Hardware security is vulnerability protection that comes in the form of a physical device rather than software that is installed on the hardware of a computer system.
Der Vortrag zeigt anhand von Beispielen für Angriffe auf eingebettete Systeme, wie sie in vernetzten Systemen heute schon praktiziert werden, wie wichtig Security hier ist.
Aus den Angriffen und einer Prognose über die Weiterentwicklung der System-funktionen werden Sicherheitsanforderungen für eingebettete Systeme der Zukunft abgeleitet. Daraus ergibt sich dann eine Sicherheitsarchitektur für die Systeme mit wichtigen Standardkomponenten als Vertrauensanker. Dazu zählen sogenannte Secure Elements, sichere Identitäten und separierende Betriebssysteme.
Hierzu werden aktuelle Forschungsarbeiten zum Einsatz von Secure Elements im Automobil, Smart Grid und mobilen Endgeräten vorgestellt. Es wird gezeigt, wie sichere Identitäten aus Materialeigenschaften mit Physical Unclonable Functions abgeleitet werden können und wie Betriebssysteme, die Secure Elements und Separierung nutzen, die Sicherheit erhöhen.
Kolloquiumsvortrag von Prof. Georg Sigl, Technische Universität München
Dienstag, 17.12.2013, 16:00 Uhr, Hörsaal 47.03 (Elektrotechnikgebäude, Pfaffenwaldring 47)
Informatik-Forum Stuttgart e.V.
Hardware security is vulnerability protection that comes in the form of a physical device rather than software that is installed on the hardware of a computer system.
Der Vortrag zeigt anhand von Beispielen für Angriffe auf eingebettete Systeme, wie sie in vernetzten Systemen heute schon praktiziert werden, wie wichtig Security hier ist.
Aus den Angriffen und einer Prognose über die Weiterentwicklung der System-funktionen werden Sicherheitsanforderungen für eingebettete Systeme der Zukunft abgeleitet. Daraus ergibt sich dann eine Sicherheitsarchitektur für die Systeme mit wichtigen Standardkomponenten als Vertrauensanker. Dazu zählen sogenannte Secure Elements, sichere Identitäten und separierende Betriebssysteme.
Hierzu werden aktuelle Forschungsarbeiten zum Einsatz von Secure Elements im Automobil, Smart Grid und mobilen Endgeräten vorgestellt. Es wird gezeigt, wie sichere Identitäten aus Materialeigenschaften mit Physical Unclonable Functions abgeleitet werden können und wie Betriebssysteme, die Secure Elements und Separierung nutzen, die Sicherheit erhöhen.
Kolloquiumsvortrag von Prof. Georg Sigl, Technische Universität München
Dienstag, 17.12.2013, 16:00 Uhr, Hörsaal 47.03 (Elektrotechnikgebäude, Pfaffenwaldring 47)
Informatik-Forum Stuttgart e.V.
Next Generation Network: Security and Architectureijsrd.com
Wireless sensor networks will be widely deployed in the near future. While much research has focused on making these networks feasible and useful, security has received little attention. Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) are a most challenging and emerging technology for the Research due to their vital scope in the field coupled with their low processing power and associated low energy. As wireless sensor networks continue to grow, so does the need for effective security mechanisms. Because sensor networks may interact with sensitive data and/or operate in hostile unattended environments, it is imperative that these security concerns be addressed from the beginning of the system design staring with a brief overview of the sensor networks security, a review is made of and how to provide the security in the wireless sensor networks. This paper studies the security problems, Requirement, Architecture of WSN and different platform, characterized by severely constrained computational and energy resources, and an ad hoc operational environment.
security is something we don't like but we cant do without it, as embedded systems growing news vulnerabilities are shown, here is some powerful steps to secure an embedded system.
IoT Cyber+Physical+Social Engineering Attack Security (v0.1.6 / sep2020)mike parks
Work-in-Progress!
IoT Cyber+Physical+Social Security
An encyclopedic compendium of tools, techniques, and practices to defend systems that sit at the intersection of the cyber and physical domains; chiefly building automation systems and the Internet of Things.
Basic Security Concepts of Computer, this presentation will cover the following topics
BASIC SECURITY CONCEPT OF COMPUTER.
THREATS.
THREATS TO COMPUTER HARDWARE.
THREATS TO COMPUTER USER.
THREATS TO COMPUTER DATA.
VULNERABILITY AND COUNTERMEASURE.
SOFTWARE SECURITY.
