage tank to a buffer/settling tank. Deviations considered include no flow, more flow, and the presence of water or other impurities. Potential causes and consequences of each deviation are examined along with recommended actions.
Basic understanding of HAZOP it covers:
-Basic understanding of HAZOP
-HAZOP requirements
-How it works
-Case study
-HAZOP team
-Advantage & disadvantage
Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) | Gaurav Singh RajputGaurav Singh Rajput
This document provides an overview of Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) studies. It begins with defining what a HAZOP study is, which is a systematic technique used to identify potential hazards and operating problems in industrial processes. The document then discusses the origins and development of HAZOP methodology. It provides details on the objectives, procedures, guidelines and key aspects of conducting a HAZOP study, including dividing the process into sections, using guide words to identify possible deviations, and documenting causes, consequences and recommended actions. Overall, the document serves as an introduction to HAZOP studies, covering their fundamental principles and approaches.
This document provides an overview of Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) studies. It defines HAZOP as a systematic technique used to identify potential hazards and operating problems in industrial processes. The document traces the origins and development of HAZOP studies since the 1960s. It describes the objective, methodology, and typical applications of HAZOP for improving safety and operability. Key aspects covered include identifying deviations from normal operating conditions, evaluating causes and consequences, and suggesting corrective actions.
A HAZOP (Hazard and Operability) study is conducted to systematically examine process systems for potential hazards arising from deviations from the design intent. Key aspects of a HAZOP study include:
- Dividing the system into nodes and selecting a process parameter for each node
- Applying guidewords like "no", "more", or "less" to the parameter to identify potential deviations
- Evaluating the causes and consequences of each deviation
- Recommending actions to address identified hazards
The document provides an example of conducting a HAZOP study on a reactor cooling system, identifying a loss of cooling function as a potential deviation. This could lead to a runaway reaction and overpressuring of the
The document discusses various techniques for hazard identification and risk assessment, including Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP), Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA), and safety audits. It provides details on how to conduct HAZOPs, including composing the team, using guide words to identify deviations from the process's intentions, and documenting the results. The document also discusses how to apply these techniques at different stages of a project's lifecycle to identify hazards, their causes and consequences, and remedial actions needed to control risks.
The Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) is a structured and systematic assessment of a complex system, (such as process facility) in order to identify the hazards that can cause potential danger to Personnel, Equipment, Environment, as well as system operability.
iFluids Engineering is a leading provider of HAZOP study consulting services in India & have extensive experience working on HAZOP studies in India, Qatar, Oman, Tunisia, and many other countries
A Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study is a systematic technique used to identify potential hazards and operability problems in processes. It involves a multidisciplinary team systematically examining a process or operation using guidewords to identify deviations from the design intent and hazards associated with those deviations. The document provides an overview of HAZOP studies, including their objectives, methodology, terminology, and examples of their application.
HAZOP I Hazard and operability study I Risk Assessment I Gaurav Singh RajputGaurav Singh Rajput
The document describes a hazard and operability (HAZOP) study for a proposed olefin dimerization unit. A HAZOP study identifies potential hazards and operating problems by systematically applying guide words like "no," "more," and "less" to process parameters at critical locations. The summary provides results of applying the guide words to the line section from an intermediate storage tank to a buffer/settling tank. Deviations considered include no flow, more flow, and the presence of water or other impurities. Potential causes and consequences of each deviation are examined along with recommended actions.
The document provides information about Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP). It describes the purpose and methodology of HAZOP studies, including identifying potential hazards, deviations, and operability issues. The document outlines when HAZOP studies should be conducted, who should be involved in the team, and the benefits of performing these studies, such as identifying safety and process improvements.
This document discusses conducting a Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study. A HAZOP study is a systematic technique used to identify potential hazards and operating problems in a process. It involves examining process diagrams and considering how deviations from normal operating conditions could lead to hazardous situations. The document outlines the origins and development of HAZOP studies, their objectives, how and why they are used, and key aspects of conducting one such as focusing on specific nodes, parameters, and guide words to identify deviations, causes, consequences and actions.
The document discusses Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP), a technique used to identify potential hazards in chemical and nuclear process plants. A HAZOP is conducted by a multidisciplinary team who systematically reviews process parameters, such as flow, temperature and pressure, and identifies possible deviations from design intent using guide words. For each deviation, the team analyzes potential causes and consequences, and recommends actions to address hazards. The document provides examples of HAZOP guide words, process parameters, and outlines the typical HAZOP procedure and documentation format.
Hazop Training - Intermediate Level Course iFluidsJohn Kingsley
The Fundamentals of HAZOP Study
A hazard and operability study (HAZOP) is a structured and systematic examination of a complex planned or existing process or operation in order to identify and evaluate problems that may represent risks to personnel or equipment. In this online training, you will be learning The Fundamentals of HAZOP Study.
What you will learn
HAZOP Study Stands for Hazard and Operability Study. Hazop is the structured brainstorming technique to identify Hazards involved in a chemical process plant. It is an important Industrial Safety tool. HAZOP study is carried out during the design stage of the process plant or during carrying out any modification in the existing plant. Live interactive sessions over the internet, combined with practical examples completed offline and shared via email to us. You will simply require a computer with a reliable internet connection, a headset with a high-quality microphone.
