HAZOP Module.pptx

HAZOP Module
By Manoj Shinde
Alky Amines Chemical Ltd

Concept
• This guidance has been prepared to help you play a full part in a
HAZOP study as a Team Member, HAZOP Recorder or Leader
• HAZOP process is based on the principle that a team approach
to hazard analysis will identify more problems than when
individuals working separately combine results.
• HAZOP team is made up of individuals with varying backgrounds
and expertise.
• The expertise is brought together during HAZOP sessions and
through a collective brainstorming effort that stimulates
creativity and new ideas, a thorough review of the process
under consideration is made.

Philosophy
• HAZOPs concentrate on identifying both hazards as well as
operability problems.
• While the HAZOP study is designed to identify hazards through a
systematic approach, more than 80% of study recommendations
are operability problems and are not, of themselves, hazards.
• Although hazards identification is the main focus, operability
problems should be identified to the extent that they have the
potential to lead to process hazards, results in an environment
violation or have a negative impact on profitability.

Definitions
• Actions (or recommendations):
suggestions for design changes, procedural changes , or
areas for further study (e.g. adding a redundant pressure alarm or reversing the
sequence of two operating steps )
• Availability :
The probability that an item of equipment or a control system will perform its
intended task
• Causes :
Reasons why deviations might occur. Once a deviation has been shown to have a
credible cause, it can be treated as a meaningful deviation. These causes can be
hardware failures, human errors, unanticipated process states (e.g. change of
composition), external disruptions (e.g. loss of power ) etc.
• Consequences :
Results of deviations (e.g. release of toxic materials ). Normally the team assumes
active protection systems fail to work. Minor consequences, unrelated to the study
objective. Are not considered.

Definitions
• Design freeze :
No further change can be made to the designs
• Emergency shutdown:
Commonly used terminology to refer to the safeguarding systems intended to shut down a plant in
case of a process parameter limit- excess.
• EUC(Equipment under Control ):
Equipment, machinery, apparatus or plant used for manufacturing, process , transportation,
medical or other activities
• EUC Control system:
System which responds to input signals from the process and or from an operator and generates
output signals causing the EUC to operate in the desired manner.
• Guide words:
Simple words that are to qualify the design intention and to guide and stimulate the
brainstorming process for identifying process hazards.
• Hazard
Any operational that could possibly cause a catastrophic release of toxic, flammable or explosive
chemicals or any action that results in injury to personnel .

Definitions
• Deviations :
Departures from the design intention that are discovered by
systematically applying the guide words to process parameters (flow ,
Pressure , etc.) resulting in a list for the team to review (no flow, high
pressure , etc.) for each process section. Teams often supplement
their list of deviations with ad hoc items.
• HAZOP :
Term applied to the structured and systematic examination of a
process or system of parts to find possible hazards and operability
problems. A process hazards analysis procedure originally developed
by ICI in the 1970s. The method is highly structured and divides the
process into different parts of each node based on an array of
possible deviation conditions or guidewords.

Definitions
• Independent Protection layers (IPL):
This refers to various other methods of risk reduction possible for a process.
Examples include items such as rupture disks and relief valves which will
independently reduce the like hood of the hazard escalating into a full accident
with a harmful outcome. In order to be effective, each layer must specifically
prevent the hazards in question from causing harm, act independently of other
layers, have a reasonable probability of working, and be able to be audited once
the plant is operation relative to its original expected performance.
• Intention
Definition of how the plant is expected to operate in he absence of deviation.
Takes a number of forms and can be either descriptive or diagrammatic (e.g.,
process description, flow sheets, line diagrams, P&IDs.).

Definitions
• Likelihood:
The frequency of a harmful event often expressed in events per
year or events per million hours. One of the two components
used to define a risk. Note that this is different from the
traditional English definition that means probability.
• Operability :
Any operation inside the design envelope that would cause a
shutdown that could possibly lead to a violation of
environmental, health or safety regulations or negatively impact
profitability.
• Piping and instrumentation drawing (P&ID):
Shows the interconnection of process equipment and
instrumentation used to control the process. In the process
industry, a standard set of symbols is used to prepare drawings of
processes.