Preventing Stealthy Threats with Next Generation Endpoint SecurityIntel IT Center
Step up security management and prevent stealthy threats with integrated solutions from Intel and McAfee that work beyond the operating system to stop attacks in real time while helping you manage endpoint security.
Network Architecture review in context of Information security helps to understand how to actually review the components of network with respect to best practices.
Security-by-Design and -Default 2023- Mehdi Mirakhorli Keynote: The 3rd International Workshop on Designing and Measuring Security in Software Architectures
Next Generation Network: Security and Architectureijsrd.com
Wireless sensor networks will be widely deployed in the near future. While much research has focused on making these networks feasible and useful, security has received little attention. Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) are a most challenging and emerging technology for the Research due to their vital scope in the field coupled with their low processing power and associated low energy. As wireless sensor networks continue to grow, so does the need for effective security mechanisms. Because sensor networks may interact with sensitive data and/or operate in hostile unattended environments, it is imperative that these security concerns be addressed from the beginning of the system design staring with a brief overview of the sensor networks security, a review is made of and how to provide the security in the wireless sensor networks. This paper studies the security problems, Requirement, Architecture of WSN and different platform, characterized by severely constrained computational and energy resources, and an ad hoc operational environment.
security is something we don't like but we cant do without it, as embedded systems growing news vulnerabilities are shown, here is some powerful steps to secure an embedded system.
IoT Cyber+Physical+Social Engineering Attack Security (v0.1.6 / sep2020)mike parks
Work-in-Progress!
IoT Cyber+Physical+Social Security
An encyclopedic compendium of tools, techniques, and practices to defend systems that sit at the intersection of the cyber and physical domains; chiefly building automation systems and the Internet of Things.
Basic Security Concepts of Computer, this presentation will cover the following topics
BASIC SECURITY CONCEPT OF COMPUTER.
THREATS.
THREATS TO COMPUTER HARDWARE.
THREATS TO COMPUTER USER.
THREATS TO COMPUTER DATA.
VULNERABILITY AND COUNTERMEASURE.
SOFTWARE SECURITY.
Preventing Stealthy Threats with Next Generation Endpoint SecurityIntel IT Center
Step up security management and prevent stealthy threats with integrated solutions from Intel and McAfee that work beyond the operating system to stop attacks in real time while helping you manage endpoint security.
Network Architecture review in context of Information security helps to understand how to actually review the components of network with respect to best practices.
Security-by-Design and -Default 2023- Mehdi Mirakhorli Keynote: The 3rd International Workshop on Designing and Measuring Security in Software Architectures
Would you Rather Have Telemetry into 2 Attacks or 20? An Insight Into Highly ...MITRE ATT&CK
From ATT&CKcon 3.0
By Jonny Johnson, Red Canary and Olaf Hartong, FalconForce
As defenders, we often find ourselves wanting "more" data. But why? Will this new data provide a lot of value or is it for a very niche circumstance? How many attacks does it apply to? Are we leveraging previous data sources to their full capability? Within this talk, Olaf and Jonny will walk through different data sources they leverage more than most when analyzing data within environments, why they do, and what these data sources do and can provide in terms of value to a defender.
hashdays 2011: Felix 'FX' Lindner - Targeted Industrial Control System Attack...Area41
The talk will show you the techical details of Stuxnet in their full glory and make you appreciate this work of engineering more. Based on a code-level analysis of the Stuxnet PLC payload, the presentation will explain techniques therein that can be used for industrial espionage and sabotage by copycat attackers against competitor's production facilities. Currently recommended defenses, their shortcomings and alternative approaches will also be discussed.
Bio: Felix 'FX' Lindner is founder and technical lead of the Recurity Labs GmbH consulting and research team. He is also the leader of the Phenoelit group and loves to hack pretty much everything with a CPU and some communication, preferably networked. He looks back at 15+ years of (legal) hacking with only a couple Cisco IOS and SAP remote exploits, tools for hacking HP printers and protocol attacks lining the road.
How to write clean & testable code without losing your mindAndreas Czakaj
If you create software that is to be developed continuously over several years you'll need a sustainable approach to code quality.
In our early days of AEM development, however, we used to struggle with code that is rigid, hard to test and full of LOG.debug calls.
In this talk I will share some development best practices we have found that really work in actual AEM based software, e.g. to achieve 100% code coverage and provide high confidence in the code base.