Course Content
What is a HAZOP Study?
Definition of basic terms
Risk matrix/ALARP principle
When to Perform a HAZOP Study
Different stages of Hazop study and relevant Data requirement
HAZOP STUDY - TEAM COMPOSITION
Generally accepted rules of HAZOP
Overall HAZOP Methodology
Layers of protection/Safeguard
Hierarchy of controls (with simple example)
HAZOP Study-Example
https://trainings.ifluids.com/
HAZOP ANALYSIS
A Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study is a systematic technique used to identify potential problems in processes. It involves examining a system and considering how intended design can deviate. A multidisciplinary team applies guidewords to parameters at nodes to identify causes and consequences of deviations. The team then recommends safeguards. HAZOP is useful early in design and can be applied to processes, procedures, software and human factors. It provides a structured way to brainstorm hazards without requiring quantification of risks.
The document discusses process risk management through hazard identification and risk assessment. It introduces key concepts like hazard identification, risk assessment methodologies, and the goals of identifying hazards and reducing risks in advance. It describes methods for hazard identification like process checklists, "what if" analysis, and HAZOP studies. It also discusses risk assessment techniques like event tree analysis and fault tree analysis. Finally, it covers accident statistics, fire and explosion hazards, and flammability characteristics important for assessing process safety.
0 INTRODUCTION
The four main sources of Fugitive Emissions on most plants are valves, machine seals, re-makable joints and pressure relief devices. Other possible sources include open-ended lines, sampling connections, drains and vents.
Sometimes special precautions are taken to minimize Fugitive Emissions, for example the use of bellows seal valves. However, generally no special precautions are taken and the subsequent Fugitive Emissions to atmosphere represent a significant amount of plant losses.
Regulatory requirements covering Fugitive Emissions exist in many countries and therefore a leak reduction program should be implemented. Fugitive Emissions also represent financial losses to the business as well as potential damage to the environment.
Hazop Fundamentals Online Training iFluidsJohn Kingsley
This document provides an overview of HAZOP (Hazard and Operability) studies. It defines key terms like hazard, risk, and PHA. It explains that a HAZOP is a systematic technique used to identify potential problems in a process. It should be performed by a multidisciplinary team and involves analyzing deviations from the design intent using guidewords at nodes on piping and instrumentation diagrams. The team evaluates causes, consequences and recommends safeguards to address any issues identified.
Shutdowns of chemical plants can be dangerous, as an analysis showed accidents are five times more likely during shutdowns than normal operations. There are three types of shutdowns - normal, prolonged, and emergency - and a safety analysis must be conducted for each to prevent accidents. One way to safely manage shutdowns is through proper use of change management processes and avoiding flammable ranges when removing raw materials or finished products. A written shutdown procedure must always be used and include steps like isolating and purging lines, proving safe atmospheres, using proper personal protective equipment, and conducting pre-work meetings.
FMEA - What is FMEA. Everything about FMEA.Dheeraj Chavan
FMEA is a structured approach to recognize and evaluate potential failures and their effects. It identifies actions to eliminate or reduce failures and documents the process. FMEA involves assessing the severity, occurrence, and detection of potential failures to determine a risk priority number. Higher risk failures are prioritized for corrective actions like design changes or verifications. FMEA is conducted by a team and is an ongoing process throughout the product lifecycle to prevent known and potential problems.
Process Hazard Analysis for the safety and lawsJayaKarthic1
The document outlines the procedures for conducting a preliminary hazard analysis (PHA). The PHA focuses on identifying hazards associated with hazardous materials and major process areas in a plant during the development stage. The analysis procedure involves identifying hazards, determining causes and effects, assigning hazard categories, and recommending preventive measures. A sample PHA is included that analyzes toxic releases for a DAP reactor process and an H2S storage area, identifying what-if scenarios and corresponding corrective actions.
The document outlines the procedures for conducting a preliminary hazard analysis (PHA). The PHA focuses on hazardous materials and major process areas in a plant during the development stage. It involves identifying potential hazards, determining causes and effects, assigning hazard categories, and recommending preventative measures. An example PHA is provided for a DAP reactor process that analyzes toxic releases and recommends safety controls.
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is a systematic tool used to identify potential failures, their causes, and effects. It helps prioritize issues based on a Risk Priority Number calculated from severity, occurrence, and detection ratings. FMEA was first used in the aerospace industry and has since been applied to automotive and other sectors. The analysis involves identifying failure modes, causes, and effects, then taking actions to reduce risks.
This document provides an overview of Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP). It defines HAZOP as a formal procedure to identify hazards in chemical processes. The summary includes:
- HAZOP identifies potential hazards, failures, and operability problems through a team approach including designers, operators, and safety experts.
- The HAZOP process involves dividing the system into nodes, applying guide words like "no," "more," and "part of" to process parameters to suggest deviations, and evaluating causes and consequences to recommend actions.