Definitions
• Process Parameter:
Physical or chemical property associated with the process . It
includes general items such as reaction, mixing, concentration, pH,
and specific items such as temperature, pressure, phase, and flow.
• Process sections(or Study Nodes):
Sections of equipment with definite boundaries (e.g. a line between
two vessels ) within which process parameters are investigated for
the deviations (e.g., reactors).
• Proof test:
Testing of safety system components to detect any failures not
detected by automatic on-line diagnostics i.e. dangerous failures,
diagnostic failures, parametric failures followed by the repair of
those failures to an equivalent that a system achieves its required
safety integrity level throughout the safety lifecycle.

Definitions
• Redundancy :
It is the use of multiple elements or systems to perform the same
function. Redundancy can be implemented by identical elements
(identical redundancy) or by diverse elements (diverse redundancy).
Redundancy is primarily used to improve reliability or availability.
• Reliability:
The probability that no functional failures has occurred in a system
during a given period of time.
• Safeguards :
Engineered systems or administrative controls designed to prevent
the causes or mitigate the consequences of deviations(e.g. process
alarms , interlocks, procedures).

HAZOP in various Operational Phases
• HAZOP studies are one of the structured hazards analysis tools most suitable in
the later stages of detailed design for examining operating facilities, and when
changes to existing facilities are made.
• Application of HAZOP and other methods of analysis during the various lifecycle
phases of a system are described in more details below.
1. Concept and Definition phase:
• In this phase of a system's life cycle, the design concept and major system parts
are decided but the detailed design and documentation required to conduct
not exist
• However, it is necessary to identify major hazards at this time, to allow them to
be considered in the design process and to facilitate future HAZOP studies.
• To carry out these studies, other basic methods should be used. (For descriptions
of these methods, see IEC 60300-3-9.)

2. Design and Development phase:
• During this phase of a life cycle, detailed design is developed, methods of
operation are
decided upon and documentation is prepared
• The design reaches maturity and is frozen.
• The best time to carry out a HAZOP study is just before the design is frozen.
• . At this stage the design is sufficiently detailed to allow the questioning
mechanism of a
HAZOP to obtain meaningful answers.
• It is important to have a system that will assess the implications of any
changes made
after the HAZOP has been carried out
3. Manufacturing and Installation phase:
• It is advisable to carry out a study before the system is started up. if
commissioning and operation of the system can be hazardous and proper
operating sequences and instructions are critical, or when there has been a
substantial change of intent in a late stage.

4. Operation and Maintenance phase:
• The application of HAZOP should be considered before implementing any
changes that could affect the safety or operability of a system or have
environmental effects.
A procedure should also be put in place for periodic reviews of a system to
counteract the effects of "creeping change".
• It is important that the design documentation and operating instructions
used in a study are up to date.
5. Decommissioning or Disposal phase:
• A study of this phase may be required, due to hazards that may not be
present during normal operation. If records from previous studies exist, this
study can be carried out expeditiously.
Records should be kept throughout the life of the system in order to ensure
that the decommissioning issues can be dealt with expeditiously.

Team Members
The HAZOP process is a team approach to hazard identification. This is important
because when working as a team, more problems can be identified than when
individuals working separately combine results.
The HAZOP team is made up of individual with varying backgrounds and expertise. The
expertise is brought together during HAZOP sessions and through a collective
brainstorming effort that stimulates creativity and new ideas, a thorough review of the
process under consideration is made. This creativity results from the interaction of the
team and their diverse backgrounds.
Consequently the process requires that all team members participate, and team
members must refrain from criticizing each other to the point that members hesitate to
suggest ideas.
Ideally, the team consists of five to seven members, although a smaller team could be
sufficient for a smaller plant. If the team is too large, the group approach fails.
On the other hand, if the group is too small, it may lack the breadth of knowledge
needed to assure completeness. The team leader should have experience in leading a
HAZOP.

Team Members
The team should be experts in areas relevant to the plant operation. For
example, a team might include:
1. Design engineer
2. 2. Process engineer
3. 3. Operations supervisor
4. 4. Instrument design engineer
5. 5. Maintenance supervisor
6. 6. Safety engineer
The discussion is by the HAZOP Leader who will keep the team focused on the
key task: to identify problems, not necessarily to solve them.
There is a strong tendency for engineers to launch into a design or problem
solving modes soon as a new problem comes to light.
Unless obvious solutions are apparent, this mode should be avoided or it will
detract from the primary purpose of HAZOP, which is hazard identification.