Spoiler alert: no new libraries, frameworks or tools are required - once you know the ideas, plain old TDD and the S.O.L.I.D. principles of Clean Code will do the trick.
by Andreas Czakaj, mensemedia Gesellschaft für Neue Medien mbH
Presented at the adaptTo() 2017 conference in Berlin (https://adapt.to/2017/en/schedule/how-to-write-clean---testable-code-without-losing-your-mind.html).
Presentation video can be found on YouTube (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JbJw5oN_zL4)
Solve the colocation conundrum: Performance and density at scale with KubernetesNiklas Quarfot Nielsen
As we move from monolithic applications to microservices, the ability to colocate workloads offers a tremendous opportunity to realize greater development velocity, robustness, and resource utilization. But workload colocation can also introduce performance variability and affect service levels. Google describes the problem as the “tail at scale”—the amplification of negative results observed at the tail of the latency curve when many systems are involved.
With its latest tooling capabilities, Intel has an experiments framework to calculate the trade-offs between low latency and higher density. Niklas Nielsen discusses the challenges and complexities of workload colocation, why solving these challenges matters to your business no matter the size, and how Intel intends to help smarter resource allocations with its latest tooling capabilities and Kubernetes.
Pass your PCDRA Palo Alto Networks Certified Detection and Remediation Analyst Exam Questions today by Exactcert. Exactcert is one of the growing brands in the industry to clear any exam on the first attempt. If you have a short time to prepare for the exam I suggest you visit exactcert and get your Palo Alto Certifications 100% real exam questions today.
https://www.exactcert.com/pcdra-exam-questions.html
The globalization of the electronics supply chain allows for the reduction of chip manufacturing costs but poses new security threats. Untrusted foundries can steal the intellectual property in the chips, while malicious users can tamper with the systems to steal sensitive information. The design of next-generation systems requires to change the design methods, introducing security concepts since the early stages.
In this talk, I will present an overview of the security issues in the design of accelerator-rich architecture, focusing on the protection of the data and the intellectual property. I will also discuss high-level methods to address these concerns, along with metrics for their evaluations. These solutions include the design and prototyping of architectures with secure communications, the high-level synthesis of security countermeasures, and the logic locking of RTL designs.
CLÍNICA DE RESPUESTAS A INCIDENTES Y THREAT HUNTING - WORKSHOP DAY TÉCNICO DE...Cristian Garcia G.
Conozca más a
fondo la estrategia, soluciones y
mejores prácticas para la
identificación, contención y cacería
de amenazas, para que usted pueda
incorporar estos procesos en su flujo
de trabajo diario logrando estar más
protegidos de los ciberataques más
sofisticados.
overview of NICTA's Trustworthy Systems research. Formal verification of the seL4 microkernel, what it means, how to use it to build trustworthy systems. Cost of verified systems
Similar to Hardware, and Trust Security: Explain it like I’m 5! (20)
Observability Concepts EVERY Developer Should Know -- DeveloperWeek Europe.pdfPaige Cruz
Monitoring and observability aren’t traditionally found in software curriculums and many of us cobble this knowledge together from whatever vendor or ecosystem we were first introduced to and whatever is a part of your current company’s observability stack.
While the dev and ops silo continues to crumble….many organizations still relegate monitoring & observability as the purview of ops, infra and SRE teams. This is a mistake - achieving a highly observable system requires collaboration up and down the stack.
I, a former op, would like to extend an invitation to all application developers to join the observability party will share these foundational concepts to build on:
Epistemic Interaction - tuning interfaces to provide information for AI supportAlan Dix
Paper presented at SYNERGY workshop at AVI 2024, Genoa, Italy. 3rd June 2024
https://alandix.com/academic/papers/synergy2024-epistemic/
As machine learning integrates deeper into human-computer interactions, the concept of epistemic interaction emerges, aiming to refine these interactions to enhance system adaptability. This approach encourages minor, intentional adjustments in user behaviour to enrich the data available for system learning. This paper introduces epistemic interaction within the context of human-system communication, illustrating how deliberate interaction design can improve system understanding and adaptation. Through concrete examples, we demonstrate the potential of epistemic interaction to significantly advance human-computer interaction by leveraging intuitive human communication strategies to inform system design and functionality, offering a novel pathway for enriching user-system engagements.