- Benefits of HAZOP include fewer problems during commissioning and operation, improved safety and product quality, and evidence of due diligence for insurers.
1. The document discusses troubleshooting strategies and common problems in HPLC.
2. It outlines a 5-step troubleshooting strategy of identifying the problem, determining the cause, isolating the exact cause, rectifying the problem if possible, and returning the system to use.
3. Common problems discussed include issues with the mobile phase, pump, injector, detector, and peaks/baseline, along with potential causes and solutions for each.
Ammonia Plant Technology
Pre-Commissioning Best Practices
GBHE-APT-0102
PICKLING & PASSIVATION
CONTENTS
1 PURPOSE OF THE WORK
2 CHEMICAL CONCEPT
3 TECHNICAL CONCEPT
4 WASTES & SAFETY CONCEPT
5 TARGET RESULTS
6 THE GENERAL CLEANING SEQUENCE MANAGEMENT
6.6.1 Pre-cleaning or “Physical Cleaning
6.6.2 Pre-rinsing
6.6.3 Chemical Cleaning
6.6.4 Critical Factors in Cleaning Success
6.6.5 Rinsing
6.6.6 Inspection and Re-Cleaning, if Necessary
7 Systems to be treated by Pickling/Passivation
The document contains the resume of Osumanu Basiru. It summarizes his work experience as a Senior Operator at ADNOC subsidiary Abu Dhabi Gas Industry (GASCO) in the UAE since 2012, where he has responsibilities like monitoring facilities and providing work instructions to operators. It also outlines his previous role as a Senior Production Operator at a petroleum refinery in Ghana from 2006 to 2012.
HAZOP, or a Hazard and Operability Study, is a systematic way to identify possible hazards in a work process. In this approach, the process is broken down into steps, and every variation in work parameters is considered for each step, to see what could go wrong. HAZOP’s meticulous approach is commonly used with chemical production and piping systems, where miles of pipes and numerous containers can cause logistical headaches.
HAZOP and Hazard Analysis Systems
This document provides an overview of failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA). FMEA is a systematic process for identifying potential failures in a design, manufacturing or production process. It involves reviewing all possible failures, their causes and effects. Potential failures are then ranked according to severity, occurrence, and detection. This allows teams to prioritize high risk failures and identify actions to address them. The document outlines the basic FMEA process including defining potential failures and their effects, identifying causes, current controls and assigning ratings. It also describes how to calculate a risk priority number and use FMEAs to drive process improvement.
The document provides information about Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP). It describes the purpose and methodology of HAZOP studies, including identifying potential hazards, deviations, and operability issues. The document outlines when HAZOP studies should be conducted, who should be involved in the team, and the benefits of performing these studies, such as identifying safety and process improvements.
This document discusses conducting a Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study. A HAZOP study is a systematic technique used to identify potential hazards and operating problems in a process. It involves examining process diagrams and considering how deviations from normal operating conditions could lead to hazardous situations. The document outlines the origins and development of HAZOP studies, their objectives, how and why they are used, and key aspects of conducting one such as focusing on specific nodes, parameters, and guide words to identify deviations, causes, consequences and actions.
The document discusses Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP), a technique used to identify potential hazards in chemical and nuclear process plants. A HAZOP is conducted by a multidisciplinary team who systematically reviews process parameters, such as flow, temperature and pressure, and identifies possible deviations from design intent using guide words. For each deviation, the team analyzes potential causes and consequences, and recommends actions to address hazards. The document provides examples of HAZOP guide words, process parameters, and outlines the typical HAZOP procedure and documentation format.
Hazop Training - Intermediate Level Course iFluidsJohn Kingsley
The Fundamentals of HAZOP Study
A hazard and operability study (HAZOP) is a structured and systematic examination of a complex planned or existing process or operation in order to identify and evaluate problems that may represent risks to personnel or equipment. In this online training, you will be learning The Fundamentals of HAZOP Study.
What you will learn
HAZOP Study Stands for Hazard and Operability Study. Hazop is the structured brainstorming technique to identify Hazards involved in a chemical process plant. It is an important Industrial Safety tool. HAZOP study is carried out during the design stage of the process plant or during carrying out any modification in the existing plant. Live interactive sessions over the internet, combined with practical examples completed offline and shared via email to us. You will simply require a computer with a reliable internet connection, a headset with a high-quality microphone.
Course Content
What is a HAZOP Study?
Definition of basic terms
Risk matrix/ALARP principle
When to Perform a HAZOP Study
Different stages of Hazop study and relevant Data requirement
HAZOP STUDY - TEAM COMPOSITION
Generally accepted rules of HAZOP
Overall HAZOP Methodology
Layers of protection/Safeguard
Hierarchy of controls (with simple example)
HAZOP Study-Example
https://trainings.ifluids.com/
HAZOP ANALYSIS
A Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study is a systematic technique used to identify potential problems in processes. It involves examining a system and considering how intended design can deviate. A multidisciplinary team applies guidewords to parameters at nodes to identify causes and consequences of deviations. The team then recommends safeguards. HAZOP is useful early in design and can be applied to processes, procedures, software and human factors. It provides a structured way to brainstorm hazards without requiring quantification of risks.