Roles & Responsibilities of Team Members
1. Chairman/Independent leader:
The team leader should be independent (i.e., no responsibility of the process and/or the
performance of operations). His responsibilities include.
• Plan sessions and time table
• Control discussion
• Limit discussion
• Encourage team to draw conclusion
• Ensure secretary has time for taking note
• Keep team in focus
• Encourage imagination of team members
• Motivate members
• Discourage recriminations
• Judge importance issues
2. HAZOP Secretary/Scribe:
Scribe documents the proceedings including recording attendance. Prepares and completes the
worksheets as the study progresses. Scribe records the HAZOP Session and the discussion of the
HAZOP team. Reads back conclusions for agreement as each item is covered. The study leader may
sometimes do this job but it can distract from the promotion of thinking and control of the
meeting. Sometimes one of the team members involved can do this.

HAZOP study can be recorded in MS Word, MS Excel or using any other PHA software. Any good software (PHA Pro)
package makes this job much easier, more efficient and less time consuming.
• Responsibilities:
• Take adequate notes
• Record documentations
• Inform leader if more time required in taking notes
• If unclear, check wording before writing.
• Produce interim lists of recommendations.
• Produce draft report of study
• Check progress of chase action
• Produce final report
3. Design Engineer and Process Engineer
He explains the design and its representation on the diagrams and drawings under review. Explains how the system
may respond to suggested deviations. This person's knowledge of the system is essential but his/her assumptions
can be challenged. Responsibilities:
• Provide a simple description
• Provide design intention for each process unit
• Provide information on process conditions and design conditions
• Provide a simple description
• Provide design intention for each process unit
Provide information on process conditions and design conditions

4. Operations Supervisor:
Explains the operational context for the parts under study. In process plants the commissioning
manager is the essential person here. He/she will have to start up and operate the plant and
train others to do the same. This person is sure to be keen on making changes that make for
more practical operating. Their practical experience is essential to balance the plans of the
designers.
Responsibilities:• Provide guidance on control instrumentation integrity from an operating
experience view point• Provide for study on existing plant) information on plant stability at the
specified control parameters• Provide information on experienced operability deviations of
hazard potential
5. Instrument Design Engineer:
The instrument engineer represents the technical and functional aspects of the control system
as part of the process equipment. This person can advise on control system responses to
deviations and as causes of deviations. The second role is to advise on the performance of
safeguards employing alarms and trips. The instrument engineer will be required to implement
any new safety instrumentation measures called for during the studies. He/she will want to
collect the best possible information on safety system requirements at the time of the study.

Responsibilities:• Provide details of control philosophy• Provide interlock and alarm details• Provide
info on shutdown, safety features
1. Maintenance Supervisor:
This person may be needed where maintenance of the plant is complex or hazardous. Many
operability problems are associated with maintenance and many accidents occur during maintenance.
2. Safety Engineer:
This person will represent the interest of occupational safety and health and may be required to serve
as an independent observation.
3. Other specialist:
They provide expertise relative to the system and the study as needed. This may only require limited
participation but the team leader will have to decide on the times when such persons are needed.
Likely candidates include:
• Research chemist for new processes
• Electrical engineer Environmental pollution specialist
• Effluent treatment specialists
• Control system software engineer
4. Contractor and client representatives:
If the plant is being designed by a contractor, the HAZOP team should contain representatives from
both contractor and client. This may result in some duplication of the above the roles but is generally
necessary do to the alternative perspectives of the parties.

1. Process Description
2. PFD (Process Flow Diagram)
3. P & ID ( Process and Instrumentation Diagram)
4. Cause & Effects Diagram (Details about alarms, trips, Interlock,
etc.)
5. Design Conditions and Operating conditions
6. SOP / Operating Instructions (Optional)
7. MSDS of major chemicals
8. Details on Site Conditions (Optional)
9. Emergency Procedures/ Shut down procedures (For Reference)
Note: Other documents may also be required for reference. Examples of such
documents are:• Plant layout• PSV set values• Specific study reports (ex. Surge
analysis report, dust explosion study, reaction calorimetric study, etc.