In the rapidly evolving landscape of technologies, XML continues to play a vital role in structuring, storing, and transporting data across diverse systems. The recent advancements in artificial intelligence (AI) present new methodologies for enhancing XML development workflows, introducing efficiency, automation, and intelligent capabilities. This presentation will outline the scope and perspective of utilizing AI in XML development. The potential benefits and the possible pitfalls will be highlighted, providing a balanced view of the subject.
We will explore the capabilities of AI in understanding XML markup languages and autonomously creating structured XML content. Additionally, we will examine the capacity of AI to enrich plain text with appropriate XML markup. Practical examples and methodological guidelines will be provided to elucidate how AI can be effectively prompted to interpret and generate accurate XML markup.
Further emphasis will be placed on the role of AI in developing XSLT, or schemas such as XSD and Schematron. We will address the techniques and strategies adopted to create prompts for generating code, explaining code, or refactoring the code, and the results achieved.
The discussion will extend to how AI can be used to transform XML content. In particular, the focus will be on the use of AI XPath extension functions in XSLT, Schematron, Schematron Quick Fixes, or for XML content refactoring.
The presentation aims to deliver a comprehensive overview of AI usage in XML development, providing attendees with the necessary knowledge to make informed decisions. Whether you’re at the early stages of adopting AI or considering integrating it in advanced XML development, this presentation will cover all levels of expertise.
By highlighting the potential advantages and challenges of integrating AI with XML development tools and languages, the presentation seeks to inspire thoughtful conversation around the future of XML development. We’ll not only delve into the technical aspects of AI-powered XML development but also discuss practical implications and possible future directions.
Communications Mining Series - Zero to Hero - Session 1DianaGray10
This session provides introduction to UiPath Communication Mining, importance and platform overview. You will acquire a good understand of the phases in Communication Mining as we go over the platform with you. Topics covered:
• Communication Mining Overview
• Why is it important?
• How can it help today’s business and the benefits
• Phases in Communication Mining
• Demo on Platform overview
• Q/A
GraphRAG is All You need? LLM & Knowledge GraphGuy Korland
Guy Korland, CEO and Co-founder of FalkorDB, will review two articles on the integration of language models with knowledge graphs.
1. Unifying Large Language Models and Knowledge Graphs: A Roadmap.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2306.08302
2. Microsoft Research's GraphRAG paper and a review paper on various uses of knowledge graphs:
https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/blog/graphrag-unlocking-llm-discovery-on-narrative-private-data/
Alt. GDG Cloud Southlake #33: Boule & Rebala: Effective AppSec in SDLC using ...James Anderson
Effective Application Security in Software Delivery lifecycle using Deployment Firewall and DBOM
The modern software delivery process (or the CI/CD process) includes many tools, distributed teams, open-source code, and cloud platforms. Constant focus on speed to release software to market, along with the traditional slow and manual security checks has caused gaps in continuous security as an important piece in the software supply chain. Today organizations feel more susceptible to external and internal cyber threats due to the vast attack surface in their applications supply chain and the lack of end-to-end governance and risk management.
The software team must secure its software delivery process to avoid vulnerability and security breaches. This needs to be achieved with existing tool chains and without extensive rework of the delivery processes. This talk will present strategies and techniques for providing visibility into the true risk of the existing vulnerabilities, preventing the introduction of security issues in the software, resolving vulnerabilities in production environments quickly, and capturing the deployment bill of materials (DBOM).
Speakers:
Bob Boule
Robert Boule is a technology enthusiast with PASSION for technology and making things work along with a knack for helping others understand how things work. He comes with around 20 years of solution engineering experience in application security, software continuous delivery, and SaaS platforms. He is known for his dynamic presentations in CI/CD and application security integrated in software delivery lifecycle.
Gopinath Rebala
Gopinath Rebala is the CTO of OpsMx, where he has overall responsibility for the machine learning and data processing architectures for Secure Software Delivery. Gopi also has a strong connection with our customers, leading design and architecture for strategic implementations. Gopi is a frequent speaker and well-known leader in continuous delivery and integrating security into software delivery.
zkStudyClub - Reef: Fast Succinct Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Regex ProofsAlex Pruden
This paper presents Reef, a system for generating publicly verifiable succinct non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs that a committed document matches or does not match a regular expression. We describe applications such as proving the strength of passwords, the provenance of email despite redactions, the validity of oblivious DNS queries, and the existence of mutations in DNA. Reef supports the Perl Compatible Regular Expression syntax, including wildcards, alternation, ranges, capture groups, Kleene star, negations, and lookarounds. Reef introduces a new type of automata, Skipping Alternating Finite Automata (SAFA), that skips irrelevant parts of a document when producing proofs without undermining soundness, and instantiates SAFA with a lookup argument. Our experimental evaluation confirms that Reef can generate proofs for documents with 32M characters; the proofs are small and cheap to verify (under a second).