The document discusses process risk management through hazard identification and risk assessment. It introduces key concepts like hazard identification, risk assessment methodologies, and the goals of identifying hazards and reducing risks in advance. It describes methods for hazard identification like process checklists, "what if" analysis, and HAZOP studies. It also discusses risk assessment techniques like event tree analysis and fault tree analysis. Finally, it covers accident statistics, fire and explosion hazards, and flammability characteristics important for assessing process safety.
0 INTRODUCTION
The four main sources of Fugitive Emissions on most plants are valves, machine seals, re-makable joints and pressure relief devices. Other possible sources include open-ended lines, sampling connections, drains and vents.
Sometimes special precautions are taken to minimize Fugitive Emissions, for example the use of bellows seal valves. However, generally no special precautions are taken and the subsequent Fugitive Emissions to atmosphere represent a significant amount of plant losses.
Regulatory requirements covering Fugitive Emissions exist in many countries and therefore a leak reduction program should be implemented. Fugitive Emissions also represent financial losses to the business as well as potential damage to the environment.
Hazop Fundamentals Online Training iFluidsJohn Kingsley
This document provides an overview of HAZOP (Hazard and Operability) studies. It defines key terms like hazard, risk, and PHA. It explains that a HAZOP is a systematic technique used to identify potential problems in a process. It should be performed by a multidisciplinary team and involves analyzing deviations from the design intent using guidewords at nodes on piping and instrumentation diagrams. The team evaluates causes, consequences and recommends safeguards to address any issues identified.
Shutdowns of chemical plants can be dangerous, as an analysis showed accidents are five times more likely during shutdowns than normal operations. There are three types of shutdowns - normal, prolonged, and emergency - and a safety analysis must be conducted for each to prevent accidents. One way to safely manage shutdowns is through proper use of change management processes and avoiding flammable ranges when removing raw materials or finished products. A written shutdown procedure must always be used and include steps like isolating and purging lines, proving safe atmospheres, using proper personal protective equipment, and conducting pre-work meetings.
FMEA - What is FMEA. Everything about FMEA.Dheeraj Chavan
FMEA is a structured approach to recognize and evaluate potential failures and their effects. It identifies actions to eliminate or reduce failures and documents the process. FMEA involves assessing the severity, occurrence, and detection of potential failures to determine a risk priority number. Higher risk failures are prioritized for corrective actions like design changes or verifications. FMEA is conducted by a team and is an ongoing process throughout the product lifecycle to prevent known and potential problems.
Process Hazard Analysis for the safety and lawsJayaKarthic1
The document outlines the procedures for conducting a preliminary hazard analysis (PHA). The PHA focuses on identifying hazards associated with hazardous materials and major process areas in a plant during the development stage. The analysis procedure involves identifying hazards, determining causes and effects, assigning hazard categories, and recommending preventive measures. A sample PHA is included that analyzes toxic releases for a DAP reactor process and an H2S storage area, identifying what-if scenarios and corresponding corrective actions.
The document outlines the procedures for conducting a preliminary hazard analysis (PHA). The PHA focuses on hazardous materials and major process areas in a plant during the development stage. It involves identifying potential hazards, determining causes and effects, assigning hazard categories, and recommending preventative measures. An example PHA is provided for a DAP reactor process that analyzes toxic releases and recommends safety controls.
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is a systematic tool used to identify potential failures, their causes, and effects. It helps prioritize issues based on a Risk Priority Number calculated from severity, occurrence, and detection ratings. FMEA was first used in the aerospace industry and has since been applied to automotive and other sectors. The analysis involves identifying failure modes, causes, and effects, then taking actions to reduce risks.
This document provides an overview of Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP). It defines HAZOP as a formal procedure to identify hazards in chemical processes. The summary includes:
- HAZOP identifies potential hazards, failures, and operability problems through a team approach including designers, operators, and safety experts.
- The HAZOP process involves dividing the system into nodes, applying guide words like "no," "more," and "part of" to process parameters to suggest deviations, and evaluating causes and consequences to recommend actions.
- Benefits of HAZOP include fewer problems during commissioning and operation, improved safety and product quality, and evidence of due diligence for insurers.
1. The document discusses troubleshooting strategies and common problems in HPLC.
2. It outlines a 5-step troubleshooting strategy of identifying the problem, determining the cause, isolating the exact cause, rectifying the problem if possible, and returning the system to use.
3. Common problems discussed include issues with the mobile phase, pump, injector, detector, and peaks/baseline, along with potential causes and solutions for each.