HAZOP Pre-concessions
Throughout the HAZOP session, the following considerations should be adopted:
1. No design work / quantitative analysis are to be performed during HAZOP meeting.
2. Equipment is deemed suitable for the specified design conditions.
3. in principle, only single failure results in hazards - no double jeopardy.
4. All process vents, discharge lines from PSVS/PSEs are routed properly and situated at
appropriate height which is appropriate to disperse the gases to non-hazardous concentration.
Also, the vents are provided with flame arresters if required
5. Plant is well maintained and operated in accordance with acceptable standards..
6. Failures of instrument gauges were not considered.
7. Mechanical protection devices (PSVs. rupture discs) are expected to work.
8. If there is more than one train/pass, study of one typical node shall be carried out.
9. Single check valve is used unless reverse flow may cause pressure to exceed test pressure.
10. The following items were not considered:
• Operator's negligence (except common human error)
• Natural calamity (e.g. flood, earthquake)
• Objects falling from sky
• Sabotage
11. The following are deemed as protection / safeguard:
• Interlock/shutdown system / trip
• Alarm system for operator action
• Sample monitoring system Operating instruction and operating manuals
• SOPS

HAZOP Process
The HAZOP team focuses on specific portions of the process called "nodes". Generally these are
identified from the P&ID of the process before the study begins.
A process parameter is identified, say flow, and an intention is created for the node under consideration.
Then a series of guidewords is combined with the parameter "flow" to create deviation. For example, the
guideword "no" is combined with the parameter flow to give the deviation "no flow".
The team then focuses on listing all the credible causes of a "no flow deviation beginning with the cause
that can result in the worst possible consequence the team can think of at the time. Once the causes are
recorded the team lists the consequences, safeguards and any recommendations deemed appropriate.
The process is repeated for the next deviation and so on until completion of the node The team moves
on to the next node and repeats the process.
Basic Principles
To obtain a full description of the process, including the intended
design conditions
To systematically examine every part of the process, to discover how
deviations from the intention of the design can occur
To decide whether these deviations can give rise to hazards and/or
operability problems
Typical HAZOP Process

HAZOP Process
The success or failure of the HAZOP depends on several factors:
• The completeness and accuracy of drawings and other data used
as a basis for the study
• The technical skills and insights of the team
• The ability of the team to use the approach as an aid to their
Imagination in visualizing deviations, causes, and consequences
• The ability of the team to concentrate on the more serious
hazards which are identified.

Typical HAZOP Worksheet
Nodes:
The locations (on piping and Instrumentation drawings and procedures at which the process
parameters are investigated for deviations are called Nodes.
Intention:
The intention defines how the plant is expected to operate in the absence of deviations at the study
nodes. This can take a number of forms and can either be descriptive or diagrammatic: e.g.. flow
sheets, line diagrams. P&IDs.
Deviation:
Deviations are departures from the intention which are discovered by systematically applying the
guide words (e.g., "more pressure"). Some deviations can be conveniently derived from a
combination of Guide-Words and Process Parameter. For example NO(Guideword) FLOW
(parameters) produces NO FLOW as deviation
Node : Design Intention:
Date P&ID NO:
Deviation Causes Consequence Existing
Provision/
Safeguard
Action/Recommendation

Guidewords
Guide words are simple words which are used to qualify or quantify the intention in order to guide
and stimulate the brainstorming process and so discover deviations. The guide words shown in Table
are the ones most often used in a HAZOP; some organizations have made this list specific to their
operations, to guide the team more quickly to the areas where they have previously found problems.
Each guide word is applied to the process variables at the pointing the plant (study node) which is
being examined. For example:
There are other useful modifications to guide words such as
SOONER or LATER for OTHER THAN when considering time
WHERE ELSE for OTHER THAN when considering position, sources, or destination
HIGHER and LOWER for MORE and LESS when considering elevations, temperatures, or pressures.
Guide Words
Meaning
No
Negation of Design Intent
More
Quantitative Increase
Less
Quantitative Decrease
Part Of
Quantitative Decrease
As Well As Quantitative Decrease
Reverse Logical Opposite of the Intention
Other Than
Complete Substitution

Parameters
These guide words are applicable to both the more general parameters (e.g., react, transfer)
and the more specific parameters le.. pressure, temperature). With the general parameters,
meaningful deviations are usually generated for each guide word. Examples of parameters are
given in Table Below.
General Parameter Specific Parameter Specific Parameter
REACTION FLOW,
TEMPERATURE,PRESSURE
CORROSION /
EROSION
SEPARATION LEVEL, COMPOSITION,
PHASE
SAMPLING
HEATING RELIEF
INSTRUMENTATION
ADDITION
SAFETY INSERTING/PURGING MAINTENANCE