Paper: https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1886
UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 6DianaGray10
Welcome to UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series part 6. In this session, we will cover Test Automation with generative AI and Open AI.
UiPath Test Automation with generative AI and Open AI webinar offers an in-depth exploration of leveraging cutting-edge technologies for test automation within the UiPath platform. Attendees will delve into the integration of generative AI, a test automation solution, with Open AI advanced natural language processing capabilities.
Throughout the session, participants will discover how this synergy empowers testers to automate repetitive tasks, enhance testing accuracy, and expedite the software testing life cycle. Topics covered include the seamless integration process, practical use cases, and the benefits of harnessing AI-driven automation for UiPath testing initiatives. By attending this webinar, testers, and automation professionals can gain valuable insights into harnessing the power of AI to optimize their test automation workflows within the UiPath ecosystem, ultimately driving efficiency and quality in software development processes.
What will you get from this session?
1. Insights into integrating generative AI.
2. Understanding how this integration enhances test automation within the UiPath platform
3. Practical demonstrations
4. Exploration of real-world use cases illustrating the benefits of AI-driven test automation for UiPath
Topics covered:
What is generative AI
Test Automation with generative AI and Open AI.
UiPath integration with generative AI
Speaker:
Deepak Rai, Automation Practice Lead, Boundaryless Group and UiPath MVP
A tale of scale & speed: How the US Navy is enabling software delivery from l...sonjaschweigert1
Rapid and secure feature delivery is a goal across every application team and every branch of the DoD. The Navy’s DevSecOps platform, Party Barge, has achieved:
- Reduction in onboarding time from 5 weeks to 1 day
- Improved developer experience and productivity through actionable findings and reduction of false positives
- Maintenance of superior security standards and inherent policy enforcement with Authorization to Operate (ATO)
Development teams can ship efficiently and ensure applications are cyber ready for Navy Authorizing Officials (AOs). In this webinar, Sigma Defense and Anchore will give attendees a look behind the scenes and demo secure pipeline automation and security artifacts that speed up application ATO and time to production.
We will cover:
- How to remove silos in DevSecOps
- How to build efficient development pipeline roles and component templates
- How to deliver security artifacts that matter for ATO’s (SBOMs, vulnerability reports, and policy evidence)
- How to streamline operations with automated policy checks on container images
LF Energy Webinar: Electrical Grid Modelling and Simulation Through PowSyBl -...DanBrown980551
Do you want to learn how to model and simulate an electrical network from scratch in under an hour?
Then welcome to this PowSyBl workshop, hosted by Rte, the French Transmission System Operator (TSO)!
During the webinar, you will discover the PowSyBl ecosystem as well as handle and study an electrical network through an interactive Python notebook.
PowSyBl is an open source project hosted by LF Energy, which offers a comprehensive set of features for electrical grid modelling and simulation. Among other advanced features, PowSyBl provides:
- A fully editable and extendable library for grid component modelling;
- Visualization tools to display your network;
- Grid simulation tools, such as power flows, security analyses (with or without remedial actions) and sensitivity analyses;
The framework is mostly written in Java, with a Python binding so that Python developers can access PowSyBl functionalities as well.
What you will learn during the webinar:
- For beginners: discover PowSyBl's functionalities through a quick general presentation and the notebook, without needing any expert coding skills;
- For advanced developers: master the skills to efficiently apply PowSyBl functionalities to your real-world scenarios.
How to Get CNIC Information System with Paksim Ga.pptxdanishmna97
Pakdata Cf is a groundbreaking system designed to streamline and facilitate access to CNIC information. This innovative platform leverages advanced technology to provide users with efficient and secure access to their CNIC details.
Goodbye Windows 11: Make Way for Nitrux Linux 3.5.0!SOFTTECHHUB
As the digital landscape continually evolves, operating systems play a critical role in shaping user experiences and productivity. The launch of Nitrux Linux 3.5.0 marks a significant milestone, offering a robust alternative to traditional systems such as Windows 11. This article delves into the essence of Nitrux Linux 3.5.0, exploring its unique features, advantages, and how it stands as a compelling choice for both casual users and tech enthusiasts.