Ammonia Plant Technology
Pre-Commissioning Best Practices
GBHE-APT-0102
PICKLING & PASSIVATION
CONTENTS
1 PURPOSE OF THE WORK
2 CHEMICAL CONCEPT
3 TECHNICAL CONCEPT
4 WASTES & SAFETY CONCEPT
5 TARGET RESULTS
6 THE GENERAL CLEANING SEQUENCE MANAGEMENT
6.6.1 Pre-cleaning or “Physical Cleaning
6.6.2 Pre-rinsing
6.6.3 Chemical Cleaning
6.6.4 Critical Factors in Cleaning Success
6.6.5 Rinsing
6.6.6 Inspection and Re-Cleaning, if Necessary
7 Systems to be treated by Pickling/Passivation
The document contains the resume of Osumanu Basiru. It summarizes his work experience as a Senior Operator at ADNOC subsidiary Abu Dhabi Gas Industry (GASCO) in the UAE since 2012, where he has responsibilities like monitoring facilities and providing work instructions to operators. It also outlines his previous role as a Senior Production Operator at a petroleum refinery in Ghana from 2006 to 2012.
HAZOP, or a Hazard and Operability Study, is a systematic way to identify possible hazards in a work process. In this approach, the process is broken down into steps, and every variation in work parameters is considered for each step, to see what could go wrong. HAZOP’s meticulous approach is commonly used with chemical production and piping systems, where miles of pipes and numerous containers can cause logistical headaches.
HAZOP and Hazard Analysis Systems
This document provides an overview of failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA). FMEA is a systematic process for identifying potential failures in a design, manufacturing or production process. It involves reviewing all possible failures, their causes and effects. Potential failures are then ranked according to severity, occurrence, and detection. This allows teams to prioritize high risk failures and identify actions to address them. The document outlines the basic FMEA process including defining potential failures and their effects, identifying causes, current controls and assigning ratings. It also describes how to calculate a risk priority number and use FMEAs to drive process improvement.
Introduction- e - waste – definition - sources of e-waste– hazardous substances in e-waste - effects of e-waste on environment and human health- need for e-waste management– e-waste handling rules - waste minimization techniques for managing e-waste – recycling of e-waste - disposal treatment methods of e- waste – mechanism of extraction of precious metal from leaching solution-global Scenario of E-waste – E-waste in India- case studies.
Comparative analysis between traditional aquaponics and reconstructed aquapon...bijceesjournal
The aquaponic system of planting is a method that does not require soil usage. It is a method that only needs water, fish, lava rocks (a substitute for soil), and plants. Aquaponic systems are sustainable and environmentally friendly. Its use not only helps to plant in small spaces but also helps reduce artificial chemical use and minimizes excess water use, as aquaponics consumes 90% less water than soil-based gardening. The study applied a descriptive and experimental design to assess and compare conventional and reconstructed aquaponic methods for reproducing tomatoes. The researchers created an observation checklist to determine the significant factors of the study. The study aims to determine the significant difference between traditional aquaponics and reconstructed aquaponics systems propagating tomatoes in terms of height, weight, girth, and number of fruits. The reconstructed aquaponics system’s higher growth yield results in a much more nourished crop than the traditional aquaponics system. It is superior in its number of fruits, height, weight, and girth measurement. Moreover, the reconstructed aquaponics system is proven to eliminate all the hindrances present in the traditional aquaponics system, which are overcrowding of fish, algae growth, pest problems, contaminated water, and dead fish.
Redefining brain tumor segmentation: a cutting-edge convolutional neural netw...IJECEIAES
Medical image analysis has witnessed significant advancements with deep learning techniques. In the domain of brain tumor segmentation, the ability to
precisely delineate tumor boundaries from magnetic resonance imaging (MRI)
scans holds profound implications for diagnosis. This study presents an ensemble convolutional neural network (CNN) with transfer learning, integrating
the state-of-the-art Deeplabv3+ architecture with the ResNet18 backbone. The
model is rigorously trained and evaluated, exhibiting remarkable performance
metrics, including an impressive global accuracy of 99.286%, a high-class accuracy of 82.191%, a mean intersection over union (IoU) of 79.900%, a weighted
IoU of 98.620%, and a Boundary F1 (BF) score of 83.303%. Notably, a detailed comparative analysis with existing methods showcases the superiority of
our proposed model. These findings underscore the model’s competence in precise brain tumor localization, underscoring its potential to revolutionize medical
image analysis and enhance healthcare outcomes. This research paves the way
for future exploration and optimization of advanced CNN models in medical
imaging, emphasizing addressing false positives and resource efficiency.
Embedded machine learning-based road conditions and driving behavior monitoringIJECEIAES
Car accident rates have increased in recent years, resulting in losses in human lives, properties, and other financial costs. An embedded machine learning-based system is developed to address this critical issue. The system can monitor road conditions, detect driving patterns, and identify aggressive driving behaviors. The system is based on neural networks trained on a comprehensive dataset of driving events, driving styles, and road conditions. The system effectively detects potential risks and helps mitigate the frequency and impact of accidents. The primary goal is to ensure the safety of drivers and vehicles. Collecting data involved gathering information on three key road events: normal street and normal drive, speed bumps, circular yellow speed bumps, and three aggressive driving actions: sudden start, sudden stop, and sudden entry. The gathered data is processed and analyzed using a machine learning system designed for limited power and memory devices. The developed system resulted in 91.9% accuracy, 93.6% precision, and 92% recall. The achieved inference time on an Arduino Nano 33 BLE Sense with a 32-bit CPU running at 64 MHz is 34 ms and requires 2.6 kB peak RAM and 139.9 kB program flash memory, making it suitable for resource-constrained embedded systems.