Deviation
In practice, it is not unusual to have more than one deviation from the application of one guide
word. For example, "more reaction" could mean either than a reaction takes place at a faster rate, or
that a greater quantity of product results. With the specific parameters, some modification of the
guide words may be necessary. In addition, it is not unusual to find that some potential deviations
are eliminated by physical limitation. For example, if the design intention of a pressure or
temperature is being considered, the guide words "more" or "less" may be the only possibilities.
Deviations Generated From Guide words and Parameters
Guide Words
Parameter
Deviation
NO FLOW
NO FLOW
MORE PRESSURE
HIGH PRESSURE
AS WELL AS PHASE ONE
TWO PHASE
OTHER THAN OPERATION
MAINTENANCE

Causes and Consequence
Causes:
These are the reasons why deviations might occur. Once a deviation has been shown to
have a credible cause, it can be treated as a meaningful deviation. These causes can be
hardware failures, human errors, an unanticipated process state e.g., change of
composition), external disruptions (e.g., loss of power), etc.
Consequence:
The primary purpose of the HAZOP is identification of scenarios that would lead to there
lease of hazardous or flammable material into the atmosphere, thus exposing workers to
injury.
In order to make this determination it is always necessary to determine, as exactly as
possible, all consequences of any credible causes of a release that are identified by the
group. If the team concludes from the consequences that a particular cause of a deviation
results in an operability problem only, then the discussion should end and the team should
move on to the next cause, deviation or node.
If the team determines that the cause will result in the release of hazardous or flammable
material, then safeguards should be identified.

Existing Provision / Protection / Safeguard
Safeguards should be included whenever the team determines that a combination
of cause and consequence presents a credible process hazard. What constitutes a
safeguard can be summarized based on the following general criteria:
1. Those systems, engineered designs and written procedures that are designed
to prevent catastrophic release of hazardous or flammable material.
2. 2. Those systems that are designed to detect and give early warning following
the initiating cause of a release of hazardous or flammable material.
3. 3. Those systems or written procedures that mitigate the consequences of a
release of hazardous or flammable material.
The team should use care when listing safeguards. Hazards analysis requires an
evaluation of the consequences of failure of engineering and administrative
controls, so a careful determination of whether or not these items can actually be
considered safeguards must be made.
In addition, the team should consider realistic multiple failures and simultaneous
events when considering whether or not any of the above safeguards will actually
function as such in the event of an occurrence.

Action / Recommendation
Recommendations are made when the safeguards for a given hazard scenario, as judged by
an assessment of the risk of the scenario, are inadequate to protect against the hazard.
Action Items are those recommendations for whom an individual or department has been
assigned
Action Party:
To avoid misunderstanding, action party should be specified for each recommendation,
derived during the HAZOP session.

Risk Matrix in HAZOP
Traditionally, a HAZOP study and PHA are two sessions held separately,
producing two databases. HAZOP technique is guided by guide words
application (such as no more less) to each process variable (e.g., temperature,
flow, pressure) generating the deviation of operating standards (such as low
flow, the temperature). On the other hand, PHA allows the definition of risks
priorities through the use frequency and severity categories to determine a
risk value.
In this quantitative approach for a HAZOP, the aim is for integrating it with a
risk matrix. The core of this method is use the HAZOP identification and
diagnosis method (parameter, guideword and deviation investigation for each
node). From that, the causes and consequences related to each deviation are
investigated.
Upon the completion of this part of the process, one should use the PHA and
risk matrix method to convert causes into frequencies, severities into
consequences and, thus, determine a risk parameter to allow put risks in
order of relevance.

Risk Matrix in HAZOP
This modified HAZOP should be built around the information (columns) presented in table:
Where, P-Probability, S-Severity, IR-Initial Risk and RR-Residual Risk
This risk categorization promotes experience sharing among staff members and standardizes the
level of knowledge by generating useful information for subsequent analysis, especially for
quantitative assessments of risk. In addition, it generates a better understanding of the unit
functioning and awareness of the risk management importance since simple deviations can
generate operational consequences of great magnitude. Thus, it is possible to systematically
identify the ways in which the equipment constituting the industrial process may fail or be
improperly operated, which would lead to unwanted operating situations and categorize the risk
in order to prioritize the measures.
Node : Design Intention:
Date
P&ID NO:
Deviation Causes
Consequenc
e
Initial risk Existing
Provision/
Safeguard
Residual
Risk
Action/
Recommend
ation
P S IR P S RR