Generative AI Deep Dive: Advancing from Proof of Concept to ProductionAggregage
Join Maher Hanafi, VP of Engineering at Betterworks, in this new session where he'll share a practical framework to transform Gen AI prototypes into impactful products! He'll delve into the complexities of data collection and management, model selection and optimization, and ensuring security, scalability, and responsible use.
Why You Should Replace Windows 11 with Nitrux Linux 3.5.0 for enhanced perfor...SOFTTECHHUB
The choice of an operating system plays a pivotal role in shaping our computing experience. For decades, Microsoft's Windows has dominated the market, offering a familiar and widely adopted platform for personal and professional use. However, as technological advancements continue to push the boundaries of innovation, alternative operating systems have emerged, challenging the status quo and offering users a fresh perspective on computing.
One such alternative that has garnered significant attention and acclaim is Nitrux Linux 3.5.0, a sleek, powerful, and user-friendly Linux distribution that promises to redefine the way we interact with our devices. With its focus on performance, security, and customization, Nitrux Linux presents a compelling case for those seeking to break free from the constraints of proprietary software and embrace the freedom and flexibility of open-source computing.
Threats to mobile devices are more prevalent and increasing in scope and complexity. Users of mobile devices desire to take full advantage of the features
available on those devices, but many of the features provide convenience and capability but sacrifice security. This best practices guide outlines steps the users can take to better protect personal devices and information.
National Security Agency - NSA mobile device best practices
Hardware, and Trust Security: Explain it like I’m 5!
1. Hardware, and Trust Security:
Explain it like I’m 5!
Teddy Reed
teddy.reed@gmail.com
…or maybe 15, 27, 55??
Nicholas Anderson
nanderson7@gmail.com
2. DEFCON 0x17=23 Hardware and Trust Security
Objectives
2
To simplify some otherwise complex
explanations of hardware security
Provide an overview of obscure protocols, technologies, features
Satisfy our burning desire for lego & Pokémon references
Highlight previously controversial uses of hardware security
1.
2.
4.
Inspire hardware security and trust enthusiasm3.
3. DEFCON 0x17=23 Hardware and Trust Security
Outline
3
Designer and administrator goals
Failures, uses, and use cases
Hardware security building blocks
1.
2.
4.
Components; technologies, protocols, features3.
4. DEFCON 0x17=23 Hardware and Trust Security
Outline
4
Designer and administrator goals
Failures, uses, and use cases
Hardware security building blocks
1.
2.
4.
Components; technologies, protocols, features3.
5. DEFCON 0x17=23 Hardware and Trust Security
Outline
5
Designer and administrator goals1.
We want to protect processes and code
the same way we protect machines on a network
Authentication, confidentiality, trust relationships
Isolate, reduce attack surface, audit
Use:
to protect:
9. DEFCON 0x17=23 Hardware and Trust Security9
privileged
0
3
unprivileged
user
root
most
privileged
-1
10. DEFCON 0x17=23 Hardware and Trust Security10
privileged
0
3
unprivileged
user
root
most
privileged
-1
11. DEFCON 0x17=23 Hardware and Trust Security11
Crossing a protection domain
defined by the architecture, not the operating system
this is NOT checking capabilities, comparing integers or
consulting a bitmask mode of permissions
API defined by instruction set architecture
operating system implements both domains
some instructions [rdmsr] limited to privileged
1.
2.
4.
concept should apply to all forms of memory*3.
*virtual address translation logic within MMU
12. DEFCON 0x17=23 Hardware and Trust Security12
Crossing a protection domain
defined by the architecture, not the operating system
kernel user
there are LOTs of ways to cross
‘most’ cause a context switch
rippling effects on performance of the process
and the system in general!