KuberTENes Birthday Bash Guadalajara - K8sGPT first impressionsVictor Morales
K8sGPT is a tool that analyzes and diagnoses Kubernetes clusters. This presentation was used to share the requirements and dependencies to deploy K8sGPT in a local environment.
International Conference on NLP, Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning an...gerogepatton
International Conference on NLP, Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning and Applications (NLAIM 2024) offers a premier global platform for exchanging insights and findings in the theory, methodology, and applications of NLP, Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning, and their applications. The conference seeks substantial contributions across all key domains of NLP, Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning, and their practical applications, aiming to foster both theoretical advancements and real-world implementations. With a focus on facilitating collaboration between researchers and practitioners from academia and industry, the conference serves as a nexus for sharing the latest developments in the field.
Harnessing WebAssembly for Real-time Stateless Streaming PipelinesChristina Lin
Traditionally, dealing with real-time data pipelines has involved significant overhead, even for straightforward tasks like data transformation or masking. However, in this talk, we’ll venture into the dynamic realm of WebAssembly (WASM) and discover how it can revolutionize the creation of stateless streaming pipelines within a Kafka (Redpanda) broker. These pipelines are adept at managing low-latency, high-data-volume scenarios.
TIME DIVISION MULTIPLEXING TECHNIQUE FOR COMMUNICATION SYSTEMHODECEDSIET
Time Division Multiplexing (TDM) is a method of transmitting multiple signals over a single communication channel by dividing the signal into many segments, each having a very short duration of time. These time slots are then allocated to different data streams, allowing multiple signals to share the same transmission medium efficiently. TDM is widely used in telecommunications and data communication systems.
### How TDM Works
1. **Time Slots Allocation**: The core principle of TDM is to assign distinct time slots to each signal. During each time slot, the respective signal is transmitted, and then the process repeats cyclically. For example, if there are four signals to be transmitted, the TDM cycle will divide time into four slots, each assigned to one signal.
2. **Synchronization**: Synchronization is crucial in TDM systems to ensure that the signals are correctly aligned with their respective time slots. Both the transmitter and receiver must be synchronized to avoid any overlap or loss of data. This synchronization is typically maintained by a clock signal that ensures time slots are accurately aligned.
3. **Frame Structure**: TDM data is organized into frames, where each frame consists of a set of time slots. Each frame is repeated at regular intervals, ensuring continuous transmission of data streams. The frame structure helps in managing the data streams and maintaining the synchronization between the transmitter and receiver.
4. **Multiplexer and Demultiplexer**: At the transmitting end, a multiplexer combines multiple input signals into a single composite signal by assigning each signal to a specific time slot. At the receiving end, a demultiplexer separates the composite signal back into individual signals based on their respective time slots.
### Types of TDM
1. **Synchronous TDM**: In synchronous TDM, time slots are pre-assigned to each signal, regardless of whether the signal has data to transmit or not. This can lead to inefficiencies if some time slots remain empty due to the absence of data.
2. **Asynchronous TDM (or Statistical TDM)**: Asynchronous TDM addresses the inefficiencies of synchronous TDM by allocating time slots dynamically based on the presence of data. Time slots are assigned only when there is data to transmit, which optimizes the use of the communication channel.
### Applications of TDM
- **Telecommunications**: TDM is extensively used in telecommunication systems, such as in T1 and E1 lines, where multiple telephone calls are transmitted over a single line by assigning each call to a specific time slot.
- **Digital Audio and Video Broadcasting**: TDM is used in broadcasting systems to transmit multiple audio or video streams over a single channel, ensuring efficient use of bandwidth.
- **Computer Networks**: TDM is used in network protocols and systems to manage the transmission of data from multiple sources over a single network medium.
### Advantages of TDM
- **Efficient Use of Bandwidth**: TDM all
DEEP LEARNING FOR SMART GRID INTRUSION DETECTION: A HYBRID CNN-LSTM-BASED MODELgerogepatton
As digital technology becomes more deeply embedded in power systems, protecting the communication
networks of Smart Grids (SG) has emerged as a critical concern. Distributed Network Protocol 3 (DNP3)
represents a multi-tiered application layer protocol extensively utilized in Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition (SCADA)-based smart grids to facilitate real-time data gathering and control functionalities.