Risk Matrix
A risk matrix (Table) can be used to prioritize the action associated with each
potential accident. The size of the matrix and category definitions should be
defined to meet the needs of the organization.
TYPICAL RISK MATRIX
Severity
Probability/Frequency
Catastrophic Critical Marginal Negligible
Frequent High High Serious Medium
Probable High Serious Serious Medium
Remote Serious Serious Medium Low
Improbable Medium Medium Low Low

Risk Matrix
PROBABILITY/FREQUENCY:
An accident scenario is defined as the combination of the identified hazard, its causes and each of its
effects. According to this method, accident scenarios are categorized by its probability/frequency, which
provides a qualitative indication of the expected frequency of occurrence as defined in table.
Probability Levels
Description Aspects
Frequent Likely to occur often in the life of an item.(Six to twenty times per year OR 65%
to 90% chance of Occurrence)
Probable Will occur several times in the life of an item.(Two to five times per year OR
35% to 65% chance of occurrence)
Remote Unlikely, but possible to occur in the life of an item. Once per year OR 10% to
35% chance or occurrence
Improbable So Unlikely, it can be assumed occurrence may not be experienced in the life of
an item.(Less than once per year OR <10% chance of occurrence)

Risk Matrix
SEVERITY:
Accident scenarios are classified into categories of severity, which provide a qualitative
indication of the severity of the consequences of each of the scenarios identified. Table
presents a possible set of parameters for severity.
Severity Categories
Description Mishap Result Criteria
Human
Consequences
Environmental
Consequences
Property
Damage Cost
Facility status Legal
consequences
Catastrophic Deaths damage
outside the
boundary
Irreversible outside the
site (effects lasting's for
long period )
Compensation
costs above Rs
100000000
Facility stopped Legal /community
complications
Critical Reportable Serious
injury- irreversible
Reversible serious
damage inside &
outside of site
costs above Rs
100000000
Facility stopped
For a week /
month
Legal /community
complications
Marginal Minor injury first Damage within the
plant boundary
Compensation
costs above Rs
100000000
Facility running
with minor repair
Legal
complications but
within the site
Negligible Minor injury no
first aid required
No harm within the
plant boundary
No
compensation
required
Facility running
without repair
No Legal
complications

HAZOP Limitations
Whilst HAZOP studies have proved to be extremely useful in a variety of different industries. The technique has
limitations that should be taken into account when considering potential application.
HAZOP is a hazard identification technique which considers system parts individually and methodically examines the
effects of deviations on each part. Sometimes a serious hazard will involve the interaction between a numbers of
parts of the system. In these cases the hazard may need to be studied in more detail using techniques such as event
free and fault tree analyses.
As with any technique for the identification of hazards or operability problems, there cane no guarantee that all
hazards or operability problems will be identified in a HAZOP study. The study of a complex system should not,
therefore, depend entirely upon HAZOP It should be used in conjunction with other suitable techniques. It is
essential that other relevant studies are co-ordinated within an effective overall safety management system.
Many systems are highly inter-linked, and a deviation at one of them may have a cause elsewhere. Adequate local
mitigating action may not address the real cause and still result in a subsequent accident. Many accidents have
occurred because small local modifications had unforeseen knock-on effects elsewhere. Whilst this problem can be
overcome by carrying forward the implications of deviations from one part to another, in practice this is frequently
not done.
The success of a HAZOP study depends greatly on the ability and experience of the study leader and the knowledge,
experience and interaction between team members
HAZOP only considers parts that appear on the design representation Activities and operations which do not
appear on the representation are not considered

Advantages & Disadvantages
Advantages:
1. Helpful when confronting hazards that are difficult to quantify
• Hazards rooted in human performance and behaviours
• Hazards that are difficult to detect, analyse, isolate, count, predict, etc.
• Methodology doesn't force you to explicitly rate or measure deviation probability of
occurrence, severity of impact, or ability to detect
2. Built-in brainstorming methodology
3. Systematic & comprehensive methodology4. More simple and intuitive than other
commonly used risk management tools
Disadvantages:
1. No means to assess hazards involving interactions between different parts of a
system or process
2. No risk ranking or prioritization capability Teams may optionally build-in such
capability as required
3. No means to assess effectiveness of existing or proposed controls safeguards.
May need to interface HAZOP with other risk management tools (ex: HACCP) for this
purpose

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