0 3
13. DEFCON 0x17=23 Hardware and Trust Security13
static inline long long unsigned time_ns(struct timespec* const ts) {
if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, ts)) {
exit(1);
}
return ((long long unsigned) ts->tv_sec) * 1000000000LLU
+ (long long unsigned) ts->tv_nsec;
}
int main(void) {
const int iterations = 10000000;
struct timespec ts;
const long long unsigned start_ns = time_ns(&ts);
for (int i = 0; i < iterations; i++) {
if (syscall(SYS_gettid) <= 1) {
exit(2);
}
}
const long long unsigned delta = time_ns(&ts) - start_ns;
return 0;
} by Benoit Sigoure
@github.com/tsuna/contextswitch
Measure context switch impact
14. DEFCON 0x17=23 Hardware and Trust Security14
static inline long long unsigned time_ns(struct timespec* const ts) {
if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, ts)) {
exit(1);
}
return ((long long unsigned) ts->tv_sec) * 1000000000LLU
+ (long long unsigned) ts->tv_nsec;
}
int main(void) {
const int iterations = 10000000;
struct timespec ts;
const long long unsigned start_ns = time_ns(&ts);
for (int i = 0; i < iterations; i++) {
if (syscall(SYS_gettid) <= 1) {
exit(2);
}
}
const long long unsigned delta = time_ns(&ts) - start_ns;
return 0;
} by Benoit Sigoure
@github.com/tsuna/contextswitch
Measure context switch impact
Various cache invalidations, and look-
aside buffer trampling, scheduling on
different hardware threads (affinity)
17. DEFCON 0x17=23 Hardware and Trust Security17
Crossing a ‘protection’ domain
process net
TCP/443
your PC LAN
You defined a protocol to handle/serve requests
that separates two trust domains
API defined by protocol and RFC*
operating system implements both domains
lots of capability limited to service*
1.
2.
4.
concept should apply to all forms of memory3.
18. DEFCON 0x17=23 Hardware and Trust Security18
Hardware and trust security
The operating system (software) provides primitives
that help us build and secure network services
…hardware provides primitives to build and secure
operating systems and software
Begins at primitives, then forms features and technology
often encapsulated into a security-focused capability
19. DEFCON 0x17=23 Hardware and Trust Security19
Hardware and trust stack
primitives
features and specifications
technologies
capability
20. DEFCON 0x17=23 Hardware and Trust Security20
Hardware and trust stack
primitives
features and specifications
technologies
capability
21. DEFCON 0x17=23 Hardware and Trust Security21
Hardware and trust stack
primitives
features and specifications
technologies
capability
22. DEFCON 0x17=23 Hardware and Trust Security22
primitives
features and specifications
technologies
capability
23. DEFCON 0x17=23 Hardware and Trust Security23
primitives
features and specifications
technologies
capability or implementation
24. DEFCON 0x17=23 Hardware and Trust Security
Outline
24
Designer and administrator goals
Failures, uses, and use cases
Hardware security building blocks
1.
2.
4.
Components; technologies, protocols, features3.
25. DEFCON 0x17=23 Hardware and Trust Security
Outline
25
Hardware security building blocks2.
Consider building the perfect Pokémon team
…pretty much always on our minds
26. DEFCON 0x17=23 Hardware and Trust Security26
Psychic:
Poison, Fighting
Water/Ice Hybrid:
Fire, Grass, Dragon, Rock, Ground, Flying
Grass, Electric
Electric:
Water, Flying vs. Ground, Grass
Dragon:
Dragon vs. Ice
Fire:
Grass, Bug, Ice
Rock, Ground, Water
Normal, or Fighting:
Creativity
The line up is well understood
based on a series of attributes
each lineup attribute is a primitive
27. DEFCON 0x17=23 Hardware and Trust Security27
Psychic:
Poison, Fighting
Water/Ice Hybrid:
Fire, Grass, Dragon, Rock, Ground, Flying
Grass, Electric
Electric:
Water, Flying vs. Ground, Grass
Dragon:
Dragon vs. Ice
Fire:
Grass, Bug, Ice
Rock, Ground, Water
Normal, or Fighting:
Creativity
28. DEFCON 0x17=23 Hardware and Trust Security28
Pro tip: Information security
Like balancing your Pokémon team
eventually you’ll get beat by a 12 y/o
suck it up and always hold grudges
29. DEFCON 0x17=23 Hardware and Trust Security
Reminder
29
Designer and administrator goals
Failures, uses, and use cases
Hardware security building blocks
1.
2.
4.
Components; technologies, protocols, features3.