Robust Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are necessary for early threat detection and mitigation because
of the interconnection of these networks, which makes them vulnerable to a variety of cyberattacks. To
solve this issue, this paper develops a hybrid Deep Learning (DL) model specifically designed for intrusion
detection in smart grids. The proposed approach is a combination of the Convolutional Neural Network
(CNN) and the Long-Short-Term Memory algorithms (LSTM). We employed a recent intrusion detection
dataset (DNP3), which focuses on unauthorized commands and Denial of Service (DoS) cyberattacks, to
train and test our model. The results of our experiments show that our CNN-LSTM method is much better
at finding smart grid intrusions than other deep learning algorithms used for classification. In addition,
our proposed approach improves accuracy, precision, recall, and F1 score, achieving a high detection
accuracy rate of 99.50%.
3. A SCENARIO….
You and your friends are on a road trip by using a car in the middle
of the night. You were replying a text message while driving at 100
km/h and it was raining heavily. The car hits a deep hole and one of
your tire blows. You hit the brake, but due to slippery road and your
car tire thread was thin, the car skidded and was thrown off the
road.
3
4. POINTS TO PONDER
What is the cause of the accident?
What is the consequence of the event?
What can we do to prevent all those things to happen in the first place?
What other possible accidents might happen on the road trip?
Can we be prepared before the accident occurs?
4
5. Can we make it more systematic?
Parameter Guideword Possible
Causes
Consequences Action Safeguard
Car speed Too fast
Too slow
Rushing Skidded when
emergency brake
- Slow down
- Speed up
-ABS brake system
-Safety belt
- Air bag
Tire No thread
Less thread
Tire too old, often
speeding and
emergency break
Car skidded - Check frequently
- Have spare tire
Window
visibility
Low
Very low
Rain Cannot see the road
Car light Dim
No light
-Stop car
-Go to nearest garage
-Use emergency signal
Road With holes
Rocky
Breaks the car tire - Put a signboard
-Street lights
Travel time Night
Foggy
No street light -Travel during daylight
5
6. HAZOP ?
A Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study is a structured and systematic examination of a
planned or existing process or operation in order to identify and evaluate problems that may
represent risks to personnel or equipment, or prevent efficient operation.
A HAZOP is a qualitative technique based on guide-words and is carried out by a HAZOPteam
during a set of meetings.
A HAZOP is a process to identify and Accessrisks.
6
7. Objective of HAZOP
7
• For identifying cause and the consequences of perceived mal
operations of equipment and associated operator interfaces in
the context of the complete system.
• It accommodates the status of recognized design standards
and codes of practice but rightly questions the relevance of
these in specific circumstances where hazards may remain
undetected.
12. Team Members & Their
Responsibility
HAZOP team leader HAZOP secretary HAZOP team members
Responsibilities: Responsibilities: The basic team for a
1.Define the scope for the 1.Prepare HAZOP process plant will be:
analysis
2.Select HAZOPteam
members
worksheets
2.Record the discussion in
the HAZOP meetings
Project engineer
o Commissioning manager
o Process engineer
o Instrument/electrical
3.Plan and prepare the 3.Prepare draft report(s)
engineer
oSafety engineer
study
4.Chair the HAZOP
meetings
13. HAZOP meeting
Proposed agenda:
1.Introduction and presentation of participants.
2.Overall presentation of the system/operation to be analysed.
3.Description of the HAZOP approach.
4.Presentation of the first node or logical part of the operation.
5.Analyse the first node/part using the guide-words and parameters.
6.Continue presentation and analysis (steps 4 and 5)
7.Coarse summary of findings.
Focus should be on potential hazards as well as potential operational
problems.
Each session of the HAZOP meeting should not exceed two hours.
7
15. HAZOP procedure
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
1.Divide the system into sections (i.e., reactor, storage)
2.Choose a study node (i.e., line, vessel, pump, operating
instruction)
3.Describe the design intent
4.Select a process parameter
5.Apply a guide-word
6.Determine cause(s)
7.Evaluate consequences/problems
8.Recommend action: What? When? Who?
9.Record information
10.Repeat procedure (from step 2)
Indrajit
Das;REC;IIT-KGP
1
5
16.
17. Causes & Consequences
Causes: The reason(s) why the deviation could occur. Several
causes may be identified for one deviation. It is often
recommended to start with the causes that may result in the
worst possible consequence.
Consequences: The results of the deviation, in case it occurs.
Consequences may both comprise process hazards and
operability problems, like plant shut-down or reduced quality of
the product. Several consequences may follow from one cause
and, in turn, one consequence can have several causes.
1
7
18. Safeguards
Facilities that help to reduce the occurrence frequency of the
deviation or to mitigate its consequences. There are five types of
safeguards that:
1.Identify the deviation:
2.Compensate for the deviation:
3.Prevent the deviation from occurring:
4.Prevent further escalation of the deviation:
5.Relieve the process from the hazardous deviation.
19. • HAZOP technique is used by most major companies handling and
processing hazardous material,
- oil and gas production
- flammable and toxic chemicals
- pharmaceuticals etc
Where HAZOP is used ?
11
20. 7 steps of HAZOP ?
Let’s break down a HAZOP into 7 steps:
1. Identify the Risk by asking what can cause a hazardous event.
2. Describe the consequence and assign a severity level.
3. Assess the probability of the cause.
4. Evaluate the Risk based on the severity and probability without any safeguards
5. Look up your Risk Matrix to categorize the Risk.
6. Assess the Risk with Safeguards
7. Make a decision to accept the Risk or make a recommendation to further reduce
the risk.
12
21. GUIDE WORDS *
POSSIBLE CAUSES DEVIATION ( FROM DESIGN AND/OR
OPERATING INTENT )
CONSEQUENCES
ACTION(S) REQUIRED OR RECOMMENDEED
HAZOP Study Procedure
21
22. Guide Words
22
NONE
MORE
No forward flow when there should be
More of any parameter than there should be,
e.g more flow, more pressure, more
temperature, etc.
LESS
PART
MORE THAN
OTHER
As above, but "less of" in each instance
System composition difference from what it
should be
More "components" present than there should
be for example, extra phase, impurities
What needs to happen other than normal
operation, e.g. start up,shutdown, maintenance
23. Guide Words
23
MORE OF
LESS OF
LESS
PART OF
MORE TEMPERATURE, pressure caused by external
fires; blockage ; shot spots; loss of control ; foaming;
gas release; reaction;explosion; valve closed; loss of
level in heater; sun.
e.g., LESS FLOW caused by pump failure; leak; scale in
delivery; partial blockage ; sediments ; poor suction
head; process turndown.
e.g., low temperature, pressure caused by Heat loss;
vaporisation ; ambient conditions; rain ; imbalance of
input and output ; sealing ; blocked vent .
Change in composition high or low concentration of
mixture; additional reactions in reactor or other
location ; feed change.
24. Guide Words
■ Impurities or extra phase Ingress of contaminants such as air,
water, lube oils; corrosion products; presence of other process
materials due to internal leakage ; failure of isolation ; start-up
features.
■ Activities other than normal operation start-up and shutdown of
plant ; testing and inspection ;
■ sampling ; maintenance; activating catalyst; removing blockage or
scale ; corrosion; process emergency ; safety procedures
activated ; failure of power, fuel, steam , air, water or inert gas;
emissions and lack of compatibility with other emission and
effluents.
24
MORE THAN
OTHER
25.
26.
27.
28. HAZOP Study Form
28
Sheet 1 of
HAZOP STUDY REPORT FORM
TITLE :
LINE 1 :
CAUSES
DEVIATION
CONSEQUENCES EXISTING PROVISIONS ACTIONS, QUESTIONS OR
RECOMMENDATIONS
29. HAZOP Study
29
HAZOP study are applied during :
• Normal operation
• Foreseeable changes in operation, e.g. upgrading, reduced
output, plant start-up and shut-down
• Suitability of plant materials, equipment and instrumentation
• Provision for failure of plant services, e. g . steam, electricity,
cooling water
• Provision for maintenance.
31. Preli minary HAZOP Exampl
e
31
T
C
Cooling Coils
Monomer
Feed
Cooling Water to Sewer
Cooling
Water In
Thermocouple
Refer to reactor system shown.
The reaction is exothermic. A cooling system is
provided to remove the excess energy of reaction.
In the event of cooling function is lost, the
temperature of reactor would increase. This would
lead to an increase in reaction rate leading to
additional energy release.
The result could be a runaway reaction with
pressures exceeding the bursting pressure of the
reactor. The temperature within the reactor is
measured and is used to control the cooling water
flow rate by a valve.
Perform HAZOP Study
32. Prel i minary HAZOP
on
32
React or -
Causes Action
Guide Word
NO
Deviation
No cooling
Exampl e
Consequences
Temperature increase
in reactor
REVERSE Reverse cooling
flow
Failure of water
source resulting in
backward flow
MORE More cooling
flow
Instruct operators
on procedures
AS WELL AS Reactor product
in coils
Check maintenance
procedures and
schedules
OTHER THAN Another
material besides
cooling water
Water source
contaminated
33. Prel i minary HAZOP
on React or –
Answer
Deviation Causes Consequences Action
33
Guide Word
NO No cooling Cooling water valve
malfunction
Temperature increase in
reactor
Install hightemperature
alarm (TAH)
REVERSE Reverse cooling
flow
Failure of water source
resulting in backward
flow
Less cooling, possible runaway
reaction
Install check valve
MORE More cooling flow Control valve failure,
operator fails to take action
on alarm
Too much cooling, reactor cool Instruct operators on
procedures
AS WELL AS Reactor product
in coils
More pressure in reactor Off-spec product Check maintenance
procedures and
schedules
OTHER THAN Another material
besides cooling
water
Water source
contaminated
May be cooling inefffective
and effect on the reaction
If less cooling, TAH will
detect. If detected, isolate
water source. Back up
water source?
34. HAZOP - Hazard and Operability
34
Nodes
Parameters
Guide
words
Consequence
Deviation
All of these terms! This stupid table!
I hate HAZOPS. Why don’t we just
learn the engineering?
ATTITUDE CHECK
36. 57
HAZOP - Hazard and Operability
Without HAZOP
How will you focus all
members of a team on the
key issues in a systematic
manner?
You are
responsible for
the safety team.