35. DEFCON 0x17=23 Hardware and Trust Security
Building blocks
35
dedicated storage
DRAM
0x0
0x7FFFFFFFFFFF…
NVRAM
0x0
0x800000
*Memory sizes not to scale
36. DEFCON 0x17=23 Hardware and Trust Security
Building blocks
36
dedicated storage
DRAM
0x0
0x7FFFFFFFFFFF…
NVRAM
0x0
0x800000
*Memory sizes not to scale
open, inw, outw
byte transfer over bus
(1)
(2)
(3)
37. DEFCON 0x17=23 Hardware and Trust Security
Building blocks
37
dedicated storage
means plus
providing a policy enforcement point
or limiting transformation
38. DEFCON 0x17=23 Hardware and Trust Security
Building blocks
38
dedicated storage
providing a policy enforcement point
or limiting transformation
plus equals
39. DEFCON 0x17=23 Hardware and Trust Security
Building blocks
39
dedicated storage
providing a policy enforcement point
or limiting transformation
plus equals
40. DEFCON 0x17=23 Hardware and Trust Security
Building blocks
40
dedicated storage
providing a policy enforcement point
or limiting transformation
plus
MISTY CANT
USE ASH’S
POKEMON
equals
41. DEFCON 0x17=23 Hardware and Trust Security
Building blocks
41
dedicated storage
providing a policy enforcement point
or limiting transformation
magic
42. DEFCON 0x17=23 Hardware and Trust Security
Building blocks
42
algorithm implementations
read/write
43. DEFCON 0x17=23 Hardware and Trust Security
Building blocks
43
algorithm implementations
sign, encrypt/decrypt
44. DEFCON 0x17=23 Hardware and Trust Security
Building blocks
44
algorithm implementations
sign, encrypt/decrypt
provide algorithm in as
hardware fast path
caller provides all data
including keying materials
61. DEFCON 0x17=23 Hardware and Trust Security
Secure Boot
61
Secure Boot: Enabled
Misty runs
Linux & used
MOKutil!
62. DEFCON 0x17=23 Hardware and Trust Security
Boot “trust”
62
Secure Boot: Verify that the firmware has been digitally signed
…or the user has manually approved the boot loaders digital signature
Trusted Boot: Verify the digital signature of the Windows 8.1 Kernel
…including boot drivers, startup files and ELAM
Measured Boot: Check measurements against TPM
63. DEFCON 0x17=23 Hardware and Trust Security63
fetch code and size
compute hash and extend:
H(V1) || H(V0)
apply signature check using
certificate store and blacklist
allow signing of extended hashes
make decision
Boot “trust”
64. DEFCON 0x17=23 Hardware and Trust Security64
…the leg firmware is connected to the… ______ firmware
…the ______ firmware is connected to the… boot-loader
Boot “trust”
65. DEFCON 0x17=23 Hardware and Trust Security
Reminder
65
Designer and administrator goals
Failures, uses, and use cases
Hardware security building blocks
1.
2.
4.
Components; technologies, protocols, features3.
66. DEFCON 0x17=23 Hardware and Trust Security
TrustZone
66
Highly configurable hardware and software specifications for SoC on ARM
ARM Cortex-A57
ARM Cortex-A53
ARM Cortex-A17
ARM Cortex-A15
ARM Cortex-A9
ARM Cortex-A8
ARM Cortex-A7
ARM Cortex-A5
ARM1176
Hardware layer Software layer
67. DEFCON 0x17=23 Hardware and Trust Security
TrustZone
67
A privilege domain providing an execution environment (TEE)
Applications (TA) run in a secure world protected by
memory controllers and interrupts
dedicated storage
algorithm implementations
tamper resilience
extendable trust
isolated execution
monitoring & auditingstate maintenance
dedicated I/O
69. DEFCON 0x17=23 Hardware and Trust Security69
Isolated Execution
TrustZone
Guarantee Confidentiality and Integrity;
while also providing standard execution functionality
75. DEFCON 0x17=23 Hardware and Trust Security
TrustZone & SecureCore
75
privileged
0
Qualcomm’s SecureMSM
Implements custom Secure Boot
and TrustZone application API
76. DEFCON 0x17=23 Hardware and Trust Security
TXT, IOMMU
76
privileged
0
Isolate devices on MMU
Measure specific executions
then isolate by CPU & memory
Oracle for attestation
78. DEFCON 0x17=23 Hardware and Trust Security78
Hardware & Trust enabled auditing
privileged
exec
OS X kauth sysent[exec]()
Good idea? (y/n)
Audit
event
Log
sent
79. DEFCON 0x17=23 Hardware and Trust Security79
Hardware & Trust enabled auditing
privileged
exec
OS X kauth sysent[exec]()
Good idea? (y/n)
Audit event
to OOB
Log
sent
80. DEFCON 0x17=23 Hardware and Trust Security80
Hardware & Trust enabled auditing
Audit event
to OOB
Log
sent
API defined by hardware features
no software trapping required (fast)
privileged mode not needed, but helpful
1.
2.
4.
signing, buffering, compression supported3.